On Behavior Strategy Solutions in Two-Person Zero-Sum Finite Extended Games with Imperfect Information. Part I. A Method for Determination of Minimally Complex Behavior Strategy Solutions,
Abstract
In any two-person zero-sum finite extended game with imperfect information, an upper bound on the quality of each player's strategies, is established by his choice of a scheme for gathering and retaining the information that becomes available to him as the game progresses. Further, for a given game, strategies of the maximum possible quality may exist for each player on a number of information schemes of widely differing complexities. By analyzing the relationship between any given two-person zero-sum finite extended game with given information schemes for its players, and an associated N-person non-cooperative game, a heuristic scheme is uncovered for searching for minimally complex information schemes which support behavior strategies having within epsilon of the maximum possible quality, for any given epsilon. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 01, 1971
- Accession Number
- AD0720361
Entities
People
- R. L. Kashyap
- Victor A. Utgoff
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses