The Effects of Size of Payoff and Real Versus Imaginary Rewards,
Abstract
Previous bargaining experiments manipulating payoff type (real vs. imaginary) and quantity have yielded conflicting results. In general, these studies have failed to distinguish effects at different stages of bargaining and to collect data that permit discrimination among contending explanations. This experiment investigates the effect of real vs. imaginary and $2 vs. $20 payoffs on a large set of pre-negotiation perceptions of the bargaining situation. Results indicate that the two incentive variable effects are less similar than assumed. The quantity variation primarily affects strategic stance; the real-imaginary variation primarily influences the maximizing-difference orientation. Both effects are salient prior to the start of bargaining. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 01, 1972
- Accession Number
- AD0741642
Entities
People
- Gerald H. Shure
- Sandra Lanto
Organizations
- University of California