PRICE DUOPOLY AND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS,

Abstract

The paper examines an extremely simple model of a duopoly situation in which the two firms compete with price as the strategic variable and in which the firms are limited by capacity constraints. Some of the important developments of duopoly theory concerned with the existence of equilibrium is reviewed. Such a market, as Edgeworth showed, does not in general have an equilibrium. It is shown that the model described in the report has a rather simply described equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 17, 1970
Accession Number
AD0710749

Entities

People

  • Martin Shubik
  • Richard Levitan

Organizations

  • Yale University

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Behavior And Behavior Mechanisms
  • Behavioral Disciplines And Activities
  • Behavioral Sciences
  • Chemical Reaction Properties
  • Cooperation
  • Group Dynamics
  • Psychology

Fields of Study

  • Economics

Readers

  • Strategic Security Studies
  • Theoretical Analysis.