QUEUEING THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTORS' SEQUENTIAL BIDDING PROBLEMS. I,

Abstract

One considers here the bidding problem of a contractor with a fixed amount of resources producing products under time incentive contracts. A time incentive or schedule incentive contract is a function T(xi), xi epsilon (0, infinity), which specifies that a contractor will receive a payment T(xi) if he completes the product xi time units after he was awarded the contract. The contractor simultaneously services a number of such contracts, so that whenever a new RFP arrives, the contractor will have his fixed resources spread among a number of contracts in various stages of completion. (Author)

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 01, 1970
Accession Number
AD0710271

Entities

People

  • Leonard H. Zacks

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Contractors
  • Contracts
  • Incentive Contracts
  • Motivation

Readers

  • Government Contracting/Procurement.
  • Mathematical Modeling and Probability Theory.
  • Systems Analysis and Design