Uniformity Theorems in Missile Duels

Abstract

A theorem dealing with the purchase of defensive weapon systems is proven. The purchaser's objective is assumed to be the achievement of an assumed destruction criterion at minimal cost. It is shown that under certain circumstances it is optimal to purchase a uniform defensive system. The applicability of the mathematical theorem to the real world is then studied. A second theorem gives a simple procedure for finding an attacker's optimal firing rule under very general circumstances. An example illustrates the problems in choosing a defensive weapon system.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 1971
Accession Number
AD0735260

Entities

People

  • Joel Spencer

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Active Defense
  • Air Force
  • Area Defense
  • Bayesian Networks
  • Kill Probabilities
  • Models
  • Plastic Explosives
  • Probability
  • Probability Distributions
  • Sequences
  • Targets
  • United States
  • Weapon Systems
  • Weapons

Fields of Study

  • Mathematics

Readers

  • Graph Algorithms and Convex Optimization.
  • Marksmanship and Weaponry.
  • Systems Analysis and Design