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SUMMARY

This report summarizes the recent joint research activities of thirteen experimental social psychologists from U.S. and European universities, who are informally organized to plan and conduct studies on conflict between individuals and groups.

Final completion and acceptance for publication of the report of the study of interpersonal negotiation, conducted at eight laboratories, is noted.

A further report has been prepared on investigations of the roots of ingroup-outgroup conflict. Aimed at clarifying the role played in intergroup behavior by processes of social categorization, this research shows that even though the usual cues of ingroup membership and of interactions with an outgroup are missing, subjects still act in terms of their ingroup membership and in terms of an intergroup categorization. Their actions tend strongly to favor the members of their ingroup as against the members of the outgroup despite the fact that an alternative, acting in terms of the greatest common good, is clearly available to them at relatively small cost to the members of the ingroup. These results are interpreted in terms of individuals classifying the situation as one to which the social norm of ingroup-outgroup behavior is pertinent, in which social categorization ought to lead to discriminatory intergroup behavior.

Research on the effect of within group relations upon intergroup relations has been recently directed toward the problem of persuasive arguments addressed to a mistreated minority group in order to maintain their loyalty. Preliminary conclusions are presented with regard to what types of persuasive arguments the majority communicators will expect to be most effective and, in contrast, the types of persuasive arguments the minority group will expect to be most influenced by. Further evidence is also presented on the effects of heterogeneity vs. homogeneity of opinions within a group upon its attitudes toward and relationships with an outgroup.

Finally, a survey is described as being designed to test hypotheses about differences between cooperative and competitive people in their conceptions of interdependency situations and their expectations about others' decisions in choice-dilemma situations.

1. Research on information acquisition under conflict.

The members who have worked on this topic are Flament, Kelley, Lanzetta, Nuttin and Tajfel. No further progress on this research is to be reported for the present period.

2. "International" bargaining experiment.

A somewhat abbreviated final report on this study (56 pages with two tables and six figures) has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. The paper, entitled "A comparative experimental study of negotiation behavior", will be published before the end of the year. The abstract of this paper and some of the implications of the research have been reported in prior technical reports, particularly technical report #5.

3. The basis of ingroup-outgroup conflict.

Research has been conducted on this problem by Tajfel, Deutsch and Flament. The work was initiated with funds from the present grant. It has been continued with support from the James Marshall Fund. A recent paper, entitled "Social categorization and intergroup behavior", has been prepared by Tajfel, Flament, Billig, and Bundy.

As described in their paper, the experimental procedures employed to study ingroup-outgroup differentiation have been designed to fulfill the following criteria:

1. There should be no face-to-face interaction whatever between the Ss, either in the ingroup or in the outgroup or between the groups.
2. Complete anonymity of group membership should be preserved.
3. There should be no instrumental or rational link between the criteria for intergroup categorization and the nature of ingroup and outgroup responses requested from the subjects.
4. The responses should not represent any utilitarian value to the subject making them.
5. A strategy of responding in terms of intergroup differentiation (i.e., favoring the ingroup and detrimental to the outgroup) should be in competition with a strategy based on other more "rational" and "utilitarian" principles, such as obtaining maximum benefit for all. A further step in this direction would be to oppose a strategy of maximum material benefit to the ingroup to one in which the group gains less than it could, but more than the outgroup.
6. Last but not least, the responses should be made as important as possible to the Ss. They should consist of real decisions about the distribution of concrete rewards (and/or penalties) to others rather than of some form of evaluation of others.

The main findings, confirmed in all three experiments designed to these specifications, is clear. In a situation devoid of the usual trappings of ingroup membership and of all the vagaries of interacting with an outgroup, the Ss still act in terms of their ingroup membership and of an intergroup categorization. Their actions are unambiguously directed toward favoring the members of their ingroup as against the members of the outgroup. This happens despite the fact that an alternative strategy - acting in terms of the greatest common good - is clearly open to them at a relatively small cost of advantages that would accrue to members of the ingroup. Two further aspects of the findings are even more important. First, the Ss act in this way in a situation in which their own individual benefit is not affected one way or another. And second, when the Ss have a choice between acting in terms of maximum utilitarian advantages to all combined with maximum utilitarian advantage to members of their own group as against having their group win or points at the sacrifice of both these advantages, it is the winning that seems more important to them. It is clear from the analysis of the findings that this is a deliberate strategy adopted from their choices, though they are aware of the existence of the alternative strategies.

This summary of the findings would not be complete without stressing the importance in the determination of choices of the variable of fairness (F) which was not manipulated in the present experiments. All the choices in the experiments can be conceived as tending to achieve a compromise between F and other variables.

The results are interpreted in terms of a "generic" social norm of ingroup-outgroup behavior which guided the Ss' choices. They classified the social situation in which they found themselves as one to which this norm was pertinent, in which social categorization ought to lead to discriminatory intergroup behavior rather than to behavior in terms of alternatives that were offered to them. Alternative interpretations including the "experimenter effect", expectation of reciprocity, and anticipation of future interaction, were also considered but by and large rejected.

A related series of studies is being conducted at present at Columbia University by Deutsch. Their studies bear upon the degree to which continuously distributed differences among a group of people interfere with the ingroup-outgroup discrimination effect found by Tajfel and his co-workers. The effects of intergroup differences being perceived as discontinuous and also the creation of such discontinuities when they are socially or psychologically functional are probably fundamental to the study of intergroup relations.

4. The effect of within-group relations upon intergroup relations.

During the present reporting period, a replication was conducted at Utrecht by Dr. Rabbie of Thibaut's earlier study on the persuasive arguments addressed to a mistreated minority group in order to maintain their loyalty. The data from the replication are being assembled at Chapel Hill for an overall analysis.

Thibaut has recently completed a further experiment in which the messages from the majority were evaluated from the point of view of the minority receiving them. Preliminary analysis of the results make it clear that senders and recipients do not evaluate the various possible persuasive messages in the same way. In the original experiment, there was a significant tendency for the majority to prefer to use derogation of the outgroup when the evidence was quite clear that the minority had been treated unfairly. What is the reaction among the recipient minority? In general, they are not particularly impressed. However, there are individual differences in response to this message among the subjects identifying with the minority. Persons low on the machiavellian respond more favorably and hence would presumably be more influenced by this derogation message. The comparison of senders and recipients generally suggests that the former placed more emphasis upon influence attempts that involve little cost (flattery, outgroup derogation) while the recipients report that they would be most impressed by messages requiring some commitment to costs by the majority (reward, force).

Professors Rabbie and Thibaut had earlier conducted two experiments taking a different approach to the problem of how relations within a group affect its relationships with other groups. They were particularly interested in whether attitudes within the group were homogeneous or heterogeneous. A summary of two experiments on homogeneity vs. heterogeneity has now been prepared by Professor Rabbie. He reports that in line with previous research, these experiments show that people who are strangers to each other and who are randomly assigned to ad hoc laboratory groups show a significantly greater preference for the ingroup than for the outgroup. Heider's (1958) balance theory seems to be the most parsimonious explanation of these results.

As expected, there was a significantly greater preference for the ingroup over the outgroup in the homogeneous than in the heterogeneous condition. This differentiation was almost entirely due to more negative ratings of the outgroup in the homogeneous condition. An internal analysis showed that this positive attitude toward the outgroup was mainly due to those members of the heterogeneous ingroup whose attitudinal positions were closer to those held by the outgroup. The hypothesis that similarity in attitude leads to attraction seems to be supported by the outgroup but not by the ingroup ratings. Social interaction seems to be the major determinant of ingroup attraction. These data suggest that social interaction was such a strong determinant of ingroup attraction that it overrode the possible negative effects of heterogeneity in opinions. This is all the more remarkable in view of the heated discussions that took place in the heterogeneous group, the attitudinal topic being one of euthanasia which is anchored in various philosophical and personal values.

Each group, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, prepared itself for competitive negotiations with an unknown adversary group which they saw briefly before the group discussions began. The pairs of negotiating groups were supposed to negotiate a common position paper regarding the question of legalizing euthanasia, but each group was urged to have as much of its point of view represented in the common paper as possible. For this purpose, each group prepared instructions for its negotiating representative who was to meet with a representative from the other group. This problem of preparing a mandate for the representative was particularly difficult in the heterogeneous groups

inasmuch as it was necessary for the two conflicting sides to agree upon a position for their group and then to instruct the representative in how to support that position. In the instructions given the representatives, it was found that homogeneous groups push for a more extreme position to be attained by their representative than do the heterogeneous groups, and the former are also much less likely to be willing to make concessions to the other group. The representative for each group was chosen by chance. If within a heterogeneous group, the spokesman happened to be from the "losing" side (that is, his original opinion was different from that which the group had decided to advocate as their own), much less was expected of him. In general, the losing members in the heterogeneous groups, that is, members who had been out voted in the decision about their group's position, demand less of their representative and are much more lenient about how many of their group's ideas must be represented in the final common agreement. In general, these and other findings confirm the view that the losers felt more loyal to their own original positions than to the position the group had more or less imposed upon them. This is reflected in a greater preference for the opposing group's position, their readiness to compromise with the outgroup rather than to compete with them, and their willingness to strive for a moderate rather than an extreme position in the negotiations. This does not mean they were disloyal toward their own group, because as noted above they felt as positive about the ingroup as did members of the homogeneous groups. However, in these ad hoc experimental groups, the minority or out voted members seemed to have been more strongly motivated by their convictions than by their needs to belong.

5. Conceptions of Social Interdependent Relationships

The research here has been carried out by Kelley as a result of general discussions within the Working Group. One of the earliest topics of interest to the Group concerned the layman's conceptions of interpersonal relationships, of interpersonal conflict, his beliefs about possible outcomes of conflict, and his conceptions of various actions and means of influence within conflict situations.

During the present period, a large sample survey study on this problem has been planned and conducted by Kelley, using the resources of the Survey Research Center at UCLA. The problem investigated grew out of the large bargaining study described earlier, in which it was found that cooperatively oriented people have different beliefs about others than do competitively oriented people. Thus, evidence was found in the bargaining study in support of the "triangle hypothesis" advanced by Kelley and Stahelski. One of the implications of the different world views held by cooperators and competitors was that they would have different beliefs about the potentiality of other people to be induced to be "good" (helpful, cooperative, etc.). Cooperators believe that people in general are heterogeneous with respect to cooperative-ness, some being basically cooperative and able to be induced to be good. In contrast, competitive people believe that all others are competitive like themselves, and this might well carry the implication that other people cannot be counted upon to be helpful nor can they be easily influenced to be helpful.

The survey study was part of an omnibus study administered to over 1,000 persons in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. In the relevant part of the survey, a determination was made of whether each respondent was inclined to be cooperative or competitive. Additionally, an assessment was made of how readily he was able to think of examples of certain mixed motive relationships involving choice dilemmas for the participants. Then a series of questions was asked to determine such things as his awareness that people do experience conflict in social dilemma situations, his expectations about the decisions people typically make in dilemma situations, his understanding of the general social consequences of the situation in which people make selfish choices as opposed to the case in which most people make choices out of consideration for the general welfare, his optimism about how readily people could be induced to base their decisions on the general welfare, etc. These questions are based on a series of hypotheses derived more or less strictly from the Kelley and Stahelski observations and argument. The data have been gathered and prepared for computer analysis but no results are known as yet.

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