Global Stability in n-Person Games

Abstract

A class of bargaining sets, including the bargaining set M(sub 1)(sup i) and the kernel, is treated with regard to studying the tendency to reach stability from unstable points. A known discrete procedure is extended, and these results are applied to derive global stability properties for the solutions of certain differential equations. These differential equations are given in terms of the demand functions which define the bargaining sets, and the set of critical points is precisely the bargaining set in question.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Dec 01, 1970
Accession Number
AD0721725

Entities

People

  • Louis J. Billera

Organizations

  • Cornell University

Tags

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Bargaining
  • Convex Sets
  • Cooperative Games
  • Differential Equations
  • Engineering
  • Equations
  • Game Theory
  • Lyapunov Functions
  • Military Research
  • New Jersey
  • New York
  • Numbers
  • Operations Research
  • Real Numbers
  • Sequences
  • Theorems
  • Universities

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  • Game Theory.
  • Linear Algebra
  • Theoretical Analysis.