THE CRISIS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA IN 1968.
Abstract
The Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia confirmed that the era of Moscow's command and control in Eastern Europe had been superseded by a period of political maneuvering, bargaining, and conflict mediation. In trying to arrive at a bloc solution to the crisis, the Soviet Union had to work with allies who viewed the situation from very different perspectives. Rumania was irreconcilably opposed to any intervention, while Hungary was, on the whole, favorably disposed toward Czechoslovakia's liberalization. East Germany and, to a lesser extent, Poland urged drastic action against Czechoslovakia's revisionism, which was threatening their domestic stability and the solidarity of the bloc. Only Bulgaria apparently followed the Soviet lead unquestioningly. Before resorting to military force, the Soviet Union had exhausted every lesser means of persuading the Dubcek leadership to reverse its political course. The timing of the invasion, prior to two scheduled party congresses, leads to the conclusion that the Kremlin meant to forestall the legitimization of Dubcek's reforms which would have spelled the political demise of prominent hardliners still in ruling positions. By intervening militarily before these congresses could endorse the new program, the Kremlin could justify its actions (at least to the world Communist movement) by claiming to aid the 'true Communists' in their struggle against counterrevolutionary elements. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1969
- Accession Number
- AD0708020
Entities
People
- Wolfgang Klaiber
Organizations
- Institute for Defense Analyses