VALUES OF NON-ATOMIC GAMES, III: VALUES AND DERIVATIVES,
Abstract
A non-atomic game is a special kind of infinite-person game, in which no individual player has significance; such games have recently attracted attention as models for mass phenomena in economics. In this Memorandum, the characteristic function of the game is extended to a space that includes not only the ordinary coalitions (measurable sets) of players, but also certain 'ideal' coalitions--intuitively, sets to which a player can 'belong' at any intensity between 0 and 1. The value of the game is then redefined in terms of the derivatives of this extended function, following the principle that a player's value is based upon his incremental worth to coalitions. The close relation between this definition and those previously considered is established. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 01, 1970
- Accession Number
- AD0711036
Entities
People
- Lloyd Shapley
- Robert J. Aumann
Organizations
- RAND Corporation