


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RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION

Patterns of French Foreign Policy, 1958-1967



by
Edward Kolodziej

*Woodrow Wilson Department
of
Government and Foreign Affairs
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia*



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MCLEAN, VIRGINIA

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position.

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FOREWORD

In the recent French domestic crisis, President de Gaulle behaved in a manner similar to his predecessors' reaction to the problems facing them, "Après moi, le déluge." In this connection, Professor Kolodziej convincingly argues that much of Charles de Gaulle's foreign policy is in the mainstream of post-WWII foreign policy of his predecessors and by extension will be continued by his successors. (Of course, this is not to argue that the style personified in de Gaulle will remain unchanged.) From an exhaustive, detailed examination of primary documents, Professor Kolodziej also develops a rationale for evaluating both French foreign policy formulation and its communication.

His analysis is particularly useful and relevant to evaluating future foreign policy developments elsewhere in Europe that may be influenced by de Gaulle, especially in West Germany. Although the latter has significantly different options and capabilities, it, like others in Europe who may embark on an independent course, may draw lessons from the French pattern.

On the surface, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia appeared to require, on first examination, a shift in French foreign policy. But, after a cautious initial reaction, French policy has in the main reverted to the pattern established under de Gaulle from 1958 to 1967. French foreign policy priorities may be influenced more by the Spring 1968 internal crisis in France—as reflected in a shift in resources from international security to domestic programs—than by the Czech crisis in Eastern Europe.

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**Patterns of French Foreign Policy,
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ABBREVIATIONS

EEC	European Economic Community
GATT	general agreement on tariffs and trade
ICBM	intercontinental ballistic missile
IRBM	intermediate-range ballistic missile
MLF	multilateral force
MNF	multinational force
MRBM	midrange ballistic missile
MRP	Mouvement Républicain Populaire
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NADGE	NATO Air Defense and Ground Environment (system)
NF	new franc
SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe
the Six	France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg
UNR	Union pour la Nouvelle République

Chapter 1

DE GAULLE, FRANCE, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

INTRODUCTION

A precondition to an understanding of French strategic policy under the Fifth Republic is a grasp of the thought and actions of President Charles de Gaulle. Unlike his elective predecessors of the Fourth and even Third Republics, except perhaps briefly for Georges Clemenceau, de Gaulle indelibly stamps French foreign and strategic policy with his own views and personality. De Gaulle's domestic opponents have singularly failed so far to influence seriously his conduct of France's external affairs. Absent under de Gaulle's rule are the delicately balanced compromises among rival parties and groupings within the National Assembly of the Fourth Republic. Largely absent also are the perpetual cabinet shufflings that reflected the persistent and sharp internal political differences within France. The air of impending chaos and upheaval that characterized the Fourth Republic's handling of foreign affairs has been replaced by an atmosphere that seethes, to be sure, with public criticism of de Gaulle but still yields an overriding impression of order and stability. There is little doubt about who finally decides what will be the policy and actions of the French government and people in foreign affairs. De Gaulle does. The margin of maneuverability of legislative officials, including members of the government, and civil servants engaged in foreign policy has been clearly narrowed since the days of the Fourth Republic. All significant lines of authority in foreign affairs for the time being lead to de Gaulle.

So long as de Gaulle rules, his personal views and French foreign policy are much the same. After his leaving, a clearer picture may be gained of how the two may differ. Meanwhile French foreign policy rests on a popular consensus that de Gaulle simultaneously fashions and reflects. His election to another 7-year term as President indicates the position of confidence he holds among the French people, even after the 1965 ballotage. In the runoff he defeated his leftist opponent by polling 55 percent of the vote, a remarkable figure by American standards. Popular confidence of course flows to him personally, but it also points to a deeper insight into de Gaulle's policies, one often obscured outside France and particularly in the US, which has felt the sting of de Gaulle's sharp tongue and borne the brunt of his ire and intransigence. Many of the actions taken by de Gaulle in foreign affairs, including many that have irritated the US, have been supported by most of his countrymen. Many of the foreign policy objectives that he pursues—to the

extent that they have been revealed—are rooted firmly in contemporary French political life. Nor has de Gaulle, as the following analysis makes clearer, deviated from French foreign objectives of the Fourth Republic as much as he would have others, both in and out of France, believe.¹ On the key issue of French independence and initiative in foreign policy, de Gaulle's predecessors share common ground with him, although admittedly not with the same energy and focused intensity.

CONTEXT OF FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE UNDER DE GAULLE

What has markedly changed in French foreign policy since the Fourth Republic is the context within which French action and initiative operate. Most strikingly the international environment in the past decade has become increasingly favorable for French initiatives. First, there is the nuclear stalemate between the US and the Soviet Union. More than his predecessors, de Gaulle grasps and acts on the significance of the nuclear balance between the superpowers. The flight of sputnik and the Soviet development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability occurred, fortunately enough for de Gaulle's purposes, on the eve of his reassumption of power. Growth of Soviet strategic strength signalled a new phase in East-West relations. Neither nuclear giant could devastate his adversary without suffering intolerable losses in kind. Only the highest stakes would henceforth justify war between the two states. The very strength of the major nuclear powers gradually conditioned them to proceed cautiously in their relations with each other. Smaller powers like France, if they chose, had greater latitude to adopt divergent views and to defy openly the guarantor of their security and the mutual adversary. The superpowers must tolerate greater independence and even recalcitrant behavior from client states, or alternatively they must pay a higher cost of conformity and compliance. Many provocations from allies and enemies, too, must be accepted at the risk of an international crisis, with all its attendant dangers of military confrontation between the great powers. As the threat to the national security of the smaller powers recedes within the terms of the nuclear balance of terror, the major powers lose control over them. De Gaulle not only understands the implications of the balance of terror but seeks, through his diplomacy and through the accelerated development of the force de frappe, to capitalize strategically and politically on the new equilibrium. His objectives and the calculations on which they rest are described and analyzed in more detail in the succeeding sections of this report.

Second, the emergence of a nuclear stalemate reinforces the trend toward greater national reassertion around the world. A multipolar international system gradually replaces the bipolar division of the 1940's and 1950's. In Europe both blocs confront the development of polycentrism. The underdeveloped regions of the world also assert their independence, resisting absorption into either rival camp while throwing off their former colonial bonds. French nationalism therefore is both a part of these worldwide nationalistic trends and, under de Gaulle's stimulus, a contributing factor in encouraging the process of national independence. The range of French action in a multipolar setting is under most circumstances enlarged. De Gaulle therefore rose to power at the very time when the

international system was becoming sufficiently flexible to permit expanded French initiatives. Had the Fourth Republic persisted, it would have fallen heir to the same favorable international setting for action. It is of course a moot question whether the leadership of the Fourth Republic would have exploited its enlarged field of operation to the extent that de Gaulle has. In any event the opportunity for independent French action is endemic in the evolving nationalistic character of the international environment.²

Third, Western Europe has grown closer together and increasingly stronger and more certain of its political and economic power. Dependence on the US in the wake of the devastation of WWII and the emergence of the Soviet threat severely narrowed the choices and opportunities of the Western European powers in foreign affairs. French diplomacy was no less constrained. France's progress is now tied to European strength, and under de Gaulle it has been keen to draw on this strength for national purpose.

Whether de Gaulle will be able to parlay French power on European power remains to be seen. France, no less than the US, may be unable to harness European power to suit its objectives. Its foreign and strategic policies, however, encourage independence from US control and influence. The resulting split between Europe and the US may serve French purposes as they define them, but in the final analysis France is likely to experience the same difficulties and incapacity to induce its neighbor nations to do its bidding. What appears clear is that French-European alignments in foreign policy in relation to the US rest partly, though clearly not predominantly, on negative factors, i.e., on a shared reluctance to be dominated by the US rather than on a common design toward European organization, particularly in political matters, or toward the US, generally.

Fourth, the opportunities for French diplomacy were enlarged as the scene of Cold War conflict shifted outside Europe. No longer "the cockpit of conflict," as the Europe of the second half of the twentieth century was characterized, it could concentrate on its own internal development. Decolonization has freed Europe from its former overseas obligations and has speeded the process of forcing Europe to fashion its own institutions and common policies. Conflict in the underdeveloped areas has served, too, to discourage entanglement abroad. At the same time the Western European states are striving, no less than France, to maintain a flexible diplomatic posture and to avoid involvement in foreign ventures to which they might be exposed as members of an alliance and as dependencies of another more powerful state.

Fifth, de Gaulle's liquidation of the Algerian problem was the single most important factor explaining his enlarged sphere for French foreign policy action. The Fourth Republic could well have exploited most of the conditions sketched above, but it was unable to free itself from the Algerian straitjacket. The Algerian crisis discredited France in the international world, particularly in the Third World; earned the criticism and scorn of her allies; strained her relations with the communist nations; and dissipated her precious human and material resources. De Gaulle's deft resolution of the Algerian struggle opened the way for French assertion in the larger international arena.

When de Gaulle returned to power after 12 years of self-imposed exile, France's economic and political systems—indeed, its very social structure—were threatened by breakdown. Almost 20 years of foreign wars in Europe, Northern Africa, and Southeast Asia had sapped French resources and distorted the

development of the economy. It had divided the nation, too, into warring factions. Class tensions were acute as social reform was inevitably deferred on grounds of national security and French responsibilities abroad. The Algerian problem divided France and cut deeply into the political life of the nation already fragmented into rival economic, social, and religious groupings. In this setting the army revolt in Algeria in 1958 proved too great a strain for the fragile institutions of the Fourth Republic. Then as in 1940 de Gaulle awaited the call to power as the savior of France. The noncommunist parties, which he so detested, banded together long enough in the closing moments of the Fourth Republic to invest him with power and to prepare the legal groundwork for the Fifth Republic. The overwhelming endorsement of the Fifth Republic by almost 80 percent of the French voters was as much a vote of confidence in de Gaulle as in the stronger powers of the French executive that characterize the new constitution. At the outset of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle's power was undisputed by any rival political force in France. His personal power was immense, for he alone was acceptable to both the Right and the Left as the alternative to civil war. Longtime opponents, like Socialist leader Guy Mollet, closed ranks behind de Gaulle, who alone appeared to possess sufficient political stature and authority to forestall military rule. His prestige among the military was still high and his previously strong statements on behalf of the French Empire encouraged the military circles. De Gaulle appeared to offer the hope of preserving republican institutions in France and French rule in Algeria. In lending his personal prestige to the task of resolving this problem, de Gaulle risked failing where so many others had failed already. His brilliant, if hard-won, success enhanced his personal power and prestige in France, even as the ending of the Algerian problem opened the door to a freer and more fluid French diplomatic posture.

Sixth, de Gaulle's power was strengthened in foreign policy by the legal powers of his office as President, which he largely defined and incorporated into the constitution of the Fifth Republic. As President he is the principal source of French foreign policy and is specifically charged by the constitution "to be the protector [le garant] of national independence, and of the treaties concluded by France if it should happen that the country falls into danger."³ De Gaulle's legal position was bolstered further in the 1962 referendum on the popular election of the President. The traditional parties bitterly contested de Gaulle's move to amend the French constitution in favor of the popular election of the French President in place of election by a college of notables. Although de Gaulle's popularity diminished from its previous high of the referendum on the constitution, the more than 60 percent of French voters who approved the proposed change was impressive enough. De Gaulle soundly trounced the old-time parties. He can now claim to represent the will of the French people above the quarrels and squabbles of the parliamentary groups. As President he, not the National Assembly, is the embodiment of national will. He alone represents the continuity of the State, and in this capacity he acts as an arbiter of the conflicting claims of rival internal political groups and, through his appointive power, advises and guides governments in control of the National Assembly.

Seventh, internal economic growth in France also buttressed de Gaulle's power and, as a consequence, his hold over French foreign policy. It may well be argued that de Gaulle largely inherited the fruits of a number of significant economic moves taken under the Fourth Republic to stabilize and stimulate the

French economy. The Treaty of Rome signed in 1957 signalled the initiation of the European Common Market, which was potentially equal in strength and purchasing power to the economy of the US. Cooperative relations among European nations in the production of coal and steel and in atomic development were also reinforced. Europe as a whole was emerging from its economic dependency on the US; France shared in the economic upturn. Whatever the precise causes of the economic upsurge in France, the progress of the French economy was significant. Its balance-of-payments deficit was eliminated and its currency stabilized. French dollar reserves grew as US balance-of-payments deficits reached alarming proportions in the late 1950's and 1960's. Indeed, de Gaulle has felt sufficiently confident of his economic position to challenge the dollar as an international reserve currency by proposing a return to the gold standard. Simultaneously he angered US financial interests by insisting that gold be transferred from the US to cover the American balance-of-payment deficits.

Eighth, de Gaulle's domestic power base is still sufficiently stable to permit new foreign policy initiatives. His support in the National Assembly is dwindling apparently because his social and economic policies have slowed welfare, housing, and education programs rather than because of his foreign and strategic moves. His stand during the June 1967 Middle East crisis and his July trip to Canada earned him criticism, yet his weakening domestic power derives largely from domestic affairs. This conclusion is reflected in the legislative elections in the spring of 1967. The lineup of parties after the election is shown in Table 1.⁴

TABLE 1
Results of the National Assembly Election, March 1967⁴

Party	Seats before election	Seats after election	Gains or losses
Communist	41	73	+ 32
Federation of the Left	91	116	+ 25
Extreme Left and Mendés- France followers	2	5	+ 3
Other leftist groups without Federation support	13	5	- 8
Democratic Center	42	27	- 15
Moderate	0	15	+ 15
Gaullist	284	244	- 40

Voter rejection of Gaullist candidates and their shift to the Left can largely be explained on domestic issues (Ref 4, pp 1-3). The Left, particularly the communists, strongly supported Gaullist NATO policy and encouraged French disengagement from the Alliance. Yet the far Left was the largest gainer in the elections. Its success therefore must be sought on other grounds that are fundamentally internal to French politics. On the other hand, de Gaulle will certainly not lose votes among the Left if he pulls France out of NATO or continues to pursue an anti-American foreign policy. He can still count on his slim majority of Gaullist supporters. Moving out of NATO, for example, can actually strengthen his overall position. It can be reasonably argued that this domestic situation en-

courages de Gaulle to follow his own strong inclinations to withdraw France from the Alliance. By pulling France out of the Alliance, de Gaulle can accomplish two purposes: full and final liberation of France from its Alliance commitments under NATO and extension of his power and that of his party. De Gaulle would seem to be led therefore to do what the following analysis of his objectives and actions since taking office in 1958 suggests he wishes to do—sever commitments made by France in the NATO Alliance. This view is given support in an August 1967 poll of the French Institute of Public Opinion that was commissioned and published by Le Nouvel Observateur. The poll showed that a majority of French voters approved de Gaulle's foreign policies although many regretted France's position during the Middle East crisis in June and believed that British entry into the Common Market would be in France's interest. The poll clearly indicated that the average Frenchman hopes for political stability and "wishes to be free of the schemes of the Great Powers."⁵ The poll also revealed that the Right and the supporters of Jean Lecanuet were the most committed to retaining ties with the US. These groups suffered of course the sharpest setback in the National Assembly elections of March 1967. The opposition that they could mount against a de Gaulle move to withdraw France from NATO has largely been dissipated in view of their thinning ranks in the French legislature. Little organized support stands in de Gaulle's way. Contrariwise, public opinion seems to urge him to cut France's ties with NATO.

The same poll produced an interesting and highly relevant response to this issue. One of the questions was: "Personally, in light of the present world situation, do you think that France ought on the whole be on the side of the United States, the Soviet Union, or neither one nor the other?" The responses were distributed as shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Side favored	Percentage favorable	
	July 1967	April 1966
US	13	19
Soviet Union	10	9
Neither	57	57
No response	20	15

Sentiment for the US dropped over the year and that for the Soviet Union rose slightly. The steady percentage of neutralist sentiment is the most striking result. The French wish for an end to the Cold War and hope to extricate themselves from commitments that were made at the height of the Soviet threat to Western Europe and at a time of French incapacity to withstand Soviet pressures.

In sum, de Gaulle's domestic power base may be narrowing, and his foreign policy moves outside NATO may be more constrained than in the past. But so far as NATO is concerned, his policies at present enjoy French support, and complete French withdrawal from the Alliance is not likely to hurt—indeed it promises to improve—de Gaulle's domestic power and to strengthen his party's position.

DE GAULLE'S VIEW OF DOMESTIC POLICY

As a beginning point, some appreciation of the role that de Gaulle assigns to domestic policy provides a useful insight into his conception of international

relations. In his scheme, domestic affairs are subordinate to foreign policy. De Gaulle, as Professor Maurice Duverger observes, has proposed more far-reaching social legislation than the Socialist Party.⁶ The reforms of the Provisional Government from 1944 to 1946 on tenant farming, health, social security, etc., were critical in returning France to some form of stability after WWII. De Gaulle's intent in promoting these changes, however, was not keyed to improving the quality of French life as such. In working with French officials to effect these reforms, de Gaulle sought a different objective. "Once again I remarked," de Gaulle notes in his memoirs, "that if the goal guiding them was perhaps the same for them as for myself, the motives guiding them were not identical with my own. . . . I perceived that they were scarcely aware of the motive inspiring me, which was the power of France" (Ref 1, FFPG, p 16).

Economic and technological progress, no less than social advancement, is to be at the disposal of the foreign policy of France, which is destined in de Gaulle's mind to play a leading role in international relations. These are the means by which French power is enhanced. "The objective of policy for de Gaulle," as the French analyst Alfred Grosser observes, "is 'France,' which is very distinct from the sum of the French people, who are all engaged in its service" (Ref 1, FFPG, p 17).

Grosser's observation also points to another important aspect of French attitudes and domestic politics that is a persistent concern in de Gaulle's thinking. De Gaulle is acutely aware of the essentially local or even provincial concerns of his countrymen. Although France has played an important—at times predominant—role in world affairs, its citizens have traditionally betrayed a marked preference for their domestic hearths over foreign adventure, for the bargaining of the market place over diplomatic negotiations, for the perfection of a comfortable pleasant life over martial virtues and civil disciplines.⁷ De Gaulle suffered the resistance of French opinion to national preparedness during the interwar period and its aversion to the costs of involvement abroad. De Gaulle has few illusions about the interests of public opinion in affairs beyond the nation's immediate borders unless faced by a clear and present danger. "So long as a country is not immediately threatened," de Gaulle noted in an early and influential writing, "public opinion will be strongly opposed to increasing the burden of armament, and to accepting the need for additional manpower. Recruiting. . . has always been regarded as an attack on personal liberty which arouses violent feelings in the populace. Only too often, the money spent on an army. . . is looked upon as sheer waste."⁸ "The task of political leaders," de Gaulle asserts, "is to dominate opinion" (Ref 8, p 104). For what purpose? De Gaulle has been quite explicit—the grandeur of France. The celebrated opening paragraph of his memoirs sets out the object of his statecraft and in colorful romantic language reveals his view of France and the French people and the domestic obstacles confronting any French leader who seeks to place France among the great nations of the world. De Gaulle observes:

All of my life I have thought of France in a certain way. This is inspired by sentiment as much as by reason. The emotional side of me tends to imagine France like the princess in the fairy stories or the Madonna in the frescoes, as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional destiny. Instinctively I have the feeling that Providence has created her: either for complete successes or for exemplary misfortunes. If, in spite of this, mediocrity shows in her acts and deeds, it strikes me as an absurd anomaly, to be imputed to the faults of Frenchmen, not to the genius of the land. But the positive side of my mind also assures me that France

is not really herself unless in the first rank: that only vast enterprises are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of dispersal which are inherent in her people: that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness.⁹

Here are key elements of de Gaulle's political philosophy that are given form and substance in his foreign policy pronouncements and initiatives. France is something more than the French people. It is a corporate entity that exists over time and transcends the life of the individual citizen whose loyalty and service are to be expected in promoting its ends. De Gaulle's conception approaches the distinction between Rome and the Romans that characterized the Empire. Rome was eternal; only Romans lived and died. Men earned a transcendent worth in service to Rome—the eternal city. So Frenchmen, too, gain a higher value by service to France. Their private concerns and personal pursuits that breed so much internal rivalry and conflict are transformed in service to a nobler end—the greatness of France. Domestic strife and struggle, hallmarks of French society for generations,¹⁰ can be muted and even submerged in ambitious and visionary foreign enterprise. The benefits are twofold. Domestic order and harmony are encouraged and the merit of personal action ennobled; France's international position is in turn promoted.

THE NATION-STATE: PRIMARY UNIT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Under what conditions can France maximize its power and prestige in the present and emerging international system? Although de Gaulle has frequently spoken on this question, there remains considerable dispute about the intent of his words and actions and the precise political objectives that he is pursuing. De Gaulle's handling of the Algerian problem illustrates the ambiguity and contradictions that surround many of his foreign policy actions. In his first news conference on 19 May 1958, less than a week after the army's revolt and at the time of his assumption of power, de Gaulle stated that "the best thing to do—and even the only thing to do—would be to prevent Algeria from drawing away from France. Algeria must remain with us."¹¹ Three years later de Gaulle, having weathered two army coups, granted independence to Algeria. More recently de Gaulle's government has aided Israel in sales of military aircraft, yet France joined communist efforts to block UN support of Israel's military action against the Arabs.

De Gaulle's European views are similarly perplexing. His opposition to American policy in Europe has been variously interpreted. Some experts picture de Gaulle as a European.¹² Others see his actions as an expression of personal pique. He is pictured as seeking retribution for the humiliation that he feels he suffered during WWII at the hands of President Roosevelt.¹³ These interpretations of de Gaulle's views need to be sorted out in order to understand French policy toward NATO and Europe and to gain some conception of the likely direction of French foreign policy both under and after de Gaulle. It is important therefore to probe for the assumptions underlying de Gaulle's statements and actions, particularly his view of the nation-state and, by that token, the role of France in

a political system composed of a large number of entities each of which claims to be sovereign and independent.

De Gaulle believes that the primary units of international relations are states: Whether they have always existed (which they have not as a historical fact) is irrelevant in his mind. The state provides personal security for its citizens. Only within its confines can order be preserved and justice dispensed. The state exists independent of any one individual and is continuous over time so long as it can effectively claim to order and protect the lives of its citizens. A mark of a true state is the adequacy of its powers to rule with "authority in internal affairs and with assurance in external affairs" (Ref 11, p 14). "What is primordial for public powers," de Gaulle observes, "is their effectiveness and their continuity" (Ref 11, p 14). Endurance over time therefore is a distinguishing note of a state.

A state is seen by de Gaulle to be more viable if it rests on the support of a nation composed of a people sharing the same heritage, language, and tradition. The two are, however, distinct. De Gaulle indicates the difference in his speech supporting the constitution of the Fifth Republic: "The French nation will flourish again or will perish according to whether the State does or does not have enough strength, constancy and prestige to lead her along the path she must follow" (Ref 11, p 14). In de Gaulle's view, some countries are hardly more than nations. They lack not only sufficient power and history but also an independently conceived and executed foreign policy that has influence in the relations among states. International convention treats these entities as states, but within de Gaulle's terms of reference they do not legitimately deserve to bear that title.

Just as a nation should not be identified with the state, the ruling regime in power at any given moment should not be confused with the state and its distinct elements and functions. The government acts in the name of the state and gains its legitimacy by tireless devotion to the maintenance of an independent state. It is no mere legal nicety that is at issue in de Gaulle's claim that during WWII he, not the Vichy regime, embodied the French state. The indignities that he suffered during his exile in England and still remembers were, in his view, aimed at the French state no less than at his person. On his return to France he insisted that there was no break in the continuity of French rule. The French state did not begin anew after liberation. It merely adopted a new governmental machinery that was ratified by a majority of Frenchmen. In sum the French state, in existence for over a thousand years—even before the emergence of a French people—and in possession of a long tradition of involvement and importance in external affairs under a variety of regimes, is truly a state in every important aspect of the term.¹⁴

De Gaulle views states in a constant struggle to maximize their power and objectives. "International life, like life in general, is a battle," de Gaulle has often observed (Ref 11, p 78). Each state strives ceaselessly to improve its position in relation to others. There is no respite from the power struggle, nor is there at present a feasible alternative to it. It is a Hobbesian world. De Gaulle accepts this view, and one is tempted to say that he would not have it any other way. De Gaulle's opposition to US military and economic proposals in Europe flows in great part from his conviction that they are essentially rooted in a desire to maintain US hegemony in Europe. In any event de Gaulle is certain that the US seeks to maximize its power on the Continent.

Given this view France's recalcitrance under de Gaulle is not surprising, although its countering moves to American objectives are not always predictable. France is playing the traditional role of the little power seeking to redress the power balance against the larger. France's seeming obstructionism is felt to be no less natural than the efforts of the US to preserve its leading position.

The contrast between American-French relations today and those that prevailed during the early years of American independence may perhaps illustrate de Gaulle's view of the proper relation of big and small states. Two centuries ago France, not the US, acted from a preponderant position. It felt betrayed when the newly formed Washington government refused to join in a war against England, although the two nations had signed a treaty of friendship in 1778. Fifteen years later the republican regime ruling France expected the US to honor the commitment that it had incurred with the royalist government of Louis XVIII. Instead George Washington, seeking to keep the new and fragile nation free of foreign wars that threatened to divide the nation and sap its strength, issued a proclamation of neutrality. The French republican government was understandably outraged, as its royal predecessor would likely have been under similar circumstances. Its vital interests at stake, the new nation sided in effect with royalist England over republican France.

The tables of history are now turned in de Gaulle's mind. Whereas the US sees a break between her past insularity and present world responsibilities, de Gaulle sees the course of international relations, including the actions of the US, as following a discernible, if irregular and unpredictable, line. For de Gaulle the diplomacy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has never died. He interprets the bipolarity of the Cold War as a temporary interruption in the normal pattern of interstate relations. Already conditions are ripe for a resumption, but now on a global scale, of the multipolar system that characterized European politics for over two centuries. Thus the essential nature of state action has not changed. States still are cold and selfish; they seek to maximize their power; they strive to influence the behavior of other states, with whatever means available, to foster their particular goals; and they search to enhance their prestige and status at the expense of other states. These tendencies remain below the surface of the new circumstances of interstate behavior. They continue to manifest themselves despite the larger number of states involved and the impressive power, including nuclear force, at their disposal. These new conditions of international relations give novel shape and substance to state action. They do not transform the basic nature and the tendencies of state behavior.

De Gaulle does not find anything extraordinary about the proclivity of states to maximize their power and prestige. He accepts the fact that the US is the major power in the world today and that it is bent on preserving its position. "The French faced with American acts, waste little time deploring their impact," Stanley Hoffmann perceptively observes, "because they expect great powers to act that way, i.e., to try to preserve their privileged position by rewarding the most docile and by opposing the most rebellious of their allies. . . ." ¹⁵ The US response to the French characterization of its actions is mixed with heat and hurt. It challenges the self-image of the US as the defender of the Free World and reduces the human and material sacrifices it is making, as the leader of the noncommunist group, to a selfish grasping for power, self, and privilege. The

US is tempted to accuse France of being at best an ingrate and at worst disruptive, mischievous, and even destructive.

French opposition to American power rests on the eighteenth and nineteenth century dictum that the strongest power, even a former ally, must be resisted. Ideology and cultured values, although they may have more importance for de Gaulle than he would like to admit (Kulski,¹ pp 1-40), are considered of less importance than nationalism and natural self-interest in predicting state behavior. The French journalist André Fontaine well describes de Gaulle's attitude, "Ideologies are . . . transitory, while the fact of nations endures—and with it the fundamental rivalries, born of geography and nourished by history. . . ." ¹⁶ The reactions of the Big Powers to the balance of terror between them confirm this analysis to de Gaulle's satisfaction. Each seeks to avoid war with the other and is prepared, according to de Gaulle's reckoning, to sacrifice the interests of its allies to minimize risk to its homeland.

At present the US, not the Soviet Union, threatens French interests and objectives. According to de Gaulle it does so in two general senses: (a) through its massive economic, scientific, and technological resources and its military power and presence, it is alleged to exercise undue strategic and political influence on European and world affairs; and (b) through its varied and complex interests and obligations around the globe, it threatens to be drawn and, in turn, to draw its NATO allies into wars and conflicts and to conduct its military operations in a way detrimental to France. Increasingly during de Gaulle's rule the Soviet Union and the US were identified as equally threatening to France and Europe. De Gaulle warned in 1954 against "surrendering to one or the other of the two hegemonies which are tending to share the world. . . ." ¹⁷

De Gaulle's often-repeated unwillingness to distinguish between the motivations of the US and the Soviet Union naturally rankles the US. In de Gaulle's eyes it is no longer clear who is France's enemy. Indeed he has progressively substituted the US for the Soviet Union as the principal threat. For de Gaulle the gap between US and Soviet economic and technological progress is widening, and accordingly the political and strategic advantage of the US is growing. His foreign policy is increasingly shaped by a determination to combat the power of the US. De Gaulle is convinced, as Alfred Grosser argues, that since the Cuban missile crisis the US is the dominant power, that the USSR has recognized this state of things, and that consequently there is no longer a possible Soviet threat. ¹⁸ A new era has appeared in which "the struggle against the ally constitutes the principal objective" (Ref 18, p 2).

De Gaulle's critique of American policy in the Middle East and Vietnam charges the US with responsibility for both conflicts. He accuses the US of fomenting international discord in allegedly employing its immense power to preserve and even extend its dominant position. ¹⁹ The characterization of the US as the leading superpower conveniently fits into de Gaulle's scheme and, in his view, strengthens the case for opposing the US simply on the grounds of curbing its massive power, quite apart from the merits of any particular issue. "The threat to world peace [does not come] from any expansionist will, from any ideology, but simply from power itself" (Ref 18, p 2). By opposing the US, de Gaulle cloaks France in the garments of peace even as he pursues a balance-of-power strategy essentially based on a conception of ceaseless state conflict.

De Gaulle does not appear bothered by the reactions to France's opposition to the US. What is important is the marginal gain that will accrue to France and to French independence by shifts in its policies or changes in its relations with other nations. The Cold War froze the normally fluid character of interstate relations. It hindered shifts among and between states on a variety of issues ranging from cultural exchange to military security. It obscured the essential bilateral basis of international relations. For de Gaulle such an outcome was contrary to the nature and tendencies of a global system based on the nation-state. It was a danger to peace and, most importantly in his mind, a major obstacle to the realization of French objectives.

France's independence is ensured, however, only in a state system that, although inevitably entailing cooperative arrangements, tends toward direct bilateral relations among states. In such a system France, through the genius of its diplomacy and the judicious use of its limited power, can strike a set of relations on a complex number of issues with states around the globe that will serve its interests to a maximum degree. International relations is therefore a kind of free marketplace in which France sells and buys its political wares as it pleases. De Gaulle wishes to trade on relations with an international system that is as free and fluid as possible. Monopolies are shunned. Any one state, if it is too powerful, will polarize other states. By keeping relations open through the creation of a number of power centers, chances are likely that France has something to gain if relations remain in flux. De Gaulle is convinced that the status quo largely benefits the superpowers and specifically the US. It is in this sense then, that France can be called a globally revisionist power insofar as she seeks always to improve her position, which, according to de Gaulle's analysis, is not at present in the first rank where she belongs. Given this Gaullist assumption and the fact that French power is likely to remain limited in the distant future in light of the power of the Big Two and the potential prowess of India, Japan, and China, France is likely to maintain a globally revisionist posture for quite some time. Although a revision in security ties, as in NATO, may of course redound to the disadvantage of all participants, most changes can be calculated as being probably more costly to one or both of the Big Powers; any change in the relative power position of the US or the Soviet Union, although carrying risks for smaller powers like France, presents an opportunity for the latter to improve their positions. These conditions depend on the assumed continuance of the balance of terror and the interest of the major powers in preserving their respective spheres of influence or, at least, in respecting the sphere of influence of the other major rival.

FRENCH INDEPENDENCE AND THE BALANCE OF POWER

France and the Six

The NATO alliance constrains French action and in de Gaulle's eyes has increasingly become an obstacle to the realization of French objectives (see Chap. 2). It has not proved a very useful means to maximize French power, prestige, and independence. The US is too strong; it overshadows its allies and dominates NATO strategic policy. American-dominated strategic policy is then woven into European economic policy. De Gaulle and his followers assert that the

American security advantage affords leverage over European economic development. In de Gaulle's view the productive capacity of the US and its leadership in technology and science reinforce the already compelling influence that the US can exert on Europe.

Yet France cannot stand alone against the US. In an bilateral contest the US hopelessly outclasses France. Independence can only be an aspiration, not a tangible realization. France's weakness forces de Gaulle to seek a vehicle of interstate cooperation that France can dominate and whose policies it can substantially shape. De Gaulle needs an institutional means on the international plane to give expression and substance to his notion of French national independence through a balance of power. The powers to be balanced include of course the Soviet Union and the US, and perhaps China in the distant future. Special effort, as already noted, is required to check the US, which, after the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, emerged as the predominant power in the world. The general, if sometimes halting and desultory, pattern of French foreign policy under de Gaulle has been toward the development of a closer Western European confederation of states that can be manipulated by French policy. Since France cannot challenge the US directly, it seeks under de Gaulle's leadership to expand its influence by attaching the power of its partners in the EEC to its designs. The vision is hardly new in de Gaulle's thinking and finds expression in the third volume of his memoirs.⁹ France may not be able to dictate NATO policy, but it can continue to defy the US and can perhaps determine much of the shape of emerging European institutions and the policies flowing from them, such as the common position of the Six at the recent GATT (general agreement on tariffs and trade) round. If Western European power can be harnessed to French intent, a potentially significant counter to American and Soviet policy goals will be created.

De Gaulle of course faces an inherent dilemma in his jealous desire for French national independence and the need for cooperative arrangements with his European neighbors. It is not at all certain that he will resolve the problem. He may be trading one entangling relation for another. What seems to be crucial in de Gaulle's calculations is the trade-off between the cost and benefits that are incurred in close ties in NATO and those deriving from a stronger European union that can conceivably be shaped to an appreciable degree in France's own image. French independence and French policy are optimally served either if the collective bodies in which France participates adopt its policy views or, what is tantamount to the same result, if they afford France a greater opportunity to work its will. The Europe of the Six is a start.

The success of the de Gaulle enterprise hinges on at least these elements: (a) the blocking of British entry into the Common Market, (b) continued Franco-German rapprochement and close cooperation in all significant policy areas, and (c) Soviet acceptance of a European third force with France as its implicit spokesman. France's policies toward NATO and its creation of a force de frappe are integral parts of de Gaulle's European policy, which will be treated later.

France under de Gaulle has attempted to fuse all these policy streams, paying little heed to their crosscutting movements. French foreign policy therefore may often appear confused and at odds with itself when observed from without. Yet if it is viewed from the perspective of de Gaulle's conception of a balance of power, these inner contradictions of French foreign policy can be resolved at least in concept, if not in every instance in its actual operation.

Needless to say an understanding of de Gaulle's mode of reasoning and action does not ensure success in coping with them. Nor does such an understanding suggest that because some rationale can be given for French foreign and strategic behavior, France will through some legerdemain achieve the goals that de Gaulle has set for it.

In de Gaulle's view French independence must be pursued through time under changing conditions of international life. His view of independence would appear to possess an inner and an outer aspect. Inwardly de Gaulle strives to make France economically and technologically self-sufficient. He seeks to develop an indigenous French production base that is tied to the EEC yet is flexible enough politically to be bent to serve French policy interests. But self-sufficiency is an ephemeral political goal, hardly a realistic economic objective for a country the size of France. De Gaulle's operational policy tends to be directed at maintaining a delicate balance between economic cooperation with the Six while resisting binding political ties or moves to create supranational decision agencies to make common policy for the member states. De Gaulle has not prevented the operation of the Common Market on economic grounds. He appreciates the importance of the EEC for France's economic life. Indeed, it is interesting to note that under de Gaulle France has spurred economic integration and cooperative economic planning. In contrast to West German economic development, the French economy has been regulated by a series of periodic economic plans since WWII. Planning is fully accepted in France. De Gaulle has not interfered with either internal economic planning or its projection to the EEC level. Moreover de Gaulle's administration spurred the development of a common agricultural policy in the EEC. It is hardly conceivable that further significant progress toward European economic integration would have been possible if agreement had not been reached on agriculture. Instead de Gaulle's hostility to the EEC has centered on the attempts of France's partners and the Brussels commission to create an institutional framework that might assume an independent political existence and set policy in contradiction to one or more EEC members, particularly France.

De Gaulle has adopted a very complex strategy within the EEC. He strives to maximize the economic benefits of French membership in the Common Market at a minimal cost to the French economy and to French diplomatic flexibility. He is wont to shape EEC policies, if not directly through France's economic weight—a weak reed to lean on in view of West Germany's superior economic strength—then indirectly through its veto of unpopular proposals or through the diplomatic technique of the "empty chair." The French negotiating position over the incorporation of agriculture into the EEC illustrates the thin and often imperceptible line that France treads between economic cooperation and political independence. France broke off negotiations with its partners in June 1965, ostensibly because of their reluctance to include agriculture in the Common Market. France has most to gain from the absorption of agriculture, since it has the largest agricultural population of the Six and has more land under cultivation than any of its partners. One out of four Frenchmen is still attached to the soil.

A more compelling explanation for de Gaulle's abrupt rupture of talks was his opposition to the insistence of the other five to adopt a pattern of majority voting within the community as called for by the Treaty of Rome, to transfer certain budgetary powers from the member states to the European Parliament,

and to permit wider powers to the EEC Commission. These political issues overshadowed his concern for French agriculture. A measure of his determination to prevail on these political issues is suggested by the fact that he risked domestic support with the highly influential and volatile French farmer who counted on the rapid incorporation of agriculture into the Common Market.

France's temporary withdrawal from active cooperation in the Common Market halted EEC advancement until a compromise settlement could be reached in these areas in January and May 1966 (Kulski,¹ pp 203-34). Agriculture was brought within the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, using guarded and ambiguous language, the Six agreed to reach solutions in the future on matters of importance on a basis that would be acceptable to all members. The scope of the political authority of the EEC Commission and the member states still remains in doubt. For the moment France appears to have successfully arrested the political integration of the community. De Gaulle holds tightly to his notion of the EEC as essentially a technical and economic body in the service of French interests. It survives by common consent of the Six. In de Gaulle's view, EEC policy must bend to national will in the event of conflict with the policy of an EEC partner. "It is quite natural that the European States should have at their disposal organs specialized in the problems which they have in common," de Gaulle asserted in 1960, "but the right to make decisions belongs to them alone. This right must remain theirs. They make decisions only by common consent."²⁰ Whether France can continue to walk the narrowing line between domestic economics and foreign policy remains to be seen. This grows increasingly problematical.

De Gaulle is quite interested in developing a cohesive French-inclined economic policy for the EEC, particularly regarding foreign trade. A common tariff wall within the EEC promises to hamper American access to the French and European markets. The French have consistently resisted proposals for a free-trade Atlantic Union. "We do not believe that a totally free-trade Atlantic area is possible," M. Herve Alphand, former French Ambassador to the US has explained, "as we do not want the European economy completely submerged by that of America, because of the size and productivity of your business enterprise as compared with ours."²¹ Concern is expressed, too, over the alleged rapid rise of American investment in Europe and France since the inception of the EEC.²²

FRANCE, THE EEC, AND BRITAIN

The economic arguments that support the American-penetration thesis, although used by de Gaulle, are secondary in his mind to the strategic and political considerations that are at stake. British application for entry into the EEC raises these problems in all their complexity. De Gaulle has long nurtured a hope of a French-British entente that would combine the strength of each nation. He insists, however, that Britain cut or weaken its ties with the US. His search for a balance against preponderant power was pursued even in the midst of WWII. In France's darkest hours de Gaulle held firmly to the notion of maintaining French independence and prestige through the construction of a foreign balance

of power that fostered these goals. As hostilities raged against Germany, he proposed a joint British-French accord to counter postwar US influence, only to be rebuffed by Churchill, who preferred to influence US policy from within the Anglo-Saxon special relation.

The possibility of combining with Great Britain or at least splitting British ties with the US lingered in de Gaulle's thinking. With the end of the Algerian War and the diminution of European tensions after the construction of the East Berlin Wall, de Gaulle turned his attention again to the task of fashioning international ties that offered an alternative to reliance on the US. He first made a triumphal tour of England. Key to more intimate relations was Britain's nuclear policy and entry into the Common Market. These topics were central to the Macmillan-de Gaulle talks of 15-16 December 1962. The two men left the conference with different views of the outcome of their talks. Macmillan was convinced that British entry into the Common Market would not be blocked. De Gaulle was equally certain that the British would cooperate with the French in some mutually acceptable efforts in nuclear development. A Europe-oriented British economy and British-French nuclear coordination promised to weaken, if not break, the American hold on Britain.

De Gaulle saw his second major attempt to establish a British-French accord shattered at the Nassau meeting less than a week after his meeting with Macmillan at Rambouillet. The cancellation of the Skybolt program, which might have lengthened the life of Britain's V-bomber force and the Polaris submarine agreement, indicated Britain's increased, not decreased, dependence on the US. Most analysts agree that despite the many thorny economic questions hampering Britain's smooth entry into the Common Market, its decision at Nassau to tie itself even closer to the US nuclear arsenal settled de Gaulle's mind about Britain's reliability as an ally within the terms of his meaning of the word.²³ Britain's utility as a sword of French policy and as a shield against American influence in Europe was less after Nassau than before. De Gaulle felt the added displeasure of having been misled at Rambouillet since he found it difficult to believe that the Nassau improvisation had not been deliberately conceived as a means of diluting both the French and British nuclear efforts. His veto of British entry into the Common Market followed as a matter of course.

De Gaulle's reservations about Britain's entry into the Common Market provide further insight into his European view and his strategy in asserting France's leadership on the Continent. There is a remarkable similarity, and even subsequent hardening, of the position announced in his news conference of 14 January 1963 and in his rebuff to the British application for entry into the EEC on 16 May 1967.²⁴ In de Gaulle's 14 January statement he summarized the differences between the Six and Britain. Their economies were similar; their geographical and strategic positions, contiguous; and their political solidarity, long-standing; on the other hand, Britain's commitments were world-wide, beyond the European Continent, and tied largely to the US and the Commonwealth. "The nature, structure, and economic context of England," de Gaulle declared in 1963, "differ [ed] profoundly from those of the other states of the continent" (Ref 11, p 213). So long as Britain was tied to American security policy, its entry into the EEC would raise serious questions about the future economic and political development of Europe. Its entry would "completely change the series of adjustments, agreements, compensations and regulations already established between

the Six" (Ref 11, p 213). Agriculture, in particular, precluded easy British entry. The agreements already struck among Common Market members would have to be reviewed and renegotiated, even as delicate negotiations on the future of the EEC were being conducted. This would mean the construction of another Common Market comprising perhaps up to 18 members. The cohesion of the members could not be maintained. Negotiations with other nations, "first of all the US," would create "a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community" (Ref 11, p 213). British entry might be possible in the future but only if it were willing to commit itself fully to the European Continent. Meanwhile cooperation could continue in selected areas "of science, technology, and industry." France could pursue its relations on a bilateral basis, limiting itself to specific accords reached only after hard, and often long, bargaining. England would not be permitted to follow suit, especially on the key questions of European security and unity. It would not be allowed to hold on to the traditional elements of its foreign policy. Thus de Gaulle introduced a double standard, forbidding to England the flexibility that he reserved to himself and France.

De Gaulle reiterated this position at his May 1967 news conference and raised new objections to British entry into the Six. To the catalog of previously stated economic obstacles, de Gaulle added the problems of the free flow of capital, the instability of the pound sterling as a domestic and reserve currency, and the chronic British inability to improve its balance of payments. De Gaulle restated the difficulty of building a unified Europe unless Britain cut her political and military ties with the US and the Commonwealth. De Gaulle expressed faint optimism that British policy "would concur, in certain cases, with the policy of the Six, as soon as they have one." "But we cannot see how both policies could merge, unless the British assumed again, particularly as regards defense, complete command of themselves, or else if the continentals renounced forever a European Europe" (S&PC,²⁴ pp 10-11). Britain challenges de Gaulle's vision of Europe. Unless it cuts its US ties, de Gaulle fears that Britain would be a conduit for US economic and strategic policy in Europe.

De Gaulle perceives that even if Britain did reverse itself (an unlikely prospect in the immediate future) and bend to his stiff conditions, its presence in Europe would potentially contest French leadership. At present only France is a continental nuclear power. If the US and the Soviet Union remained steadfast in discouraging nuclear proliferation, West Germany would be effectively precluded from developing its own nuclear weapons, at least into the distant future. Britain's nuclear force, more formidable than France's, would threaten to neutralize the subtle political leverage that France could exert on continental policy. Britain and West Germany would also reduce France to third place, both in absolute economic strength and in many areas of technological and scientific growth.

If it is assumed that these difficulties were resolved—that Britain would not be an American Trojan horse or would shrink from challenging France directly—de Gaulle concludes that British entry would still be harmful to France. In de Gaulle's mind, a loose, weakly confederated Europe that would resist French domination would be prey to the US. Seven or more European states—having, as de Gaulle recognizes, "important traits of their own"—would have difficulty coordinating their various policies. They could be played off one against the other by the American colossus. No European union can develop

except in the absence of the American exercise of its immense power. So long as the US can influence European economic, security, and political policy, it can turn one or more European states from Europe and orient their policies toward American concerns and interests. De Gaulle is fully aware of the inclination of his partners to lower considerably the fee for British entry into the Common Market. He also knows that they are prepared to make economic concessions to the US and to depend strategically on US military protection. France's policy of strategic and diplomatic independence, its persistent attacks on all aspects of American influence in Europe, and its stiff conditions for British membership in the EEC—all are allegedly keyed to the creation of an independent Europe, with its own personality and policies. A united Europe and a French-oriented Europe are one.

Georges Pompidou summarized these aspects of the French President's conception of independence for Europe and how they bear on British overtures to join Europe. In criticizing the opponents of de Gaulle's policies who sought British entry into the Common Market and the integration of Europe, Pompidou asked: "Why do the . . . manifestoes call simultaneously for immediate steps toward European integration? Why, furthermore, are the states which most strongly support close ties with Great Britain, and which therefore should be hostile to integration, precisely those which call for integration most insistently?" Pompidou answered his own question, claiming de Gaulle and his policies were truly European, in contrast to those advocating British entry and integration:

The goal of [the opponents] . . . is to build not Europe, but the so-called "Atlantic" Europe, that is, a Europe which, giving up the creation of its own political personality, giving up a European defense and European foreign policy, limits itself to organizing its social and economic life in supranational frameworks, and, for the rest, leaves it to the United States to define its policies and assume its defence. . . . No nation exists, be it a European nation or France, unless it is independent, that is, with its own policy, its own defence, its own power of decision. That is why, by defending our own independence, we are defending that of the Europe to which we belong, and we are the real Europeans.²⁵

De Gaulle has been quite explicit about the political objectives underlying his opposition to British membership in the EEC. The French veto in December 1967 of Britain's renewed bid to enter the Common Market brought these larger political considerations to light. De Gaulle claims to have saved the Common Market from the dilution and division that would allegedly result from British entry. Three weeks before France's partners in the EEC forced a vote on the British request, de Gaulle expressed deep concern that the British might preclude realization of his hope to build a strong Six against growing US power in Europe. De Gaulle stated:

What France cannot do is to enter now, with the British and their associates, into negotiations that would lead to destroying the European construction to which she belongs. And, then, that would in no way be the path that would lead to allowing Europe to construct itself by itself, and for itself. . . . For Europe to be able to counter balance the immense power of the United States, it is necessary not at all to weaken, but to the contrary, to strengthen the communities' ties and rules.²⁶

At present it is unclear whether de Gaulle will have his way. His partners in the EEC object strongly to his refusal even to allow talks with the British on the Wilson government's proposal to enter the Common Market. The Dutch

are especially exorcised over French intransigence. They have boycotted meetings on labor and agriculture and speak of possibly withdrawing from the group despite the great costs to their nation and to their neighbors. It is testimony to the great political stakes at issue that de Gaulle's high-risk policy is eliciting similar behavior from other nations. This year is crucial for the EEC. As Premier Georges Pompidou has recognized, "...it will show, depending on the attitudes of the member nations, whether the Europe of the Six is resigned to a sort of progressive dissolution or whether... it is determined to be economically and politically united."²⁷

In de Gaulle's mind, Europe is possible only if it wills to be Europe, i.e., independent of any other state. British entry would dilute the growing bonds among the Six, hamper the construction of a strong Europe, weaken European unity and facilitate the preservation of the alleged US hegemony. If a European state is to exist, in French official thinking, it must build on the existing structure of Europe, which is essentially plural and divided into distinct nation-states. It must also assume the functions of a state: economic planning, internal order, defense, and foreign policy—in sum, security and solvency. De Gaulle questions whether the other states of the Common Market are ready to assume these functions and responsibilities. An independent Europe implies in the first instance independent states. If the individual states from which Europe would be formed lack the determination or capacity to be independent, that determination simply will not be generated collectively. This view may appear curious in view of the American experience, but it does suggest that de Gaulle believes not only that the nation-state is the primary building block of international relations but also that it ought to be. Because de Gaulle's France wishes to remain national, it is therefore the only state with sufficient will to be independent of the US. In the final analysis it is the true European state. An integrated Europe along the lines suggested by de Gaulle's opponents would subordinate it, as de Gaulle argues, "to an Atlantic system, in other words... to what the United States calls its leadership."²⁸

More than verbal play is at stake. De Gaulle's Europe is a confederation of states built on national ties. His united Europe is conceived largely as a body of states that retain their sovereignty while coordinating their policies for common purposes on economic, strategic, and foreign policy issues at the level of the head of state. The plan of Fouchet, a former member of the EEC, envisioned a system of interlocking committees for economic, political, and security coordination. De Gaulle believes in joining a nationalist France to a confederated Europe. His confidence, indeed, grows. In his news conference of 16 May 1967 de Gaulle spoke optimistically about a European union initially based on the Six. "Aware of the potential of their material resources and their human values," de Gaulle observed, "all desire either aloud or in whispers that their unit constitute one day an element that might provide a balance in the world" (S & PC, ²⁹p 9).

De Gaulle's design entails, first of all, rapprochement with Germany and the construction of a cohesive Six whose collective foreign and security policy is consistent with the views of the member states. Gradually ties with Eastern Europe would develop that would be increasingly free of US or Soviet influence. These would essentially develop on a bilateral basis among "the European peoples." As relations among European states grow closer, it is expected that

the Soviet Union would become progressively satiated and reconciled with its neighbors. In de Gaulle's scheme, "Russia must evolve in such a way that it sees its future, not through totalitarian constraint imposed on its own land and on others, but through progress accomplished in common by free men and peoples."²⁹ In such an Eastern European setting, Germany's fate could be negotiated. Through France it would be reconciled with the East. A Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals would be erected. The Western and Eastern blocs of Europe would gradually harmonize their policies. Their defense and foreign policies could be coordinated. The Atlantic Alliance would then become irrelevant as Europe assumed its own protection and as the Soviet threat evaporated. Indeed de Gaulle is convinced that Germany and Europe cannot be united unless West German ties to NATO are loosened and eventually broken.³⁰ The Soviet Union, already reluctant to entertain the possibility of a united and Communist Germany, can hardly be expected to be enthusiastic about a Western-oriented and integrated Germany.

What has just been described is de Gaulle's design for Europe and the major role that he has marked out for France. In de Gaulle's view, as the US role in Europe declined, the French role would increase. Chapter 2 analyzes how well de Gaulle has advanced the interests of France.

Chapter 2

DE GAULLE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

INTRODUCTION

There is an increasing tension between de Gaulle's political objectives in Europe and the Third World and the continued adherence of France to the NATO Alliance. The trend in French-announced and operational strategy toward NATO since 1958 is clearly in the direction of disengagement from past Alliance commitments. The French withdrawal from all of NATO's integrative arrangements in the past year and a half culminated a careful and considered retreat that began as early as 1959. The question now raised is whether France will remain within the Atlantic Alliance even on its own terms. The trend in French NATO policy reinforces the trend in de Gaulle's emerging views on international relations. They lead to the conclusion that France under de Gaulle will probably not remain in NATO after 1969, the year in which NATO members may legally leave the treaty. De Gaulle's statements and actions toward NATO indicate his increasing disenchantment with the benefits of French membership and an increasing sense of burden and cost to French policy goals through continued participation. The following analysis traces France's gradual withdrawal. It assesses the major factors underlying de Gaulle's policy and attempts to demonstrate that after de Gaulle failed to establish a tripartite decisional body of the US, Britain, and France for NATO, he began slowly and cautiously to ease France out of the organization and now gives indication of cutting France's remaining ties with NATO.

TEST OF ALLIANCE

Early in office, de Gaulle tested the utility of the Atlantic Alliance. In his celebrated (although still not officially published) memorandum of 17 September 1958, de Gaulle raised a number of fundamental criticisms of NATO's decision-making procedures. In correspondence with President Eisenhower and Britain's Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, de Gaulle is reported to have argued (a) that NATO was unduly restricted to Europe and should be extended on a global basis, (b) that the determination of NATO strategy was too heavily balanced in favor of the US, and (c) that there was an absence of agreement among the NATO allies on the circumstances in which nuclear weapons would be employed.³¹ De Gaulle foresaw the possibility of organizing theaters of operation and the creation of a

security system of worldwide dimensions. According to a recent State Department release he declared that France would subordinate its participation in NATO to the achievement of such a security organization.

De Gaulle essentially confirmed these reputed views in his news conference of 5 September 1960. He referred to conflicts around the globe, particularly in the Middle East and Africa, where political differences that existed among the principal members of the Alliance might well turn into disagreements on strategy (Ref 11, pp 95-96). De Gaulle proposed that the treaty be revised to meet two points.

The first... is the limitation of the Alliance to a single area of Europe. We feel that, at least among the world powers of the West, there must be something organized—where the Alliance is concerned—as to their political conduct and, should the occasion arise, their strategic conduct outside Europe, especially in the Middle East, and in Africa, where these three [United States, Britain, and France] are constantly involved... If there is no agreement among the principal members of the Atlantic Alliance on matters other than Europe, how can the Alliance be indefinitely maintained in Europe? [emphasis added] (Ref 11, p 96).

De Gaulle's second criticism concerned joint strategic planning on NATO policy, including the use of nuclear weapons. He praised France for initiating its force de frappe as a necessary step toward the eventual substitution of national defense for NATO's integrative arrangements. De Gaulle expressed the need for a change in the integration of NATO forces in the defense of Europe: "It seems to us that the defense of a country, while being of course combined with that of other countries, must have a national character" (Ref 11, p 96). In the same vein de Gaulle brushed aside the American two-key system of nuclear control that had been adopted in other NATO countries. "Given the nature of these weapons, and the possible consequences of their use, France obviously can not leave her own destiny and even her own life to the discretion of others."¹¹

To remedy these defects, de Gaulle, according to James Reston,³¹ proposed "an arrangement whereby the Washington-Paris-London governments would agree on common policies—each having a veto on the others—on what to do in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere outside the North Atlantic area." In de Gaulle's view these three powers were the principal members of the Alliance. Unlike Italy, Canada, and the other members of the Alliance, with the exception of Germany, their interests were global. According to de Gaulle, Germany suffers from the debilities of its past—a conquered divided state whose fate rests in the hands of other powers. It cannot claim to be an independent state until its future is decided. The wartime western Big Three remain intact as states. They have a right by conquest and by tradition to exercise influence on a world scale.

De Gaulle also sought accord on US use of nuclear weapons. He wished nothing less than a veto over their use anywhere in the world. An exception would have been to counter a direct attack against the homeland of any of the three powers. In return for US-British agreement on these points, de Gaulle is alleged to have offered to cooperate fully within NATO. France's interests would have been fully covered and, through a tight tripartite alliance within an alliance, the interests of the US, Britain, and France would have been mutually merged. France would have been accepted as an equal of Britain and the US, and its voice would have carried the same weight in NATO decision making as the Anglo-Saxons. De Gaulle did not propose, as newspaper stories indicated, a

formal Atlantic Directorate.³² He did seek, however, the cooperative development of Big Three strategic and foreign policy on an egalitarian basis whose form was open to negotiation.

De Gaulle's memorandum suggests his views of alliances and, specifically, the tests that he applies to the usefulness of the NATO Treaty. Alliances are convenient accords that bind only as they serve the interests of the parties to them. He rejects the notion of the Atlantic Alliance leading to a system of global security and economic and political integration through the preceding development of an Atlantic Community.^{33, 34} De Gaulle quite candidly accepts the Atlantic Alliance on at once narrower and broader terms. On the one hand, it is and must remain a solemn guaranty pact among sovereign states. However conceived by the Americans or British, it is only one of a number of tools of French diplomacy. It is a convenient instrument to ensure French security principally against Soviet aggression. Its utility, however, is measured always by French, not American, views. If an alliance is to be broadened in scope, it must be done by mutual consent of the parties; if conditions change, previous commitments must be re-examined and reevaluated. How could it be otherwise in de Gaulle's view? What is lasting is the state, not its commitments. Alliances cannot be permanent. They bind only as they are responsive to the interests and viewpoints of the original parties that initially gave rise to the alliance. Certainly the maintenance of the political system and the preservation and the maximization of freedom of action in foreign affairs are a state's lodestars. Its alliance policy must be guided by these larger considerations. Alliances are an extension of the state. For de Gaulle, the Atlantic Alliance is an extension of France. Through the Treaty, French power is maximized because France potentially has access to the power of 14 other nations including the US. In the case of conflict between alliance and French national policy, the former must yield. Each decision to cooperate or resist alliance policy is calculated at the margin. If sufficient tension and difference develop between the two policies and the decisional frameworks by which they are reached, then alliance commitments either must be reduced or the alliance must be abandoned. The rejection of the alliance, in whole or in part, is inherent in the basic assumption of the supremacy of the nation-state. De Gaulle has asked of the Atlantic Alliance:

How indeed in the long-run could a Government, a Parliament, a people give their money and their services with all their heart in time of peace, and make their sacrifices in time of war, for a system in which they are not responsible for their defense? That is why from this point of view... a revival of the Alliance seems indispensable to us (Ref 11, p 96).

With his penchant for global strategy, de Gaulle perceived early the possible conflict between NATO policy and national policy not only within Europe but also in the Third World. The Suez crisis of 1956 indicated how a serious fissure could develop between NATO allies in a different part of the globe where France still claimed to have an interest and a major role to play. The US had intervened in Lebanon without much more than a notice to the French government several hours before the actual landing of troops. The possibility of taking such action had admittedly been conveyed to the French. Nevertheless there was no preceding consultation as de Gaulle expected of his allies. Nor did the US consult with France about US actions in Quemoy in 1958.

Similarly, at the time of de Gaulle's dispatch of his memorandum, France found itself increasingly isolated within NATO because of its Algerian policy, yet desperately in need of allied diplomatic support. From the US view, France's determination to retain Algeria gravely weakened Arab-Western relations and, from a military strategic perspective, tied down 400,000 French troops who were earmarked in NATO planning for European defense. The US sought through the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to avoid choosing between its European ally with whom it sharply disagreed and the Arab states. On a number of important UN resolutions that criticized or condemned France's North African policy, the US either offered lukewarm and hesitant support or abstained. The French government deplored the ambiguity of the American position. American behavior fell short of de Gaulle's test of an alliance partner. French adherence to NATO and cooperation within its arrangements did not yield the aid that was needed in an area of the world that it considered vital to its interest and that it had attempted to incorporate for over a century within metropolitan France. The de Gaulle government's reaction to what appeared tentative British and US support was given by Prime Minister Michael Debré in a speech at L'Île-Bouchard on 16 August 1959. His remarks reveal France's expectations of allied cooperation in areas outside the immediate confines of Europe:

Alliances have benefit for a country only as much as the latter is able to be respected and can compensate for the sacrifices to which it consents in the common interest by the sacrifices to which its allies consent, should the case arise, in favor of its own interests. The national revival of our policy is not one of isolation, but is a reaction... against forms of alliance which, because of our weakness, led, in fact, to our servitude by foreign powers, which, and notably in Africa, do not hesitate to oppose our essential interests... It belongs to a renewed France to make its allies understand that it is in the right to demand from all of them the support for a cause (Algeria) which is much greater than one people or one generation.³⁵

Both Debré and de Gaulle linked alliance in Europe and the concomitant requirement to seek common policies there with global security and policy coordination among the major Western Powers. Neither left doubt that the basis of the Alliance was at issue if a worldwide strategy could not be developed among the wartime Western Big Three. Each indicated the calculation and convergence of self-interest that underlay French evaluation of the utility of the Atlantic Alliance. On the critical questions of Algeria and North Africa, France found the NATO treaty more a hindrance than a help. The extension of the Alliance to Africa would have serviced French objectives. American and British insistence on limiting the Alliance to Europe downgraded the NATO Treaty's utility in de Gaulle's mind in terms of the immediate and overriding problem confronting France. He recognized that his power in France would depend on his handling of the Algerian problem. Here his allies seemingly let him down and threatened through their interests elsewhere to complicate his foreign and domestic problems by involving France in unsought conflicts around the globe. As André Fontaine observed in 1958, France could be involved "in a world war without having had the opportunity to do anything to prevent it."³⁶ For their parts the US and Britain sought to minimize their involvement in the entangling webs of the Algerian War and Arab and French domestic politics. De Gaulle could understand such hesitancy from the perspective of US and British national interest, but paradoxically enough he could not condone their behavior from the point of view of French

self-interest as he defined it. This clash of national interests reinforced de Gaulle's doubts about the utility of the Atlantic Alliance for French foreign policy and for his personal political position as President of France.

De Gaulle's alliance position rested on a number of questionable and, in some respects, contradictory assumptions. His willingness to subordinate France to NATO hinged on whether France would be given a veto over its policies and would enjoy a privileged position vis-à-vis the US. Under these circumstances, NATO policy would be French policy or would necessarily be shaped to an acceptable degree to suit French views. The power, interests, and responsibilities of the US would be reduced to legal equality with France. Within de Gaulle's terms, global policy among the Western Powers would tend to develop as a compromise of the Western Big Three. De Gaulle chose to drive a very stiff bargain. Unless the alliance strengthened France's regional and world position, it suffered from a serious, if not fatal, defect. If it could not be turned to French interests, e.g., in Algeria, its utility was diminished and France's responsibility for its maintenance was correspondingly reduced. France joined in alliance to maximize its power; if alliance diminished French power in any way or constrained its diplomacy, then to the degree that it clashed with France's interests the alliance was essentially inoperative.

In de Gaulle's view, his proposals did not receive a systematic hearing from the US or Britain. President Eisenhower's reply of 20 October 1958 rejected the de Gaulle proposal on a number of grounds: (a) US interests were too extensive and its responsibilities too much greater than France's to permit their reduction to a tripartite arrangement; (b) other NATO allies would object to being excluded from the group, which would be making decisions affecting their interests; and (c) the US saw too many difficulties in extending the NATO Treaty to other areas of the globe (Atlantic Alliance,³¹ pp 230-31).

In the succeeding 3 years a series of inconclusive meetings between the two governments took place. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles took the position in December 1958 that the US was ready to consult on world problems but would not go beyond an exchange of views. This position was extended in early 1959 to the Far East situation to include discussion by general staff officers of strategic aspects of the area. In April 1959 the US and Britain agreed to discuss African problems and to assign military experts to these talks. The French government ignored the offer. Presidents Eisenhower and de Gaulle met in 1959 and 1960, but no progress was made in developing a tripartite framework for consultation and decision on political and strategic questions. De Gaulle found his political consultations with President Eisenhower useful, but he again called for cooperation in strategy. De Gaulle failed to respond to an Eisenhower suggestion to hold talks among military representatives on worldwide problems. He recommended instead the more formal approach of a heads-of-government meeting "to work out a joint plan for organizing united action on world problems and for reorganizing the Atlantic Alliance."³⁷ De Gaulle later agreed to President Kennedy's proposal of 2 June 1961 to have military representatives of the three governments review strategic requirements and prepare common positions "whenever possible" (Ref 37, p 229). De Gaulle, however, did not name military representatives to a meeting. He again raised the issue of combined planning in a letter to President Kennedy in August 1961. In this instance Kennedy did not respond (Ref 37, p 10E). The impasse over joint planning remained until 1966 when de Gaulle ruptured most of France's ties with the NATO organization.

It must be added that France's allies in NATO gave little indication of being any more enthusiastic than the US and Britain about a privileged tripartite decision-making authority within NATO to which they would not be privy. Italy's Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani announced on 29 October 1958, a week after President Eisenhower's reply to the de Gaulle proposal, that Italy would not accept an inferior position in the Alliance. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was equally cool. He found de Gaulle's views in conflict with the concept of French-German equality to which the French President had subscribed in talks with him. To these protests were joined those of Canada, Norway, and Holland. In the wake of de Gaulle's news conference of 5 September 1960, in which he exposed his views on NATO, Belgian Prime Minister Henri Spaak observed that a tripartite directorate was not acceptable to a majority in NATO. Adenauer reaffirmed his opposition on 10 November 1960. He accorded the leadership of NATO to the US and denied that any other nation should have a privileged position.³⁸

INTEGRATION AND NUCLEAR SHARING

Within his frame of reference de Gaulle has received little encouragement on the associated issues of integration and sharing of nuclear information and responsibility for the decision to employ nuclear weapons. His steadfast refusal to accept anything less than formal participation in joint political and strategic planning in a tripartite organization raises serious doubt that he ever really expected the US to accept his rigid terms on these issues. The gradual and, in retrospect, deliberate manner in which de Gaulle has withdrawn from the NATO organization casts doubt on whether, short of US capitulation to his demands, there was any way to compromise American-French differences as to their respective conceptions of the Alliance and its organization, the functions it was to perform, and the relative importance of the roles of the states to the accord. The trend in French policy toward NATO since 1958 has generally been in the direction of disengagement and withdrawal. This trend dates approximately from the last meetings between French and American military officers in February 1959, the principal joint undertaking arising from the de Gaulle memorandum.

On 7 March 1959 the de Gaulle government notified the Permanent NATO Council of its intention to transfer its naval forces in the Mediterranean from NATO control to national command in time of war. The announcement came at a trying moment since the West was working toward the development of a united front in the face of heavy Soviet pressure on Berlin. Belgium and Denmark had recently shortened the service time of draftees. In 1957 Bonn had reduced the period of conscription to 12 months and slowed the pace and scope of rearmament.³⁹ The French move, although not critical from a military standpoint, further weakened NATO's military and diplomatic stance. GEN Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, voiced concern in a 19 March news conference that the French pullout threatened the principle of integration.

On the day of Norstad's news conference, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville noted that the French naval force protected the transport of Saharan oil and guaranteed liaison with North Africa and the French Community. In case of war, explained the Foreign Minister, France would still be prepared to cooperate

with allied forces. GEN de Gaulle was more pointed than his Foreign Minister in explaining the French withdrawal. In his news conference of 25 March, he went beyond Couve de Murville and dismissed Norstad's anxiety. He observed that the US and Britain had withheld the greater part of their naval forces from NATO and had "kept in their hands alone the principal element of strength, their atomic bombers" (Ref 11, p 49). To ensure that his point was not lost, he concluded his NATO remarks by a direct assault on NATO's principle of integration.

I believe that the Alliance will be all the more vital and strong as the great powers unite on the basis of a cooperation in which each carries his own load, rather than on the basis of an integration in which peoples and governments find themselves more or less deprived of their roles and responsibilities in the domain of their own defense (Ref 35, pp 564-69).

The French withdrawal was framed against a number of other serious French-NATO disputes. The de Gaulle government refused the stockpiling of nuclear weapons on French territory unless France was given control over their use. The US, however, held firm to the policy, already applied in other NATO countries, that US personnel retain ultimate determination over atomic weapons. The impasse was complete. In December 1959 GEN Norstad's command transferred the American fighter-bombers at Toul to Germany where acceptable atomic-depository arrangements were in operation. The French government considered the move final and gave no sign of revising its position (Ref 35, pp 564, 569).

The American proposal for the emplacement of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in France under joint-control arrangements and for a reorganized and more tightly integrated air-defense system for NATO was also at issue even before de Gaulle's term of office. The government of Félix Gaillard had already laid down conditions for French acceptance of American IRBMs that were unacceptable to the US. French criticism of NATO nuclear policy was sharp even before de Gaulle's entry into the French political scene. In 1957 Jules Moch attacked NATO strategy that divided shield and sword forces and permitted the US to monopolize NATO's nuclear sword. In light of the growing nuclear balance between East and West, Moch no longer believed this division to be justifiable. The Gaillard government adopted a similar line. Not unlike de Gaulle's insistence on the issue of a global strategy was the Gaillard government's argument that allied strategy could no longer be confined to NATO; strategy was global and atomic.⁴⁰ Negotiations with the Gaillard and de Gaulle regimes consequently proved futile. The Fourth and Fifth Republics were quite close in their opposition to US nuclear policy in NATO. The US position, as outlined in President Eisenhower's 28 October response to de Gaulle, revealed little if any ground for compromise.

Slightly more progress was made on NATO air defenses. De Gaulle resisted the inclusion of French forces into an integrated air-defense system, although a strictly national system made no sense in the confined geography of Europe. NATO members were convinced that the construction of a system of advanced-warning stations necessitated a single command to launch NATO's air-defense forces in case enemy forces breached the first line of defense. Negotiations among France and the other NATO powers actively commenced in December 1959. GEN Norstad's command argued that Europe was too small and the time

for consultation too limited to establish a nationally based command authority to cover the advanced-warning system stretching from the northern cap of Norway to the Mediterranean. In February the French government gave its consent to a new air-defense structure in NATO. French units, like those of its Mediterranean naval forces, would remain under national control, but they would be inserted into the allied system at the general-headquarters level according to a formula of tight coordination (Ref 35, p 568). The air-defense accord matched French consent to Norstad's 30-division force for NATO that was presented at the December 1959 meeting of the NATO ministers. France agreed to these force levels although, like most of the other nations of NATO except for the US and Germany, it failed eventually to comply with its assessed contribution.

These hopeful signs of cooperation were marred somewhat by the attack launched by Air Force GEN Nathan Twining on 10 December 1960 at a meeting of NATO military chiefs of staff. He reproached France for having compromised the military progress of the Alliance and even its cohesion. In his reply French Defense Minister Pierre Guillaumat chided Twining for going beyond the framework of the NATO Military Committee and affirmed France's attachment to the Alliance and to the principle of close cooperation in the Atlantic zone. American Defense Secretary Thomas G. Gates regretted the publication of Twining's remarks but felt that they were a valuable commentary on the military consequences of French political decisions. The Western Powers, particularly the US and Britain, hesitated to press de Gaulle further on NATO issues so long as hope existed that he could liquidate the Algerian War.

What is interesting of course is the extent to which de Gaulle was willing to antagonize his allies on the issues of nuclear sharing or NATO integration despite his burdensome and precarious involvement in Algeria. He risked erosion of his domestic political power in attacking NATO at its heart even as he moved slowly and cautiously to settle the Algerian crisis that was to threaten his office. The risks taken by de Gaulle indicate his resolution to have his way in NATO—if indeed any more examples need to be offered. On the other hand, de Gaulle's willingness to agree to an air defense accord, NATO force levels, and command and control by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe (SHAPE) over French contingents suggests a flexibility on de Gaulle's part to tolerate often-entangling foreign involvement to protect French security interests. This same suppleness is suggested in the September 1960 accord between Germany and France. The French government consented to provide West Germany with installations for the stocking of equipment to extend the fighting duration of NATO and German troops.

The German accord differed, however, in two important respects from the NATO agreements: it was bilateral, which held obvious political advantages for France, and it permitted additional French control over the German army. That de Gaulle unilaterally relinquished this lever over the West German government in March 1966 suggests from another perspective how detestable he finds any form of possible restraint on French independence and sovereignty.

REJECTION OF NUCLEAR-SHARING PROPOSALS

Even before the explosion of the first French atomic bomb in February 1960, the US was moving toward developing some means to head off such independent

nuclear effort, either within NATO or directly through international accord with its principal adversary, the Soviet Union. The French were adamantly committed to their own independent nuclear deterrent. French intransigence became increasingly clear as the de Gaulle government systematically ignored or rejected a series of nuclear-sharing proposals—whether inspired within a NATO or European framework.

GEN Norstad's proposal for NATO to become a fourth nuclear power took initial shape in Secretary of State Christian Herter's plan presented at the December 1960 meeting of NATO ministers to assign five Polaris submarines to NATO in time of war. The plan foresaw the development of a multilateral force. The Standing Group, with France as a member, would determine how these forces would be employed. The submarines would be irrevocably assigned to NATO contingent on the signing of an accord. The US was also ready to sell 100 missiles to be sea-deployed under NATO control.

The French response was presaged in the remarks of Prime Minister Michel Debré and Defense Minister Pierre Messmer at the meeting of the Assembly of the Western European Union in early December. Both defended France's independent nuclear development. Messmer insisted that France's effort did not in principle differ from those of the US and Britain. A week after the Herter proposal, France exploded its third A-bomb.⁴¹

President Kennedy affirmed Herter's proposal in somewhat amended form. Interested in increased European spending for conventional forces—a policy opposite to evolving French military views—President Kennedy agreed to assign Polaris submarines to NATO but dropped the provisions for the sale of missiles. Secretary of State Dean Rusk presented this proposal at the May 1961 meeting of NATO ministers in Oslo. Five submarines were foreseen immediately, nine by 1965. The President of the US would retain for the moment the decision on their use. A week later President Kennedy told the Canadian Parliament that the US contemplated the eventual establishment of a NATO seaborne missile force that would be truly multilateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by its allies once NATO's nonnuclear goals had been achieved. The US would commit five, and subsequently more, Polaris submarines to NATO "subject to any agreed NATO guidelines for their control and use and responsive to the needs of all members but still credible in an emergency."⁴²

Kennedy raised much the same points in his meeting with de Gaulle in Paris a few weeks later. De Gaulle reiterated the position that he had already outlined in his news conference of 21 April 1961: NATO must be extended in order to retain "the close solidarity between its members, which is indispensable to it;" nuclear weapons use must be clarified; and defense must remain national since "in integration... the integrated country loses its interest in national defense [and] ... the whole structure of the Alliance then loses its resilience and its strength" (Ref 11, pp 123–24). Four days later France exploded its fourth nuclear bomb.

The US persisted in its efforts to develop some form of nuclear-sharing policy within NATO as the central feature of an entire reappraisal of overall US and NATO strategic policy.⁴³ In the spring of 1962, a review of NATO policy sought to enhance the credibility of the American commitment and to shift NATO policy increasingly toward nonnuclear forces. Meanwhile West Germany was alleged to be pressing for some form of nuclear deterrent directly within NATO, but one that would not be exclusively under US control. Defense Minister Franz

Strauss went even further. In a May interview with a German newspaper he criticized the suggestion of a special NATO tactical nuclear force and called instead for the arming of existing German units with a greater proportion of weapons capable of receiving nuclear arms. He saw no reason to go beyond the initial German commitment of 12 conventional divisions.⁴⁴

On 1 March 1962 Secretary of State Dean Rusk noted US willingness to consult with its allies on nuclear sharing.⁴⁵ A month later Assistant Secretary of State George Ball indicated renewed US interest in President Kennedy's Ottawa proposal.⁴⁶ George McGhee, a ranking State Department official and present ambassador to Germany, similarly recognized the need for a greater sharing of nuclear responsibility.⁴⁷ At the NATO ministers meeting at Athens in May 1962, the US formally placed five Polaris submarines at NATO disposal as a measure of fulfillment of the Ottawa pledge. This measure was followed by President Kennedy's speech on 4 July 1962 at Independence Hall in Philadelphia, in which he advocated an Atlantic partnership based on a united Europe. He referred to a new declaration of interdependence between Europe and the US. In a speech in Copenhagen in August, McGeorge Bundy averred that "it would be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which we feel to individual, ineffective and unintegrated forces would be extended automatically to a European force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of the alliance."⁴⁸ In October 1962 a US technical mission headed by Gerard Smith, former assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, and RADM John M. Lee went to Europe to explain American findings that favored a NATO midrange ballistic missile (MRBM) force. George Ball reaffirmed American interest in some form of multilateral force (MLF) at the NATO parliamentarians' meeting in Paris.

These efforts were rapidly crystallized in the November decision of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to scrap the Skybolt missile on which Britain placed much of its hopes to extend the life of its V-bomber force. The maintenance of the British nuclear deterrent was at stake. After a month of harried and turbulent negotiations between Washington and London, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan met at Nassau 18-21 December 1962. It was agreed that the US would make the Polaris missile available to British submarines. Britain would build the submarines and warheads. These forces would be targeted according to NATO plans. The US would contribute at least an equal amount of force to be made available in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. Britain retained the option of using its submarine forces in the event that "supreme national interests are at stake."⁴⁹ The Anglo-American pact was accompanied by a similar offer to the French (*L'Année*,²³ p 610).

French policy, however, was already moving toward an independent nuclear deterrent. Progress along this route proved to have gone too far to be arrested at this late date. De Gaulle pressed his campaign for the force de frappe despite the grave difficulties that he faced in Algeria and growing opposition in the National Assembly. The Algerian question nearly toppled de Gaulle from power. His experience with mutinous army officers deepened his conviction concerning the need for a truly national defense and the commitment of the nation's armed forces and officer corps to the nation and its legitimate authorities. De Gaulle had told President Kennedy of the importance of this consideration in his thinking (Ref 13, p 353). At least in the early stages of his thinking about the force de frappe, the

problem of wedding the army to the nation and its governing institutions and authority appeared important to his views.⁵⁰

De Gaulle challenged the National Assembly to adopt his nuclear program in 1960. The ground for his proposal had been laid in the Fourth Republic, which since 1952 had been actively and progressively more heavily engaged in nuclear research for military purposes.⁵¹ De Gaulle gave form and impetus to these previous efforts and, over newly formed and hardened opposition in the legislature, forced the force de frappe program to realization.

Although the Right and Left were opposed to de Gaulle's emerging Algerian policy in 1960, de Gaulle proposed nevertheless in October 1960 a projet de loi for the creation of a force de frappe. The Finance Committee of the National Assembly narrowly approved the government's plan by a vote of 18 to 17, with 9 abstentions. The Foreign Affairs Committee remained deadlocked. Opponents stressed the contradiction between a national nuclear force and the policy of establishing a united Europe. Others questioned the effectiveness of the Mirage IV and preferred to rely on US nuclear power. Still others objected to funds' being drained from the Algerian War or foresaw an unfortunate diminution in French conventional arms. The opposition moved to refuse examination of the program, but they were unable to prevail over government forces, which defeated the motion 264 to 213, with 41 abstentions.

An unsuccessful attempt was made to send the proposal to committee. Those voting in favor of this parliamentary maneuver now included members of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), which was a part of the de Gaulle government. A motion to censure the government failed on 25 October, carrying 207 votes, 34 votes short of a majority.

The bill thus passed a first reading in the National Assembly and went to the Senate where opposition forces were stronger. The Senate debated the proposal in the first week of November. After intense disagreement between government and opposition forces, including Senator Jean Lecanuet who was later to oppose de Gaulle for the French presidency, the Senate refused further to examine the force de frappe proposal on a vote of 186 to 83. A conference committee of the two legislative assemblies was unable to reach accord. Prime Minister Michel Debré moved to make the government's proposal a question of confidence, failure of which would mean the dissolution of parliament. The opposition countered with a motion of censure that gained 214 votes, 7 more than the previous censure motion, but still below the required number for a majority. The Senate again refused to discuss the proposal and the vote on a third censure motion failed to carry. The force de frappe had passed its initial legislative hurdle (Ref 41, pp 102-22).

Most relevant to the evolving NATO proposals for an integrated nuclear force were Debré's remarks to the National Assembly in defense of an independent French nuclear force. "There does not exist, and I can tell you there will not exist for a long time, anything other than national atomic forces, corresponding to the efforts of some nations. It ought to be understood that these forces should cooperate. But integration does not exist for the good reason that no one desires it" (Ref 41, p 562). Socialist leader Guy Mollet, whose government in 1956-1957 had supported a nuclear military-research program, queried Debré on whether he had attempted to explore the possibility of an integrated solution to nuclear arms; Debré ignored the question, and the measure passed (Ref 41, p 562).

The moment of truth between the de Gaulle government and the National Assembly on the force de frappe program occurred 2 years later. The government requested in 1962 an additional 200 million new francs (NF) for the construction of the nuclear separation plant at Pierrelatte. The Pierrelatte complex was destined to produce fissionable material for thermonuclear weapons. Initial governmental estimates had seriously underestimated the costs of the plant. The initial cost was set at 600 million NF and later raised to 1200 million NF. A total of 1230 million NF was already accorded the program, but work speedups and new expenses had raised the cost to 1430 million NF. Scientific Research Minister Gaston Palewski set the reestimated cost over 5 years for construction and operation at 4500 million NF. The Pierrelatte issue galvanized the opposition although it was hampered somewhat by (a) the possibility of creating a crisis 2 weeks before the parliamentary summer recess, (b) the imminence of an Algerian peace, and (c) the coming visit of West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The French Senate twice rejected the proposed increase. Prime Minister Georges Pompidou met the attack head on. He placed the matter before the National Assembly in a vote of confidence. Refusing to accept amendments to the government's proposals, Pompidou argued for continued parliamentary support that dated from the Fourth Republic. He also advanced the notion that the French effort was in the service of European unity: "The day can be very near wherein the political union of Europe will be constructed. It will extend, of course, to defense. The extent that the possession by France of a nuclear arm will be constituted will be an essential element for this [European] defense" (*L'Année*, ²³ p 90). The motion to censure received 206 votes, 35 short of the 241 required to carry it. The Union pour la Nouvelle République (UNR) cast its 177 votes against the motion. The opposition votes were grouped as shown in the accompanying tabulation.

Political affiliation	Members	For censure ^a
Communists	10	10
Socialists	43	43
Entente démocratique	36	25
MRP	57	33
Independents	121	69
Nonregistered	36	26
Total	303	206

^aRef 23, p 91. For the full discussion of the assembly vote, see *ibid*, p 165, and *La Libération*, 12 Oct 60.

His opposition divided and dispersed at home, de Gaulle pressed his program for an independent nuclear deterrent abroad. He resisted American pressures to increase French purchase of American conventional equipment to bolster NATO nonnuclear defense and to improve the US sagging balance-of-payments deficit. De Gaulle reportedly sent GEN Lavaud to the US in March 1961 to explain the French position. France was willing to buy materials for its atomic-energy program, from submarine equipment to a plant for the production of enriched uranium. It was ready to pay immediately for its goods. The American government is reported to have turned Lavaud down.

The sharp response of French Prime Minister Debré to the American refusal prompted President Kennedy to send his leading military adviser, GEN

Maxwell D. Taylor, to Europe. According to French sources, Taylor is alleged to have recommended acceptance of the de Gaulle request. His views paralleled those of American Ambassador to Paris James Gavin; Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon was supposed to have been inclined to accept the French offer that conceivably might have yielded sales of \$700 million.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, supported by GEN Norstad, NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker, and a number of minor NATO countries, demurred. On 18 April 1962 President Kennedy held a news conference in which he reiterated his objection to further nuclear proliferation. Two months later Defense Secretary Robert McNamara openly attacked the French nuclear effort in a speech at the University of Michigan as "dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent."⁵² President Kennedy had presaged McNamara's more pointed statement in his news conference of 21 June. Kennedy judged the force de frappe as contrary to the interests of the Atlantic Community and an encouragement to other countries to follow the same example. The President's views received considerable coverage in France.

Nevertheless President Kennedy approved the sale in June 1962 of 12 KC-135 tankers for in-flight refueling of the Mirage IV, whose short range seriously limits its attack capability particularly in missions against the Soviet Union. No contradiction was officially noted or rationalized between the opposition to dissemination of nuclear information and the sale of tankers that were indispensable for the effective operation of the French nuclear force. The White House approval may have been influenced in part by GEN Taylor's reported conclusion that the US had little chance to reduce de Gaulle's hostility to NATO and that it should accept the creation of the force de frappe (*L'Année*,²³ p 499). De Gaulle's refusal to cooperate in NATO was paralleled by his failure to comply with the Paris accords of 1954, which called on France to report its work on the fabricating of nuclear arms to the Agency for the Control of Armament (*L'Année*,²³ p 484).

French tenacity in developing an independent nuclear deterrent offered little encouragement that de Gaulle would accept the Nassau proposal. De Gaulle's answer came expectedly at his news conference of 14 January 1963. He rejected both British entry into the Common Market and the Polaris offer. De Gaulle pressed for the same independence of action in using nuclear weapons that the US had threatened in the October Cuban missile crisis. De Gaulle had been the first to pledge his support to the US in the midst of that tension. In talks with Secretary Rusk he had applauded President Kennedy's handling of the problem. It justified his own claims for nationally controlled weapons (*L'Année*,²³ p 610). In his news conference, however, de Gaulle suppressed his admiration for the American President. He stressed instead the initiative that the US in protecting its own interests had taken without the consent of or consultation with other powers. Europe was subordinated, allegedly, to US interests. "Thus the immediate defense, and one can say privileged defense of Europe and the military participation of the Europeans which were once basic factors of their [United States] strategy," said de Gaulle, "moved by the force of circumstance into second place."

Playing on European fears—a tactic that the de Gaulle government was to employ with increasing frequency—de Gaulle questioned whether the US would come to the aid of Europe in a crisis. "No one in the world—particularly no one in America—can say if, where, when, how and to what extent the American nuclear weapons would be employed to defend Europe."⁵³ That Europe would have

been more gravely threatened, as President Kennedy had observed,⁵⁴ if the US had not responded to the Cuban challenge appeared beside the point to de Gaulle. He sought rationalization for his determination to have France possess its own nuclear forces, not a rationale for grand strategy in a moment of crisis. As did the US, France allegedly needed its own nuclear weapons. It could not rely indefinitely on an alliance with the US, however useful a league with the American colossus was at the moment. "Alliances have no absolute virtues, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based," said de Gaulle. "If one spontaneously loses. . . the free disposition of oneself, there is a strong risk of never regaining it" (Ref 11, p 216). Nuclear weapons permitted self-disposition. The Cuban crisis demonstrated to de Gaulle that nuclear weapons, not a greater number of conventional ones, were decisive.

Nor did de Gaulle see much utility in the proposed MLF as such. France had neither nuclear submarines nor thermonuclear warheads. It did not enjoy a special relation with the US, as did England. By the time that French technology was able to use the missile, it was expected to be capable of producing its own delivery vehicles. Worse still, in de Gaulle's mind, the MLF entailed a "web of liaisons, transmissions, and interferences" that violated French defense doctrine of independence. A French force, if integrated in a multilateral arrangement, would not be easily responsive to French needs and its withdrawal would jeopardize the operation of the MLF, very likely at a time when its efficient use was most needed.

De Gaulle's news conference left in shambles the Kennedy administration's Grand Design for Europe.⁵⁵ It wrecked the idea of a united Europe including Britain. It exposed to painful light the inner quarrel, as Arthur Schlesinger has written, between American-European equality and continued reliance by Europe on the American deterrent (Ref 13, pp 343-78, 842-88).

The rift in French-American relations was to grow increasingly large and to continue to the present. The list of differences is long and disconcerting: the gold standard, international monetary policy, foreign aid to the Third World, the recognition of Red China, American military intervention in Santo Domingo, UN financing, Congo, Vietnam, nonparticipation in disarmament and nuclear control talks, refusal to sign the Test Ban Treaty, disengagement from SEATO, and most recently the Israeli-Arab conflict. But overshadowing these differences are the multiple frictions and clashes that have characterized French-American relations over NATO policy, including its strategy, force requirements, organization, and decisional arrangements. De Gaulle's January news conference marked in effect the informal opening of diplomatic hostilities between the two countries. A number of skirmishes had occurred before, as in the withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet. These actions were a rehearsal of what was to follow.

The French launched a concerted attack on any scheme for a NATO MLF or multinational force (MNF). In the 2 years, 1963-1964, during which some form of NATO joint nuclear force was under active consideration, France offered the most systematic attack and critique of any Atlantic Alliance power. The high costs of the marginal addition to NATO's nuclear power were duly noted. Scant credibility was given by the French to hints that the NATO force might eventually operate free of a US veto.⁵⁶ Under the circumstances Europe would be paying heavily for a force that it could not use at its discretion.

Besides, the French argued, the MLF or MNF proposals reversed priorities. They presumed the existence of a political authority in Europe that did not seem likely to be created for some time to come. Meanwhile France's force de frappe was to be at the disposal of Europe. It was touted to be an eventual alternative to the US deterrent. In presenting the government's military program to the National Assembly in 1964, French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou justified his proposal by asserting, "Each of our soldiers, each of our atomic bombs serves Europe as France."⁵⁷ At Strasbourg on 22 November 1964 de Gaulle looked to the day when the Six would "put into practice among themselves in the political domain—which is first that of defense—an organization, certainly allied to the New World, but which would truly be theirs, with its objectives, its resources, and its obligations."⁵⁸ The American-sponsored MLF or the British MNF—any pooling arrangement with the US—hampered European unity because of continued dependency on the US.⁵⁹

The US campaign for a multilateral nuclear force conflicted directly with de Gaulle's vision of Europe. Germany would be given access to nuclear weapons. France worked behind the scenes to prevent this from occurring. At one point Pompidou threatened that the French government would withdraw its forces from NATO. The French saw the MLF as a means of driving a wedge between them and the Germans. If Germany were to be the largest contributor to the MLF, this would be in conflict with the French-German Treaty of 1963. American assurances that a US-German MLF would not be acceptable fell on deaf ears. The French criticism served rather to arouse European sentiment against the MLF proposal. Britain and the Scandinavian countries were not eager to see Germany gain increased influence over American nuclear policy.⁶⁰ Some French officials held the MLF to be sham. They pointed to the contradiction between American assurances of continued control and American suggestions that its veto over MLF use might be lifted.

The MLF also complicated a détente with Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union had objected on a number of occasions to German participation in the MLF. Here French and Soviet views were similar (Ref 53, p 251). It was the French dream to establish by common agreement a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. German access to nuclear weapons not only diluted the French force de frappe as a diplomatic bargaining tool, but it also threatened to arouse Soviet fears and preclude an eventual political settlement in Europe.⁶¹

In the spring of 1965 Secretary of Defense McNamara proposed a NATO group to examine nuclear policy in the Atlantic Alliance. For many of the same reasons, the French were cool to this so-called McNamara Committee proposal, which was offered by the US as a substitute for the defunct MLF. President Johnson had largely shelved the MLF idea in the winter of 1964. The French indicated that they would study the proposal, but French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer failed to participate in Paris talks on the McNamara Committee that were held in the following autumn. The de Gaulle government refused to cooperate further in the effort. In the French view the Committee had grown too large in membership. De Gaulle was still focused on a Paris-London-Washington grouping. The Committee would study, not share, nuclear-decision responsibility with the US. The McNamara initiative had come too late in any event. The French policy of cutting ties with the US had moved too far to be arrested or reversed.

Since his news conference of 14 January 1963, in which he rejected Britain's entry into the Common Market, the French President spoke with increasing frequency of the French mission to avoid rule by either the US or the Soviet Union—the so-called "hegemonical" powers. In his 14 January statement, de Gaulle referred to the utility of France as an independent ally and small but formidable foe. From the context of his remarks it was not immediately clear which of the great powers was ally or foe. Said de Gaulle: "France, when formerly it was its turn to be world colossus, often experienced the worth of either the resistance of a less powerful but well-equipped adversary, or the support of an ally lining up inferior but well-tempered and well-employed weapons " (Ref 11, p 218). In rejecting the Moscow accord in testing, de Gaulle reaffirmed France's determination to arm itself with nuclear weapons. He told reporters:

We repeat that a mere agreement on tests between Soviet and Anglo-Saxons, already invested with immeasurable power, and who do not cease to strengthen it and thereby to confirm day by day their respective hegemonies, a mere agreement will not prevent France also from equipping herself with the same kind of means, failing which, since others have these means, France's own security and her independence would never again belong to her (Ref 11, p 238).

This same theme was repeated in a speech at Orange, France, in September (Ref 53, p 289).

France's national drive to independence was subsequently broadened to imply a universal effort on behalf of Europe and the Third World. De Gaulle told a French radio and television audience on 16 April 1964, that France had a responsibility for world leadership. Essential to that role was the development of its own nuclear weapons in order thereby to be freed of a protector of uncertain reliability. It also required the extension of aid to the Third World. Failure of France to respond would leave a vacuum that would be filled by the great powers. To stand apart, asserted de Gaulle:

... would be tantamount to denying the role which is ours as regards the evolution which is bringing so many peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America to develop themselves, in their turn, without surrendering to one or the other of the two hegemonies which are tending to share the world so long as Western Europe is not able or does not have the will to organize itself so that the balance may be found (Ref 17, p 4).

France's opposition to both powers was natural for a nation of its history. It was to be expected that the Soviet Union and the US would seek to maintain their positions and would even agree to divide the world into spheres of influence.

The fact that America and Soviet Russia possess their nuclear arsenals provides them with such security and moreover gives them, inside their respective camps, such a reason for exercising hegemony that they will not get rid of theirs, no [sic] more than any other State in their place would get rid of its arsenal, whatever its ideology, its nature and its propaganda (Ref 28, p 8).

French independence was an example to others, inspiring them to resist placing themselves "either under the blow of crushing competition [of the US and Russia] or under the yolk of a double hegemony that would be agreed upon between the two rivals."⁶² This elaborate rationale underlay the gradual, yet systematic, withdrawal or nonparticipation of France in the NATO organization in the period 1963-1966.

France would also have nothing to do with the interallied force that had been suggested at the Nassau meeting. Hope of French cooperation had been held out since French pilots were trained under NATO auspices in the use of nuclear weapons. The French had even agreed to a two-key system for segments of its more than 400 combat fighter planes in Germany.⁶³ Nevertheless the French stayed clear of any involvement in the proposed NATO force to be composed of existing strategic and tactical units. They also neglected to assign to NATO the two divisions that returned from Algeria, and they made no effort to meet their quota of the 50-division conventional NATO force to which France had agreed.

On 21 June 1963 the French government announced the withdrawal of its Atlantic fleet from NATO. Its decision was seen as part of the logic of its previous withdrawal of its Mediterranean fleet from NATO in 1959. The fiction that the fleet was needed to maintain vital communications was dropped. The 1959 decision had been based on French requirements to maintain liaison with North Africa. However, the French fleet was moved from Toulon on the Mediterranean to Brest on the Atlantic (Ref 52, p 266-67). On 24 April 1964 French naval staff officers were withdrawn from NATO service, since French units were largely placed under national control. In NATO naval war games of September 1964, French surface vessels were ordered at the last moment not to participate. The Pentagon attempted to minimize the French action, but the de Gaulle government publicly insisted that the French move was a deliberate action to underline its policy of nonparticipation. Only five submarines still remained formally attached to NATO.⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that the French initially challenged integration by withdrawal of their naval forces, which, although important to NATO, were less central to its planning than ground and air units. France began a slow disengagement from NATO army units by failing to participate in the "Fallex" exercise in June 1965 and by having decided earlier not to adopt a rifle caliber similar to those used by US units. It had agreed in 1960 to a coordinated air-defense system although reports in 1965 indicated less-than-total French coverage in the NATO Air Defense and Ground Environment (NADGE) system.⁶⁵ Its energy was principally focused until early 1966 on resisting the potential extensions of the integration principle as in the case of the MLF or the implanting of missiles and stocking of nuclear weapons on French soil. It refused to accept the 1963 Athens guidelines for the use of atomic weapons. Former NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker has said "to this list should be added details on French positions in the NATO Council on split communiqués after ministerial meetings, and France's hostile attitude toward the International Secretariat and the Secretary General on basic questions of procedure and administration."⁶⁶

Hope lingered in some quarters that the French President would stop his attack on the NATO structure. President Kennedy, however, decided that there was no possibility of compromise with de Gaulle short of capitulation to his demands (Ref 54, pp 643-49). Yet each French provocation surprised American officials. The American interpretation of the latest French onslaught would invariably minimize its significance whereas the French pointedly underscored their disengagement moves although simultaneously affirming support for the Alliance. Each French retreat assumed increasingly the character of a diplomatic event. The pattern of French withdrawal was becoming clearer and more compelling.

At his news conference of 22 February 1966 de Gaulle warned that France would no longer adhere to NATO's organizational arrangements: "France, without ending her membership in the Atlantic Alliance, will continue to modify present arrangements until April 4, 1969, when her obligations are due to end. . . . Of course, the changes will take place gradually so that her allies do not suddenly find themselves inconvenienced by her action" (Ref 63, p 6). De Gaulle reiterated French claims of sovereignty and the intention to assert national authority over French ground, air, and sea forces and all foreign units on French soil.⁶⁷

Four days before these warnings, the New York Times quoted French diplomatic sources as saying that France had not demanded a reorganization of NATO and its reversion in effect to a bilateral guaranty pact.⁶⁸ Like so many other predictions of Gaullist behavior, this projection underestimated again the potential extent of de Gaulle's determination to cut his NATO ties. To be sure, de Gaulle's own statements were also misleading. De Gaulle's actions in March contradicted his announced intention to adhere, with certain "adaptations," to NATO's military structure and to permit adequate time to France's allies to absorb these changes into their own planning.

The French memorandums of 8 and 10 March 1966 abruptly announced the withdrawal of all French units from NATO's integrated commands. They also notified allied governments that France could no longer accept "that any foreign units, installations or bases in France be responsible in any respect whatsoever to authorities other than French authorities."⁶⁹ The French government declared void certain bilateral accords between France and the US, Canada, and West Germany. It was prepared to discuss the consequences of French renunciation of these varied accords. The de Gaulle government was also ready to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the US and Canada regarding facilities that could be made available to both governments "on French territory in the event of a conflict" in which France might "participate by virtue of the Atlantic alliance" (Ref 69, pp 2-3).

The French government also requested examination of liaisons between French and NATO commands in Germany and clarification of the conditions under which French troops there would participate in time of war under Article 5 of the NATO pact. The French were willing to allow their troops to remain on the terms of the Paris accords of 23 October 1954. They were also ready to review the agreement of 25 October 1960 with West Germany by which military facilities were accorded to Germany forces in France.⁶⁹ The French justified these various initiatives on previously articulated grounds: (a) the Soviet menace was no longer "immediate or threatening," (b) the nuclear balance had diminished the significance of the American guaranty, (c) French nuclear weapons could not by their very nature be integrated, and (d) Europe had regained its strength and was no longer the center of world conflict. These justifications, however, appeared secondary to the political and psychological elements underlying them. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville gave expression to the latter elements of French concern in a radio interview on 6 April 1966. He argued that integrated French forces were threatened by the loss of their military personality and sense of national responsibility. These military compromises in command relations started the nation down a road in which it would lose its pride "because a country that is not concerned with its defense is not an independent country." Foreign troops on its soil, moreover, "impaired its sovereignty."⁷⁰

Again departing from de Gaulle's assurances of 22 February the French memorandums of 29 and 30 March to allied powers set out a rapid timetable for the withdrawal of French forces from NATO and the departure of foreign units from French soil. French troops in France and Germany were to withdraw from NATO largely by 1 July. The French note looked to the transfer from France of SHAPE and the headquarters for Allied Forces in Central Europe by 1 April 1967. These moves entailed the denunciation of the protocol of 28 August 1952. Certain facilities covered by bilateral arrangements with the US were abrogated and a 1 April 1967 deadline was set for their operational termination in France. The French expressed willingness "to make special provision" on a bilateral basis for the NATO pipeline that was subject of an agreement of 30 June 1953. Again the offer of French liaison missions with NATO commands was made, especially for French troops in Germany.⁷¹

The US and allied response was characteristic. President Johnson replied immediately to President de Gaulle's handwritten message of 7 March that preceded the formal conveyance of the French memorandums. President Johnson emphasized that the US would have to confer with its other NATO allies since the French action affected their collective security. France's NATO allies replied formally on 18 March. The note rejected the French distinction between the NATO treaty and organization. The communiqué said:

The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its efficacy as an instrument of defense and deterrence by the maintenance in peacetime of an integrated and interdependent military organization in which... the efforts and resources of each are combined for the common security of all... No system of bilateral arrangements can be a substitute.⁷¹ [emphasis added]

Although carefully avoiding any direct criticism of France, President Johnson met the French challenge head on. He saw no alternative to integration of forces in NATO to preserve Western security:

If our security effort should falter and our common determination be eroded, the foundation of the Atlantic's present stability would certainly be shaken... Yet a nation... by her own decision to prepare and plan alone... could still imperil her own security by creating a situation in which response would be too late and too diluted. Every advance in the technology of war makes more unacceptable the old and narrow concepts of sovereignty... It is our firm conviction that collective action through NATO is the best assurance that war will be deterred in the Atlantic world.⁷²

The President's words, although forceful, could not change the French course. There was little the US could do, but comply with de Gaulle's demands. It could formally protest the rigid time schedule set by the French and the questionable abrogation of some of the bilateral accords.⁷³ These were appropriate legal actions. These actions could not, however, redress the larger political issues raised by the French moves against NATO. The US did make clear to the French the consequences of withdrawal. The two-key arrangements by which French air forces were supplied with nuclear weapons were to be terminated.⁷⁴ Financial claims were also made against the French government for losses suffered in moving out of France.

The French memorandums anticipated allied criticism that France had failed to submit counterproposals for reorganizing NATO through negotiation. In attacking the government, René Pleven had made this point central to his critique of de Gaulle's unilateral actions. French officials argued that such a

course was futile. The French pointed further to the allied statement of 18 March that insisted on integration. No basis for compromise presumably existed to encourage a favorable outcome for the French through negotiations. The French quickly moved to neutralize allied reprisals. The de Gaulle government announced on 5 May that allied overflights of French territory would require monthly approval. French permission had previously been given on an annual basis.⁷⁵ French sources also disclosed that the US had stopped delivering atomic fuel to France for over a year in alleged violation of a 1959 accord to furnish materials for atomic submarines. The French charged the US with retaliation against France's attempts to gain its independence.⁷⁶ US circles were reported to have stated that President de Gaulle's determination to construct an atomic striking force went beyond the agreement. The French were working on a Polaris-type submarine rather than defensive "hunter-killers" as covered, according to American sources, by the 1959 pact.⁷⁷

These disclosures strengthened de Gaulle's hand at home. They played on previously voiced French resentment against the US for its refusal to render to France the same privileges in nuclear sharing that England enjoyed. In defending the French government's actions before the National Assembly, Prime Minister Georges Pompidou added fuel to French dissatisfaction in his defense of the de Gaulle government's NATO policies. He drew from his own experience in meeting with American officials the conviction that the US never intended to amend the McMahon Act and share either nuclear information or responsibility with France. In answer to charges that France had broken its word, Pompidou charged that the US instead had failed to keep its commitments on the critical question of NATO defense strategy. The doctrine of massive retaliation, Pompidou argued, had been unanimously adopted by the NATO Council, yet later had been unilaterally overturned by the US without consultation with or endorsement by its NATO allies, including France. He further argued:

Now, nothing better illustrates the accuracy of our theses and the totally illusory nature of the apparent equality within the [NATO] Council than this affairs of the strategic concept. . . .

For the strategy approved by the Council was that of massive and immediate atomic retaliation.

But, in actual fact, this strategic concept approved by the NATO Council unanimously, still theoretically in effect has been abandoned by the Supreme Command in favor of the concept of the flexible response. It sufficed for Mr. McNamara to replace Mr. Dulles's concepts with a strategy that the NATO Council had never approved for the new strategy to become, in fact, that of the Command. . . . We upheld, throughout conferences of military leaders and diplomatic representatives, our theses conforming to the official NATO doctrine. The entire apparatus, nonetheless, obeyed the directives of the American government. . . . And that is what integration is ⁷⁸

Pompidou reiterated the French charge that the American shift in strategy had benefited the US, not Europe or France. It allegedly suited the geographic position of US. Europe would become the nuclear battleground whereas the homelands of the US and the Soviet Union would be spared. Deterrence of Soviet attack was weakened in repeated claims of NATO's capability to defend Europe with conventional arms. Deterrence was not a function of integration since the US retained control of nuclear arms. Integrated forces did not stop aggressors or keep the peace. What did was the certainty that the aggressor would be destroyed. The Alliance brought the American nuclear deterrent to bear. In view

of the nuclear balance, that force was now of questionable value and the American strategy of flexible response was supposed, according to Pompidou, to have indicated as much. Pompidou said:

The aggressor's certainty that he would sustain intolerable losses is the only guarantee that we can have against aggression. That is what justified our own deterrent force. That is what leads us to remain in the Atlantic alliance. . . . You [Gaullist critics] tell us: NATO has guaranteed peace in Europe for 15 years. What an error if you are referring to the integrated organization. What has guaranteed peace is the alliance, in so far as it brought to bear the threat of the Strategic Air Command. . . .⁷⁶

On the other hand, integrated military establishments created "a collective war mechanism. . . [that] is the daughter of the cold war and helps to perpetuate it."⁷⁷

Continued participation in NATO also raised the risk of French involvement in wars against its interests; American bases in France became targets for nuclear bombardment. Pompidou minimized the risks of not being included in NATO's alert system. He counted on "a period of perceptible political tension" and "of military movements of sufficient importance that we may be placed on alert."⁸⁰ These arguments were reaffirmed by French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville.⁸¹

The divided opposition was unable to mount a serious threat to the de Gaulle government. A motion of censure collected only 137 votes, over a hundred votes short of the number needed to topple the government. The 137 votes included 64 socialists, 70 center democrats, and 3 nonaffiliated (Ref 80, pp 1, 3). Sentiment in the National Assembly favored de Gaulle's policies, although it must be noted that the precise explanation of each decision to support the de Gaulle policies varied from legislator to legislator. Thus, for example, an MRP delegate, who might have been expected to vote for censure, abstained from voting—in effect aligning himself with the Gaullists—out of fear of losing his seat in the upcoming legislative elections.⁸² On the basis of reports from France the favorable governmental sentiment in the National Assembly appeared to conform to public opinion. Except for a relatively small group within the national legislature, France's NATO pullout never generated much interest among the mass of French voters.⁸³

De Gaulle's will thus prevails at home, and his opponents lack the numbers and the will to reverse his NATO policy. Their leaders, René Pleven and Guy Mollet, are old and waning and out of step with emerging French opinion. De Gaulle, although working toward his own purposes, is still safely in the swelling mainstream of French elite and public thought on NATO policy. French criticisms of de Gaulle's foreign policies lie elsewhere. They are rooted in the deep fissures within French political life and the sharp social and economic class and status differences that exist. Given these differences, doubts can be raised whether de Gaulle can successfully play a Big Power role, even after France's modest resources are taken into account. The acquisitive appetite of the French people is not satisfied by foreign adventure. Social, economic, and educational progress lags. Demands for more housing, greater educational opportunities, expanded scientific and technological research, better roads, and more leisure lay claim to many of the resources that are needed for de Gaulle's conception of France's role in international relations and his vision of French grandeur.

On the other hand, disengagements from NATO and a termination of financial and military obligations under the Alliance are in keeping with the views of a majority of the French electorate—a political viewpoint that de Gaulle himself

has succeeded in creating partly through his repeated insistence on French independence. De Gaulle's nationalism, almost always carefully presented as in the service of larger goals, European and global, appeals to many Frenchmen on the Right and Left.⁴⁴ Independence from the US pleases many Frenchmen, especially since it can be had for what appears to be an ever diminishing cost. Indeed, opposition to US policies in Europe and the Third World creates the impression that the French are projecting on a worldwide scale the ideals that animated the French Revolution.

The vision is as staggering as the pretension. Here the views of the nationalist Right and internationalist Left converge. De Gaulle is acutely aware of the desire of both groups to be free of the US despite their polar differences over the goals that should direct French foreign policy. Overt American pressures on France to conform to current NATO doctrine are likely to enlarge and solidify Gaullist opposition to NATO policy in France without offering much hope that France will bend to whatever diplomatic, military, or economic pressures the US might apply.

Where de Gaulle's policy is vulnerable, as already suggested, is in his intention to play a world role. De Gaulle has helped breed a national and neutralist body of opinion in France. He and his successor are likely to face increasing difficulties in leading France to assume large regional and global responsibilities. This situation presents the US with a basic dilemma. It finds a neutralist France as intolerable as de Gaulle does, although the respective world roles that each assigns France differ radically.

It is precisely these questions that must be answered, and soon: What world role does the US envision for France, and more broadly for Europe, that will prove acceptable to these peoples? How, too, can it employ its immense resources to encourage assumption of this role? Answers to these questions depend on the prior question of whether France will continue as a member of the Atlantic Alliance, which is a basic cornerstone of American policy expectations.

The final section of this paper argues that the trends in de Gaulle's view of French foreign policy and international relations and his policies toward NATO since coming to office strongly tend to the conclusion that he will withdraw France from the Atlantic Alliance in 1969. The inner logic of French foreign and strategic policy under de Gaulle prompts this view. It would be useful now to define in more detail the implications of these trends and their relation to other important aspects of French foreign policy under de Gaulle. What follows is an attempt to predict what de Gaulle will do in 1969, a hazardous venture to be sure, yet a necessary one if American policy is to be responsive to changes in the European environment and to either preclude or mitigate their potentially adverse impact on American policy objectives. Indeed, American policy should be focusing on the question of what the military, political, economic, and psychological effects of a possible French withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance are.

FACTORS UNDERLYING EVENTUAL FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE NATO ALLIANCE

The often-repeated assurance that France intends to remain in the Atlantic Alliance is of course the principal rebuttal to the thesis of eventual French withdrawal from NATO. The de Gaulle memorandums of 8 and 10 March affirmed

France's intention "to maintain the alliance concluded in 1949" (Ref 79, p 1). Despite changed strategic conditions in Europe and the world, the de Gaulle notes denied that "these developments in any way lead the French Government to call into question the treaty signed in Washington on April 4, 1949" (Ref 79, p 2). In his news conference of 21 February and in his handwritten message to President Johnson of 7 March, de Gaulle denied any intent to reject the Atlantic treaty (Ref 67, pp 411, 413). Prime Minister Georges Pompidou, even as he castigated US policy in Europe before the National Assembly, averred that France wished "to maintain the alliance concluded in 1949" (Ref 79, p 1). Foreign Minister Couve de Murville buttressed this view in his National Assembly address and in effect indicated the French view of Atlantic Alliance for French foreign and strategic interests and objectives:

In our view the Atlantic alliance should continue to exist, and to do so doubtless for a long time still. This is because it remains, in a still disordered world, a factor of equilibrium and consequently of peace. In man's eye, it will remain as such so long as an overall European settlement has not been reached—that is, essentially a solution to the problem of Germany—so long, in other words, as a new equilibrium has not been established in Europe, a stable one that would open the way to normal relations, that is, peaceful relations within the entire continent (Ref 81, p 2).

These affirmations would appear conclusive (see Ref 11, pp 216, 225, 233; the following are representative: Ref 21, p 5; Ref 29, pp 9–12; and Ref 79). They are part of a pattern of French pledges that have been rendered on numerous occasions in the past half decade. But, like many unsolicited claims of faith and friendship, they protest French fidelity too much. As conditions have changed, France under de Gaulle has broken its promises before to suit its perspectives and interests. France's withdrawal from NATO was gradual.

The rationale for disengagement, however, has not fully kept pace with the actual actions that have been taken. The detachment of the Mediterranean fleet in 1959 was justified on grounds that were later contradicted by the transfer of the fleet from Toulon to Brest. The Gaullist distinction between NATO organization and treaty was fabricated in the early 1960's and became a useful, though not always convincing, means to justify France's determination to cut its Western alliance ties. It was injected at a late date, coinciding approximately with the end of the Algerian War, in spite of France's previous pledges of support to NATO's defense that dated from the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle had himself suggested his willingness to subordinate France to an integrated NATO under the direction of a tripartite group comprising the US, Britain, and France. He did not hesitate to propose a radical transformation of NATO allies.

Each withdrawal move by France has consisted of two elements: the action of disengagement and an accompanying affirmation of continued French allegiance to the Alliance.⁸⁵ For France, each step out of the Alliance threw into relief the increasing discrepancy between the action that was taken by France and the formalistic statement of support for the treaty. Progressively form and substance have parted ways. It remains for the two to be finally severed and for France to reap what benefits it can from a final and irrevocable departure from the NATO treaty.

Incead, even as de Gaulle and his ministers were announcing France's continued commitment to the Alliance, as previously noted, and were withdrawing French forces from NATO, they were attaching new conditions to French adher-

ence to the treaty. In his 7 March letter to President Johnson, President de Gaulle confined French aid to a NATO partner to cases involving an "unprovoked aggression" (Ref 67, p 413). The condition can hardly appear accidental. De Gaulle wrote the note to Johnson in his own hand, and he has the deserved reputation of rarely acting on impulse or without deliberation. The phrase reappeared in Pompidou's address on 13 April before the National Assembly: "We wish to maintain the Alliance concluded in 1949 that makes us united in the face of possible unprovoked aggression" (Ref 79, p 1). Foreign Minister Couve de Murville reiterated the qualification in a radio interview the week before. His careful emendation of his interpretation of the Atlantic Treaty was interesting: "The alliance is a treaty that joins all the member countries—there are 15 of us at present—and that binds us to go to the aid of any one of our allies who is the object of an attack, of an unprovoked attack" (Ref 70, p 2). —emphasis added

The treaty says nothing about the nature of the source of an attack although it does indicate that assistance will be rendered according to the constitutional processes of a nation, a provision that had been inserted into the treaty at the insistence of the US whose delegates were sensitive to Congressional prerogatives in foreign affairs. The effect of the qualification is to set France apart from her NATO partners on the diplomatic plane in much the same way that its withdrawal of French forces from NATO command uniquely marks France on the military plane. Unable to gain special status within the Alliance, France has defined for itself a special relation by posturing outside the Alliance. This new French condition is tantamount to an invitation to its allies to ask for clarification and to provoke eventually a crisis in the Alliance that might force France's allies to sever alliance ties with it. To date a policy of keeping a chair open for France has been followed. The French qualifications on its membership in the Alliance make it difficult for the allies to permit qualified or special participation. But if its allies move first, then France can claim US provocation. If the French are permitted to act without regard for the views of their allies and to pay little or no cost for recalcitrance, then other nations that may feel constrained by American leadership might be tempted to embark on the same road as France.

Whether the implications of de Gaulle's phrase of "unprovoked aggression" are so pervasive is debatable. What is not is the systematic reinterpretation and reevaluation by France of its commitments. Its hesitancy to fulfill previously incurred obligations can be detected in other policy areas. France's EEC neighbors bitterly complained that its refusal to accept majority voting was in violation of the Rome treaty. France has failed to report its production of nuclear weapons to its associates in the Western European Union as specifically required by the accords of 1954 by which West Germany was admitted to NATO. The rapidity with which de Gaulle is capable of negating a promise is suggested in the circumstances surrounding France's recognition of Red China. De Gaulle had initially attempted to maintain relations with both Communist and Nationalist Chinese. The Red Chinese called de Gaulle's bluff, forcing him to choose between the two groups in Red China's favor. There is question, too, whether de Gaulle was fully candid with his followers in ending the Algerian struggle. The Evian agreement did little to protect Algerian Arabs who had sided with France. Part of the French army's resentment against de Gaulle was his indifference to the eventual fate of the Francophile Arabs.

De Gaulle's view of alliances and France's interest in joining and adhering to them create a presumption against his maintaining an alliance commitment that

he feels is costly to French objectives as he defines them (see Chap. 1). De Gaulle has not succeeded in fashioning his model of NATO. The US and his NATO allies have turned a deaf ear to his recommendation for a special French role in NATO. He has similarly failed to destroy NATO's principle of integration, but his actions have manifestly hobbled NATO's defense efforts.⁸⁶ Except most prominently for limited agreements with the US on furnishing fissionable materials and air tankers to France, de Gaulle has largely been unable to change American nuclear policy to his advantage. Having failed to temper NATO to his designs, he uses it today as a guaranty pact until France can forge an alternative security system among the Six and then later between Eastern and Western Europe. It is useful, as Couve de Murville has observed, until a "new equilibrium" can be "established in Europe" (Ref 81, p 2).

This new balance, or third force, in between the US and the Soviet Union depends on the credibility of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. To the extent that the Soviets no longer intend to attack Western Europe and France, NATO's utility for France is diminished. There is reason to believe that de Gaulle considers a Soviet attack increasingly less likely. In any event he has developed a rationale by which to assure himself that even if NATO were dismantled French security would still be effectively maintained in terms of current French strategic doctrine concerning nuclear deterrence.

De Gaulle has confided on occasion that war is not likely as long as the nuclear balance is maintained. He is convinced that nuclear weapons preserve the peace through the threat of nuclear retaliation or the initiation of a first strike in the event of an aggression against the vital interest of France or the West.⁸⁷ In sum, French officials, especially de Gaulle, appear to be approaching the conclusion—and there is indication that they already have accepted the view—that the Atlantic Treaty is no longer needed as such for French security and that it is a serious obstacle to French plans. The analysis of this emerging French position hinges on: French conception of the threat that the Soviet Union poses to France's security; French strategic doctrine, especially with respect to nuclear weapons; the Big Power status sought by the French and the restraining effect that NATO imposes; and the domestic political support that can be generated to support Gaullist foreign and security policies. These factors should be considered in light of de Gaulle's general views of the nature of international relations and the role of France within them and the pattern and emerging purpose that have crystallized in French policy toward NATO since 1958.

FRENCH VIEW OF THE SOVIET THREAT

Whatever the actual nature of the Soviet threat to Western Europe and the US may be, and however correct the American intelligence views regarding Soviet intentions and capabilities, the French will prefer to act on their own interpretations of the Soviet threat. This statement may seem simple enough and perhaps unnecessary. That would be true if it were not for the fact that American policy has repeatedly been taken off guard by French foreign policy moves because it has failed to attach sufficient weight to French views and objectives as stated by the French and as verified in their actions. There is little utility in correctly appraising Soviet behavior if allies refuse to accept the analysis and to join in common efforts to blunt untoward Soviet moves against Western interests. The

French will act on French—not American—views of the Soviet threat. French notions are partly influenced by American conceptions, but in the present circumstances of French-American relations they appear in some degree to be a counter-reaction to US conceptions instead of being positively shaped by them. Intelligence estimates are inevitably influenced by objectives. Differing French and American goals and interests and even psychic states of mind are almost inevitably to be found traced, however faintly, in the perspectives and perceptions of each nation.¹⁵

The French have consistently insisted that NATO was specifically fashioned to meet the Soviet threat and that its vitality and raison d'être are a response to this Eastern pressure. The Atlantic Alliance is indispensable for France as long as Soviet aggression is present. "The Atlantic Alliance exists," said de Gaulle in the wake of negotiations over the Algerian settlement in 1962. "So long as the Soviets threaten the world, this alliance must be maintained. France is an integral part of it. If the free world were attacked, on the old or the new continent, France would take part of the common defense on the side of her allies and with all the means that she has" (Ref 11, p 179). Four years later the same theme was struck in the memorandums of 8 and 10 March: "Barring events that in the coming years might change East-West relations in a fundamental way, the French Government does not intend to avail itself in 1969 of the provisions of Article 13 of the treaty and considers that the alliance should continue so long as it appears necessary" (Ref 69, p 2). Corresponding pledges of fidelity to the Alliance on the condition of continued possibility of Soviet aggression can be found in a succession of French pronouncements.¹⁶

What is the French view of the Soviet threat? The threat appears to be rapidly dissipating, sufficiently so that de Gaulle speaks of détente with the East and possible entente and cooperation with the satellites of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, even perhaps with the Soviet Union itself. The Cold War is over for France and Russia's client states. "Everyone is aware that we are in the process of renewing, deeply and positively, our relations with Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary," de Gaulle told reporters in October 1966. "Today, between all these peoples and ours, the cold war appears silly when growing and friendly cooperation is being organized" (Ref 62, p 5). The French have made extensive diplomatic efforts in Eastern Bloc countries urging them to be independent of, though not hostile to, Moscow.¹⁷ This offensive has been supplemented by frequent contacts between French and Communist Bloc ministers and by a pattern of visits by Eastern Europeans, including heads of state, to the French capital. It is not without significance that Romania has assumed a posture within the Soviet system that increasingly resembles the independent posture of the French. The range of independence is obviously less for Romania than for France, but the trend is nevertheless in the direction of progressive loosening of Soviet control.

Great store is put in recent agreements made between France and the Soviet Union in economic, cultural, scientific, and technical areas.¹⁸ The Soviet Union adopted a French television system rather than a German or US system (Ref 64, pp 241-43). De Gaulle's trip to the Soviet Union in 1966 in the wake of his orders withdrawing French forces from NATO further tightened these growing lines of communications and interaction. The two governments agreed to cooperate in telecommunications and meteorological research and to exchange scientific information through student groups and professional delegations. The Soviets have

consented to launch French instrument satellites. A "hot line," similar to the one between Moscow and Washington, is to be installed. Both governments served notice of willingness to negotiate a consular treaty and to expand "cultural arrangements." Each called for a reawakening of confidence in Europe and the consideration of problems of Europe "first of all in a European framework" (Ref 89, pp 1, 14).

There also developed a convergence of view on opposition to the Vietnam war, stricter financial control of the UN to conform to French and Soviet views of the charter's operation, and disarmament. The two governments sought "normalization" of relations and continued contacts between officials. To this end, Soviet President Podgorny was invited to visit Paris.⁸⁹ Since de Gaulle's visit, contacts between the two governments have been continuing, including exchange visits by Kosygin and Pompidou. An alignment of views has also developed with respect to American operations in the Third World. Both governments have bitterly attacked American involvement in Santo Domingo and Vietnam although their actions in each struggle have not been entirely congruent. (See Ref 64, pp 249-51, 259, for French views on Santo Domingo. The French abstained from a Soviet-sponsored UN amendment as too anti-American even for them. On the other hand the French have been vociferous in their criticism of US actions in South Vietnam. Numerous and somewhat contradictory interpretations may be assigned to the difference. The French hold strongly to a "sphere-of-influence" position, and Santo Domingo falls within the US orbit; Vietnam, an old French preserve, does not. Here the two are competitors, with influence in the area and on China being the prize.) The two governments have recently aligned their policies in the Middle East crisis and worked closely together in shaping a common position in UN debates. De Gaulle swung the French government into the Soviet camp over the hesitancy of his own advisers (see the analysis of Alfred Grosser, Ref 18, p 1). His own statements went even further and linked the Middle East war with the Vietnamese struggle. De Gaulle's remarks are instructive, since they suggest a new dimension in his own perception of the threats facing France's realization of its foreign policy goals. This theme is discussed later. De Gaulle came close to charging the US with culpability in the Middle East war:

The spirit and the act of war are again spreading around the world. One conflict contributes to the creation of another.

The war was started in Vietnam through American intervention. The destruction of lives and property that it is bringing about, the fundamental sterility that is its hallmark, however powerful the means employed and however terrible its effects—these cannot but spread disorder not only on the spot but far away. Hence the attitude of China and the haste in its arms buildup. Hence, on the other hand, the political and psychological process that has led to the struggle in the Middle East.⁹⁰

The developing French-Soviet rapprochement is based on more than an optimistic view of Soviet intentions. De Gaulle has never held a sanguine or altruistic view of human behavior, whether Soviet or American—or even French. He has given indications, however, that to his mind the Soviets neither intend to make war nor are in a favorable domestic or foreign policy environment to launch an aggression. Reference has already been made to de Gaulle's conviction that the nuclear balance and the importance of Europe to the US holds the Soviet Union at bay.⁹¹

The rising strength of Europe offers an increasingly powerful counter to Soviet expansionism, whether military, economic, or political, and to American

hegemony in Western Europe.⁹² For de Gaulle, the Six is a rising third force and a new element in the world balance of power. French policy, indeed, as de Gaulle has recently announced in an address to the French nation, "is working to see that the community of the Six shall become, in its own right, a political reality and therefore an essential element in the peaceful equilibrium of the world."⁹²

Developments in the Third World toward national independence reinforce de Gaulle's views of the receding influence and threat of the Soviet Union.⁹³ Moreover, tensions and armed conflict have shifted from Europe to Third World areas. Europe is now a zone of peace that can be solidified through internal union and eventual understanding with the Soviet Union. Neither France nor Europe needs be dragged into war against its will.⁹⁴ De Gaulle's foreign policy initiatives have been based, by his own admission, on these considerations.

De Gaulle is optimistic, too, about developments within the Communist Bloc. He has been aware since 1961 of the internal economic problems faced by the Soviets and the constraints that lagging economic progress place on their ambitions. Soviet political leadership, faced by rising mass demands for domestic development, is itself internally divided and, since Stalin, less capable of foreign adventure. It has grown progressively more prudent and conservative and contemplates the possibility of striking a bargain with the US.⁹⁵ The Soviet Union—leadership and people—is reverting increasingly to a nationalist mode of operation and is less responsive to communist ideology. The USSR faces mounting nationalist pressures from its satellites. These bloc demands complicate Soviet control and set obstacles in the way of Soviet initiatives abroad. The Warsaw Pact is affected by a kind of "bloc fatigue," that makes it a questionable instrument of Soviet strategic and foreign policy. For de Gaulle the Eastern, no less than the Western, camp is disintegrating.⁹⁶

These multiple slippages in the Soviet hold over its client states are speeded to crisis proportions by the split with Communist China. The French consider the rupture complete and permanent since it is based on national differences that are expressed in ideological terminology. Confronted by rising power on its eastern borders, the Soviet Union, in the French view, has little choice but to settle its accounts eventually with the West in order to secure its flank in Europe. The Sino-Soviet disagreement is inherent in the nation-state system according to de Gaulle's views. The characteristic disagreements generated by national interest are intensified further by racial differences. Thus de Gaulle's Soviet Union is still Western and European and fits his repeated references to a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals. In de Gaulle's terms the Urals are a politically convenient, if not geographically precise, demarcation to distinguish the West, including Russia, from the East. The latter is represented principally by an emerging China, now torn perhaps by internal division, but destined eventually to dominate its sphere of Asia.⁹⁷ French recognition of the communist regime and France's neutralist line on South Vietnam are cast in terms of these expectations.⁹⁸

FRENCH SECURITY OUTSIDE NATO

In the French view the threat of war and Soviet aggression in Europe has clearly diminished. If so, is France's adherence to the Atlantic Alliance still needed?

The direction of evolving French policy would seem to lead to the conclusion that France has alternative routes by which to ensure its physical security from foreign attack or intervention and that continued allegiance to the Western Alliance, however minimal its participation, is an obstacle to the realization of the Gaullist designs.

From this perspective the resolution of the security problem is to be found only provisionally in the military deterrence of Soviet military aggression. According to de Gaulle the long-run solution to French security must be found in a European settlement, particularly with respect to Germany. The principal barrier to such a settlement is the existence of two blocs welded together into two tightly controlled military formations, each dominated by a major power. France's withdrawal from the NATO organization was an important step in the breakup of the Western camp. For de Gaulle and his advisors, an Atlantic pact is impossible without French consent and participation, whatever may be the allied view to the contrary. This evolutionary process of inner-bloc disintegration can be given impetus by the final break of France from her former allies. That such a French initiative can be contemplated is the thrust of the analysis that follows. It may be seen forced, moreover, in President de Gaulle's remarks of 11 August 1967, justifying his NATO actions:

What peace demands, externally, is energetic and continuous action. This action is all the more difficult because, in the midst of the conflicts of ideologies and clashes of interest that fill the universe, one must be free of foreign allegiances and the episodic forces of public opinion.

By quitting the system of blocs, France has perhaps given the signal for a general evolution toward international détente, she appears to the devotees of Atlantic obedience condemned to what they call isolation, when, in the world at large, an immense human mass approves her and recognizes her as right. [emphasis added]³⁹

De Gaulle is convinced that the US defends Europe out of its own self-interest. It cannot afford to permit this vital resource to fall into the hands of the Soviet Union. Despite his protestations of doubt about the American determination to protect Europe, he has never questioned that the US considers Europe vital to its interests. His concern turns on how the US might protect its European interests. In the case of a nuclear war, de Gaulle and his advisors hope to preclude the use of European territory as the battleground between the two nuclear colossi.

French strategic thought insists on the primacy of nuclear deterrence. The French force de frappe provides France with what the French believe is a trigger on the American nuclear arsenal. The French have carefully avoided reference to triggering American atom forces, although the use of the French force for this purpose is clear enough. For de Gaulle the threat of nuclear war, rather than the capability of NATO to fight a conventional or even a tactical nuclear war in Europe, is conceived as fundamental to peace. (French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou's remarks to the National Assembly make this point clearly.⁷⁰) Conventional war in Europe is rejected as tantamount to its destruction and, in any event, as a weakening of the deterrent. The French force ensures that there can be no doubt open to the Soviets that an attack in Europe will result in a nuclear war. No claim is made that the French force can equal the Soviet capability. In a bilateral confrontation the French seek to present a posture of proportional deterrence where-

in whatever stake the USSR may have in attacking France will be offset by the possible destruction of the principal Soviet cities. France can presumably, in de Gaulle's view, "tear an arm off" the aggressor although France may be destroyed in the nuclear exchange.¹⁰⁰ Short of actual conflict, France's own nuclear force allegedly affords France a significant bargaining level in nuclear diplomacy among the great powers and insulates France from the nuclear blackmail that it suffered in the Suez crisis. These various strategic uses of an independent nuclear force preclude its integration. This is the meaning of de Gaulle's often-repeated insistence that France must have its own means of defense and must not depend on a third party, even an ally.

Whether the French nuclear force can accomplish these various strategic missions is highly questionable.¹⁰¹ The actual merit of the French case is important for military purposes. It is less significant, however, in explaining French political behavior, for the French give the impression that they take very seriously their analysis of nuclear strategy. The French withdrawal from NATO is firmly based on French conviction about their views of nuclear warfare, military and political, despite the criticisms of the US. The French believe that time is on their side. The Mirage IV acquitted itself well in the Middle East war. Reports from Vietnam indicate a favorable mission-aircraft loss ratio in favor of attacking forces, i.e., against communist air defenses. Beyond the Mirage IV, land and sea missiles are being developed that promise to give France a measure of invulnerability in the 1970's and to close the gap somewhat between its nuclear forces and those of the major powers, unless significant progress is made in missile defense and antisubmarine warfare, two areas of interest in which the French still cooperate to some degree with NATO forces.¹⁰²

Even vigorous opponents of de Gaulle's Atlantic policies support the construction of a force de frappe on much the same grounds as de Gaulle does. Raymond Aron bitterly criticizes de Gaulle's antagonizing the US for fear this may result in eventual withdrawal of the American nuclear umbrella over France. Yet he justifies the force de frappe as a means of influencing American actions and on the general grounds of the uncertainty of the future of interstate power relations.¹⁰³

On what basis can the French hope to preserve their security if France withdraws from the Alliance in 1969? Three possibilities occur. First, France can be reasonably assured that if current US policy toward NATO is projected into the future, US will actively attempt to hold the remaining 13 members of NATO according to the established integration principle. The response of France's NATO allies on 18 March 1966 lends weight to the view that NATO, although weakened by France's withdrawal, will still survive in some form and that the American nuclear guaranty will still envelop Europe and, incidentally, France. If the Washington-Bonn axis continues, then France's physical security can be ensured. It is impossible to defend Germany without also defending France. France can therefore decide to remain content under US protection through its continuing defense ties with Germany and England in the Western European Union. Such a diplomatic-strategic tie would not be novel. The US attempted to extend its influence in the Middle East in the 1950's through proxy powers in the Baghdad, and later in the CENTO, treaty.

Second, failing access to NATO through the Western European Union, France could still rely on its bilateral accord of January 1963 with Germany. Nor is it

beyond reason to foresee the possibility of France's reaching a bilateral accord with NATO or directly with the US. Such an arrangement, limited to a specific purpose, would seemingly suit French policy goals. De Gaulle prefers bilateral accords and conceives alliance relations in these terms. The agreement would presumably deal with the extension of US nuclear protection to France in case of an attack from the Soviet Union. Such an arrangement might keep France tied loosely to NATO. It is questionable whether the US or its NATO allies could feasibly accept an agreement along these lines. It would certainly violate previously stated commitments to integration and to a forward strategy based initially on a conventional defense of Europe. On the other hand it is highly doubtful that France would settle for anything less than the adoption of its position.

Third, de Gaulle and France could conceivably conclude—and may have already—that French security will be ensured by the US, that is, that the US will protect Europe and France with its nuclear forces whether NATO survives or not. Two elements bear on this conclusion. The significance of Europe and France for the US is fundamental to the French position. As de Gaulle had before him, Couve de Murville underlined this assumption in his address to the National Assembly defending the French government's NATO actions:

People will object. . . our unilateral action risks jeopardizing everything by leading the United States to take its protection away from a dissenting France, if not to abandon all of Europe?

Strange questions. . . not only because they depict the Atlantic Alliance as a one-way commitment—that of the United States toward Europe—but also because of the lack of consideration they imply for Washington's policy, as if Washington were committed to this Europe-American partnership only because the Europeans are docile allies. Were there not on this side of the Atlantic essential interests for the other side, which it wanted and still wants to watch over? (Ref 81, p 5).

An American president may chafe under the necessity of extending nuclear protection to a recalcitrant ally or neutral, but his choices are limited. Failure to act to deny these areas to an expansionist enemy would prove too costly. If Cuba were worth the risk of nuclear war, Europe would certainly warrant running the same risks. US nuclear protection was implicitly extended to other, albeit lesser, areas of importance than Europe, viz, India, Formosa, and Israel. The US now runs grave risks, too, of armed conflict with the Chinese in Vietnam. Europe would appear to be worth as much.

Furthermore the very existence of the force de frappe changes the strategic calculations of the Soviet Union and the US. American opposition to nuclear proliferation rests on the uncontrollable features of an expanding nuclear club. Neither great power can ignore the French effort. There is an incentive for both to come to terms with the French force. In most bilateral cases the French nuclear striking capacity may not appear very formidable. But a nuclear confrontation over Europe is likely to be multilateral, not bilateral. In such a circumstance an independent center of nuclear decision could conceivably be a very critical factor. France would be running serious risks, too, in attempting to bargain with either superpower under such tense conditions.¹⁰⁴ De Gaulle has quite deliberately adopted such a high-risk policy. Given the limited power of France in material terms, it offers one admittedly hazardous route to maximize its power in relation to the US and the Soviet Union.

FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCE. THE STRATEGIC-POLITICAL TRADE-OFF

It can be argued that whatever marginal loss France may suffer in leaving the Alliance, it will recoup as much and even gain more in political benefits through nonalignment. The current French government is decidedly inclined toward this point of view for at least three reasons: (a) fear of French involvement in American-backed conflicts in the Third World and the growing fear of American strategic superiority, (b) the obstacle that the Alliance places before the attempt of de Gaulle and France to create an effective and responsive economic-political confederation among the European Six, and (c) the barrier that the Alliance presents for the development of closer East-West ties among European states and the construction of a Europe free from dependence on either major power. The first element has already been treated. The others require some development in light of recent French relations with Germany and the Soviet Union.

So long as NATO persists, especially in its integrative arrangements, France's leverage over her European partners must necessarily be limited. Dependence on the US military guaranty and the presence of American forces in the heart of Europe constrain French influence. De Gaulle's foreign minister has given voice to the problem facing France in its attempts to influence German policy:

...with regard to NATO, Bonn is... anxious that the American forces remain numerous in Europe.... It is highly improbable that our initiatives will make Bonn change its attitude. If changes do take place in the future, the French would be presumptuous to think that they are responsible for them: these changes would result from an evolution in the relations of the Federal Republic and the United States (Ref 81, p 7).

This surprising admission is an open avowal, according to the informed French commentator Alfred Grosser, of the failure of Gaullist policy to wean Bonn from Washington.¹⁰⁵ This conclusion, although bearing a kernel of truth, appears too final in light of developments in Franco-German relations under the Kiesinger government. Nevertheless it does indicate the difficulties confronting France in gaining influence over German foreign policy views. What appears to be happening is a growing convergence of diplomatic styles between Bonn and Paris. Each wishes to adopt a more flexible stance with respect to the US. Both are resisting new foreign commitments. Bonn is even interested in cutting its NATO forces.¹⁰⁶ Each is exploring new options and avenues to achieve its policy goals. These similarities in style suggest a growing similarity of policy views and interests.

Before these emerging alignments are discussed, it would be well to put them in the context of the impressive differences that still separate the two governments. A tightly formed and smoothly working Paris-Bonn axis is by no means a certainty.¹⁰⁷ De Gaulle himself summarized most of the differences in his news conference of 23 July 1964. He lamented the slow implementation of the Paris Treaty of 1963. The two nations were split on a variety of crucial issues: nuclear policy; NATO defense and force integration; the MLF; relations with Eastern Europe; territorial boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe; Chinese recognition; ways to peace in Asia, including Indo-China and Indonesia; and aid to developing countries. Significant divergencies also persist over the future organizational arrangements within the EEC, British membership, and economic relations with the US (Ref 28, pp 6-7). In October 1966 de Gaulle complained again that preferential ties between Bonn and the US "stripped this French-German agreement of its inspiration and substance" (Ref 62, p 4).

Despite these sharp differences the two nations are moving to a common point of view in a number of areas. Both desire a settlement of past hatreds that have been constraints in French and German policy and a policy of rapprochement. The two countries disagree over British entry although the degree of differences is harder to gauge with the Kiesinger government: Erhard firmly espoused the idea of British entry; Kiesinger affirms Erhard's position but appears more reserved on the issue. Both nations are satisfied with the common position hammered out in negotiating with the US at the recent GATT meetings. France under de Gaulle has remained steadfast in supporting West German claims against the East on matters of independence though de Gaulle has been on record since 25 March 1959 as favoring the Oder-Neisse line (Ref 11, pp 43-44).

In his trip to Russia in the spring of 1966 de Gaulle rejected a Soviet bid to reorganize East Germany. He has consistently pressed the issue of German unification and is convinced that a peaceful Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals cannot be formed in the absence of a German settlement. Similarly the Kiesinger government has been increasingly receptive to French overtures to Eastern Europe and has given signs of welcoming French initiatives in that direction. The French have reconciled themselves with West Germany and at the moment have aligned more closely with the Soviet Union than with the US. It remains for France to reconcile these two powers. The task is formidable and in the final analysis not very likely to succeed without American support (or at least acquiescence), for the US alone can assure the Soviet Union on the question of nuclear proliferation and the restraint of Germany. France, as André Fontaine has observed, would prefer a "new alliance" with the USSR aimed against the US rather than Germany. The Soviet Union prefers an alliance pointed the other way. Premier Kosygin, in his visit to Paris last winter, was not enthusiastic about and did not press for German unification.¹⁰⁸

Under these circumstances a French pullout from the Atlantic Alliance would not necessarily destroy the prospects of French-German unity so long as the fundamental elements of the relations were maintained. On the other hand France could argue that its withdrawal and a subsequent loosening of NATO ties and even the disestablishment of NATO would open the way to East-West negotiations. In the French calculation the likely loser would be the US. Germany, though barred from nuclear weapons, would be in a better position to bargain for its unification on some still-undetermined basis.

De Gaulle had these strategies and schemes in mind in his July visit to Bonn. His rhetorical flourishes on behalf of US friendship offered thin cover for his primary motive: to join Paris and Bonn against the US and eventually reach a predominantly all-European settlement with the Soviet Union. In the summary of his visit to Bonn de Gaulle said, "The United States has become the greatest power and it is automatically led to extend its power. I do not say to dominate but to exercise a preponderant weight, that is to say, a hegemony over others. It is a fact that we Germans and French cannot overlook."¹⁰⁹ De Gaulle then announced the conditions that would need to be created to preserve the individual personalities of both nations:

The first is that the French and Germans not be divided. Otherwise it will be impossible to avoid American preponderance. On the other hand, if we remain linked, we will safeguard our personalities.

The second is that what we have built as Six in the economic realm be maintained, that it may not be disbanded. Because if that is disbanded, then we will be pressed into a different system... under American ascendancy.

The third is that, with Eastern Europe, we may proceed towards entente and cooperation in order that there may be something else in the politics of the world than the system of two blocs. That leads us to take different positions vis-à-vis America, our natural friend and with whom we wish to preserve our alliance as long as the threat remains.¹⁰⁰

(See also Ref 99, p 13, where similar themes are struck in de Gaulle's speech to the French people.)

Interestingly enough de Gaulle does not mention the Soviet Union. The threat to French independence comes from the West, not the East. Opposition to the US is a matter of necessity whatever the issue. Power is to be combated; overwhelming power is to be combated overwhelmingly. The Atlantic Alliance strengthens the American position, according to the French, since France's European allies are forced to abandon France for the US. Negotiations with the Soviets are also futile as long as Germany is tied to the US.

The logic of the French position would appear to require the end of NATO and its principle of integration. That system binds Europe and isolates France. France has only one major card to play if it is to reconcile Germany with the USSR and to isolate the US in turn from Europe: withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance. The Alliance may perhaps still survive but not under the same tight control that America is alleged to have enjoyed before. A weakened Alliance would still serve French objectives as the French interpret the conditions for their realization. The French-German bilateral accord signed in December 1966 gives hope to the French design. Multilateral ties can conceivably give way to bilateral security accords.¹¹⁰

A FINAL WORD

Two final considerations lend weight to the proposition that France will refuse to accept membership in the Atlantic Alliance after 1969. Since de Gaulle's failure to gain American consent to a Paris-London-Washington system of NATO direction, he has striven to enhance France's power and prestige outside NATO. His primary focus, as discussed at length earlier, has been on Europe and the fashioning of a "Little" (and eventually "Big") Europe as a counterweight to the superpowers. De Gaulle has also made attempts to enhance French prestige in the Third World, especially in Africa. He has spoken repeatedly of the special responsibility that falls to the nuclear powers to preserve the peace. He has referred to a Big Five settlement for Southeast Asia among the permanent members of the Security Council including Red China, all of whom are, by happy coincidence in de Gaulle's view, nuclear powers. Big Power accord, as envisioned by the UN treaty, is offered as an alternative to the uneasy peace that is secured through the delicate balance that is the product of West-East competition. De Gaulle holds little, if any, hope for the realization of this broader vision, but he is insistent on appealing to it as a measure of the existing world balance of power:

It happens, actually, that the five States on which the destiny of Southeast Asia depends, in the final analysis, and which, moreover, are those that possess atomic weapons, together founded twenty years ago the United Nations Organization and are the permanent members

of the Security Council. They could tomorrow—if they so desired and naturally once they come together—see to it that this institution, instead of being a theatre of the main rivalry of two hegemonies, becomes the framework in which the development of the whole world would be considered and in which the conscience of the human community would thereby grow stronger.¹¹¹

De Gaulle made a similar appeal to Big Power collaboration to solve the Middle East crisis.¹¹²

So long as France remains a member of the Atlantic Alliance, it admits its dependence on the US. If it can break away, its claim to speak for independence and nationalist movements is strengthened. The attraction of this improvement of its diplomatic stance is likely to remain subordinate to de Gaulle's European design, which is France's primary and vital area of concern.

Unless de Gaulle leads France out of the Atlantic Alliance, he cannot trust to his successors to dismantle the Atlantic edifice. He alone is capable of succeeding in this hazardous venture where others would be doomed to domestic failure. He has a favorable majority in the National Assembly. As already indicated, French public opinion is now prepared to accept, if not a reversal of alliances and a new pact with the Soviet Union, at least a rending of ties with the US.

Chapter 3

CONCLUSIONS

Even after de Gaulle's passing, continuity of his policy can be expected on many important issues separating the US and France. Barring a major calamity or shift of power in the international order, this outcome will likely be the result of two principal factors: (a) the support enjoyed by de Gaulle within the National Assembly and among the French public for most of his foreign policy initiatives and (b) the essential similarity of the goals pursued by the Fourth and Fifth Republics on key foreign policy issues.

Public opinion in France has by and large supported de Gaulle's foreign policy. Those elements that have been directed against the US have been especially well received. De Gaulle retains tight control over French foreign affairs despite the recent wave of protest over his policies toward Canada and Israel. Opposition to the US runs deep in French political life, whatever the affection most French may have for the American people or American capital. De Gaulle's disengagement policy in NATO reinforces a trend toward neutralism in France that strikes very responsive chords within the French citizenry who still remember the deprivation of the postwar years and the burdens incurred in retaining the French colonies. The majority of Frenchmen give little sign of any inclination to become involved in US policy in the underdeveloped areas of the world. Clearly they want no part in military operations such as Vietnam. American presence there is deeply resented. Little support therefore is likely to be found for US policies toward Red China, the Third World, or American-sponsored arms control and disarmament measures that give the impression of continued American-Soviet monopoly over nuclear weapons.

On the crucial issue of nuclear policy, de Gaulle is largely following the path laid out by his predecessors. The French force de frappe was first etched in the nuclear programs supported by a succession of French governments under the Fourth Republic. De Gaulle has broadened these programs and accelerated their application to military purposes. The force de frappe is principally viewed by de Gaulle as a tool in the service of his diplomatic objectives. His government has survived every legislative test on the military nuclear program. His opponents remain dispersed and divided. It is difficult to see how any of de Gaulle's successors, including many of those on the Left, could effectively reverse the trends in French nuclear policy that have been set in motion over the past 15 years.

De Gaulle is also continuing the supporting of the Common Market initiated under the Fourth Republic. French policies under his leadership have differed from Fourth Republic attitudes on supranational control of the EEC and on sympathy

for British entry. These are important issues, but discontinuities in these areas still do not obscure the strong support extended by the de Gaulle government to the EEC. De Gaulle's insistence on bringing agriculture into the Common Market ensured the continued growth of the EEC. Accord on agriculture seems to have served two important Gaullist goals: it greatly strengthened the French position in the EEC since France is the largest agricultural producer of the Six, and it raised the barrier to British entry into the Common Market. These successes weigh heavily in French foreign policy.

In a political sense, continued growth of the EEC is more important to de Gaulle than it was to his predecessors. Gaullist goals hinge on continued cooperation of the Six in the framework of the EEC. These include notably the maximization of French power and prestige in Europe, the enlargement of France's leadership role in European affairs, the end to the division of Europe, and the minimization of US influence on the Continent. De Gaulle can be expected to go to great lengths to preserve the Six as a vehicle for these designs. How far he can be pushed is difficult to say. He is likely to stop short of accepting supranational controls or British entry. De Gaulle calculates that his associates in the Six will acquiesce in these areas although they generally oppose his views. As his intransigence during the 1965 crisis over agriculture suggests, he is willing to play a very-high-risk policy within the EEC in order to achieve his larger political goals for France and Europe even though success on these fronts depends on the strength and growth of the EEC.

De Gaulle's EEC policy is potentially very vulnerable. He is attempting to pass between the horns of a self-created dilemma. On the one hand he asserts national sovereignty over the development of supranational institutions in the EEC, and on the other hand he counts on shaping the EEC to fit his design for France and Europe. The Dutch and Germans in particular have been wary of French policy in the EEC. Both seek greater supranational authority in the Brussels Commission and the entry of the British into the Common Market. Either development is antithetical to current French objectives. If the Dutch and Germans could be induced to press their views in EEC deliberations, de Gaulle could conceivably be faced with the choice of accepting a compromise on the two issues or pulling out of the Common Market. Either decision would seriously damage his chances of realizing his objectives. De Gaulle has relied on the caution and prudence of his allies to accept his veto of supranational decision making in the EEC and of British entry. If pressed, he might accept a compromise formula on one or both issues. Any form of relaxation of the French position is likely to strengthen the US on the Continent. This is particularly true on the question of British inclusion in the Common Market. British ties with the US remain strong in economic, political, and cultural relations. De Gaulle has compromised before to cut his losses and to salvage as much as he could of his basic objectives as illustrated by the Evian accords ending the Algerian War. Consequently he must be similarly dealt with in any future confrontation even though he may drive a hard bargain in the process.

French policy in the Fourth and Fifth Republics has diverged most sharply on French support of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. Although the NATO Treaty was a foundation stone of French foreign policy under the Fourth Republic, it has only limited value for de Gaulle. His downgrading of the Alliance appeals to a majority of Frenchmen. The French, carried forward by a renewed sense of nationalism, chafe under American leadership. The cost of fulfilling NATO commitments

and the possible involvement of France in American ventures outside Europe encourage the French to limit their treaty obligations. De Gaulle has cleverly played on these French attitudes and has nurtured their development. The result has been a growing disenchantment with NATO and the Alliance in France.

The wavering of French support for the Atlantic Alliance now threatens, ironically enough, both US and Gaullist objectives. Having rekindled French nationalism, de Gaulle has singularly failed to stir much French interest in the assumption of greater global responsibilities. French nationalism has developed a pronounced neutralist bent. The potential loss for world stability is great. France has played an important role in European and global politics for over 4 centuries. It will continue of course to have a significant impact on international relations, but its constructive contribution will be limited if French leadership is unable to convince the French people to assume greater responsibility in European and world affairs.

The prospect of French withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance, as this report has tried to demonstrate, is not as empty a gesture as some have implied. Such a withdrawal would not serve French or US interests and objectives. The severing of French ties with NATO countries on security matters would increase the already great difficulties that exist in reaching satisfactory accords with the French on European security. The complete detachment of French military power from continental defense would seriously weaken efforts to coordinate noncommunist forces into an effective security system. It might well preclude renewed cooperation between France and her Alliance allies after de Gaulle's departure.

The absence of the French from the councils of the Western Powers can only serve to strengthen the neutralist trend evidenced in French nationalism. Worse still, the growth of such a trend in France threatens to spill over into the politics and attitudes of other Alliance members. Decline of French and European interest in their own security menaces not only their own position but that of the US. And it is plausible to imagine that US public opinion would become increasingly disenchanted with the policy of sustaining a large-scale military effort in Europe if the French or Europeans show little interest in their own security. Under these circumstances de Gaulle's charge that the US cannot be depended on to defend Europe could be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Even though US abandonment of Europe is currently inconceivable, a gradually diminishing American contribution to European defense is not.

De Gaulle's successors will be faced with the task of reconciling a neutralist-leaning nationalism with the security and foreign policy imperatives of France. They may be aided by the emergence of a new generation in France that is not burdened by the experience of 20 years of French defeat from 1940 to 1960. Although future French leaders can be expected to be nationalistic and, not unlike de Gaulle, to emphasize French national interests, they are likely to be more open than de Gaulle to compromise and negotiation with their allies, including the US. This flexibility in style, though not necessarily in objectives, can be somewhat anticipated. Few French have as focused a concern for Big Power politics as de Gaulle. Even if they share his balance-of-power views and his antipathy to the US, they will inevitably lack his great personal power and his unique control over French foreign policy. Lacking de Gaulle's political vision and determination as well as his domestic political position, his successors will very likely be more approachable. They can be expected to accept, on the basis of compromise, a

modified formula on such issues as nuclear policy, military security, arms control, and the economic and political future of Europe. This prospect of Franco-American reconciliation after de Gaulle's departure, although not ensured, is greatly promoted by France's continued adherence to the Atlantic Alliance. Unfortunately for the US, the initiative for keeping France in the Atlantic Alliance rests with de Gaulle.

The specific military and political implications for Western Europe and the US of de Gaulle's current and the future French policies discussed earlier are not addressed in this paper. This requires a separate detailed examination. But suggested here are two general implications for Europe and the US: (a) the pattern of nationalism forged by de Gaulle and France may be copied by West Germany—with all that this implies; and (b) whatever the final form of French or West German foreign policy pattern, the US cannot count on a return to early NATO days in which it played the dominant role.

Therefore the US should examine the impact of these implications on its interests in Western Europe. At the same time the US should also take into account the impact on other parties in Europe such as the Soviet Union and the Eastern European nations. They would undoubtedly be gravely disturbed by a Western European situation that saw a resurgence of German nationalism and an accompanying loss of US control or influence over West Germany.

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