




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REFUGEE MOVEMENT IN
REVOLUTIONARY WAR:

A Study of the Causes and Characteristics
of Civilian Population Displacement in
Viet-Nam

JULY 1969



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July 1969

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SUMMARY

Introduction

This report presents a description and analysis of the dynamics of refugee movement in the Republic of Viet-Nam and develops a generic model of refugee movement in insurgency situations. It is based on data collected in 1,633 interviews with displaced persons in Thuong Duc District, Quang-Nam Province, in Central Viet-Nam in mid-1967 as part of the Human Sciences Research Refugee Study Project. Results are presented in four chapters, summarized below. The study methodology and the background characteristics of the area of investigation are described in two appendices.

Causes of Refugee Movement

The principal thesis of the study is that refugee movement is an adaptive response by rural Vietnamese to the stresses of revolutionary warfare. The villagers are caught between two equally implacable forces, each demanding total commitment and threatening the villagers in one or more ways. The data indicate that refugees moved primarily because of fear or dislike of the Viet-Cong, including economic and social hardships resulting from Viet-Cong activity, and fear of GVN military activity.

Changing Patterns of Refugee Movement

Patterns of refugee movement change over time, beginning with a trickle during the early phases of insurgency, increasing in volume as the insurgency gains momentum, and building to a peak as the insurgency achieves Phase III magnitude. Fear of the Viet-Cong becomes less a cause of movement in the later phases of insurgency, as most of the Viet-Cong's main targets--the GVN cadre and soldiers--have already left as refugees.

The Demography of Refugee Migration

Nine hypotheses about the relationship between time of movement and certain demographic characteristics are tested. Seven of these are supported by the data, as follows:

- Literate persons tend to move earlier than illiterates.
- Owners of large plots of land tend to move earlier than owners of smaller plots.
- Persons owning no land tend to move earlier than landholders.
- Refugees having family members or close relatives with the legal government tend to move earlier than nonassociated refugees.
- Persons with skills tend to move earlier than do farmers and tenant farmers.
- Catholics, Protestants and adherents of the Cao-Dai sect tend to move earlier than Buddhists and ancestor worshippers.
- Younger persons tend to move earlier than do the more elderly.

A Model of Refugee Migration in Revolutionary Warfare

Three variables--war stress, the social characteristics of the affected population, and the constraints on migration--are related through the various phases of insurgency. The following conclusions are drawn:

In Phase I the refugee population is small and homogeneous, consisting of large landholders and officials or important supporters of the legal government.

In Phase II, as the stress becomes greater, the number of refugees increases but they are still a socially distinct group.

In Phase III, when stress levels reach a peak, there is a high rate of refugee generation with virtually no social selectivity.

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INTRODUCTION


Refugee movement, although attracting greatest outside attention in the case of Viet-Nam, has occurred in virtually every post-World War II insurgency, most notably in the cases of Algeria, Greece and Cuba. Prediction and control of refugee migration can thus be expected to be a recurrent problem for forces engaged in pacification operations. With this in view, this study, using the Viet-Nam experience as an empirical basis, develops a dynamic model of refugee migration patterns in revolutionary warfare situations. Such a model should have utility to counterinsurgency planners both in terms of allowing more accurate prediction of potential refugee migrations and in providing a basis for interpreting the politico-military significance of refugee movements when these occur.

This report is divided into four chapters and four appendices. Chapter I describes the causes of refugee movement; Chapter 2 discusses the changing patterns of refugee migration; Chapter 3 examines the demography of refugee movement; and Chapter 4 presents a generic model of refugee migration in revolutionary warfare. Appendix A describes the study methodology in detail, Appendix B describes the specific area of study in Viet-Nam, Appendix C presents an English translation of the survey questionnaire employed in the field study, and Appendix D is the Bibliography.

Summary of Study Methodology

The data on which this paper is based were collected in mid-1967 as part of the Human Sciences Research Refugee Study Project conducted under contract to the Advanced Research Projects Agency. The study area was Thuong Duc District, Quang-Nam Province in the I Corp area of Viet-Nam (Map 1).

Approximately ten thousand refugees had moved into the secure area (three hamlets) around the district capital. Most of these refugees had moved voluntarily. Only an estimated 350 households had taken refuge outside of the district, and no refugees had returned to their native villages. Thus the



Map 1. Area of Refugee Generation in Thuong Duc District, Quang Nam Province.

population available for interviewing was essentially the total refugee population that had been generated in the District in the entire course of the war.

Types and Sources of Data

Two basic types of data are employed in this analysis: (1) data on the refugees, and (2) information on the insurgency history of their communities of origin.

Data on Refugees

An attempt was made to learn the date of movement and sociological characteristics of every refugee household generated in each study community. These data were collected by means of standardized questionnaires administered to 1,633 refugee heads-of-households.

Data on Insurgency History

Information was sought on the stresses affecting the rural population in each community and the constraints on movement at various stages of the insurgency. These data were in part collected by means of the census of refugees, but were primarily developed through 17 extensive interviews with knowledgeable refugees on the war histories of three of the study units. Supplementary information was obtained from Vietnamese officials and their American advisors having familiarity with the areas of concern.

Data Collection and Processing

Field work in Thuong Duc began in mid-July 1967 and continued until early September. The writer, assisted by Mr. Philip Estermann, directed a team of eight Vietnamese interviewers in conducting the census of refugees. The interviewers were high school students recruited in the province capital of Hoi-An. In addition to the locally-recruited census team, there were three English-speaking senior interviewers participating in the study, who had worked for the

author the previous year in a study of refugees in Phu-Yen Province. One senior interviewer served as the writer's assistant on the census task, helping to prepare the maps and directing the routine activities of the census interviewers. The other two were conducting depth interviews with refugees on the war history of the communities in the study. They also served as interpreters in our dealing with Vietnamese officials.

Refugee settlement areas were located for the author on a large-scale map by local Vietnamese officials. After making a preliminary on-foot reconnaissance of these sites, the author prepared small scale maps of each area of refugee settlement and assigned control numbers to all refugee houses. Interviewers were assigned blocks of houses and would make repeated call-backs if the refugee head of household was not available for interviewing on the first visit. By this means 97 percent of the identifiable refugee households residing in the district were included in the survey.

The author was not present during the actual interviewing (although it was no secret to the refugees that the study was American directed) and in any case had much too limited a Vietnamese vocabulary to have checked on the accuracy of the interviewing. Random re-interviews were conducted, however, by his Vietnamese assistant to check on the quality of the census team interviews. Two census takers were found, as a result of this checking, to be falsifying their protocols and were consequently dismissed and all their earlier questionnaires redone by reliable interviewers. On the whole, however, the interviewers performed conscientiously and capably and the overall quality of the data appears to be high.

Analysis

Although there were refugees from 23 hamlets of origin represented in the sample, the small number of respondents per hamlet made it necessary to group respondents from several hamlets to form populations suitable for analysis. The required aggregation was accomplished in two stages: (1) the hamlets were distributed into five natural groups on the basis of geographical contiguity and similar insurgency history. Respondents from each community were then

dichotomized according to whether they migrated in Phase I and II of the insurgency or Phase III. The breakpoint between the second and third phases was taken to be a point six months after the Viet-Cong achieved control of the community. (2) Phases I and II respondents from all five communities were placed in one analytic group and all Phase III respondents in another and the distribution of study variables in these groups determined.

CHAPTER 1. THE CAUSES OF REFUGEE MOVEMENT

The principal thesis of this study is that refugee movement is an adaptive response by rural Vietnamese to the stresses of revolutionary warfare. This chapter examines the concept of stress as employed by behavioral scientists, describes the stresses resulting from revolutionary warfare, and relates refugee movement to these war stresses.

The Theory of Stress

The concept of stress is one of the classic metaphors of behavioral science. In engineering, where the concept originated, stress is physical force applied to a structural member which results in lesser or greater deformation (strain) of that member. In behavioral science, stress is a stimulus¹ (mediated in the human neural apparatus) which results in some changed behavior of the organism. As individuals with common sociocultural attributes tend to react to similar stress stimuli in similar ways, it is feasible to analyze the workings of stress at the group level without concern for the psychological mechanisms of perception, analysis, and decision-making to react to stress at the individual level which are the proper concerns of psychologists.

Individual stress is a relatively constant phenomenon in any social system; collective stress occurs only when a system in equilibrium is sufficiently disturbed, either due to internal developments or external disruption, that traditionally sanctioned individual coping behaviors are no longer effective in reducing perceived stress to acceptable levels. If a sufficiently high level of stress is maintained the society will either be destroyed or will undergo change in ways intended to reduce the stress level. Wallace has described this change

¹Because of man's unique symbolizing capability, stress stimuli need not, and probably usually do not, take the form of actual physical forces impinging on the individual. Thus fear of an event can be as much of a stimulus for behavioral change as the actual occurrence of the event would be.

process in his paper as "revitalization." He argues that a society in which stress is increasing passes through five phases:

I. **Steady State.** For the vast majority of the population, culturally recognized techniques for satisfying needs operate with such efficiency that chronic stress within the system varies within tolerable limits. Some severe but still tolerable stress may remain general in the population, and a fairly constant incidence of persons under, for them, intolerable stress may employ "deviant" techniques (e. g. , psychotics).

II. **The Period of Increased Individual Stress.** Over a number of years, individual members of a population... experience increasingly severe stress as a result of the decreasing efficiency of certain stress-reduction techniques. The culture may remain essentially unchanged or it may undergo considerable changes, but in either case there is continuous diminution in its efficiency in satisfying needs. The agencies responsible are various: climatic, floral and faunal change; military defeat; political subordination; extreme pressure toward acculturation resulting in internal cultural conflict; economic distress; epidemics, etc.

III. **The Period of Cultural Distortion.** The prolonged experience of stress, produced by failure of need satisfaction techniques and by anxiety over the prospect of changing behavior patterns, is responded to differently by different people. Rigid persons apparently prefer to tolerate high levels of chronic stress rather than make systematic changes in the mazeway. More flexible persons try out various limited mazeway changes in their personal lives... Some persons turn to psychodynamically regressive innovations; the regressive response empirically exhibits itself in increasing incidences of such things as alcoholism, extreme passivity and indolence, the development of highly ambivalent dependency relationships, intragroup violence, disregard of kinship and sexual mores, irresponsibility in public officials, states of depression and self-reproach, and probably a variety of psychosomatic and neurotic disorders. Some of these regressive action systems become, in effect, new cultural patterns. In this phase, the culture is internally distorted. ... For this reason alone, stress continues to rise. ...

Finally, as the inadequacy of ways of acting to reduce stress becomes more and more evident, and as internal incongruities of the mazeway are perceived, symptoms of anxiety over the loss of a meaningful way of life also become evident: disillusionment with the mazeway, and apathy toward problems of adaptation, set in.

IV. The Period of Revitalization. The process of deterioration can, if not checked, lead to the death of the society. Population may fall even to the point of extinction as a result of increasing death rates and decreasing birth rates. . . .

But a revitalization movement can lead to restoration of social equilibrium by:

- (1) "Mazeway reformulation" by a charismatic prophet.
- (2) "Communication" of the new mazeway by the prophet to the masses.
- (3) "Organization" of the converts.
- (4) "Adaptation" of the new movement to social reality.
- (5) Routinization, leading to:

V. The New Steady State. (Wallace:268-70)

It is the thesis of this paper that revolutionary warfare has placed rural Vietnamese society under stresses sufficient to lead to cultural distortion, and that refugee migration represents an adaptive response of Vietnamese to this collective stress. This is not to argue that some war-impacted Vietnamese do not go insane, or commit suicide, smoke opium or even develop severe cases of the stutters--they do. It is to say that the majority of the war stress-affected Vietnamese take active social measures (principally in the form of mass flight) in the attempt to relieve the tensions they are experiencing.

Stresses Resulting from Revolutionary Warfare

All modern warfare places heavy stresses on the combatants and on the civilian population residing in the actual theater of operations. Revolutionary warfare, however, as it has been fought in rural Asia and especially in Viet-Nam, has wholly abolished the dividing line between combatants and civilians.² A guerilla pressure-mine in the highway is incapable of distinguishing an Army jeep

²Col. Trinquier, one of the leading French theorists of revolutionary warfare, states that, "The battlefield today is no longer restricted. It is limitless; it can encompass entire nations. The inhabitant in his home is the center of the conflict. . . . Like it or not the two camps are compelled to make him participate in the combat; in a certain sense, he has become a combatant also." Col. Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 29.

from a civilian bus. Air strikes kill peasants on occasion and the economic disruptions caused by the war affect the entire population--if anything, hurting civilians more than military personnel who have the "cushion" of belonging to an organized body. In part this increase in war generated stress is a consequence of the increasing power of weapons of war, but in the main it is a direct result of the theory and doctrine of revolutionary warfare, or as it is labeled by its communist practitioners, "people's war." What distinguishes revolutionary warfare from other forms of conflict is that the principal objective of the protagonists is the mobilization of the masses. All resources are ultimately derived from the people so that the side that develops the most effective and comprehensive system of population control will ultimately be victorious.³ Thus, every citizen regardless of age, sex, or occupation, must be incorporated into the insurgent organization and make a contribution, however small, to the war effort.

A typical insurgent organization has been described by Col. Ximenes (4) as being formed of three elements:

1. the functional associations ("unions of workers, peasants, youth movements, sports associations, veterans' societies, etc.")
2. the regional associations ("forming at successive strata from the elementary social cell [at the village level] to the 'central committee'")
3. the Insurgent Party organization.

By these means every member of the population is caught in a multiple web of insurgent-controlled associations.

The relationships of the various components of the Viet-Cong parallel hierarchies in Thuong Duc District are illustrated in Figure 1. Even old women may serve the Viet-Cong by "encouraging the combatants," and accounts of little children acting as guerrilla couriers, spies and even terrorists, are legion in

³As Col. Galula (7-8) puts it, "if the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war..."

Viet-Nam. The counterinsurgents must strive both to destroy the insurgent population control apparatus and to replace it with a government infrastructure which is a mirror image of the rebel parallel hierarchies.⁴

The villagers are thus caught between two equally implacable (if not equally competent) forces, each demanding total commitment. If a person does commit to one side, then he is subject to reprisal from the other, and even if he tries to bend with the wind he is likely to be crushed in a chance collision of the antagonists.

War-induced stresses can be grouped into the following generic categories for purposes of analysis.

1. Fear of GVN reprisals (due to one's affiliation with Viet-Cong) or ideological dislike for GVN
2. Fear of Viet-Cong reprisals (due to one's affiliation with GVN) or ideological dislike of Viet-Cong
3. Economic or social hardship resulting primarily from GVN activity
4. Economic or social hardship resulting primarily from Viet-Cong activity
5. General economic or social disruption by war
6. Fear of GVN military activity
7. Fear of Viet-Cong military activity
8. General fear of war.

Table 1 shows the frequency with which refugees in Thuong Duc District attributed their decisions to migrate to these stresses. Fear of GVN reprisals or dislike of the GVN is not cited by the refugees because persons reacting to such stress would stay in the Viet-Cong controlled areas.

⁴See Trinquier (30-35) for a discussion of the establishment of a counter-insurgent infrastructure.

FIGURE 1. INSURGENT PARALLEL HIERARCHIES IN THUONG DUC DISTRICT





FIGURE 1. INSURGENT PARALLEL HIERARCHIES



T PARALLEL HIERARCHIES IN THUONG DUC DISTRICT

Popular Functional Organizations




Table 1/ Reasons for Refugee Movement

<u>Stress Motivating Refugee Movement</u>	<u>Number of Citations*</u>
Fear/dislike of GVN	None 0.0%
Fear/dislike of VC	673 23.6%
Economic or social hardships resulting from GVN activity	294 10.3%
Economic or social hardship resulting from VC activity	560 19.6%
General war-caused economic or social hardship	463 16.2%
Fear of GVN military activity	592 20.7%
Fear of VC military activity	110 3.8%
General fear of war	170 5.9%
Total	2,862 100.0%

*Refugees could cite more than one reason for movement.

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CHAPTER II. CHANGING PATTERNS OF REFUGEE MIGRATION

Refugee movement in a revolutionary war does not occur as a single mass rush of the entire population to safety. Instead, movement typically starts as an almost imperceptible trickle of a few families to district capitals or provincial towns.⁵ Such small scale movement may continue to occur for several years, as the insurgency slowly gains momentum and develops from Phase I intensity to a Phase II level.⁶

⁵ The available evidence on refugee movement in other areas in Vietnam indicates that the Thuong Duc District pattern is typical. See Rambo, Tinker, and LeNoir, 52-53, 138-139, and Tinker.

⁶ It is customary to describe revolutionary warfare as developing through three phases:

Phase I. This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

Phase III. The situation moves from Phase II to Phase III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Publication 2. (Washington, D. C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1959), p. 110.1.

In the case of Thuong Duc District, the current insurgency had an extremely foreshortened first phase because the Viet-Cong were able to utilize the organizational base already built by the Viet Minh. The Special Warfare and early Viet-Cong Expansion periods (see Appendix B) correspond to Phase II of the insurgency scenario, while the latter part of the Viet-Cong Expansion period and the whole of the Allied Counteroffensive Period correspond to Phase III.

Then as guerrilla warfare spreads, and the ability of the government to provide security in the countryside falls off, the rate of refugee movement increases, building to a peak as the insurgency achieves Phase III magnitude with major battles occurring in the rural areas.

All of the communities originating refugees in Thuong Duc District display a similar pattern of evolution of refugee generation rates, although the calendar times differ from group to group (Figure 2). As refugee movement is a response to stress it seems logical to explain changes in the rate of generation in terms of: (1) objective and subjective changes in the character and intensity of war stresses, and (2) changes in constraints on the movement of refugees.


Objective and Subjective Changes in War Stresses

War stresses have not been uniform throughout the history of the insurgency. In Phase II the Viet-Cong were actively engaged in terrorism directed against GVN cadre, harassment of strategic hamlets, sabotage of transportation facilities and other politico-military activities of a type likely to arouse fear or antagonism on the part of many rural people. The GVN on the other hand was fighting an essentially defensive war which had relatively little direct impact on the hamlet dwellers. In Phase III, the Viet-Cong controlled the hamlets and the GVN was forced to direct military activity (air strikes, artillery and ground operations) against these, thus directly inflicting hardships on the populace. The Viet-Cong also brought increased hardship on the people in their zones of control by increasing the political and economic pressure on them (e. g., increasing taxes, forced labor demands and conscription). Thus, the overall level of stress increased, but the relative importance of specific stresses shifted as the war grew in intensity.

The populations' vulnerability to stress also changed over time. Three factors effect people's vulnerability to stress: (a) psychological adaptation, (b) objective changes in vulnerability, and (c) changes in the composition of the affected population.

Figure 2. Rate of Refugee Generation for
Five Communities in Thuong Duc District

(Number of households moving in six-month intervals)



Psychological Adaptation

There is a tendency for repeated exposure to certain war stresses to lead to reduction in the extent of tension these produce. Thus people who have been frequently subjected to air bombardment lose much of their fear of this threat.⁷ No studies have been made of Vietnamese psychological adaptation to warfare but it is probable that a large proportion of the rural population is now highly adapted.⁸

Objective Changes in Vulnerability

If bombing is a threat, one response is to construct shelters that objectively reduce people's vulnerability to bombs. If Viet-Cong terrorism is a threat, construction of strategic hamlets may reduce tension by providing protection against the terrorists. The threat is unchanged but its intensity is moderated by effective reduction of people's vulnerability.⁹

Changes in Population Composition

Where the threat is a selective one, Viet-Cong terrorism directed at GVN cadre and soldiers, removal of these individuals from the affected population will reduce the reported stress level on that particular dimension (although

⁷ In World War II during the Battle of Britain "there was a definite decline in overt fear reactions as the air blitz continued, even though the raids became heavier and more destructive. With successive dangerous raids, the bombed population displayed more and more indifference toward air attacks." (Janis:111)

⁸ The writer had one opportunity to observe a peasant family's reaction to war stress. The people had been sitting in their house eating their dinner when a Viet-Cong sniper directed a burst of automatic rifle fire toward the house. While the American advisors were still scrambling for their weapons and assuming firing positions the family had quietly and without overt panic moved into their bomb shelter and had there resumed eating their meal.

⁹ "It was found [by the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey] that those Germans who felt that air raid shelters, anti-aircraft barrages, and relief measures were inadequate had poorer scores on a combined index of fear and morale than those who considered defensive measures adequate." (Janis:119.)

the character of the specific stress is unchanged). Thus fear or dislike of the Viet-Cong as a cause of refugee movement is likely to be less important in Phase III than in Phase II, not because the Viet-Cong have changed their policies on harassment of GVN sympathizers, but because most of the GVN cadre and their families have already left the insurgent-controlled area as refugees during Phase II. Chapter III provides examples of the selective migration of various social categories of people which changed the composition of the population in the insurgent controlled and contested areas between Phase II and Phase III.

Analysis of reasons for movement given by refugees reveals significant differences in the frequency with which particular stresses are cited by those who moved in the early stages and the latter stages of the insurgency (Table 2).¹⁰

Changes in Constraints on Refugee Movement

People may be motivated to become refugees yet unable to actually move because of either internal or external constraints on migration. Internal constraints would include such factors as lack of knowledge of a refuge area, fear of being unable to make a living as a refugee, religious ties to ancestral land or graves, etc. External constraints are primarily prohibitions on refugee movement, either by the Viet-Cong or the government. In the case of Inland District (although not in all areas in the Republic of Viet-Nam) the government has encouraged refugee movement. The Viet-Cong, as the following quotations from interviews with refugees will show, have actively discouraged migration from their zones of control.

¹⁰For purposes of this analysis the refugees have been divided into two categories--those moving in Phases I and II, and those moving in Phase III.

Table 2. Changes in Stresses Causing
Refugee Movement

<u>Reason for Movement</u>	<u>Phase I & II</u> n = 708	<u>Phase III</u> n = 924
Fear/dislike of Viet-Cong	422 34.9%	251 15.2%
Economic or social hardship resulting from GVN	62 5.1%	232 14.0%
Economic or social hardship resulting from Viet-Cong	221 18.3%	339 20.5%
General economic or social disruption by war	161 13.3%	302 18.3%
Fear of GVN military activity	206 17.0%	386 23.4%
Fear of Viet-Cong military activity	60 5.0%	50 3.0%
General fear of war	77 6.4%	93 5.6%
Total	1,209* 100.0%	1,653* 100.0%

* Refugees could cite more than one reason for movement

One refugee stated:

By the end of 1964 the VC did not allow anybody to move. All the hamlet gates were controlled and those who tried to move were arrested and sent to reeducation sessions in the mountains. My family and I tried to move in December 1964 by sampan, but we were arrested by the VC and sent to the mountains for three months of reeducation sessions. Actually they put us in prison. The VC believed that those who moved were taking the side of the enemy and would become spies for the GVN. Thus, those who were arrested for moving were sent to reeducation sessions. The VC controlled everyone they suspected and built a fence around the hamlet to keep people from leaving.

A second refugee reported that:

People who wanted to leave had to have Viet-Cong permission. The Viet-Cong set up control posts everywhere. The Viet-Cong propagandized that if people moved to the Government area they would live in poverty and unemployment. The Viet-Cong forbade people to buy the old furniture of the people who left.

Another respondent stated:

The VC prevented people from moving because they had to live off the people. The VC knew that the Allied forces did not shoot people, so they used the people as shields. The VC also knew that people were attached to their property and did not want to move.

The VC considered those who moved to the GVN area to be GVN spies. They threatened that those who were caught moving would be sent to reeducation sessions in the mountains,

and a fourth refugee reported a well-developed population control system designed to check refugee movement from his area:

The Viet-Cong strictly forbade people from moving. They checked the ferries and the roads leading to the district capital. They watched the hamlet at night and carefully kept an eye on those families who were likely to flee.

A reflection of the extent to which Viet-Cong population control activities in Phase III of the insurgency constrained refugee movement is found in the strong relationship ($Q = .62$) between time of movement and the number of persons who reported moving voluntarily during an Allied operation in their hamlet when the insurgent control apparatus was temporarily inoperative (Table 3).

Table 3. Refugee Movement During
an Allied Operation

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>Total</u>
Moved during an operation	131 18.7%	457 49.8%	588 36.4%
Moved without protection of an operation	568 81.3%	461 50.2%	1,029 63.6%
Total	699 100.0%	918 100.0%	1,617 100.0%

Q = .62
chi square = 165.24
df = 1
p < .01

CHAPTER 3. THE DEMOGRAPHY OF REFUGEE MIGRATION

Refugee migration is hypothesized to be a socially selective process with persons possessing certain demographic characteristics demonstrating a greater disposition to move than others. The following hypotheses were formulated of the relationships between demographic characteristics and readiness to migrate:

Literacy is related to time of movement. Persons who are literate move earlier than those who are illiterate.

Land ownership is related to time of movement. Large landowners and persons who own no land move earlier than do middle peasants. Persons renting land to tenants will move earlier than nonlandlords.

Affiliation with the GVN is related to time of movement. Persons who served the GVN (hamlet chiefs, self-defense force members, etc.), or who have close relatives serving the GVN, move earlier than do nonaffiliated people.

Occupation is related to time of movement. Persons with skills move earlier than do farmers and tenant farmers.

Religion is related to time of movement. Catholics, Protestants, and Cao Dai move relatively earlier than other denominations.

Previous movement experience is related to time of movement. Persons who have already severed their roots in their native hamlets will move earlier than those who have not moved in the past.

Age is related to time of movement. Younger persons move earlier than older heads of household.

Method of Analysis

The refugee population of each of the five units of analysis was divided into two groups based upon date of movement in relation to the date of Viet-Cong establishment of control (see Appendix A). All refugees moving from the start of the insurgency until six months after the Viet-Cong achieved effective control

of their community were classed as comprising Phase I and II migrants. Refugees moving after this date until mid-1967 constitute Phase III migrants.

The specific hypotheses were then tested by comparing the reported characteristics of Phase I and II and Phase III refugee populations using Yule's Q test as the measure of relationship and the chi-square test as the measure of statistical significance.

Results of Analysis

Hypothesis 1: "Literate persons tend to move earlier than illiterates."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based upon two assumptions: (a) the fact of literacy increases a person's sense of being able to adapt to new conditions, and (b) being literate increases a person's knowledge of the world beyond his hamlet and thus reduces the extent to which possible places of refuge appear alien to him, thus also increasing his readiness to move.

Data: Refugee heads-of-households were asked if they could read and write. No objective test of literacy was made but independent information on rural Vietnamese literacy rates (Hendry: 23-24) suggests that the refugee responses in Table 4 are not exaggerated.

Table 4. Refugee Literacy Rates
(Heads-of-household--all age 15 or older)

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Literate	476 68.5%	493 53.8%	969 60.2%
Illiterate	219 31.5%	423 46.2%	642 39.8%
Total	695 100.0%	916 100.0%	1,611 100.0%

Q = .30
chi square = 35.47
df = 1
p < .01

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is supported by the data.

Hypothesis 2: "Owners of large plots of land tend to move earlier than owners of smaller plots."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based upon two premises: (a) large landholders are subject to high, even punitive taxation, by the Viet-Cong compared to middle peasants. Thus the economic incentive to stay in their hamlet and work their land is lower than for the latter. (b) Large landholders are likely to have reserve mobile capital with which to start life anew as refugees. Thus they are not giving up everything by migrating.

Data: Refugees reporting owning land were divided into two groups, those with less than 3 mau¹¹ and those owning 3 or more mau (Table 5), large landholders by Thuong Duc District standards where the mean holding is 1 mau.

Table 5. Refugee Landholdings

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Under 3 mau	338 92.4%	622 96.0%	960 94.7%
3 mau or more	28 7.6%	26 4.0%	54 5.3%
Total	366 100.0%	648 100.0%	1,014 100.0%

Q = .33
chi square = 6.14
df = 1
.05 > p > .01

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is supported by the data.

Hypothesis 3. "Persons not owning land tend to move earlier than landholders."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on the premise that landless persons have less of a vested interest in remaining in their native hamlets than do

¹¹ 3 mau are slightly more than one hectare or 2.5 acres; 1 mau equals 3,600 square meters in Central Viet-Nam.

landholders. (Their occupational skills, unlike those of farmers, are also likely to be those that can be practiced in a refugee location.)

Data: Refugees were categorized according to whether they had owned land or not (Table 6).

Table 6. Refugee Ownership of Land

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Landless	340 48.2%	276 29.9%	616 37.8%
Landholders	366 51.8%	648 70.1%	1,014 62.2%
Total	706 100.0%	924 100.0%	1,630 100.0%

Q = .37
chi square = 56.94
df = 1
p < .01

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is supported by the data.

Hypothesis 4. "Landlords (persons renting land to tenant farmers) tend to move earlier than other peasants."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on the premise that the Viet-Cong conspicuously harass landlords as a means of winning the sympathy of the poorer peasants.

Data: Refugees were asked if they had rented land to others (Table 7).

Table 7. Extent of Landlordism among Refugees

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Landlords	10 1.4%	20 2.2%	30 1.8%
Nonlandlords	697 98.6%	905 97.8%	1,602 98.2%
Total	707 100.0%	925 100.0%	1,632 100.0%

Q = -.21
chi square = 1.24
df = 1
p = not significant

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is not supported by available data. It should be noted, however, that landlords may be underrepresented in the refugee population still in Thuong Duc District as large landlords would have sufficient capital to emigrate from the District to larger (and safer) provincial towns. In any case the number of landlords in Central Viet-Nam is so low as to make this variable an insignificant factor in the formation of the refugee population there.

Hypothesis 5: "Refugees with immediate family members or other close relatives associated with the legal government (GVN) tend to move earlier than nonassociated refugees."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on the premise that the Viet-Cong are likely to harass persons (such as hamlet officials, soldiers and teachers) associated with the GVN, their immediate family and close relatives. Harassment can take the form of assassination, enforced political education, forced labor, higher tax rates, etc.

Data: Refugees were asked: (1) if they or immediate family members were associated with the GVN, and (2) if they had close relatives (including first cousins) associated with the GVN. Table 8 presents data on immediate family members and Table 9 presents responses to the second question.

**Table 8. Association of Immediate Members of
Refugee Families with the GVN**

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Have members associated	392 55.4%	295 32.0%	687 42.2%
No family association reported	316 44.6%	627 68.0%	943 57.8%
Total	708 100.0%	922 100.0%	1,630 100.0%

Q = .45
chi square = 89.71
df = 1
p < .01

**Table 9. Close Relatives of Refugees
Associated with GVN**

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Relative associated	571 80.6%	679 73.6%	1,250 76.7%
Not associated	137 19.4%	243 26.4%	380 23.3%
Total	708 100.0%	922 100.0%	1,630 100.0%

Q = .20
chi square = 10.99
df = 1
p < .01

Test of Hypothesis: The data support the hypothesis. It is probable that VC harassment is principally directed at families having immediate members associated with the government as over three-fourths of the refugee population report close relatives having such affiliation--a rather large group for the insurgents to deliberately risk alienating. This view is supported by the appearance of a much stronger association between early movement and family members affiliated with the GVN than appears in the case of relatives affiliated with the government.

Hypothesis 6: "Persons with skills tend to move earlier than do farmers and tenant farmers."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on the premise that persons who feel that they will have difficulty in earning a living are less ready to become refugees than persons who have easily marketable skills. And as land is scarce in refugee settlement areas, farmers and tenant farmers will have to change occupations to earn their livelihood.

Data: Refugee heads-of-household were asked what their principal occupation had been before they moved. Their responses were categorized into four major groups (Table 10).

Table 10. Occupation of Refugees

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Farmers and tenant farmers	434 61.7%	732 79.5%	1,166 71.8%
Laborers, vendors, craftsmen	157 22.3%	157 16.9%	314 19.3%
GVN civil cadre and soldiers	49 6.9%	3 0.3%	52 3.2%
Fishermen	64 9.1%	29 3.2%	93 5.7%
Total	704 100.0%	921 100.0%	1,625 100.0%

Q = .41
chi square = 102.88
df = 3
p < .01

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data.

NOTE: This finding should be compared to the findings with regard to Hypothesis 3 that persons not owning land tend to move earlier than landholders. It is evident that farmers have both the most to lose by leaving their homes (their capital invested in land and their means of making a livelihood) and the least to gain in the new location where land is unavailable and they will have to find a new occupation.

Hypothesis 7: "Adherents of the more structured religious groups (Catholics, Protestants and Cao-Daists) tend to move earlier than do followers of the relatively unstructured peasant religions (Buddhists and ancestor worshippers)."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on two premises: (a) that the Viet-Cong have persecuted the hierarchically organized religions, viewing them as competitors for the allegiance of the rural masses, and (b) that the leadership of the hierarchically-organized religious groups encouraged their followers to become refugees to escape communist control.¹²

Data: Table 11 presents data on the religious affiliations of the refugees.

Table 11. Refugee Religious Affiliations

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Unstructured religions	510 58.1%	604 65.5%	1,114 61.9%
Hierarchically organized religions	368* 41.9%	318 34.5%	686 38.1%
Total	878 100.0%	922 100.0%	1,800 100.0%

* Includes 158 Catholic and 13 Cao Dai refugee households now residing outside of the District. These refugees were not included in the sample but are known to have moved during Phase I.

Q = .16
chi square = 10.5
df = 1
p < .01

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is supported by the data.

¹²The great majority of refugees who fled to the South from Tonkin in 1954 were Catholics although Catholics constituted a minority of the Northern population. These refugees were in most cases led by their parish priests, who still remain the dominant leadership in the resettled Northern communities. (Lindholm:49)

Hypothesis 8: "Persons who have migrated from their native hamlet in the past (peacetime in-country migration) tend to move earlier than persons with no previous migration experience."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on the premise that a person who has severed his connections with his native hamlet will be less strongly attached to his current residence than will be true in the case of natives. This should be especially true in the case of Vietnamese peasants who are frequently asserted by observers to have strong ties to their land and their ancestral grave sites.

Data: Table 12 presents data on the previous migration history of the refugees.

Table 12. Past Migration by Refugees

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Native of hamlet of origin	608 89.2%	795 87.8%	1,403 88.4%
Previous migration experience	74 10.8%	111 12.2%	185 11.6%
Total	682 100.0%	906 100.0%	1,588 100.0%

Q = .07
chi square = 0.74
df = 1
p > .05 (not significant)

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is not supported by the data. There is no significant difference in the time of refugee migration between natives and non-natives of an area. This is suggestive that Vietnamese may not be as strongly tied to their native hamlets as is commonly believed. Certainly the frequency of internal migrations reported as having occurred throughout the history of Vietnam would support such an interpretation.

Hypothesis 9: "Younger persons tend to move earlier than do the more elderly."

Discussion: This hypothesis is based on the premise that younger people will have less sentimental attachment to their native hamlets than will be the case

with elderly people. At the same time they are also more likely to be literate and to have the occupational skills necessary to adapt to resettlement.

Data: The mean age of heads-of-household moving in Phases I & II is 41.9 years, compared to 47.4 years for respondents in Phase III. Table 13 presents data on the distribution of respondents by age category.

Table 13. Age of Refugee Heads of Households

	<u>Phase I & II</u>	<u>Phase III</u>	<u>All Refugees</u>
Under 45	443 62.6%	421 45.7%	864 53.0%
45 and older	265 37.4%	500 54.3%	765 47.0%
Total	708 100.0%	921 100.0%	1,629 100.0%

Q = .17
chi square = 45.68
df = 1
p < .01

Test of Hypothesis: The hypothesis is strongly supported by the data.

Conclusion

Seven of the nine specific hypotheses formulated on the sociology of refugee movement are supported by analysis of the available data (see Table 14). Since at the .01 level of significance only one in a hundred tests of spurious relationships would appear significant by chance, the validity of the general hypothesis that refugee migration is a socially selective process can be taken as demonstrated.

Table 14. Recapitulation of Social Characteristics
Associated with Refugees Moving in Phase I & II
and Phase III of the Insurgency

Phase I & II Migrant:	Phase III Migrant:	Strength of Association (Yule's Q)	Test of Significance (Chi-square)
is literate, a large landholder, or is landless	is illiterate, small landholder, or landowner	.30 .33 .37	$p < .01$.05 > $p > .01$ $p < .01$
has a family member associated with GVN	has no close associ- ations with GVN	.45	$p < .01$
is a laborer, vendor, craftsman, GVN cadre, soldier or fisherman	is a farmer or tenant farmer	.41	$p < .01$
is a Catholic, Protes- tant, or Cao-Dai	is a Buddhist or an ancestor worshipper	.16	$p < .01$
is under 45 years of age	is over 45 years of age	.17	$p < .01$

CHAPTER IV. A MODEL OF REFUGEE MIGRATION IN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Thuong Duc District's history may fascinate the author, but the audience can hardly fairly be expected to locate it on a map, let alone be concerned with its specific historical problems. Thus, the empirical data on which this study is based while of some intrinsic interest as offering one of the only detailed descriptions of the impact of war on a rural Vietnamese population are of real scientific and operational significance only as they offer a basis for the prediction and evaluation of peasant behavior under insurgency stress.

On the basis of specific data from Thuong Duc District, a generic model of refugee migration in a revolutionary warfare environment is presented. This model should be viewed as a set of hypotheses useful in providing suggestions as to how to interpret the significance of refugee movement in countries other than Viet-Nam and not as the final truth on the dynamics of refugee migration. Even in the case of other regions within Viet-Nam, care should be taken in applying the model mechanically (although preliminary evidence suggests that the model does apply both to II Corp [see Rambo, Tinker, LeNoir:59-65] and IV Corps [see Murfin]).

Three variables are manipulated over time: war stress, the social characteristics of the affected population, and the constraints on migration, revealing the consequent rate of refugee generation and social characteristics of the refugee population. Table 15 displays the relationship of these variables to one another.

The following patterns of refugee generation emerge:

1. In Phase I, when insurgent activity is of low intensity and terror is selective, only a relatively few persons feel sufficient stress to motivate migration. Thus the absolute number of refugees is small and the refugee population is socially homogeneous consisting of large landowners, government officials, and important supporters of the legitimate government.

2. In Phase II, stresses resulting from insurgent and counterinsurgent activities are of increased intensity and of reduced selectivity. Hamlet-level cadre, members of the now defeated or demoralized self-defense forces, members of anti-insurgent religious groups and their families will become refugees during this phase. Thus the refugee generation rate increases but the refugees are still socially distinct from the mass of the population and form a relatively homogeneous social group.

3. In Phase III, insurgent and counterinsurgent activities produce high stress levels exhibiting virtually no social selectivity in their impact. Consequently, there is a high rate of refugee generation, with persons exhibiting a wide range of social characteristics composing the refugee population. If constraints on movement are removed and stresses reach sufficient intensity virtually the entire civilian population will migrate to more secure areas.

TABLE 15. A MODEL OF REFUGEE MIGRATION IN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
1. Source of stress	Insurgent selective terrorism	Insurgent selective terrorism Insurgent military harassment of government secured hamlets. Limited government counterinsurgency activity. Insurgent demands on social and economic systems.	Government military operations and use of fire power against insurgent-controlled areas. Increased insurgent demands on the social and economic system. Economic and social disruption resulting from military activities of both sides. Disruption of families/communities due to refugee movement.
2. Character of stress	Fear of being deliberately killed by insurgents	Fear of being deliberately killed by insurgents. Fear of accidental death in battle. Economic and social hardships.	Fear of death from bombs or artillery shells. Fear of accidental death in battle. Economic and social hardships.
3. Affected Population	Government cadre, soldiers, and sympathizers Large landholders	All inhabitants of contested areas but especially: Government cadre, soldiers, and sympathizers. Members of anti-insurgent religious groups. Large landholders.	All inhabitants of insurgent controlled and contested areas.
4. Constraints on migration	"Internal" factors	Primarily "internal" factors.	Insurgent population control apparatus.
5. Time of migration	Movement occurs at initiation of terrorist activity	Peak movement occurs when government defenses are overrun and insurgents begin to establish control of area.	Peak movement occurs when government ground operations disrupt insurgent population control apparatus.
6. Modal socio-demographic characteristics of refugees	Under 45 years of age. Literate Large landholder Member of hierarchically structured religion Skilled laborer Government cadre or soldier or member of their family.	Under 45 years of age. Literate Landless or large landholder Member of hierarchically structured religion Skilled laborer Family member associated with government	Over 45 years of age Illiterate Middle or small landholder Follower of unstructured religion Farmer or tenant farmer No association with government
7. Percentage of base population moving	Up to 5%.	Up to 20%.	Up to 70%.

351

35.2

353

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
See the following pages
for greater detail.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TABLE 15. A MODEL OF REFUGEE MIGRATION IN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
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35.1

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7. Percentage of base population moving	Up to 5%.	Up to 20%.	Up to 70%.

APPENDIX A: STUDY METHODOLOGY

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Research Objective and Approach

This research involved setting up a socio-cultural "experiment" using empirical data collected in a single district in Quang-Nam Province to examine the relationships between changes in the war-induced stresses on rural Vietnamese society, constraints on population movement, and the rate of migration and demographic characteristics of refugees.

The specific goals of the research were (1) to describe the rate of refugee generation, and the demography of refugee migration in Thuong Duc District, and (2) to relate these aspects of mass population displacement to the evolution of the insurgency in the District, with the ultimate objective of (3) developing a dynamic model of refugee migration in revolutionary warfare situations.


Selection of the Study Area

Experience with an earlier study of refugee migration (Rambo, Tinker, LeNoir) indicated that data must be collected at the district or village administrative level in order to allow meaningful examination of the dynamics of movement. At the province level, differences between time sequences for the district units tend to obscure relationships between military events and rate of refugee generation. For this reason, the focus was on intensive examination of the dynamics of movement at the district level. Criteria for selection of the district of study were:

- It must be geographically isolated so that refugee movement will be channeled into a limited number of regroupment sites. A district in the delta where refugees could freely move to many other areas would be unsuitable for study. (Figure 1 represents the most and least favorable geographic situations for study.)

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Figure 1. Geographic Factors in Selection of Study Site



Key:

- District Boundary
- ⊛ District Capital
- ^^ Mountains
- Road or canal
- + Site of refugee origin
- Direction of refugee movement

- Relatively few refugees shall have returned to their villages or been resettled by the GVN outside of the district; i.e., the current refugee population must represent essentially the total refugee population. If either condition is violated, accurate statistics on refugee generation rates cannot be collected.

- The majority of the refugees must have moved voluntarily. For obvious reasons, interviewing forced evacuees can provide little information on the causes of refugee movement.

- All regroupment areas must be sufficiently secure so that the refugees will not fear Viet-Cong reprisal for cooperating with the interviewers and so that the interviewers will not be overly constrained in their operations for the same reason.

- The refugee population must be of manageable size to be handled by the resources and methodology involved in the study. Ten thousand refugees (ca. two thousand families) is about the maximum manageable population size with the resources available to the researcher.

- District officials and American advisory personnel must be willing to cooperate with the researcher.

After examination of several potential field sites, Thuong Duc District, Quang-Nam Province, was selected for study as the area best meeting the above criteria. Approximately ten thousand refugees had moved into the secure area (three hamlets) around the district capital. Most of these refugees had moved voluntarily. Only an estimated 350 households had taken refuge outside of the district, and no refugees had returned to their native villages. (Appendix B presents more detailed information on Thuong Duc District.)

Types and Sources of Data

Two basic types of data were employed in this analysis: (1) data on the refugees, and (2) information on the insurgency history of their communities of origin.

Data on Refugees

An attempt was made to learn the date of movement and sociocultural characteristics of every refugee household generated in Thuong Duc District. These data were collected by means of standardized questionnaires administered to 1,633 refugee heads-of-households.

Data on Insurgency History

Information was sought on the stresses affecting the rural population in each community and the constraints on movement at various stages of the insurgency. These data were in part collected by means of the census of refugees, but were primarily developed through seventeen extensive interviews with knowledgeable refugees on the war histories of their settlements. Supplementary information was obtained from Vietnamese officials and their American advisors having familiarity with the areas of concern.

Data Collection and Processing

Field work in Thuong Duc District began in mid-July 1967 and continued until early September. The writer, assisted by Mr. Philip Estermann, directed a team of eight Vietnamese interviewers in conducting the census of refugees. The interviewers were high school students recruited in the province capital. Three of the boys were refugees themselves and they all demonstrated considerable empathy with their rural compatriots. In addition to the locally-recruited census team, there were three senior interviewers participating in the study. All were English-speaking university students from Saigon, two of whom worked for the author the previous year in a study of refugees in Phu-Yen Province, and one who had worked previously for another American researcher. One senior interviewer served as the writer's assistant on the census task, helping to prepare the maps and directing the routine activities of the census interviewers. The other two were conducting depth interviews with refugees on the war history of

the communities in the study.¹ They also served as interpreters in our dealing with Vietnamese officials.

Refugee settlement areas were located for the author on a large-scale map by local Vietnamese officials. After making a preliminary on-foot reconnaissance of these sites, the author prepared small-scale maps of each area of refugee settlement and assigned control numbers to all refugee houses. Interviewers were assigned blocks of houses and would make repeated call-backs if the refugee head-of-household was not available for interviewing on the first visit. By this means 97 percent of the identifiable refugee households residing in the district at the time of the survey were actually interviewed.

The author was not present during the actual interviewing (although it was no secret to the refugees that the study was American directed) and in any case had much too limited a Vietnamese vocabulary to have checked on the accuracy of the interviewing. Random re-interviews were conducted, however, by his Vietnamese assistant to check on the quality of the census team interviews. Two census takers were found, as a result of this checking, to be falsifying their protocols and were consequently dismissed and all their earlier questionnaires redone by reliable interviewers. On the whole, however, the interviewers performed conscientiously and capably and the overall quality of the data appears to be high.

All open-ended responses were translated into English by university students in Saigon. The protocols were shipped to the U. S. and responses were coded by Mrs. P. G. Nordlie. After transferral to punch cards the responses were sorted on an IBM 083 counter-sorter.

¹The depth interviewing task was directed by Philip Estermann using a data collection guide developed by the author in cooperation with John LeNoir and ARVN Capt. La Van Truong in Phu-Yen Province the preceding year. Mr. Estermann greatly improved this interview format and is wholly responsible for its successful employment in Thuong Duc District. The results of this work are reported in Philip I. Estermann, "Revolutionary Warfare in Rural Vietnam" (McLean, Va.: Human Sciences Research, Inc., March 1968).

Analysis

Although there were refugees from twenty-three hamlets represented in the sample, the small number of respondents per hamlet made it necessary to group respondents from several hamlets to form populations suitable for analysis. The required aggregation was accomplished in two stages: (1) the hamlets were distributed into five natural groups on the basis of geographical contiguity and similar insurgency history. Respondents from each group were then dichotomized according to whether they migrated in Phases I and II of the insurgency or Phase III. The breakpoint between the second and third phases was taken to be a point six months after the Viet-Cong achieved initial control of the area, i. e., the time when the insurgents had fully consolidated their grip on the rural population. (2) Phases I and II respondents from all five groups were placed in one analytic unit and all Phase III respondents in another and the distribution of study variables in these units determined.

The significance of differences between the two analytic units was measured by the standard chi-square test of statistical significance. Results at the .05 level (a 5 in 100 probability of the observed differences occurring by chance) or better were considered significant. Where a dichotomous variable was being examined Yule's Q test of relationship was also employed. With this measure, 1 indicates perfect association, 0 nil association.

APPENDIX B: BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

APPENDIX B: BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA

The area of refugee generation investigated in this thesis is located in Thuong Duc District, Quang-Nam Province, in the I Corps area of the Republic of Viet-Nam. This appendix presents background information on the physical geography, ethnology, political geography, and insurgency history of the district, essential to examination of the dynamics of refugee movement there.

Geography

Thuong Duc District is the largest, least populated and most isolated district in Quang-Nam Province. The District capital of Ha Tan is located at the end of the Vu Gia River valley that opens eastward onto the coastal plain of Annam. West of Ha Tan the land rises into forested mountains that extend across the frontier in Laos. The mountains, which reach a maximum elevation of 1,700 meters, are severely eroded and present no defined ridge lines. Several deep river gorges (notably the Song Vu Gia, Song Buong and the Song Con) have been cut through the high country. Before the war these rivers provided the principal access routes to Thuong Duc District from the coast. Thuong Duc District has a monsoon climate with the dry season running from May to October and a wet season from November through April. Rain may fall in the highlands as early as August with an annual precipitation between 80 and 150 inches. Temperatures vary 20 degrees between the two seasons with a wet season mean of 60-65 degrees Fahrenheit and a dry season average of plus 85 degrees F. Nights are generally cool enough in the mountains to require a blanket for sleeping even in the hot season.

Transportation is poorly developed with an unimproved dirt road connecting Ha Tan to Danang. The bridges were blown by the guerrillas in 1965 so that the road is closed and the only connection between the district and the outside is by air. There is a strip suitable for Caribous (CV-2's) and other STOL aircraft at Ha Tan as well as a helicopter landing pad.

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Ethnology

Thuong Duc District is inhabited by two racially and culturally distinct populations, the Vietnamese and the Katu. The Vietnamese are the politically dominant population both in Thuong Duc and in Viet-Nam as a whole, while the Katu are one of the tribal groups collectively referred to as Montagnards or highlanders. The Montagnards are remnants of the aboriginal population of Viet-Nam that was pushed into the mountains by the militarily stronger Vietnamese in the course of their "march to the south." The Katu, who speak a Mon Khmer language, are estimated to number 30,000 in Viet-Nam and in Laos, with the bulk of this population living in western Thuong Duc District. The Katu are one of the most isolated of the highland tribes and were never completely subjugated either by the Vietnamese empire or the French colonial regime. They were noted for their ferocity as fighters and were the only tribe in Viet-Nam known to practice human sacrifice.

Prior to the war the Katu lived in fortified villages consisting of five to fifty extended family houses, but recently due to fear of air bombardment the villages have become dispersed with single nuclear families living in widely separated huts that are carefully camouflaged against aerial observation.

The tribesmen practice swidden (rai) cultivation of dry rice and do considerable hunting. Formerly they traded forest products with the Vietnamese in exchange of iron and salt, but the war has disrupted this limited contact.

The Katu experienced their first sustained political contact with ethnic Vietnamese when they were penetrated by Viet Minh cadre in the late 1940's and organized in support of the resistance war against the French. The Viet-Cong inherited the Viet Minh organization and have never been challenged by the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) in their control of the Katu. In fact, only sixty Protestant members of the tribe currently reside in GVN administered areas.

The Vietnamese are a lowland people living in the deforested river valleys of the district where it is possible to practice wet-rice agriculture. They reside in nucleated settlements of from 150 to 500 persons. Households usually contain

a nuclear family with perhaps a grandparent or grandchild in residence. There is a strong tendency for extended family members to cluster their houses into homestead groups, however, and there is a strong sense of lineage identification.

Religions are Buddhism, Confucianism (ancestor worship), Catholicism, Protestantism and Cao Daism, in approximately that order of importance in Thuong Duc District. Only the Catholics (and to a lesser degree the Protestants and Cao Daists) have had any extensive formal organization with links to a national church--a fact which had political implications during the Diem period.

Unlike the tribespeople the Vietnamese peasants are participants in a culture having a "great tradition" with all its concomitants--literacy, class stratification, developed political administration, etc. Thus, although the peasants in Thuong Duc are poorer and more isolated than most rural Vietnamese they are still actively incorporated in the working nation-state.

Political Geography

Thuong Duc District, one of the seven districts comprising Quang-Nam Province, is divided administratively into three villages (xa) and twenty-five hamlets (ap). These units are located in the Vietnamese-populated river valleys near the District capital.

Prior to the expansion of Viet-Cong control in late 1964, the GVN-administered area had a population estimated at 18,579. Since 1964 there has been a drastic displacement of the population which has both reduced the district total (due mainly to refugee movement to Hoi An and Danang) and greatly shifted the population within the subadministrative units (see Table 1).

The GVN administrative structure in Thuong Duc District, while in theory following the prescribed national pattern of a district-village-hamlet hierarchy, in practice has been greatly modified to meet the realities of the local environment. Thus the District Chief and his staff exercise much closer control of day-to-day activities of hamlet officials than would normally be the case in a unit with a larger population being dispersed over a wide area.

Table 1. Population Estimates for Thuong Duc District

Analytic Unit	Total pre-movement population	Number of households	Number of evacuee households ³	Number of refugee households in District ³	Number of refugee households residing outside District	Refugees as percent of total population of Group	Percent of refugees moving in Phases I & II	Percent of refugees moving in Phase III
Group A	4,202 ¹	750	60	700	?	93.3	17.2	82.8
Group B	3,929 ¹	702	21	201	?	28.6	100.0	No Phase III
Group C	1,285 ²	231	2	183	?	79.2	84.7	15.3
Group D	1,613 ¹	288	3	208	?	72.2	88.9	11.1
Group E	6,148 ¹	1,098	118	341	?	31.1	16.4	83.6
Total for Rural Area	17,177	3,068	204	1,633	433 ⁴	67.3	44.0	56.0
District Total	18,579	3,322	204	1,633	433 ⁴	62.2	44.0	56.0

¹ 1963 estimate by village chief

² 1960 estimate by district chief

³ Households surveyed by study

⁴ Estimate based on information supplied by district chief.

Insurgency History

While the current insurgency may be said to have its roots in the disruption of traditional Vietnamese society by French Colonial rule, the present analysis is concerned with the symptoms--i. e., revolutionary warfare--rather than the causes of the problem. Thus historical discussion will be confined to the five periods which Thuong Duc District has passed through since the Viet Minh launched the Resistance War at the end of World War II. These periods are:

1. The Resistance War, 1945-mid-1954
2. The Republican Peace, late 1954-1958
3. Special Warfare, 1959-1963
4. Viet-Cong Expansion, 1964-early 1966
5. Allied Counteroffensive, mid-1966-mid-1967

The Resistance War, 1945-1954

The entire area now comprising Thuong Duc District was under Viet Minh control throughout the war against the French. Initially most of the population sympathized with the Resistance Forces but severe Viet Minh taxes soon alienated the large landlords and richer peasants, and by the end of the war only the poorest peasants still strongly supported the insurgents. There was no true land reform (other than some distribution of communal lands to poor people) but Viet Minh tax policy forced large landholders to give much of their "excess" land to landless laborers and former tenant farmers.¹ This was accomplished by allowing people to keep only a fixed amount of rice regardless of how much they produced.² In addition to the production tax the cadre frequently called upon

¹In some hamlets rudimentary collectives or communal farms (Nong Doan) were formed in the early phases of the war combining land "contributed" by the large landlords and former hamlet communal lands. These plots were worked in common and people paid after the harvest according to the number of days' labor they had expended. The experiment was not successful as production fell off radically and it was soon discontinued.

²An example of the working of Viet Minh tax policy was provided by a "middle farmer." He owned 1.1 mau of "middle" quality land producing a yield of rice, corn and vegetables equivalent in value to 980 kilos of rice. For each of nine family members he was allowed to keep 70 kilos of rice or corn plus a universal
(Continued, next page)

people to make "voluntary" cash contributions to the "Soldiers' Solidarity Pot." Even very poor people had to make donations to this fund although it bore hardest on the richer peasants. During the most intense phase of the Resistance War in the area a steeply progressive tax (Quy Chuyen Manh) was levied in addition to the production tax and the "solidarity" contributions. The tax rate varied from 400-500 piastres for a "poor farmer" to 5,000 piastres for a "rich farmer."

The Viet Minh made some efforts to improve the living conditions of the population. First aid cadre were assigned to some hamlets but medicines were scarce. Education, especially the anti-illiteracy campaign, received considerable attention.

Despite the general severity of the Viet Minh regime there was little or no refugee movement out of the District. In part this may be due to the fact that almost the entire province was under control of the Resistance Forces and consequently there was no secure area for refugees to flee. It may also be that the Viet Minh succeeded in maintaining popular sympathy to a greater extent than is the case with the Viet-Cong.

The Republican Peace, late 1954-1958

It was not until three months after the signing of the Geneva accords in July 1954 that the newly independent Nationalist Government of Viet-Nam (GVN) established effective control of the Vietnamese inhabited areas of Thuong Duc. The Viet Minh forces in the district were formally disbanded and the leading cadres "regrouped" to the North.³ The communist cadre system among the Katu

Footnote 2, Continued

exemption of 70 kilos for the family as a whole giving him a total exemption of 700 kilos. The remaining 280 kilos (all that remained beyond mere subsistence requirements for his family) was taken by the Viet Minh.

³ 184 individuals are known to have emigrated to the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam (DRV) in 1954. Nineteen of these regroupes are known to have since returned to fight with the Viet-Cong guerrillas. Not surprisingly, relatives of the regroupes have tended to strongly support the guerrillas and have in many cases stayed in the hills rather than move with their neighbors as refugees to more secure areas.

remained intact, however, and the GVN failed to exercise any meaningful control over the tribal areas of the district.⁴

The government initially appointed hamlet and village chiefs and councils to handle local administration. Catholics were appointed to most key posts--a source of serious dissatisfaction to the non-Christian majority. These councils later became elective bodies in some hamlets although no uniform system of selection appears to have been implemented throughout the district. In 1958 Thuong Duc District was formally established by combining parts of neighboring Dai Loc District with the two Montagnard autonomous administrative zones left over from the period of French Rule.

Land redistributed by the Viet Minh was returned to its former owners--a measure adversely affecting the poor peasants. On the other hand, land taxes were very greatly reduced and peoples' living standard appeared to rise. Two- or three-year elementary schools and health stations were established in almost all of the hamlets.

In mid-1955 the Diem government launched the infamous "Anti-Communist Denunciation Campaign" (Scigliano:167-68). Persons suspected of having been Viet Minh cadre or supporters were imprisoned, subjected to anti-communist indoctrination and in some cases severely tortured. Some former Viet Minh cadre fled to the mountains to avoid imprisonment, providing a ready supply of recruits for the nascent Viet-Cong guerrillas. Even non-Communists became afraid that they would be denounced by personal enemies. A common complaint regarding enforcement of the policy was the preferential treatment shown to Catholics.

⁴Hickey briefly visited several Katu villages in early 1957. He notes in his report that "with the exception of propaganda, the Katu of this area do not appear to have received any attention from the government." He also stated that "there very definitely is Viet Minh activity in the area" (Hickey:62). "One of the sons of a Katu village chief had regrouped in 1954 and had recently returned to the village" (Hickey:60). This report casts some doubt on the often-cited Lacouture thesis that "the pitiless 'witch hunt' conducted against their comrades in the South, resulting in the latters' pathetic appeals for help to Hanoi leaders, and the economic pressure on them, resulting from the blockade of the undernourished North, led them, after 1959 and five years of honest application of the Geneva Agreements,

(Continued, next page)

Despite the pro-Catholic bias of the regime and its harsh treatment of suspected dissidents it appears to have been initially viewed without hostility by the mass of the population in the district and with strong positive feelings by the wealthier classes who had suffered most from the Viet Minh forces.

Special Warfare, 1959-1963

Little is known about the early stage of the Viet-Cong insurgency, but by 1959 the guerrillas were on the offensive in the district, attacking government outposts, assassinating GVN cadre, propagandizing the peasants and collecting taxes and recruits from the outlying hamlets. In 1961, the Diem regime responded to the threat with the strategic hamlet program--attempting to turn most of the settlements in the district into self-defended hamlets which would prevent the guerrillas from having access to the population. The program, as was the case elsewhere in Viet-Nam, was poorly conceived and hastily implemented. For example, arms were not supplied to the self-defense units in some hamlets until several months after these had been established. Fortification was rudimentary (often no more than a bamboo fence) and the perimeters overly long. Villagers resented the costs and labor involved in establishing the hamlets, the loss of valuable land for defense works and the restrictions on their movement. On the other hand, many people appear to have appreciated the increased sense of security that the strategic hamlets created and in several hamlets the defense forces fought off guerrilla attacks with considerable vigor. In sum, the hamlets did at least partially fulfill their intended function until the collapse of the counter-insurgency effort in late 1963-early 1964, following the coup d'etat against Diem. At the same time the Special Forces camp at An Diem which had been established in 1962, in a largely unsuccessful effort to recruit a Katu Strike Force, was closed out in July 1964 and the District lost its only aggressive troops, hastening the collapse of pro-government forces.

Footnote 4, Continued

to intervene progressively in the South in order to press by force for reunification that could not be obtained through other means" [Emphasis added]. (Lacouture:35)

Viet-Cong Expansion, late 1963-early 1966

The guerrillas began overrunning the strategic hamlets in rapid succession and the local defense forces disintegrated, either returning their arms to the government and submitting to Viet-Cong control, or fleeing as refugees to Ha Tan. Loc Ninh Village and several hamlets in Loc Vinh and Loc Binh Villages were completely Viet-Cong controlled by late 1964. The district chief had only one platoon of Popular Force soldiers left and was effectively contained in Ha Tan. By early 1966 even the district headquarters was under guerrilla attack.

The Viet-Cong set up their own administration in hamlets under their control. An autonomous hamlet committee (Ban Tu Quan) was appointed or elected by a clearly rigged vote, a hamlet guerrilla force established, the strategic hamlet defense works repaired and the name changed to combat hamlet, production taxes and corvee labor instituted and a parallel hierarchy of mass and cadre organizations established. By late 1965 the entire district except for the hamlets immediately surrounding the District Headquarters was Viet-Cong controlled in the fullest sense of the term. The quality of life in the "liberated areas" began to fall as Viet-Cong taxes and labor demands increased, the economy deteriorated, and as former supporters of the GVN were persecuted and forced to undergo political reeducation.

Allied Counteroffensive, early 1966-mid-1967

In April 1966 the U. S. Marines ran Operation Orange in the district in order to disrupt the guerrillas and give the U. S. Special Forces time to establish a new camp at Ha Tan and recruit and train a Vietnamese Strike Force. Air bombardment and artillery fire played a prominent part in the operation--the first major action in the district--and the local guerrilla forces took heavy losses. Special Forces operations later in the year also took their toll and guerrilla defections to the government side began to climb. The insurgents found it difficult to replace their losses because by this time refugee movement had drained most of the people from the Viet-Cong areas. By mid-1967 the local guerrillas were reduced to an understrength company. Life in the Viet-Cong areas was both

unpleasant and dangerous. The economy was completely disrupted, production had greatly decreased although tax rates continued upwards, and shortages of basic commodities such as salt and fish sauce (nuoc mam) were reported. Frequent air strikes and almost daily artillery fire was directed against the Viet-Cong areas forcing people to spend much of their time in shelters. The GVN was starting to expand its controlled area and there was even talk of opening the road to the coast. However, introduction of large North Vietnamese (NVA) units at this time effectively halted pacification and the contest now appears stalemated. The local guerrillas are beaten but the government cannot exploit the situation for fear of exposing itself to NVA attack.

**APPENDIX C: ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF CENSUS
QUESTIONNAIRE EMPLOYED IN REFUGEE DYNAMICS TASK**

**ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF CENSUS QUESTIONNAIRE
EMPLOYED IN REFUGEE DYNAMICS TASK**

1. Site: Hamlet _____
Village _____
District _____
Province _____
2. Date of interview: day _____ month _____
House Number: _____
3. Place of Movement: Hamlet _____
Village _____
District _____
Province _____
4. Date of Movement: Day _____
Month _____
Year _____
Lunar _____ Western _____
5. Is the head of household a man or woman? Man _____ Woman _____
6. How old is the head of household? _____ Years
7. Can the head of household read and write? Yes _____ No _____
8. What is the occupation of the head of household now?
- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| _____ Farmer | _____ Soldier |
| _____ Tenant farmer | _____ Civil cadre |
| _____ Laborer | _____ Fisherman |
| _____ Vendor | _____ No occupation |
| _____ Craftsman | _____ Other _____ |
9. What was the occupation of the head of household before becoming a refugee?
- | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|
| _____ Farmer | _____ Soldier |
| _____ Tenant Farmer | _____ Civil cadre |
| _____ Laborer | _____ Fisherman |
| _____ Vendor | _____ No occupation |
| _____ Craftsman | _____ Other _____ |
10. How many mau were cultivated?
- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------|
| _____ No | _____ 3 - 4 mau |
| _____ 0 - 0.5 mau | _____ 4 - 5 mau |
| _____ 0.6 - 1 mau | _____ 5 - 6 mau |
| _____ 1 - 2 mau | _____ 6 mau or more |
| _____ 2 - 3 mau | Record actual size of plot _____ mau |
11. How many mau were rented?
- | | |
|---------------|--------------------------------------|
| _____ No | _____ 3 - 4 |
| _____ 0 - 0.5 | _____ 4 - 5 |
| _____ 0.5 - 1 | _____ 5 - 6 |
| _____ 1 - 2 | _____ 6 mau or more |
| _____ 2 - 3 | Record actual size of plot _____ mau |

Preceding page blank

12. How many mau were owned?

_____ No
_____ 0 - 0.5
_____ 0.6 - 1
_____ 1 - 2
_____ 2 - 3

_____ 3 - 4
_____ 4 - 5
_____ 5 - 6
_____ 6 mau or more
Record actual size of plot _____ mau

13. Did you rent land to other people?

Yes _____ No _____

14. If yes, How many mau in all did you rent out?

_____ mau

15. How many persons are in your family here now?

_____ persons (including head of household)

16. How many persons were in your family before you moved?

_____ persons (include head of household)

17. Before you moved was any member of your household a soldier or worker of the GVN? (include self defense force, Republican Youth, Health Cadre, hamlet council member, etc.)

Yes _____ No _____

18. Was any close relative of your family a GVN soldier or worker?

Yes _____ No _____

19. Were you forced to move?

Yes _____ No _____

20. If yes, Who forced you to move?

ARVN _____
US _____
VC _____
Other _____

21. If movement was not forced, did you move during an ARVN or US operation?

Yes _____ No _____

22. If movement was not forced, why did you leave your hamlet?

(Write out all reasons given)

23. How many years have you lived in your old hamlet?

_____ Years

24. What is your religion?

_____ Buddhist
_____ Catholic
_____ Ancestor
_____ Protestant
_____ Cao Dai
_____ Other _____

Interviewer comments of the refugee:

In my opinion, the refugee was:

_____ Cooperative
_____ Not very cooperative
_____ Honest
_____ Not very honest
_____ Intelligent
_____ Not very intelligent

Interviewer number: _____

APPENDIX D: BIBLIOGRAPHY

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TAB 67-8