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AN ANALYSIS OF CRISIS DECISION-MAKING

Charles H. Piersall, Jr.


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ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes two "real" crisis situations for the United States; the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 1964. The study is intended to be of assistance to decision makers and students of political science in categorizing lessons learned from the past and invite attention to recurrent issues. The empirical analysis is predicated upon an a priori framework of hypotheses from those advanced by Professor Glen Paige, University of Hawaii, for the Korean Crisis. Using Paige's Korean Crisis propositions, a correlation analysis was made to determine their applicability to the latter crises. After reviewing for applicability, each proposition was assigned to a different stratum dependent upon its individual degree of substantiation of the empirical data. The strata were quantified so as to be able to assign relative values to each proposition. The results of the correlation analysis show generally good agreement with the Korean decision. The range of correlation was obtained using a "go, no-go" principle. A crisis decision model is presented to explain the sequential behavior in the referenced cases. Care was taken to evaluate the empirical data in a non-polemical manner and although a normative analysis may be beneficial, it was not considered within the scope of the paper.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
1. Introduction	1
2. Correlation Analysis Methodology	2
3. A Correlation Analysis of Variable Clusters	4
4. Description of the Crisis Model and Input Variables	6
5. Summary and Conclusions	7
Bibliography	12
Appendix A - Organizational Variables	
Appendix B - Informational Variables	
Appendix C - Value Variables	
Appendix D - Internal Setting Relationships	
Appendix E - External Setting Relationships	
Appendix F - Correlation Computations	

1. Introduction

In a world which has a "balance-of-terror environment," threats to national geographic integrity, ideals, or citizenry are frequently arising. Such threats precipitate crises which may be "ostensible" in their embryonic stage and then escalate to "real" crisis, remain ostensible, or perhaps originate as real crisis.^{1/}

This paper analyzes two "real" crises for the United States, the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 1964. Crisis as used in this study was defined by Charles Hermann as a "situation that (1) threatened high priority goals of the decisional unit, (2) restricted the amount of time in which a response could be made, and (3) was unexpected or unanticipated by the members of the decision making unit."^{2/}

The empirical analysis is predicated upon an a priori framework of hypotheses from those advanced by Glenn Paige Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii as the bases. Professor Paige identified thirty-four empirically grounded propositions grouped into five dependent variable clusters with the independent variable being crisis.^{3/} His empirical data was extracted from the occurrences associated with the Korean crisis. The data used to test his propositions was obtained on the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and is synthesized in Appendices A through H, parts I and II of each respectively.

2. Correlation Analysis Methodology

a. Definition of Strata Assigned to Propositions. A first step in the analysis was to determine the correlation between the propositions derived from the study of one crisis (Korean) as applied to a study of two others (Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident). Each of the thirty-four propositions of Paige^{4/} were evaluated for applicability. Each proposition was then assigned to one of the following stratum dependent upon its individual degree of substantiation of the empirical data:

Sustained - This category contains all propositions which were substantiated by explicit reference in the source material. In order to be strictly objective in the analysis, maximum utilization was made of direct quotations of the authors referenced.

Sustained with Modification - This category contains those propositions which were substantiated explicitly in the central theme; however, required minor word changes in order to qualify for that sustainment.

Sustained with Limitation - This category contains those propositions which were substantiated implicitly or, where the basic proposition was not substantiated, those where one or more corollaries were substantiated explicitly.

Limited Sustainment with Modification - This category is a combination of the two preceding. It contains those propositions which, when re-worded

are substantiated implicitly or those having one or more corollaries substantiated explicitly after the re-wording.

Unsustained - This category contains those propositions which were not substantiated either explicitly or implicitly, nor were any corollaries. The research material did not sustain the central theme of the proposition.

Rejected - This category contains those which were refuted or disproven. Even though provision was made for this category, none of the propositions were found to be in it.

b. Numerical Value Assignments. In order to determine a measure of correlation between the propositions advanced in the reference case (Paige's Korean Decision) and the two other incidents investigated (Cuban Missile Crisis and Gulf of Tonkin Incident), the strata were quantified so as to be able to assign a value on each proposition. Inasmuch as the objective was to obtain relative weights, the strata were arbitrarily assigned the following weights:

Sustained (S).....	4
Sustained with Modification (M).....	3
Sustained with Limitation (L).....	2
Limited Sustainment with Modification (C)...	1
Unsustained (U).....	0
Rejected (R).....	-4

Additionally the extremes were investigated by using the "go, no-go" principle. First, those which were assigned to the "Sustained" category were assigned a weight of unity, all others were weighted zero.

Secondly, those propositions which were sustained to any degree were assigned a weight of unity; those which were "Unsustained" were weighted zero.

Other weights could be assigned to each of the strata; however, these would presumably assign greater weight to the "Sustained" strata or perhaps be multiplicative of those given above; nonetheless, the above weights are considered to be conservative. It should be remembered that the methodology is what is important; the reader is at liberty to assign weights of his own choosing if he prefers.

3. A Correlation Analysis of Variable Clusters

The computations for correlation between the propositions advanced by Paige^{5/} and the two incidents investigated are provided in tabular form in Appendix F. In summary, the correlation for each of the two incidents (Cuban and Gulf of Tonkin), using the weighting scheme discussed in section 2b, revealed the following for the total framework:

Cuban Missile Crisis.....	89%
Gulf of Tonkin Incident.....	81%
Combined (Equal Weight).....	85%

Using the "go, no-go" methodology to obtain the range of correlation yielded:

Cuban Missile Crisis.....	83 to 94%
Gulf of Tonkin Incident.....	74 to 83%
Combined (equal Weight).....	78 to 88%

The matrices, Tables 1 and 2, below show the relative support of the propositions in each of the incidents. The abbreviations assigned to each degree of support in section 2b are used here for consistency and brevity.

TABLE 1
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

Variable Clusters		Propositions*								
		.1	.2	.3	.4	.5	.6	.7	.8	.9
Organizational	(1)	S	S	S	M	C	S	S		
Informational	(2)	S	S	S	S					
Value	(3)	S	S	S	S	S	U			
Internal Setting	(4)	S	S	S	L	S	M	S	S	
External Setting	(5)	U	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S

TABLE 2
GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT

Variable Clusters		Propositions*								
		.1	.2	.3	.4	.5	.6	.7	.8	.9
Organizational	(1)	L	S	S	M	C	L	S		
Informational	(2)	S	S	S	S					
Value	(3)	S	S	S	S	S	U			
Internal Setting	(4)	U	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
External Setting	(5)	U	S	L	U	S	S	S	S	S

* Note: Entry in row 1, column 1 corresponds to proposition 1.1, etc.
(See Figure 4.1)

4. Description of the Crisis Model and Input Variables

In order to adequately explain the model, it is first essential to briefly describe each of the five basic input variable clusters (organizational, informational, value, internal setting, and external setting relationships). As defined in reference (8), organizational variables explain changes in organizational behavior, informational variables explain the kinds of information considered by decision makers and the means of communication (they form the information base of the sequence of decisions), value variables are positive and negative statements about desired goals and the means of achieving them, internal setting relationships explain aspects of the domestic environment and the way in which they influence foreign policy decisions, and external setting relationships explain aspects of the international environment with regard to foreign policy decisions. The "tree" diagram in figure 4-1, condensed from reference (8), shows the sub-dependent variables within these five dependent variable clusters versus the independent variable, "crisis."

Figure 4-2 portrays the model of crisis decision stages. Stage 1 is the establishment of a general framework of response where costs are kept low and alternative choices of action are kept large. Stage 2 is the analysis of the capability to respond and the determination of shared willingness among the decision makers to make a positive response. Stage 3 is the decision to commit new, but limited resources and Stage 4 is the decision to expand both the amount and kind of resources. The "reinforcement" blocks account for positive and negative reinforcement of officials between stages which may affect subsequent responses, e.g., support of the news media through

editorials, Congressional support, support from the U. N., etc. The "restrictions" blocks provide input as to whether or not the goals sought are within the range of reasonable accomplishment. The feedback loops, typical of a closed-loop servo analysis, reflect input of known results from the preceding stage and serve to update the weights assigned to each of the input variable clusters. Stages 1 through 4 are not always clearly defined and the stages in fact are sequential in the decision making process.

5. Summary and Conclusions

This paper has attempted to evaluate the empirical propositional analysis of Professor Paige in a non-polemical manner and although a normative analysis may be beneficial it was not considered here.

The correlation analysis in section 3, using the methods described in section 2, showed generally good agreement between the propositions advanced by Paige in reference (8) for the Korean Decision and applicability to the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. A detailed explanation of the degree of substantiation of each of the propositions within the variable clusters to the two test cases is given in Appendices A through E.

The crisis decision model shown in Figure 4-2 represents a flow chart of the sequential behavior in the reference case (Korean Decision) and the two examples reviewed herein. By assigning probability distributions, or weighting factors, to each of the dependent variables, the aggregate variable clusters can be weighted in order to explain their relative importance.

Mathematically, the model in figure 4-2 shows that Crisis (K) is a function of the five dependent variable clusters, representing a total of 34 propositions, (figure 4-1), where w_i are the weighting factors

$$K_i = \sum_i [w_1 O_i + w_2 I_i + w_3 V_i + w_4 R_{1i} + w_5 R_{2i}]; K = \sum K_i$$

and the sequential decisions in Stages 1 through 4 show the path of action indicating responses to the input variables together with the constraints of both restrictions and reinforcement and that portion of the decision stage which were returned to the decision makers, i.e., feedback.

In the testing of the propositions it was discovered in both test cases that propositions 3.6 and 5.1 could not be substantiated from the available literature.

I believe a warning expressed by Secretary of State Rusk in an interview with Glenn Paige in 1955 regarding the variables in the Korean decision is appropriate to remember. "In such circumstances, I believe, there can be no textbook to tell the policy maker what to do."^{6/} The model developed herein is not a panacea and I recognize the inability to produce a theory or a forecasting model. To make such a claim would be reckless and foolhardy. What is hoped is that this study in support of Professor Paige's initial work will be of assistance to decision makers and students of political science in categorizing lessons learned from the past and invite attention to recurrent issues.





FIGURE 4-1

PATH OF ACTION



LEGEND
 O = ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES
 I = INFORMATIONAL VARIABLES
 V = VALUE VARIABLES
 R₁ = INTERNAL SETTING RELATIONSHIPS
 R₂ = EXTERNAL SETTING RELATIONSHIPS
 ⇨ = INPUT / OUTPUT TO & FROM STAGES

MODEL OF CRISIS DECISION STAGES
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 CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES, 1970
 ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

FIGURE 4-2

FOOTNOTES

- 1/ For a complete definition of "ostensible" and "real" crisis and the escalation principle, refer to Herman Kahn, On Escalation. New York: Frederick A Praeger, Inc., 1965, p. 54.
- 2/ Charles F. Hermann, Crisis in Foreign Policy Making: A Simulation of International Policies. China Lake, California: Project Michelson Report, U.S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, April 1965, p. 29.
- 3/ For a complete discussion, refer to Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision. New York: The Free Press, 1968, Chapter II.
- 4/ Ibid.
- 5/ Ibid.
- 6/ Ibid., p. 366.

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6. Males, William, LTC, USA, The Cuban Missile Crisis, An Empirical Evaluation. (Unpublished report). University of Rochester, March 1969.
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13. The New York Times, 3 August 1964.
14. The New York Times, 4 August 1964.
15. The New York Times, 5 August 1964.
16. The New York Times, 6 August 1964.
17. The New York Times, 7 August 1964.

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

Part I - Cuban Missile Crisis

Proposition 1.1: Crisis decisions tend to be reached by ad hoc decisional units.

The discussions and recommendations pertaining to the Cuban Missile Crisis were undertaken by an ad hoc committee comprised of "some fourteen or fifteen men who had little in common except the President's desire for their judgement."^{1/} The reference here is to the core group called together on 16 October by the President. Later on 22 October, this ad hoc committee was to be formally established as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOM). (Sustained.)

Proposition 1.2: Crisis decisions tend to be made by decisional units that vary within rather narrow limits of size and composition.

The initial meeting called by the President after discovery of offensive missile installations in Cuba had twelve participants in addition to President Kennedy. This group was gradually expanded until there were fifteen members of the EXCOM "with others brought in on occasion."^{2/} The total list of part-time and regular participants was approximately twenty-two, not all of whom attended any one meeting. A review of the available data indicates that the composition of the decision making body varied from the original twelve to eighteen.^{3/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 1.3: The greater the crisis, the greater the felt need for face-to-face proximity among decision makers.

There were daily meetings of the President's advisors. Theodore Sorensen stated that his recollection of the ninety-six hours following President Kennedy's telling him of the missile discovery, "is a blur of meetings and discussions; mornings, afternoons, evenings."^{4/} When it came time to select a course of action, the President, who was in Chicago, feigned an illness in order to be present in the deliberation of the "war council."^{5/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 1.4: The greater the crisis, the greater the accentuation of positive-affect relationships among decision makers.

In the context of Professor Paige's analysis I detect the notion of a tendency to "bury the hatchet" in face of common danger. The a priori acceptance of the basic premise that Presidential advisors and/or appointees have "axes to grind" of such magnitude that it takes a national crisis to put them to rest is questioned. Such a situation would not only reflect unfavorably upon the President, but would be intolerable. I believe that the proposition would be more appropriately stated as follows:

The greater the crisis, the greater the tendency among decision makers toward open-mindedness.

Similar to any other group of decision makers when rated relatively, the decision makers of the Cuban crisis started out with its "hawks" and "doves" but that stratification was only temporary; in the final analysis there were only "dawks" and "hoves."^{6/} The members of the EXCOM were inconsistent in their positions because they were willing to listen to each other's proposals and evaluate them.^{7/}

"In the course of the long hours of thinking aloud, hearing new arguments, entertaining new considerations, they almost all found themselves moving from one position to another."^{8/}
(Sustained with Modifications.)

Proposition 1.5: The greater the crisis, the greater the acceptance of the responsibility for action by the leader and the more the follower expectation and acceptance of the leader's responsibility.

I am firmly convinced that a leader and responsibility are inseparable, that is to say that a leader is responsible for everything his subordinates do or fail to do, without equivocation. Therefore, Proposition 1.5 is a tautology and should not be included in the analysis.

The second idea of this proposition, regarding the leader's propensity to respond, appears to be only a partial. I offer the following re-phrasing:

The greater the crisis and the greater the past record of response to crisis by the leader, the greater the propensity to make a similar response.

As re-stated the proposition includes both positive and negative responses. It is intended to imply that under pressure, decision makers will respond instinctively in either direction depending on their habit pattern.

President Kennedy carried out this showdown with the Soviet Union in his own personal style characterized as "Massive means of coercion and surprising speed."^{9/} This was not a new style for him: he had used it successfully on the steel industrialists when they raised their prices earlier the same year.^{10/} (Limited Sustainment with Modification.)

Proposition 1.6: The greater the crisis, the more the leader's solicitation of subordinate advice.

There was a variation in the face-to-face proximity theme as implemented during this crisis. The President, upon the advice of one of his advisors, agreed to the holding of some EXCOM meetings without his presence.^{11/} This policy fostered an atmosphere of cooperation and progress that tended to insure the maximum participation of attendees and thereby more freely elicited advice from subordinates. In essence, "the absence of the President encouraged everyone to speak his mind."^{12/} Solicitation of advice from subordinates was further exemplified by Sorensen's statement, "He (the President) took pains to seek everyone's individual views."^{13/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 1.7: The greater the crisis, the greater the interdepartmental collaboration.

Interdepartmental cooperation during this crisis was shown in two areas. One, the Secretary level, was shown by the aura of cooperation and frank discussions of the EXCOM which included the Secretaries of the Defense, State, and Treasury; the Attorney General; and the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. It is acknowledged that these men were chosen because of the trust the President had in them as individuals; however, they were also institutional leaders and as such were charged with implementing and coordinating the decisions reached by the committee once they returned to their own departments. The second display of cooperation was in the gathering, interpreting, and analysis of intelligence data. The CIA analysts disseminated their findings on the missile bases to all elements of the intelligence community within hours of discovery.^{14/} In addition, working level meetings between CIA, State, and military intelligence officers were held at least daily.^{15/} (Sustained.)

APPENDIX A

ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES

Part II - Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Proposition 1.1: Unlike the Cuban Crisis, the discussions and recommendations did not rest with an ad hoc group. The initial White House meeting on 2 August was attended by Secretary of State, (Rusk), Under Secretary of State (Ball), Deputy Defense Secretary (Vance), and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. Wheeler), and other top military and diplomatic representatives.^{16/} This group was ad hoc; however, after the second attack on 4 August, the Executives of NSC (Rusk, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) played the primary role together with the NSC.^{17/} (Sustained with Limitation.)

Proposition 1.2: The initial meeting at the White House consisted of a group of about fifteen to twenty participants. The triumvirate from NSC (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy) were instrumental advisors as was the rest of NSC.^{18/19/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 1.3: There were several meetings of the NSC and its Executive Committee during the short span of time of this incident. President Johnson briefed Congressional leaders (16 of them) at 6:45 p.m. 4 August;^{20/} Rusk, McNamara and Gen. Wheeler briefed combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees during the afternoon of 3 August.^{21/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 1.4: As with the Cuban Crisis, I believe the proposition needs restating. Once restated the final analysis is the same. Congressional leaders gave President Johnson "encouraging assurance" that Congress would pass his "resolution."^{22/} "The resolution was promptly passed

466 - 0 in the House, 88 - 2 in the Senate."^{23/} Congress endorsed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, "in an atmosphere of urgency that seemed at the time to preclude debate," according to Senator Fulbright.^{24/} At the outset of the incident (2 August) Senate Majority leader Mansfield speculated that, "the incident might cause considerable Congressional debate."^{25/} Senator Dirksen asked for a Vietnam Policy Study and other Republicans expressed dismay;^{26/} however, in the final analysis the President was given overwhelming support. (Sustained with Modification.)

Proposition 1.5: "Damage and doubt aside, the American response was prompt." Referring to President Johnson, "His decisions on the domestic front came with equal swiftness."^{27/} "Within a few hours, President Johnson decided on a limited, single strike response against the patrol boat bases, avoiding densely populated areas."^{28/} In his previous news conferences Johnson had refused to answer questions and only briefly reported the incidents.^{29/30/} There was a cloak of secrecy maintained until Johnson went on the air to announce that we were retaliating and that bombers were already in the air and on their way.^{31/} This "cloak of secrecy" and surprising speed was not only a style of Johnson, but that of Kennedy under whom he had served as Vice President. (Limited Sustainment with Modification.)

Proposition 1.6: On 2 August, shortly after the incident President Johnson was briefed by top government officials at a 45 minute White House meeting; however, Johnson issued no statement at this time and how much solicitation for advice, if any, is not known. On 4 August at the NSC meeting, "a consensus quickly emerged that the North Vietnamese

should not go unpunished."^{32/} This is the only documented solicitation for advice which could be found and therefore the conservative result is (Sustained with Limitation).

Proposition 1.7: Interdepartmental cooperation was displayed throughout the crisis. "Simultaneously with Reedy's (White House Press Secretary) announcement that the President would have a statement that night over television and radio, the Military's Defense Communication System went into action sending the strike order down the chain-of-command to the carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation."^{33/} All the referenced material showed extreme cooperation between the State and Defense departments in supporting the President and in responding swiftly and jointly in this incident. (Sustained).

FOOTNOTES Appendix A

- 1/ Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1965, p. 674.
- 2/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 802.
- 3/ Ibid., p. 802.
- 4/ Sorensen, op. cit., p. 678.
- 5/ Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1966, p. 252.
- 6/ Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course, New York: Frederick A Preger, Inc., 1963, p. 16.
- 7/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 678.
- 8/ Schlesinger, op cit., p. 803.
- 9/ Pachter, op cit., p. 16.
- 10/ Ibid., p. 16.
- 11/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 679.
- 12/ Ibid., p. 679.
- 13/ Ibid., p. 679.
- 14/ Ibid., p. 673.
- 15/ Ibid., p. 678.
- 16/ The New York Times, 3 August 1964.
- 17/ The New York Times, 5 August 1964.
- 18/ Ibid.
- 19/ Richard T. Loomis, "The White House Telephone and Crisis Management," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, December 1969, p. 72.
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- 23/ Ibid., p. 159.
- 24/ Ibid., p. 197.
- 25/ The New York Times, 3 August 1964.
- 26/ Ibid.
- 27/ Kahin, op. cit., p. 158.
- 28/ Loomis, op. cit., p. 72.
- 29/ The New York Times, 3 August 1964.
- 30/ The New York Times, 4 August 1964.
- 31/ Loomis, op. cit., p. 72.
- 32/ Ibid., p. 72.
- 33/ Ibid., p. 72.

APPENDIX B

INFORMATIONAL VARIABLES

Part I - Cuban Missile Crisis

Proposition 2.1: The Greater the crisis, the greater the felt need for information.

Once the presence of offensive missile installations in Cuba had been discovered by the United States and the threat realized by the President, the intelligence (information) gathering effort was increased. The first action of the President was to order the institution of low-level photographic flights.^{1/} Additionally, instructions were issued that put Cuba under increased high-level surveillance. "There was hardly an hour of daylight that did not see a U-2 over some part of Cuba."^{2/}

Prior to the day of discovery, all useful intelligence had been provided by refugee reports, clandestine agent observations, and high-level U-2 photography. The refugee reports were extremely varied in reliability, slow to be received, and voluminous; the agent observations were of higher reliability but again were slow; the U-2 was fast and accurate but was subject to weather restrictions.^{3/} Agent and refugee reports were received in Washington throughout the month of September indicating the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba.^{4/} The intelligence community, as well as the President, were convinced that the evidence was conclusive once it was supported by U-2 photographs. This conviction was the result of one U-2 flight as compared with the constant refugee clamor. It is noteworthy that the U-2 source was not unique in revealing the presence of weapons; agent and refugee reports both pointed to the same thing. The U-2, however,

was the most reliable source and only one of varied channels through which the information was communicated.

As time passed and more information was gathered through reconnaissance flights, it became apparent that the United States felt it had sufficient intelligence to permit easing the surveillance. This relaxation of surveillance was not a pre-planned action on the part of the United States but was in response to the shooting down of a high-flying U-2 by Soviet-operated SAM's and ground fire on two low-flying reconnaissance planes.^{5/} President Kennedy called off the flare-drop flight scheduled for the night of 27 October because of the danger that it might be mistaken for an attack on the SAM site.^{6/} Had there existed the same feeling of inadequate information as was present earlier in the week, I do not believe the flight would have been cancelled, regardless of the danger. (Sustained.)

Proposition 2.2: The greater the crisis, the greater the tendency for primary messages to be elevated to the top of the organizational hierarchy.

This crisis appears to be a classic as far as the ultimate level to which primary messages are elevated is concerned. Early, before the United States realized a crisis was developing, messages that contained important data were shelved at a low level (within the intelligence community); whereas, once we were in the crisis all messages were referred to the EXCOM. This is exemplified by the fact that it was President Kennedy himself that managed the crisis "in all its exquisite detail."^{7/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 2.3: The greater the crisis, the greater the reliance upon central themes in previously existing information.

Prior to President Kennedy's public announcement of the presence of missile sites in Cuba, the Soviet Union had undertaken an extensive campaign to convince the United States that only defensive weapons were being supplied to Castro.^{8/} This campaign, supported by the assumption that the best interests of the Soviets would not be served by their introducing offensive weapons, established the central theme around which pieces of intelligence were analyzed.^{9/} Because of this central theme there was a pronounced reluctance to accept, even at face value, reports of offensive missiles in Cuba. That is, there was a reluctance to believe espionage agents and refugees or to analyze completely the technical reports that were received, until the U-2 flight of 14 October.^{10/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 2.4: The greater the crisis, the greater the propensity for decision makers to supplement information about the objective state of affairs with information drawn from their own past experience.

The most striking examples of this proposition are evident in the discussions of the EXCOM which analyzed the various alternatives that existed for meeting and eliminating the threat. Early in the crisis, sentiment seemed to be strongest for eliminating the bases by means of a sudden, surprise attack by air or airborne forces.^{11/} Robert Kennedy argued convincingly, however, that a surprise attack on Cuba would not be unlike the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor and "Sunday morning surprise blows on small nations were not in our tradition."^{12/} (Sustained.)

APPENDIX B

INFORMATIONAL VARIABLES

Part II - Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Proposition 2.1: "Perhaps the most co-ordinated communication effort by President Johnson, was during the Tonkin Gulf incident... Although it was on a much lower tension level than the Cuban crisis and remains politically controversial, it represents a significant refinement in the effective use of every available mode of communication by the President."^{13/} It is apparent that the flow of information via this system provided the necessary data for the President's decision to act. (Sustained.)

Proposition 2.2: This has been basically covered in the explanation to Proposition 2.1 above. "The White House telephones became key tools in coordinating the many political and military facets of the problem."^{14/} With this communication system "President Johnson was able to orchestrate a highly sensitive, fast-moving military response 12,000 miles from the White House, with confidence and precision."^{15/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 2.3: "Damage and doubt aside, the American response was prompt." Senator Fulbright's comments, after the fact were, "We were briefed on it, but we have no way of knowing even to this day, what actually happened. I don't know whether we provoked that attack in connection with supervising or helping a raid by South Vietnamese or not."^{16/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 2.4: The Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorized the President to, "take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."^{17/} This fits Professor Paige's example

regarding "aggression" nicely. Regarding the President's response, "He may fervently believe that this course is likely to strengthen the resolve of anticommunist governments elsewhere, but he is also sure to bear in mind the exigencies of domestic politics, where he would be open to attack from his political opponents by any appearance of being 'soft on communism'."^{18/} (Sustained.)

FOOTNOTES Appendix B

- 1/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 802.
- 2/ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967, p. 194.
- 3/ Ibid., p. 167.
- 4/ Ibid., p. 174.
- 5/ Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1965, p. 713.
- 6/ Ibid., p. 713.
- 7/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 213.
- 8/ Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963, p. 176.
- 9/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 189.
- 10/ Ibid., p. 189.
- 11/ Ibid., p. 203.
- 12/ Schlesinger, op cit., p. 807.
- 13/ Richard T. Loomis, "The White House Telephone and Crisis Management," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, December 1969, p. 72.
- 14/ Ibid., p. 72.
- 15/ Ibid., p. 73.
- 16/ George Kahin and John Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1969, p. 158.
- 17/ Ibid., p. 159.
- 18/ Ibid., p. 197.

APPENDIX C

VALUE VARIABLES

Part I - Cuban Missile Crisis

Proposition 3.1: Crisis tends to evoke a dominant goal-means value complex that persists as an explicit or implicit guide to subsequent response.

In the Cuban crisis the goal-means value complex was one that advocated the "gradual evening out of the strategic equation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R." rather than an abrupt change.^{1/} This gradual evening out would permit accords, or tacit understandings, on a range of matters such as arms control as well as political adjustments between the contesting ideologies.^{2/} This was the goal - the means was to have Soviet offensive missiles removed from Cuba.^{3/}
(Sustained.)

Proposition 3.2: The goal-means value complex evoked by crisis tends to be broad in its scope of applicability.

This is interpreted to mean that the goal-means complex associated with a particular crisis is a component of some larger complex that reflects the continuing aims of all nations - to retain their sovereignty and further their ideals. In this case the larger complex has the goal of maintaining world peace. "Kennedy never dared forget that whatever he did was to preserve, not to end the peace."^{4/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.3: Crisis tends to evoke a goal-means value complex that is strongly conditioned emotionally.

The emotional conditioning in this case was the resolve not to repeat the humiliation of the "Bay of Pigs." President Kennedy knew that another such blow to U.S. prestige would ruin all hope for a stable world peace.^{5/} The manifestation

of his determination is shown by the statement, "that the United States must bring the threat to an end: one way or another the missiles would have to be removed."^{6/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.4: Crisis tends to evoke the gradual proliferation of associated values around a dominant value core.

The data on Cuba shows the similarities in values associated with or identified by crisis situations. Professor Paige recognized that the Korean invasion was related to American interests in the Far East; the confidence of American allies throughout the world; the post-war confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; and the immediate goal of protecting American lives in Korea. The analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis shows that it became related to American interests in Central and South America (self-evident; supported by references to the Monroe Doctrine);^{7/} the confidence of American allies throughout the world;^{8/} the post-war confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.;^{9/} and the immediate goal of forcing removal of the missiles that threatened U.S. property and lives.^{10/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.5: The greater the sense of urgency, the less the effectiveness of negative values as inhibitors of positive response.

It was estimated that the missile sites would be operational within a matter of days after their discovery. This fact had a strong influence on the evaluation of the various alternatives under consideration. Among the alternatives, the one with the least negative values was the one calling for the application of diplomatic pressures through direct contact with Khrushchev, the U.N., or the O.A.S.^{11/} This alternative was rejected from the outset by the President.

"He was not willing to let the U.N. debate and Khrushchev equivocate while the missiles became operational."^{12/}

(Sustained.)

Proposition 3.6: Costly responses to crisis tend to be followed by decline in the salience of the values associated with them.

This proposition gets its strongest support from intuition. I feel that it was true during the examined crisis as it was in others, but it is extremely difficult to find empirical data to substantiate that feeling. The closest support found was the observation that President Kennedy, in effect, called off the thirteen day blockade after he received word from Khrushchev that the missiles would be withdrawn.^{13/}

Evaluating this could indicate that the salience of the value associated with the missiles being on the island had diminished; otherwise, the President would not have eased the pressure until they had been removed. However, even after giving the most liberal consideration to the above, I cannot deduce the sustainment of this proposition.

(Unsustained.)

APPENDIX C

VALUE VARIABLES

Part II - Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Proposition 3.1: Johnson's request for prompt passage of The Tonkin Gulf Resolution (means) was "not merely because of the events of the Tonkin Gulf, but also because we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us." (goal)^{14/}
(Sustained.)

Proposition 3.2: As with the Cuban crisis, I take this to be part of a larger goal complex: The Tonkin Gulf Resolution to prevent further aggression, the fact that it is important for our allies to "remain assured that we are loyal and determined,"^{15/} and that our "first order of business," according to Secretary Rusk, "is the struggle between Communism and freedom."^{16/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.3: In the President's address to Congress he asked it to, "join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met" and to approve "all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty."^{17/} Congress approved the resolution, "in an atmosphere of urgency that seemed at the time to preclude debate."^{18/} In his speech Johnson said that he would request a resolution from Congress making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia."^{19/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.4: As pointed out in Proposition 3.3, we related the incidents to the necessity to preserve freedom and peace in all of Southeast Asia. We stand ready to, "assist nations covered by the SEATO treaty"^{20/} and furthermore we stand firmly in the struggle between Communism and freedom (as pointed out in 3.2). (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.5: Johnson had discussed his response with Congressional leaders; however, he did not wait for Congress to act or debate prior to his retaliatory moves. Johnson had Adlai Stevenson, "raise the matter immediately at the U.N. Security Council meeting" (5 August),^{21/} but this again was after his response. He, as John Kennedy, was not willing to let debate slow down his swift response. (Sustained.)

Proposition 3.6: Once again there is no empirical data available in the literature searched to substantiate this proposition. (Unsustained.)

FOOTNOTES Appendix C

- 1/ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967, p. 202.
- 2/ Ibid., p. 202.
- 3/ Ibid., p. 202.
- 4/ Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963, p. 13.
- 5/ Ibid., p. 13.
- 6/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 801.
- 7/ Pachter, op cit., p. 37.
- 8/ Ibid., p. 18.
- 9/ Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1965, p. 700.
- 10/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 202.
- 11/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 682.
- 12/ Ibid., p. 683.
- 13/ Ibid., p. 717.
- 14/ George Kahin and John Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1969, p. 159.
- 15/ The New York Times, 3 August 1964.
- 16/ Ibid.
- 17/ Kahin, op cit., p. 158.
- 18/ Ibid., p. 197.
- 19/ Ibid., p. 158.
- 20/ Ibid., p. 159.
- 21/ The New York Times, 5 August 1964.

APPENDIX D

INTERNAL SETTING RELATIONSHIPS

Part I - Cuban Missile Crisis

Proposition 4.1: The greater the crisis, the greater the environmental demands for information about the probable responses that political leaders may make to it.

On the Sunday before President Kennedy's television broadcast announcing the presence of offensive missiles in Cuba and our response to that threat, the Washington press knew something was up and, "most of the reporters accredited to the State Department and the Pentagon spent Sunday there, prowling the corridors looking for some lead."^{1/} Many reporters were speculating - the U.S.S.R. might have delivered an ultimatum on Berlin; the U.S. might have finally lost patience with Castro; the U.S. might be planning an invasion of Cuba.^{2/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.2: The greater the crisis, the more the attempts by political leaders to limit response - relevant information transmitted to the internal setting.

Prior to public revelation of the secret, the New York Times had pieced together most of the story; however, at the President's request the paper held the story so as not to give the Soviets warning of the fact that the United States was planning a reaction.^{3/}

At one time, in order to preclude attracting attention with a convoy of limousines, nine members of the EXCOM went to a meeting in one car.^{4/} Another incident was that of McCone (Director of the CIA) and McNamara (Secretary of Defense) telling a band of reporters that they were headed for a dinner being given for Gromyko in "Foggy Bottom" when they were in fact going to an EXCOM meeting.^{5/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.3: The greater the crisis, the greater the efforts of decision makers to diminish popular anxieties.

The most outstanding example of this hypothesis occurred on Friday, 26 October when the State Department press officer went beyond what President Kennedy wanted conveyed regarding the gravity of continuing work on the Cuban missile sites. This "overstepping of bounds" caused the President to become angry inasmuch as it led to headlines about a possible invasion of Cuba. This was in direct contradiction to Kennedy's desires; he realized that this struggle was going to require "as little public pressure on him as possible."^{6/} Furthermore, he realized that the way to maintain that low pressure was to diminish popular anxieties, not raise them. (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.4: The greater the crisis, the greater the reliance upon the political leader's estimate of the domestic acceptability of a response.

Data supporting this proposition is in the negative sense, i.e., the evidence is really a lack of disagreement with the President. All but one of the EXCOM conferees shared Kennedy's view that invasion was the last step to take because it would result in "the indictment of history for our aggression."^{7/} This observation is the only explicit reference to the decision makers deferring to or relying upon the political cognizance of the President but all articles reviewed imply reliance upon Kennedy's political opinion. (Sustained with Limitation.)

Proposition 4.5: The greater the crisis, the greater the avoidance of response-inhibiting involvement.

This proposition is exemplified by the President's hesitancy to place the matter in the hands of the U.N. or to discuss the matter with Congress prior to making a decision. "From the very start, the twelve men of the Executive

Committee agreed that diplomatic protests were too slow."^{8/}
President Kennedy did not want to give Russia the opportunity to delay or block action in the U.N.; he wanted freedom from international pressures until he could take action."^{9/}

The President was adamant that he "was acting by Executive Order, Presidential proclamation, and inherent powers, not under any resolution or act of the Congress. He had earlier rejected all suggestions of reconvening Congress."^{10/}
(Sustained.)

Proposition 4.6: The greater the crisis, the greater the avoidance of legitimacy challenging involvement.

This proposition is very closely tied to that preceding. The proposition concerning response-inhibiting involvements is proper when couched in terms of avoidance but the proposition could more appropriately be stated in terms of seeking legitimacy offering involvements. Our U.N. representative analyzed our approaching the U.N. and the O.A.S. in those terms. The U.N. was not to be relied on to authorize action against Cuba in advance; however, the O.A.S. offered a chance for multilateral support and provision of some protection in law and a great deal in public opinion."^{11/} (Sustained with Modification.)

Proposition 4.7: The greater the crisis thrust upon the decision makers from the external environment, the greater the propensity for them to receive positive reinforcing responses to their actions from individuals and groups within the internal setting.

Evidence to support this assertion is overwhelming. A Congressional leader telephoned President Kennedy that after having watched the President's television broadcast of 22 October, he fully supported his policy."^{12/} Telegrams

received at the White House expressed confidence and support by a ratio of 10:1.^{13/} The day after the speech, "the GOP Congressional leaders called for complete support of the President."^{14/} Gov. Barnett of Mississippi retracted an earlier telegram in which he had criticized the use of our military might in Mississippi rather than the Caribbean.^{15/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.8: The greater the crisis, the more the preferential communication of crisis decisions to politically sensitive elements, the support of whom is required for effective implementation.

As with the foregoing, this proposition is well documented by supporting data. The most concise example is an extract of the schedule of who was to do what and when on 22 October:

"10:00 - Lawrence O'Brien (Presidential Assistant for Congressional Relations) to notify congressional leadership;

12:00 noon - the President's press secretary, Pierre Salinger, to announce time of President's speech;

3:00 p.m. - National Security Council meeting followed by Cabinet meeting;

5:00 - The President, Rusk, McNamara, and McCone to brief congressional leadership;

6:00 - Ambassador Dobrynin of the Soviet Union to see Secretary Rusk (to receive copy of President's disclosure address);

6:15 - Under Secretary George Ball and Director of Intelligence Roger Hilsman to brief 46 allied ambassadors;

7:00 - The President's speech;

7:30 - Assistant Secretary Edwin Martin to brief Latin American ambassadors;

8:00 - Rusk and Hilsman to brief 'neutral nations' ambassadors - Ball, Alexis Johnson, and Abram Chayes (the legal advisor of the State Department) to give first half of press briefing;

8:15 - Hilsman to give second half of press briefing."^{16/}

In addition to the briefings and notifications called for in the Washington scenario, "Dean Acheson had briefed General de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer, and the NATO Council."^{17/}
(Sustained.)

APPENDIX D

INTERNAL SETTING RELATIONSHIPS

Part II - Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Proposition 4.1: The events in this incident occurred far too quickly to permit leakage of information or speculation; therefore, it is unsupported. (Unsustained.)

Proposition 4.2: The President's refusal to issue a statement after the White House meeting on 2 August; his brief statement to newsmen and refusal to answer questions at the news conference on 3 August; the vagueness of information revealed to Congress (according to Senator Fulbright)^{18/} all support this proposition as in Professor Paige's example.^{19/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.3: Government officials said, "the attack is not regarded as a major crisis - the Seventh Fleet has sufficient strength on hand."^{20/} On 3 August, McClosky (State Department spokesman) said the situation was serious but avoided exaggeration. "He said there was no plan to retaliate - except that orders were issued to shoot to kill in the future."^{21/} After the second incident Johnson kept everything in secrecy until he went on the air to reveal the facts of the situation. "The Administration wanted the American people to learn of the decision and the attack on the patrol boat bases from Washington before they heard of it from Hanoi or Peking."^{22/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.4: Johnson conferred with his political rival Barry Goldwater prior to making his retaliatory response known and received his "full support of his decision."^{23/} Johnson had been given "encouraging assurance" of the passage of his resolution and received overwhelming Congressional support.^{24/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.5: Johnson, as pointed out in proposition 3.5, did not want to wait for U.N. action. After the first incident, a formal protest had been prepared, but the second incident occurred before it was released. The State Department said, "there was no time to consult with SEATO or other allies, the need for surprise made consultations difficult."^{25/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.6: Again this is linked closely with the proposition 4.5, but it is also closely allied with the prose offered in 3.5. Johnson cleverly avoided Congressional debate and although he approached the U.N., it was after our retaliation. Interesting enough, the speculate thought that U.N. would be of little, if any assistance, was affirmed by Thant on 6 August who said, "he did not believe the Security Council could be usefully employed in settlement of Southeast Asia crisis at this time, the Security Council was limited by nature of the conflict and North Vietnam was not a U.N. member."^{26/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.7: Johnson received overwhelming support from Congress. The resolution he requested passed with a vote of 466-0 in the House and 88-2 in the Senate.^{27/} Even his political rival, Barry Goldwater, was in full support of his actions.^{28/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 4.8:

3 August p.m. - Rusk, McNamara and Wheeler brief the combined Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

4 August 12:00 noon - NSC meeting, preceded by special meeting with Rusk, McNamara and Bundy.

6:00 p.m. - NSC meeting again to go over operational details and loose ends.

6:43 p.m. - President briefs Congressional Leaders.

8:45 p.m. - President's press Secretary, George Reedy, to announce time of President's speech.

11:40 p.m. - President's speech.

12:00 midnt.- Secretary of Defense holds news conference.

The President said, "Secretary of State Rusk had been instructed to make the American attitude clear to all nations - we Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict."^{29/} There was no use of "hot line" to warn U.S.S.R. and no effort was made to warn Communist China through intermediaries before the President's speech, in order to maintain surprise. He gave the limits of the retaliation to them via his speech. (Sustained.)

FOOTNOTES Appendix D

- 1/ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967, p. 208.
- 2/ Ibid., p. 208.
- 3/ Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963, p. 31.
- 4/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 200.
- 5/ Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1965, p. 691.
- 6/ Ibid., p. 712.
- 7/ Ibid., p. 683.
- 8/ Pachter, op cit., p. 15.
- 9/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 683.
- 10/ Ibid., p. 702.
- 11/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 810.
- 12/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 704.
- 13/ Ibid., p. 707.
- 14/ Ibid., p. 707.
- 15/ Ibid., p. 707.
- 16/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 207.
- 17/ Ibid., p. 212.
- 18/ George Kahin and John Lewis, The United States in Vietnam, New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1969, p. 158.
- 19/ Glenn Paige, The Korean Decision, New York: The Free Press, 1968, p. 303.
- 20/ The New York Times, 3 August 1964.

- 21/ The New York Times, 4 August 1964.
- 22/ Richard T. Loomis, "The White House Telephone Crisis Management," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, December 1969, p. 73.
- 23/ The New York Times, 5 August 1964.
- 24/ Kahin, op cit., p. 158.
- 25/ The New York Times, 5 August 1964.
- 26/ The New York Times, 7 August 1964.
- 27/ Kahin, op cit., p. 159.
- 28/ The New York Times, 5 August 1964.
- 29/ Ibid.

Appendix E

EXTERNAL SETTING RELATIONSHIPS

Part I -- Cuban Missile Crisis

Proposition 5.1: The greater the crisis, the more the directed scanning of the international environment for information.

This proposition is in direct support of proposition 2.1 pertaining to the felt need for information. Proposition 2.1 dealt primarily with the need for information about the crisis and the associated actions, i.e., how many missile sites were being prepared? how far along was construction thereof? when would the sites be operational?, etc.

This proposition deals primarily with the situation in the external environment concerning the reasons for the crisis and possible external reactions to our following some course of action.

Although explicit directions were not issued for gathering the type information discussed herein, the feeling of the decision makers appears to be that they would have preferred more information but that they felt the results would not justify the means, nor was there time. (Unsustained).

Proposition 5.2: The greater the crisis, the greater the sensitivity to external response expectations.

Among pieces of empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis was the consideration that something must be done to counter the threat. If the Russian build-up continued without opposition the Western allies would disband and the neutrals would veer toward the Soviet bloc.^{1/} If our reaction was too strong, say an invasion of Cuba, the small nations of the world

would condemn us for picking on one of their group.^{2/} In Latin America, where U. S. nonintervention was a religion, the situation was worse; failure to intervene there would bring on a Castro-Communist trend.^{3/} The Secretary of State summarized the state of affairs to the effect that if we take too strong an action, the Allies and Latin Americans will turn against us; too weak an action, they will turn away from us.^{4/} (Sustained).

Proposition 5.3: The greater the crisis, the less the international acceptability of information about it emanating from the decision makers directly concerned.

The decision makers during this crisis felt it essential to carefully calculate the quantity and type of information to be released during the briefings and notifications of 22 October. Finally, President Kennedy decided that to preclude hesitancy of acceptance by the world of our operations, the photographs in our possession should be used in the briefings to Allies and neutrals as well as in the U. N. At first there had been some doubts expressed in the British press that there were actually offensive missiles in Cuba, but as soon as the photographs were released all doubts were swept aside.^{5/} In the U. N., Adlai Stevenson "turned to the enlargements of the U-2 photographs, convincing the world of Soviet guilt and mustering support for the action the United States was about to take."^{6/} This final point is especially significant in view of Mr. Stevenson's embarrassment over the "photographs" of the Cuban Air Force bombing Cuba prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Sustained).

Proposition 5.4: The greater the crisis, the more frequent and the more direct the interactions with friendly leaders in the external setting.

As suggested by Professor Paige, in this age of rapid communication, the interactions were with friendly, neutral, and political opponent leaders. There are five basic channels of communication between the Soviet and American governments both official and unofficial, formal and informal. During the Cuban Missile Crisis all were used.^{7/}

"Both Sekou Toure in Guinea and Ben Bella in Algeria sent Kennedy their assurances that they would deny Russian aircraft transit rights."^{8/}

President Kennedy (or his personal representative) contacted the heads of government of Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. Chancellor Adenauer and General de Gaulle both strongly supported the American position and, once he had been assured that this was a U. S./ U. S. S. R. major showdown, Mr. Macmillan gave his unfaltering support and counsel.^{9/} (Sustained).

Proposition 5.5: The greater the crisis, the greater the efforts to secure international collaborative support for an appropriate response.

Once President Kennedy had made the decision on what would be done, the necessary steps were taken to notify friends and neutrals and to solicit their support. Letters were written to forty-three heads of government^{10/} and personal envoys were sent to the capitals of our principal European allies.^{11/} Of primary importance was the drafting of the resolution to be presented to the O. A. S. and the concurrent briefings. There were two main points to be considered; one, we wanted to negate

any Latin American resentment that would result in unilateral American action; and two, we felt that we must actively pursue O.A.S. support of our actions so as to add legal justification "under international and maritime law as well as the U.N. Charter."^{12/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.6: The wider the range of international involvements undertaken in response to crisis, the wider the range of legitimations required to gain international acceptance of them.

All indications showed that the decision makers were avidly trying to restrict the crisis and reaction thereto. All peripheral actions were in support of existing, internationally acknowledged commitments. (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.7: The greater the crisis, the greater the clarification of the values of international political objects.

Again there were many examples of our stating precisely what our objects were both in regard to the immediate crisis and in regard to those long-standing. This proposition deals with the latter.

President Kennedy made it extremely clear that any Soviet move against Berlin would result in the United States taking a full role there as well as the Caribbean.^{13/} When the Soviets attempted to trade missile bases in Cuba for those of the U.S. in Turkey, they were told emphatically that "it had been unacceptable in the past, it was unacceptable today, and would be unacceptable tomorrow and ad infinitum." Any talk of U.S. missile bases would have to be in the framework of general disarmament not Cuba.^{15/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.8: The greater the crisis, the greater the efforts directed toward the provision of opportunities for autonomous threat withdrawal by the source of the threatening behavior.

This thesis is exemplified by the entire atmosphere of the decision makers' deliberations. Specifically, President Kennedy finally came to support the blockade approach versus the air strike because he favored the idea of leaving Khrushchev a way out.^{16/} In further support of the proposition is noted that the President ordered the blockade as close to Cuba as possible in order to afford Khrushchev as much time as possible to back down gracefully.^{17/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.9: The greater the crisis, the greater the efforts devoted toward minimizing the range and degree of the threat confronted.

As pointed out by Professor Paige, this proposition is "a corollary of the foregoing."^{18/} Substantiating evidence is contained in the discussion of proposition 5.8. (Sustained.)

APPENDIX E

EXTERNAL SETTING RELATIONSHIPS

Part II - Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Proposition 5.1: Again the readings indicate that greater data would have been desirable; however, there was insufficient time for gathering. (Unsustained.)

Proposition 5.2: The President decided on a limited, single strike response against the patrol boat bases. The timing of the President's speech was critical, "since Washington did not want to give North Vietnam opportunity to clear the bases. But the White House also wanted to make it clear that the strike would be limited to specific targets. In particular, Peking was not to mistake the action for an assault on Red China."^{19/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.3: Our actions were swift and made without consultation of our allies or the U.N.; however, Adlai Stevenson was told by the President to bring the matter immediately before the U.N. Security Council (5 August). Since the data relative to this particular proposition is so nebulous, a conservative ranking is given as: (Sustained with Limitation).

Proposition 5.4: As pointed out earlier, in order to maintain secrecy and the need for surprise, "there was no time to consult with SEATO or other allies."^{20/} On the local scene, Barry Goldwater, Johnson's political opponent was contacted. In his speech Johnson said, "Rusk had been instructed to make the American attitude clear to all nations."^{21/} Whether or not any of this was done before his speech is doubtful, but can neither be substantiated nor refuted. (Unsustained.)

Proposition 5.5: Once the decision was made on what would be done and the action announced, then the U.S. proceed to notify its allies and other nations as mentioned in proposition 5.4. Likewise, the matter was then referred to the U.N. (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.6: As with the Cuban Crisis, all indications point toward decision makers trying to restrict the crisis and the reaction. All peripheral actions were in support of our existing, well known commitments. (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.7: President Johnson on 5 August. "warned the nations of the Communist World not to support or widen aggression in Southeast Asia or to assume that elections in the U.S. would divide the country."^{22/} (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.8: The decision makers made it very clear that our response was limited in nature. It was made vividly clear to the Chinese Communists that we were striking specifically as targets the patrol boat bases only and also avoiding densely populated areas. We were trying to avoid escalation and merely offering an, "eye for an eye." (Sustained.)

Proposition 5.9: Again since this is a corollary of the foregoing, the discussion of 5.8 suffices. (Sustained.)

FOOTNOTES Appendix F

- 1/ Henry M. Pachter, Collision Course, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963, p. 14.
- 2/ Ibid., p. 14.
- 3/ Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, Inc., 1965, p. 681.
- 4/ Ibid., p. 682.
- 5/ Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967, p. 212.
- 6/ Ibid., p. 212.
- 7/ Ibid., p. 216.
- 8/ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965, p. 815.
- 9/ Ibid., p. 816.
- 10/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 206.
- 11/ Schlesinger, op cit., p. 815.
- 12/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 706.
- 13/ Schlesinger, op cit., p. 816.
- 14/ Hilsman, op cit., p. 222.
- 15/ Ibid., p. 223.
- 16/ Sorensen, op cit., p. 691.
- 17/ Schlesinger, op cit., p. 818.
- 18/ Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision, New York: The Free Press, 1968, p. 315.
- 19/ Richard T. Loomis, "The White House Telephone and Crisis Management," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, December 1969, p. 72.
- 20/ The New York Times, 5 August 1964.

21/ Ibid.

22/ The New York Times, 6 August 1964.

Variable Cluster	Cuban Crisis			Gulf of Tonkin			Combined Cuban/Tonkin Gulf		
	Assigned Points	Possible Points	Correlation Percent	Assigned Points	Possible Points	Correlation Percent	Assigned Points	Possible Points	Correlation Percent
Organizational	24	28	86	20	28	71	44	56	79
Informational	16	16	100	16	16	100	32	32	100
Value	20	24	83	20	24	83	40	48	83
Internal Setting	29	32	91	28	32	88	57	64	89
External Setting	32	36	89	26	36	72	58	72	81
Total Framework	121	136	89	110	136	81	231	272	85

Lower Bound
Go, no-go:
Sustained Variables
= 1, Others = 0

Upper Bound
Go, no-go:
Unsustained or
Rejected Variables
= 1, Those Sustained
to Any Degree = 0

Appendix F

CORRELATION COMPUTATIONS

List of CNA Professional Papers*

- PP 1
Brown, George F. and Lloyd, Richmond M., "Static Models of Bank Credit Expansion," 27 pp., 23 Sep 1969, AD 703 925
- PP 2
Lando, Mordechai E., "The Sex-Differential in Canadian Unemployment Data," 5 pp., 9 Jan 1970, AD 699 512
- PP 3
Brown, George F.; Corcoran, Timothy M. and Lloyd, Richmond M., "A Dynamic Inventory Model with Delivery Lag and Repair," 16 pp., 1 Aug 1969, AD 699 513
- PP 4
Kadane, Joseph B., "A Moment Problem for Order Statistics," 14 pp., 13 Jan 1970, AD 699 514
- PP 5
Kadane, Joseph B., "Optimal Whereabouts Search," 28 pp., Oct 1969, AD 699 515
- PP 6 - Classified
- PP 7
Friedheim, Robert L., "The Continental Shelf Issue at the United Nations: A Quantitative Content Analysis," 25 pp., 7 Jan 1970, AD 699 516
- PP 8
Rose, Marshall and White, Alex., "A Comparison of the Importance of Economic Versus Non-Economic Factors Affecting the Residential Housing Market During the Two Decades Subsequent to World War II," 128 pp., 15 Jan 1970, AD 699 517
- PP 9
Rose, Marshall, "A Thesis Concerning the Existence of Excess Capacity at Naval Shipyards Prior to the Escalation of Hostilities in Southeast Asia in 1964," 67 pp., 9 Jan 1970, AD 699 518
- PP 10 - Classified
- PP 11
O'Neill, David M., "The Effect of Discrimination on Earnings: Evidence from Military Test Score Results," 19 pp., 3 Feb 1970, (Published in the Journal of Human Resources, Summer 1970), AD 703 926
- PP 12
Brown, George F. and Lloyd, Richmond M., "Dynamic Models of Bank Credit Expansion Under Certainty," 29 pp., 3 Feb 1970, AD 703 931
- PP 13 - Cancelled
- PP 14
Rose, Marshall, "Determination of the Optimal Investment in End Products and Repair Resources," 38 pp., 18 Feb 1970, (Published in the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Cost Engineers Proceedings, Jun 1971, Montreal, Canada) AD 702 450
- PP 15
Rose, Marshall, "Computing the Expected-End Product Service Time Using Extreme Value Properties of Sampling Distribution," 29 pp., 18 Feb 1970, AD 702 451
- PP 16
Rose, Marshall, "Study of Repairable Item Resupply Activities," 35 pp., 18 Feb 1970, AD 702 452
- PP 17
Brown, Lee (Lt., USN) and Rose, Marshall, "An Incremental Production for the End-Item Repair Process," 17 pp., 3 Mar 1970, (Published in Annual Conference of the American Institute of Industrial Engineers Transactions, May 1970, Cleveland, Ohio) AD 702 453

*CNA Professional Papers with an AD number may be obtained from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Other papers are available from the author at the Center for Naval Analyses, 1401 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

CNA Professional Papers -Cont'd.

PP 18

Rose, Marshall, "Inventory and the Theory of the Firm," 14 pp., 18 Feb 1970, AD 702 454

PP 19

Rose, Marshall, "A Decomposed Network Computation for End-Product Repair Curves," 24 pp., 18 Feb 1970, AD 702 455

PP 20

Brown, George F.; Corcoran, Timothy M. and Lloyd, Richmond M., "Inventory Models with a Type of Dependent Demand and Forecasting, with an Application to Repair," 4 pp., 10 Feb 1970, AD 702 456

PP 21

Silverman, Lester P., "Resource Allocation in a Sequential Flow Process," 21 pp., 5 Mar 1970, AD 702 457

PP 22

Gorlin, Jacques, "Israeli Reprisal Policy and the Limits of U.S. Influence," 27 pp., 23 Mar 1970, AD 703 534

PP 23

Rose, Marshall, "An Aircraft Rework Cost-Benefit Model," 13 pp., 12 Mar 1970, (Published in the 5th Annual DoD Cost Research Symposium Proceedings, Mar 1970) AD 702 514

PP 24

Lloyd, Richmond and Sutton, S. Scott, "An Application of Network Analysis to the Determination of Minimum Cost Aircraft Pipeline Factors," 51 pp., 31 Mar 1970, (Presented at NATO Conference on Problems in the Organization and Introduction of Large Logistic Support Systems, May 1970, Luxembourg) AD 703 536

PP 25

Saperstone, Stephen, "An Approach to Semi-Markov Processes," 38 pp., 23 Mar 1970, AD 703 537

PP 26

Brown, George F. and Corcoran, Timothy M., "The Reliability of a Complex System with Spares, Repair, and Cannibalization," 45 pp., 23 Mar 1970, AD 703 538

PP 27

Fain, Janice B.; Fain, William W.; Feldman, Leon and Simon, Susan, "Validation of Combat Models Against Historical Data," 18 pp., 14 Apr 1970, (Published in 9th Symposium of the National Gaming Council Proceedings, Apr 1970) AD 704 744

PP 28

Friedheira, Robert L. and Kadane, Joseph B., "Quantitative Content Analysis of the United Nations Seabed Debate: Methodology and a Continental Shelf Case Study," 32 pp., 24 Mar 1970, (To be published in International Organization, Summer 1970) AD 702 539

PP 29

Saperstone, Stephen H., "Controllability of Linear Oscillatory Systems Using Positive Controls," 27 pp., Apr 1970, AD 704 745

PP 30

DeVany, Arthur S., "The Effect of Social Policy on the Social and Private Value of a Child," 20 pp., 27 Apr 1970, AD 704 746

PP 31

DeVany, Arthur S., "Time in the Budget of the Consumer," 51 pp., 27 Apr 1970, AD 704 747

PP 32

Overholt, John L., "Fitting Korean War Data by Statistical Method," 11 pp., 5 May 1970, (Presented at the 9th Symposium of the National Gaming Council, Apr 1970, Washington, D.C.) AD 705 349

PP 33

DeVany, Arthur S., "A Theory of Household Demand and Labor Supply," 23 pp., 5 May 1970, AD 705 350

PP 34

Kadane, Joseph B. and Fisher, Franklin M., "The Covariance Matrix of the Limited Information Estimator and the Identification Test: Comment," 6 pp., 14 May 1970, AD 706 310

*Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

PP 35

Lando, Mordechai E., "Full Employment and the New Economics--A Comment," 4 pp., 14 May

CNA Professional Papers -Cont'd.

PP 35 Continued

1970, (Published in the Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Vol. XVII, Feb 1969) AD 706 420

PP 36

DeVany, Arthur S., "Time in the Budget of the Consumer: The Theory of Consumer Demand and Labor Supply Under a Time Constraint," 28 pp., 15 Jun 1970, AD 708 348

PP 37

Kadane, Joseph B., "Testing a Subset of the Over-identifying Restrictions," 7 pp., 19 Jun 1970, (Published in the Journal of the American Statistical Association, Mar 1970) AD 708 349

PP 38

Saperstone, Stephen H., "The Eigenvectors of a Real Symmetric Matrix are Asymptotically Stable for Some Differential Equation," 19 pp., Jul 1970, AD 708 502

PP 39

Hardy, W. C. and Blyth, T. S.*, "Quasi-Residuated Mappings and Baer Assemblies," 22 pp., 14 Jul 1970

*Mathematical Institute, University of St. Andrew

PP 40

Silverman, Lester P. and Forst, Brian E., "Evaluating Changes in the Health Care Delivery System: An Application to Intensive Care Monitoring," 19 pp., Jul 1970, AD 710 631

PP 41

Piersall, Charles H. (LCdr), "An Analysis of Crisis Decision-Making," 55 pp., Aug 1970

PP 42

Sullivan, John A., "Measured Mental Ability, Service School Achievement and Job Performance," 22 pp., 31 Jul 1970

PP 43 In preparation

PP 44

Schick, Jack M., "Conflict and Integration in the Near East: Regionalism and the Study of Crises," 43 pp., Oct 1970, (Presented at the 66th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sep 1970)

PP 45

Brown, George F. and Lloyd, Richmond M., "Fixed Shortage Costs and the Classical Inventory Model," 13 pp., Jul 1970, AD 713 057

PP 46

Hardy, William C. and Blyth, T. S.*, "A Coordination of Lattices by One-Sided Baer Assemblies," 21 pp., Jul 1970, (To be published by the Royal Society of Edinburgh)

*Mathematical Institute, University of St. Andrew

PP 47

Silverman, Lester P., "Resource Allocation in a Sequential Flow Process with an Application to the Naval Resupply System," 18 pp., Oct 1970, (Presented at the 11th American Meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences, Oct 1970; Presented at the 26th Meeting of the Military Operations Research Society, Nov 1970) AD 713 028

PP 48

Gray, Burton C., "Writeup for B34TCNA-A Step-Wise Multiple Regression Program," 15 pp., Oct 1970, AD 713 029

PP 49

Friedheim, Robert L., "International Organizations and the Uses of the Ocean," 88 pp., Oct 1970, (To be published in Volume of Essays on International Administration, Oxford University Press) AD 714 387

PP 50 - In preparation

PP 51

Saperstone, Stephen H., "Global Controllability of Linear Systems with Positive Controls," 29 pp., Nov 1970, AD 714 650

PP 52

Forst, Brian E., "A Decision-Theoretic Approach to Medical Diagnosis and Treatment," 14 pp., Nov 1970, (Presented at the fall 1970 11th American Meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences, Oct 1970, Los Angeles, California) AD 714 651

PP 53

Kadane, Joseph B., "On Division of the Question," 12 pp., Nov 1970, AD 714 652

CNA Professional Papers -Cont'd.

PP 54 -- In preparation

PP 55

Brown, George F., "Optimal Management of Bank Reserves," 35 pp., Aug 1970

PP 56 -- In preparation

PP 57

Lando, Mordechai E., "A Comparison of the Military and Civilian Health Systems," 20 pp., Dec 1970, AD 716 897

PP 58 -- In preparation

PP 59

Dyckman, Zachary Y., "An Analysis of Negro Employment in the Building Trades," 309 pp., Jan 1971

PP 60

Lando, Mordechai E., "Health Services in the All Volunteer Armed Force," 33 pp., Jan 1971, AD 716 899

PP 61 -- In preparation

PP 62

Brown, George F. and Schwartz, Arnold N., "The Cost of Squadron Operation: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," 10 pp., Jan 1971