On Division of the Question,
Abstract
Suppose a committee is to write a platform taking positions on many issues. Suppose also that the alternatives for each issue can be ordered so that each member's preferences are single-peaked, and that the issues are separable in the sense that the outcome on one issue does not affect preferences on the others. The committee may consider the issues one-by-one, leading to a platform P* of the majority view on each issue. Alternatively the committee may consider the entire platform as a single motion. If so, there may be a cycle of platforms each of which defeats all platforms not in the cycle. P* is in the above cycle if there is a cycle; if not, P* defeats all other platforms. If division of the questions on amendments is automatically imposed, P* defeats all amendments and from any other platform a sequence of successful amendments leads to P*. The theory is applied to explain why state constitutional amendments tend to fail when submitted as a package, and pass when submitted separately. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1970
- Accession Number
- AD0714652
Entities
People
- Joseph B. Kadane
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses