COALITIONS IN N-PERSON ESSENTIAL GAMES.

Abstract

A notion of a solution of an n-person essential game is developed based on the core of a game. This solution exists for every essential game but is not unique. A bargaining procedure is developed which gives some insight into which coalitions may actually form. It can be characterized by means of linear programs. (Author)

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jun 01, 1970
Accession Number
AD0713693

Entities

People

  • Abraham Charnes
  • S. Sorensen

Organizations

  • University of Texas at Austin

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Applied Mathematics
  • Bargaining
  • Convex Programming
  • Interdisciplinary Science
  • Linear Programming
  • Mathematical Programming
  • Mathematics
  • Negotiations

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Linear Algebra