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OVERVIEW OF THE CITIZEN-ARMY CONCEPT

Jon L. Lellenberg

Stanford Research Institute

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
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<p><i>AT THE REPORT</i></p> <p>This paper presents a review and analysis of the application of the citizen-army concept by certain small nations to deter and defend against attack. Implementation of the concept by Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, South Korea, and Israel is analyzed and the content of the Yugoslav concept of general people's defense for defeat of enemy strategy is examined. The final section discusses the application of the concept for territorial defense forces to serve as one component of a revised NATO force posture. <i>OK</i></p>			

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
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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT . . . . .	111
FOREWORD . . . . .	v
I    CONTEXT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE . . . . .	1
II   THREAT TO SMALL NATIONS . . . . .	4
III  ALTERNATIVE CITIZEN-ARMY APPLICATIONS . . . . .	7
Singapore . . . . .	7
Sweden . . . . .	10
Switzerland . . . . .	15
South Korea . . . . .	20
Israel . . . . .	23
IV  THE YUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF GENERAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE . . .	30
V   THE CITIZEN-ARMY CONCEPT IN WESTERN EUROPE . . . . .	43

## FOREWORD

A major security problem of many small nations in the 1970s will be that of finding means to cope with potential military threats seemingly beyond their resources to counter. For those which have been aligned with the United States, the dangers may appear the more acute as the likelihood of American intervention in their behalf seems to decline. Under the provisions of the Nixon Doctrine, allied nations are expected to bear an increasing share of the burden of their own defense, with the goal of eventually becoming self-sufficient.

One way in which the objectives of both small nations and the Nixon Doctrine may be accomplished is through the application of the citizen-army concept, in which the available manpower of a small nation can be rapidly mobilized in time of crisis or war, but remain at their civilian occupations as producers in the national economy during time of peace. This paper examines various applications of the citizen-army concept by a number of small nations to their problems of deterrence and defense, and discusses the possible role and utility of national territorial defense forces in a revised NATO force posture in Europe.

The author would like to acknowledge his debt to General Charles H. Bonesteel III (USA, ret.); Lieutenant General Young Hoon Kang (ROK Army, ret.), Director, Research Institute on Korean Affairs, Silver Spring, Maryland; Professor Nils Andrén, Research Institute on Swedish National Defense, Stockholm; and Mr. Frederick Martin Stern, for their assistance in the preparation of this paper.

Richard B. Foster  
Director  
Strategic Studies Center

## I CONTEXT OF THE NIXON DOCTRINE

As a doctrinal pronouncement of American foreign and military policy for the 1970s, the Nixon Doctrine remains open to differing interpretation. Various critics, foreign as well as American, have condemned it either as a continuation of the former containment policy, modified only to satisfy certain changing domestic and international conditions, or as a guise for alleged American withdrawal from the world, brought on by a renascent isolationist attitude. In actuality, however, official statements emphasize both continuity and change in American international security policy. In this regard, as President Nixon stated to Congress:

The Doctrine seeks to reflect these realities:

- that a major American role remains indispensable.
- that other nations can and should assume greater responsibilities, for their sake as well as ours.
- that the change in the strategic relationship calls for new doctrines.
- that the emerging polycentrism of the Communist world presents different challenges and new opportunities.<sup>1</sup>

The most specifically-stated of these "realities" is the second: that other nations should assume, in this case, greater responsibility for their own national defense, and thereby relieve the United States of much of the burden that it has carried since World War II. To a considerable extent, this redirection of American policy is as much the product of necessity as of desirability. The requirement for a lower American profile is a change largely brought about by a complex of domestic conditions: changes in national values and priorities (which themselves introduce new budget constraints), disaffection with the military, a desire after Vietnam to avoid new foreign conflict, and a questioning

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<sup>1</sup> President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 25 February 1971, p. 11.

attitude on the part of public and leadership alike toward the subject of American commitments abroad.<sup>1</sup>

As a result, a reorientation of American political-military policy is taking place along these lines. Its effect is most likely to be irreversible for the foreseeable future. Fundamental is a conscious sense of renewed caution in becoming involved in "foreign entanglements" and foreign conflicts:

...We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around.

We will view new commitments in the light of a careful assessment of our own national interests and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to counter those threats at an acceptable risk and cost.<sup>2</sup>

By virtue of this guideline, American involvement in foreign conflict will consequently depend upon what has been described as "an existential approach to the application of foreign policy and military strategy."<sup>3</sup> While the United States will continue to honor its treaty obligations, active American military assistance to another nation threatened by aggression or confronted with attack will not necessarily be automatic. Instead, it will depend first and primarily upon the American interests involved; and even in such a case, the United States "shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Col. Dale W. Scott, "A Strategy for Military Partnership", The Nixon Doctrine and Military Strategy (Maxwell AFB: Air University), 1971, p. 29.

<sup>2</sup> President Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 18 February 1970, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Capt. Pember W. Rocap, "Implications of the Nixon Policy for Future U.S. Military Strategy", The Nixon Doctrine and Military Strategy, op. cit., 1971, p. 4.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 25 February 1971, p. 14.

This, then, is one of the most important caveats of the Nixon Doctrine in its application to the question of international conflict: that even in instances involving American interests, a nation imperilled by aggression must expect to bear most of the burden of its defense, rather than to rely upon the United States to assume most or all of the risks and costs:

Others now have the ability and responsibility to deal with local disputes which once might have required our intervention. Our contribution and success will depend not on the frequency of our involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our policies. This is the approach which will best encourage other nations to do their part, and will most genuinely enlist the support of the American people.<sup>1</sup>

This applies as much to Asia,<sup>2</sup> where conflict potential is likely to remain high throughout the 1970s, as it does to Western Europe, whose NATO members, technically and economically, are more than capable of assuming a greater and more equitable share of the alliance defense burden.<sup>3</sup>

The United States will continue its policy of assisting other nations through economic, technical, and military aid in developing the ability to defend themselves.<sup>4</sup> Under the Nixon Doctrine, however, this should be understood as the ability to defend themselves with a minimum of possible American military intervention in a combat role.<sup>5</sup> Should an ally find itself threatened or confronted by attack, in all but the most extreme cases such American intervention would depend not only upon the American interests involved, but also upon the associated risks and costs; that is, whether the ally itself was making a serious effort, to the point that an acceptably limited American intervention would make a consequential difference to a successful defense.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 18 February 1970, p. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>3</sup> U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 25 February 1971, pp. 35-36.

<sup>4</sup> See Stephen P. Gibert, Implications of the Nixon Doctrine for Military Aid Policy, Stanford Research Institute/Strategic Studies Center, SSC-IN-71-103, September 1971.

<sup>5</sup> See U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, 18 February 1970, p. 56.

<sup>6</sup> See Rocard, *op. cit.*, p. 4, and Scott, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

## II THREAT TO SMALL NATIONS

Irrespective of the question of American or other foreign support, small and medium-sized allied and neutral nations throughout the world will continue to be concerned with the possibility of military aggression in the 1970s and 1980s. While the actual threat potential may vary considerably from place to place and from time to time, the threat of conflict will nonetheless continue to exist; and may in fact appear the more menacing, the less the likelihood of rapid and massive American military assistance seems to be. To many governments, it may well appear--and be true--that they can count only upon their own resources, regardless of the circumstances.

The nature of the threat may vary considerably as well. There is, for one, that of guerrilla warfare, of "wars of national liberation", which, whether entirely internal or actively supported by a foreign power, have become familiar through the war in Indo-China. The likelihood that guerrilla warfare will occur in a number of places, chiefly in Asian nations, appears high for the foreseeable future, and will thus continue to pose a problem for American policy. But if the nature and especially the consequences of such warfare are understood, a solution to the challenge is not; and for American policy, the experience of Vietnam and its political, social, and economic aftermath have guaranteed that the United States will do all it can in the future to avoid becoming involved in combat roles in such wars. This poses the problem for small nations of finding their own means of coping with such threats; for as Professor Frank N. Trager has noted:

...The Nixon Doctrine clearly throws the burden on the threatened government. It is to "preempt" such wars "through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, para-military and military action". That the threatened Third World Government must carry such burdens is generally established and accepted; that they generally are prepared with resources

and training both to preempt and where necessary control such wars is not and cannot be established on present evidence.<sup>1</sup>

Indigenous insurgency and guerrilla warfare, however, are not the only kinds of military threat facing the small and perhaps largely isolated nation in the 1970s. In terms of the degree of military action and active combat, the "war of national liberation" might be only about mid-point on the intensity scale. Such a nation, limited in resources, may be confronted with military threats lower or higher in intensity, with which it might be little better prepared to cope.

An example of the kind of threat which is low in intensity, but designed to be long and telling in duration, is the "porous war" that was waged against the Republic of Korea in the second half of the 1960s. During this period the government of North Korea evolved a strategy designed to erode South Korean stability, and implemented this strategy by attempting to attain an ascending scale of objectives through the use of groups of armed and specially-trained infiltrators sent into the South.

Three phases of objectives of the North Korean "porous war" strategy against the Republic of Korea can be distinguished. In the first phase, Northern objectives emphasized the incitement of South Korean retaliation for incidents and firefights provoked by the infiltrations, in order to create incigeneous political discontent with the Park government and to exacerbate dissension between the South Koreans and Americans. The second phase was intended to continue these developments, to worsen the South Korean situation by disrupting its economic development program, and to support whatever revolutionary forces that might arise in the South. The third phase was to see the creation of active centers of guerrilla warfare, and with them the establishment of a provisional government able to call upon North Korea for assistance.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Frank N. Trager, Wars of National Liberation in the 1970s, Stanford Research Institute/Strategic Studies Center, SSC-IN-71-109, October 1971, p. 70. Emphasis in the original.

<sup>2</sup> The author is indebted to General Charles H. Bonesteel III, (USA, rtd) and to Lieutenant General Young Hoon Kang (ROK Army, rtd) for information regarding the "porous war" waged against South Korea. Its presentation and the conclusions drawn from it, however, remain the responsibility of the author.

Given a favorable set of circumstances, such a "porous war" program could enjoy considerable success. That it did not in the case of South Korea is due to reasons which will be examined later in this paper. That it did not succeed should not necessarily be of much comfort, however, for in other places this kind of threat could arise again in a most serious way, particularly in such Asian nations as Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines.

On the other side of the intensity scale, small and medium-sized nations may face more overt and immediate threats to their freedom of decision and national independence by the threat or actuality of a blitzkrieg-type attack: one manifested by large-scale conventional invasion designed to overwhelm and destroy the defending forces, in order to attain a decisive political victory in as short a time as possible. The violent invasion of Hungary in 1956, and the bloodless invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, are recent examples of the use of this kind of military operation by the Soviet Union to achieve political goals rapidly and decisively. The mere threat, combined with an obvious physical capability to conduct such an operation, could in many instances be sufficient to allow an aggressor to impose its will upon a smaller nation. Nations in both Europe and Asia, for example Yugoslavia and South Korea respectively, could find themselves confronted with either the threat or actuality of such an attack in the 1970s.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For a Western analysis of blitzkrieg as a tool of policy, see Col. W.W. Yale, Gen. I.W. White, and Gen. H.E. Von Manteuffel, Alternative to Armageddon: The Peace Potential of Lightning War (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press), 1970.

### III ALTERNATIVE CITIZEN-ARMY APPLICATIONS

#### Singapore

The case of Singapore is an illustrative example of the quandary faced by small nations which are confronted by potential threats seemingly beyond their resources. Singapore's independence was attained by withdrawal from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965; but the future viability of that independence cannot be taken for granted, for it could well seem a major economic prize to an aggressor. It occupies, moreover, an important geostrategic location, one whose possession by a large and expansive international actor would confer considerable influence over the regional power balance.<sup>1</sup>

Yet Singapore is most limited in resources. Its population is only 2,100,000, and its estimated gross national product for 1970, while quite impressive in terms of achievement, is only 1.82 billion dollars.<sup>2</sup> Its combined armed forces total a mere 16,000 men, with a regular army of about 14,000 active troops.<sup>3</sup> Singapore does not even approach being in the same league with the kind of armed force that China or the Soviet Union could conceivably apply against it; and it would have slight chance of success in conventional warfare even against the relatively modest but more probable threats presented by Malaysia and Indonesia, for the size of Singapore's regular army is far outweighed by Malaysia's 43,000 and Indonesia's 250,000.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For a general discussion of Singapore's security situation see Y.L. Wu, The Military Implications of the Nixon Doctrine in the Pacific Basin, Stanford Research Institution/Strategic Studies Center, SSC-IN-71-101, September 1971, pp. 39-42.

<sup>2</sup> The Military Balance, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971, pp. 50-51.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

To a certain extent, Singapore has acted to safeguard its national security through more or less traditional devices. It has sought to maintain a certain balance of power among the major actors in the region, inviting their (commercial and other) presence in order to assure the usefulness of an independent Singapore to each.<sup>1</sup> Singapore has also remained a member of the Five-Power defense arrangement of the British Commonwealth (Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and the United Kingdom),<sup>2</sup> seeking both the benefits of collective defense and the interposition of three other nations between itself and its potential Malaysian adversary.

But such provisions as these are no convincing guarantee of long-term security. Balances of power can alter for the worse, or even dissolve altogether, and collective defense arrangements hardly have an unbroken record of success. The presence of British military power in the Far East is the mainstay of this security arrangement, and the withdrawal of the last vestiges of that presence, no matter how long delayed, seems inevitable in the long run. Should conflict come, Singapore could well find itself with only its own limited resources to protect its security and independence.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has put forward simultaneously both Singapore's dilemma and the responsive strategic concept in the terms of a cogent analogy: in an ocean of large and medium-sized fish, Singapore is no more than a shrimp. This being so, there is consequently little to be gained by worrying about the threat from the large fish, against which it could do next to nothing. Against medium-sized fish which prey on the smaller ones and on shrimp, however, it must take measures to prevent being swallowed. To accomplish this, Singapore must become a poisonous shrimp, which to swallow would kill such a predator.

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<sup>1</sup> See Y.L. Wu, An Asian Trip Report, Stanford Research Institute/Strategic Studies Center, SSC-IN-71-30, February 1971, p. 7, and Wu, The Military Implications of the Nixon Doctrine in the Pacific Basin, op. cit., p. 40.

<sup>2</sup> See Supplementary Statement on Defense Policy 1970 (HMSO, Cmnd. 4521, October 1970), paras. 7-11.

Thus Lee Kuan Yew announced in 1968, after the United Kingdom's initial decision to withdraw its military forces from east of Suez, that Singapore would act to create an armed force of the citizen-army type.<sup>1</sup> According to this plan, the regular army and its reserves would be maintained and strengthened;<sup>2</sup> and concurrently, the development of a citizen-army (with the assistance of a small group of Israeli military advisors) would be undertaken under the provisions of the National Service Bill of 1967: ultimately, every able-bodied man and woman between the ages of eighteen and forty-five would be trained, for an eventual total strength of some 150,000.<sup>3</sup> Singapore might still be outmatched in military manpower by some potential adversaries, but the cost of conquest would be raised significantly; and the aggressor would be forced to undertake not a short campaign to overwhelm a tiny regular army, but instead a protracted one against a citizenry in arms.

The "poisoned shrimp" strategy, in one form of implementation or another, may be one of the most viable concepts for the defense of small nations. Many such nations will face potential military threats of a dangerous magnitude in the 1970s, regardless of whether these threats may be high or low in intensity. Some nations, as in the case of Israel, may face more than one kind of threat simultaneously. Yet most often these nations are wholly unable to form and maintain the large standing military forces which are seemingly required, because of basic shortages in such areas as manpower and finance. In these cases, the development of a militia-style force which is broadly based throughout the entire population can afford a degree of military strength that is otherwise unattainable, even under the best of circumstances.

While the value and effectiveness of citizen-armies have frequently been questioned, there is nonetheless a significant record of the successful application of the concept by a number of small nations to the problems

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<sup>1</sup> See Frederick Martin Stern, "Militias East of Suez: Filling the Power Vacuum," Orbis, Fall 1968, p. 887.

<sup>2</sup> The Military Balance, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

<sup>3</sup> See Stern, op. cit., pp. 898-899.

of deterrence and defense.<sup>1</sup> The method of application can vary considerably, however, according to the circumstances of military experience, threat, and resources in each case, and it is consequently instructive to examine a number of these cases.

### Sweden

Sweden continues to pursue a long-standing policy of armed neutrality, which, in addition to its usefulness to both sides,<sup>2</sup> successfully allowed it to avoid entering both World Wars:

- We conducted a non-aligned foreign policy before both wars.
- We declared our determination to remain neutral when war had broken out.
- The belligerent powers considered that we had built up a relatively strong national defense which showed that not only had we a wish to observe neutrality but also the ability to maintain this condition. The political gains which a possible aggressor would attain in Sweden did therefore not compensate the disadvantages of having to allocate military resources large enough to crush the Swedish defense forces.

These experiences are still the basis for the philosophy and the framing of our defense policy.<sup>3</sup>

In the view of present Swedish defense policy, the principal military threat is the possibility of being occupied by another power in the event of a major European conflict, not so much for Sweden's intrinsic value to either bloc, but rather because each bloc would wish to deny the other advantages which might be gained from such occupation: particularly control of the North Cap and the Baltic Straits.<sup>4</sup> One mitigating factor in Sweden's favor in such a situation, however, is that neither bloc could likely afford to allocate more than relatively limited resources to such an attempt.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Frederick Martin Stern, The Citizen Army (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1957, pp. 55-151.

<sup>2</sup> See Annette Baker Fox, The Power of Small States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1959, pp. 108-146.

<sup>3</sup> Swedish National Security Policy, Stockholm: Ministry of Defense, Publication Fö no. 5, 1970, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., pp. 3-4.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

Still, Sweden is forced to operate under serious constraints in planning against this contingency. It has the peculiar position of being one of the largest European nations in terms of land area, but has a population of little more than eight million, concentrated primarily in the southern third of the nation. Its gross national product for 1970 is estimated at 31.2 billion dollars.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, it must deal satisfactorily with the task of presenting a defense system which is obviously and sufficiently impressive in quality and quantity to discourage any potential aggressor.

This has been an expensive proposition. Priding itself on maximum independence in defense effort, Sweden has invested heavily in a massive civil defense program,<sup>2</sup> and has developed a diversified indigenous research, development, and production capability for high-technology conventional weaponry.<sup>3</sup> The cost, both direct and indirect, of its defense effort currently runs at about two billion dollars, or about 6.5 percent of GNP.<sup>4</sup> Equally important as a constraint is the severely limited amount of available manpower, which under traditional methods of peacetime military organization would support an army of only very modest size.<sup>5</sup>

To compensate for this disadvantage, Sweden has adopted a system which, in the words of one observer, "represents a compromise between the citizen and the cadre-conscript systems, but may still be called a citizen army."<sup>6</sup> This system, based upon compulsory military service

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<sup>1</sup> The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>2</sup> See Kurt Ek, Civil Defense, Stockholm: Swedish Civil Defense Administration, 1970.

<sup>3</sup> See The Total Defence of Sweden, Stockholm: Swedish Defense Staff, 1970, pp. 12-15, and The Swedish Army, Stockholm: Swedish Army Staff, 1971, pp. 19-28.

<sup>4</sup> For information on Swedish defense expenditures, see Swedish National Security Policy, op. cit., pp. 14-19.

<sup>5</sup> Austria, for example, with a population of 7.5 million, has maintained a regular army of 44,000 men. See The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>6</sup> Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., p. 189.

for all men between the ages of eighteen and forty-seven who are not required for other wartime "total defense" duties, combines periods of traditional training and active service with prolonged periods of ready reserve and territorial defense duty. The result is a constant flow of newly and highly trained men into a substantially reserve army which, according to Swedish claims, is able to mobilize 700,000 troops, or about 9 percent of the entire population, within seventy-two hours after the command in wartime.<sup>1</sup>

While the professional officer and non-commissioned officer corps of the army numbers only about 10,000 men,<sup>2</sup> about 36,500 recruits receive eight to eleven months of basic training each year, eleven to eighteen months in the case of those selected to become officers and NCOs.<sup>3</sup> In completion of serving out the active duty period, in its last month each conscript trains with his assigned reserve field unit, which "in principle" is organized on a local basis, according to a network of almost 2,000 supply dumps scattered throughout six military districts.<sup>4</sup> Thereafter, Swedish soldiers undergo refresher training at regular four-year intervals, with about 100,000 men receiving it any given year.<sup>5</sup>

For the average conscript, the overall system of refresher training consists of five periods in all, during which time at each interval, and thus in every year, the army mobilization arrangements are tested and rehearsed.<sup>6</sup> On each occasion the average conscript receives one to two days of mobilization training and eighteen days of refresher training, with longer periods (up to sixty-six days) for officers and NCOs.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Total Defence of Sweden, op. cit., p. 3. The magnitude of the effort can be seen in a hypothetical equivalent figure of 18,000,000 troops for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> The Swedish Army, op. cit., p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 3, and The Total Defense of Sweden, op. cit., p. 9.

<sup>4</sup> The Total Defence of Sweden, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 9, and The Swedish Army, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> The Swedish Army, op. cit., p. 8.

After two or three intervals in this system, the conscript, at an average age of thirty-five years,<sup>1</sup> is transferred from a reserve field unit to a territorial unit.<sup>2</sup> These relatively lightly-armed territorial units are designed primarily for second-line defense duties and limited assault operations,<sup>3</sup> for which there is some additional retraining.<sup>4</sup>

Complementary to, but part of, the army is a voluntary Home Guard of about 100,000 troops,<sup>5</sup> consisting of men both under and over the normal age-span for military service.<sup>6</sup> Lightly armed, with personal equipment and small arms kept at home, the Home Guard is geared for immediate response to the mobilization order. Its primary mission is to assist and facilitate the mobilization of the wartime army units, and to man static defense installations until mobilization is completed.<sup>7</sup> Thereafter, it has the assignment of guard duty at various kinds of military and civilian sites and installations which are critical to the defense effort.<sup>8</sup>

While the army's peacetime basic training is carried out by over thirty-five regiments maintained in cadre form, the basic wartime field formation is the brigade of about 5,000 men, with the division (three brigades) the highest field formation.<sup>9</sup> Full wartime field strength is

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<sup>1</sup> The Swedish Army, op. cit., p. 16.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>5</sup> The Total Defence of Sweden, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>6</sup> The Swedish Army, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>8</sup> See Col. Albert L. Romaneski, "Sweden and Nordic Balance," Parameters, Fall 1971, p. 63.

<sup>9</sup> The Swedish Army, op. cit., pp. 12, 14-15.

estimated at thirty infantry and ten armored brigades, plus logistic and support units.<sup>1</sup> Army training is designed essentially for conventional land warfare, to halt and then repulse and expel the invading armed forces, though guerrilla warfare operations are anticipated for units which are cut off behind enemy lines.<sup>2</sup>

Mobilization can be carried out on either a step-by-step or a general basis. Its notice, which is conducted through a variety of means in accordance with circumstances and length of warning time, is designed to produce a maximum strength of 600,000 regular (both field and territorial) troops and 100,000 Home Guardsmen within seventy-two hours.<sup>3</sup> According to Swedish claims, within a given military district 4,000 Home Guardsmen will be initially mobilized within "a couple of hours" after the order; 10,000 troops from the territorial units will follow within twenty-four hours; and full reserve field units within seventy-two hours. There is no actual verification of this claim, as some observers have pointed out, since total mobilization could paralyze the national economy and is not practiced in peacetime; but the annual partial mobilization exercises are successful, and the similar Israeli mobilization system is an impressive analogue.<sup>4</sup>

It would be hazardous to attempt to predict the performance of the Swedish army in a hypothetical war against numerous, well-equipped, and highly-trained aggressor forces. The Swedish reserve/mobilization system is designed to provide an army of considerable size for its population base, but it does so at the sacrifice of intensive and frequent training once the conscript has passed out of the initial active service period into the field and territorial units. Whether this army could stand up

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<sup>1</sup> See Romaneski, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>2</sup> See The Swedish Army, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

<sup>3</sup> See The Total Defence of Sweden, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>4</sup> Romaneski, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

to more professional forces equal or superior in size and armament is a question for which a positive general historical argument can be made, but which cannot be supported by specific examples in this case, for Sweden has not been at war for well over a century. Similarly, how long the army could wage war under total mobilization is a moot point.

But that Sweden has been able to avoid involvement in war, particularly World Wars I and II, is itself a mark of the success its defense policy has enjoyed. The overall national commitment to its stance of armed neutrality has long been convincingly evident, and that it is capable of rapidly mobilizing an army of its magnitude and technical quality presents an impressive deterrent to aggression. Even for an opponent of superior capability, the conquest of Sweden in a conventional war would not be a simple undertaking. While this would hold less true against an enemy willing to use nuclear weapons, such use against Sweden is viewed as an improbable contingency;<sup>1</sup> and in any case, Sweden has combined extensive civil defense measures with preparations for conducting military operations in a nuclear environment.<sup>2</sup>

### Switzerland

Switzerland's national defense problem has many features in common with that of Sweden. Switzerland is a small nation with a long-standing policy of armed neutrality, and has successfully avoided involvement in conflict since the Napoleonic period. Like Sweden, it considers involvement during the course of a general European war to be the most probable military threat to Swiss national security and independence.<sup>3</sup> And similarly, in such an event, it would benefit from the circumstance that the aggressor could not afford to allocate more than a relatively limited portion of its resources in an attempt to seize and control Swiss territory.

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<sup>1</sup> Swedish National Security Policy, op. cit., p. 5.

<sup>2</sup> See The Total Defence of Sweden, op. cit., p. 15.

<sup>3</sup> The Swiss National Defense, Bern: Ministry of Defense, April 1971, p. 14.

Unlike Sweden, however, the Swiss conception of the nature of such a war imposes certain additional disadvantages upon the defense of the nation. It is assumed that the enemy forces would enjoy some appreciable margin of general technical superiority in weaponry;<sup>1</sup> and Swiss defense policy anticipates the enemy's attack to be characterized by a combined armored and airborne blitzkrieg operation, facilitated by the use of tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>2</sup>

....In war, the army's mission is to maintain the nation's independence by obstinate and continuous resistance, thereby inflicting maximum losses upon an aggressor. If the strategic situation permits, the army must protect the greatest possible part of the country, or at least hold on to a limited zone. If Switzerland is drawn into a conflict in the near future; it will probably be in a general war where weapons of mass destruction are used or there will be a threat that they will be used.

The principal goal of Swiss national security policy, however, is the prevention of Swiss involvement in such a war in the first place, if at all possible. For a neutral nation like Switzerland, of course, the concept of deterrence does not have the same meaning that it does in the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead of the capability to retaliate in the event of attack, Swiss national security policy defines its goal as "dissuasion", in the sense of restraining the opponent from attacking at all by making the costs of success unacceptable:

The strategy of dissuasion is therefore directed primarily at the psychological influencing of the potential opponents. It seeks to make it clear that nothing would be gained by an attack upon Switzerland, and that the prize would not be worth the cost.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 10-12. The Swedish conception does not deny possible enemy use of nuclear weapons, but deems it less likely than the Swiss conception, which makes it something of an a priori assumption. See Swedish National Security Policy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>4</sup> Gustav Däniker, "Strategie der Sicherheit: Neue Wege schweizerischer Selbstbehauptung," Bulletin of the Swiss Credit Bank, Bern: July 1971, p. 35. See also Bases d'une Conception Stratégique Suisse, Bern: report of the Study Commission on Strategic Questions, 14 November 1969, pp. 17-22, 44-49.

Thus, within the realm of national strategy and security policy as a whole:

The main effort must certainly be directed at that which will make dissuasion successful; first of all, the capability to wage war successfully in the worst of circumstances, and to deny the enemy attaining his operational objectives.<sup>1</sup>

In essence, these goals are the same as those of Swedish defense policy, yet the Swiss national defense effort must operate within even more restrictive constraints. The Swiss population is less than six and a half million people. Its estimated gross national product for 1970 was 20.5 billion dollars, only about two-thirds that of Sweden. While there is less territory to defend, Switzerland nevertheless seeks to do so with a smaller level of expenditure; its defense budget for 1971 was 459 million dollars,<sup>2</sup> or less than 2.5 percent of GNP,<sup>3</sup> compared to the approximately 3.8 percent (for direct expenditures) of GNP spent by Sweden.<sup>4</sup>

These constraints notwithstanding, Switzerland's geographical location could suffice (terrain notwithstanding) to put it in the middle of any major European war, thereby reinforcing the need for large and powerful forces to dissuade any would-be invader. Since it first achieved national independence in the fourteenth century, it has sought to fulfill this need by the development of what is indigenously referred to as a "semistanding army,"<sup>5</sup> which, by means of "a mobilization system of nearly unbelievable efficiency,"<sup>6</sup> can field well over 500,000 troops from twenty-four to forty-eight hours.<sup>7</sup> As in the case of the Swedish system, the Swiss army is

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<sup>1</sup> Däniker, op. cit., p. 36.

<sup>2</sup> See The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>3</sup> See The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 24, which allows that there are also indirect expenditures, but does not estimate a total.

<sup>4</sup> Swedish National Security Policy, op. cit., p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 23.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>7</sup> See The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 25.

based upon compulsory service for all able-bodied men of military age, resulting in "a nearly total absorption of the male population between twenty and fifty in an emergency."<sup>1</sup>

This national military obligation pervades the Swiss citizens' entire way of life.<sup>2</sup> Even prior to conscription, the future Swiss soldiers have already received a certain amount of premilitary training.<sup>3</sup> Each year 15,000 conscripts at the age of twenty enter active military service at the "recruit school," where they receive seventeen weeks of intensive and individualized military instruction and combat training,<sup>4</sup> administered by a regular training cadre of 2,500 officers and NCOs.<sup>5</sup> This is followed in some cases by additional training for specific military specializations or for advancement to NCO or commissioned officer rank.<sup>6</sup>

After the initial period of active military training, the conscripts are assigned to units in the army's first-line reserve (Auszug, or "Elite"), in which they serve about twelve years, through the age of thirty-two.<sup>7</sup> During this period, they participate in eight refresher courses,<sup>8</sup> each three weeks in length.<sup>9</sup> At the age of thirty-three, the conscripts pass into the second-line (static defense units) reserve (Landwehr, or "Territorial Forces") for a period of about ten years,<sup>10</sup> and during this period

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<sup>1</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 17, and Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., p. 160.

<sup>3</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 20, and Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., p. 162.

<sup>5</sup> The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., pp. 160, 168.

<sup>7</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>9</sup> See Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., p. 160, and Swiss Air Force and Antiaircraft Troops, Bern: Ministry of Defense, May 1971, p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 18.

participate in three refresher courses of three weeks each.<sup>1</sup> Finally, at about the age of forty-three, they pass into the army's third-line (lines-of-communication units) reserve (Landsturm, or "General Levy"), where they remain through the age of fifty.<sup>2</sup> During this final eight-year period of service, the number of refresher courses drops to two,<sup>3</sup> each for a duration of two weeks.<sup>4</sup>

As a whole, the Swiss refresher courses system is more intensive than that of Sweden. Under this system, Swiss army enlisted ranks and NCOs serve over a total period of thirty years; officers up to the rank of lieutenant colonel serve for thirty-five years, with a disproportionately greater amount of time spent on active duty, while a colonel (the highest peacetime rank) may serve as many as forty-five years.<sup>5</sup> Though the action is seldom required, the army has the authority to order any soldier to accept promotion, with the accompanying additional time that must be devoted to training and active service.<sup>6</sup>

That approximately 530,000 well-equipped troops can be mobilized within forty-eight hours of the order is a tribute to Switzerland's mobilization system, which is facilitated by each soldier maintaining his personal equipment and arms at home, and by prearranged unit assembly areas with prepositioned equipment and weaponry.<sup>7</sup> In wartime, mobilization would be directed by a field organization based upon four corps of three divisions each: one corps of three mountain divisions for the defense of the Alps, and three corps of one armored and two infantry divisions each for the defense of the Swiss plain; supplementing these formations are seventeen frontier, fortress, and "redoubt" brigades, and forty-eight artillery battalions.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 20.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>4</sup> See Swiss Air Force and Antiaircraft Troops, op. cit., p. 2.

<sup>5</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> See Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., 167.

<sup>7</sup> The Swiss National Defense, op. cit., p. 22.

<sup>8</sup> The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 25.

The Swiss army has long enjoyed a high reputation, and the size and quality of its rapid-mobilization militia-type force has permitted it to maintain its neutrality through World Wars I and II, despite its central location in a major theater of war. To no combatant in these wars did the difficulty of invading and occupying Switzerland appear to justify the high costs that would be unavoidable, if indeed the resources which would be required for the task were at all available. This latter point, that in any major European war no combatant could afford to allocate more than a relatively limited effort to the task, is an important one, but it has been operative largely because of the dimensions of Swiss national defense. It is not one that spared the wealthy and more populous, but far less prepared, neutral nation of the Netherlands in 1940.

Certainly in a nuclear environment the present Swiss army could be put at a grave disadvantage. Even in anticipation of an enemy armed with tactical nuclear weapons, Swiss military organization and training is designed for a conventional defense more or less traditional in nature, though modified to minimize the effects of such weapons and the advantages accruing to their use.<sup>1</sup> How viable such a defense would be is a moot point, given the many unknowns involved in tactical nuclear warfare. However, the possibility of similarly equipping the Swiss army remains: while the recent report of the Study Commission on Strategic Questions viewed strategic nuclear weapons as inappropriate for a neutral nation, it recommended that the option to acquire tactical nuclear weapons be maintained, in light of their potential defensive utility.<sup>2</sup>

#### South Korea

Both Sweden and Switzerland are small neutral nations which, largely by virtue of their high degree of constant military preparedness, have been successful in their intention to avoid involvement in European war. Other small nations, on the other hand, have been considerably less

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<sup>1</sup> See The Swiss National Defence, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

<sup>2</sup> See Bases d'une Conception Stratégique Suisse, op. cit., pp. 97-107.

fortunate, and will continue to be, so long as they remain the particular targets of aggression. But there are others which have been equally unable to avoid conflict, and yet were able to cope with the threat successfully. One recent example of the latter is the Republic of Korea, against which the North Korean "porous war" strategy has previously been mentioned, but whose response to this threat deserves some examination.

As discussed, North Korea's implementation of its objectives was attempted through the use of groups of trained infiltrators. The program began in early 1965, when the number of North Korean provinces was increased from seven to the South Korean number of nine; and in each a center was established, initially to train 500 agents, emphasizing at that time the development of a political infrastructure that could be transplanted inside the Republic of Korea. Eventually, however, the total number of agents reached some 20,000 men, whose training and missions in the South ranged from intelligence collection to active commando operations.

The active infiltration program began in October 1966, and at that time took two forms: intelligence missions deep in the interior of South Korea, and hunter/killer operations in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that were designed to provoke South Korean retaliation. About thirty-five firefights had occurred by the end of the year, and certain, more or less passive, anti-infiltration measures were taken along the DMZ by the South Korean and American authorities. In 1967, however, the North Korean program gained momentum, and about 250 firefights took place, approximately half along the DMZ and half deep in the South Korean interior. While such missions as intelligence collections continued, there was also intensified activity by agents trained as commandos, of which about 5,000 were available to be employed in this manner.

The level of North Korean activity reached its peak during 1968, which saw about 350 firefights. The organization of the infiltration groups had increasingly taken on a military cast, and the objective by this point in time appears to have been the commencement of large-scale guerrilla warfare operations: notable were terrorist activities in the Taebek and

Chiri-sam mountain areas, and the "Blue House raid" in Seoul, in which a commando team of thirty-one agents undertook an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Park. During 1968, however, two events occurred which began to spell ruin for the North Korean program. One was the seizure of the USS Pueblo, which acted to create North Korean apprehension of and preparations for war with the United States, with at least a resultant short-term disruption of the infiltration program.

More important, however, was the establishment of the Republic of Korea's Home Defense Militia, which was conceived at about this time.<sup>1</sup> In six months, about 60,000 units had been created in villages, industrial plants, and cities, for a total strength of somewhat over 2,000,000 men, of whom approximately 95 percent were ex-servicemen. Training of the militiamen was originally planned to be one weekend per month, but soon became every Sunday, largely due, it would seem, to President Park's enthusiasm for the program. One major shortcoming that took some time to overcome, however, was that of equipment: there was a severe shortage of rifles, for example, with only one per five to ten men available for some time.

While the training of the militia was conducted by the South Korean army, the organization was kept independent of the army's reserve system,<sup>2</sup> and was placed under the operational control of the local National Police headquarters and the governors of the nine provinces. Weapons and other

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<sup>1</sup> North Korea has its own highly-trained and well-equipped militia, organized in villages, towns, industrial plants, and government agencies, with a claimed strength of 1,250,000 men. While such a force could serve in a function similar to its ROK counterpart, it could also serve as a large pool of manpower easily absorbable into the regular army, in which each soldier is supposed to be trained to take responsibility for the next two echelons higher.

<sup>2</sup> For comments on the ROK Army's reserve, see General Hamilton H. Howze, "Toward Real Reserve Readiness: The Case for the Cadre System," Army, August 1972, pp. 14-15.

equipment were kept stockpiled in readiness at local administrative centers, and a system of cooperation between the militia, the regular forces, and the coastwatcher force was organized.

The success of the program soon became apparent in 1969, during which year the number of firefights declined to about ninety. The casualty rate of the North Korean infiltrators reached approximately 75 percent during this period, largely through the cooperation of the civilian population, whose alertness was sharpened by a cash bonus system for the detection and apprehension of the infiltrators. During the following year the number of firefights declined further to about twenty. It was obvious that the North Korean program had failed; and had, in fact, contributed to a purge which included the removal of the North Korean defense minister.

By the early 1970s, however, the admitted decline of an obvious threat had brought the future of the Home Defense Militia into question. Contributing to the problem has been criticism directed at the frequency of the militia's weekly training schedule, which has become an irritation in a period of low conflict activity and incipient movement toward a detente. One possible alternative for the militia that has been considered is the idea of cooperation with the regular army's second-line reserves in the event of a conventional attack, in order to create a "depth in reverse" effect for sabotage, raids, and guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. Whatever may become of this proposal, it is highly unlikely that the militia will be abandoned, but instead will be modified to cope with other forms of potential conflict.

### Israel

Since its creation in 1947, the state of Israel has been a small nation threatened by considerably larger and implacable enemies. Among the Arab states, Egypt and Syria alone have a combined population of over 40.3 million people, gross national products totaling 7.89 billion dollars, defense budgets totaling over 1.67 billion dollars, and an aggregate army strength of 375,000 troops.<sup>1</sup> Nor is this the whole of the

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<sup>1</sup> The Military Balance, op. cit., pp. 28-32.

possible threat: Iraq remains a potential adversary, the future of Jordan's course is uncertain, and various other Arab governments make at least a financial contribution to the effort. While Israel also receives both government and non-government aid from abroad, in the final analysis it can depend only upon its own resources in what at any time could become a war for simple survival.

Yet its national resources are severely limited. While Israel is an industrialized nation, with a vigorous economy that maintains an impressive gross national product estimated at some 5.4 billion dollars, its national security problems place a great burden upon its overall national strength. Its current defense budget is almost 1.5 billion dollars, over 27 percent of GNP, and total expenditures for national security measures may actually be somewhat higher. Israel has developed a sizeable indigenous military industry, which perforce competes with the non-defense sectors of the economy for scarce resources. The geography of the region imposes its own constraints: the scant land area of Israel permits no depth for strategic defense and maneuver, and the short time-and-distance relationship to its adversaries demands large forces to prevent loss of territory even in the event of surprise attack.<sup>1</sup>

Yet Israel's principal shortage, one that combines with the other constraints to condition Israeli military organization and doctrine, is manpower. Its population is only some 3,040,000 people, a figure which includes an Arab minority unavailable to the Israeli military planner. With such a small population base, particularly in comparison to those of its adversaries, Israel would be quite unable to develop with traditional methods armed forces of sufficient size to cope with the threats, especially since it must be prepared to fight on several fronts simultaneously. Should it attempt to do so, moreover, the national economy could not long survive the manpower drain.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> See Irving Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, Research Analysis Corporation, 1970, pp. 15, 20-21.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 31.

Under these circumstances, the Israeli national leadership, political and military, has always been faced with the requirement of devising a system which will devote the great bulk of the population to the needs of the national economy in peacetime, while allowing the mobilization of great numbers of well-equipped and highly-trained troops in a minimum of time, should war appear imminent. J. C. Hurewitz has observed that:

Israel found its primary answer in a citizen army. The structure of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is more typical of Europe than of the Middle East, and among the European armies the IDF, particularly in the organization of the reserves, most closely resembles the citizen army of Switzerland, after which it was originally patterned.<sup>1</sup>

The Israeli army maintains some 12,000 regular and 50,000 conscript troops, organized in one parachute, four armored, and four infantry brigades. With its training and reserve system, however, it has the demonstrated capability to mobilize some 300,000 troops in twenty-three brigades,<sup>2</sup> within twenty-four to forty-eight hours.<sup>3</sup> "Israel would never have been able," according to the Israeli view, "to maintain her development and at the same time stand up to the Arab armies if it were not for this reserve system."<sup>4</sup>

Like that of Switzerland, Israel's army system is based upon the principle of universal military service. Because of the lesser resources and the greater immediate threat, however, the demand upon the population

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<sup>1</sup> J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Frederick A. Praeger), 1969, pp. 364-365.

<sup>2</sup> The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 29.

<sup>3</sup> Maj. Gen. R. L. Shoemaker, "The Arab-Israeli War," Military Review, August 1968, p. 68.

<sup>4</sup> Shimon Peres, David's Sling (New York: Random House), 1970, pp. 21-22.

is considerably higher.<sup>1</sup> About ninety percent of all eligible men and fifty percent of all eligible women are inducted, beginning at the age of eighteen.<sup>2</sup> The men, who fill the combat roles in the Israel army, are liable for thirty-six months of active duty in the Regular Service,<sup>3</sup> receiving intensive professional training which emphasizes basic military skills from the cadre of about 4,500 career officers and 7,500 non-commissioned officers who make up the Permanent Service.<sup>4</sup>

After initial training, and when not engaged in maneuvers, the standing forces serve a number of functions: administration, development of doctrine and tactics, provision of the organizational and logistic structure for the reserves, and border security.<sup>5</sup> A large part of the last-mentioned responsibility has been borne by a paramilitary force of about 10,000 armed civilians in settlements along the borders, whose mission, in coordination with the regular armed forces (primarily second-line units), is to defend against and contain ground attacks.<sup>6</sup> Since the 1967 war, this kind of army duty has also included occupation service in the occupied areas of the Sinai and the west bank of the Jordan, and increased security measures against Arab terrorists, a responsibility which has expanded the role of the women in the Israeli army.

Upon completion of their terms in the Regular Service, the conscripts are transferred into the Reserve Service, composed of all able-bodied

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<sup>1</sup> See Stern, The Citizen Army, op. cit., pp. 190-191.

<sup>2</sup> Irving Heymont, "The Israeli Career Officer Corps," Military Review, October 1968, p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> Shoemaker, op. cit., p. 66, and Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 365, 366. The pre-1967 figure was thirty months.

<sup>4</sup> See Shoemaker, op. cit., p. 67, and Heymont, "The Israeli Career Officer Corps," op. cit., p. 14.

<sup>5</sup> Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 365-366, and Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, op. cit., p. 25.

<sup>6</sup> Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, op. cit., pp. 31-33, and The Military Balance, op. cit., p. 29. See also Leo Heiman, "Israel's Nahal Corps," Military Review, July 1967, pp. 65-70, and Peres, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

men under the age of forty-five.<sup>1</sup> Each reservist spends one day per month (preferably, three consecutive days every three months) in short refresher courses on weapons training and field tactics.<sup>2</sup> In addition, reservists through the age of thirty-nine spend one entire month, and reservists between forty and forty-four, two weeks, in intensive field training under simulated combat conditions,<sup>3</sup> with an additional one to two weeks service for reserve officers. Rather than being obligated one month per year, however, the spirit of service is such that, "in Israeli terminology, about 80 percent of their army units are on furlough eleven months a year."<sup>4</sup>

Israel's hope for victory in war rests largely in the ability to respond rapidly to threats, and the mobilization arrangements for the reserve forces have been accordingly designed for efficiency and speed. Hurewitz has noted that in the Sinai campaign of 1956, the Israeli army was able to mobilize five reserve brigades in addition to three standing conscript brigades within seventy-two hours.<sup>5</sup> Since that campaign, the system has been further improved to permit the reserve forces to be fielded in forty-eight hours or less. Organized on a geographically distributed basis, the army's brigades and their personnel continue in being whether on active or reserve status. In the latter case, small professional cadres are nonetheless maintained on a full-time basis,

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<sup>1</sup> Men between forty-five and fifty-five receive two week's training per year for civil service duties.

<sup>2</sup> Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, op. cit., p. 29, and Shoemaker, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, op. cit., pp. 30, 46, and Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 370.

<sup>5</sup> Shoemaker, op. cit., p. 66.

providing the basic structure for administrative and maintenance functions;<sup>1</sup> and reservists bear a continual responsibility for the care of their arms and equipment, which are kept stocked and available in local depots.<sup>2</sup> The result is an ability to respond fully to mobilization orders in a minimum of time, and in a combat readiness and familiarity with roles and means that is perhaps unsurpassed.<sup>3</sup>

The concept of the citizen-army has extensive roots in the history of Israel, both before and after the Diaspora.<sup>4</sup> Yet it differs from those of the other nations which have been discussed. Most dramatic is its offensive strategy: The doctrinal emphasis upon a short war waged in rapid, often pre-emptive, blitzkrieg campaigns,<sup>5</sup> according to the dictates of economics, geography, and demography. Nor is it based, as it might appear, upon a national homogeneity. While the state of Israel is founded upon a common basic religious bond, there is, nonetheless, considerable heterogeneity among the population. Economic, social, and cultural conflicts between native-born and immigrants, between "European" Jews and "Oriental" Jews, exist in plenty. It is, in fact, one objective of the Israeli armed forces to assist in the development of a unified nation by working to overcome these differences.<sup>6</sup>

Much of this diversity and heterogeneity of personal experience and thought in Israel is expressed in its numerous and sharp political

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<sup>1</sup> Heymont, The Israel Defense Forces, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>3</sup> See Jac Weller, "Israeli Armor: Lessons from the Six-Day War," Military Review, November 1971, pp. 44-50.

<sup>4</sup> See Heymont, The Israeli Defence Forces, op. cit., pp. 2-15.

<sup>5</sup> See Ch. 9, "The Sinai Campaigns", pp. 166-184, of White et al., Alternative to Armageddon, op. cit., and Peter Young, The Israeli Campaign 1967 (London: William Kimber), 1967.

<sup>6</sup> Heymont, The Israel Defence Forces, op. cit., pp. 24-25. See also Peres, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

divisions. Nonetheless, despite all these differences, which in some nations might prevent the functioning of an army drawn from throughout the entire population, there is a quite homogeneous position on national defense. The constant existence of a high-profile threat--political, economic, and military--and the intense Israeli determination to survive and prosper, have always been sufficient to override the usual tendencies toward fragmentation. It is this underlying and solid foundation of national will that has made it possible for the Israeli defense system to succeed.

#### IV THE YUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF GENERAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE

As an independent multinational communist state possessing an important geopolitical position in Eastern Europe, with implications for the Mediterranean, Yugoslavia's status has always been somewhat anomalous since its initial break with the Soviet Union in 1948. In order to establish its security, it developed four basic principles for its international policy, from which Yugoslav military policy is subsequently derived. The first, which is most fundamental and establishes the foundation for the others, is an insistence upon national sovereignty. Second, if Yugoslavia is to preserve its political independence and national sovereignty, membership in any political-military bloc must be denied. Third, in order to assure its freedom from the kinds of coercion that could be applied within or by a bloc, Yugoslavia espouses the principle of international political nonalignment. And fourth, Yugoslavia pursues the principle of assuming a nonaggressive or nonprovocatory military stance.

Principles, of course, are seldom sufficient in themselves to assure national security. The kinds of potential military threats to Yugoslavia encompass a fair range. At one extreme is "that the two superpowers, analogous to what happened in other areas, reach an understanding under specific conditions to divide our territory on a fifty-fifty basis or on a similar principle, in accordance with the provisions of the Yalta agreement reached toward the end of the last war."<sup>1</sup> It has not been seriously advanced, however, that this kind of threat is very probable. Nor is the possible threat at the other end of the spectrum, that of an attack by a neighbor which results in a local war limited in size and

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<sup>1</sup> Col. Gen. Savo Drljević, "The Role of Geo-Political, Socio-Economic, and Military-Strategic Factors," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, Belgrade, 1970, p. 205.

scope. Even should it occur, it is presumed, the level of conflict should be sufficiently low to be managed by the Yugoslav operational army.

Between these two extremes, however, lies one possible military threat that presents a very real danger to Yugoslavia:

The situation is altogether different as regards the possibility or probability of an aggression by one or the other bloc, as a whole, i.e., an aggression involving the main power too. Such an act of aggression, regardless of which of the two blocs were involved, would inevitably be aimed not only at occupying our territory but primarily at changing the character of our social system.<sup>1</sup>

While Yugoslav spokesmen deny that Yugoslav military policy and defense strategy is directed toward any one particular opponent,<sup>2</sup> it is nonetheless clear that the Soviet Union is the most likely adversary in the event that such a war occurred. Soviet policy toward the communist nations of Eastern Europe, as expressed by the 1956 invasion of Hungary and, more recently, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, has become known in the West as the "theory of limited sovereignty"; its fundamental premise is that "the sovereignty of individual nations cannot be sustained against the interests of world socialism and the world revolutionary movement."<sup>3</sup> An order of international relations between socialist states, different from that existing between socialist and non-socialist states, is posited not only to exist, but also to provide for measures to enforce conformity, regardless of whether the change comes from internal and external sources. In

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<sup>1</sup> Ibid., pp. 209.

<sup>2</sup> For example, see Andro Gabelić's reaction to Western press reports that the "Freedom '71" maneuvers were directed against hypothetical Soviet forces, in "The Armed People in Defense of Liberty," Review of International Affairs, 20 October 1971, pp. 22-24.

<sup>3</sup> Sergei Kovyalev, "Sovereignty and International Responsibilities of Socialist Nations," Pravda, 26 September 1968, p. 4. Others are Gromyko's defense of the intervention at the United Nations, October 1968, and Brezhnev's address to the Polish Communist Party Congress, November 1968.

operational terms, then, the Soviet Union's fear in 1968 that Czechoslovakia, if left to itself, might opt to leave the bloc framework, resulted in a massive Soviet intervention to replace the Dubček government.

In those cases where the Soviet Union has intervened in the affairs of European nations, Soviet purposes have been essentially political: to crush any resistance that might occur, as happened in the case of Hungary, and to replace the erring indigenous government with another more responsive to Soviet policy and wishes. In these invasions the Soviet Union placed particular emphasis on the rapidity and decisiveness of the achievement of its objectives. Soviet strategy in Hungary and Czechoslovakia subsequently employed the style of blitzkrieg, and it is this kind of threat that Yugoslavia perceives as most likely and most dangerous,<sup>1</sup> for it is obvious to the Yugoslav political and military leadership alike that in a conventional conflict, the Soviet Union would hold most of the advantages. Yugoslavia would be wholly unable to match the kind of force, quantitatively and qualitatively, that the Soviet Union could throw into a blitzkrieg operation; and to employ the operational army in a conventional form of resistance would in all probability result in a fairly rapid defeat:

This would be the worst kind of aggression but, to my mind, the only one to be realistically reckoned with. It is logical that we cannot build up an operational army, however large and well-equipped it may be, with which to repulse such an aggression. The only way of effectively counteracting this kind of aggression would be through the resistance of the whole armed people.<sup>2</sup>

The essence of the Yugoslav response has therefore been to direct its efforts not at the defeat of Soviet armed forces per se, but instead at the defeat of Soviet strategy itself. The Yugoslavs perceive certain key points in the Soviet strategy as weak ones which can be turned to their

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<sup>1</sup> For a detailed operational description of such a blitzkrieg attack on Yugoslavia, see Maj. Gen. Mirko Vranić, "The Strategic Employment of the Armed Forces in a General People's Defensive War," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., pp. 241-242.

<sup>2</sup> Drljević, op. cit., p. 210. Emphasis added.

advantage. Chief among them is the Soviet desire to accomplish its political objectives through military means rapidly and decisively, in order to avoid a protracted conflict situation with unforeseen but detrimental consequences, and to present a fait accompli to any outside powers supporting Yugoslavia's independence and political self-determination. If the capability to accomplish this can be denied to the Soviet Union, according to Yugoslav political-military thinking, then a powerful deterrent to such armed intervention would be created:

It is safe to say that a potential aggressor, no matter what his intentions, would not easily decide to infringe upon the freedom and independence of a country if he knew that such a country would put up tenacious resistance and involve him in a long and exhausting war, also inevitably entangling him in a staggering burden of international complications.<sup>1</sup>

Should the Soviet Union be unable to achieve a rapid victory, the consequent result would be an international political-military crisis not of its choosing. The Soviet choice, at that point, would be either to come to terms with the Yugoslav leadership, or to continue a long and bitter war in an obvious attempt to crush a resistant people in open aggression. Either course could be a political defeat for the Soviet Union, with unforeseeable repercussions not only in Western Europe and the NATO alliance, but among the Eastern European members of the Soviet bloc as well. But to impress the Soviet Union with the likelihood of such a result in the event of an attack, a means to frustrate its military strategy is required:

Understandably, an essential prerequisite for activating international factors is the organization and ability of internal forces to offer uncompromising resistance to pressure and aggression. This is an indispensable premise. The effectiveness of internal resistance may find expression in two ways: first, in preventing initial "blitz" strategic penetration by the aggressor and second, by transforming brief war operations into a long-lasting people's war if the situation so requires. The first is essential in order to prevent strategic surprise and the policy of the "fait accompli," and the second to offset the technical superiority which the aggressor has regularly enjoyed in people's wars so far.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Andro Gabelić, "The Universal Substance of General People's Defense," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> Col. Gen. Danilo Lekić, introduction to The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., p. 10.

Thus the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held in Spring 1969, reported that Yugoslav defense structure must "make our country an unconquerable fortress for the enemy," so that "under such conditions, the aggressor would entangle himself in a prolonged, exhausting war, fraught with uncertainties, without any realistic outlook for achieving his goals."<sup>1</sup>

Up to the time of this revision of its military policy, Yugoslavia's ground forces had consisted of its operational army of some 195,000 troops. Developed along more or less orthodox lines of military organization, it is comprised of nine infantry divisions, fourteen armored brigades, thirty-one independent infantry brigades, one airborne brigade, and one marine infantry brigade.<sup>2</sup> The operational army constitutes Yugoslavia's maneuverable and high-firepower strike force; and while the great emphasis of Yugoslav defense effort in the event of invasion is henceforth to be given<sup>3</sup> to the territorial defense force, the operational army nonetheless continues to be regarded as

the backbone, the principal component of national defense. It alone is capable, in terms of its weapons, technical equipment, power, mobility, organization and trained cadres, to wage regular fronted battles--in all forms of operations.<sup>3</sup>

Yugoslavia's territorial defense force, on the other hand, is another variation upon the theme of the citizen-army: "the territorial army should embrace the entire able-bodied population, i.e., that section of it that is not earmarked for the operational army."<sup>4</sup> Its units are dispersed

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<sup>1</sup> Report by Josip Tito, Ninth Congress of the LCY, quoted in Col. Drago Nikolic's, "The League of Communists of Yugoslavia and General People's Defense," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>2</sup> The Military Balance, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1971, p. 25. See also "Yugoslav Defense," Military Review, October 1971, p. 31.

<sup>3</sup> Lt. Col. Jovan Radovanović, "The Operational Army," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., p. 271.

<sup>4</sup> Drljevic, op. cit., p. 210.

throughout the whole of Yugoslavia, with individual units formed out of labor organizations and local communities, and varying in size accordingly from platoons up to battalions and brigades. Equipped with small arms and light anti-armor weapons, the territorial defense units are trained to conduct the kind of partisan warfare in which Yugoslavia excelled in World War II. Over 600,000 men have so far been organized and trained, with the intent of eventually attaining an overall force strength of some 3,000,000 troops.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, it seeks to do this without adversely affecting Yugoslavia's economic development:

Members of territorial defense units have a twofold status: they work at their jobs...while at the same time they are organized into military units which can act at a moment's notice....Every able-bodied man is trained and organized in armed formations, without losing his status as a producer (worker in production)...<sup>2</sup>

In a local war, in which Yugoslavia would be attacked by a neighbor of more or less equivalent military strength, the operational army would wage a conventional defense to halt the assault, and then counterattack to expel the enemy, with the territorial defense force serving as a source of continual reinforcement.<sup>3</sup> In the event of an attack by the Soviet Union, however, the strategic requirement imposed upon Yugoslavia by the disparity of forces would be radically different:

From this strategic estimate that it would be impossible for our operational army, alone, to oppose successfully and on a long-term basis a much larger and better equipped army, we concluded that we would have to search for a new quality which by its essence and forms would neutralize the opponent's numerical and technical supremacy.<sup>4</sup>

To offer an entrenched conventional defense by the operational army against a more numerous and powerful massed force is therefore to be avoided, for such tactics risk the rapid loss of the operational army in a series of quick and intense battles, in which the mobility and firepower factors would favor the attacker.

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<sup>1</sup> See Stille Brown, European Security 1972-1980, London: Royal United Services Institution, April 1972, p. 53.

<sup>2</sup> Col. Vuko Gozze-Gučetić, "Fundamental Premises of the National Defense Law," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., pp. 259-260.

<sup>3</sup> Drljević, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 215.

Instead, during the initial phase of the war, short-term frontal defensive operations by the operational army would be designed to accomplish two basic objectives. First, the defensive operations conducted along the main invasion routes would serve as a delaying action essential to the Yugoslav strategy: "...it must gain time (however short it may be) and create conditions permitting the whole people to get ready for resistance and particularly for ensuring the necessary degree of combat readiness of the elements of territorial defense."<sup>1</sup> Second, by preventing rapid and deep incursions into Yugoslav territory, while maintaining the operational army's basic integrity, a fait accompli by the enemy will be prevented, either through an outright victory, or by an attainment of specific political-military objectives that would allow them to impose terms successfully.<sup>2</sup>

Consequently, the attacking forces would be met with early resistance intended to slow and delay the assault, in order to allow mobilization: "the aggressor's first and main blow will be absorbed by the 'A' echelon whose flexible, mobile but nonetheless sufficiently persevering defense should give the rest of the armed forces time to mobilize and the nation the possibility of shifting more easily to wartime conditions."<sup>3</sup> This phase is one of the most sensitive of the war, for while the enemy must be prevented from penetrating rapidly, the loss of major portions of the operational army must be avoided. Consequently, fixed defensive operations designed to control certain border areas must be avoided: "...the armed forces should not be allowed to be drawn into decisive confrontation for the purpose of defending certain areas, as they could easily be destroyed this way, and the area in question would be lost."<sup>4</sup> This is particularly the case in the plains of northern and northeastern Yugoslavia, where the terrain favors an attacker's high-firepower and high-mobility maneuver forces.<sup>5</sup> Instead, the principal defense effort by the bulk of the operational army and the territorial forces is to take place in the mountainous

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<sup>1</sup> Drljević, op. cit., p. 211.

<sup>2</sup> Maj. Gen. Dusan Dozet, "The Social Basis of General People's Defense," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Radovanović, op. cit., p. 274.

<sup>4</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 252.

<sup>5</sup> Radovanović, op. cit., p. 274.

regions of central Yugoslavia, the site of most of the partisan warfare against the Germans in World War II, where the terrain is more suitable for defensive operations by small units against large forces.<sup>1</sup>

Once the Yugoslav territorial forces have mobilized during the initial period of the war, implementation of the basic strategic concept of general people's defense begins: "that a lightning war can by suitable action be turned into a protracted one, into a war of attrition (against) the overwhelming forces of the aggressor."<sup>2</sup> Large-scale conventional warfare would be transformed into protracted partisan warfare, and simultaneously the operational army would transform itself into lighter units which would themselves conduct partisan operations in coordination with the territorial defense forces.<sup>3</sup> According to this strategy, the difference between the front and the rear would be erased, to the great disadvantage of the attacker:

...there can be no question of a certain and more or less continual front line, but only of a broken one. The attacker would frequently find himself not knowing where the front and where the rear is, not being able to decide where to direct his main forces, whether to the front or the rear. Practically, this would mean that he would be involved in operations in which his technical superiority and firing power would not be as effective as they would otherwise be.<sup>4</sup>

One responsibility of the operational army during the protracted period of the war will be to ensure that within the central region of Yugoslavia there remains certain areas of free territory, to serve as a base of operations. While maintaining this territorial integrity will necessarily require frontal operations,<sup>5</sup> at this point in the war a number of factors will presumably work in favor of the Yugoslav defense:

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<sup>1</sup> Radovanović, op. cit., p. 275, and Vranić, op. cit., p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> Dozet, op. cit., p. 77.

<sup>3</sup> Drljević, op. cit., p. 213, and Radovanović, op. cit., p. 275.

<sup>4</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 243, 245.

<sup>5</sup> Dozet, op. cit., p. 82.

...In view of the enemy's weaknesses (e.g., external lines of communication) and the advantages of the domestic forces deriving from the twofold structure of the armed forces, the character of the land, the factor of morale and the application of all forms and ways of resistance, it would be possible even in case of the worse variants of war to maintain on a lasting basis the continuity of the most important part of the state's territory.<sup>1</sup>

While the operational army would seek to avoid significant losses in peace-meal fashion, "frequent movements and maneuvers, offensive operations along the flanks, wings and in the rear, would facilitate striking at and destroying the aggressor, prevent him from penetrating further and weaken his power to attack generally."<sup>2</sup> For the most part, however, the role of the operational army during the protracted period of war is the engagement of mobile and high-firepower units in frontal-type operations, in order to create the most suitable environment for an effective partisan campaign:

...the army continues to be the major component in the further course of the war in taking frontal action along the principal lines of both defense and attack, which is an important condition for successful operations of other armed units--in the opponent's rear, in one's own rear and in a specific way at the front itself. The operational army is intended for concentrated action along the principal lines and its mobility enables it to use its striking power at any place throughout Yugoslav territory.<sup>3</sup>

According to Yugoslav military theory, the most desirable form of warfare to be executed for the national defense would be characterized by simultaneous and coordinated use of both the frontal and partisan styles of operations;<sup>4</sup> for in Yugoslav military theory, at least in a declaratory sense, "the frontal and partisan forms of waging war are two equal components with an equal strategic significance and role."<sup>5</sup> Offensive attacks or defensive operations by the operational army, it is expected, will reach brigade or even higher levels of armored, mechanized,

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<sup>1</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> Radovanović, op. cit., 275.

<sup>3</sup> Dozet, op. cit., pp. 82-83.

<sup>4</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 245.

and infantry forces, over areas of appreciable size.<sup>1</sup> Whenever such battles take place, there will also be large numbers of territorial defense forces, reaching at least into the thousands, the exact number depending upon the area's population. In these battles, the territorial forces will always have some combat role against the enemy forces. Some units may engage in frontal-type operations, especially in defense of towns and settlements.<sup>2</sup> Other units will undertake partisan attacks on the enemy's flanks and in his rear areas, possibly in conjunction with operational army units.<sup>3</sup> Even if the operational army's units in question are forced to fight a defensive action, the territorial forces will undertake offensive attacks in the rear.<sup>4</sup>

Nonetheless, in doctrinal writings the partisan mode of warfare has so far been given somewhat greater emphasis, the exact extent depending primarily upon the degree of enemy superiority: the greater the disparity of strength, the greater the predominance of partisan operations.<sup>5</sup> And while units of the operational army may be engaged in such operations,<sup>6</sup> particularly units which "find themselves" in the enemy's rear areas,<sup>7</sup> partisan warfare is particularly the province of the territorial forces:

Naturally, the basic mode of waging war by territorial units is the partisan mode. In other words, this means not pitting one's forces against a technically and numerically superior enemy, but rather mounting swift surprise attacks and ambushes, operating against sensitive and insufficiently protected units, hqs and targets of the aggressor. This also means imposing on the enemy forms of fighting that he does not expect and for which he is not ready. A multitude of individual and relatively small-scale actions by the territorial units have, in their totality, a tremendous impact.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Lt. Gen. Milojica Pantelić, "Territorial Defense," in The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, op. cit., pp. 279-280.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 279.

<sup>3</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 252.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 247.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Dozet, op. cit., p. 83.

<sup>7</sup> Radovanović, op. cit., p. 275.

<sup>8</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 250.

The Yugoslavs practiced the art of partisan warfare for over three years against the Germans in World War II, and it is instructive to note the observations of Fitzroy Maclean, chief of the British Military Mission to Tito during that period:

The war waged by the Partisans was a strange one. There was no fixed front. Fighting for the most part with small arms only and limited stocks of ammunition, against a well-trained, well-equipped, well-supplied and motorized enemy, supported by armor, artillery and aircraft, it was necessary for them to avoid pitched battles in which they would inevitably have come off worst. If they were to succeed, it was essential that they should retain the initiative themselves, and not allow it to pass into the hands of their opponents. Their aim must be to attack the enemy where he presented the richest target, where he was weakest, and, above all, where he least expected it. It was equally important that, having attained their purpose, they should not linger but should fade once again into the background of hills and woods where pursuit could not reach them. This necessitated a high degree of mobility. Their human resources, like their material resources, were precious. Any engagement in which enemy losses did not outnumber their own losses by at least five to one the Partisans reckoned a defeat.

Long before the Allies, the Germans and Italians came to realize that the Partisans constituted a military factor of first-rate importance against which a modern army was in many respects powerless. In the course of three years they launched against them no less than several full-scale offensives, each employing upwards of ten divisions with supporting arms. Once or twice large forces of Partisans came near to being surrounded and wiped out. Enemy aircraft, against which they had no protection whatever, played an important part, seeking out their positions and pinning them down while additional land forces were brought up to deal with them. But, each time they succeeded in extricating themselves, fading away, reappearing elsewhere and attacking the enemy where he least expected it. During each of these offensives, the extensive troop movements involved exposed the enemy more than ever to the attacks and ambushes of the Partisans. Thus these offensives failed in their object, and the Partisans, though tired, hungry and poorly equipped, continued their resistance undismayed. Meanwhile, the Germans, with an elusive enemy, with unreliable allies and without enough troops of their own to occupy the country effectively could do little more than garrison the large towns and try to guard the lines of communication between them. And merely to do this, they were using a dozen or more precious divisions...<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches, (New York: Time Inc.), 1964, pp. 338-340.

While the Yugoslav military planners are cognizant of the differences in situation between World War II and the present,<sup>1</sup> there are particularly three lessons drawn from the historical record which are viewed as constant factors: (1) that while the amount of manpower which the aggressor can devote is more or less fixed, the defense can draw upon the greater resources of the entire nation; (2) that while the aggressor may enjoy marked superiority in material factors, the resultant advantages can be neutralized by various forms of unconventional opposition; and, (3) that the aggressor's advantages in speed, in terms of time and space, will nevertheless be insufficient to exert complete control over the occupied territory and population.<sup>2</sup>

The Yugoslav strategy must be viewed as a design for both deterrence and defense. Insofar as the latter may be mandatory to make deterrence credible, there are admittedly a number of problems. One has to do with how long the Yugoslav forces could conduct military operations. In World War II the partisans fought for some years, but the current situation imposes certain caveats, for Yugoslavia might not receive even the limited amount of various kinds of aid from abroad that it did in World War II. Moreover, to the extent that the operational army maintains mobile high-firepower units of relatively large size, logistics and supply requirements that did not exist during most of World War II's Yugoslav campaigns are created. Attrition can cut both ways.

A second major problem is that of nuclear weapons. Yugoslav defense strategy is geared primarily for operations within a non-nuclear environment. To a considerable degree, Yugoslavia expects that the Soviet Union would be unwilling to employ nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, the possibility exists, and how well Yugoslav strategy and tactics would then function is a moot point. Yugoslav military analysts are themselves somewhat ambiguous on the subject. While one recent writer has argued in this regard that "the dispersal of armed forces throughout the country's territory... precludes the destruction of any large force,"<sup>3</sup> the comments of the commandant of Yugoslavia's Superior Military Academy in 1961 remain pertinent:

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<sup>1</sup> Drljević, op. cit., p. 197.

<sup>2</sup> Gabelić, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

<sup>3</sup> Dozet, op. cit., p. 73.

The miniaturization of nuclear weapons has made a company of partisans a nuclear target. This precludes the concentration of major units...the only tactic which can be used by partisan combat elements will be well-coordinated action in the rear of the enemy. Under nuclear conditions, the forest will not provide the protection it has in the past because of the risk of large fires. Partisan installations will have to be located on the edge of the forests. All movement will have to be at night, and during periods of reduced visibility.<sup>1</sup>

If tactical use of nuclear weapons were initiated by the enemy forces, the result, for at least some period of time, would be to force the level of Yugoslav resistance down to only guerrilla-like partisan operations, admittedly "the most difficult situation of all," but one that nonetheless could have a certain viability of its own.<sup>2</sup>

Whatever the problems, there is little question that the Yugoslav strategy does have a considerable deterrent potential. Its objective is to deter a Soviet attempt to achieve a rapid, decisive, and relatively bloodless takeover, and the degree of effort to be vested in the defense program seems likely to guarantee this. While the Soviet Union unquestionably has the manpower, resources, and military strength to achieve a military occupation, and, if necessary, to crush Yugoslav resistance, it would nonetheless require a massive investment and a disregard for the consequential military and political repercussions elsewhere to accomplish it:

A geographic and strategic-operational assessment of directions, areas and objects, irrespective of a specific aggressor, indicates that an aggressor would have to engage about 50-60 divisions, powerfully supported by aviation and other forces, simply for penetrating along the main directions for the purpose of taking the principal objects. Even if he succeeded in carving up the territory and taking the main economic areas, he would need over 50 divisions for the occupation of the country. This statistic, although it may have to undergo certain corrections, speaks most eloquently of the substantive character and importance of the conception of general people's defense. There is no disputing the fact that the forces an aggressor would have to engage in the Yugoslav theater of war would be considerable, even for the strongest military powers in the world.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in "Yugoslav Defense," op. cit., p. 34.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., and Radovanović, op. cit., p. 275.

<sup>3</sup> Vranić, op. cit., p. 231.

## V THE CITIZEN-ARMY CONCEPT IN WESTERN EUROPE

Most of the previously-discussed examples of the citizen-army concept have been those of nations which maintain positions of neutrality or political non-alignment. Obviously, those Western European nations which are allied with the United States cannot afford such a luxury in the face of the contemporary Soviet political-military threat. Nor can they afford the instability and explosive potential that would attach to the adoption of Israel's preemptively offensive spirit. Any NATO force posture, if it is to be both politically acceptable and viable in the sense of security, must at a minimum conform to a number of general principles:

1. NATO policy should be to provide a valid sense of military security in Western Europe without unduly inhibiting constructive political, economic, and other Western initiatives vis-à-vis East Europe and the Soviet Union.

2. More explicitly, NATO's policy to defend Europe is based on deterring any war with the Soviet Union in Western Europe, and, if war should come, to terminate on satisfactory terms without its enlarging in scope or being prolonged in time.

3. The NATO force posture should be developed so that it will not appear to the Soviet Union to be designed for preemptive offensive operations, but is clearly in line with the defensive nature of the NATO alliance.

4. The NATO force posture should be designed so that it will provide a valid and enduring sense of military security in Western Europe over the long haul. The postures should not be based on an expectation of fundamental convergence of the two social-economic systems, but should try to encourage--and certainly not hamper--a political settlement between the United States and Western Europe on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other.<sup>1</sup>

In the current political-military environment, it is difficult to reconcile NATO force posture, as it has developed through the past fifteen-odd years, with these principles. And for its future development, two driving factors especially warrant mention in relation to those principles.

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<sup>1</sup> Adapted from Richard B. Foster, DIAMOND Briefing: Dynamic Interaction Model of the Nixon Doctrine, Stanford Research Institute/Strategic Studies Center, SSC-IN-72-5A, 19 April 1972, pp. 46-47.

First, for Western Europe as a whole, and for West Germany in particular, the concept of defensive primacy in military stance is increasingly important as an active constraint in force posture design criteria. This is an operative factor not only because of its bearing on relations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, especially in the context of the forthcoming Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, but also because of the heightened requirement of national leaderships to secure domestic political and financial support for national policy and alliance policy.

A second highly active constraint in force posture design criteria is the interplay of military manpower economics and weapons procurement costs. The expense of training, equipping and maintaining large conventional armed forces is becoming increasingly prohibitive. For example, in West Germany at the present time over seventy percent of the total defense budget is allocated to such costs as these. Projections of such costs over the next decade, moreover, envision a continued rise to as much as ninety percent, possibly even more. The immediate consequence of this trend is the increasing unavailability of funds for procurement of advanced weaponry and support equipment, the unit costs of which are themselves rising drastically. The result is a loss of overall readiness and force effectiveness, with large-scale regular armed forces pricing themselves out of business.

In advanced industrialized societies these constraints, combined with such socio-political factors as declining support for large-scale long-term conscription and competing industrial demand for manpower,<sup>1</sup> are causing movement away from reliance on mass armed forces. In early 1972 Morris Janowitz observed that:

The mass army based on conscription with extensive reserves is being phased out of existence in Western industrialized countries. During the 1970s, the force structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be altered with profound

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<sup>1</sup> General Charles H. Bonesteel, The Use of Territorial Reserve Forces in the Future Defense of NATO, Stanford Research Institute/Strategic Studies Center, working draft, November 1970, p. 9.

implications for international relations and domestic civil-military relations. The decline of the mass armed force takes place under conditions of advanced industrialization, but reflects both technological and socio-political factors.<sup>1</sup>

In France and West Germany particularly, this process has brought about a search for new force posture design concepts which will provide some relief from the pressures against large standing forces, while delivering viable deterrent and defense capabilities. And in the case of both nations, the possibility of shifting in large part to some form of the citizen-army concept has assumed considerable significance.

Thus France has sought to compensate for large-scale regular force reductions by establishing a complementary territorial defense force. Since the mid-1960s French ground forces posture has undergone reorganization into two basic components: on the one hand, a mobile land combat force of five high-technology and high-firepower divisions,<sup>2</sup> and on the other, numerous territorial defense units (DOT, Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire) to be dispersed throughout metropolitan France.<sup>3</sup> For a nation determined to have an independent position, the Yugoslav system has been both an inspiration and a rationale: in January 1972, Defense Minister Michel Debré reaffirmed the French nuclear force as one bulwark of its independent policy, and went on to assert that Yugoslavia "assures its security by ardent popular defense without any spirit of compromise.... France ought to have the means of one and the other: a credible nuclear defense and an efficacious popular defense."<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Morris Janowitz, "The Decline of the Mass Army," Military Review, February 1972, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup> Eventually to be equipped with Pluton tactical nuclear weapons.

<sup>3</sup> See Livre Blanc sur la Défense Nationale, Paris: Ministry of Defense, June 1972, pp. 16-17.

<sup>4</sup> Michel Debré, "France and Its Defense," Revue de Défense Nationale, January 1972, pp. 16-17. Emphasis added.

The case of West Germany is even more portentous, since it is a key military member of NATO and occupies the critical geopolitical position on the central front. For at least the past decade it has found itself forced to cope simultaneously with severe economic and fiscal constraints, heightening need for domestic support of policy, and the requirement to reassure allies and adversaries alike of its defensive intent. As a result, consensus has apparently been attained by the leaderships of both the Christian Democratic Union and the Social Democratic Party on the adoption of some form of the citizen-army as the foundation of West German national defense within NATO. "The Bundeswehr does not seem to have any alternatives," one German observer has remarked, "to accepting the proposals of Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt to become a professional army that would leave all local and regional defense assignments to a part of the federal army that is organized on the lines of a militia."<sup>1</sup>

Out of these developments may evolve a new NATO force posture for the 1970s and 1980s, which in addition to the supporting American and allied theater nuclear forces would be composed of two basic components:

- comparatively small maneuver forces possessing high technology, mobility, and firepower, and backed by ready reserves for either unit replacement or support of the regular forces;
- numerous territorial defense units dispersed throughout Western Europe, and trained and equipped on a national basis to assist in defense against attacking invasion forces.<sup>2</sup>

It would not be realistic to expect either one or the other force component alone to perform deterrent and defense roles satisfactorily, even

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<sup>1</sup> Rudolf Woller (President of the Association of Reservists of the Bundeswehr), Reservists and a Reformed Federal Army, Address to the Officers of the Bundeswehr III Corps, Koblenz, 11 May 1970. See also the West German defense White Paper 1971/1972, Bonn: Ministry of Defense, December 1971, pp. 26-27, 31.

<sup>2</sup> Foster, op. cit., p. 43. Such a force, of course, could also mobilize large amounts of conventionally-organized infantry, engineers, artillery support, and so on, as is the principal intent in Sweden and Switzerland. Attention in this section, however, is given to a proliferated partisan-like defense.

with the support of NATO theater nuclear weapons. The two basic components together, on the other hand, could prove a potent combination. Advocacy of this kind of defense concept and force posture is not restricted solely to civilian decision-makers concerned with severe budgetary constraints. In 1971, for example, General Sir Walter Walker, former commander of NATO's northern flank, urged the formation of territorial defense forces comprised of "small teams, each of about six men, equipped with small arms and an efficient light anti-armour weapon," and went on to state that:

The concept of guerrilla and regular forces operating to a single, coordinated and mutually supporting plan, as the two blades of a pair of scissors, has not been accorded the importance and pride of place that it warrants.<sup>1</sup>

Once a territorial defense system was established and its functions coordinated with the other force components, it would give NATO force posture a new quality that it presently lacks: a basis for defense in depth, extending some hundreds of kilometers behind the initial FEBA. The current ground forces configuration, with limited numbers of active (but often understrength) divisions primarily deployed for a forward defense, has evolved as a result of various national and international considerations of doctrine, politics, and economics. But it nonetheless continues to possess a particular inherent vulnerability, characteristic of such force deployments, to the kind of blitzkrieg operation that the preponderantly armored and mechanized ground forces of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact could undertake in either West Germany alone or Western Europe as a whole.

The corresponding Soviet attack plan could vary in tactics according to the anticipated response by NATO. In the face of an early tactical nuclear response, for example, the Soviet forces might mass only long enough for the initial breakthrough, thereafter dissolving into many dispersed and mobile "nuclear-scared" firepower units which would spread out into NATO's rear areas. Should a significant delay of NATO nuclear weapons

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<sup>1</sup> Quoted in Hugh Manning, "The Longbow of the Nuclear Age," The Times, London, 8 May 1971.

release seem likely, on the other hand, the Soviet forces might undertake a modern replay of Germany's Barbarossa attack of 1941: massed armor and mechanized forces sweeping into West Germany at lightly-defended northern and southern points in great arcs, in order to encircle the great bulk of NATO's forward defense forces before a nuclear response could be initiated.

Considering the imbalances between current NATO and Soviet/Warsaw Pact tactical air and ground forces deployments in central Europe, neither attack variation would be likely to result in a war termination state favorable to the West. Any significant drawdown of the American forces in Germany would only worsen NATO's military situation. And even in the absence of war, a perceptible measure of Soviet theater military power may lend a certain politically coercive effect to Soviet attempts at influencing Western European national policies. This may become increasingly important to the extent that Western Europeans perceive American strategic nuclear weapons to be increasingly decoupled from European defense as a result of American strategic force neutralization through SALT I.

Within the realm of theater security, on the other hand, Western European and NATO defense efforts can direct themselves not only against Soviet tactics in a hypothetical attack plan, but against the Soviet strategy itself as well. To accomplish a defeat of NATO arms and the occupation of Western European territory, emphasis in any Soviet attack plan would most probably be placed upon making deep and rapid penetrations into NATO rear areas, in order to achieve the political-military objectives decisively, and in as short a time as possible. This time-urgency of the Soviet operation would be especially critical, first, in order to achieve a tactical victory before NATO tactical nuclear weapons could be released, and second, to present a political fait accompli in order to avoid an escalation of the war to the strategic level.

If the Soviet Union achieved strategic surprise, the combination of present NATO force posture and current political arrangements for tactical nuclear weapons release extends marginal hope of frustrating Soviet

strategy. On the other hand, a territorial defense force which was organized as one component closely coordinated with active maneuver forces in the overall NATO force posture could be of considerable utility to Western European defense efforts. Significant numbers of territorial defense units--rapidly mobilizable, ubiquitously dispersed, and appropriately trained and equipped--could harrass Soviet combat units on a local basis throughout the theater of operations, and perform an accumulative number of functions directed at the disruption and delay of Soviet operations.

In close coordination with the active forces, for example, the dispersed territorial defense units could aid in vitiating much of the advantage that high ground (and airborne) mobility can confer upon the offensive forces. Acting as forward observers, the territorial defense units could provide the high-mobility and high-firepower maneuver forces with continual surveillance of enemy movement, and near real-time target acquisition for conventional (and perhaps even tactical nuclear) strikes.<sup>1</sup> As equally important, however, could be various kinds of independent combat activities: denial of rapid and low-loss enemy passage through territory by fighting enemy units in detail; defense in the rear against airborne landings and infiltrations; operations against enemy lines of communication and logistics; provision of a basic service support structure for the maneuver forces; assistance in refugee and population control; and the like.<sup>2</sup> As in the Swedish mode of defense, a high-mobility conventional defense could be combined with the accumulative effects of widespread partisan-style resistance:

The guerrilla or para-guerrilla element in Swedish defense plans is fairly marked. There is a good deal of emphasis on mobile defense, with attacks on the enemy's flanks, and in his rear on the lines of supply and communication. The men are taught to act independently and without detailed instructions in circumstances where this

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<sup>1</sup> See Bonesteel, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 13-15.

is necessary, for example behind enemy lines. Such action is generally referred to in Sweden as "free warfare."<sup>1</sup>

In a tactical nuclear environment, moreover, a territorial defense force would have the additional virtue of presenting the enemy with many aimpoints of little unit value.

This kind of defense against a large invading force would not be a facile or inexpensive one, and many difficulties would have to be dealt with and overcome in the process of creating a viable force structure of this sort: organization and training, tactical and operational concepts, logistics, command and control, and the like. Appropriate weaponry would be required, not only in small arms, but also in weapons with combined anti-personnel and anti-armor uses which nonetheless would be relatively low in cost, easily handled, and durable. A reliable system of supply would have to be provided for units in the enemy's rear, perhaps based upon dispersed and hidden supply caches. Adequate identification, command, and control procedures and communications equipment would be required to ensure coordination between units and with the active forces. "The readiness of reserve component units to carry out their wartime missions," one recent study remarks, "is a function of numbers of personnel, individual skills, availability of proper material, adequacy of control elements, and the time required to develop effective unit capabilities."<sup>2</sup> Creation of this kind of defense will not be a simple process, though perhaps much can be learned from the experience of nations like Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia.

But to the extent that a viable territorial defense system can be developed in such nations as France and West Germany, it would contribute significantly to overall NATO defense capability by transforming much of

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<sup>1</sup> Adam Roberts, Total Defense and Civil Resistance: Problems of Sweden's Security Policy, Stockholm: Research Institute on Swedish National Defense, September 1972, p. 108.

<sup>2</sup> USACDCSSI, The Army Study of the Ground and Reserve Forces (Alternatives for Improved Army Forces Capabilities), Final Report, 15 May 1972, Vol. II, SECRET, p. 43.

Western Europe into what has been termed a "wasp's nest."<sup>1</sup> Successfully integrating the virtues of both dispersed territorial defense and mobile conventional defense could more than serve to disrupt the critical time-schedule of the Soviet attacker, whose logistically tenuous forces "would thus be required to slow down their advance and continuously expend ammunition and fuel with no prospect of surcease from continuous engagement no matter how deeply they advanced."<sup>2</sup> At the same time, the ability to retain the initiative and momentum, and thus control the course of the battle, would far less reliably remain in Soviet hands, with a corresponding loss of predictability by the attacker as to outcome and consequences. The Soviet Union's capability to achieve a victory rapidly and decisively would perforce be drastically reduced.

Termination of such a war on terms favorable to the West would necessarily be dependent upon a complex of political, military, and economic variables, many of which are outside the scope of this study. But for the nations of Western Europe, the emphasis upon deterrence of war in the first place is perhaps greater than upon defense itself. In the past, Western Europeans have largely sought to preserve deterrence through a politically credible coupling of the American strategic nuclear forces to theater defense: deterrence by threat of retaliation, influencing the risk-versus-gains calculus of the opponent. But the credibility of the American strategic force commitment to European defense has long been questioned in many quarters, long before the current Soviet nuclear and conventional military buildups came to fruition. If its credibility was questionable then, it may be so increasingly since Soviet attainment of approximate strategic parity, especially as codified by a SALT agreement that can be interpreted to have politically institutionalized mutual assured destruction as the basis of Soviet-American strategic stability.

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<sup>1</sup> Bonesteel, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 14.

But deterrence may also be viewed as dissuasion, as the concept is employed by the Swiss:

The strategy of dissuasion is therefore directed primarily at the psychological influencing of the potential opponents. It seeks to make it clear that nothing would be gained by an attack upon Switzerland, and that the prize would not be worth the cost.

The main effort must certainly be directed at that which will make dissuasion successful; first of all, the capability to wage war successfully in the worst of circumstances, and to deny the enemy attaining his operational objectives.<sup>1</sup>

Dissuasion, then, is deterrence through the removal of the opponent's incentive to attack, as distinct from the fears of punitive retaliation. In this particular attempt at dissuasion, defense efforts are primarily directed toward the frustration of the opponent's tactical objectives. In so doing, and in an accumulative manner, this would result in a nullification of the opponent's strategy itself. Thus in the context of a NATO defense founded upon a territorial defense system, to the extent that the Soviet Union perceives its political-military objectives in an attack to have become infeasible, thereby making a rapid and decisive victory unattainable, a new dimension would be added to the alliance's overall deterrent capability. And to the extent that Western European feelings of security were consequently enhanced, new counters to coercion through the threat of force would be provided, helping to sustain the national will.

In addition to whatever purely military utility it might have, a territorial defense system could be expected to confer certain other benefits, both external and internal. Such a system has the virtue of being in accordance with the derived general principles for NATO force posture which were noted earlier. This is especially so in the case of its defensive primacy, particularly in the context of the goal of improving

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<sup>1</sup> Däniken, op. cit., pp. 35, 36. See pp. 16-17 of this report.

East-West relations while preserving Western European security: "Characteristically, a territorial defense system is based on weapons systems, strategies, and methods of military organization which are better suited to their defensive role than to engagement in major military actions abroad."<sup>1</sup> Forces of this character could be of considerable value to the bargaining position of the West in future security and arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.<sup>2</sup>

Internally, among Western European nations, adoption of territorial defense systems as the foundation of national military security would go far to relieve the economic problems of current force postures, and the tax burdens associated with them. Particularly, its method of manpower utilization, in which members of territorial defense units remain in their civilian occupations during the great majority of their period of service, would act both to reduce the vast manpower maintenance costs which are required to support large regular forces, and to satisfy the demands of expanding national economies for large labor forces.<sup>3</sup> At the same time, the general universality of service distributed throughout the population might help to restore the public willingness to support national defense efforts that has become somewhat eroded in recent years.<sup>4</sup> The combination of these factors could affect psychological and morale considerations in a positive manner:

The introduction of citizen armies, with their ubiquity, lower operating costs, and far lesser demands on the productive time of the individuals involved, might improve the citizen's and hence the nation's attitude towards contributing taxes, time, and effort to the defense of their own homelands.<sup>5</sup>

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- <sup>1</sup> Roberts, op. cit., p. 55.
  - <sup>2</sup> See Bonesteel, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
  - <sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 9.
  - <sup>4</sup> See Janowitz, op. cit., p. 12.
  - <sup>5</sup> Bonesteel, op. cit., p. 13.

For there is little question that in most nations of Western Europe, as in the United States, large standing armed forces based on large-scale, long-term, and occasionally inequitable conscription are receiving declining public support.

In advanced industrial societies, both the purpose of military institutions has been subjected to massive criticism, and the moral worth of conscript service has been shaken. Hedonism, personal expression, opposition to the style of life of the military establishment, resistance to military authority, plus a new, diffuse, moral criticism have become paramount among young people.<sup>1</sup>

Application of the citizen-army concept to Western European national defense would do much to overcome these difficulties. And while it may generally be true in Western societies that, "progressively, men are no longer prepared to fight for nationalist sentiments alone, but the cause must be seen as morally justified",<sup>2</sup> a military organization and force posture that is obviously and specifically configured for the defense of the nation in the event of invasion is far less vulnerable to moral objections than large-scale standing forces with significant expeditionary potential.

Overshadowing all this is one greater psychological and sociopolitical consideration involved in the subject. The citizen-army concept goes beyond the relatively restricted realm of military efficacy, for it is also a political concept, one of values which must be shared by "people who are loyal to the concept of the nation".<sup>3</sup> This can be a difficult point in two different ways. First, creation of a territorial defense force could conceivably facilitate national fragmentation, if the concept is applied to a pluralistic society marked by sharp internal hostilities

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<sup>1</sup> Janowitz, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Foster, op. cit., p. 64

and divisions; this could eventually be true of Yugoslavia, for example.<sup>1</sup> And second, there is also a danger that other professional military forces, such as those hypothesized for a new NATO force posture, might develop values and role attitudes markedly different from those of the citizenry at large.

Either of these conceivable developments would obviously be counter-productive to the purposes of a territorial defense system, both politically and militarily. Implementation of some form of the citizen-army concept as the foundation of a nation's defense should instead promote two political goals: first, enhancement of the cohesiveness of the nation, even one characterized by a pluralistic society, and second, and obviously inter-related, the sustainment of the national will in periods of stress.<sup>2</sup> In so doing, the concept of the citizen-army as applied in any particular nation psychologically should embrace not only the territorial defense force, but any other and all military organizations as well.<sup>3</sup> That this kind of sociopolitical development can be accomplished is made manifest by the example of Israel. That it necessarily will be accomplished elsewhere is problematical. Success will depend upon the amount of effort expended in developing a public loyalty to the nation.

While the application of the citizen-army concept to the development of territorial defense forces has been receiving increasing attention in various nations during recent years, the difficulties of actually implementing the concept should not be underestimated. In any nation where the attempt may be made, the careful consideration of national cultural and historical perspectives will be highly important to the success of the undertaking, and will influence the nature and shape of the eventual territorial defense organization.

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<sup>1</sup> See Jon L. Lellenberg, The Yugoslav Concept of General People's Defense, Stanford Research Institute/Strategic Studies Center, SSC-TN-8974-84, November 1972.

<sup>2</sup> Foster, *op. cit.* p. 42.

<sup>3</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 67.

It is unlikely that the United States could be of much assistance in this way. In fact, even though American international security policy might come to the conclusion that development of national territorial defense forces in Western Europe would improve the alliance's security posture as a whole, while providing other national and international benefits, over-advocation of the concept by the United States might produce unnecessary and undesired reactions from Europeans who are not wholly disposed to regard American proposals enthusiastically:

If any such concept were formulated, it should be done by each European NATO nation for itself because only it can judge whether such a concept is militarily, politically, and sociologically feasible in its environment. If advocated initially only by the U.S., any such concept might be construed as some devious scheme promoted by the Americans to justify U.S. troop withdrawals. There are many ways, however, in which the U.S. could help make such a concept, if developed in Europe, effective and less costly. Perhaps one of the most important areas for help might be in the research and development of simple, cheap, but effective weaponry and communications for the quantity-equipping of the citizen-army elements.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Bonesteel, op. cit., p. 16.