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FIRE FIGHTING OPERATIONS IN HAMBURG, GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II: EXCERPTS FROM THE HAMBURG FIRE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS ON THE AIR ATTACKS DURING WORLD WAR II, APPENDIXES 3, 4, 5, AND PHOTOGRAPHS

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URS Research Company

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FINAL REPORT

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Washington, D. C. 20301

By:

Carl F. Miller

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13. ABSTRACT

To obtain and preserve valuable untranslated records of the large fires resulting from air attacks in World War II, Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (formerly the Office of Civil Defense) sent Dr. Carl F. Miller and Mr. James W. Kerr to Germany in 1965. They found, and obtained permission to publish, a number of documents and photographs, particularly of the mass fire in Hamburg, Germany. These documents have been translated and analyzed and a number of reports concerning them have been published. The present report contains the remaining translations and pictures considered worth preserving for those studying the effects of large fires.

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FOREWORD

The large fires resulting from air attacks in World War II are of interest to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (formerly the Office of Civil Defense) because of the implications they hold for large fires which could follow nuclear attacks. To obtain and preserve valuable untranslated records of these large fires, DCPA sent Dr. Carl F. Miller and Mr. James W. Kerr to Germany in 1965. They found, and obtained permission to publish, a number of documents and photographs, particularly of the mass fires in Hamburg, Germany. These documents have been translated and analyzed and a number of reports concerning them have been published and are available as listed below. The present report contains the remaining translations and pictures considered worth preserving for those studying the effects of large fires. During the several years required for translating and analyzing the German documents, Dr. Carl Miller has been employed by the Stanford Research Institute, URS Corporation, and is now at the Dikewood Corporation. The reports listed below may all be obtained from National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22151. Appendixes 1 and 2 were published in the last report listed below:

Miller, Carl F., and James W. Kerr, Field Notes on World War II German Fire Experience, October 1965, AD 632 366.

Miller, Carl F., World War II German Fire Document Translations, July 1967, AD 664 523.

Miller, Carl F., Summary of Damage Inflicted by Air Raids on the City of Hamburg in the Period July 25 to August 3, 1943, July 1968, AD 672 497.

Miller, Carl F., Appendixes 1 through 7 to the Hamburg Police President's Report on the Large Scale Air Attacks on Hamburg, Germany in World War II, December 1968, AD 680 459.

Miller, Carl F., Appendixes 8 through 19 to the Hamburg Police President's Report on the Large Scale Air Attacks on Hamburg, Germany, in World War II, December 1968, AD 681 075.

Schubert, R., Ed. by Dr. Carl Miller, Examination of the Building Density and Fuel Loading in the Districts Eimsbuttel and Hammerbrook in the City of Hamburg as of July 1943, January 1969, AD 683 345.

Miller, Carl F., Fire Fighting Operations in Hamburg, Germany, During World War II, June 1971, AD 726 461.

Appendix 3

EXCERPTS FROM THE HAMBURG FIRE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS ON THE AIR ATTACKS DURING WORLD WAR II: THE FIRST ATTACKS AND GROUP WEST UNIT REPORTS ON ACTIONS AND EXPERIENCES DURING THE LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS OF JULY-AUGUST, 1943

TR

Police President Hamburg, May 27, 1940

REPORT

About the Attack on May 18, 1940, at 12:28 midnight to 3:00 a.m.

Kind of Attack: Night attack in several waves.

Approximate Strength of Enemy: About 30 Fighter Planes.

Estimated Number of Bombs Dropped.* About 80 high explosive and 400 firebombs.

Review of Damages (estimated)

Damage through firebombs.....13

Damage through high explosives..... 160 including smaller damages, which are not mentioned in detail below.

Damage through poison gas bombs..... None

Losses	Dead	Wounded	Poisoned	Remarks
Men	24[1), 3)]	60[2)]	--	1) of these, 5 military men
Women	9	10		2) of these, 18 military men and 3 policemen
Children	1	2		3) of these, 1 military man who died afterwards

---

Loss of Equipment of the Self-Protection Service: None

Begin → 114

Fire Department Sector VIII
Fire Chief

Hamburg-Harburg, May 20, 1940

Damage Sites from the Enemy Air Attack May 18, 1940, in Sector VIII

No.

1 United Harburger Feed Company, Wilhelm Weberstrasse

The plant was hit by several firebombs. The storage sheds and the cake mill were on fire. The large fire was brought under control within one hour. Three small fire brigades, one industrial fire brigade were put into service.

2 Municipal Construction Department, Blohmstrasse

The Construction Department was hit by firebombs. The materials shed, auto garage, carpenter shop, offices, oil storage shed, one personnel vehicle, 10 hand carts, 1 silo cart were destroyed by fire. To fight the fires, one small fire brigade was put into service. The fires were under control within one hour.

3 Guano Works, One Hafenstrasse

The storage building, Thomas Mill, phosphate mill, magnesite mill, were hit by three high explosive bombs and several firebombs. The fire threatened to spread to the superphosphate shed and to the neighboring firm of Thoerl-Baumwollsaat. This was prevented. The Thomas Mill, phosphate mill, magnesite mill and machinery building burned to the ground. Fire fighting was done by 3 small fire brigades, 2 large fire brigades, 1 fire fighting squad, and 1 plant fire brigade. Three additional fire brigades were requested to provide assistance.

4 Brinckman and Mergell, Seehafenstrasse 6

The storehouse was hit by about 20 firebombs. Most of the bombs were extinguished by the plant fire fighting personnel; however, a few penetrated through the roof covering and the ceiling below into the silo chambers. For fire fighting, the following were employed: two large fire brigades, 2 small fire brigades, 1 plant fire brigade as well as other plant fire fighting forces.

No.

5 Geradestrasse 26

Several firebombs hit the house and caused light physical damage. One larder caught on fire. The firebombs were extinguished by Self-Protection.

6 Hohestrasse 29

The roof was ignited by a non-penetrating firebomb. The fire, as well as the firebomb was put out by the local Self-Protection force.

7 Hohestrasse 32

One firebomb penetrated the roof and attic and started a fire in a bed in the bedroom. The fire was extinguished by the Self-Protection forces.

8 Hohestrasse 27

The attic was damaged and ignited by shrapnel from our own flak. This fire was extinguished by the Self-Protection forces.

9 Neuland

One cow was hit by four pieces of shrapnel from a high explosive bomb; the overland cable was damaged by shrapnel from another high explosive bomb.

10 Ebano Works, Moorburgerstrasse

One firebomb fell into the factory grounds and another firebomb of larger caliber fell in the area between the factory grounds and Moorburgerstrasse. No physical damage resulted. The bombs burned themselves out.

11 Rhenania-Ossag, 3 Hafenstrasse

The following bombs fell onto the factory grounds: Three high explosive bombs and about 50 firebombs. The direct hits were all along a line. Railroad siding, several open freight cars, one oil tank car, the firehouse, the janitor's lodge and the administration building were destroyed. One person was killed; four were injured.

No.

12 Noblee and Thoerl, 3 Hafenstrasse

One high explosive bomb fell onto the factory grounds. One oil tank and several window panes were destroyed. Two men were killed by the bomb fragments.

13 Seehafenstrasse 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11

Several small high explosive bombs fell near the houses. Window pane and house walls were damaged.

14 Brinckman, Lumberyard, Blohmstrasse

One high explosive bomb fell onto the factory grounds. One shed containing building materials was completely destroyed. The firewall of the house at Blohmstrasse 9 was partially destroyed. The nearby office building was badly damaged; the firewall at Blohmstrasse 10 was pushed in and one shed was destroyed. The planing shop also at Blohmstrasse 10 was badly damaged. Gas masks, machinery and fire fighting equipment in the area were damaged and, for the most part, have been made useless. One man was seriously injured.

15 E-Works Blohmstrasse

About 150 window panes of the E-Works were destroyed.

16 Hugo Stinnes, 2 Hafenstrasse

In the second harbor basin at Hugo Stinnes, the Elbe tugboat "Praesident" received a direct hit midship by a high explosive bomb and was sunk. One person was seriously injured, and two persons lightly injured. Three barges were riddled by bomb fragments and a number of window panes in the machine shop were destroyed.

17 Felser Works, 3 Hafenstrasse

Several window panes in the works and in the office were destroyed. Also some of the walls were damaged.

No.

18 North German Motor Works, 2 Hafenstrasse

All the windows of the works were destroyed and the roof was badly damaged by shrapnel.

19 Niedersachsen Works, Konsul Ritter-Strasse

Three high explosive bombs fell onto the works. Hall No. 2 was badly damaged; about 300 window panes and part of the interior furnishings were destroyed.

20 Harburger Grain Storage Company, 1 Hafenstrasse

Three high explosive bombs fell onto the factory grounds. The chimney of the administration building was toppled. All steel doors were riddled; the masonry was badly damaged; and about 600 window panes and three light fixtures were destroyed. Ten to fifteen fruit trees were blown down by the bombs, and one person was lightly injured.

21 Freight Station Unterelbe

Several firebombs fell onto the freight station. No damage was reported.

22 Sierk & Son, Konsul Ritter-Strasse

The mill installations inside the buildings as well as the exterior of the office building were damaged by high explosive bombs. One person was lightly injured.

23 Thoerl, 1 Hafenstrasse

High explosive bombs were dropped onto the grounds of the Guano Works; many window panes and the exterior masonry were damaged.

24 H. C. Hagemann, Blohmstrasse

One high explosive bomb was dropped on the court in front of the office building. The office and storage buildings were badly damaged; many windows were torn out of the masonry. Two people were killed.

No.

25 Rami Feed Works, Blohmstrasse

Twelve firebombs were dropped onto the works. The storage building was slightly damaged. The fire and the firebombs were put out quickly by Expanded Self-Protection forces.

26 Party Headquarters, 8 Blohmstrasse

One high explosive bomb fell into the garden. Fifty window panes were shattered and the outer walls of the building badly damaged. One wall, 19 meters long, was completely caved in.

27 Lammerich, Blohmstrasse, Oil Cake Mill

One hundred window panes were shattered and light physical damage of the office was caused by shrapnel.

28 Seehafenstrasse 12, Kaphorn

Two hundred window panes were shattered in the restaurant.

29 Galalith, Seehafenstrasse

Several window panes on the street side were broken.

30 Lackschmidt, Moorburgerstrasse 6

The office building was hit by two firebombs that penetrated the roof. The resulting fire was extinguished by the Self-Protection forces.

31 Lauenbruch Ost House No. 8

Six window panes were destroyed.

32 Lauenbruch Ost House No. 66

Thirteen window panes were destroyed.

33 Lauenbruch Ost House No. 67

Ten window panes were destroyed.

No.

34 August Prien, Dampfshiffsweg 50

Some light damage was sustained by the roofs of the building and the inside machinery due to bomb fragments.

35 Winter, Dampfshiffsweg 5

Ten window panes destroyed by shrapnel.

36 Thoerl A.G., Dampfschiffsweg 16

Several windows, walls and roofs were damaged in the building by high explosive bombs that detonated nearby.

37 Harbor Administration 5

Light roof and window damage was sustained.

38 Old Locks

Two high explosive bombs that landed in the harbor district completely destroyed the lock keeper's house.

39 Hanstrasse 25

One dud landed in the front yard.

40 Staderstrasse 40

One dud landed on the front walk.

41 Hangstrasse 15

Two duds landed in the yard.

42 Grumbrechtstrasse 49

One dud landed in the front yard.

43 Milchgrund

One dud landed on the athletic field.

No.

44 Moellmerstrasse 22a

One dud landed in the yard.

45 Ehestorferweg 9

The window curtains were ignited; the cause of fire is unknown.

46 Finance Department, Harburg

The windows and masonry were damaged by high explosive bombs. One air raid shelter was completely destroyed. One person was killed and four were seriously injured.

47 Hermann Goering Barracks

The windows and masonry were damaged by two high explosive bombs. Also, several bomb craters were noted in the street; two gas lamps were torn up.

48 Hermann Goering Platz

One layer of cables was destroyed.

49 Buxtehuderstrasse

The street was torn up by a high explosive bomb.

50 Ehestorferweg 17 and 20

The telephone cable was severed by shrapnel.

51 Hangstrasse 13

Four people were killed; the exact cause of their deaths is unknown.

52 Friedrich Naumann Strasse 12N

The house was hit by several firebombs; the resulting fire in the attic was put out by the Self-Protection forces.

No.

53 Hermann Goering Platz

The streetcar wires were broken by shrapnel fragments.

54 Buxtehuderstrasse 82

The roof was ignited by firebombs at 12:40 a.m. A large fire brigade was dispatched to the site but the fire had already been put out by the Self-Protection forces by the time the brigade arrived.

55 Staderstrasse 21

The house was demolished by a high explosive bomb. One person was killed.

56 Schorchtstrasse 45

The house as well as the back house was hit by high explosive bombs. The roof of the back house caved in.

57 Grumbrechtstrasse 55

At 2 a.m., a firebomb landed on the roof which then caught on fire. This fire was put out by the Self-Protection forces. The landing of the firebomb on the roof was not heard in the shelter.

58 Friedrich Naumann Strasse 8 and 10

Two duds landed at this address.

Buxtehuderstrasse 17

Four high explosive bombs and several firebombs landed on the house. One fire brigade worked with several hoses to extinguish the fire.

Grumbrechtstrasse 46

One firebomb landed on and bounced off the roof. The fire was put out by the Self-Protection forces.

No.

Grumbrechtstrasse 47

One firebomb penetrated the roof and ceiling and came to rest on a sofa in the living room which it ignited. The fire was put out by the Self-Protection forces with a portable extinguisher.

Grumbrechtstrasse 45

One firebomb landed at this address. It was thrown out of the window by the residents.

59 Bleicherweg 4

The house was damaged by a high explosive bomb. The back wall and the stair case collapsed. Two persons were killed and two were lightly wounded.

60 Staderstrasse 5b

This house was completely destroyed by a high explosive bomb.

61 Staderstrasse 7

This house was completely destroyed by a high explosive bomb.

62 Staderstrasse 11a

This house was completely destroyed by a high explosive bomb.

63 Air Sector 80

The window panes of about 100 buildings were partly pushed in.

64 Schorchtstrasse 18, 19, 17, 20, 43, 12, 14, 15, 16, 46, 48

The housefronts were all hit by high explosive bombs. All housefronts were either lightly damaged or partially collapsed.

65 Gartenstrasse 5, 7, and 9

The houses were badly damaged by high explosive bombs and all were in a partially collapsed condition.

No.

66 3. Twiete 3

The house was lightly damaged by high explosive bomb.

67 Bleicherweg 2, 6, 10

The houses were largely collapsed by the detonation of a high explosive bomb.

68 Buxtehuderstrasse 17 and 19

The houses were badly damaged by a high explosive bomb and have largely collapsed.

69 Buxtehuderstrasse 76

One firebomb penetrated the roof and the ceiling and fell onto a bed. The resulting fire was put out by the Self-Protection forces.

70 Buxtehuderstrasse 80, Gambrinus

A firebomb penetrated the roof and the ceiling of the restaurant hall. One light fire brigade was moved to the site; however, on arrival of the firemen it was found that the Self-Protection forces had already put out the fire. Twenty-five firebombs fell on the grounds of this address.

71 Buxtehuderstrasse 41

One firebomb penetrated the roof and the top floor and fell on a stack of linen which was then ignited. The resulting fire was put out by the Self-Protection forces.

72 Staderstrasse 5, 5a, 5b, 7, 9, 9a, 11

High explosive bomb fragments caused widespread damage among, and partial collapse of, these houses.

73 Bergstrasse 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 53, 51, 63, 51, 63, 65, 69, 77

The back houses at these addresses were slightly damaged by bomb fragments.

No.

74 Ehestorfer Way (Kallmeyer)

In the pasture, one cow was hurt and one cow was killed by shrapnel from exploding high explosive bombs.

75 Ehestorfer Way 9, 17, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29

These houses were slightly damaged by bomb fragments.

76 Staderstrasse 15, 17, 21, 23, 33, 48, 46, 44, 42, 40, 38, 36, 16

These houses were slightly damaged by bomb fragments.

77 Hangstrasse 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37

These houses were slightly damaged by bomb fragments.

78 Railroad Embankment at Blohmstrasse

The railroad embankment was damaged by a high explosive bomb; one track of the railroad was displaced.

79 Gasmeter, Staderstrasse

One high explosive bomb fell on the railway embankment of the Elbe Railroad. The fragments damaged the gasmeter about 50 meters away which received about 25 holes. On five different spots, jets of flame leaped out. The fire was stifled with clay by workmen which prevented further escape of the gas. Other holes in the gasmeter were also sealed with clay.

The above mentioned damage sites were identified so far by the Police Precincts 80, 81, and 82. There were a total of 145 damage sites. It can be assumed that the number of itemized damage sites will be increased as more information is obtained.

(Signed) Schott
Fire Engineer

General Report on the Air Attack of May 16, 1940

1. Weapons

Electron Firebombs: Brand Name: Novobax 1938

Weight: 1.7 kg; overall length: 54 cm; thickness: 4.5 cm; hexagonal body of 34 cm in length, loaded with a steel head that weighs 0.65 kg. The metal body contains a 25 mm diameter bore-hole which is filled with a powder train (presumably thermite). At the upper end of the metal body, a fuse is screwed on; the fuse consists of a metal cover with spring firing pin, safety valve and detonating powder. Around the fuse is a tin cover that is 20 cm in length, which serves only to increase the overall length and give the bomb better falling properties.

When the bomb hits the target, ignition of thermite is instantaneous with a hissing sound. Short flames leap out of holes in the side. After burning about 15 seconds, the flame breaks through the middle of the body of the bomb with the typical phenomenon of light of a metallic fire. The total time of burning is two to four minutes; in one case a bomb burned for 8 minutes. Burning particles are thrown out onto the surrounding area up to a distance of 2 meters. The residue of the bomb that remains after burning glows for a long time.

The extinguishing of the firebomb and the glowing residue can be accomplished with either a spray or full jet from a canister fire extinguisher as well as by dousing with water. The ignited firebomb can be extinguished during the time that it burns. When hit by water, the burning metal lights up but no explosions have been observed. In addition, the burning bomb can be extinguished by covering with sand; it actually burns out under the cover of sand.

The penetrating force of this firebomb is very strong. Most of those which penetrated the roof covering did not remain in the attic floor but penetrated the ceiling of the top floor and, in some cases, even the ceiling of the next floor down. In the same way, the bombs penetrated concrete ceilings 10 cm thick, and on one pier, a steel deck of 10 mm thickness. Because of this, most fires from the attack were room fires rather than roof fires. The bombs often came to rest in beds or on the floor beside wardrobes, chests of drawers, behind bedframes, and ignited these fuels from which the fires then developed. In the petroleum harbor, the roof of tanks and in some cases, even the floor of the tanks was penetrated by these bombs; where this occurred, the firebombs got

stuck in the ground under the floor. The firebombs apparently were dropped in groups of five to seven since it was observed that this number of bombs always lay close together within a relatively small area. However, groups of bombs numbering as much as 25 can be released at the same time.

2. Fire Effects

In a great many cases, the firebombs dropped onto streets, squares, yards, empty sheds, ships, slips, etc., and burned out without causing any damage. In many cases, the bombs failed to work properly; some of them did not ignite at all and some ignited only partially. The cause for this failure to ignite is apparently due to the comparatively small thermite train.

In numerous cases, the firebombs were extinguished in the rooms by the Self-Protection forces with excellent results. However, a large amount of water was usually necessary to extinguish the fire. It was proved that the thorough training of the Self-Protection forces showed good results. For example, one widespread room fire in Grumbrechtstrasse 47, where all the furniture in the room was in flames, was put out in exemplary fashion with a portable fire extinguisher by the Self-Protection forces. In the majority of cases, however, the fire damaged only part of the furniture in the room, single furniture pieces or part of the floor. In one case, a courageous man picked up a firebomb which had just fallen into a room and threw it through the window into the yard, where it burned out harmlessly.

Reports by house occupants show that the penetration of the roof and upper ceilings by the firebombs cannot be heard by the occupants of the air raid shelter. Many times the occupants were either alerted by their neighbors as to the bomb hits or they were still (as before the sounding of the alert) in their apartments. According to these experiences, it should be emphasized that fire watches should be posted outside the shelter and that these watches should frequently patrol the upper floors.

Altogether so far we know of 22 cases where firebombs, and the initial fires that they started, were extinguished by Self-Protection or Industrial Civil Defense forces. In five cases, the Fire Department had to supplement the efforts of the Self-Protection forces. In one case (Kielerstrasse 72) the firebomb was not noticed until the next morning; the ceiling fire which had developed, was put out by the Fire Department with portable extinguishers.

3. Larger Fires

Seven larger fires developed, and hoses had to be put to work by the Fire Department to extinguish them. These were as follows:

(1) United Harburger Feeding Company, Wilhelm Weberstrasse

The fire was reported at 12:41 a.m. (before the alert) through a fire alarm at Brinkmann & Mergell, whose fire watch suspected that the fire was on their territory. The approaching fire brigade of Fire Station 15 gave a "5 alarm," whereupon four more fire brigades moved out, according to peacetime fire regulations. These fire brigades belonged partly to Air Sector B as far as civil defense is concerned.

Storage sheds and the mill were burning extensively. Spread of the fire to neighboring firms was prevented. During the fire fighting operations, several high explosive bombs were dropped nearby. At first it was thought that the firemen were being shot at with machine guns. They did not take cover, however, but continued in the fire fighting activities without interruption. One fireman was slightly injured by bomb fragments; also, some of the hoses were damaged. The fire was brought under control within one hour with three small fire brigades and one plant fire brigade with 6 B and 14 C hoses. Part of the fire fighting forces were sent immediately thereafter to the Guano Works.

(2) Residence Buxtehuderstrasse 82, Harburg

A fire was reported at 12:55 a.m. (before the alert) in the Restaurant "Gambrinus," Buxtehuderstrasse 80. The fire station transmitted the alarm to the LA Command. At 1:08 a.m., one large fire brigade was sent by LA Command, who immediately started fighting the raging fire in the house on Buxtehuderstrasse 82, with 4 C hoses. The whole roof was on fire, but the fire was contained. The fire in the restaurant had already been put out by the Self-Protection forces.

(3) Municipal Construction Department Blohmstrasse

The fire was observed at 1:20 a.m. from the light Fire Brigade 12/VIII during their return from the fire at Harburg Feed Company. The chief of the brigade started fire fighting operations at once without a special order, because the whole neighborhood was endangered by the fire. The fire was contained without spreading to additional buildings with 3 B hoses and 3 C hoses; the fire was extinguished within an hour (even though some pieces of wood were still burning on the other side of the canal). The material sheds, the automobile garage, the

carpenter shop, the oil storage shed and the main offices were on fire when the brigade arrived. By resolute fighting, the fire was partly brought to a standstill within the burning buildings. During the fire fighting operation, a high explosive bomb fell nearby and damaged 2 B hoses and this caused a brief interruption in the fire fighting operations.

(4) Printing Shop, Kielerstrasse 53, St. Pauli

The fire was reported verbally at about 1:30 a.m. to the small fire brigade 13/III which had been previously sent to the fire site at Paulinenplatz 3. Three firebombs had dropped into an industrial building (containing a book printing shop); the fires which resulted could not be extinguished by the Self-Protection forces without professional assistance. The fire brigade took one hose for the operation. The physical damage in the building was slight.

(5) Guano Works, 1 Hafenstrasse, Harburg

The works was hit by numerous (perhaps 50) firebombs and fires were started over much of the plant area. In the beginning of the fire and later on during fire fighting operations, high explosive bombs fell on the fire site; the explosions threw burning fragments in every direction and these helped to spread the fire. The fire was reported to the LA Command, which ordered two fire brigades to the site at 1:45 a.m. At about the same time the fire was observed from the fire site of the Harburger Feed Company; fire brigades were ordered by the leader of the fire fighting operations at that site to the new fire site, as soon as they became free to go. Altogether, four fire brigades and one plant fire brigade with 8 B hoses and 24 C hoses were put into action at the Guano Works. They were successful in putting out a fire which had just started in a neighboring superphosphate shed, built of wood. Thus, a catastrophic spread of the fire was prevented. A part of the works extending over an area of 140 x 70 meters was completely destroyed by fire; this included the magnesite mill, phosphate mill, Thomas mill, machinery building and storage shed. One fire brigade was busy at the fire site until 9 a.m. Some hoses were damaged by high explosive bombs at this fire site.

(6) Silo Brinkmann and Mergell, Seehafenstrasse, Harburg

The silo, which had a flak post on top, was hit by 20 firebombs. The concrete roof was penetrated by several of the bombs. The majority of the bombs, however, burned out harmlessly on a protective roof above the silo chambers. One or two of the firebombs apparently fell into the space between the outer wall and the wooden walls of the

separate silo chambers and ignited the wooden construction. The fire was first fought by the Industrial Civil Defense forces. At 2:05 a.m., the Fire Department was called in to assist. Because of strong smoke, it was very difficult to get close to the origin of the fire. At times therefore the operations had to be performed with gas mask protection. It was found necessary to break open the masonry to get to the fire nests. Several wooden chambers burned along with the contents (peanuts and copra). In addition to the Industrial Civil Defense forces, three fire brigades with 7 B and 6 C hoses were put into action. The operations lasted until 9 a.m. of May 21, 1940, with two fire brigades and relief being on duty until 9 a.m. May 19, and after that with one fire brigade on duty.

(7) Residential House, Buxtehuderstrasse 17, Harburg

The small fire brigade 33/B had gone to the fire site "Harburger Feed Company" and was supposed to proceed from there to the Guano Works. At about 3:15 a.m., a Hitler Youth came on a bicycle and urgently requested help at Buxtehuderstrasse 17; he had been unable to obtain help at any other place until then. One fire fighting squad was therefore sent to the Guano Works, and the other squad went to Buxtehuderstrasse. At Buxtehuderstrasse, a house had been damaged by high explosive bombs and apparently had been set afire afterwards with firebombs. Also a small, detached garage was on fire. The Fire Fighting Squad 33a/B put out both fires with three C hoses. Several injured people from this building had already been taken to safety before the fire brigade arrived.

4. High Explosive Bombs

The high explosive bombs that were dropped were of high caliber and caused extraordinarily strong air blast effects. Those which detonated on the pavement caused a minor indentation of about 30 cm in depth; but those which detonated on open ground created bomb craters that were about 7 meters in diameter and 2 to 3 meters deep. The shrapnel from the bombs had enormous penetrating power. They penetrated masonry of 1 to 1-1/2 stone strength, steel beams and even railroad ties, walls of tanks, tanks of tank cars, and wood up to a thickness of 30 cm. The fragments traveled over 200 meters in air and still had considerable penetration force at a distance of 100 meters. The fragments were very hot as they hit so that they welded steel and ignited coal gas.

For the Fire Department, the following effects of the shrapnel were of interest:

(1) Five circuits of the fire alarm installations (overhead cables) in Harbor were damaged at 13 places. Largely because of this, the fire alarm system was out of commission. The sounding of the air defense sirens, which is partially accomplished over underground telegraph lines, would not have been possible via the fire alarm cables. The damages were repaired, for the most part within one hour and completely within 7 hours, by the Fire Department's repair service.

(2) Hoses were damaged at several sites by shrapnel during fire fighting operations and had to be replaced by new hoses. This caused a temporary interruption of the fire fighting operations.

(3) The fragments penetrated the walls of tanks, tank cars, and gasmeters. When this happens, the flammable liquids and gases can leak out and lead to a greatly increased fire danger.

(4) High explosive bombs causing fire to buildings were not observed.

(5) Above ground hydrants were largely unusable because of the shrapnel damage.

5. Petroleum Harbor

In the region of the petroleum harbor, one high explosive bomb and about 20 firebombs were dropped. The high explosive bomb hit a stone slope at Bubendey Shore and the walls of several tanks were penetrated by bomb fragments. The damage however was above the liquid level, so that flammable liquid did not seep out. An irrigation cable on the roof of one tank was penetrated. The firebombs penetrated the tank roofs and in some cases, also the tank floor. One tank was hit by three firebombs. The tanks that were hit were either empty or filled with lubricating oil and Diesel oil. The firebombs did not ignite in the tanks, and failed to start fires. Gasoline tanks were not hit.

6. General Experiences

At the beginning of the air attack, a flood of telephone calls came in to the Fire Department, which tied up all the lines. Most involved very unimportant questions, such as if there was an alert, if the danger was over, etc. Later on, several reports of fires came in; also, many firebombs were reported, many of which had burned out in the open or had already been extinguished. The Fire Department tried to pass these messages on to the Civil Defense Sectors. However, it was impossible to transmit all the messages, since all the telephone lines were constantly

busy. The fire messages were finally transmitted to the fire stations located in the various sectors in order to make a later check possible.

The dispatch of forces of the Fire Department took place according to peacetime regulations until the sounding of the "alert," whereby an effective fire fighting was immediately started. Later on, the brigades moved out only on order. Only in Air Sector VIII were fire fighting forces sent directly from one fire to another; in one case, the fighting of a fire that was observed on the way from another fire was taken up by a brigade leader on his own initiative. The independent actions of leaders of the fire service was indicated according to the circumstances and contributed significantly to the quick extinguishing of fires. The reports of the tower watches proved to be very valuable, especially in the announcement of fires. However, they occasionally reported light phenomena as fires and some of these turned out to be firebombs burning in the open. Therefore the tower watch reports must be treated with caution.

In action, the forces of the Fire Department proved themselves outstanding. The reserve forces, too, worked very well, even though their uniforms and boots left much to be desired. At some sites, the reserves worked in civilian clothes and with street shoes, which of course prevented their being used in a total capacity. Everything should be done to complete the equipping of the Fire Department reserves.

Even though the Fire Department was able to put out all fires effectively, no final verdict can be handed down, because of the existing confusions due to the belated alarm, on whether the present organization of reporting and action for the Fire Department is adequate or should be improved.

(Signed) (Unreadable) May 30, 1940

Air Defense Command VIII
Chief of Fire Department

Hamburg-Harburg, May 29, 1940

ACTION REPORT

About the events during the air attack of May 18, 1940, at the damage site Merkische Guano-Works A.G., Hafenstrasse 17

The bombs were dropped starting at 12:28 a.m. on May 18. Eight high explosive bombs and sixty firebombs landed at the damage site.

When the first firemen arrived, half of the buildings of the works was on fire; these consisted of the artificial fertilizer and slag installation, the magnesite mill, phosphate mill, boiler house, and the personnel rooms. The plant civil defense organization was powerless to cope with the fires. They opened the gates for us and did put out a number of small fires. The first arriving fire fighting forces protected the neighboring firms from the spread of the fire and then started fighting the fires. The fires were confined to the locations on fire as found on arrival at the site.

- The area covered by the damage site was 95 x 150 meters
- The plant fire forces consisted of nine men and they fought the fire
- The professional fire fighting forces were requested by the Plant Civil Defense Chief. The following units were put into action: Industrial Fire Brigade 15/VIII, light fire brigade 33/VIII, heavy fire brigade 22/VIII, heavy fire brigade 13/C, light fire brigade 21/VIII, heavy fire brigade 23 'IV, reserve brigade 14/VIII, heavy fire fighting squad 12a/VIII, Plant Fire Brigade 25a/B, and 26a/B, heavy fire brigade 12/B.
- The overall leadership of these forces was first assumed by Chief Hennig, later by Fire Engineer Schott.
- The fire brigades were committed as follows:

  Plant Fire Brigade 15/VIII moved out 2:20 a.m., arrived 2:25 a.m.
  Heavy Fire Brigade 33/VIII " " 2:20 a.m., " 2:23 a.m.
  Light Fire Brigade 22/VIII " " 2:40 a.m., " 2:46 a.m.
  Heavy Fire Fighting Squad 13a/C moved out 2:53 a.m., arrived 2:58 a.m.
  Heavy Fire Fighting Squad 13b/C moved out 3:10 a.m., arrived 3:15 a.m.
  Light Fire Brigade 21/VIII moved out 2:37 a.m., arrived 2:45 a.m.

Reserve Brigade 14/VIII moved out 6:15 a.m., arrived 6:21 a.m.

Heavy Fire Fighting Group 12a/VIII
Plant Fire Fighting Group 25a/B
Plant Fire Fighting Group 26a/B
Heavy Fire Brigade 12/B
} arrived 7:31 a.m.

- The fire brigades left as follows:

  Plant Fire Brigade 15/VIII moved out 7:30 a.m., back at fire station 7:35 a.m.
  Heavy Fire Brigade 33/VIII moved out 7:26 a.m., back at fire station 7:30 a.m.
  Light Fire Brigade 22/VIII moved out 7:15 a.m., back at fire station 7:23 a.m.
  Light Fire Brigade 13a/C moved out 6:30 a.m., back at fire station 6:51 a.m.
  Reserve Brigade 14/VIII moved out 10:52 a.m., back at fire station 11:00 a.m.
  Light Fire Squad 12/VIII moved out 7:12 a.m., back at fire station 7:15 a.m.

- The Reinforced Industrial Civil Defense took over the fire watch after all brigades left.

I certify that the above is correct:

(Signed)	Lehmann	Hoeltje
	Acting Fire Chief	Fire Engineer

To the Policepresident July 10, 1940

Hamburg

RE: Fire Site Schuetzenpforte 7

An investigation about the actions of Fire Brigade 23/III, quartered in Sprinkenhof, produced the following:

The driver of a fire engine, Fireman Fastnacht, heard the detonation of a high explosive bomb while in an air raid shelter at Burchardplatz. He ran upstairs where he could see, from the entrance of the house on Burchardplatz, that a house in Schuetzenpforte was burning on the ground floor. He ran through the inner courtyard to Police Precinct 32 (Altstaedterstrasse) and at the entrance met First Lieutenant Bauermeister, to whom he reported the fire. A reserve policeman reported the fire at the same time. Fastnacht ran back to his vehicle and started the motor. In his estimation it might have taken 4 to 5 minutes from the time he reported the fire until the crew of the fire brigade arrived and moved out to the fire site. Taking the local distances into consideration, it may have taken a total of 10 minutes from the time of discovery of the fire to the time at which the fire brigade moved out. Precinct 32 apparently passed notice of the fire on to C. D. Command III, where it was received at 2:42 a. m.

Even before that (2:40 a. m.), the C. D. Command III had been informed by the telegraph office in the Main Fire House of a fire in Klosterstrasse. The department head of the C. D. fire service immediately gave orders to the HFB 23/III (Sprinkenhof). This order was passed on orally to the commander of the fire brigade, Captain Bendfeld. He reports that the order came a short time after the detonation of the high explosive bomb. This order almost coincided with the alarm given by Fireman Fastnacht.

The crew of the fire brigade immediately left the air raid shelter and because of the very short distance, ran to the fire site. On their arrival, the house was on fire from the cellar to the third floor. Because of the intensity of the fire and advanced degree of destruction, the building could not be entered, so that containment of the fire to the third floor and prevention of a spread to the upper rooms was impossible.

The quick spread of the fire might have been caused by the fact that an auto supply shop was located on the ground floor of the building and that

flammable liquids were stored in the shop, (e.g., liquid rubber in cans, 50 kg lacquer and 200 kg brake fluid). Apparently some gasoline in canisters was also stored in the shop.

In view of the described situation, it is highly doubtful whether the fire could have been extinguished had the fire department arrived sooner. Faster action could have been possible only if the driver who discovered the fire would have alarmed the fire brigade directly. It is suggested therefore that fire department personnel, when they notice a nearby fire be permitted to take immediate independent action and report same to the C.D. Command at the same time. In view of the small number of fires up till now, even in larger air attacks, this regulation should be adopted without hesitation. It would be possible in many cases, if this suggestion is adopted, to prevent many small starting fires from developing and spreading to become large fires.

(Signed) Fire Chief

Fire Protection Service - Department I
Fire Station 11 Hamburg, August 23, 1943

Experience Report on the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg on July 24/25, July 27/28, July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943 by Captain Jacobs, Chief of Fire Protection Service Department I

REPORT OUTLINE

1. Attack Tactics of the Enemy
2. Start and Spread of Fires
3. Use of Preventive Measures in Buildings
   a. Clearing Out Rubbish
   b. Fireproofing
   c. Sand and Water Reserves
4. Deployment of Local Forces
5. Use of Expanded Self-Protection and Industrial Civil Defense Forces
6. Water Supply; Water Containers
7. Clean-Up Operations; Repeated Flare-Ups of Extinguished Fires through the Storm
8. Use of Self-Protection, Armed Forces personnel, etc.
9. Messenger Service, Inquiry Service, Command Posts
10. Special Experiences with Small Vaults in Banks and Safes

* *

1. Attack Tactics of the Enemy

The first attack waves consisted almost exclusively of high explosive bombs. This tactic was successful in breaking many windows and in removing many pantile roofs in city residential districts, so that favorable conditions were created for the ignition and rapid development of fires following the subsequent dropping of firebombs. The later dropping of high explosive bombs, especially those with time fuses, was intended to frighten the population, so that the Self-Protection forces would come

into play too late and be prevented from successfully carrying out their task (fire fighting).

Findings

a. Pan-tile roofs are most unsuitable in providing protection from high explosive and firebomb effects. They were torn off at a great distance from the detonating bombs and exposed the flammable attics of the houses and afforded the firebombs easy direct contact with the flammables.

b. Roofs consisting of tar and gravel proved much more durable and protected many houses. The highest degree of protection for the houses was provided by the slate roofs.

c. Windows with large panes shattered easily and allowed the flying embers to enter apartments and start fires. Windows with many small panes withstood the air pressure fairly well, seldom shattered, and in many cases prevented the entry of embers into the houses and apartments.

2. Start and Spread of Fires

The residential fires can be divided into four main groups according to their way of spreading.

a. The most common kind: The roof of the house was hit by firebombs, and the fire developed in the attic.

b. The house was hit by phosphorus or liquid bombs. The bombs penetrated one or two stories and ignited fuel materials on these floors as well as the attic and roof materials.

c. The house was hit by firebombs (as under b). The burning contents of the bomb dropped into the stairwell and further down into the cellar. In this case, the house would be completely aflame in a few moments.

d. The windows of the house were destroyed, and the ignited mass of material from bombs detonated in front of a house would be thrown into the ground floor and lower floors; where this took place, the house burned from the bottom up.

Findings

a. In many cases, the Self-Protection forces were able to put out the fires with their own equipment, provided the attics were free of rummage and no coal was stored in the attic.

b. Although the Self-Protection forces, especially in the night of July 24/25, 1943, attacked the fires courageously, their limited fire fighting equipment was not sufficient to contain the widespread conflagrations.

c. Houses with inside stairwells usually have a light shaft on each floor and a large skylight in the roof. After the broken glass made the staircases difficult to use, the liquid fire mass from the firebombs would drop from the skylight to the basement (as for instance in houses at Gerstenkamp). Numerous members of the Self-Protection service who were fighting fires in the upper stories had to leave their tasks when this sequence of events took place and had to flee in order not to be cut off. The tenants who were sheltered in the basement, could only flee by way of a wall breakthrough to the neighboring house and then into the open air.

d. At several points in the Hohenlift Chaussee, near the Karzentra Department Store (which was destroyed by a high explosive bomb), the stores and apartments in the lower floors were on fire. From these buildings, jet flames leaped clear into the middle of the street and prevented the Fire Fighting Squad 23a/I from entering the burning buildings. In these houses, collapse of their different parts followed very swiftly.

3. Use of Preventive Measures in Buildings

a. Clearing Out Rubbish

The clearing out of rubbish, vigorously put into practice at one time, has been allowed to lapse in many homes. Especially since the delivery of winter fuel, large stocks of briquets, hard coal, and coke were brought to the attics. Whenever these fuels were ignited in the attics, the ceilings quickly burned through, and the burning material fell into the next story below, growing in size from floor to floor, and in many cases, led to the total loss of the house.

b. Fireproofing (e.g., Attic of Fire Station 11)

Even though the attic of Fire Station 11 had been carefully fireproofed, this fireproofing gave little protection. Example: A stick firebomb burning out on a floor protected by a sand layer with a thickness of 2 cm, set the roof on fire two meters above the bomb residual and would have led to a fire of the rafters if left alone, while the floor protected by sand showed no fire traces of any kind. The protective layer of sand on the floor certainly proved most effective in the bomb hits at Fire Station 11.

c. The water and sand reserves kept in readiness in the residential houses (on the average, one bucket of water and one small box of sand in front of every apartment door), were not nearly adequate for the successful fighting of fires by the Self-Protection forces, especially since the municipal water supply failed early in the attack. Based on experiences from fires in other cities, this shortage was repeatedly pointed out by the undersigned in the past.

4. Distribution of Local Forces

It should be pointed out once again that after being called to a fire the crews of the fire brigades, including the Fire Chief and his Squad Captains, were put into action immediately and without hesitation. No matter how dense the hail of bombs, not a single man entertained even the most fleeting thought of delaying his response by a single second.

The protective eye goggles have proved very effective in fighting fires and against the rain of sparks, even though the enormous heat of the fires still caused a large number of minor burns of the conjunctivae. At many fire sites, fire fighting would have been impossible without these goggles.

5. Use of Expanded Self-Protection and Industrial Civil Defense Forces

The activation of these forces, which was carried out by telephone during the night of July 24/25, 1943, but had to be done by motorcycle and bicycle in the later attacks was achieved without difficulties and without delay. By selfless and courageous attention to duty these crews have successfully fought many fires, and they deserve recognition and commendation, even though it is impossible for me to single out the crews of certain plants for this purpose. Every plant crew did its utmost.

6. Water Supply; Water Storage Containers

The fire fighting activities were hindered by the fact that the municipal water supply failed very early after the beginning of the first attack and the necessary water had to be obtained partly through long hose lines (up to two kilometers) laid to waterways and reservoirs. Even though the reservoirs were soon empty and had to be refilled from natural bodies of water, the building of reservoirs was still a very good thing and saved many buildings from total destruction. It is imperative that many more reservoirs be built all over the city and that the tanks be bigger, so that the water supply will not be exhausted so quickly, causing a time-consuming re-routing of hose lines.

7. Clean-Up Operations

The wind that came up during the attack nights caused several fire sites that had been extinguished to flare up a second time and these fires had to be finally put out to prevent them from spreading to undamaged buildings. These mop-up operations occupied all forces of the Fire Service, as well as the available out-of-town forces, full time for several days after the attack. Help by the Self-Protection forces in these actions was completely lacking, as these people were completely exhausted and also because they had no water at their disposal for fire fighting since the municipal water supply was not functioning.

8. Effort and Tasks of Self-Protection

Even though the Self-Protection forces worked superbly at many damage sites until they were completely exhausted during the first night of attack, the activation of and assistance rendered by the Self-Protection Service, taken as part of the overall picture, was too little and too late. This was partly due to the fact that many houses were without Self-Protection units and the tenants were in public air raid bunkers, and fire fighting operations were not taken up until the alarm was over. In the meantime, the fires had spread to such an extent that the small supplies of water and sand were not sufficient to extinguish the fires. Even though in many cases the Self-Protection forces started fire fighting operations, they soon became discouraged and often gave up altogether, although the men of the Fire Protection Service kept encouraging them. The Self-Protection forces limited their efforts thereafter to salvaging household goods and personal belongings; i.e., putting them on the street.

Because of the evacuation which followed, many men left Hamburg, so that during the third and fourth air attacks, there was, for all practical purposes, no assistance provided by the Self-Protection forces.

Fire fighting operations were further impaired by the fact that, especially in Uhlenhorst, many of the houses were not only evacuated, but locked up as well and, in many cases, the front door had to be broken down.

During the attack nights and during the fire fighting operations, military personnel and other units were put to salvaging household items and other personal belongings, i.e., to get these things out of the houses and into the street. It is urgently requested for the future, that these forces be equipped with spades and shovels and that in places where the Fire Protection Service has blackened a fire site, they shovel the still glowing fire debris into the street instead of saving household goods. The clearing out of household goods creates new fire dangers, while the shoveling out of glowing fire debris from the upper stories of houses would have saved many houses from total destruction.

9. Messenger Service, Inquiry Service, Command Posts

While the messenger service during the first attack night was largely handled by telephone and required little assistance from motorcycle and bicycle messengers (gas sentries), in some sectors the messenger service during subsequent nights had to be handled almost exclusively by messengers with bicycles.

It has proved to be practical to equip all Command Posts with gasoline stations, so that the vehicles can fill tanks at the station. According to the above, during the first night July 24/25, 1943, the Command Posts were equipped as follows: Command Post with gasoline station, 18th Police Precinct Hoheluftchaussee for the damaged district Hoheluftchaussee. Command Post Erickestrasse with gasoline station, for the District Frickestrasse, Niendorferstrasse. Fire Station 11 with gasoline station for Alsterdorf and Winterhude. In most cases, the fuel had to be obtained in small canisters by motorcycles with sidecars, since heavy vehicles could not get to the Command Posts and gasoline pumps because of blocked streets.

How vital the inquiry service is, especially when carried out through the Fire Service, is shown by the fact that from fire sites in Jarrestadt no messages of any kind reached headquarters. These fire sites were discovered by the undersigned while driving through the territory of the Civil Defense Sector, and fire fighting units were put into action by him immediately. These reconnaissance trips were often quite difficult to make, since one had to go through streets which could only be passed with protection from a heavy overcoat and with protective goggles because of the heat and the shower of sparks. Other streets, which were not passable because of the heat and wildly leaping flames, could only be

reconnoitered by closing all windows of the automobile and racing through them at top speed. At the time of the first reconnoiters, there was no obstruction caused by falling buildings, so that these streets could be driven through.

10. Special Experiences with Small Vaults in Banks and with Safe Deposit Boxes

In Hohenlitchenssee, Corner Gosslerstrasse, a branch of the Commerce Bank was located in the ground floor of a large residential house. This branch had a small built-in vault, about 3 x 5 meters, with walls 1/2 meter thick and 1/2 meter thick concrete ceiling and floor.

The building was completely gutted. In the cellars, heaps of coke burned for days. After eight days, the vault was cleared of debris and opened. The thick walls of the vault were still so hot that even after airing it for several hours, the vault could only be entered for a few minutes at a time.

Nothing had burned in the vault, but the suitcases and equipment stored there had to be carried out with asbestos gloves.

The leather suitcases for the most part were so dried out that they disintegrated during transport. The valuable linens in the suitcases were completely yellowed. The papers salvaged from the vault were intact and still readable, but were completely yellowed. Some of the more delicate pieces of jewelry in the strongboxes were melted.

Similar experiences were reported with other safes. The papers stored in the safes were not burned and were still readable, but dried out and yellowed, and turned to ashes when touched.

(Signed) Jacobs
District Captain of
Fire Protection Police

Fire Service Department I
Fire Station II

Hamburg, August 5, 1943

To Department 91

RE: Saving of Human Lives from Destroyed or Fire-Engulfed Houses and Bunkers

Lieutenant Jersemann and Reserve Lieutenant Albers, during the attack night of July 24/25, 1943, saved about 200 persons from the tunnel bunker between the Houses on Quickborn and Dreppelstrasse. There was a violent storm of sparks and great heat. Smoke was already being sucked into the bunker through the ventilation system.

Brigade Sergeant Gustav Kuhlman, during the night of July 25 in Oldesloherstrasse 19, with the assistance of three flak-men, recovered six persons alive and six dead from the cellar of a collapsed building in a continuous 10-hour effort. He had to saw the living people free as they were completely trapped.

Sergeant Theodor Harfst, during the night of July 25, 1943, recovered seven persons alive from a burning and collapsed house at Oldesloherstrasse 21 in Schnelsen. Harfst, after hours of clearing away the debris, worked his way with his bare hands to the people buried in the shelter.

During the air attack of July 29/30, 1943, Fire Fighting Squads 11a/I under the command of Master Sergeant Simon and 11b/I under the command of Master Sergeant Wagner were ordered by Lt. Colonel Schliemann to the tunnel bunker Mesterkamp/Roennheidstrasse, to rescue about 400 people who were trapped in the bunker surrounded by burning houses. First, a fire in a neighboring factory in which enormous amounts of gasoline and oil barrels were stored, had to be extinguished. After about 3-1/2 hours of fire fighting, the two squads arrived at the bunker and were able to save the 400 people there. The work was greatly complicated by the fire storm.

Civil Defense Police Staff Sergeant Karl Keil, on July 25, 1943, at 1 a.m., with his Squad 23b/I, saved twenty women and children from an air raid shelter in the Kaufhaus Concentra Department Store at Hoheluftchaussee in the middle of a fire storm. On July 28, the same Sergeant Keil saved about fifty people from a cellar in Sternstrasse, Wandsbek, in the middle of a fire storm with the help of his Squad 23b/I.

On July 28, 1943, Brigade Captain Carl Stuhr, who was subsequently killed by a high explosive bomb during the fire fighting operations on July 30, with his Squad 23a/I saved about fifty people from a shelter in Zweite Schulstrasse, Wandsbek during a fire storm.

Brigade Leader Hugo Moser ordered three rescue missions. During the night of July 24/25, 1943, two men of Brigade 14/I saved two women and four children in Lehmweg Terrace by way of a wall and a fire ladder. During the same night, four additional men of the brigade were entrusted with the rescue and transport of children from a nursery in Moltkestrasse. During the night of July 29/30, 1943, the occupants of the air raid shelter at Corner Abendrothsweg and Hoheluftchaussee (Beiderhase Restaurant) were rescued by seven men from Brigade 14/I. All these actions were accomplished under the most difficult conditions.

Brigade Leader, Sergeant Hans Fischer, with his Fire Brigade 21/I, rescued 400 people during the night of July 30, 1943, from the Large Bunker at the Corner Gertigstrasse/Geibelstrasse, which was surrounded by burning buildings.

(Signed) Fersemann
District Lieutenant of the Fire
Protection Police
Chief of Fire Service Department I

Fire Service Department I
Heavy Fire Brigade 11/I

Hamburg, August 5, 1943

RE: Saving of Lives During the Air Attack of July 29/30, 1943

On July 30, at 2:00 a.m., FB 11/I was ordered into action fighting fires at Muehlenkampstrasse. At 7:30 a.m., the brigade was pulled out on orders of Lt. Colonel Schliemann to save lives at Mesterkamp/Roennheidstrasse. About 400 persons at this address were trapped in a tunnel bunker surrounded by burning buildings. When we arrived, we found the area in total darkness in spite of the tremendous fire storm in progress. The brigade proceeded through the burning Roennheidstrasse to the bunker. The A hose was connected directly at the bunker. The A-Squad started to fight the fire at a neighboring factory, in which enormous amounts of gasoline and oil drums were stored, and which were exploding, one after the other. These burning liquids, which were being blown by the fire storm winds in the direction of the bunker, were attacked by A-Squad under the leadership of Master Sergeant Simon with 2 B hoses and were thereby extinguished. The B engine had to be pulled out because of the great heat. The B-Squad under the leadership of Master Sergeant Wagner with the help of 2 B hoses then formed a retreat path through the burning streets for the A-Squad and the people to be saved.

After about 3-1/2 hours of constant fire fighting the storm abated somewhat and the heat became less intense. Thereupon the people were asked to leave the bunker as fast as possible, since the bare ruins threatened to collapse. After repeated urgings, the people were led through the path of retreat to the assembly point. After all trapped persons had been rescued, the fire brigade had to find a new way back, since the various streets were blocked by debris from falling buildings. Finally it was possible to leave the site by roundabout routes without damage.

Master Nehmer was in charge of the rescue operation. After 1-1/2 hours at the fire site, he had to visit a hospital because of eye irritation.

(Signed) Simon (Master Sergeant)
Squad Leader

Experience Report About the Conflagrations
from July 24/25 to the Middle of August, 1943

During the air attack in the night of July 24/25, 1943, high explosive and firebombs fell in the immediate vicinity of Lockstedt Fire Station. While HFB 11/I was busy extinguishing stick firebombs which had fallen into the yard of the firehouse and into one of the apartments above the fire station, we noticed that the woodworking shop of Wrage & Schact, on Jahnstrasse in Lokstedt that bordered on the back of the houses Wilhelmstrasse 16 and 18--a bakery and a shoe store and apartments above--was in flames. It was not feasible to extinguish the fire since the available fire fighting forces were not sufficient and since it was impossible to get reinforcements due to the fires raging all over Hamburg. We went into action immediately, however, to protect the threatened buildings at Wilhelmstrasse 16 and 18, and we were successful in preventing the spread of fire to these houses. The water necessary for this action was taken from the hydrants.

Soon thereafter we were called to Wilhelmstrasse 21, a residential house which was on fire. There we were able to contain the fire with the contents of a tank engine; the clean-up operations were taken over by the Self-Protection forces. From there we were dispatched to Hindenburgstrasse (Lockstedt) where the houses at Nos. 1 and 3 were on fire. Since the various hydrants situated in the vicinity did not release any more water, we began to lay a hose line to the water reservoir at Siemensplatz. As soon as the B engine was connected to the hose and ready to draw water, we were called away and ordered to go to Hoheluftchaussee.

The A engine, in the meantime, had been put in place at Mathildenstrasse in Lokstedt, where the oilskin factory of Koehler & Son was on fire. The engine could not be used, however, since no source of water was available. The A Squad, together with the Plant Civil Defense forces formed a water bucket chain, by which it was possible to save one wing of the building. From there the A Squad, too, was ordered to go to Hoheluftchaussee.

When we arrived at Hoheluftchaussee, the B engine was put at the Hoheluft Bridge, in order to pump water from the Isebek Canal. The B Squad was ordered to start fighting the fires in Houses at Isestrasse 1, 3 and 5. First, 3 hoses were directed to houses Nos. 3 and 5, since it appeared possible to save the lower floors of these houses and because by doing so the spread of the fire to the house at No. 7 was prevented. If we had had larger forces at our disposal, it would have been possible to limit the fire to the roof and the top stories of the 3 houses; however, since we could only spare 1 C hose for each house, we could not prevent

the lower floors from catching on fire. The house on Isestrasse 1 burned down completely. In addition, the water pressure from the hydrant became lower and lower; the hose-truck 1/I was used to lay a hose line from Hoheluft Bridge to Gosslerstrasse which provided water to the B Engine. Other brigades and squads that were fighting fires in Klinker and Grindelberg 88-90, also received their water from B engine, so that finally 6 B lines were connected to it.

It should be added, regarding the fires at Isestrasse 1, 3, and 5 that most of the tenants had fled and left their belongings behind. Otherwise it would have been possible to save a great deal of the furnishings and merchandise from the lower floors, especially from the stores at Isestrasse 1 (Corner Hoheluft Bridge). Some men of the B Squad rescued linens and other valuables from the burning house; they had to leave many things to the flames however, since the forces at their disposal were not large enough to remove everything.

The A Engine was connected to the above mentioned hose line laid by the hose truck at Gosslerstrasse and supplied the hose lines laid out by Squad A with water. The men of the A Squad fought several fires in Hoheluftchaussee and in Gosslerstrasse. During the fire fighting operations on the second floor of the house at Hoheluftchaussee 64, the staircase caught fire. Since the stairs could not be used any longer, expansion ladders had to be used to remove the men working in the house. Here, too, none of the tenants were present, so that the same observations as made above for the Isestrasse case apply.

On July 26 at 2 p.m., after 36 hours on duty, HFB 11/I received orders to return to the fire station. However, at 4:20 p.m., we received new orders for action. The B Squad moved out to Hindenburgstrasse No. 3, at which a raging fire was fought with 2 C hoses. The A Squad was ordered to go to Niendorferstrasse 131, but did not go into action at that address since no water was available and the extent of the fire was not large enough to justify the laying of an extended hose line to the water basins far away. However, a coke heap was covered with sand. At 11:55 p.m. the brigade was back at the station.

After about 1-1/2 hours, on July 27 at 1:30 a.m., a new order was received that instructed the B Squad to go to Hindenburgstrasse 35 to extinguish a fire at a coke dump at Kemm Cake Bakery. A long hose line had to be laid to the water storage tank at Siemersplatz and at about 6 a.m. in the morning the fire was extinguished to the point where renewed flare-up was no longer imminent.

During the attack on the night of July 27/28, the houses at

Hindenburgstrasse 1 and 3 were hit a second time by firebombs and caught on fire. Also the buildings at Siemersplatz and the corner house at Wilhelmstrasse caught on fire. Immediately, the HFB 11/I went into action on its own and fought the fires at Siemersplatz. Because of the fast action on the part of the brigade only the roof was damaged. The water for fighting the fire was taken from the water storage tank about 50 meters away. The fires in Hindenburgstrasse in the meantime were fought by the Party Fire Engine. The Brigade 11/I assisted them a little later and through the combined efforts it was possible to prevent the gutting of these houses and to save at least parts of them.

On July 29, the B engine was ordered to the Command Post Lombardsbruecke/Alsterdamm. There the squad received an order to proceed to Rothenburgsort. All attempts to reach that location by all sorts of routes and detours were unsuccessful as the streets, to the extent that they did not form a sea of flames, were impassible because of the debris from collapsed houses. The B Squad then received orders to take up fire fighting at Wandsbekerchaussee and in the vicinity of Eilbektal Strasse. Together with the Volunteer Fire Brigade from Buedelsdorf (near Rendsburg) we worked until 5:45 p.m. on July 29 at which time we returned to the station. We were successful in saving numerous houses from complete destruction and in containing the fires at other places at least until the tenants of the lower floors could rescue their most precious possessions.

The A Squad was assigned to clean-up operations at Langenkamp during our absence. It should be noted here, that for work of this kind, the mobile task force would have been sufficient, and it was not necessary to employ the large fire engine of the heavy fire brigade.

On July 30, the HFB 11/I was put into action at Muehlenkamp. The brigade received its orders at 1:45 a.m. and moved out immediately. Since whole streets, especially Sierichstrasse, Dorotheenstrasse, Barmbekerstrasse, Winterhuder Marktplatz were in flames (and were partially impassible because of large bomb craters in the streets), it was possible to reach our goal only by roundabout routes. Squad A went into action at Langenkamp; Squad B at Preystrasse. At Preystrasse, between Muehlenkamp and Schinkelstrasse, nine houses were totally enveloped by flames. One C hose was taken at once to the corner of Preystrasse and Schinkelstrasse, in order to head off the fire. The second C hose was placed on Preystrasse at the corner of Muehlenkamp, to prevent the fire from jumping across Muehlenkamp. Not till then could the fires in the center houses be fought. Since the staircases for the most part had already collapsed, the only possibility that remained was to fight the fire from the outside with a B hose, which was done immediately. The houses

Schinkelstrasse and the rear of Peter Marquardtstrasse were covered with sand and water by the Self-Protection forces despite a heavy rain of sparks, which prevented these houses from catching on fire. The water was brought in with a B line from the A engine which received water from the Muehlenkamp Canal at the Langenkamp Bridge.

At 7 a.m., HFB 11/I was ordered by Lt. Colonel Schliemann to Mesterkamp/Roennheidstrasse to rescue some people. The fire fighting at Muehlenkamp was interrupted immediately, and the brigade went by the fastest route to Mesterkamp. Details about our activities there are contained in the attached special report.

Nothing needs to be said about various small actions and the refilling of water storage tanks. On August 1, the B Squad was ordered into action in Barmbekerstrasse 13 and at Goldbekufer 25 for clean-up operations. In fighting the fire at Barmbekerstrasse 13, the laying of a long hose line was avoided because a drain located in the street contained enough water. The water was therefore sucked from the drain. Even though the water was very dirty, it was good enough to wet the burning remnants. At Goldbekufer, water was taken from the Goldbek Canal.

During the day of August 2 and the night of August 2/3, both squads were again active. Squad A operated at Stammanstrasse 22, while the B Squad carried out clean-up operations at Flueggestrasse 12/14 and Kaemmerufer 8, 10, and 12. At all these locations, the floors, beams, etc., as well as the fuel stored in the cellars were on fire.

The action at Winterhuder Marktplatz on August 2, should be especially mentioned. In the Kolzen Garage, coke supplies had to be wetted down in order to prevent the nearby gasoline tanks, containing about 15,000 liters of gasoline, from exploding. With one B and one C hose it was possible to cool off the coke and to turn away the explosion danger. The A Squad was active on that day at Knickweg and at Goldbekufer, dousing burning fuel supplies--especially a store of coal at Knickweg. The water was obtained from the Osterbek Canal (for Knickweg) and from the Goldbek Canal.

On August 3, the A Squad received orders at 3 a.m. to go to Borstelerchaussee 246, where a large villa and a barn with a built-in apartment were on fire. While the fire at the villa was already so widespread that it was impossible to save it, it was possible to preserve the barn with 1 B hose and 3 C hoses. The water was taken from two hydrants. If these had not supplied water, help would have been impossible since there were no bodies of water and no reservoirs or tanks for miles around. At the same time, the B Squad was ordered to Hainholt 85 and

Timm Kroegerweg. At these sites work proceeded only with the tank engine, because no other water was available. It seems that water tanks should be installed in these housing districts. While Squad A was kept busy until 12:30 noon, Squad B returned to the station at 5:10 a. m. It was ordered out again immediately to Maria Louisenstrasse 90 and to Rondeel. There is nothing special to report about the actions at these sites.

On August 3, at 10:46 p. m., the A Squad was called to Curschmannstrasse 8 where coke in a cellar was on fire. The neighbor house was practically undamaged; however, there was danger of the fire spreading to the neighbor house by way of the wall breakthrough in the air raid shelter. This was averted by hosing operations.

On August 4, HFB 11/I was busy in Winterhude; the A Squad in Maria Louisenstrasse/Krohnskamp, and the B Squad at Langenkamp. At these sites, the beams, floors, fuel supplies, etc. were on fire and they kept flaring up anew because of the phosphorus that was present.

Concerning further actions, only those of August 6 are mentioned. The B Squad was busy at Rondeel/Maria Louisenstrasse with clean-up operations. A long hose line had to be laid to the Leinpfad Canal. This could have been avoided if a small brigade with a small fire engine had been put into action; a small engine could have taken water from the Rondeel Pond by way of the gardens of the villas. On August 10, 1943, the A Squad was put into action at Geffkenstrasse 15/17. While the villa at No. 17 was completely gutted, No. 15 was virtually undamaged. Since the ceiling beams were carried through the firewall, the fire spread to th eighboring house. However, the fire was put out before it progressed v ry far. If the beams had been installed according to regulations, the danger of fire spread would not have existed.

Hamburg, August 25, 1943
(Signed) Wagner, Brigade Leader
HFB 11/I

Fire Brigade 14 Hamburg, August 22, 1943

To: Fire Service Department I Through Official Channels

RE: Report on Actions from July 24 to August 4, 1943

July 25 - 12:30 a. m.

Five stick firebombs fell into the shelter and gymnasium of our own quarters at Lehmweg 14; the resulting fires in the ceilings and beams as well as the burning bombs were extinguished. During these actions the telephone service failed. Two gas sentries were consequently ordered to go to the sector headquarters to serve as messengers; they were given the following message: "Brigade has decided to go into fire fighting action on its own initiative on burning houses at Nos. 6, 8, and 10 on Lehmweg, burning streetcars standing nearby, and the burning house at the corner of Lehmweg and Otto-Bloeckerstrasse.

July 25 - 1:00 a. m.

The fires in the streetcars were put out with one C hose using water from a nearby hydrant. The houses at Lehmweg 6 to 10 and those to the rear were wholly on fire. Squad 14b/I was assigned to the burning industrial building at Lehmweg 10.

July 25 - 1:15 a. m.

After 15 minutes of action, Squad 14a/I was ordered to go to the Valvo Pipe Works on Lockstedt. Access by way of Bismarck-Manstein-Quickbornstrasse was made difficult because of a bomb crater and debris in the streets. We had to stop when we reached house No. 39 (on Quickbornstrasse) because of a fire storm. We then went around by way of Gaertnerstrasse, Eidelstedterweg, Ottersbek Allee, Lutterothstrasse, Hellkamp-Eidelstedterweg, Kaiser Friedrichstrasse, Lowenstrasse, Carlstrasse, Horst Wesselallee. On the way we noted that fire station No. 9 and neighboring houses were all on fire and observed industrial fires on Horst Wesselallee. On arrival at the Pipe Works we found that only two sheds had burned down, that the fires were contained by the Self-Protection Service, that no water was available and that no water storage containers were in the area. Orders were given by Captain Jacobs for Squad 14a/I to go to a damage site at Hoheluftchaussee-Lehmweg. Laid-out hoses were picked up and we went to the new site by way of Behrkampsweg, Hindenburgstrasse, and Hoheluftchaussee. When we reached the Capital Theater we found the way blocked by debris,

craters and fallen overhead wires. We went back to Eppendorferweg and then by way of Moltkestrasse to Isekai-Hoheluft Bridge. We were held up along the way by fire storms which had developed in the meantime as well as by the debris in the streets. Also, along Moltkestrasse, we were asked by the nurses of the children's nursery located on that street to help them. A shower of sparks had developed in the area and the winds carried burning wood fragments the size of a fist along through the air. We were able to calm the nurses by promising assistance.

The motorized fire engine was put into position at the Isebeck Canal and the squad laid hoses to the nursery. The brigade captain and two men directed the rescue of the children under a water curtain from the hose teams. A civilian bicyclist was sent to obtain ambulances. After the rescue operation was completed and wet blankets were made available to the children and nurses, the squad proceeded to the damage site on Hoheluftchaussee.

Squad 14b/I fought the fires at Lehmweg 7 to 10 for about one hour when it received orders from Captain Jacobs to seal off the fires in the houses to the rear of Lehmweg 7 since, of the eight houses along the street, two had not yet caught on fire. The houses to the rear were difficult to reach because a small fire storm at Lehmweg 7.

July 25 - 6:00 a.m.

Squad 14b/I assigned also to the damage site at No. 6 Hoheluftchaussee. Calls for help were heard from the terrace; they saved two women and two children with the help of hook ladders laid across walls. Sergeant Japp was injured by a falling wall and was rescued by Brigade Sergeant Moser and Staff Sergeants Kolland and Hansen. He was taken to the aid station on the 4th floor of the fire station; a police car arrived after 3 hours (9 a.m.) to take him to Eppendorfer Hospital. At House No. 6, the Self-Protection people assisted us very effectively.

At the damage site Lehmweg 8, built-in coal chutes caused difficulties in putting out the fires; the burning coal stuck in the chutes, was difficult to shovel out, and delayed hosing operations.

Later in the day, fires in Moltkestrasse, Bismarckstrasse, and Isestrasse were fought by both squads. In the Klinker skyscraper at Hoheluftchaussee Station, fire fighting was particularly difficult because of the very great heat and large stores of coal. The three men, Kolland, Storm, and Busch, were able to put out the fire in the upper floor. Four S.A. men were asked to relieve the squad crew at the hose nozzle; however, they did not comply.

July 25 - 2 p. m.

On orders from Captain Jacobs, the brigade was relieved by reserves.

July 26 - 8 a. m. to 6 p. m.

Conducted difficult clean-up operations at Otto Bloecherstrasse 2, 6, and 8, and at Wesseley Corner. Put out a number of fires at each site, including a fire in a large store of coke in a damaged building.

July 27 - 2:10 a. m.

The brigade was ordered to go to Hindenburgstrasse 29 in Lokstedt where an entire house or villa was on fire. Two long hose lines were laid from a storage basin at Siemersplatz and the fire itself was fought with 3 C hoses. Military personnel assisted in fighting the fire.

July 28 - 7:00 a. m.

Brigade received orders to go to Command Post Lombard Bridge where it was ordered to go into action on Spaldingstrasse and Repsoldstrasse. On arrival, Spaldingstrasse was found blocked by debris and by a widespread fire storm. We had to retreat to Repsoldstrasse and were assigned the task of fighting the fires at Repsoldstrasse No. 47 and the houses to the rear. The fire fighting operations were hindered by the presence of food packages stored on the fourth floor (this building was a provisioning post for the police). The smoke was especially strong and biting. Only after completely rearranging and dousing the packages with water was it possible to bring the fire under control. On both the fourth and fifth floors, the fires had to be fought from the front to the rear in order to finally extinguish the fires in the burning roof beams. They were impossible to reach otherwise because of the tremendous heat and strong shower of sparks. The house remained intact.

Later the brigade was assigned to other fire fighting tasks along Repsoldstrasse and Rosenallee. An administration building was prevented from burning.

July 27 - 8:00 p. m.

Brigade relieved from duty and returned to quarters.

July 28 - 8:00 a. m. to 8:00 p. m.

Brigade ordered to fight fires in the area of Spaldingstrasse and

Repsoldstrasse. Although fire storm conditions existed along the way, both motorized pump engines got through. They were stationed along Repsoldstrasse. The houses along the front, at the corner, and the rear houses between Spaldingstrasse and Mnemzestrasse were burning fully. The house at the corner of Spaldingstrasse and Wollmanstrasse collapsed and burned completely. In the afternoon the brigade fought various small but difficult fires in houses on Repsoldstrasse and Roseallee, sealing them off to prevent spreading. Squad 14L/I assisted in rescue operations from the public shelter at the corner of Abendrothsweg and Hoheluftchaussee. Water spray from a B hose was used to cover the entrance (and exit path) from the shelter. In this way about 250 people were able to leave the shelter without being exposed to flames jetting into the street from burning buildings on both sides.

July 29 - 1:00 a.m.

Received orders to go to the corner of Breitenfelderstrasse and Hoheluftshaussee where a large fire was reported. Squad 14a/I worked on the damage site at Breitenfelderstrasse while Squad 14b/I was put into action at the corner of Abendsrothsweg and Hoheluftchaussee. At the latter location, about 200 people were in an air raid shelter that was in danger of being cut off by the enclosing fires. After prolonged fire fighting of these fires, Squad 14b/I was successful in rescuing these people. In the meantime, Squad 14a/I, through uninterrupted fire fighting operations at the houses No. 4 and No. 6 on Breitenfelderstrasse, was successful in preventing the fires from spreading to the gasoline storage buildings which were located behind the houses and which belonged to the streetcar line. Houses on both sides of the elevated streetcar line building in which 12,000 liters of gasoline were stored were on fire. The roof of the building and the surrounding area were constantly kept under a spray of water until the fires which threatened were sealed off. In securing the safety of the rear houses, Mr. Reher (formerly of the first aid station on Wrangelstrasse) particularly distinguished himself by personal bravery and outstanding judgment, although he was somewhat handicapped since he is a hunchback.

July 29 - 6 a.m. to 6 p.m.

The brigade received orders to go to Semperstrasse 65 and 64 for clean-up operations. We conducted afterhosing tasks on houses at Nos. 49 to 53 and 46 to 64, several of which were under danger of collapse. Large stores of coal in the attics made the clean-up operations difficult. Holes had to be cut with axes in the walls from one room to another before the sources of the fires could be found and the fires extinguished. FPP Sergeant Krueger was injured by falling debris (he died in the Eppendorf

Hospital on July 30, 1943, at 4:30 a.m.).

August 1 - 7:00 p.m.

Brigade assigned to afterhosing operations on Semperstrasse and Giebelstrasse.

August 2 - 1:15 a.m.

Brigade relieved and returned to quarters.

August 2 - 12 noon to 8 p.m.

Brigade ordered to conduct clean-up operations on Efeuweg.

August 3 - 4 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

Brigade assigned to clean-up operations on Maria-Louisenstrasse.

August 4 - 8 p.m. to August 5 - 1:15 a.m.

Furnished motorized ladder truck and conducted clean-up operations at No. 7 Gosslarstrasse. Afterhosing operations with the motorized ladder were conducted from balcony-to-balcony.

(Signed) Moser, Brigade Sergeant, FP 14/I
Rolland, Master Sergeant, FB 14a/I
Muenster, Master Sergeant, FB 14b/I

Heavy Fire Brigade 22/I Hamburg, August 23, 1943

Experience Report About the Last Air Attacks

Squad 22a/I

At 1:26 a.m. on July 25, 1943, during the air attack, Squad 22a/I was ordered to go to the Tratama Works at Dorotheenstrasse 2-24. The fires had already assumed widespread proportions by the time the squad arrived. However, with energetic help from the Plant Civil Defense forces, it was possible to check and contain the fires to such an extent that the Plant Civil Defense forces could take care of the continued fire watch and clean-up operations.

Roof fires at houses No. 3 and 5 (rear house) across the street were extinguished with the help of military personnel and the Self-Protection forces. The squad also saved the house at Sierichstrasse No. 14 from burning down; the neighboring house was gutted. Following that action, fires were extinguished in the houses at Lehnhardstrasse Nos. 9, 11, and 13. It should be mentioned that a dud bomb was lying in the yard and a Flak dud was lying on the fourth floor between burning heaps of debris at house No. 13. The squad next extinguished fires at the sites Bismarckstrasse 96; Mansteinstrasse Nos.14, 20, and 55; and Breitenfelderstrasse Nos. 38 and 40. After 28 hours of uninterrupted fire fighting operations, the squad returned to quarters at the fire station.

At 2:40 a.m. on July 28, 1943, during the air attack, Squad 22a/I was ordered to go to Wandsbecker Marktplatz. The fire fighting was made extremely difficult by the shortage of water. During this action, Sergeant Rahfeld fell from a sliding ladder and was taken to the hospital suffering a fracture of the left clavicle. Even though four men were holding the ladder, it was not possible to prevent the accident because of the strong gusting winds of the prevailing fire storm. I did not see the accident myself, as Squad 22a/I was fighting the fire from a neighboring house.

After extinguishing that fire, Colonel Doctor Fagg ordered the squad to Berliner Tor with instructions to cool off the air raid shelter or bunker in the Laemmermarkt School where about 800 people were locked in. On the way back to Wandsbeck, the squad rescued nine persons from a school at Heidenskampsweg and Franklinstrasse. The trip to Berliner Tor and back posed extraordinary problems for the driver, Master Sergeant Piercromber. Our path was continuously blocked by felled trees, torn

down overhead streetcar power lines, debris from collapsed buildings, bomb craters, and the heat from the sea of flames of burning buildings. Although badly damaged by bomb shrapnel, the vehicle performed well during the whole time.

During the air attack of July 30, 1943, Squad 22a/I was ordered at 2:15 a.m. to go to the damage site at Gottscheidstrasse and Rossmoorweg where large-scale roof fires had reportedly developed. The municipal water system no longer functioned and water had to be taken from the Goldbek Canal. Also present at the fire site were 800-liter pump engines from the Adlerwerks, the H.A.K., and the Local Group of the Nazi Party. In order to secure sufficient water supply and to make best possible use of the available hoses, B22/I Leader Schweim assigned a fire sector to each group and allocated the supply of water to the three groups by way of the KL.921 from the Goldbek Canal using 2 B lines and distributors. The Squad 22a/I fought the fires at Rosmoorweg and Gottscheidstrasse to prevent its spread to neighboring houses; this it accomplished through energetic action. The three groups together contained the fires. The local Self-Protection forces functioned very well. Special mention should go to Mrs. Schreier, Rospersweg No. 1, who contributed much to the success of the operation by carrying water untiringly.

During the attack of August 3, 1943, Squad 22a/I was active at Blumenstrasse 16 where it prevented the spread of the fire to neighboring houses.

(Signed) Claus Rademann, Master Sergeant
Squad Leader 22a/I

Squad 22b/I

At 1:26 a.m. on July 25, 1943, Squad 22b/I was assigned to fire fighting tasks in the area of Frickestrasse. On arrival, several houses were found to be on fire and the water and telephone lines destroyed. We were forced to get additional hoses from the Kolow Station which, together with a long hose line to FB Ortesfeld (2 B hoses). With the water supplied by this means, we proceeded to fight fires in the houses at Nos. 59, 61, 65, 67, 69, 71, 77, 81, 66, and 64 on Frickestrasse. With the assistance of the Plant Civil Defense and Self-Protection forces, we were able to fight the fires to a standstill permitting the squad to return to quarters at 1:00 p.m. Great demands were made of the crews. Much hose material had to be moved during the operation since the supply was short and since we did not have sufficient forces to fight all the fires in the area at the same time. During the morning and afternoon of July 26, the squad

conducted clean-up operations on Hohe Luftchaussee and at Hegestrasse and Oderfelderstrasse.

At 10:45 p.m. on July 26, we were assigned hosing duties near the building at Hamburgstrasse 71, Schnelsen, to assist in the recovery of bodies. A long hose line was required to reach a source of water. The fires were caused by the gas escaping from broken gas mains in four gutted buildings. The fires looked like flares, lighting up the whole neighborhood. These fires were put out with a strong jet of water from the hose nozzles after which the valves of the gas main leading to the buildings were turned off. At 1 a.m. on July 27, we returned to quarters.

On July 28, Squad 22b/I was ordered to the Wandsbecker Marktplatz at 2:45 a.m. to fight fires. In spite of great difficulties in obtaining the necessary water and in conducting operations in the prevailing heavy fire storm, the squad was able to hold back the encroaching fire permitting the safe removal of all the goods and furniture in the Marktplatz. When the water basin became empty, hosing operations had to cease until the hose line was relaid to the Mill Pond. During the waiting period, the squad put the furniture into a safe place.

At 2:15 a.m. on July 30, the squad received orders to go to the Vidahl Coal Storage Company at Sierichstrasse No. 176. To obtain water for the operations, one B line with distributors was laid with the hose truck to a storage basin on Dorotheenstrasse. With the able assistance of the Nahe Fire Brigade and the Self-Protection forces, fires in the roofs and apartments of structures at Nos. 3, 5, 7, and 9 Gayhiusstrasse were contained. Special mention should go to two young girls (not named) who carried messages to the pump site during the whole operation. At the Vidahl Coal Storage Company, a phosphorus bomb had fallen into the briquette storeroom and was not discovered until the briquettes were ignited and readily burning. The flames were extinguished with a C hose after which the Self-Protection forces personnel spaded the briquettes over and kept watching the site for further signs of burning. In the meantime a nearby gas station began to burn but the squad was easily able to extinguish the fire with one B hose.

At 2:15 a.m. on August 3, the squad was ordered into action at the corner of Blumenstrasse and Maria Louisenstrasse. With the help of the Self-Protection forces, we were successful in extinguishing the developing fires. One house was fully on fire and the heat and flying sparks from it seriously threatened a neighboring house. A C hose was used to extinguish all the small fires that started in the second house and thus the second house was prevented from burning. Later in the day, the squad conducted clean-up operations at the Post Office on Grasweg.

At 4:17 p.m. on August 21, Squad 22b/I was ordered to go to State Square on Hegestrasse and extinguish some burning phosphorus bombs. Several bombs in one pile were burning when we arrived. All around there were small piles of phosphorus bombs, stick firebombs, and flare munitions. The situation looked more dangerous than it really was. It would have been better to put all such half-burned bombs and duds into a box of sand for burning. However, we lit off all the piles, let the bombs burn out, and then covered the remnants with earth.

(Signed) Timm, Master Sergeant
Squad Leader, 22b/I

Brigade 22/I

In all air attacks and actions, all of my men did outstanding work. They persisted through long hours of tireless fire fighting work under the most difficult circumstances and this way prevented further widespread fire damage. They all deserve full recognition.

(Signed) Schweim, Brigade Sergeant
Squad Leader C.D. Police

HFB 32/I Hamburg, October 4, 1943

To Fire Department I, Hamburg

RE: Brief Report About the Successes That Were Achieved at the Various Fire Sites by Our Actions During the Time of July 25 to August 4, 1943

According to: Circular Letter of Fire Department I from October 2, 1943

7/25/43	Goethestrasse 1, near Wandsbek	32/I	Fought fires and checked spread
	Schlankrye	32/I	Extinguished fire, saved human lives and salvaged precious material
7/26/43	Schlankrye	32/I	" " "
7/27/43	Hammerstrasse and Freesestrasse, Wandsbek	32/I	Afterhosing operations
	Goethestrasse 9	32b/I	" " "
	Curvenstrasse	32a/I	" " "
	Hammerstrasse 26-32, 54	32/I	" " "
7/28/43	Wilthoeftstrasse	32/I	Fought fires and prevented spread
	Wandsbek Hospital	32b/I	Fought fires and salvaged precious food stocks
	Wandsbeker Markt, Wilhelmstrasse	32/I	Filled water storage basin
7/29/43	Schlossstrasse 17, 19	32b/I	Extinguished fire
	Stiftstrasse	32a/I	" "
	Horst Wesslestrasse	32a/I	Checked spread of fire

	Hammerstrasse	32a/I Fought fire
	Loewenstrasse 10, 12	32a/I Afterhosing operations
	Bramfelderstrasse	32b/I Prevented spread of fire
7/30/43	Hirschstrasse 2, Fire Station Wandsbek	32/I Rescued human lives
7/31/43	" " "	32/I Recovered dead bodies
8/1/43	Sternstrasse 39	32b/I Extinguished fire
8/2/43	Luebeckerstrasse, Holsten - von Lergerckestrasse	32a/I Afterhosing operations
8/3/43	Ackermannstrasse and Sechslingspforte	32a/I Prevented spread of fire
	Moenckegergstrasse	32b/I Extinguished fire
	Luebeckerstrasse, Wandsbek	32a/I Afterhosing operations
	Freight Station, Wandsbek	32a/I " "
8/4/43	Luebeckerstrasse, Wandsbek	32a/I " "
	Freight Station Wandsbek	32b/I " "

(Signed) Menck, Squad Leader

(Signed) Jacobs

Fire Department Group West

Fire Department Division II Hamburg, August 11, 1943

RE: Report About the Major Air Attacks on July 25, 27, 29, and August 3, 1943

At the beginning of the attack on July 25, 1943, all units went into action according to plan. Within a short time, telephone communication with the units was no longer possible. From then on, messages and orders were carried between the units and division headquarters by motorcycle or bicycle messengers. All units went into action on their own initiative in response to fires that were flaring up everywhere. The leaders of the units worked completely independently in repressing (in order to darken) the developing fires at damaged sites. After the Sector headquarter building was hit by stick firebombs and burned down, the Air Defense Command and the Command Post of the Fire Service Department moved to the 24th Police Precinct in Oberstrasse; during the move, communication with the units was interrupted. On Sunday, the 25th, the Command Post was established at Fire Station 4. A regular relief schedule for the exhausted crews could not be worked out because new fires were developing everywhere, or old ones flared up again; these circumstances persisted the following night and day, so that the crews were not able to rest between July 25 and 30, 1943. Provisions were in short supply on the 25th; however, improvement in getting food to crews occurred on the following days.

During the air attacks on July 28 and July 30, numerous fires were started in C.D. Sector II; in these attacks, the assignment of units was again accomplished independently. At several sites the fires were successfully contained and several houses were saved. In very many cases, the upper stories and the staircases were on fire, so that it was not possible to fight the fires from the inside of the buildings. Since the water distribution system went out of commission early during the attack of July 25, the fire fighting units had to rely on water supplies from the storage basins or from open canal water. However, the available hose supply was insufficient to make best use of these supplies. The requested additional hoses were not promptly delivered and the fire fighting at many sites was greatly delayed. At sites where the hose trucks were in action, the supply of hoses was quickly exhausted.

All fire fighting actions were carried out under the greatest of difficulty because of the shortage of water, and because the enormous heat in the

streets combined with the terrific fire storms, the flying sparks, and the rain of glowing ashes. At the beginning of the action, only single fire sites were apparent; with a sufficient water supply these small fires could have been successfully put out. It is therefore recommended that a portable fire extinguisher be kept on hand which would be sufficient to extinguish such fires. Because of the loss of time, due to the laying out of the long hose lines, the single small fire sites grew and joined, so that whole streets were on fire and burned out before the crews were able to start operations. It was noted that firewalls between several high buildings offered effective fire protection because the fire came to a standstill at these walls.

It is suggested that the firewalls be extended at least one meter above the roof covering. Also, the installation of additional water storage basins with contents of at least 500 cubic meters at a distance of about 150 to 200 meters from each other throughout the city is recommended.

The effectiveness of the so-called fireproofing of the attics was not substantiated in any of the attic fires that occurred.

(Signed) Sick
District First Lieutenant of the
Fire Protection Police
Fire Department Division Chief

Fire Brigade 11/II Hamburg, August 31, 1943

TO: Fire Department Division II

The following experiences were gathered from the air attacks during the time from July 25, 1943 till present:

1. Since the municipal water supply failed almost at the beginning of the attack on July 25, the units were forced to obtain water from open bodies of water or from water storage basins. The amount of hose carried on the fire department vehicles proved to be insufficient. Since the Fire Fighting Squads--or Fire Brigades--were put into action singly, hose trucks were not available to them. An additional supply of hose carried on the fire trucks (especially B hoses) is absolutely necessary.

2. The fire fighting activities had to be interrupted frequently because the connections on the new hoses ripped.

3. The existing water storage tanks of 200 cubic meters capacity proved in most instances to be much too small. Also the number of tanks was not sufficient.

4. The equipping of the LF 8's with hose couplings is absolutely necessary.

5. At the fire sites it was frequently observed that the out-of-town units could not reach the fire from the inside of the buildings and therefore had no success in extinguishing the fire.

6. The frequent occurrence of eye inflammation is partly due to the bad quality of the protective goggles. Some of them were unusable after a very short time.

7. Provisioning of the crews at the damage sites left much to be desired. Since the men were on continuous duty for very long periods of time, we had to try to get provisions and drinks from the civilian population.

(Signed) Mallok, Master Sergeant
Fire Brigade 11/II

Emergency Brigade 14/II Hamburg, October 5, 1943

Experiences Report About Actions During the Attacks on Hamburg

Messages: It would be advantageous if every truck had a bicycle for quicker transmittal of messages.

Water Supply: When the municipal water supply fails to function, the stock of B hoses is insufficient to fight fires effectively; in many cases the nearest water storage tank or open water source cannot be reached with 10 B hoses joined together. When assignmnet is by squad, and a considerable amount of time is needed to obtain B hoses, success in fighting a fire becomes questionable.

The amount of B hoses on the vehicles should be at least doubled, and more water storage tanks should be placed in the streets. Wherever possible, the fire should be fought from the inside of a building and assignments to sites should be made by brigade. Also, a number of portable tank extinguishers would be useful for every squad, since small developing fires can be put out quickly with such equipment.

The lumberyards located near the streets represent a great danger to the surrounding houses, and the special safety measures for these houses should be adopted and implemented.

The Self-Protection organization fell apart, and it would probably have been more advantageous to have block groups rather than house groups, since in this way one leader would have had larger forces at his disposal. Here, too, in the houses and yards, more water containers should be in readiness.

(Signed) Ruland
Brigade Captain

Fire Department Emergency Squad

Fire Station 4 Hamburg, August 23, 1943

Experience Report About Service During the Air Attacks

The crew of Fire Department Emergency Squad 2/II, for the most part, went into action independently and fought the fires on their own initiative.

At first the hydrants gave water; however, after a short time, the water supply failed and long hose lines had to be laid to alternate water sources. The fire fighting was therefore delayed. Hose material was not in sufficient supply; in case of failure of the municipal water line, every brigade should have a hose truck.

During the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th attack nights, the various squads usually had about 20 extra B hoses on the trucks and therefore were more equal to the fire fighting tasks. The number of water storage tanks was too small. The hose couplings were made too skimpily and very often broke apart. The light metal was not strong enough for the demands made on it. The hose bridges were not nearly sufficient; those filled with cork were not at all satisfactory.

No police forces were on duty to implement the necessary blocking off of streets. The fire fighting forces, therefore, were hindered in fulfilling their tasks. If one wanted a place blocked off, he had to order the policemen standing around to do it. Traffic was not re-routed as it should be.

The fire sites, which were left to the Self-Protection for afterhosing operations soon flared up again and caused further fires.

Burning fuel (such as coke, coal, briquettes) in the attics burned through the floors of the upper stories. Here, clean-up squads could have saved many buildings. The forces requested to carry out this task arrived too late.

Many buildings burned down through ignition by flying sparks of curtains and black-out equipment; once ignited, the fire was carried by these curtains and black-out equipment into the apartments.

(Signed) Zimmerman
District Lt. of Fire Protection Police

LPB 21/II Hamburg, August 21, 1943

Report of Experiences During the Air Attacks on Hamburg July 25 to August 3, 1943

The fighting of fires during the first attack night was made extremely difficult by the fact that the water main failed after about seven minutes of usage. When this occurred, a hose line was laid to the nearest water storage basin. However, usually there were not enough hoses on one truck which, when connected together, could reach the basin. The same shortage of hose applied to afterhosing operations. The fires in many cases could have been extinguished in about five minutes of hosing; but to lay the hose line to a distant source often required about 20 minutes or more of the brigade's time. It would be most advantageous if several 3000-liter pump engines would be provided to each squad. Also a water storage tank should be available about every 100 to 150 meters along each street.

Many houses burned down because the roofs are of an even height and the fire was able to leap from one roof to the next. This could perhaps be prevented if the firewalls were extended a sufficient distance about the roofs.

It would be advisable to equip the pump engines with electrical lamps. The reinforcement of the fire fighting forces failed completely. Relief during the first attack night came only after 12 hours. The brigade did not get anything to eat or drink during that period. During the 2nd and 4th attack nights we were fed by the population. At the Bornplatz fire in the 3rd attack night, the motorized police unit took care of feeding us. We did not receive coffee, however. The C.D. policemen also complained that they did not have sufficient supplies. Firemen should be equipped with a second pair of knee-boots. A bicycle per brigade for the transmission of messages would be advisable. Police were not available to block off fire sites and to direct traffic.

(Signed) Behrmann
Sergeant of the Fire Protection Police

HFS 23b/II

Experience Report

During Actions on July 25, July 28, July 30, and August 3, 1943

7/25/43 Action at Finance Department, Schlump 83; Reserve Hospital IV Schlump; Residential Homes Schlump 26-31; and houses in rear

Right after the squad went into action, the water main failed. The fire watchers in the finance building apparently had run home. At the Reserve Hospital, the Air Raid Emergency Squad proved very helpful. At the houses on Schlump 26-31 it was ascertained that the tenants left the air raid shelters too late and that no fire watch had been posted. During this attack, a portable extinguisher, put into action immediately, could have put out the fire.

7/28/43 Action at Andreas Church, Bogenstrasse, and Apartment House, Bogenstrasse 26

Prior to our arrival, the apartment house at Bogenstrasse 26 had partially collapsed. All we could do was to prevent the fire from spreading. It proved very helpful to have a larger number of B hoses along; the squad was able to fight the fire without a hose truck.

7/30/43 Action at Grindelallee

Here too, long hose lines were used and it would have been a great advantage to have at least two portable extinguishers available. Where the Self-Protection forces were on hand, they worked hard and well.

8/3/43 Action at Gaensemarkt 13, Gerhofstrasse, Hamburger Anzeiger, ABC Strasse, and Hohe Bleichen

Here the extent of the fire was too great for one brigade to fight. The crew had to spread out too far, so that the Squad Leader lost the ability to keep the whole squad under supervision. The Binnenalster nearby was a very good water source.

(Signed) Langner
Sergeant of FPP

Fire Department - Squad 1/III
F. D. Division III

Hamburg, August 19, 1943

RE: Experiences During the Air Attacks on July 25, 28, 30, and August 3, 1943, in the District of Fire Emergency Squad 1/III

1. Attack on July 25, 1943

During the air raid, at 12:45 a.m., Division III ordered Heavy Fire Brigade 13/III by telephone to go into action at Hohe Bleichen - Grosse Bleichen, while HFB 12/III, which at the time of the alarm was stationed on the grounds of the packing house, went on their own initiative into action at the Detjens Sausage Factory at Sternstrasse and Kampstrasse. Squad 101/III of the Special Fire Service, stationed at Bavaria Brewery, moved out to Hopfenstrasse-Kastanienallee to fight fires.

At 2:30 a.m., the Emergency Brigade 1/III was sent to collect information from the district of St. Pauli and the surrounding streets. They found several fires on both sides of the Reeperbahn, many single fires in the area bounded by Eckerfoerderstrasse-Seilerstrasse-Kastanienallee-Taubenstrasse, and incipient fires at Harbor Hospital. The Self-Protection forces were working hard at fighting the fires, but because of the great number of fires and because the water supply has failed they were helpless.

In the meantime, at the command post which was set up at Fire Station III right away, the reports of fires and danger to human lives were piling up. In response to a call to Division III Headquarters, three Squads were promised as soon as out-of-town forces will arrive; in the meantime, the last brigade remaining in the Division, 11/III, was called out to a fire site on Deichstrasse.

After his return, the Squad leader asked for five emergency squads to be sent to the sector. At 8:00 a.m. the first out-of-town forces arrived and were put into action at the Finance Department on orders from Headquarters Sector III.

By 9:00 a.m., the Squads were reporting from the outlying districts and an orderly distribution of forces among fires in the damage area of St. Pauli began to take place. In the meantime, however, widespread conflagrations developed in the section from Eimsbuettelerstrasse to the Reeperbahn. The Fire Department from Neumunster, Division V, was put at the division's disposal immediately after receipt of the request for further assistance.

On the afternoon of July 25, Squad 11b/III, which had been put into action at the Hospital for Tropical Diseases, was put out of commission by a direct hit to their vehicle.

On the morning of July 28, the fires in the damage areas around St. Pauli were contained and the available forces were assigned to afterhosing operations.

2. Attack on July 28, 1943

New fires were reported along Taubenstrasse, Kastanienallee, Bernard-Nochtstrasse, at the Hospital for Tropical Diseases, and on Valentinskampweg. The fires were fought with the few available forces, since most all the crews that could possibly be spared had previously been sent by headquarters to the Lombardsbridge.

3. Attack on July 30, 1943

In our own sector, only a few fires in Markststrasse and Schanzenstrasse were reported; these were fought by the Squad from Steinburg. The local fire brigades were sent to Gr. Reichenstrasse, the Fischmarkt, Dornbusch, and Baecherstrasse, as well as to Kurze Muehren, and Ferdinandstrasse.

4. Attack on August 3, 1943

In our own sector, fires occurred only at the Reeperbahn, where the HFS 13b/III was put into action. The remaining forces were sent to Dammtorstrasse, to State Opera, and to Gaensemarkt.

Until noon of July 25, telephone connections were kept open with the headquarters of Fire Department, Division III. From that time period on, messenger service was put into operation; but, because of loss of motorcycles, this service at times was out of commission.

(Signed) Markmann
Dist. Lt. of Fire Protection Police
and Squad Leader 1/III

F. D. Emergency Squad 1/III Hamburg, August 21, 1943

Appendix to Experience Report of August 10, 1943

During the reconnaissance trip taken at 2:30 a.m. on July 25 by the Squad Leader of Emergency Squad 1/III into the damage area St. Pauli, he ascertained that the Self-Protection forces were tirelessly at work fighting the fires in the residential districts. They only had the reserve water supplies at their disposal, which had been stored in buckets and tubs, because the municipal water main failed almost immediately after the attack began. Everywhere the call was hear, "Fire Department, bring us water, we have nothing to fight with!"

In the business districts, on the other hand, I saw no such activity on the part of the Self-Protection forces.

The hook and ladder truck 1/III was requested by the building Alterwall 69, Third Floor, Hansawerke G.m.b.H., in order to salvage very important papers in a safe in one of the rooms of the firm which was completely burned out. The outer walls of the safe were completely annealed, but the salvaged papers were intact.

No Self-Protection personnel with gas masks were found in an unconscious state.

The storage attic in the rear building of the Bakery Cooperative A.G., at Muehlenstrasse 9/11, was saved intact, except for the gutting of the apartments on the attic floor and a small room in the 6th floor. The firm is back in full production.

The neighboring houses in Muehlenstrasse and Boenmkenstrasse are completely gutted and are just heaps of debris.

The Bakery Manager and plant civil defense chief F. Wuenker, in June of this year, had all windows on the sixth floor (top floor), as well as those on the fourth, second and first floor, in the storage rooms and the garage walled up with half bricks. The only one not walled up was one window on the sixth floor.

The spread of the fire to the roof and to the room on the sixth floor without wall-up, could not be prevented by the fire watch on duty (reportedly two people). Only the walling up of windows of those rooms used for merchandise and packaging materials, kept out heat and sparks, and thereby prevented a complete gutting of the building.

The above civil defense measure is worth noting and should be applied wherever storage buildings with precious contents are located in densely built up city parts.

(Signed) Markmann
District Lt. of FPP and
Squad Leader

HFB 12/III
Fire Department Division III Hamburg, September 5, 1943

RE: Actions During Air Attacks in the Time Period from July 25 to August 3, 1943

During the air attack of July 25, 1943, strong units of enemy aircraft flew over the city district from the north. The HFB 12/III, which during air raids is quartered at the Lagerstrasse stockyards for safety reasons, had to take care of the stockyards. During the early part of the attack by enemy planes, stick firebombs, phosphorus bombs and latex canisters fell in the area of the stockyards, and at sites on Sternstrasse and Lagerstrasse. At first several small roof fires and one larger fire (in a shed in Sternstrasse) were started. Then the high explosive bombs began to fall. The Unit HFB 12/III tried to fight these fires along with the Industrial Civil Defense and Self-Protection forces. After a short time, the dropping of high explosive bombs increased in intensity. The Self-Protection forces left off from their labors and sought shelter. Fire Truck 25/35-679 was caught by a collapsing storehouse wall and was lost. Therefore it became impossible to fight the fires on the territory of the Stockyards-Sternstrasse-Lagerstrasse. In a short time, the roof fires, helped by a developing whirlwind, had spread to the corner of Sternstrasse 98/121 and Ludwigstrasse. In order to check further spread of the fire, the fire in the house on the corner Ludwigstrasse-Sternstrasse was fought against the wind with success. By that time all the water mains in the district had failed. However, the water storage tanks in the neighborhood had sufficient water. The other fires at the Detjen Sausage Factory, at Sternstrasse 44, and at the Cold Storage Co., Kampstrasse 17/21, were fought at the same time under the most difficult conditions by the combined Industrial Civil Defense and Self-Protection forces with help from a TS 8.

Since the telephone failed during the attack, a messenger had to be dispatched to receive further orders. He reported on his return that roof fires had started at the Superior Court Building and the State Supreme Court Building on Carolinenstrasse No. 5. In order to have immediate success in the fighting of the fires, all available forces of Emergency Brigade 14/III, the Industrial Civil Defense, Self-Protection, and part of the Navy personnel that was quartered in the house, had to be put into action. The combined forces worked most effectively.

During the attack of July 28, 1943, the unit received orders to move out to Ferdinandstrasse No. 2 at the corner of Kurze Muehlen. Upon arrival they found two widespread roof fires. Despite the handicap of having to

lay long hose lines to the Alster, these roof fires were fought successfully. The Self-Protection forces showed exemplary spirit. At the finish of these fire fighting operations, a roof fire at the Hamburg America Line building was reported; it spread very quickly to the center of the building. Successful fire fighting operations were not possible at first because one brigade crew was not sufficient to extinguish the large-scale fire. But after the arrival of several additional units, the fire was fought successfully. The roof fire in question would probably not have occurred, if the fire watch had searched all rooms and niches of the attic for firebombs.

During the attack of July 30, 1943, orders were received for the Division to go in action at Karstadt Department Store on Moenkebergstrasse. On arrival we found that the roof of the Southwest wing had received firebomb hits, and that a fire had started. By laying a long hose line from the water tank at Johanneum, a comprehensive attack on the fire with 6 C hoses and 2 water towers was launched and the fire was brought quickly under control.

During the attack of August 3, 1943, the unit was busy with afterhosing operations on ABC Strasse. While in action at this location a heavy air raid took place. During the attack, fire and high explosive bombs of various kinds were dropped on the inner city. The unit received orders to check whether the State Opera House had been hit. On our arrival we found the building in flames, that the fire had spread to the roof of the audience hall and that the neighboring houses were endangered. One squad and four hook and ladders were immediately put into action. Since the stage house was well separated from the audience hall, and since the fire watch had worked especially hard to contain the fire, the stage house remained untouched by flames. The energetic activities of the police company in salvaging the bread rations at the main entrance are especially praiseworthy, since there was danger of the roof collapsing.

(Signed) Koss
Master Sergeant
Fire Protection Police

Fire Department Emergency Squad 1/III
HFB 13/III

Hamburg, October 5, 1943

RE: Survey Sheet

July 25, 1943 to July 26, 1943

1:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.,	Hohe Bleichen 34-46, residential and business buildings	13/III
	Koenigstrasse 36-49, residential buildings, checked spread of fire	
	Jungfernstieg 38/40/43/44, checked spread of fire	

July 26, 1943

7:19 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.,	Roedingsmarkt (Finemann) residential house, fought fire	13a/III
8:05 p.m. to 9:25 p.m.,	Colonnaden 5, residential house, roof fire, extinguished	13b/III

July 27, 1943

1:40 a.m. to 1:15 p.m.,	Gr. Bleichen (Trocadero) Coal Storage, fought fire	13a/III
1:25 a.m. to 2:15 a.m.,	Petri Kirche, afterhosing, put out fire	13b/III
12:00 noon to 8:50 p.m.,	Coal Storage Lagerstrasse, put out fire	13b/III

July 28, 1943

3:20 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.,	Markstrasse 10, residential houses, fought fire and checked spread	13a/III
1:40 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.,	Dammtorstrasse across from State Opera, fought fire	13b/III

July 29, 1943

10:10 a.m. to 9:15 p.m.,	Lagerstrasse, put out Coal Storage fire	13b/III
9:30 p.m. to 2:20 a.m.,	Seilerstrasse 25 and Coffee House Laussen on Reeperbahn, after-hosing	13a/III

July 30, 1943

2:25 a.m. to 3:30 a.m.,	Stock Exchange, put out roof fire	13b/III
2:25 a.m. to 2:55 a.m.,	Stock Exchange, put out roof fire	13a/III
3:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.,	Kl. Burtsah-Goerttwiete, residential building, fought and checked spread of fire	13a/III
3:35 a.m. to 12:34 noon,	Gr. Reichenstrasse 47 and 79, put out and checked spread of fire	13b/III

July 31, 1943

3:30 p.m. to 6:50 p.m.,	Neue ABC Strasse, residential house, fought fire	13b/III
8:45 p.m. to 12:30 midnight,	Eichholz 11 and Dithmar Koehlstrasse, fought fire	13b/III
2:20 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.,	Gr. Burtsah 32/34, residential and business building, fought fire	13a/III

August , 1943

6:40 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.,	Steckelhoern 5, storage building fought fire	13b/III
6:40 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.,	Eichholz 11, afterhosing operations	13a/III

August 2, 1943

8:00 a.m. to 1:03 p.m.,	Gr. Reichenstrasse 75, residential house, fought and checked spread of fire	13/III

1:55 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.,	Paulstrasse 5, office building, afterhosing	13/III

August 3, 1943

1:15 p.m. to 4:00 a.m.,	Roedingsmarkt & Burstah, residential house, fought fire	13b/III
4:00 a.m. to 10:40 a.m.,	Schauenburgerstrasse 44/48, office building, roof, put out fire	13b/III
3:10 a.m. to 11:30 a.m.,	St. Pauli Theatre, Reeperbahn 84/84, and Friedrichstrasse 11c put out fire	13a/III
7:20 p.m. to 8:30 p.m.,	Reeperbahn 89/91, residential and business houses, afterhosing	13a/III
8:30 p.m. to 11:18 p.m.,	Kielerstrasse 40, residential house, afterhosing	13a/III
8:40 p.m. to 11:18 p.m.,	Kielerstrasse 30, residential house, afterhosing	13b/III

August 4, 1943

4:00 a.m. to 1:25 p.m.,	Gaensemarkt (Sturm) business property, afterhosing	13a/III
10:15 a.m. to 2:45 p.m.,	Dammtorstrasse (Opel), business property, fought fire	13b/III
6:20 p.m. to 7:15 p.m.,	Gr. Roosenstrasse, cold storage, fought fire	13b/III
9:10 p.m. to 11:15 p.m.,	Seilerstrasse-Wilhelminenstrasse, residential house, afterhosing operations	13a/III

(Signed) Schluensen
Master of FPP

Fire Truck 2/III

Publicity Building Hamburg, August 10, 1943

Experience Report

During a reconnaissance ride in the first attack night, it was noted that the developing fires in Tomas House were not being extinguished by Self-Protection and Expanded Self-Protection forces. In the Publicity Building, the fire was put out by the Expanded Self-Protection, with Fire Department support.

The fire in the Hall of Justice tower was fought energetically. Since the water pressure was too low, a third portable pump engine was put into the tower. By this means the water pressure was increased sufficiently to extinguish the fire.

During the first night, there was a shortage of gasoline, and several of the motorized fire engines stopped operating because of the lack of fuel.

It should be noted that the Volunteer Fire Department of the close-by towns (e.g., County Pinneberg) reported in, while the fire departments of counties farther away, despite being informed of the location of the command posts by messengers and pilots, did not report at appropriate places. No close supervision over these units was possible as they went into action during the attacks. Very good cooperation was received from the Emergency Squad from Wittke-Berlin. This unit had its command post in the Publicity Building also, so it was easy to achieve a friction-free cooperative effort.

During the attack on the fourth night the Publicity Building, amongst others, was hit anew. During comprehensive fire fighting operations on the roof we found out that a Flak battery with 2000 rounds of ammunition was stationed on the roof of the Publicity Building which was a hindrance to fire fighting operations. Because the ammunition was exploding due to the heat, fire fighting operations were held up for a time; part of the ammunition, however, was finally salvaged.

Unfortunately it was evident during all attacks, that reserve units which were requested in good time--often even during the time of the actual raid--did not arrive till too late. The existing hose bridges were in many cases insufficient because they did not stand up to the constant demands made on them. Also, there weren't enough of them.

(Signed) Bendfeld, Sergeant of FPP

LFB 21/III Hamburg, September 14, 1943

RE: Experiences During Air Attacks and Afterhosing Operations

During the first attack night of July 25, at about 12:50 a.m., the headquarters of LFB 21/III, at Admiralty, Admiralitatstrasse 46, was hit by several stick firebombs. The firebombs were extinguished at once by the personnel present, in cooperation with Self-Protection forces, so that a large fire did not have a change to get started. During these fire fighting operations at 1:10 a.m., we received orders by telephone to move out to Gr. Baecherstrasse No. 16. On arrival we noted several roof fires caused by both stick firebombs and phosphorus bombs. Reinforcements were requested by messenger; these, however, did not arrive apparently because none were available to be dispatched. Squad B fought the roof fire at Gr. Baecherstrasse No. 16 and limited it to its original site. Squad A fought the fires on the roofs at Baecherstrasse Nos. 20 and 24 and Johannisstrasse No. 17 and with one C hose to each site. After extinguishing these fires at about 4:00 a.m., the fires on the roofs at Boersenbruecke 2a and the Savings Bank at 1827 Adolfsplatz were fought. During this time, the B Squad put out the fire at Gr. Baeckerstrasse No. 16 and was ordered to the Hindenburg House at Gr. Burstah 34, and to a site at the corner of Hahnentrapp and Gr. Burstah, to fight the fires. The roof at Boersenbruecke 2a was saved, but at the Savings Bank, the fire was already so widespread that fire fighting operations were limited to the ground floor and to the prevention of fire spread to the neighboring houses, Gr. Burstah 4 and 12, Adolfsplatz 4 and 5, and Moenckedamm 5. At about 5:00 a.m. the brigade was relieved by units of the Expanded Self-Protection of the Metal Works Niedersachsen, Brinkmann and Mergell, Wilhelmsburg. At the fire sites Gr. Baeckerstrasse No. 22, Johannisstrasse No. 17, Adolfsplatz, Moenckedamm, Boersenbruecke 2a, Gr. Burstah, the Hindenburg House and Gr. Burstah Corner Hahnentrapp, the fire fighting crews were ably assisted by the Self-Protection forces. At the other fire sites, assistance by the Self-Protection forces was negligible. Also, in these latter houses, doors were often locked, so that the fire fighting operations were greatly hindered. Because of heavy showers of ashes, the crews suffered from eye inflammations, which also hindered operations. Additional activities were as follows:

7/26/43 - Afterhosing operations day and night at Police Department Headquarters, Town Hall Bridge.

7/27/43 - Afterhosing operations until 10 p.m. in the district between Alternwall, Graskeller, Hopfenmarkt and Adolf Hitler Platz.

7/27-28/43 - In the second attack night, the LFB 21/III had taken emergency quarters on Rathausstrasse, in order to be close to the Emergency Squad. During the air attack it was noted that houses on the block Adolf Hitlerplatz-Bergstrasse were on fire. At about 1:30 a.m., the LFB 21/III went into action on its own in Gr. Bergstrasse. Despite the greatest of efforts, spread of the fire could not be prevented. At 2:00 p.m. the brigade was relieved at their site by out-of-town forces. The fire at Coffee House Vaterland was later brought under control after further fire fighting forces were put into action. At the fire fighting operations, the fire department was strongly assisted by miliary personnel. No Self-Protection forces were seen at Coffee House Vaterland.

7/29-30/43 - In the third attack night, the LFB 21/III went to the public air raid shelter at the Finance Department in Roedingsmarkt. During the attack, at about 1:15 a.m., it was observed that several houses were on fire along Deichstrasse and at Roedingsmarkt. In order to seal off the latter fires, I ordered the LFB 21/III into action at Roedingsmarkst, and the fires were sealed off. However, the fire began to spread to Goertwiete. On Goetwiete, further spread of the fire to the other side of the street was prevented with the assistance of the Self-Portection forces of the Post Office and the Party.

7/31/43 - 9:20 p.m. - Afterhosing operations. Neuerwall 8.

8/1/43 - 2:25 p.m. - Afterhosing operations. Gr. Burstah 34.

8/2/43 - During the fourth attack night, the LFB 21/III went to the public air raid shelter at the Finance Department in Roedingsmarkt. During the raid it was noted that the corner house at Roedingsmarkt and Gr. Burstah was on fire, as well as the houses at Roedingsmarkt 18/19 and Deichstrasse No. 29. The A Squad reported at the fire site Fahnenfleck (Roedingsmarkt 1) to Colonel Zaps who was present and was ordered to fight the fire. Because the ignition got wet, the fire engine was out of service for about a half hour. After the fire was under control, the A Squad was ordered to Schaumburgerstrasse, where all the houses on the whole street were on fire; the A Squad worked at this site until it was relieved at 4 p.m. During this time, the B Squad worked from 1:30 a.m. to 11 a.m. at the fire sites at Roedingsmarkt 18 and Deichstrasse 29 with success.

Later operations are as follows:

8/4/43 - 12:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., fought fires on Rathausstrasse.

8/5/43 -	8:40 p.m.,	afterhosing	operations	at Gerhofstrasse No. 38 and Jungfernstiev
8/6/43 -	12:30 noon	"	"	on Rathuasstrasse
	5:24 p.m.	"	"	at Raborien, Cold Storage Plant
	5:25 p.m.	"	"	at Herrengraben 58
8/7/43 -	11:20 a.m.	"	"	at Gr. Bleichen 32
8/8/43 -	8:10 a.m.	"	"	on Gr. Reichenstrasse
	4:30 p.m.	"	"	on Duesternstrasse - Ellerntor
8/9/43 -	1:17 p.m.	"	"	at Gr. Reichenstrasse, Fish Market
8/10/43-	6:00 a.m.	"	"	at Gaensemarkt 47
	4:18 p.m.	"	"	at Vorsetzen 29
8/17/43-	8:30 a.m.	"	"	at Eichholz 11
8/18/43-	8:00 a.m.	"	"	on Neueburg and Reimerstwiete
8/11/43-	2:30 p.m.	"	"	on Kl. Reichenstrasse
	4:08 p.m.	"	"	on Eichholz
8/12/43-	9:40 a.m.	"	"	at Deichstrasse 38
8/13/43-	8:40 a.m.	"	"	on Reimersbruecke
8/14/43-	6:25 a.m.	"	"	at Deichstrasse 34
8/18/43-	6:49 p.m.	"	"	at Deichstrasse 18
8/19/43-	9:00 a.m.	"	"	on Neueburg-Reimersbruecke
8/20/43-	8:20 p.m.	"	"	at Raborsen 27

8/20/43- 9:50 p.m., afterhosing operations at City Hall Bridge

8/25/43- 4:00 p.m. " " at Ferdinandstrasse 29

8/29/43- 2:45 p.m. " " at Deichstrasse 10

9/1/43 - 8:00 a.m. " " on Gr. Reichenstrasse

9/2/43 - 8:30 a.m. " " on Gr. Reichenstrasse

9/7/43 - 11:00 a.m. " " at Caffemacherreihe

Aside from the above, the LFB 21/III performed afterhosing at the following fire sites:

Bornthobel, Gr. Burstah, Stock Exchange, Adolfsplatz, Justice Building, Adolf Hitler Platz, Herrengraben, Kueberwall, Dueckerstrasse 28, Terhofstrasse, Gaensemarkt, Brotschwangen, Dornbusch, Steintwiete, Gertrudenkirchhof, Herrlichkeit, Brandsende, Klosterstrasse, Knochenhauertwiete.

The times of these operations cannot be ascertained at this time.

Nothing warranting special attention was encountered during afterhosing operations.

(Signed) Suhr,
Master of FPP

HFB 23/III Hamburg, September 1, 1943

To Fire Department, Division III

RE: Experience Report During the Air Attacks on Hamburg from July 25 to August 3, 1943

First Attack, July 24/25

Since orders to go into action could not be given by Division III due to the failure of the telephone system, the HFB 23/III moved into action on its own cognizance.

Fire sites near Sprinkenhof were fought successfully by squads of the brigade. Reinforcements were requested immediately by way of a messenger. These reinforcements did not arrive, except for a hook and ladder truck which had been requested to rescue a person. The hook and ladder truck did not arrive for one hour; however, we were successful in rescuing the person unharmed before it arrived.

During the first attack all the hydrants were still in working order; therefore we were successful in all instances in keeping the fires to their original sites and in checking the spread of the fires.

Second Attack, July 26/27

Headquarters orders were that the brigades move out autonomously. HFB 23/III had been active at fire sites on Rosenstrasse, Gertrudenstrasse, and Rabrisen for 18 hours when the second attack began. New fires immediately started in the vicinity which were fought at once with the previously laid-out hose line. Soon, however, the water from the hydrants failed and arrangements had to be made to pump water from the Alster. Thereby precious time was lost. In the meantime, the fires spread unchecked especially at sites where no Self-Protection forces were on the job. The reinforcements which were requested immediately, did not arrive till hours later. When the pump engine finally delivered water, a new mishap occurred. The camouflage of the Inner Alster caught fire and suddenly the fire engine was surrounded by flames. The driver of the engine was able only with the greatest of effort, to save the fire engine. By the time the engine was ready once again to pump water, the fire storm had developed. As a consequence the hose line in the narrow Gertrudenstrasse was buried under falling roof tiles and burning beams and was damaged. It was impossible at the time to even get near the hose line in order to salvage it, since the fire was

already raging on both sides of the street. From the direction of Ferdinandstrasse, new hose lines were laid and the fire storm was fought head on. Since in the meantime the requested reinforcements had arrived it was possible to encircle the fire and to put it out. Here again it was noted that where the Self-Protection forces had tried to fight the fire right at the beginning the fires were not nearly as widespread as where the buildings were unprotected. All the buildings were saved from destruction by the heavy fire brigade, sustaining only minor damages.

Third Attack, July 28/29

The brigade mobilized autonomously during the attack. First message received was that Sprinkenhof was on fire. The HFB 23/III was put into action immediately, but, because the Emergency Commando had been put into action earlier and had already put out the fire stick bombs that had fallen into the building, the brigade did not need to assist. As the hoses were taken out, the crews and equipment were hit by phosphorus bombs which were extinguished without causing damage. When the second message arrived reading, "Klosterburg on fire," the HFB 23/III was again put into action. At Glockengiesserwall, several houses were on fire. The forces on hand were not sufficient, so that reinforcements had to be summoned. These reinforcements did not arrive until about noon. Again it was noted that wherever the Self-Protection forces were on the job, the buildings usually could be saved. Unfortunately, however, during the third attack, not many of the Self-Protection organization remained, since most of them had fled the city after the first and second attacks.

One occurrence should be mentioned here. During operations at the last site, flames suddenly leaped out from under the fire engine and one of the rear tires caught fire. Fortunately, the driver noticed it immediately and took action right away and put out the fire before much damage was done. This mishap was caused by phosphorus drops which had sprayed onto the engine while we were driving through the dark streets and which ignited as soon as the material dried out.

Fourth Attack, August 2/3

The HFS 23a/III, which was busy with afterhosing operations at Kl. Reichenstrasse No. 3, was put into action at the burning Publicity House in order to support the units present there. Here, too, the Self-Protection forces contributed to the saving of the building.

The following special points should be emphasized:

1. The Alster shore at Alsterdamm should be excavated to the height

of the pump, because getting the pump line to the water through the existing dirt is most difficult.

2. Keep the camouflage clear from the shore line, about 2 to 3 meters, since this can endanger the engine when on fire.

3. When driving through phosphorus spray, check the engine carefully before taking up a position, so that there will not be phosphorus drops remaining which, after drying, will suddenly ignite.

(Signed) Bieger
Master of FPP

Emergency Squad 24a/III Hamburg, August 22, 1943

Experience Report - State Library

It proved to be correct that I used some of the people of my squad for watch duty, as the Expanded Self-Protection forces did not know the building sufficiently well, particularly the center building. In the attic (center building) my people removed 6 firebombs. Falling phosphorus bombs forced them to withdraw. In the East Building (on Domstrasse) two firebombs were removed by one man from Squad 24a/III and two men from Expanded Self-Protection. Here, however, there was such a terrific development of smoke, that they had to withdraw. In the West Building (on Schulstrasse) four firebombs and one phosphorus bomb were rendered harmless by one man from 24a/III and two men from Self-Protection. This building was not filled with smoke to any great extent. At 12:45 after midnight, I put the squad into action with Fire Truck 15 saving the West Building and with it, 250,000 books. Shrapnel protection in the attic was not used. The Self-Protection forces were of great help under proper supervision. Fifteen firebombs and one phosphorus bomb were dropped into the West Building (on Schulstrasse) alone.

(Signed) Helmcke, Brigade Sergeant
Emergency Squad 24a/III

Fire Department Division IX Hamburg-Altona, August 18, 1943

RE: Report About My Activities During the Enemy Air Attacks from July 25 to August 3, 1943

On the attack of July 25, 1943, my first action orders given were based on reports of fires received by telephone, and, after the phone lines were broken, by motorcycle messenger. During the heaviest period of bombardment, at about 1:40 a.m., I went to the nearest fire sites at Sternwoll Knitting Mills, Brahmsstrasse and at Margarine Company, Friesenweg. At Sternwoll Knitting Mills, the loading ramp, the large storage building, the knitting hall No. 1, the living quarters, and the old office building were all on fire. The roofs of the large administration building and one residential house were on fire, and part of the pre-knitting plant was burning. The plant civil defense forces were using several hoses at the burning loading ramp, where they were completely ineffectual. I immediately ordered the hose lines into the buildings that might still be saved and ordered two newly arrived fire squads into the administration building and the pre-knitting mill. As a result of this action, both buildings were saved and remain in operational condition. The preservation of the pre-knitting mill in particular, with its precious machinery, and the ability of the plant to continue operation, are to be attributed solely to my decisive action.

After the above-direction action, I went to the Margarine Company. The main plant, the loading ramp, the dairy, and the packaging storage building were all on fire, and part of the refinery was burning. I ordered the most expedient distribution of the plant civil defense forces, who were rather confused after the failure of the municipal water lines. Here, too, I arranged for the most efficient rerouting of hose lines of the plant civil defense groups, so that the refinery was saved from destruction.

Upon seeing the widespread glare of fire on the horizon in the direction of Bahrenfelder Chaussee, I proceeded in that direction. A large number of residential homes and several important industrial concerns were on fire in Schlageterstrasse, Kruppstrasse, Beerenweg, Bahrenfelder Steindamm, Vinckestrasse, Moortwiete, Burgstrasse and Glashuettenstrasse. At first there was only one fire brigade available to fight all these fires; the brigade was ordered to fight the fire at the Rose Company in Schlageterstrasse. Because the Fire Emergency Squad 2/IX had gone into action at Eidelstedt and Stellingen on their own initiative, three more squads were requested by motorcycle messenger.

Driving through the Schlageterstrasse in the midst of a shower of sparks, I heard cries for help from the third floor of the burning house at No. 146. It was then about 2:30 a.m. The fourth floor of the house and the attic were on fire; also, the stairwell and the backside of the house were in flames and flames were shooting out of the windows of the second floor. I ordered the hook and ladder truck of Squad 1/IX which was standing at corner Bahrenfelder Steindamm to help in a rescue effort; in the meantime I tried to go up the staircase, but that proved to be impossible. I then climbed into the apartment using the hook and ladder truck which had been put into position quickly. A woman had collapsed in the room filled with smoke and heat, and an old man was lying lifelessly at the door which had burned through. I carried both people to the balcony and lifted them onto the ladder; they were brought down to the ground by Master Tangermann under the most difficult conditions. The people saved were an 84-year-old pensioner named Bornhoeft and his 60-year-old daughter, who apparently did not want to part with her belongings and therefore did not flee to safety in time.

During my drives to the various fire districts, I repeatedly observed the effects of the fallen bombs and the strong Flak fire.

In the meantime, our command post was established at "Harten Kringel" at the corner of Bahrenfelder Steindamm and Schlageterstrasse, and from there I personally issued orders to incoming fire fighting reinforcements.

Constant supervision of the fire sites in the various fire districts and of the supply of water to all was exercised until 2 p.m. Also during the afternoon and the following night, I was constantly visiting the fire sites because new units had to be constantly reassigned to prevent the fires from flaring up again.

On July 28, during the bombardment and heavy Flak fire, I went to the operating command post at "Harten Kringel," and deployed the units which were at first arriving very infrequently, to the various fires along Bahrenfelder Steindamm, Mortwiete and Bahrenfelder Chaussee, so that the fires in the rows of burning houses were fought with at least one hose each and the fires were extinguished starting at the roofs.

Because large amounts of fuel everywhere in the attics were on fire, and because we had learned from previous raids that these burning materials would drop from ceiling to ceiling down to the cellar, I ordered Russian workers and local army units to shovel these burning masses out of the attics. By these measures, many houses were saved from destruction and afterhosing was not usually necessary. Afterward, the spare forces

were put at the disposal of the Fire Department Group West and as soon as the Emergency Unit 1/IX was assembled in Hamburg, I went to Fire Station 17 (at 12:30 a.m.). Here, too, I must say that because of my personal supervision at the fire sites the generally indolent crews were beginning to work harder and more successfully.

On July 30, 1943, at 1:50 a.m., a fire alarm from the tower watch in Flottbecker Chaussee was received at Command Post of Air Section IX which stated: "Glare of fire in the direction of Kruppstrasse." Because some of the fire fighting units were still busy with afterhosing operations, and communication with these units was nonexistent, I immediately moved out in the direction of the glare of the fire. As in previous days, the amounts of bombs dropped and the Flak fire were tremendous. In Kielerstrasse, five residential and business buildings were on fire. I personally alarmed the Emergency Squad 2/IX. The fires were subsequently contained.

At 8:50 a.m., I went with Fire Squad 2/IX to the Zentrum Cold Storage Depot on Rosenstrasse, Hamburg. In the immediate vicinity of the cold storage depot, several houses were on fire. Spread of the fire to the cold storage plant was prevented, again only because of my personal intervention at the hoses. After the danger had subsided, fire fighting actions were started to save the storage depots at Gertrudenkirche and Spitalerstrasse. Here I was asked by a director of the German Vacuum Oil Company to render assistance at the Semperhaus at Spitalerstrasse 12. No professional fire fighting forces were active at that site. Volunteer fire department units were standing around on the street with no water in their hoses. The roof had already burned through and the fire had spread to the various lower floors through the elevator shafts. It took the greatest effort to supply the Volunteer Fire Fighters with water and force them to fight the fire from the inside of the building. Also, one unit of the Berlin fire department and some units of the Sector were soon gathered together in the area and put into action. Here, too, it was only due to my vigor and my personal actions that this precious building was saved from total destruction.

On August 3, 1943, within the territory of Division IX, five residential houses were on fire in the Melanchthon Strasse Corner Kielerstrasse. Fire Brigades 22 and 23/IX were put into action at this site. At 2:15 a.m. we returned to Fire Station 17. From that location a strong glare of fire was visible in the direction of Lagerstrasse in Sector VII. We immediately went into action on our own at the numerous fire sites in Lagerstrasse between Barner and Borselstrasse, as well as in Bahrenfelderstrasse. We returned at 11:00 a.m. At 12 o' orders were received at Fire Station 17 to relieve Captain Hoelzel at the Command Post in Adolf Hitler Platz. I took over the fire sites between Gr. Reichenstrasse

and Rathausstrasse, and in the West to Roedingsmarkt. In this area, many fire sites had flared up again and, as before, the assignment and distribution of fire fighting units were successful only through my energy and my personal intervention. I kept moving the units fighting the fires from the street into the houses and closer to the fires.

These activities, with new actions at an ever-increasing number of fire sites, led to my complete exhaustion on this day. After I was relieved and received some rest, I returned to Fire Station 17 at 5:30 p.m. in order to take part in an officers' conference at the City Hall at 6:00 p.m. and a conference at Air Sector IX at 9:00 p.m.

(Signed) Max
District Captain of FPP
Chief of Fire Division IX

P.S. The Fire Emergency Squad 2/IX reported belatedly that during operations of Squad 21a/IX, a Mrs. Ehlers was saved from a collapsed house in Reichsbahnstrasse by Sergeant Walter Hamann with the help of a ladder across the balcony. Danger of burning to death was no longer acute at the time of rescue.

Fire Department Division IX Hamburg-Altona, August 11, 1943

Report About the Activities of Fire Department Division IX on July 25, 1943

The fire brigades were put into action by telephone orders, starting at 1:10 a.m. The telephones then failed. Requests for fire fighting units by the Sector could no longer be sent via telephone message, so motorcycle and bicycle messengers were dispatched. The command post for Fire Division IX was established at the corner of Bahrenfelder Steindamm and Schlageterstrasse at about 2:00 a.m.

Of about 320 fires, of which approximately one third were fought, only seven were reported by telephone. In some cases, reports of fires were received by patrols and Hitler Youths. Further reconnoitering to find fire sites was not necessary because of the widely visible glare of fire in the city districts of Bahrenfeld, Stellingen and Eidelstedt.

The combined forces of Division IX which went into action immediately after the first fires were reported were not nearly strong enough to contain all the reported fires. The first reinforcements we requested began arriving in Bahrenfeld and Eidelstedt at about 2 a.m.

Water supply from hydrants failed after about one half hour of operation. The water storage basins at Tondenerstrasse, Jaegerstrasse, Apenraderstrasse, Karkwurt, Op'n Hornack, two at Schnackenburgallee, Kielerstrasse, and corner Bruederstrasse were used; also, the auxiliary independent water supplies of the Stern Mills, Brahmsstrasse and of the Margarine Company, Friesenweg, were used by the fire fighters. The successes achieved by the fire fighting forces in plants and residential buildings were great, despite the difficult water situation.

No relief was provided for the fire fighting forces during the first 12 to 15 hours of fire fighting operations. Then one squad from each brigade was relieved for a while and used again later on to spell the other squad engaged in afterhosing operations and refilling of water storage basins. In general, the men had approximately two to three hours rest during the first 36 hours of fire fighting operations.

No food was provided at the fire sites during the first attack. The crews received their first provisions during the time between noon and 6 p.m.

In some Industrial Civil Defense plants no fire fighting activities were conducted by the plant forces. In others, the plant crews had taken many hoses and tried to fight the fires from the ground by spraying water into

the windows in an ineffectual attempt to put the fires out. On the other hand, some fire fighting squads of the Industrial Civil Defense in neighboring plants were successful.

In Sector IX, too, I had the feeling that the activities of the Self-Protection forces were directed more toward saving furniture than toward extinguishing fires when they first started. In cases where courageous persons went to work in their houses right away, the buildings were almost always saved.

Assignment of Forces, July 25, 1943:

11/IX - 1:15 a.m. to 3:40 p.m.

Hamburg-Bahrenfeld, Brahmsstrasse 75, Glashuettenstrasse 1/3

12/IX - 1:11 a.m. to 11:00 p.m.

Hamburg-Bahrenfeld, Glashuettenstrasse 1/3, Behrenfelder Steindamm 54, 56, 58, 60, 59, 63, 65, 68, Friedensallee 331, Schlageterstrasse 140/46, Kluckstrasse 1/9, Apenraderstrasse 15/17, Haderslebenerstrasse 15/17, Norburgerstrasse 4/6, Kohlentwiete 30

13/IX - 1:20 a.m. to 9:20 a.m.

Hamburg-Bahrenfeld, Brahmsstrasse 75, Schlageterstrasse 140/46, 134/138

14/IX - 1:46 a.m. to 7:50 p.m.

Hamburg-Bahrenfeld, Gasstrasse 1/5, Schlageterstrasse 126/32, Vinckestrasse 1/9, Bahrenfelder Steindamm 37, 45, 58, 67

21/IX - 1:10 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Hamburg-Eidelstedt Reichsbahnstrasse 10, 23, 33, 35, 37, 39, 27, Moehlenort 6, Paitelbuschweg 6, Kielerstrasse

22/IX - 1:38 a.m. to 4:50 p.m.

Hamburg-Bahrenfeld and Stellingen, Burgstrasse 16, 15, 15a, 21, 23, Schuetzenstrasse 239, Trommerstrasse 12, Rahlskamp 13, Kielerstrasse 440, 489, 433

23/IX - 2:00 a.m. to 4:50 p.m.

Stellingen, Kielerstrasse 392, 411, 413, 430, 432, 433, 440, 489, Jugendstrasse 4, Stephanstrasse 6/8, Steenwisch 7, 9, 11, Arminiusstrasse 17

24/IX - 1:52 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Kruppstrasse 47, 90

Reinforced Fire Service of Police Precinct 92 - 1:14 a.m. to 10:50 a.m.
Bahrenfeld, Bahrenfelder Chaussee 61, 107/9, 120, Moortweite 56/58

Volunteer Fire Department, Nienstedten - 2:26 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Bahrenfelder Chaussee 1/7, 35, Glasshuetterstrasse 1/5

Volunteer Fire Department, Othmarschen - 2:24 a.m. to 5:17 a.m.
Bahrenfeld, Moortwiete 60/68

Volunteer Fire Department, Gr. Flottbek - 5:20 p.m. to 8:20 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Vinckestrasse 1/9

Volunteer Fire Department, Blankenese - 2:35 a.m. to 4:00 a.m.
Isdorf, Flurstrasse

Volunteer Fire Department, Hemdingen - 4:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Kruppstrasse 90

Volunteer Fire Department, Wedel - 2:55 a.m. to 5:25 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Kruppstrasse 90, Schlageterstrasse 156

Volunteer Fire Department, Barmstedt - 2:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Moortwiete 56/58

Volunteer Fire Department, Pinneberg - 2:15 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Stellingen, Kielerstrasse

Volunteer Fire Department, Uetersen-Heist - 2:05 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Roehlstrasse

Fire Fighting Squad of Substitute Department, Osdorf - 7:30 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.
Bahrenfeld, Kruppstrasse 63

Of about 40 reported major fire sites, 26 were serviced by fire fighting units. All sites, except three medium-sized industrial plants, consisted of larger residential buildings which were burning in rows.

Except for the information obtained during reconnoitering missions, no reports of other fire sites were received at Division Headquarters. Because of the weak fire fighting forces and because water had to be taken from water storage basins, attacks on the fires were very difficult. On the other hand, it was very helpful that the water storage basins at Tondenerstrasse, Apenradenerstrasse, and Jaegerstrasse, had been refilled the day before. In all cases it was possible to check the spread of the fire to other buildings. A large portion of the fires in residential buildings was extinguished at the roof.

Here too, large amounts of fuel were stored in all attics. The catastrophic effect of burning fuel, which in the past had led to total loss of the house, was prevented here, because foreign workers from the plants and local army units that were drafted for clean-up operations were used to shovel the burning debris and fuel out into the yards and street. Because of this removal of burning masses, the lower stories of most of the houses were preserved and afterhosing operations were not necessary. The refilling of water storage basins was accomplished by foreign units from Bahrenfelder See.

The first food (cold) was received at 6:00 a.m., the second meal (warm) at about 10 a.m.

The Fire Emergency Squad Dithmarschen and the Fire Brigade of C.D. Motorized Division 21, were put at the disposal of the Fire Department of Territory West at 7:30 a.m., and 10:30 a.m., respectively. The water storage basins were refilled in the course of the day by FFS 11/IX. Here, too, fire fighting activities of Self-Protection forces were not observed.

Assignment of Forces; July 28, 1943

11/IX - 2:30 a.m. to 3:45 p.m.

Bahrenfelder Chaussee 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, Moortwiete 68, 70, 77

12/IX - 2:50 a.m. to 12:15 noon

Bahrenfelder Chaussee 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 40, 42, Moortwiete 68, 70

12:45 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. of July 29

Hamburg, Seumestrasse 31/37

14/IX - 2:55 a.m. to 12:15 noon

Bahrenfelder Chaussee 1, 3, 5, 7, 11

12:45 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. of July 29

Hamburg, Wielandstrasse 19/44

21/IX - 2:15 a.m. to 1:30 p.m.

Hamburg, Buchtstrasse 4, 6, 8, Schwanenwik 27, 28, 29, 30

22/IX - 2:15 a.m.
23/IX - 2:15 a.m.
H&L 2/IX - 2:15 a.m.

} These units did not reach the command post because the vehicles were badly damaged as a result of a collapsing house and fires on Steindamm

24/IX - 2:15 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Hamburg, Hartwicusstrasse 1, 2

Volunteer Fire Department Garstedt - 4:35 a.m. to 5:20 a.m.

Bahrenfelder Chaussee, Moortwiete

Fire Emergency Squad Dithmarschen - 4:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m.

Bahrenfelder Chaussee, Moortwiete

Report About the Activities of Fire Department Division IX During July 29/30, 1943

12:20 a.m. - Air alarm

12:50 a.m. - Orders to Emergency Unit 1/IX from Fire Department Group West to go to Hamburg, Ferdinandstrasse 1/5

1:50 a.m. - Report from Tower Watch Flottbeker Chaussee: "Glare of fire in direction Kruppstrasse." Lead unit departing in direction Kruppstrasse and continuing in the direction of the glare of fire to Stellingen. Fire in Kielerstrasse at five residential and industrial buildings.

2:10 a.m. - Fire Brigades 21, 22, and 23/IX assigned to duty by the Division Chief. The spread of fire at several sites was thereby prevented.

8:50 a.m. - Departure of Second Stand-by Unit with Division Chief to Cold Storage Depot Zentrum on Rosenstrasse in Hamburg.

Assignment of Forces; July 30, 1943

11/IX - 12:50 a.m. to 2:20 p.m.

Hamburg, Ferdinandstrasse 1/5

12/IX - 12:50 a.m. to 2:05 p.m.

Hamburg, Glockengiesserwall 16, 20

13/IX - 12:50 a.m. to 2:20 p.m.

Hamburg, Ferdinandstrasse 1/5

14/IX - 12:50 a.m. to 2:20 p.m.

Hamburg, Glockengiesserwall 16, 20

21/IX - 3:15 a.m. to 7:40 a.m.

Altona, Kielerstrasse 56/58

8:10 a.m. to 2:15 p.m.

Hamburg, Rosenstrasse 15, 18, 20

22/IX - 2:15 a.m. to 8:40 a.m.

Stellingen, Wolfstrasse 3, Kielerstrasse 215

8:50 a.m. to 1:10 p.m.

Hamburg, Steckelhoern 5, D.d. Muehren, Deichstrasse

23/IX - 2:15 a.m. to 8:40 a.m.

Stellingen, Kielerstrasse, 157, 161

8:50 a.m. to 1:10 p.m.

Hamburg, Steckelhoern 5, D.d. Muehren, Deichstrasse

Report About the Activities of Fire Division IX on August 2/3, 1943

12:56 a.m. - Air alarm

2:15 a.m. - Fire Brigades 22 and 23/IX depart on their own initiative to five fire sites in Melanchthon and Kielerstrasse. Roofs of residential houses reported to be on fire.

3:00 a.m. - Assembly of Stand-by Unit 1/IX to Command Post Division IX at Bahrenfelder Steindamm and Schlageterstrasse.

3:30 a.m. - Orders received from Fire Department Territory West for Stand-by Unit 1/IX to proceed to Reeperbahn, at Crater to Bunker entrance. After extinguishing the fires in Stellingen, Stand-by Unit Two was ordered to Schauenburgerstrasse and Gr. Bleichen.

4:20 a.m. to 7:15 a.m. - Emergency Squad 24/IX was active in Air Sector IV at Lagerstrasse.

3:30 a.m. to 8:30 a.m. - Chief of Division at fire sites Lagerstrasse and Bahrenfelderstrasse.

Assignment of Forces; August 3, 1943

11/IX - 3:35 a.m. to 1:20 p.m.

Hamburg, Seilerstrasse 44, Wilhelminenstrasse 22/24

12/IX - 3:35 a.m. to 3:20 p.m.

Hamburg, Gr. Bleichen 32, 34, 36, Roedingsmarkt 1

13/IX - 3:35 a.m. to 1:20 p.m.

Harbor Hospital, Wilhelminenstrasse 22/26

21/IX - 4:20 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Hamburg, Zeughausmarkt 37, Kielerstrasse 47/49, Wolfgangsweg (Sailors Home)

22/IX - 2:15 a.m. to 5:30 a.m.

Altona, Melanchthonstrasse 10, 17, 26, 27, Kielerstrasse 365

23/IX - 5:00 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Melanchthonstrasse 17, 10, 26, 27, Kielerstrasse 365, Hamburg Gr. Bleichen 32, 34, 36

24/IX - 4:20 a.m. to 7:15 a.m.

Altona, Lagerstrasse 124/126

The state of health of the men, with the exception of the injured, was excellent during the attack days. The average number of 8 men absent because of illness in Division IX did not increase despite the great exertions.

(Signed) Max
District Captain of FPP

Fire Department Division IX Hamburg-Altona, August 12, 1943

RE: Activity Report of Fire Department Division IX as of 8/11/43

The failure of the Self-Protection organization is general and obvious. As far as I know, no Self-Protection forces were seen to be fighting fires anywhere.* The most important thing for these people apparently was the salvaging of furniture and this furniture, left standing in front of the apartments, impeded fire fighting operations. There is no doubt of the fact, and there is proof of it in existence, that those buildings whose tenants were watchful and went into action at once when the bombs dropped, were saved.

Every conceivable effort should be made, and perhaps a regulation passed, to awaken the will of the Self-Protection forces to defend their property and also to make clear to them that it is possible to extinguish the phosphorus bombs. The fact that the "All-Clear" was not sounded, in my opinion, did not influence the development of the fires, because by the time the attacks had stopped, the fires were advanced to such a degree that the Self-Protection could not have put them out.

At the Noleiko firm in Friedensallee, the whole roof of the administration building was blown away. The shrapnel (bomb)-proof station, however, remained standing in the middle of the upper story. The two fire watches enclosed therein remained unhurt. Also, the two fire watches located in a bomb-proof station in the yard remained unhurt although a high explosive bomb detonated only about 15 meters away. The houses located in the vicinity were badly damaged.

Safes in burned-out houses were opened in two cases. One in the house Baeckerstrasse 9, the other in the building of the Cologne Fire Insurance, Hamburg, Rathausstrasse. The opening of the safes took place in the presence of the owners with the help of crowbars as the doors were stuck. The contents of the two safes were completely undamaged.

Morale in the Division IX, despite the heavy work and the prolonged tours of duty, may be rated as high. During the past few days, I have talked a great deal with the men and I have asked the brigade captains about the morale of their crews, and I have always received favorable replies and the best possible impressions.

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* Author: For a rebuttal to these types of comments see the content of Captain Max's brief report on Actions in Sector III for July 29/30, 1943 and the Following Note in which the author has summarized information on the Self-Protection performance reported by Captain Max in yet other reports.

As regards the work methods at the fire sites, I refer to my report of August 11, 1943, concerning activities on July 28, 1943, Paragraph 3, about the use of additional helpers.

(Signed) Max
District Captain of
Fire Fighting Police

Fire Department Division IX Hamburg, August 8, 1943

Activities During Air Attack of July 29/30, 1943

Damage Site	Damages and Actions	Equipment Used
	Actions in Air Sector III	
Ferdinandstrasse 1 - 5	Roofs completely on fire. Fought by Self-Protection forces under F.D. direction. 11/IX, from 12:50 a.m. to 2:10 p.m. 13/IX, from 12:50 a.m. to 2:20 p.m. 14/IX, from 12:50 a.m. to 2:20 p.m.	9 C hoses
Glockengiesser Strasse 16	The whole roof was on fire. Fought by Self-Protection forces, under F.D. direction. FFS 12a/IX, from 1:50 a.m. to 2:05 p.m.	2 C hoses
Glockengiesser-wall 20	The roof was completely on fire. Fought by Self-Protection under direction of Fire Department. FFS 12b/IX, 12:50 a.m. to 2:05 p.m.	2 C hoses
Steckelhoern 5 B.d. Muehren Deichstrasse	Residential and business buildings were completely on fire. Put out by Fire Department. 22/IX, from 8:50 a.m. to 1:10 p.m. 23/IX, from 8:50 a.m. to 1:10 p.m. DL 2/IX	1 B, 8 C hoses
Rosenstrasse 15, 18, 20, and 22	The roofs and in part the lower floors were on fire. Self-Protection fought fires under direction of F. D. 21/IX, from 8:10 a.m. to 2:15 p.m. DL 1/IX, from 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.	1 B, 5 C hoses

(Signed) Max
District Captain of Fire Protection

Following Note

Other reports written, or dated, two weeks earlier by Captain Max provide documentation for the presence, rather than the complete absence, of the Self-Protection Service forces in Sector IX following the first, and possibly the second, of the large-scale attacks. The other reports include one that is dated July 30, 1943, and list the Division IX and Volunteer Fire Department actions at various sites for July 25, 1943. Two summary listings that follow are undated but are signed by Captain Max; these two summaries give the location of fire sites at which the Self-Protection Service units, the Expanded Self-Protection units, the Nazi Party units, and the Industrial Civil Defense forces fought fires in the area of Division IX. It may be assumed, perhaps correctly, that the listing applies to the first large-scale attack on July 25, 1943, since the area of Group West received the brunt of that attack and since the bulk of the Self-Protection Service activities reportedly took place after that attack. The action listings reported over Captain Max's signature are summarized as follows:

Type of Fire Fighting Unit	Number of Fire Sites Attended By Action Type*				
	A	B	C	D	Total
Division IX Units	15	27	15	1	58
Volunteer Fire Department Units	4	7	-	-	11
Nazi Party Units	2	1	-	-	3
Industrial Civil Defense Units	8	7		-	24
Expanded Self-Protection Service	6	16		-	31
Self-Protection Service	216	304	1.	-	700**
Totals	251	362	213	1	827

The data, of course, refute the generalized allegations of the bigoted professional fire fighters such as those made by Captain Max. It doesn't seem possible that units who fought at 85 percent of the total sites that are reported to have been visited could not have been seen by the professionals.

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* A for extinguishing a fire
B for "fighting" the fire (outcome or endpoint not specified)
C for "fighting" the fire to a total loss
D for other tasks such as rescue operations

** Probably an underestimate; the lack of titles and dates on the first page of the listings suggests that some pages of the original report are missing.

Fire Department Division VII Hamburg-Altona, August 12, 1943

From Fire Department Group West to Department 914

RE: Report About Major Air Attacks on Hamburg

On the first attack day, in the night from July 24 to 25, 1943, the forces of Division VII went into action on their own initiative in almost all situations because transmittal of orders by telephone was not possible within a very short time after the attack began.

Because of the failure of the telephone lines, the mobilization procedures so often practiced in dry-run exercises could not be used at all. Reports from the squads back to headquarters were very rare; so as a consequence the Division had only partial supervision of the operations at the various fire sites. Relief for the crews in action could not be furnished for a long time after the attack started because of the large number of constantly developing new damage sites. The issuance of cold or hot food to the crews did not take place until many hours of action had occurred.

The situation pertaining to the second attack during the night of July 27/28, 1943, was similar to that of the first attack. The units had to be given orders through motorcycle or bicycle messengers, which naturally involved unavoidable delays in moving the crews to new sites.

In the remaining attacks, July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943, the area for which the Division VII is responsible was not hit. The forces of the Division were put into action almost exclusively in the area served by Group East.

The state of health of the units may be considered satisfactory.

(Signed) Hölfel
Captain of Fire Department

Fire Department Division VII Hamburg-Altona, August 20, 1943

Experience Report During the Air Attacks from July 24 to August 3, 1943

1. Because the municipal water lines in Hamburg-Altona failed during the first half hour of the first attack, it soon became clear that the auxiliary water supply was not nearly adequate. Based on our experience, it is recommended that the water storage basins not be located where they can be endangered by collapsing buildings, especially churches.

2. Hoses which were laid out over a long distance to water sources often were burned through before they could be laid out completely, because they could not be put under water pressure soon enough. In this respect, the Lanninger hoses were by far the most satisfactory.

3. On streets, the hose lines should be imbedded into the cobble stones as quickly as possible, or else the street should be blocked to traffic. Many hoses were damaged by vehicles running over them. Also, the available hose bridges were easily knocked aside by heavy vehicles and in such instances, the bridge itself tore the hoses.

4. Some of the out-of-town units did not report back to Headquarters after completing action at an assigned damage site. As a result, they often stood around without anything to do for long periods of time.

5. The heat in the public bunker in Holstenstrasse became so intense and oxygen so scarce, due to the heat rays from the high buildings burning in the vicinity, that oxygen had to be supplied and the bunker cooled with water. The occupants were not able to leave the bunker because the way to safety, through the burning streets, was too far away.

6. It should be pointed out that the often-used "roll glass" burns very easily. Therefore, curtains or blackout paper should not be used on windows which are equipped with "roll glass." Easily flammable objects should be placed at a safe distance away from such windows.

(Signed) Dethmann
District Lt. of
Fire Protection Police

LFS 11b/VII
House of Youth
Room 308

Hamburg-Altona, August 22, 1943

To Fire Department Division VII

RE: Activity and Experience Report

During the major attack by enemy aircraft on July 24/25, 1943, the quarters of the light Fire Fighting Brigade 11b/VII were destroyed by a direct hit of a high explosive bomb and the fire truck was badly damaged. Despite this, I put the squad into action at Rathausmarkt and at Präsidentenweg. But because of the lack of water (failure of water main) after a short time, the fire fighting operations had to be terminated. In a very few minutes thereafter, the Rathausmarkt was a sea of flames. The spread of the fire was assisted by a fire storm of a velocity not heretofore experienced, and by an enormous shower of sparks. In order to escape being completely encircled by the fire, I ordered a breakthrough to the Hinrich-Lohsestrasse, which was already blocked by masses of stones and other debris and which was then already partly engulfed by the fire. This breakthrough was successful.

We next placed the fire engine near the water storage basin at Hauptkirche to pump water. Hose lines were laid to fight and contain nearby fires but the fire engine gave out. The damage it suffered at Rathausmarkt apparently was too severe. Soon the same fire storm situation arose at this site that we experienced at Rathausmarkt. Messengers that had been dispatched to get a replacement for our fire engine did not return. Also, no replacement truck could have gotten through to us. After the steeple of the church collapsed, we had only one possibility left open to us. This was to escape through to the cemetery; in this effort we were finally successful.

Later on, I led the squad without losses to Fire Station 16 and reported for further action. On July 26, from 7:15 p.m. to 12:30 midnight, we worked at Naefke, Gr. Elbstrasse. From July 27 to August 3, we worked in cooperation with the Heavy Fire Brigade 13/VII.

The state of health of the squad was very bad in the first few days after the first attack. Of the nine men in the squad, seven had severe stomach and intestinal disturbances. All had inflamed eyes from the smoke and dust.

The failure of the water main, the debris from the collapsed buildings, the intense heat rays, the fire storms and the strong showers of sparks were the main difficulties faced by the squad, aside from the failure of the fire engine.

Suggestions for improving the fire fighting situation in the future include: rummage clearance of all attics; remove old woodsheds from yards; install many more open water storage tanks; increase the supply of water and sand in all buildings; and install more water storage tanks in air raid shelters and bunkers.

(Signed) Mansfeld
Master of FPP and
Brigade Leader

HFB 12/VII Hamburg-Altona, August 23, 1943

RE: Experience Report About Our Actions During the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg

Damage Site: Norderreihe. Air Attack July 24/25, 1943

On arrival, found several houses completely on fire. Because of the strong storm, the whole street caught on fire. Self-Protection forces were not in evidence. The water had to be taken from water storage basin Norderreihe to fight the fires.

Damage Site: Teichstrasse, Moerkenstrasse, Fire Station 16, and surrounding property

Several buildings were completely on fire; also, single roofs of several houses were on fire. Despite the strong storm further spread of the fire was prevented. Self-Protection forces ably assisted in the fire fighting. Water had to be taken from a water storage basin 400 meters away.

Damage Site: Bahrenfelder Chaussee, Air Attack July 27/28, 1943

Roofs and top stories of a residential housing block and of several town-houses and factory buildings were on fire. Sufficient fire fighting units were on hand. The water was taken from a water storage basin 500 meters away. Because of the large amount of water needed, frequent interruptions in the water supply took place.

Damage Site: Reichardt Works, Wandsbek, with surrounding buildings

Whole residential and factory buildings were on fire. The HFB 12/VII refilled three water storage basins of the Reichardt Works from the canal one kilometer away. At the same time, the brigade took part in fire fighting operations. A tremendous storm was raging. No Self-Protection forces were present at most of these fire sites.

Damage Site: Mittelweg, Milchstrasse, Attack of July 29/30, 1943

Single residential houses were on fire. The spread of the fire to neighboring buildings and terraces located behind the burning houses was prevented. A very strong wind prevailed. The water was taken from the water storage basin at St. John's Church about 100 meters away. The Self-Protection forces worked very hard at these fire sites.

Damage Site: Roedingsmarkt, Goerttwiete

Several single residential, store, and office buildings were on fire. A rather strong wind prevailed. The neighboring buildings were saved with great difficulty, since it was not possible to fight the fire from the canal side. The water was taken from the canal. Self-Protection forces were not present.

Damage Site: New City Hall, Attack of August 2/3, 1943

Greater part of the roof of the City Hall was on fire. The fire was contained to its original extent. It was raining. Self-Protection forces were very active. Water was taken from the New City Hall storage tank at Adolf Hitler Platz.

Special Observations:

The spread of fire was facilitated by the fact that in many buildings the firewalls were topped by the roof structure and by wooden beams which actually passed through the firewalls.

At many residential fire sites, the residents thought first of saving their belongings instead of first trying to fight the fire. And where the furniture was placed in front of entrances and doors, it greatly impeded fire fighting later on.

In many cases, there were not sufficient excess pressure valve, distributor joints, and for streets with a great deal of traffic, hose bridges. Since orders could be transmitted only be messenger, the exchange of damaged hoses, as well as the reestablishment of water supply, took a great deal of precious time.

The normally-used hose bridges were not practical. Instead, two pieces of wood, about 3 meters long and 5 or 6 cm square, connected by thinner boards, have proved very satisfactory as hose bridges.

The reinforcement of fire fighting units by the use of Hitler Youths as messengers and firement worked out very well.

(Signed) Jo yk
Master of FPP

Emergency Fire Brigade 14/VII Hamburg, August 22, 1943

RE: Experiences and Observations During the Action of July 24/25, July 27/28, July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943, In the Time of the Major Air Attacks

Experience Report

7/24-25/43 2:15 a.m. 7/25 to 1:00 a.m. 7/26/43
1:1:13, 1 Fire Truck 25, 1 Truck

While fighting fires at damage sites Hafenstrasse, Kl. Fischerstrasse, storehouses at Gr. Elbstrasse and Fischmarkt, the municipal water mains were, in the beginning, sufficient to supply water for the fire fighting operations. Advanced fires in the roof and balcony of Hafenstrasse 39 and Kl. Fischerstrasse 48/50 were soon brought under control. As a continued safety measure, we left a complete hose line with the Self-Protection forces for afterhosing as necessary. In this way, successful extinguishing of the fire was assured. The coffee storehouse of the Naefke Company in Kl. Fischerstrasse was saved thanks to energetic fire fighting action and because the building had concrete ceilings which help to prevent spread of the fire. We left a C hose with Self-Protection forces at the coffee storehouse in order to prevent the fire from flaring up again.

Hopeless fires were in progress at Kl. Fischerstrasse 32/38 and it was only possible to check the spread of these fires. In doing so, a public air raid shelter was made safe. The Ottilienhof at Gr. Elbstrasse 10/20 was a difficult but worthwhile fire fighting object and the fire was battled. Operations were impeded, however, by a time bomb situated in House No. 20. After the loss of our FT 25, I took over the fire truck of a Fire Squad from Elmshor which happened to come along. With it, the fire in Ottilienhof was extinguished and the residential and storage buildings of Ottilienhof, worth millions of marks, were saved. Because the fire flared up again at Ottilienhof during the later evening hours, the fire fighting operation was renewed, using the last strength of the crews. The fire fighting was impeded by an impassable staircase and the time bomb. At fire site Fischmarkt 37, the household goods of tenants were saved by our actions which took place under bombardment.

7/28/43 1 a.m. to 3 a.m.
Four patrols of three men each were sent to Harbor District in Altona to supervise operations. They found nothing on fire.

2:20 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.
Action at An der Alster 52, 1:1:12, no special occurrences were reported.

7/29-30/43 12 noon to 10:30 p.m.
Forces employed: 1:9

We were assigned the task of recovering bodies in Sector IV, Heidenkampsweg, Grevenweg, and Sorbenstrasse 132. The actions were impeded because of the fact that the crews were totally inexperienced in this type of work; also, no equipment, such as stretchers, hooks, etc., was available and the men got sick, vomited and had nervous attacks. Brandy should have been made available, both as a bracer and as disinfectant. Darkness interrupted the work. During the night, the bunker at Suederstrasse was bombarded and bomb fragments damaged our truck. At 3:00 a.m. on August 30 I received personal orders from Colonel Dr. Zaps to report to Fire Station 10.

At Sierichstrasse 76/78, the crews assisted in the recovery of personal belongings. Also, a roof fire was fought with small fire fighting equipment; the water was taken from Alsterrondeel. Because of a shortage of hoses, I used the Fire Truck 25 from Headquarters with a new crew. With the help of the Volunteer Fire Department of Bremen, difficulties with the 120-liter civil defense water pump were corrected, and fire fighting activities were continued successfully until 8 p.m. Afterward, the water storage tanks were refilled at the fire site; the threat of fire spread was removed. Crews were active for up to 34 hours at one stretch.

8/2-3/43 3:20 p.m. to midnight.
Forces employed: 1:9

Fought a roof fire on the new City Hall and put out a fire in the storehouse at Lagerstrasse No. 60. Also, we carried out independent afterhosing activities at Lagerstrasse 52, 54, 56, and 60. The water was in short supply at all sites. We used the fire engine of the Plant, Fehleisen and Rickel. Our own Fire Truck 25 had, in the meantime, broken down.

General Observations and Experiences:

Although the municipal water main has to be considered as the basic framework of the water supply for fighting fires, the independent auxiliary water supply should be greatly expanded. This should be done not so much with open water storage tanks, but more with boiler-type water containers, which would be available in every street so that developing fires could be

put out immediately by laymen. The 120-liter industrial civil defense pump engines have proved to be most practical and were conveniently handy. In general, the number of available crew members is less crucial, because with the equipment a small crew can be assisted easily by civilian helpers.

It is absolutely necessary that the leader at the fire site be able to recognize the crucial point for attacking the fire and the danger of fire spread, and that he is able to communicate to his men his determination to fight. He must be able to obtain help when it is not on hand, and if necessary, to take over the pilot and messenger service himself.

(Signed) Peters
Acting Brigade Leader

HFB 21/VII Hamburg, August 30, 1943

Report About the Activities of the Brigade
During the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg

July 24/25, 1943

The HFB 21/VII went into action in its own quarters during the first attack night. Several high explosive bombs fell in the immediate vicinity of the quarters; one detonated on the railroad embankment, one in the Holsten Brewery and one in front of the Brigade air raid shelter. Also, a huge amount of stick and phosphorus firebombs were dropped simultaneously. The high explosive and firebombs cause the total loss of one fire truck of FB 21/VII and one vehicle of FB 24/VII. Efforts to extinguish the fires in the immediate area were unsuccessful because of lack of water.

The industrial area bounded by Viehhofstrasse, Rainweg and Kreuzweg, including the Holsten Brewery, the Fish Smokehouses of Westfalen and Ihde, and the overland traffic "Nordmark," became one single conflagration instantly. This indicates that a large amount of firebombs were dropped. Neither a rain of phosphorus nor the use of new kinds of firebombs was noted; also, duds or residue of duds were not found. The fire fed eagerly on the tar and paper roof of the halls of the Brewery and on the large wooden sheds of the smokehouses, and it developed tremendous heat along with enormous amounts of flying sparks.

Because pump connections luckily had been completed shortly before the attack at the corner of Kreuzweg and Rainweg leading to the pipeline in Sonderburgstrasse, we had an auxiliary supply of water for the first two days. From here, one squad of FB 21/VII fought fires in the industrial complex and one squad fought fires at the residential housing block Kreuzweg/Rainweg; the latter were successful in preserving the housing. However, great difficulties were encountered again and again during the fire fighting in the houses because the fuel stored in the attics repeatedly caught on fire.

The plant fire departments of the Holsten Brewery and the firm Ihde helped considerably with the fire fighting operations; however, they suffered from a water shortage. After a two-day struggle, the fire was finally placed under control, and we should not forget the torrential rain which helped to check the spread of the fire on the tar and paper roofs.

July 26/27, 1943

The Fire Brigade 21/VII was put into action at Friedensallee and Hohenzollernring to fight six roof fires. The houses were all saved. As mentioned above, an unnecessarily long time was required to extinguish fires in the fuels that were stored in the attics. The water was taken from the Elbe by a long hose line.

In the evening the Brigade was busy with afterhosing duties at the Hosten Brewery, as well as at Schauenburgerstrasse and Schumacherstrasse in Altona.

On July 28, 1943, the Fire Truck 25 - 1183 of the Expanded Self-Protection Service, which had been badly damaged during the attack, was repaired temporarily and was used as an emergency vehicle by FS 21b/VII.

July 28, 1943

Fire fighting action occurred at Bahrenfelderstrasse 129 and at Lobuschstrasse. Several residential houses were saved from destruction.

July 28/29, 1943

Fires were fought at An der Alster at Heleinstift. Afterwards the squad worked at Ritterstrasse in Eilbeck and saved several homes. In these actions, long hose lines were laid from the Alster to the fire sites; due to damage from various causes, much of the laid-out hose material became unusable.

July 30, 1943

We fought fires in residential houses at Harvestehuderweg, Mittelweg, and Alsterchaussee under the direction of Captain Leudemann. Again, long hose lines were laid from the Alster.

July 31 and August 1, 1943

On these two days, the squad conducted afterhosing operations at Roedingsmarkt, at Goertwiete, at Dornbusch, and at Oeverseestrasse in Altona.

August 2/3, 1943

In this period, roof fires in residential houses at Präsident Krahnstrasse, Altona were fought. Several houses were saved. The fire fighting was impeded by fuels stored in attics.

(Signed) Waje
First Sergeant of FPP

HFB 22/VII Hamburg, August 31, 1943

RE: Report About the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg on July 24/25, July 27/28, July 39/40, and August 2/3, 1943

Before the Brigade received their first orders to go to a fire site, their quarters at Moortwiete 40 were hit by a high explosive bomb. Consequently, C.D. Police Sergeant Oberstein, Sergeant Reuter, and three other persons were injured in the air raid shelter. At 1:30 a.m., on July 25 the Brigade received orders by motorcycle messenger to report to Gr. Brunnenstrasse. We left behind a C.D. Police Sergeant to take care of transporting the wounded to a hospital, and, reinforced with a number of Hitler Youth Fire Fighters, the Brigade moved out to the fire sites at Gr. Brunnenstrasse 141, 142, 144, 146, 148. Some of the houses were completely enveloped by flames while others only had roof and upper story fires. These fires were fought while, at the same time, fires were fought in houses at Friedensallee 47, 49, 51, 53, 55, 63, 67, 71, and 75, which had roof fires and fires in their top stories. The water storage tanks at Friedensallee and Hohenzollernring served at first as the source of water supply; afterwards, the water storage tanks at Philosophenweg/Hohenzollernring was used; still later, the water was taken directly from the Elbe at Neumuehlen. When the water was taken from the Elbe, only a feeder pipe was laid because of the shortage of hoses, so that the flow of water coming through to the site was much less than previously which certainly made a difference in the way the large fires could be fought. However, spread of the fire to the surrounding buildings was prevented. The brigade remained at the site until 9:30 a.m. on July 27 when it was relieved by the Fire Company from East Prussia. During the whole time only a few men were pulled out to rest for short periods.

On the second attack day (July 28) one squad was assigned to fight fires at Bahrenfelder Chaussee; the second squad was ordered to supply water to the water storage tanks at Jaegerstrasse and to fight fires at Bahrenfelder Chaussee. The Brigade returned to its station at 12:30 noon.

On the third attack day, July 30, we moved out to the Alsterdorfer Mental Institution at 3:00 a.m. in the morning. Fifteen buildings had been ignited by stick and phosphorus firebombs. Water to fight the fires was obtained from the Alster at Sengelmanns Bridge. First, the fire at the Administration Building was fought and the stored textiles were saved from destruction. Next the hospital with much precious equipment was saved. After that, the old administration building along with the laundry containing great amounts of linens was saved from destruction. Fires in

the remaining small buildings and barracks were extinguished by the Institution's Fire Fighting Personnel and the Volunteer Fire Department from Suelfeld. At 6:00 p.m., the Brigade was withdrawn because the ball bearings on the pump were broken; the afterhosing work was left to the Institution Fire Department.

On the fourth attack day, August 3, the Brigade moved out at 3:20 a.m. to Schmidt Brothers Wholesale Grocery Company and Bahr and Gehrkens Gilt Cornice Works, both in Lagerstrasse. At Schmidt Brothers, cocoa beans worth 750,000 marks were stored, most of which were brought to safety by the Armed Forces. The fire was soon extinguished by the Self-Protection forces with some assistance from the Brigade. At 9:30 a.m., the Brigade returned to its quarters. No special observations were made during these operations. In all actions, the Hitler Youth Fire Fighters, used for reinforcements, proved to be very helpful. After August 3, the Brigade was put into action at various fire sites in Hamburg for afterhosing operations.

(Signed) Burstedt
Master of FPP

Appendix 4

EXCERPTS FROM THE HAMBURG FIRE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS ON THE AIR ATTACKS DURING WORLD WAR II: THE GROUP EAST AND GROUP HARBOR UNIT REPORTS ON ACTIONS AND EXPERIENCES DURING THE LARGE-SCALE ATTACKS OF JULY-AUGUST 1943 AND OTHER REPORTS ON LATER ATTACKS

27h

Municipal Government of the City of Hamburg
Commandant of Fire Protection Police Hamburg, August 21, 1943

Group East
Fire Fighting and Decontamination Service

RE: Report About the Major Air Raids on Hamburg, July 24/25, July 27/28, July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

Attention: The Police President, according to his directive S3(L) on August 6, 1943.

Attention is directed to the fact that on August 14 the Chief of the Fire Department Hamburg submitted a report in brief form to the Police President which is based on the reports of all Fire Department Division Chiefs and Commanders of Civil Defense Groups and which contains general experiences and suggestions for improvement.

The Fire Protection Police has a plan in its possession which shows the approximate outlines of the totally destroyed city districts.

The detailed data of the Fire Department Headquarters of Group East were lost during the course of events (mainly during the partial evacuation of the building when flammable material was not removed in spite of the danger of fire spread during the night of July 29/30). In addition, the data of Fire Department Division IV and V were destroyed by enemy action.

July 24/25, 1943

During the first attack night, the districts assigned to Divisions V, VI (with St. George Hospital) and X (Wandsbek, center of attack: Market) were especially hard hit and had extensive fire damage. The number of fires ignited in the area of responsibility of Division VI was comparatively small.

In the districts of Divisions X and IV, major conflagrations developed. The same was true of the district of Division V, between Wandsbeker Chaussee and Hasselbrookstrasse.

The number of available fire department units of Group East was not sufficient to cope with the fire situation that developed. Fire Divisions IV and V requested several additional fire fighting units. Out-of-town forces did not become available until the morning of July 25. Civil Defense Motorized Divisions 21 and 29, fire fighting units from Leubeck and

Bremen, and other fire fighting units from further away (Schleswig-Holstein) arrived at that time. The Volunteer Fire Departments of Stormarn and Lauenburg counties were requested (Alarm Urgency 3), and within one to three hours, 18 fire fighting squads arrived from Stormarn and six from Lauenburg. All were put into action.

All fires in the areas under Divisions IV, VI, and X were fought successfully. In the Division V area, the great conflagration was contained and sealed off from spreading to the rest of the territory. The rescue of endangered persons was not an important function of the brigades during that attack night. Provisions available to the fire fighting units in the time between the two attacks (July 24/25 and July 27/28) were generally insufficient. The Command Posts functioned without a hitch, due to the organization plan that had been formulated and put into effect after the major air attack of July 27, 1942.

In the damage area, and most particularly in the Division V area which was divided into "fire section," officers of the Fire Protection Police and Captains of the Fire Department were in charge of operations.

During this attack night, local telephone lines were down over most of the time of operations. However, long distance telephone connections between Police Group East, Party administration, and Divisions IV, V, VI, and X, were functioning. Requests for the volunteer fire departments of Stormarn and Lauenburg counties had to be transmitted by motorcycle messengers because of disruption of the local telephone service.

July 27/28, 1943

It should be mentioned here that the largest part of the fire fighting forces of Group East were assigned to afterhosing operations in Group West when the attack started, because the first night attack had caused more widespread damage in the Group West area than in other areas.

The effects of the second night attack were most devastating in the areas of Divisions IV and V. The districts were almost one continuous area of conflagration, and a fire storm of hurricane proportions raced through the streets.

The water supply from the municipal pipe lines failed completely during the early part of the attack. Therefore, the auxiliary water supplies had to be used. In the Division IV area, about 140 new fires developed. A fire storm also developed in this district in the area between Hamburgerstrasse and Vogelweide near Holsteinischer Kamp.

In the Division X area, the expanse of the attack extended to Marienthal and East Wandsbek. Fires developed at Wandsbek Hospital, Douaumont Barracks, Hermann Goering Barracks, Freight Station, and Neumann, Reichardt, and Draeger Works.

In the districts of Divisions IV and V, and also to some extent in the area of Division VI where conflagrations occurred, the fire fighting forces initially devoted themselves solely to the most urgent task, namely the rescue of human lives. In the vicinity of Fire Stations 1, 5, and 6 thousands of people were led out of their air raid shelters in residential houses, or were collected in the streets, and were taken to the Elbe River, to the canals, or to open land and to safety, sometimes under the protection of water spray. At the same time, and later, the Fire Department worked from hedgehog positions and the out-of-town forces worked sphenoidally from periphery defensive positions to carry the fire fighting operations into the damaged areas.

Part of the roof of the Headquarters Building of Police Group East burned. The building was also endangered by nearby houses that were burning. Self-Protection forces from the Group staff and a fire fighting squad from the Fire Department were successful in averting the danger and in extinguishing all other fires in the vicinity of the Headquarters Building.

All official telephone lines were down. The field telephones of the Fire Departments in the Headquarters of Group East could only be used very sparingly. Therefore motorcycle messengers were employed. The pilot service to out-of-town units proved to be unsatisfactory.

July 29/30, 1943

All division forces of the Group were hit again. In the areas of Divisions IV and V, numerous fires were fought successfully. The burning St. Mary's Hospital, amongothers, was saved from destruction. The Division VI area was especially hard hit. The major part of the residential district Barmbeck was destroyed by fire. In the Division X area, in Wandsbek, a conflagration developed from Holstenstrasse to Eichtal Park. Other places that were hit included the Districts Farmsen, Bramfeld and Rahlstedt.

The Wandsbek Fire Station was destroyed by high explosive and firebombs. Ten Fire Department men and one Hitler Youth were killed. The Police Headquarters in Air Sector X was hit by several stick firebombs. Next to and behind the Headquarters building other houses were set on fire. The Headquarters building of the Group was endangered by a row fire in Horst-Wessel-Strasse and by a new fire in a neighboring house. By

energetic actions, the Fire Department forces saved these buildings again.

Messages to the Headquarters of the Group arrived only by motorcycle or bicycle messengers, some of whom had to come on foot for long distances after they lost their vehicles. No telephone or wire services were available. During the night, a radio truck was put into operation at Headquarters of Group East; it was used to transmit seven messages from the Fire Department to the Party Headquarters.

August 2/3, 1943

The Division IV area was not hit in this attack. Some fires were started in the Division V area; these were successfully extinguished. The same was true of the seventeen fire sites that developed in Bergedorf and of the few that were started in Kirchwaerder.

The District VI area was hit as follows: The Gas Works Barmbeck was hit a second time. Also, fires were ignited in houses along the streets between Hamburgerstrasse/Osterbeckstrasse and Hofweg/Bachstrasse. The local fire fighting units were able to extinguish these fires. Minor damage occurred to buildings in the District X area, in the communities of Farmsen and Tonndorf.

All available forces, officers and unit leaders of the Fire Department Group East were put into action at Adolf Hitler Platz and at the State Opera House in the area of Group West after the attack.

The general observation may be made that many Self-Protection units, especially during the second and third attacks, were held down by the hail of bombs and did not go into action until too late; but in many instances they were still in time to work effectively, and they were able to hold many single fires in check.

Among serious operational difficulties encountered were the heavy debris in the streets, the lack of telephone and wire communications, and the loss of many vehicles on reconnaissance and messenger missions. The most handicapping factors, however, were the fire storms and the difficulties in obtaining the necessary water supply (without delay).

Recommendations for the Future

1. Quick and complete reconstruction of the Plant Civil Defense, the Expanded Self-Protection, and the Self-Protection units for the remaining city districts is of the utmost importance.

2. Public civil defense bunkers and other air raid shelters must be provided with sufficient water supplies for extinguishing fires.

3. At the very least, all leaders and deputies of the emergency forces and civil defense groups should be acquainted with the idea and with the methods of rescue during a fire storm. (People who know the area must acquaint themselves with protected open spaces, waterways, and the like in their respective neighborhoods, which might be used as a place of safety by the population.)

4. Radio communications are an absolute necessity for the fire fighting units.

5. Experiences and conclusions in the field of fire prevention have been collected and disseminated by the Commandant of the Fire Protection Police, Department 92 and S3(I).

(Signed) Schwarzenberger
Group East Commanding Officer

Fire Department Division IV Hamburg, August 6, 1943

Experience Report by Tower Watch at Water Tower Rothenburgsort Covering the Air Attack During the Night of July 27/28, 1943

When the alarm sounded, I received orders to man the water tower as a lookout, and I was brought to my post by motorcycle.

In the beginning I could only see the flaring up of Flak fire in the distance. A message arrived from the Water Works, that planes were approaching over Neumunster, probably from the direction of Kiel or Luebeck. After about 15 minutes, the Flak fire came closer and closer. The searchlight activity increased, and soon an enemy plane was caught in the cross beams. It escaped going away in the direction of Harburg.

Immediately afterwards, heavy high explosive bombs started falling in the direction of Billstrang. This was a prelude to the murderous air attack that followed. Stick firebombs were soon falling in enormous numbers. The whole of Rothenburgsort glowed in a bright white light. After the enemy had set up this illumination, the first "Christmas Trees" began to fall; right afterwards, in rapid succession, the fire, the high explosive, and the phosphorus bombs were dropped. I also observed that phosphorus appeared to be raining down. At first a large fireball was visible in the sky; after some time it dissolved into glowing strips that spilled over the houses, most of which were already aflame. Now fires were visible everywhere, even on the water, where boats and ships were aflame. This latter fact constituted my last message to Sector IV, before our communications were interrupted.

Shortly after my last message, the water tower was hit by a high explosive bomb to the right of the entrance (a fact which I did not find out till later on). The entrance door was thrown into the tower and a terrific pulse of air went up through the building. In the meantime, the firestorm had reached such proportions that I had to take cover on my knees behind the rampart.

After the enemy had spent his destructive rage, I found that the path of return to Fire Station 6 had been cut off. I therefore decided to put myself at the disposal of the Water Works manager. I helped the plant fire department put the portable fire extinguisher into position and we extinguished the fire at the machine house first. When the engine fuel was used up, I put eight French prisoners to work on the hand-pressure pumps and they pumped unremittingly until we brought the fire under control.

During the fire fighting operations, cries for help could be heard in the vicinity of the tower. With the help of some members of the Party and the Armed Forces, as well as of some courageous civilians, I rescued a number of people from the neighboring air raid shelters. As a result, a number of people escaped death in the flames.

After the fire storm had abated somewhat, I went back to the fire station; however, all I found on my arrival was a heap of ruins. I then went to the Main Fire Station and reported to Lt. Colonel Schliemann and Lt. Colonel Dr. Unglaube.

(Signed) Krnescher
Master Sergeant of FPP

Emergency Squad 1/IV Hamburg, August 4, 1943

RE: Rescue of Persons During Air Attack of July 27, 1943

During the air attack of July 27, 1943, the crew at Fire Station 1 rescued about 250 persons from the endangered air raid shelters along the streets Berliner Tor, Beim Strohhause, Kolbergstrasse and Stiftstrasse. In addition, about 500 persons who had wandered about the streets in the fire storm were rescued and accommodated in the air raid shelters of Fire Station 1.

While performing fire fighting tasks at Maizena Works and Lederschueler at Heidenkampsweg, about 250 persons who had escaped from air raid shelters onto barges, were rescued with the help of long ladders and with the use of C hoses. Many people had suffered burns. A few people had jumped into the water, and these, too, were rescued.

The crew of LFB 11/IV, with quarters in Burgstrasse, rescued about 300 persons from the endangered air raid shelters in Burgstrasse, Claus-Grothstrasse and Bethesdastrasse and accommodated them at the shelter in the Burgstrasse School. Other persons wandering about in the fire storm were also put up at the school.

(Signed) Stankowski
Master of FPP
and Squad Leader 1/IV

Fire Department - Emergency Squad I/IV Hamburg, August 5, 1943

RE: Report About My Activities During the Air Attacks of July 24/25 and July 27/28

1. Air Attack During the Night of July 24/25, 1943

On July 24, I started my two-week recuperative leave. During the air attack of July 24/25, I went to the roof of my house at Suederstrasse 319. The house, as well as other buildings in the vicinity, had been hit by stick firebombs. I extinguished two of them and ordered the Self-Protection forces to look after things. The roof of the rear house at Suederstrasse 323 was on fire. I directed a few Party Workers to form a bucket chain with the Self-Protection people and to start fighting the fire. After I had received the impression that my presence was no longer required, I took my bicycle and proceeded to my duty station to report for service, because by then fires were visible all over the neighborhood. I did not get very far on my bicycle, as the streets were barely passable because of bomb craters, debris, and fallen trees. With the greatest effort I was finally able to reach my headquarters, Fire Station 1. There I took over the leadership of my emergency unit, and at 1:43 the squad moved out to Repsoldstrasse. Concerning my further activities that night, please see the attached activity report.

2. Air Attack During the Night of July 27/28, 1943

During the air attack of July 27/28, 1943, I was in the air raid shelter at Fire Station 1. Shortly after the start of the attack, I went to the roof of the Main Fire Station in order to check on the state of things. When I left the shelter, I noticed considerable rock dust in the air and that a strong wind was blowing. I had a good view from the roof, from which nearly all the shingles had been ripped. Many large fires could be observed from the roof. High explosive bombs were falling at short intervals, jarring the fire house down to the foundations. I reported my observations to Captain Mack at the Central Radio Station. I then returned to the roof, accompanied by Master Pieper. I then observed a roof fire in the house at Berlinertor No. 8 and immediately went down to the shelter to obtain personnel to put the fire out. I asked for four volunteers from the crew to fight the fire, as high explosive and firebombs were still falling. The following volunteered immediately: Sergeant Bärer, Sergeant Rüter, Master Sergeant of C.D. Police Wittekind, and Master Sergeant Moldenhauer. By now the wind had increased to hurricane proportions, mingled with strong showers of sparks and rock dust. It was barely possible to remain on one's feet. With the help of the above named

men. I connected one C hose to a hydrant to fight the fire at Berlinertor 3. We found out at once that the pipes contained no water. By the time we did this, the fire spread to the fourth floor; high explosive and fire-bombs were still falling. More than 1000 people were already sheltered in the Fire Station. I gathered together all the able-bodied men and put them at the disposal of Master Pieper. He tried his utmost to save the fire station. The fact that the fire was kept away from the Fire Station, and that the many persons sheltered there had a safe place of refuge, is due solely to the efforts of Master Pieper, Sergeant Rüter, Sergeant Bruns, and members of Departments 91, 92, 93, and 94.

(Signed) Stankowski
Master of Fire Protection Police
and Chief of Emergency Squad 1/IV

Fire Department - Emergency Squad 1/IV Hamburg, July 26, 1943

RE: Report On The Activities of Emergency Squad 1/IV During the Air Attack of July 25, 1943

On July 25, 1943, at 1:41 a.m., Emergency Squad 1/IV received orders by telephone to take over fire fighting operations in the damaged district of Spaldingstrasse and Repsoldstrasse. On arrival in the damaged area, the following fire sites were noted:

Spaldingstrasse-Schultzweg-Noderstrasse: residential houses wholly on fire.

Norderstrasse, corner of Schultzweg 23: residential houses wholly on fire.

Schultzweg 7: residential house, roof and top story on fire.

Schultzweg 14: residential house, roof and apartment fires.

Schultzweg 18/20: residential house, rear building wholly on fire.

Norderstrasse, corner of Schultzweg 30: residential house wholly on fire.

Amsinckstrasse 13-14: residential and office buildings wholly on fire.

Amsinckstrasse, corner of Spaldingstrasse 6-8: roof and offices on fire.

Repsoldstrasse 58: store and roof fires.

Repsoldstrasse 60: Repsoldhof, roof completely on fire.

Repsoldstrasse 70: room fire, storage shed aflame.

Repsoldstrasse 88: residential house, second to fourth stories and roof on fire.

Repsoldstrasse 90: roof on fire.

Repsoldstrasse 69-107: all rear buildings, factories, sheds and storage buildings wholly on fire.

Repsoldstrasse 73-79: storage building and garages, front building completely on fire.

Repsoldstrasse 95-99: residential buildings, front houses and roof on fire.

Sonninstrasse 4-16: (Persil Detergent Plant), solvent building and shed on fire.

Sonninstrasse 17-18: front and rear building completely on fire.

Woltmannstrasse 23-25: rear buildings, factory, completely on fire.

The fires were caused by stick and phosphorus firebombs; several buildings were destroyed or damaged by high explosive bombs.

The squad HFS 13b/IV was active at the damage sites when we arrived. They had established a command post at Repsoldstrasse 88 - Telephone 24 52 55 - and had requested reinforcements. The Emergency Squad 1/IV also requested additional forces. It was extremely difficult to establish telephone connections with Air Sector IV because the lines were overloaded. However, two hook-and-ladder trucks, one S 4, 5, and the FFS 14a/IV arrived at the damage site eventually. Still later, another fire brigade and several plant fire crews arrived. All available forces, although very sparse in the beginning, made a concerted attack on the quickly spreading fires.

Because of the effects of the fire and the fire fighting activities, the command post had to be abandoned at 5 a.m. A new command post was established at Repsoldstrasse 83 - Telephone 24 44 95 and 24 38 80 - and Air Sector IV was informed accordingly.

The fire fighting squads that arrived later were also assigned to fighting the fires, and they worked very well. The Emergency Commandos and the forces of the Expanded Fire Service worked without a hitch.

Air Sector IV furnished an Army detachment of 90 men for fire fighting operations. This unit performed valuable service manning the fire hoses, although they did not arrive until about 8 a.m.

The necessary water supplies were obtained by pumping water from the canal. The units in action in the damage area were as follows:

Unit	Strength (Officers	Men)	Hoses C	B
HFS 13b/IV	1	9	4	2
Hook and Ladder Truck 1/IV		3	3	
S 4, 5 1/IV		3		
HFS 12c/IV (Exp. Fire Service of C. D. Pol. Precinct 42)	1	7	3	
HFS 21a/VIII HFS 22a/VIII	1	15	6	2
HFS 12b/IV	1	8	3	2
Industrial LFS 25a/IV	1	8	3	2
Hook and Ladder 2/IV		2		
Hook and Ladder 1/VI		2		
Hook and Ladder 2/VI		2		
Emergency Squad 14a/IV	1	9	5	
Plant Fire Crews:				
North German Grossverzinkerei	1	9	4	
Rhenania Ossage	1	5	2	
Blembel Bros.	1	3	1	
Karstadt Porges	1	5	2	1
German Rubber Reclaiming Works	1	5	3	
Hamburg Metal Rolling Works		6	2	
Persil Works. At first 1, 8, later	1	24	5	
Gemeinschaftsw. DAF	1	9	3	
Emergency Commando of Police Precinct 40		10		
Schlochhauer Mfg.	1	5	2	
Party Group Berliner Tor	1	7	2	
Sohst Company	1	5	2	
One Army Detachment	-	90	-	

At 3:55 p. m., after most of the fires had been extinguished, and after checking with headquarters of Air Sector IV, the command post was dissolved and the plant fire crews were sent back to their quarters. The fire department units then received orders from the Division Headquarters to move into a new damage area. The units took over the new damage sites at 4:30 p. m.

During the fire fighting operations in the damage area, Repsoldstrasse to Spaldingstrasse, I assembled a second emergency unit and with them went on reconnaissance trips in the area of An der Alster, Kirchenallee, Hühnerposten, Amsinckstrasse, Sonninstrasse, Spaldingstrasse, Berlinertor, and Lohmühlenstrasse. During these drives, Self-Protection forces were put to work by the unit at several fire sites.

The requests for and distribution of fuel for the vehicles were taken care of by the command post without any difficulties. Food for the crews was good and plentiful.

No injuries to crew members have been reported.

Damaged vehicles: Emergency Truck 14/IV (Pump gave out).

Police Car No. 128 620, all four tires flat; flats fixed during fire fighting operations.

Police Radio Car No. 128 619, one flat tire; it was also fixed during fire fighting.

(Signed) Stankowski
Master of Fire Protection Police

Fire Department - Division IV Hamburg, August 6, 1943

Experience Report

On July 27, 1943, the alarm sounded at 11:45 p. m. I went at once to the Command Post of Air Sector IV. There, a count was taken of the strength of the remaining units. Approximately one-half hour after the alarm sounded, the first bombs started falling. Soon they were dropping without pause. The Water Tower lookout reported high explosive and firebombs on Rothenburgsort. The Command Post building was jarred by the force of the bomb hits. The few telephone connections open until then ceased altogether when the power failed. The command post and the air raid shelter were very crowded on that night and the air was rather stale and used up. After a short respite, the bombs began falling again. Through emergency exits and other openings, rock dust, smoke and heat seeped into the shelter.

Fire watches reported that the Sector building and Fire Station 6 were on fire. The auxiliary power plant was put into service, and lighting and air circulation were restored. In spite of this, a certain uneasiness and restlessness developed among the shelter occupants, which I tried to combat by pep talks to the crowd. The fire fighting units stationed at Fire Station 6 received orders to fight the fire in the Sector building and Station 6. Because the water lines were out of service and the heat emanating from the burning buildings endangered the fire vehicles, all units were ordered to the Billhafen Wharf and to mount their fire fighting operations from there. The heat at the command post increased markedly. Three exits were blocked by falling debris. Only one emergency exit, across the yard of the fire station, remained passable. The Sector Commandant ordered the evacuation of the Command Post. Women were ordered to put blankets or coats over their heads and everyone doused himself with water before leaving.

Master Brümmer and I were the last ones to leave the Command Post of the Fire Department in Air Sector IV. The yard of the fire station was like a furnace. A fire storm of hurricane strength and heavy showers of sparks made progress nearly impossible. The auxiliary post could not be reached any longer. I therefore ran into Fire Station 6 and from there across Brückenstrasse to the Wharf, from where I helped direct fire fighting operations against the fires in the Sector building and Fire Station 6.

On orders from Captain Matthiessen, I issued blankets to the occupants of the shelter and together with my other comrades, I carried small

children and pulled women across heaps of ruins, falling wires, through firebombs and burning phosphorus, to the Wharf. Summoning all my strength, I then proceeded to guide people out of houses, air raid shelters, and rescue stations from Billw. Neuedeich, Billh. Mühlenweg, Stresowstrasse, and Hardenstrasse to the collection point at Billhafen. The hose lines which had at first been laid to fight fires were now extended further and their water formed a path between the houses burning on both sides of the street. Hesitating or lying down in the street meant certain death. Many times I picked up people who had fallen down, loaded with their belongings, and urged them onward. I took children who clung to their mothers and carried them along. Others, hesitant to run through the burning streets, were urged and pulled along by force.

After everything possible had been done to rescue people and the air raid shelters had been checked once more for stragglers, I went to Reichsmonopol and from there directed the cutting off of the fire by Self-Protection forces and Flak personnel.

An attack on the fire in the building of Eckelmann & Sons was mounted. Unfortunately, this effort had to be abandoned because the hose in the yard burned through due to the heat and the fuel tank of the fire truck exploded. On my way back to the Wharf, I took several people with me to the collection point.

I was then summoned by a messenger from Lt. Colonel Lehmann, who was at the Billstrang Freight Station. I went to the Freight Station and on arrival was asked if it were possible to bring the civilians to the Elbe Bridge as quickly as possible and without increasing the danger to their lives. The tower was so overcrowded that many people had to remain outside and had to take shelter under the bridges and behind the railway embankment.

A portable water pump and engine belonging to the emergency troop of the 40th Police Precinct, which was supposed to furnish a water veil for the collected people, was lost and the situation was very critical. Because the Elbe bridges were not passable, I agreed to the suggestion of Lt. Colonel Lehmann and started the people on a forced march across fallen debris, always keeping to the center of the roadway, in the direction of Harburg. I ordered one squad of the fire department to cut away fallen overhead wires and remove large pieces of debris which blocked the way. In this manner, several hundred people were brought to safety in a very short time.

There were so many single deeds of valor performed that it is impossible to mention and describe them all. Suffice it to say that everyone was inspired by the thought to help in any way possible.

(Signed) Peis, Master of FPP
(Countersigned) Matthiessen, District Captain

Fire Brigade 2/IV Hamburg, August 1, 1943

RE: Report of Air Attack of July 28, 1943

From 10:30 p.m. on July 27 till the alarm sounded at 12:22 a.m. of July 28, Squad 2/IV had headquarters at Hammerbrookstrasse 56, and the units were in action at fire sites in Schulzweg, Repsoldstrasse, Sonninstrasse, Hammerbrookstrasse, Schwabenstrasse, and Sachsenstrasse. When the alarm sounded, Emergency Squad 2/IV, HFS 21a/IV and HFS 22a/IV returned to Fire Station 6. The heavy brigade HFB23/IV, and the Industrial Fire Squad, 25a/IV, remained at previous fire sites in order to hold down the fire.

The garrison of Fire Station 6 went to the air raid shelter. As the enemy planes approached, heavy Flak started up and then diminished very soon afterward. The enemy planes dropped unusually large amounts of bombs, including fire and high explosive bombs of all sizes. As was usual, about 35 women and children from houses across the street occupied the air raid shelter of Fire Station 6. The shelter rooms were jarred by heavy explosions in the neighborhood. The occupants, however, maintained an exemplary calm.

Suddenly the Fire Watch, Staff Sergeant Gottschalk, came down from the attic to report a fire. I went upstairs with him and saw that the roofs of both the fire station and the garage were in flames. Also, the residential houses across the street were aflame from roof to ground. They presented a single sea of flames. Outside, a strong fire storm was already raging. The doors of the garage flew open and burning, flake-like particles whirled into the hall, accompanied by a strong shower of sparks. I immediately gave orders: "All personnel of Fire Department and C.D. Police, into the garage and fight the fire with C hoses."

Two fire trucks were driven to the hydrant but, because the hydrants contained no more water, were re-routed almost immediately to the auxiliary water supply at the wharf. All this took place during the worst part of the air attack. It was barely possible to carry out fire fighting operations because of the strong fire storm wind and the intense heat. At the beginning of the operations, Captain Matthiessen and his men from the Sector staff arrived from the air raid shelter of Air Sector IV. The Captain ordered the closing of the doors of the garage and the evacuation of civilians from the air raid shelter of Fire Station 6. On further command from Captain Matthiesen, blankets were soaked with water and the women, wrapped in these wet blankets, were led to the wharf at Billwaerder Neuedeich. Other men had already set up pumps at auxiliary

water supplies and were fighting the fires in residential houses along Billwaerder Neuedeich. Also, long C hose lines were laid along both sides of Billhorner Bruckenstrasse to make it possible for the Fire Department and C. D. Police personnel to rescue hundreds of people from the shelters along the nearby streets. The rescuers and the people they were attempting to rescue were doused with a water spray from the C hoses, making possible safe passage through the enormous heat and the whirling rock dust. Many air raid shelters were cleared of occupants who were assembled at the wharf and thence transported out of the city. During rescue operations, Captain Matthiesen received injuries to his right upper arm and shoulder by a falling beam. He had to lie down on a stretcher for a while; but he later resumed his duty with iron determination.

During the fire fighting operations I noticed that almost all the buildings went up in flames almost immediately. Huge flames would leap up to the sky and develop an enormous heat; in a comparatively brief time span, the outer walls would collapse and the debris from them would fall into the street, greatly hampering fire fighting operations. It should be noted here that every man, regardless if attached to the Fire Department or the C. D. (Civil Defense) Police, did his duty with great devotion. Despite the intense heat and the rain of ashes, everyone lent a hand as needed. The persons who were rescued recognized their saviors in the men from the Fire Department and C. D. Police.

(Signed) Wandel
Dist. Lt. of FPP

Fire Department - Division V Hamburg, August 10, 1943

SUMMARY REPORT

Regarding the Rescue of Persons Buried Alive or Trapped by the Fire by Members of Fire Department Division V

Major Löffler's Report

During the attack night of July 27/28, 1943, I was with my staff at Headquarters of Air Sector V in Ritterstrasse. After the telephone connections were severed and the motorcycle messengers reported that they could no longer get through because of the prevailing fire storm, I went on a reconnaissance trip on foot, accompanied by District Lt. Jarre; my driver, Sergeant Wegner; and two motorcycle messengers, Sergeants Sönken and Wölffel. The fire storm had already begun to develop along Ritterstrasse. We donned our protective goggles and went first to Marienthalerstrasse. Here it was nearly impossible to pass; however, we put on our gas masks and ran on the double along the street. On the way we gathered many people who were wandering around scared to death, and brought them to a safer place. I then dispersed the men accompanying me in different directions, with orders to bring endangered persons to the Eilbecker People's Park and to search the cellars of endangered houses. In this way, through our efforts, several hundred people were saved.

Because I had other tasks to carry out, I ordered my men to continue with their rescue efforts, and I went to the Police Officers' School on Kibitzstrasse at the corner of Ritterstrasse, where as expected, I found part of my Second Unit. I wanted to lead these vehicles by way of Wandsbeckerchaussee to Wartenau where we would attack the conflagration using water from the Eilbecker Canal. I myself went ahead in a motorcycle sidecar. My plan, however, proved almost impossible. The heat was so strong that the floor mat in the sidecar suddenly caught on fire and when I threw the burning mat out, I sustained burns on my neck.

We had to abandon the motorcycle, and pushed ahead in closed vehicles, across debris and past collapsing buildings. I ordered the unit into action as intended and sent orders to Local Headquarters that all available units were to drive to Eilbecker Canal and mount attacks from there to the south, especially from Luebeckerstrasse, Wandsbeckerchaussee and Uhlandstrasse. Master Siems directed the fire fighting operations at Wartenau/Wandsbeckerchaussee. My First Unit, which was quartered at Fire Station 5 in Freiligrathstrasse, had already gone into action on its own and, under the leadership of Master Passenheim, was protecting the

vicinity of Fire Station 5, Freiligrathstrasse School and Angerstrasse School, as well as St. Mary's Hospital. The Motorized C. D. Division No. 28, under Captain Sausmikat, took part in this task with great distinction. This latter division worked exceptionally well with the Fire Protection Police forces.

Some time later, a message was received stating that four thousand people were trapped in the Bastrasse Bunker, that the entrance to the bunker was on fire, and that the people were in danger of suffocation. I immediately passed the message on to Headquarters and then went with the Commander of Motorized C. D. Division No. 28, Captain Sausmikat and with Master Paul of HFB 13/V to personally take stock of the situation. We climbed over the heaps of ruins at Landwehr Station and with considerable difficulty, reached the bunker. The bunker was located in the middle of the fire storm. The wooden access ramp was aflame. We worked our way through single file and finally reached the bunker. Inside the bunker it was comparatively cool and the air was still quite bearable. We made the rounds of the bunker and reassured the occupants. They calmed down as soon as they saw that they were still in contact with the outside world. We urged them to remain in the bunker; there was no immediate danger.

This is only a part of my personal experiences. The remaining units under my command, with whom I no longer had any direct contact, worked in a similar manner. On the whole, I may state that thousands of people were saved from endangered streets and shelters by the Fire Department. Up till now, we did not have time to prepare detailed reports, because we had more important things to do and were on duty almost constantly during the whole period.

District Lieutenant Jarre's Report

At the beginning of the air attack of July 26/27, 1943, I was at the Command Post of Air Sector V with Major Löffler. About one hour after the attack started, all telephone connections were severed, and motorcycle messengers were directed to undertake reconnaissance trips. However, they soon returned and explained that the streets were impassable because of the fire storm conditions. Thereupon, Major Löffler and I decided to make a personal inspection trip. We were accompanied by Motorcycle Messengers Wölffel and Sönksen and the Major's Driver Wegner (but without vehicles). The fire storm forced us at once to put on protective goggles in order to be able to see anything at all. I put on my gas mask which I kept on for the duration of the fire storm.

On the street we kept meeting people who were wandering around aimlessly.

We gathered these persons into groups and brought them to less dangerous places. It so happened that all five of us acted independently and in many cases led endangered people out of the shelters. Leaving the Command Post of Air Sector V, we first reached the area bounded by Rutterstrasse, Merowingerstrasse, Lammertzhamm and Mittelstrasse. Motorcycle messengers Wöllert and Sörensen remained in this area, while Major Löffler, Sergeant Wegner, and I went to the area bordered by Hasselbrookstrasse, Hammersteinhamm, Wandsbekerchaussee and Convent Strasse. There I lost contact with Major Löffler and Sergeant Wegner, after having brought a sizable group of people to safety at the People's Park at Papenstrasse. In about twenty instances, in the area of Papenstrasse, Convent Strasse, Kibitzstrasse, Hirschgraben and Rutterstrasse, I fetched people out of their houses and led them to the People's Park and to the Peace Church. Also, I showed many persons wandering about in the fire storm the way to these two places of safety. Altogether during the night, I directed from 200 to 250 persons out of the fire storm and to a safe place; about 50 of these I rescued from shelters in houses.

In Kibitzstrasse, a special incident took place; a 65-year-old man and a 15-year-old boy were trying to rescue a man of about 50, who had fainted, from an endangered house. The unconscious man had collapsed during fire fighting operations. When I arrived, the house was burning all the way down to the ground floor. I went and got a two-wheel cart which I had seen standing in the street some distance away. The boy and I put the man onto the cart and transported him to the People's Park. He was showing signs of life before I left him.

Master Passenheim and Sergeant Körner, upon learning from two Flak-gun soldiers that 4,000 people were trapped in a bunker surrounded by fire, worked their way to the bunker only to find that no danger existed. The two men urged all the people to remain in the bunker. By their presence and by proving to the occupants of the bunker that they were still in contact with the outside world, they were able to calm everyone down.

Brigade Captain Ludwig and Master Sergeant Hardwig rescued two old women from the Hiobs Hospital, they also returned many patients from St. Mary's Hospital who had panicked and had run out into the street to the hospital shelter and calmed down the remaining patients.

Master Lange, Master Sergeant Lorenz and several men of HFB 11/V brought a large number of frail old people from the Old Folks Home "Rauhes Haus" to safety at the "Haus Tanne" outside the immediate danger area.

Master Sergeants Eggers and Mauck led about 20 old men and women out of the burning Holy Ghost Hospital to safety at the nearby Mary Magdalen Convent.

G. I. Police Sergeant Walter Kruse cleared the entrance of the house at Hammerbrookstrasse 216 of rubble, thus enabling 14 persons to get out into the street, from where he then brought them to a safer place.

Sergeants Sattler and Lechner together led 40 persons out of the fire storm and into the People's Park at Hagenbeckstrasse.

Sergeant Siems brought twelve persons to safety.

G. I. Police Sergeant Arnandus Timm rescued about fifteen persons.

Sergeants Oeverdieck, Lerche and Kroll led about sixty persons out of the fire storm at Ritterstrasse and Mittelstrasse, as well as from the Germania Palace movie theatre to the bunker at Mittelstrasse.

Sergeant Soiksen rescued about 50 persons from an air raid shelter on Landwehr Damm at the corner of Marienthalerstrasse and brought them to the bunker at Mittelstrasse.

Sergeant Plankermann broke down the jammed door of an air raid shelter in Lübeckerstrasse and brought the 25 occupants of the shelter to the bunker at Baustrasse. During the course of this operation, he carried a wounded soldier into the street and turned him over to an Air Force orderly.

Master Passenheim organized the hosing of burning debris in front of an air raid shelter exit in Marienthalerstrasse by a motorized plant squad, enabling the 70 occupants of the shelter to get out and into the street where Master Passenheim directed them to a less dangerous spot.

Sergeant Hohnsbein brought 17 persons to safety out of the fire storm in the area of Mittel-, Ritter-, Marienthaler- and Hasselbrookstrasse.

Aside from the above cited cases, which were for the most part group actions, numerous single rescues were effected by many members of Fire Division V.

(Signed) Löffler
Major of FPP and Chief, Division V

Fire Department - Division " Hamburg, September 3, 1943

Experience Report on the four Major Air Attacks on Hamburg

It was extremely difficult for the fire fighting units to reach the damaged areas because many of the streets were impassable (because of bomb craters, debris, low hanging wires, poor visibility due to the dense smoke, and showers of sparks).

The formation of a special unit for clearing streets and posting guards at danger points is suggested.

Assignment of duties within the units functioned very well. Orders were transmitted by motorcycle messengers. However, the heavy motorcycles had difficult in getting through because of the debris in the streets.

It is suggested that messengers be equipped with light motorcycles and bicycles.

At many sites, particularly during and after the second air attack, fire fighting activities were not initiated until numerous rescue operations had been completed. The following observations are made concerning these rescue operations: (1) four-story residential houses burned to the ground within 30 minutes; (2) when, because of the fire, the heat of the air raid shelters was too great or the smoke too heavy, the people left the shelter willingly and quickly, even though the fire storm was raging outside; (3) however, if conditions in the shelter were bearable, many hesitated to leave, and others flatly refused to go out into the street. Many had to be led out of endangered cellars by force.

In the fire storm, countless people were picked up and, either singly or in small groups, were led or taken to open spaces or to safe buildings. At times the heat in the streets was so intense in certain places that one could only advance after lying down for a while with one's face on the pavement. This was especially true in the vicinity of Hammerlandstrasse and Eifestrasse, where jet-like flames were observed.

It is recommended that larger quantities of water be stored in shelters to satisfy the occupants' thirst, to wet blankets and cloths, and to fight fires. Firewall breakthroughs in the cellars should not be walled up, but rather should be equipped with fireproof doors. Rescue would be facilitated and spread of fire would be prevented if the doors could be closed after the occupants leave.

During fire fighting operations it was observed that many doors in burning buildings were locked, that the attics had not been cleared of rummage, that wooden partitions in attics had not been removed, and that coal and other fuels were stored in attics.

Complete and absolute clearing out of any flammable materials from attics should be mandatory: blackout materials, curtains and drapes should be removed from all windows; these materials often facilitated the spread of fire.

Water had to be obtained from independent water sources at long distances away from the fire sites which required a great amount of hose. Shortage of hose material was evident everywhere.

More hose material should be allocated to units, brigades and squads. All fire vehicles should be equipped with durable hose bridges. Personnel must be made available quickly for refilling of emptied water storage tanks. More of the large water storage tanks should be installed.

There was a shortage of gasoline everywhere after the many hours of uninterrupted fire fighting activity.

It is suggested that gasoline reserves on the various fire vehicles be increased.

Because of the long stretches of duty, hunger and thirst among the crews were great.

It is suggested that all units be equipped with field kitchens to guarantee food and drink for the crews. "Iron rations" should be issued to all crew members.

It was often impossible to endure the fire storm without some eye protection. Men who did not wear protective goggles, suffered severe eye inflammations. Applying cocaine proved useless. Rinsing with boric acid solution and the use of eye ointment was more effective.

Every man should be equipped with protective goggles, and some asbestos helmets should be carried on the vehicles. When protective goggles are not available, gas masks are very helpful. A medical orderly should accompany each unit to dispense eye drops.

Many fires flared up again after they had been extinguished. One reason for this was the presence of phosphorus. The other reason was the fact that the firemen had no time to clean up one fire site before going to

another site, and the Self-Protection forces for clean-up work and as fire watches were seldom present after the second attack.

Special clean-up commandos should be available to take over the clean-up of extinguished fire sites where Self-Protection forces are not available.

The Plant Civil Defense forces proved their worth in many cases. Equipping them with portable fire extinguishers was an excellent idea.

It would be most advantageous to put Plant Civil Defense units in certain fire sectors under the command of the Fire Department, in the interest of smoother cooperation.

Messages were received frequently at the Command Posts that here and there hundreds of people were in danger. It often turned out that these messages were either greatly exaggerated or else completely fabricated, and were just a maneuver of the message originator to obtain fire fighting forces for "his" house.

It is recommended that personnel be dispatched only after verification of messages. When going into action in other parts of the city, unit commanders often searched in vain for command posts. Often, none were in existence or else could not be found.

Command posts in the demarcated damage areas should be set up immediately and should be plainly marked.

The questions asked by the Commandant of the Security Police can be answered as follows, based on testimony of noncoms and men of the Fire Protection Police, who were active at crucial points during the air attacks, and who came into constant contact with the population:

1. It was observed at several points that the dropping of high explosive bombs was followed immediately by phosphorus and stick firebombs at the same site. For example, Fire Truck LF 25/36 of the Second Emergency Unit was hit by seven fire sticks at the corner of Horst Wesselstrasse and Wolfshagen and two phosphorus bombs fell in the immediate vicinity of the vehicle. At Eilbeckerweg, along a distance of no more than 1000 meters, about 10 to 12 fire sticks each were dropped at intervals of about 10 to 15 meters apart. This observation was made after clearing the street to a width of about five meters.

2. There were no discernible pauses between the dropping of the various kinds of bombs.

3. Fire Brigades 11/V, 12/V, and 14/V began noticing sizeable fires about eight to fifteen minutes after the bombs fell, and they fought these fires at once. No forces, other than Fire Department units, were fighting fires at this early stage. When the bombs had stopped falling, plant civil defense crews and Hitler Youth fire fighting units were observed in action at several sites.

4. It was observed that the fires developed into conflagrations within a time span of about 25 minutes. Four-story houses, starting to burn at the roof, were often burned completely out within a half hour.

5. One sergeant reported: "I had the impression that the fire storm was kindled suddenly by the dropping of a special fire agent or by the presence of gases."

6. A brigade captain observed that about two minutes after a site had been hit by explosive bombs, a shower of phosphorus was noticed at the same spot. He learned from a soldier that this was a case of phosphorus bombs with barometric ignition, which detonate above the ground. Detailed observations are not available.

7. Nothing can be reported here about the behavior of the population in air raid shelters. All our forces were in the shelters only for very short periods of time.

8. During rescue operations, the same observation was made everywhere: If the heat in the air raid shelters was intense or if strong smoke had developed, the people left the shelter willingly, even to go out into the fire storm. Many people had fainted and had to be carried out.

(Signed) Löffler
Major of FPP and Division Chief

Brigade Sergeant Denker
FFS 12b/V

Hamburg, August 28, 1943

Experience Report on Drive from Quarters in Hornerlandstrasse 380 to Air Sector V During the Attack Night of July 27/28, 1943

Because the telephone lines went down right away after the attack began, I went by bicycle to Air Precinct 56 to establish communications with Air Sector V to get a report of the situation, and to establish a water supply line. Since I was not able to establish communications at the Precinct either, I went by car across Hamburgerstrasse, Washingtonallee, Sieveringsallee, and Ritterstrasse, back to Air Sector V Headquarters. On the way fleeing persons repeatedly tried to stop our vehicle. I noticed several incidents of people salvaging their furniture. Major fire fighting efforts were not observed anywhere along the way.

The bombs had stopped falling by the time we started back. After reporting to Air Sector V, I started my return trip via Schwarzestrasse, Horst Wesselstrasse, and Hammerlandstrasse. It was difficult to get through because of the debris in the streets. The fire storm had begun raging in full force. Many people sought shelter in Ohlendorf Park on Horst Wesselstrasse. Between Horst Wesselstrasse and Hammerweg, groups of people were wandering about aimlessly. My vehicle was practically taken away by force. It was most difficult to go on. Near Hammerweg, people were lying in the street. We got out to save them. Suddenly, an enormous number of jet flames formed along the length of Landstrasse, from which I tried to escape by running ahead. The driver escaped to Horst Wesselstrasse by turning the vehicle around. The fire storm had turned into a hurricane. There was no smoke, only jet flames and heavy showers of sparks. While running I could barely make out single persons and groups of people stumbling around moaning. I repeatedly saw people lying on the pavement. The heat in Hammerlandstrasse was unbearable. One lens of my protective goggles cracked and fell out. There was practically no air to breathe. I ran till I was exhausted. In Rumpfweg I saw some people sitting down. Instinctively I threw myself in their direction. Some of the people had fallen down lifelessly. The people sitting down were moaning apathetically and did not respond to my calls. I lay down at the curb with my steel helmet against the wind and hid my face and hands in my cap. Every so often I had to put out the fire that started to burn my clothing. Next to me sat a husky young man. I kept putting out the fire on his clothing too. The shortage of oxygen became more serious. The fire storm lasted about 1-1/2 hours. I sucked the oxygen right from the pavement. The latter got so hot after a while that I developed blisters on my nose and windpipe and on my knees. Despite strenuous efforts, I

was not able to save the life of the many lying right next to me. All the people lying near me died. The clothing of the women caught fire, so that they were naked in a very short time. Death was apparently caused by suffocation and heat stroke. The dehydration of the body was terrific. At about 5 a.m., I worked myself back to Horst Wesselstrasse.

(Signed) Denker
Brigade Sergeant
FFS 12b/V

Note: Denker added to me that he apparently lost consciousness repeatedly but kept coming to at intervals.

(Signed) Löffler

Fire Department Section VI Hamburg, August 10, 1943

RE: Report About the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg of July 24/25, 27/28, 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

1. Attack of July 24/25, 1943

During the attack, of the approximately 150 reported fires in the area of Section VI, 37 were fought by Fire Department personnel and forces of the Industrial Civil Defense, Expanded Self-Protection, and Party Volunteer Fire Units, Leubeck Fire Department units, and units of Motorized Division 29.

The following are given special mention as major fire sites: the Barmbeck Hospital, the Nursing Homes in Avehoffstrasse and Oberaltenallee, as well as several defense plants in Alten Teichweg.

The water supply was adequate and the messenger service worked faultlessly. On the day following the attack, all available forces took part in afterhosing operations. The Second Emergency Unit was assigned to Eimsbuettel for this purpose.

The log and personnel roster were maintained during this attack, albeit under great difficulties.

2. Attack of July 27/28, 1943

In this attack, several old fire sites received bomb hits. Added to these were about 140 new fire sites, of which only 32 could be fought in an orderly manner; the remaining fires had to be left unattended.

Aside from our own fire department forces, volunteer fire fighting units of the neighboring communities, of Motorized Division 29, and of the Armed Forces as well as squads from Berlin were put into action. Early in the attack, municipal water supply lines failed completely, so that the independent sources of water had to be utilized.

Communications with the units were impeded by the loss of most telephone lines; motorcycle messengers had to be used.

Noteworthy large fires were as follows: the Carpenter Shop Fette at Vogelweide, the Rubber and Asbestos Works Tretorn, the Hamburg Municipal Gas Works in Weidestrasse, the Gathering Station for the Homeless at the Uferstrasse School, the Barmbeck Hospital, and several

large blocks of residential houses. The school at Uferstrasse 10 and the Public Baths at Lerchenfeld, as well as several pavilions at Barmbeck Hospital, were saved from complete destruction by fire.

Captain Daehling was detailed to Altona as a replacement and was mortally wounded by shrapnel from a high explosive bomb.

3. Attack of July 29/30, 1943

During this attack, the area of the Section was severely hit. Many streets were blocked due to bomb craters and debris from collapsed buildings; thus the fires could be reached only by traveling long distances and the fire fighting operations were greatly delayed. All telephone connections were disrupted. During a lull in the attack, attempts were made to notify the units by motorcycle messengers that they should go into action on their own initiative. A special focus point could not be arrived at because almost 60 percent of the area of the section had been heavily bombed. During the attack, the Section H.Q. building was hit by firebombs and all members of the Fire Department present at the Section H.Q. were ordered to fight the ring of burning buildings around the H.Q. building; in this way, the building was saved.

The Deputy Section Chief, along with his automobile and driver, became casualties due to burns suffered on the way to Group East headquarters to make a report and to survey the situation.

Requested reinforcements did not arrive for several hours. Because several vehicles and some equipment were destroyed, fire fighting operations were possible only near open water sources. The deployment of complete units and the piloting of out-of-town forces could not be carried out because of the debris in the streets and the fire storm raging in the area. Fuel supplies could be obtained only under the most severe difficulties.

No food was offered at all during the first day, and even on the two subsequent days, there was not nearly enough food to go around.

4. Attack of August 2/3, 1943

On the fourth attack day, the section was hit again, particularly in the vicinity of the Municipal Gas and Electricity Works and in areas where the buildings were still standing, e.g., along the streets of Hofweg, Bachstrasse, Hamburgerstrasse, and Osterbeckstrasse. Fire Department Section VI personnel and units of the Armed Forces were active. Communication and water supply problems were similar to what they were during the previous attack.

On the fourth attack day, the available Industrial Civil Defense and Self-Protection forces were extremely few in number. On the following days and up till the present, afterclosing operations were and are being carried out by our own forces, and by units from other sections and the Armed Forces.

The Emergency Squads were assigned to recover bodies after each of the attacks.

(Signed) Höhse
Chief of Fire Department Section VI
District Lt. of Fire Protection Police

LFB 11/VI Hamburg, August 23, 1943

Experience Report on the Air Attacks of July 25 to August 3, 1943

1. Storage of fuel materials in attics proved to be very detrimental to the succes of the fire fighting operations. It would be most advisable to absolutely prohibit the storing of fuel in attics.

2. Because of failure of telephone connections, transmission of orders by messengers was required; this greatly delayed operations and caused loss of control. The brigade had to find the fire sites on its own.

3. Parking of fire vehicles in narrow streets during air alarms is not recommended because of the great fire danger. The vehicles should be parked in open squares or on wide streets and there should be an interval of at least 60 meters between vehicles.

4. When one squad at a time is assigned to a fire site after the municipal water line fails, there are usually not enough B hoses available to lay lines to distant water sources and fight the fire. During the attack days, four to six additional B hoses per squad should have been available.

(Signed) Kachler
Master of FPP
LFB 11/VI

HFB 12/VI Hamburg, August 23, 1943

Experience Report on Activities During the Air Raids from July 26 to August 3, 1943, and the Days Following

1. Parking of Fire Vehicles During Attacks

During an attack, the parking of fire vehicles in narrow streets or in yards is not recommended because of the danger of fire storm. The vehicles should be parked spaced far apart on open squares or in broad streets.

2. Transmission of Orders

Because of destruction of telephone lines, transmission of orders by phone was not possible. The Brigade went to work on their own repeatedly at fires in public buildings, schools, churches, or defense plants. In these cases, the Brigade tried to notify the Sector H.Q. by messenger.

3. Water Supply and Equipping of Fire Vehicles with Hoses

Because of destruction of the municipal water system, the squads were not equipped with sufficient hose material so that either another squad had to be called to the fire site, or else double the usual amount of B hoses had to be carried.

4. Hose Bridges

The number of hose bridges available was not nearly sufficient, especially in streets with a lot of traffic. A guard had to be posted continuously to direct traffic around hose lines. The removal of paving stones was not always possible and was impractical in streets with streetcar tracks. Makeshift hose bridges were used in some places, but because of heavy traffic they were either torn apart or else were moved around, so that a considerable number of hoses was badly damaged, which greatly impeded fire fighting operations.

5. Training of Fire Watches

The training and preventive measures taken by fire watches were often very deficient. Entrance gates and doors in buildings were locked; information about stored supplies and methods of attacks could not be provided; and the locations of gas shut-off valves were not known.

(Signed) Sievers, Master of FPP

HFB 22/VI Hamburg, August 21, 1943

Experience Report

Air Attack on July 24/25, 1943

Communications were good. All telephone connections were operable. Squad HFB 22/VI was ordered by Air Sector VI via telephone to go to Volkersdorferstrasse. On arrival, we found LFB 21/VI already at the fire site and able to fight the fire without our help. I therefore ordered Squads A and B of my brigade into action at Hamburgerstrasse and Schmalenbeckerstrasse, respectively, and informed Sector VI of my action by telephone. During the fire fighting operation at Hamburgerstrasse a high explosive bomb detonated about 50 meters away from the hose truck and all the B hoses were riddled by bomb fragments. I immediately sent for some B hoses from B Squad in Schmalenbeckerstrasse. With these hoses the fire fighting was restarted almost without delay. The water supply from the hydrants was satisfactory. The requested reinforcements did not arrive. Afterhosing operations at the two sites were soon taken over by the Volunteer Fire Department. In the afternoon, we were in action in Eimsbuettel. The municipal water supply soon gave out and a long hose line had to be laid to the Isebeck Canal to obtain water. The telephone lines remained open.

Air Attack on July 27/28, 1943

Squad A was dispatched to the conflagration at the residential block of Flotowstrasse and Frahmheinstrasse. The municipal water supply was out of commission so the necessary water was taken from the public baths on Bartholomaeusstrasse. The Army, the Party, and the Self-Protection fire units all received water from our Fire Truck 25. Squad B operated at Barmbeck Hospital. The requested reinforcements arrived with a hose truck. The necessary water supply was taken from the water storage tank at the Fuhlsbuettelerstrasse Hospital. The transmission of messages by motorcycle messengers was satisfactory. At the damage site in Flotowstrasse, the Self-Protection forces were both very active and helpful.

Air Attack on July 29/30, 1943

The transmission of orders by telephone and messenger broke down completely; the same was true of the municipal water supply. During the alarm the Brigade went on its own initiative to the conflagration in the block surrounded by Hufnerstrasse, Hufnertwiete, Roggenkamp, and Poppenhusenstrasse. A terrific fire storm was raging so that we had

great difficulty getting the hoses to the water. Most of the bombs dropped were phosphorus bombs. Both fire vehicles were set on fire by phosphorus splashes. Because of a flat tire the fire truck of Squad B was difficult to move out of the fire storm. We were successful in extinguishing the fires on the vehicles and in mounting the fire fighting attack. Squad B took part in salvaging furniture and household goods. Afterhosing operations were taken over later by out-of-town units. The quarters of HFB 22/VI at Hufnerstrasse 53 was totally destroyed by high explosive and fire bombs.

Air Attack on August 2/3, 1943

Orders were received for the Brigade to work out of Fire Station 10. The two squads were active at Humboldtstrasse and Herderstrasse, respectively. Water was taken from the sewer system at Schenckendorfstrasse and Hofwegkanal. Orders were transmitted by messenger to and from Fire Station 10. Squad B was active later on at the Brucknerstrasse School and at the residential block at Genslerstrasse. The Self-Protection forces assisted energetically at the Humboldtstrasse fire site.

During the attack, two members of the Civil Defense Police received burns on both hands and on the face. Both fire trucks were in use during the attacks and were always in good repair.

(Signed) Junge
Master of Fire Protection Police

Fire Department Division X Hamburg-Wandsbek, August 14, 1943

RE: Supplement to Experience Report of Lt. Hoehse on the Destruction of Fire Station Wandsbek by High Explosive Bombs on July 30, 1943 at 12:30 a.m.

On July 30, 1943, at about 12:30 a.m., a high explosive bomb detonated in the garage of the Wandsbek Fire Station. It destroyed the fire station, flattened the walls and shattered the ceiling of the air raid shelter which was located on the lot next door to the fire station. In this incident, ten members of the Civil Defense Police and one Hitler Youth were killed. Also, two men were seriously injured. A few crewmen were slightly wounded; these are back on duty at this date. Details are given below.

1. The Fire Station was a massive building, had a wooden roof and a heavy wood beam ceiling. It had a built-in hose room and one hose tower; only the heating furnace was housed in the basement. An air raid shelter had been fixed up in the neighboring building at Hirschstrasse 4 for the crews of HFB 13/X and Squads 1/X and E-1/X. Previously during the war, an entrance from the garage of the fire station to the shelter in the cellar had been constructed. An emergency exit from the shelter led to the yard of Hirschstrasse 4. The cellar had a concrete ceiling 10 cm thick; also a 10 cm thick concrete ceiling existed between the ground floor and the second floor. In 1942, the cellar had been further reinforced by the addition of exterior walls and girders.

2. During the air attack of July 29/30, 1943, twenty-three persons were present in the shelter, including three civilians. The members of the Volunteer Fire Department Wandsbek, Westphal and Link, had left Wandsbek prior to the attac A list of persons present in the shelter is included in the appendix to this report.

The Fire Truck 25/3.401 and three motorcycles were parked in the garage. The Hook-and-Ladder Truck 26/306 and the Police Car No. 16910 were parked in the yard along with the personal motorcycle of the fallen Sergeant Krager. The hose truck S 4.5/156 was standing in readiness on the corner of Hirschstrasse and Bleicherstrasse so that in case of a major air attack on Wandsbek, a hose line could be laid at once from the Wandse to the water storage basin in Schlossstrasse. The fire engines of HFB 13/X were parked on Bleicherstrasse, and they were driven safely out of the fire area during the attack by Lt. Hoehse, Master Kroeger and Master Sergeant Ahrens.

3. At 12:30 a.m., on July 30, the Fire Station was severely damaged by a high explosive bomb which detonated right in front of the entrance to the air raid shelter. The fire station and the factory next door to Hirschstrasse 4 collapsed. The roof, walls and other debris of the fire station and factory all fell on the west side of the shelter and buried the crew members sitting on that side. The eastern part of the shelter was not damaged quite so seriously, so that the people located on that side were only slightly injured and were able to get to the outside through still existing openings. Another high explosive bomb fell about 10 meters north of the Fire Station and destroyed several of the surrounding buildings. It is very likely that this bomb also contributed to the further destruction of the Fire Station. Aside from the above mentioned high explosive bombs, phosphorus and stick firebombs also fell onto the fire station. Six barrels filled with fuel, which were provided for reserve purposes, were hit by bomb fragments, and the fuel ran out and ignited. As a consequence, a large fire developed in which the vehicles that were parked there (hose truck, hook-and-ladder truck and motorized fire engine) were set on fire and burned. The motorcycles had already been completely destroyed by the high explosive detonation.

4. At the start of rescue operations, fourteen men were buried under the debris. The Hitler Youth Doering was able to escape and he notified Unit Commander Jungnickel in the Johannisstrasse Bunker, who immediately rushed to the fire station with the Squad HFB 12/X. Jungnickel assigned one squad to fight the fire; it was reinforced by five men of HFB 13/X under the command of Brigade Sergeant Karow who had sought shelter under the Wandse Bridge during the attack. The rescue operations were begun immediately.

Master Sergeant Auer was also able to escape from the shelter on his own and was the first to report the incident to District Captain Hoeltje at the Sector Headquarters Wiithoefftstrasse 5. Lt. Hoehse was immediately assigned by the Captain to take over the rescue operations and other measures at the fire station. Master Kroeger was assigned to him as his assistant with instructions to remove the vehicles which were not burning yet at Bleicherstrasse from the fire area. This was accomplished.

Squad 12a/X under Squad Leader Monk and five men of 13/X (Brigade Sergeant Karow, Sergeants Carstens, Mondry, Soltau and Meyn) were the first to go into action. Squad 12b/X was ordered by Lt. Hoehse to rescue the trapped persons. Eight members of the Fire Department and three civilians were recovered from the shelter with only minor injuries. Four members of the Fire Department were recovered severely wounded and ten were brought out dead. Of the four seriously injured, Sergeant Lube died on the day of the rescue.

As mentioned above, those taking part in the action included all of Squad 12a/X and five men of 13/X, as well as the crews of Brigades 11/X, 21/X, and 23/X not needed at other fire sites. Thus sufficient forces were available to rescue the buried people. A repair squad had been requested immediately on reporting to the Sector. However, because sufficient forces were on hand, the repair squad was not used. Not till the evening of July 30, were the firemen relieved by a brigade of the Repair Service who took over the remaining rescue and clean-up operations.

Sergeant Bruns was the first one to be rescued alive at abou 5:30 a.m. He was taken to the County Hospital in Oldesloe, and is back on duty at this time. While Bruns was rescued from below, on the eastern side of the cellar, similar rescues were not possible afterward because a major slide of the debris took place on that side. From about 6 a.m. on, rescue work could only proceed from above the shelter. At 8 a.m., five dead bodies, those of Sergeants Kraus, Koch, Krueger, Klaewer, and Master Sergeant Burschel, were recovered. At 10 a.m., Sergeant Naefken was rescued alive. Naefken was taken to the Oldesloe County Hospital and is on the way to recovery. He suffered severe head injuries and both shin bones were crushed. At around noon, Sergeant Lube was brought out alive; however, he succumbed to severe internal injuries at County Hospital Oldesloe later that same day. At 2 p.m., Sergeant Bohlen was recovered. He was taken to Oldesloe Hospital with a skull fracture, a severe concussion and injuries to his left tibia. He is still in critical condition at the time of this writing; however, the physician believes that, unless complications arise, he will recover.

At about 8 p.m., Fireman Warnholz and Hitler Youth Werner Mueller were recovered dead. The three remaining men, Brigade Sergeant Johannsen and Firemen Schneider and Becker could not be recovered until the morning of July 31. All were dead. On the same day, the 31st, the next-of-kin of the dead and seriously injured were notified by Chief Brigade Leader Meyer of Fire Division X.

Relief forces arrived steadily for the rescue operations. Amongst these, the volunteer fire units of Luetjensee and Stapelfeld particulary distinguished themselves. Also, a fire fighting unit from Luebeck deserves special mention for distinguished effort. The fallen men were first buried in a common grave in Tonndorf; however, on August 18, according to the wishes of the families, they were transferred to single graves in Tonndorf, and the Rahlstedt men were buried in Rahlstedt.

(Signed) Hoeltje
District Captain

LFB 21/B Hamburg, August 22, 1943

RE: Experiences During the Fire Storm Occurring at the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg

The fire storms during the major air attack of July 27/28, were so strong at Beim Strohhause, that civilians' head coverings were torn off. I did not see people actually being thrown down by the storm; however, the storm had such velocity that it took all one's strength and effort to remain upright.

The one important fact to be reported is that the narrower the street, the greater the intensity of the storm. There was no definite wind direction; rather, there were whirls of wind. Strong branches, even thick trees were uprooted and thrown onto the street.

Visibility was very poor because of the blowing fire. I saw civilians who had put on their gas masks and had removed the filter in order to protect their eyes. Protective goggles are an absolute necessity in cases of this kind.

(Signed) Kretschmann
Brigade Leader

Fire Department Division X Hamburg-Wandsbek, August 10, 1943

RE: Report About the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg of July 24/25, 27/28, 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

1. Commitment of Forces

a. First Attack

During the first attack, all three emergency units of Division X, with all fire vehicles, were ready for action. Right at the beginning of the attack, the public telephone lines went down as did the internal fire department line to the First Emergency Unit. In the attack, Wandsbek from Holstenstrasse to Horst Wesselstrasse, including Kesslersweg, was hit, with heaviest destruction occurring near the Market Place. The brigades of the First Emergency Unit went into action on their own initiative. It had been decided before the attack that in case the telephone lines should fail, and provided that no damage had occurred in the country districts of Sector X, Emergency Brigades 2/X and 3/X should go to the Sector in Wandsbek without receiving special orders. These units therefore went into action independently at Feldstrasse, Wendemuthstrasse, Reserve Hospital V Gartenstadt, Schlossstrasse, and Luebeckerstrasse. They sent messengers to the Sector immediately in order to report their actions. The transmission of messages by motorcycle and bicycle messengers went without a hitch during the first night. Reconnaissance was carried out by the messengers as planned. In addition, the Division Chief and the Unit Captains themselves undertook exploration trips. During the attack, reconnaissance from the tower of the Sector building was carried out by the Division Chief.

During the course of the night, additional forces from Stormarn County and other outlying localities, such as Schneverdingen, Hadeln and Ploen, were used. All volunteer fire units of the sector were alerted by messengers and put into action without exception. Many houses were saved from destruction during this attack; e.g., the Stormarnhouse, the Freight Station Wendemuth and many residential houses suffered only attic or roof fires. Only a small number of the motorized fire engines of the industrial plants such as Draeger Works, Hanseatic Publishing Company, and Bauer & Schaurte, and of the fire engines of the Party were noted to be active.

The water supply obtained from the Wandse was sufficient during this attack night. The focus point for the water supply was the water storage basin in Schlossstrasse. Refilling was accomplished by eight B lines

from the Wandse. At times, seven motorized fire engines were working here. Right from the beginning of the attack the water pressure in the municipal water line was very low so that the independent water supply had to be used to fight the fires. Toward evening, the volunteer fire units were dismissed. The crews of Fire Division X worked through the night and the following day. On July 25, at noon, Emergency Unit 1/X received orders to move to Sector II.

b. Second Attack

During the second attack, the First Emergency Unit in Wandsbek was on alert. The Division Chief and the Emergency Units 2/X and 3/X were ordered to go to Group East territory. While, during the first attack, only the center of Wandsbek around the Market Place had been hit, the attack area during the second attack spread to Marienthal and East Wandsbek. Among others, the Hospital, the Douaumont Barracks, the Hermann Goering Barracks, the Freight Station, the Reichardt Works, and the Draeger Works, up to and including Wiesenstrasse, were hit. The First Emergency Unit immediately went into action, and the out-of-town forces had to be used. The Volunteer Fire Unit of Sector X arrived immediately and received their orders from Fire Division X. At 3:25 a.m., five brigades from Luebeck arrived to help. One unit from Berlin took over the fire site at Wandsbek Hospital. Two units from Luebeck were piloted to the Group West area. The Volunteer Fire Department from the 80-km Zone was put into action in the same way. During this night, the Fifth Reserve Hospital burned down, as well as the Stormarnhouse.

Because of failure of the telephone lines, all orders and messages had to be transmitted by motorcycle and pedestrian messengers. During this attack night, many of the fires turned into conflagrations. The municipal water supply failed completely, so that water storage basins and the Wandse had to be used exclusively. The arriving out-of-town forces were assigned from Headquarters, while the local fire fighting forces went to work independently at the main fire sites. Toward evening of the 28th, the out-of-town forces were withdrawn and dismissed, while the fire fighting forces of Fire Division X remained at the fire sites. The Units 2/X and 3/X assigned to Group East were active in Sectors IV and VI, respectively, during the early morning of July 28. Unit 2/X had established a collection point in Schmilinskystrasse, while Unit 3/X saw action at Vogelweide/Holsteinischer Kamp in Sector VI. During this attack night, Jenfeld and Barbuettel had also been hit. However, no fire fighting forces could be spared to be sent there.

c. Third Attack

At the sound of the alarm, at midnight, the three units were in readiness, exhausted, but undiminished. Right at the beginning of the attack, Squad HFB 13/X was out of the picture because of a direct hit to the Wandsbek Fire Station. At the same time, the fire department telephone lines at Division Headquarters failed, so that orders and messages could be transmitted only by motorcycle and pedestrian messengers. At 1:16 a.m., the Police Headquarters in Witthoefftsstrasse and Horst Wesselstrasse were hit by firebombs. These two buildings had been undamaged up till then, and two brigades of Unit 2 were immediately sent to fight the fires.

The building in Witthoefftstrasse was greatly endangered by the flames leaping out of the Railroad Hotel; at the same time, the flames from the rear building of the Police Department leaped toward the front building, which had been safe until then.

During this attack, too, the volunteer fire units went into action at once at Wandsbek. On the other hand, the fire engines of the industrial plants and the party were completely absent from the fire sites. Only the Hanseatic Publishing Company and the Hauenschild Company fought the fires in their own plants.

Surveillance during this night was extremely difficult, because a general and widespread conflagration had developed in Wandsbek. At 3:40 a.m., the following message was issued by the Division Chief to Group East: "Conflagration in Wandsbek from Holstenstrasse to Nordmarkstrasse. Five emergency units needed."

During this attack night, the first out-of-town assistance was rendered by the Second Company of the Luebeck Fire Department, which was put into action on the periphery of Wandsbek in Bramfelder and Lesserstrasse. In this attack, the Stormarnhouse and Fifth Reserve Hospital were on fire again. Both buildings were saved. The Hitler Youth Hostel and the Hermann Goering School, where food supplies were stored, was also saved. The brigades themselves had already started rescue operations. During this attack, the towns of Farmsen, Bramfeld and Rahlstedt were also partially damaged.

Water supply had to be taken from the Wandse and from open water storage basins. By quick, courageous action at the North German Yeast Plant, large amounts of alcohol were saved from burning up. Several fire vehicles were hit by bombs. Also, ten Civil Defense Policemen and one Hitler Youth were killed.

d. Fourth Attack

When the fourth attack started, three emergency units stood ready for action, albeit in a much weakened and exhausted condition. The attack this time did not hit Wandsbek directly, but only the periphery. Only small damage was sustained in Farmsen and Tonndorf. The out-of-town units went into action immediately upon arrival, so that fire damage was limited to a minimum. The Fire Department Emergency Units 2/X and 3/X were put into action at 5:07 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., respectively, at Adolf Hitler Platz, Hamburg, Also, all out-of-town units arriving in Wandsbek were piloted through to Adolf Hitler Platz in Hamburg. The water supply in the outskirts north and east of Nordmarkstrasse remained intact through all attacks.

2. Food Supply

During the attack days, the food and coffee for the crews were not sufficient. The lack of field kitchens with the units was sorely felt. The establishment of feeding stations and the carrying of field kitchens with the units is considered absolutely essential.

3. Successes

While during the first, second, and fourth attack nights, single fires were readily extinguished and single objects could be saved from destruction, during the third attack it was virtually impossible to bring the widespread conflagrations under control. The rescue of people was considered the most urgent task of the units. In most cases, these rescue efforts were crowned with success, and special reports about these actions have already been submitted.

4. General Observations and Conclusions

During the first attack, communications and reconnaissance were impeded by the fact that the public telephone lines failed immediately, and that heavy clouds of smoke obscured the view from the observation towers. Surveillance from the police towers was also no longer possible because of the enormous flames near the Sector Headquarters. During exploration trips, directions had to be changed frequently because some of the streets were blocked by debris almost from the beginning of the attack. The motorcycle messengers proved to be a great help, as did the scouts who were sent on foot to certain areas. In particular, some members of the Hitler Youth Fire Service were very active as scouts. Orders to the Second and Third Emergency Units to report to Wandsbek directly, in case the outskirts were not hit, has proved to be a very good arrangement.

Because of these orders, the units were able to go into action without delay.

Most of the out-of-town forces did not report until about one to two hours after the all-clear. On the other hand, some of the volunteer fire fighting forces from Sector X arrived in Wandsbek during the attack. The overflow of out-of-town forces during major air attacks often prevented their orderly deployment to fire sites. It would be more advantageous to pull out the exhausted local forces and replace them with fresh out-of-town forces during the day.

5. Water Supply

During the third attack the Wandse, flowing through the grounds of North German Yeast Plant, was hit by a heavy explosive bomb. Because of this, the river bed was partially obstructed and a large molasses tank at the Wandse was heavily damaged. The molasses flowed into the Wandse and filled the riverbed down to the mill pond with a viscous mixture that was hard to pump. Because of this, the water supply was cut off completely for a time. After about one and one-half hours, the major part of the molasses had run off, so that comparatively clean water was again available for the pumps. Because of the drought, the Wandse in those days had very little water. The fact that the Wandse bed had been blocked in places by the crater lip of the high explosive bomb was not discovered till the next day.

The 500-cubic-meter water storage basin in Goethestrasse/Wilhelmstrasse was hit by a high explosive bomb and almost all the water was lost

6. Special Difficulties

Although the destruction of the Fire Station resulted in a loss of the total supply of fuel reserves (six barrels), the supply was replenished during the night by bringing in fuel from other division supplies.

The reserve hoses were all in use already during the second attack night, so that during the third attack night there was a definite shortage of B hoses. In addition, the hosetruck 1/X was destroyed by enemy action.

Open vehicles were especially unsuitable for use during the fires because when driving through streets with houses burning on both sides (fire storm) the men were exposed to the rays of the heat and the showers of sparks. Similarly, vehicles with summer covers are also unsuitable for fire department use. The low-hanging wires of the streetcar lines were a great impediment to vehicular travel.

7. State of Health

The state of health of Fire Department Division X personnel is generally satisfactory. The men have recovered by now from the hardships of the four attacks, and because of the eventual improvement in the food supply, their morale has risen. The provisioning of the men with soap, linen, and a second suit (including a coat) should be undertaken as soon as possible, especially since fifty percent of the First Emergency Unit have lost everything because of the destruction of their quarters.

Reports on the remaining forces, losses of personnel, etc., have already been submitted.

(Signed) Hoeltje
District Captain

Fire Division X Hamburg-Wandsbek, August 21, 1943

Experiences Drawn from Major Air Attacks of July 24/25, July 27/28, July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

Brigades and even whole emergency units must be empowered to act on their own during major attacks on a small portion of the city or outlying districts. Keeping units together because of necessity to shift long hose lines is absolutely necessary. Radio communications should be established between local headquarters and collection points for the rapid indoctrination of out-of-town units.

Use of grip-straps a few hours after the attack is necessary to clear major thoroughfares. In case of severely damaged cities, field telephone lines should be established as soon as possible by the Army Communications Division between local headquarters and the Air Command.

Additional hose trucks are needed. Also a reserve supply of hoses should be placed in civil defense high rise bunkers. A permanent manager should be appointed for each hose supply. Every unit should have a tank car or a truck with fuel supplies in readiness. Establish fuel depots at collection points. Each emergency unit should have at least one heavy fire brigade.

Identification tags are necessary to identify fallen Civil Defense police and Fire Department members. Molasses tanks and the like which are located along rivers should be surrounded with a sufficiently high wall so that in case of damage by a high explosive bomb the molasses will not run into the river, as was the case during the third attack on Wandse in Wandsbek which resulted in an impeded water supply.

Large plants still in operation, such as Army installations and the like, must have motorcycle messengers on alert who can inform the Fire Department or Sector immediately of the fire situation at the plant in case the telephone lines are down.

(Signed) Hoeltje
District Captain of FPP

Fire Department
Emergency Unit 3/X Hamburg-Wellingsbuettel, August 9, 1943

Report Regarding Human Rescue During the Night of July 27/28, 1943

Unit 3 of Division X was busy with afterhosing operations in Sector VII prior to the alarm. During the alarm, hoses and equipment were withdrawn and according to orders received, we drove to Sector VI. Here the unit was ordered to go to Lumberyard Fette at Vogelweide. While laying hose lines and putting the engines in position at the water storage basin on Marschnerstrasse and Holsteinischer Kamp, we were surprised by the fire storm. The Lumberyard Fette was completely on fire, as were the adjacent blocks of houses. A terrific fire storm had developed which swept burning wooden parts along its path; everything was whirling in the air; windows, flying about still undamaged, were crushed; blackout curtains and drapes were in flames; trees were uprooted or broken off like matchsticks. A large tree fell on a Fire Truck 25 and a Fire Truck 8, so that the street Holsteinischer Kamp was blocked to further vehicular traffic. Because the residents for the most part had gone back to their apartments after the all-clear, the fire storm caught them in their living quarters. Calls for help could be heard from all sides. All extension and staff ladders were used to rescue the residents. About 50 to 100 people were saved by ladder or by way of burning staircases. The main streets from which men, women, and children were rescued, were Volksdorferstrasse, Vogelweide, Heinskamp, and Marschnerstrasse. Because of the blocked streets, the fire vehicles were also endangered by the fire. The passenger automobile of the Unit Commander, as well as the parked open Fire Truck 8, started to burn before these rescue operations took place.

As far as it was at all possible to do so, people were rescued. It could not be ascertained whether all persons in the streets farther away could be rescued because, within 15 minutes, a conflagration developed which engulfed all buildings on the streets between Wohldorferstrasse and Hansdorferstrasse, and from Essenstrasse and Uferstrasse to Wagnerstrasse in flames.

My unit, as well as HFS 23a/X and a LFS from the Uferstrasse Quarters took part in the fire fighting operations. Although everyone had his hands full during the fire storm, all cries for help were immediately answered and the people were rescued.

(Signed) Tamm
Commander, Unit 3/X

Fire Emergency Unit 3/X Hamburg-Wellingsbuettel, August 15, 1943

RE: Supplement to Report of August 9, 1943, Concerning Human Rescue Operations During the Night of July 27/28, 1943

At 2 a.m., on July 28, 1943, the Emergency Unit received orders from Fire Division VII to drive to Sector VI, Oberaltenallee. with five fire fighting squads (23a, 32a, 33a, 33b, 34a, and S-3/X). These aforementioned squads had been active at five fire sites during the night previous to the attack of July 27/28. At 2:40 a.m., all squads, after retrieving their hoses, were ready for departure. The trip took place by way of Holstenstrasse, Gorch Fockwall, Lombardsbruecke, Glockengiesserwall, Langereihe, An der Alster and Mundsburgerdamm. During the trip across Lombardsbruecke, we could see that the camouflage of the Innenalster was on fire. The heat was very noticeable in the open vehicles. However, the trip was completed without delay.

At 2:55 a.m., the Unit reported to Lt. Juergens of Division VI. We were ordered to go to Fette-Vogelweide and vicinity to fight fires.

At 3:05 a.m., the Unit arrived at Volksdorferstrasse. On brief inquiry it was found that the Lumberyard Fette at Vogelweide 10-12 was completely on fire as were the roofs of the apartment complex at the corner of Volksdorferstrasse and Vogelweide 14. Also, the rooms of the apartment house Vogelweide 8 facing Fette and the terrace apartment adjacent to Fette, which could be reached through Holsteinischerkamp 49, were on fire. The water storage basin at Marschnerstrasse was half full. At 3:10, the squads received orders for the hose truck to lay two B lines to the Eilbek Canal.

While laying the hose lines, around 3:15 a.m., a normal wind started up, which within a few minutes turned into a hurricane (the word "storm" would not adequately describe it). It was raining fire, so as to speak. I was beneath some scaffolding across from Fette and saw large pieces of wood, parts of roofs, plywood boards, etc., whirled in the air above the fire. In no time, the street was filled with burning wood, which whirled through the air at lightning speed along Vogelweide. The furniture that had been salvaged by the residents and which stood on the side of the street away from the fire in the Vogelweide started to catch fire immediately. The storm carried along in its path anything that was movable. It was impossible to understand a word, even when it was being yelled.

The residents had been busy saving their furniture and in most cases had opened their windows to throw their belongings into the street. The storm caught the window frames, unhooked them and carried them through the air. The so-called "fire-rain" was driven into the apartments through the open windows and immediately ignited the black-out curtains and drapes. The streets were empty of people within a few minutes. I, too, had to leave my post because the boards of the scaffolding were beginning to fall down and some had caught fire. I ran to the water storage basin, because the fire vehicles were parked there. Here, a large heavy tree (the trunk was about 1/2 meter in diameter) had fallen across the street Holsteinischer Kamp and came to rest on a fire truck 25 and a fire vehicle of the LFS 21/VI. By laying planks and paving stones across the ditch, some vehicles were able to reach Marschnerstrasse safely. Some courageous crewmen were able to extinguish the fire on the Fire Truck 8 by beating it with cloths. Also, the roof of the passenger automobile, which was already burning, was extinguished.

The storm continued in undiminished force but the winds kept changing direction. Most of the crew of the Unit had sought shelter in the entrance halls of houses in order not to be hit by burning debris. Together with Brigade Leader Burmeister and a few courageous men I was able to free the Fire Vehicle LF 8, which was standing in the Uferstrasse quarters, from the tree which had fallen on top of it. It is hard to say if the catastrophe lasted for twenty minutes or half an hour. In any case, the fire storm abated as quickly as it had arisen.

Cries for help were immediately heard coming from all directions. On the orders, "Take all ladders off the vehicles and save everybody," everything else was dropped and help was extended to the distressed. Even though every one of us had faced the end of his own life a few minutes before, when the cries for help arose, everyone was immediately ready once more to give aid. Fortunately, the houses were only three stories high, and everyone could be reached with ladders. It was a great help that buckets and pots of water were standing in readiness in the stairwells. In many cases, it was easy to extinguish the fire in the halls of the apartments. Often the flames had only leaped from the rear into the halls, and the women thought they could not get through. I, myself, witnessed this in three different instances. One man, who could not wait until a ladder reached his window, jumped from the third floor onto the street, turned around and wanted to get back into his house via the ladder which had been put into place in the meantime to get his suitcase.

The exact number of people rescued is not known; first, because about 70 men were taking part in the rescue operations; and second, because the rescue operations took place simultaneously in Volksdorferstrasse,

Vogelweide, Heinskamp, and Marschnerstrasse. A conservative estimate, however, would be about 80 persons, who were rescued either via the staircases or across ladders.

Because of the fire storm, the situation had changed drastically. While when we first went into action the fire sites could have been controlled, within 45 minutes a conflagration of such dimensions developed that we were powerless to do anything to stem it. In keeping with the situation, a motorcycle messenger was dispatched to Sector VI to request five additional units to make a stand against the fire at Wagnerstrasse, Gluckstrasse, v. Essenstrasse, Hansdorferstrasse, and Marschnerstrasse. From the roof of the house at Holsteinischer Kamp 43 you could survey the whole district, and it would have been possible to push ahead to the various fire sites from the abc e-mentioned streets and limit the extent of the fire.

The following example might show what unexpected situations may arise in a fire storm: In Heinskampstrasse, three or four trailers loaded with coke were parked. They had not been burning before the fire storm; when the storm was over, they were completely gutted and to this day, charred remnants of the trailers and the coke can be seen.

Despite the fact that the crews of the Unit had been on continuous around-the-clock duty since the morning of July 25, and only had an occasional hour or two to get some rest, all tasks entrusted to them were discharged most satisfactorily.

(Signed) Tamm
Commander, Unit 3/X

Fire Emergency Unit 2/X Hamburg-Farmsen, August 27, 1943

Experience Report on the Major Air Attack on Hamburg of 7/29-30/43

On July 27, 1943, Emergency Unit 2/X was assigned to afterhosing chores in the Marienthal area. A command post was established in Goethestrasse at the corner of Juethornstrasse in the room of a burned out house. Everywhere one looked there were only ruins to be seen.

At 11:45 p.m., the air raid alarm was sounded. There was no shelter for the crews, because all buildings in the vicinity were burned out or destroyed. About ten minutes after the alarm had sounded, flak fire started, and right afterwards the attack began. Since, as mentioned above, no air raid shelter was available, we took makeshift cover behind some pillars. From this location we were able to watch the progress of the attack in detail.

One enemy plane was caught in the searchlight beams and when bombarded heavily by flak fire it went through wild gyrations. It seemed as if this enemy plane was trying to draw Flak fire onto itself. This surmise was borne out, because promptly another plane, apparently a scout, created a route indicator by throwing clusters of flare bombs in the direction of the Reichardt Works and the Neuerburg House. Immediately afterwards, the high explosive and firebombs started falling onto the area. The distance from our location to the Reichardt Works was approximately 300 meters. High explosive bombs, stick firebombs, phosphorus bombs, and phosphorus canisters rained ceaselessly onto the Marienthal area. Because of the air shock from the detonating high explosive bombs the crews were forced to lie flat on the ground. Some salvaged furniture pieces stored in the copse were ignited by the firebombs and endangered the fire trucks parked there. In order to prevent the loss of these vehicles it was imperative that the fires in the burning furniture next to the fire trucks be extinguished, no matter what the cost. This was carried out by using drinking water which we had carried along in milk cans, and coffee which we had received. Unfortunately, these amounts of liquid were not sufficient, and one fire truck had to be driven out of the danger zone to save it from destruction. This maneuver was carried out during the time of the heaviest bombardment. A little later, stick firebombs and phosphorus canisters were again dropped. The phosphorus splashed over a gas station about 40 meters from us and ignited the gasoline pump. We used the last can of drinking water to put out the fire. During this action our clothes were splattered with phosphorus. No more water was available for washing off the spots so the contaminated parts of the clothing were cut out.

After the attack had lasted about one and a quarter hours, calm seemed to descend, and all fire vehicles were immediately checked for damage. While we did this, the attack was renewed and again, high explosive, stick and phosphorus bombs were dropped like rain. Low-flying attacks followed and in a few places rows of high explosive bombs were observed being dropped. The earth trembled and the eyes of the men were directed upward watching the still-standing ruins in order not to be buried if they collapsed. At 1:30 a.m., the Emergency Unit received orders by messenger to go to the Market at Witthoefstrasse and Hirschstrasse. It was impossible to advance through Goethestrasse to the Market Place because bomb craters and felled trees blocked the streets. The motorcycle messengers were therefore directed to scout out a route and to pilot the unit to the site if necessary; this was done.

Everyone quickly forgot about the attack in the fields of ruin, for we were now faced with the tremendous task of bringing the raging fire to a halt with all means at our disposal. We were successful in sealing off the Sector Building which had not been touched by the bombs, so that the rising fire storm would not engulf the building. Water was obtained through long hose lines laid across Witthoeftstrasse, Luebeckerstrasse, and Wendemuthstrasse.

Through continuous collapse of building parts and masonry, the water supply was frequently interrupted, but by quickly exchanging hoses it was possible to restore the flow. Despite being exhausted by previous attacks, the crews did everything possible. No complaints were heard anywhere, no matter how difficult the work. The crews were shocked when it was reported that their comrades in Hirschstrasse were buried in the air raid shelter of the Fire Station. All men that could be spared were ordered to Hirschstrasse to assist with the rescue of the trapped men. Despite their exhaustion, the crews worked tirelessly.

Chief Inspector Korn from the Poultry Farm Karlshoeh reported that fire platelets the size of a handkerchief had been dropped onto the farm.

(Signed) Wehrs, Commander
Emergency Unit 2/X

Fire Emergency Unit 2/X
Unit Commander Wehrs

Farmsen, August 3, 1943

RE: Actions of Emergency Unit 2 on July 27/28, 1943

During the night of July 27/28, the alarm was sounded at 12:30, and the attack lasted until 2:20 a.m. at which time the Emergency Unit 2 received orders to report to the Fire Station I at Berliner Tor. The various brigades were ordered into action by use of motorcycle messengers that came to Karl-Muck-Platz where the unit was assembling. The trip to Berliner Tor went by way of Gorch-Fock-Wall, Stephansplatz, and Lombard Bridge. The burning camouflage of the Binnen-Alster threw an enormous shower of sparks on us as we passed by.

At the Main Railroad Station, the situation was similar: the burning houses, the rain of sparks, and an enormous fire storm which greeted us. In spite of this, we continued the trip across Steintor Damm to Grosse Allee. Here, too, the same picture prevailed. Houses were burning on both sides of the street; tremendous columns of fires leaped out of the "House of Work" and the surrounding tall buildings. As we proceeded, the storm developed into a white-hot hurricane with winds carrying sand and sparks. The wind was so strong that the crowns of the trees nearly touched the ground. Crews traveling in open vehicles and on motorcycles had a difficult time keeping their clothes from catching on fire.

On Hammerbrookstrasse, the flames from both sides of the street met in the middle. As unit commander, I tried to go on in my passenger car; however, I realized when we reached Beim Strohhausstrasse that it was impossible to go further. I ordered the automobile and the vehicles following us to turn around at once. I then tried to reach Berliner Tor by way of Kreuzweg and Steindamm. All eight fire vehicles followed me in the direction of Steindamm. That way was also impassible as Steindamm was burning on both sides of the street. Neither was it possible to get through Brennerstrasse and Rostockerstrasse. Friedenstein, the motorcycle messenger, was requested to scout out a route to the Fire Station, which proved unsuccessful because everywhere in all directions, everything was in flames and it was impossible to pass through even the broadest streets because the flames from burning buildings on both sides of the street came together in the middle and the heat was unbearable.

The hose trucks and other vehicles had become detached from the Unit. However, motorcycle messengers maintained communications. We pushed our way through to "Lange Reihe" and here, at Buelaustrasse and

Schmilinskystrasse, I decided on my own to make a stand. I ordered the Unit to halt and dismount. In the meantime, I tried once more to go to Fire Station I by automobile through Lohmuehlenstrasse and Leubeckertordamm to Berliner Tor. At Wallstrasse, I left my automobile behind and sent the driver back to the collection point, because uprooted trees blocked the street. Also, the motorcycle messenger Kuehlbach arrived at the same time. Here, too, a fire storm prevailed with heavy showers of sparks and ashes. The heat was so intense as to make breathing nearly impossible. It was then about 3:15 a. m.

I climbed aboard the motorcycle with the messenger and we tried to proceed along Wallstrasse. But an enormous fire storm came along and threw both the messenger and myself from the motorcycle onto the pavement. We immediately grabbed the motorcycle and used all our efforts to set it upright again. We had to turn back and sought shelter between the school and the public baths because the hot hurricane-force winds made breathing impossible. We used the sidewalk on the side of the street with the least amount of flames jetting out.

Upon reaching the sheltered location I decided to try to reach Fire Station I by way of the Laemmer Market. I climbed over the high wire fence of the athletic field. After about 50 paces across the field from the fence I was caught by the storm and thrown to the ground. Only by crawling along the ground was I able to return to the fence. Trees and shrubs on the field were torn out by their roots and whirled burning through the air. Because of the shortage of oxygen I no longer had the strength to climb over the fence by myself and had to be assisted by the messenger. Those were terrible minutes for me.

We now returned through the shower of sparks by way of Lohmuehlenstrasse to the collection point where the crews were in action. The brigades were laying hose lines from the Alster and from the Schwanenwik to the fire sites on Brennerstrasse, at Lohmuehlen Hospital, at Sechslingspforte, and on Graumannsweg. In the meantime, the fire storm had developed to its greatest intensity. Strong trees were uprooted and the showers of sparks, ashes, and sand was of an indescribable intensity. Thick biting smoke and collapsing ruins of burning buildings surrounded the fire crews.

During this time, Air Force General Wolff arrived at Lange Reihe. I reported to him and mentioned that I had been given orders to go to the command post at Berliner Tor, which, however, had proved impossible to carry out and I had therefore taken it upon myself to make a stand here. The General thanked me and gave orders to save the Post Office Building. I explained to the General that it was more important to make a stand in

midst of large apartment blocks than to save one building. The General said: "I again request that you save the Post Office." I answered that unfortunately I could not comply with his wish, because blocks of houses were more important. The General then took his leave, wishing me luck in the accomplishment of my task.

My orders were eventually crowned with success, with the assistance of the crews of my unit, because the fire was contained and further spread was checked.

(Signed) Wehrs
Unit Commander

Fire Division X Hamburg/Wandsbek, August 4, 1943

The above report of Unit Commander Wehrs was sent on to Group East.

(Signed) Hoeltje
District Captain of FPP

Fire Department Division A Hamburg, August 11, 1943

Experience Report About Air Attacks from July 25 to August 3, 1943

1. General

In the deployment of available forces, priority was given to larger objects with a chance of being saved. Nevertheless, in most cases in the harbor, total losses could not be prevented. The extent of the damage, however, was reduced by the quick action of the fire fighting forces who made a stand at various crucial points. Several units went into action on their own initiative because communications with them had been interrupted.

2. Rescue of Persons

People were trapped on the hospital ship "Pitea." They could not reach safety on the landside because Pier 26 was on fire. It is suggested that in case of future attacks on the harbor, rescue boats be launched early by the water protection police.

3. Fire Fighting Forces

During the major air attacks it was again obvious that the men of the fire fighting units for the most part were not up to the demands made on them because of their advanced age. It would be desirable to acquire younger men for the Fire Protection Service.

In order to save particularly endangered objects, the forces had to be regrouped constantly. Units approaching Division A to lend assistance were often diverted along the way or else went into action on their own initiative before reaching the Division.

Despite orders issued on July 26, whereby the fire sites within the Division should be fought by Division forces, Division units were often assigned to other Sectors. Therefore, it was not possible to give our own forces any rest. On the other hand, out-of-town fire fighting forces had to be discharged after only a short time on duty. The out-of-town forces, on the whole, made it their business anyhow to be ready to depart at a predetermined time.

Because fire fighting forces of Division A were assigned to afterhosing of residential houses in Sector II in Eimsbuettel (Schaeferkampsallee/ Schlump) instead of taking a badly needed rest, the men were so exhausted that they were no longer fully fit for action.

Regarding the actions of the men themselves, it should be stated that everyone applied himself beyond the call of duty. Special praise should be given to those men who had lost their quarters and who went into action again and again during the attacks, despite the fact that they were not able to exchange their drenched clothing for dry. It should be pointed out that most of the men had no knowledge about the fate of their families and the condition of their homes, and still they stuck to their post bravely and unflaggingly. Some sustained injuries, like phosphorus burns, but they did not hesitate to continue at their posts.

In using the units from the Ukraine, difficulties in communication often led to delays. Aside from that, these men worked very hard.

Provisioning of Fire Fighting Forces

Feeding of the men of Division A was very difficult because of the loss of almost all their feeding stations. Therefore, the Fire Division took matters into its own hand in that it used bread and cold cuts designated for the units to make sandwiches for the men, so that at least all crews had a substantial breakfast. This was especially appreciated because most of the men had lost all their personal equipment and would have had a difficult time trying to prepare their own breakfast.

It should be emphasized that the men take their haversacks, canteens, cooking utensils, silverware and protective goggles, as far as these are issued, with them not only for out-of-the-district trips, but also on actions within Hamburg, and store them in the fire vehicles if necessary.

Water Supply

Water supply failed partially at first because of lack of pressure, and then completely.

Low tide and eastwinds prevailed during the attacks and made the withdrawal of water from the Elbe and the canals very difficult. In some cases, pumping heights of eight meters had to be used. Also, the hose supply was not sufficient. In addition, many hoses burst because of excess strain.

Communications

Because the telephone lines were destroyed early in the attack, difficulties in transmitting messages were soon evident. Communications were also disrupted because of the destruction of some of the quarters and because of the fire storm.

Vehicles

Several fire vehicles were unusable because of damage, partly due to enemy action. Also, the vehicles were run down from constant use.

Because of low tide, and of the hulks lying in the harbor, the fireboats could not be put into action everywhere. The fireboats "Ruths," "Jaenisch," and "Waldersee" were out of service during the first hours of the attack because of pump damage. The two first-named boats were put back into use by fitting them with engines from the Sea Damage Service. Because of overuse, several motorized and portable fire engines failed. No experienced personnel were available to make repairs.

Fuel Supply

The fuel supply suffered considerable delays and difficulties, primarily because of a shortage of transport containers and also because of traffic jams at Berliner Tor. In addition to the fuel supply station at Fire Station II, an additional tank station was established at the Sector, which proved such a boon as to be recommended for future occasions.

Special Remarks

It was noted time and again that the fire watches of the Self-Protection and Expanded Self-Protection Services were not employed according to plan and often stood by uselessly while the fires raged. In some cases, they had even left their own damage sites. Even though most of the conflagrations could have been contained with the means at hand, it was still an absolute necessity for fire watches to keep an eye on the flying sparks and prevent fires from starting at adjacent buildings, especially in view of the fact that almost all the windows in the warehouse district were destroyed and the flying sparks thus had easy access. There were sufficient people available for this task (fire watches, police); however, they were without resolute leadership and lacking in initiative. Many large fires--those not caused by dropping firebombs--and the destruction of much valuable property could have been avoided if the available forces had been assigned properly and had checked the spread of fires by flying sparks. If this had been done, it is almost certain that the Kehrwieder Warehouses Blocks A, B, and C would have been spared.

The oft-repeated orders to keep the fire sites dark had several severe drawbacks, which definitely hindered the effective fire fighting operations during the repeated attacks.

Not only the fact that the forces who had been working all through the night had to be assigned in other sectors or to afterhosing tasks in their own sector during the following day, and therefore were exhausted and not 100% fit, but also the destruction of equipment during the renewed attacks hindered fire fighting operations so that the newly developing fires got such a headstart that they far outweighed any results achieved by afterhosing.

(Signed) Farnss
District Lt. of FPP
Division Chief

Fire Department Division B Hamburg, August 21, 1943

RE: Special Observations During the Major Air Attacks from July 25 to August 3, 1943, Concerning Fire Storms and Other Occurrences

A fire storm developed in Sector B only after the attack of July 28, 1943 at Veddel during the fires in the residential blocks in Veddeler Brueckenstrasse. The fire storm was most violent along the following streets: Sieldeich, Tunnelstrasse, Peutestrasse, and Niedernfelderstrasse. However, at no time did it reach hurricane proportions, so that people could be pulled to safety out of the storm. The duration of the fire storm was approximately 2 and 1/2 hours. At about 4:00 a.m., it began to slowly die down.

In the area between Grosse Bergstrasse and Rainweg in Altona, no fire storm phenomena were observed during the morning of July 25, because in general, there were no long rows of houses on fire without breaks in between.

Similarly, no fire storm was observed on August 3, 1943, in the streets Brodschrangen, Schauenburgerstrasse, Baeckerstrasse and Fischmarkt. There was only a strong shower of sparks noticeable at the time.

During the fire at the lumberyard, carpenter shop and warehouse of Shed 18 - Stuelcken Wharf on July 25, it appeared that the pumping platform of the Stuelken Wharf at the Guano Canal did not reach deep enough into the water and should therefore be enlarged and improved.

On July 26, 1943, during the fire at Schliemann Oil Refinery, Stillhornerdamm, several five-meter tall storage tanks were supposed to be extinguished with the new 20-cubic-meter foam jet nozzle. It soon became apparent that the nozzle failed repeatedly even at slight elevation and let the foam-water mixture run out the back, although high pressure was applied. When the pressure amounted to 14 atmospheres, one hose after another burst, and when the pressure was not strong enough, the foam jet did not function. Not until the foam jet nozzle was held horizontally could the storage tanks be hosed off with it. Since a horizontal position of the foam jet nozzle was achieved only under the most difficult circumstances and danger to the fire crews, and in most cases was not possible at all, the bore of the nozzles needs to be changed to make simpler use possible. In the case of high-rising storage tanks, it is more advantageous at the present to work with the 10-cubic-meter nozzle. In their present state, the 20-cubic-meter foam jet nozzles are only advisable for the foaming of pits and excavations.

(Signed) Rosselmann
Division Chief

21

HFB 12/B Hamburg, August 10, 1943

RE: Report About the Major Air Attack on Hamburg of July 24/25, 27/28, 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

Attack Day July 24/25, 1943

Squad HFS 12a/B, which was quartered at the Copper Hut on Stillhorner Damm prior to the air attack, was assigned to fight the fire which had started on the roof of the Hut. The fire was put out with small fire fighting equipment and then the fire watch was turned over to the Industrial Civil Defense forces.

During the above-described action, a large fire was seen developing in the Sloman, Schoer & Co. building on Kamerunweg. Communications with the Air Sector Command Post B could not be established. The squad therefore moved out to the Sloman fire site on their own initiative and found on arrival a widespread fire in the storehouses and that a number of tar barrels were on fire. Additional reinforcements were requested through a motorcycle messenger by Division Chief Major Bosselmann, who was present at the fire site. No reinforcements came. After four hours of work, the squad contained the fires and was able to leave after turning the fire site over to the Self-Protection forces.

The HFB 12/B brigade next went to Air Sector Command Post A and fought residential and office fires with success. Squad HFS 12b/B rescued 47 persons alive and recovered 20 dead persons out of the air raid shelter at Neuer Steinweg 46.

The HFB 12/B brigade was permitted to return to its quarters at 3:30 p.m. on July 25; therefore, it was ready for assignment to the fire site at Albrecht & Co. on Stillhornerdamm after the daytime attack on July 25 took place. At this site, an office and laboratory building were on fire. The fighting of this fire lasted from 4:35 p.m. to 8:21 p.m. The brigade then returned to quarters; at 9:20 p.m. it was ordered to go to the fire site Schliemanns Refinery at Stillhornerdamm to fight a fire in the refinery which took until 2:20 a.m. the next morning.

During the above described fire fighting actions, the men did not receive any relief, nor were they offered any food or drink.

The fire fighting actions were hampered by the failure of the municipal water supply. This resulted in our having to use more hoses to bring water from further away and in delays of starting action, but it presented

no great difficulty after reinforcements arrived. The Plant Civil Defense and Self-Protection forces had tried to fight the fires before the Fire Department arrived, but were powerless because of the failure of the water line.

Attack Day July 27/28, 1943

The HFB 12/B brigade went into action on its own initiative at the damage sites Chinosol Works, Atlantic Oil, Rhenania Barrel Storage Co., and Ritz & Co., all in Vogelreth. The municipal water line failed, so again water had to be pumped from open waters. In order to fight as many fires as possible at the same time, the engine companies of the nearby firms were called upon to assist. Orders were transmitted by messenger. The companies of the following firms took part in the operation: Blohm & Voss, Albrecht & Co., Copper Hut, and Schliemanns Oil Refinery. The combined fire fighting effort was crowned with success. Spread of the fire to neighboring plants was prevented.

Here, too, there was a total lack of refreshments or food of any kind for the crews. The crew of brigade HFB 12/B, who had been on duty since July 24, did not receive any provisions from anywhere. The Feeding Station at the German State Wharf was unable to furnish either a warm meal or even cold food. Not till the following day, after the men had furnished their own provisions, was it possible upon special direction, to obtain some warm food from the Schlageter Barracks.

With the help of the motorized fire engine companies of the local firms it was possible to contain the fires. Reinforcements from Air Sector B could not be obtained. The units put into action worked very well, while the fire watches, with the exception of those at Chinosol Works, failed completely.

Attack Day July 29/30, 1943

The HFB 12/B brigade, which was quartered in the air raid shelter in Arningstrasse when the attack began, was assigned by Unit Commander Lt. Kenter to the damage site Schliemanns Oil Refinery at Stillhornerdamm. During the second attack wave, the firms of Gall & Seitz and Bruegmann and Fries, both in Vogelreth, were hit. Squad HFS 12a/B was immediately ordered to fight the fires at the new sites. In addition, the remaining available fire engine companies of the German State Wharf, Albrecht & Co., and Copper Hut were put into action. With these forces, it was possible to contain the fires and to prevent their spread to other firms.

Several men of brigade HFB 12/B were suffering from severe dysentery due to the long spell of constant activity and the fact that they had not received any food in all that time. Not till provisions became more regular and plentiful did the state of the health of the crew begin to improve.

Attack Day August 2/3, 1943

Brigade HFB 12/B, which was at the Air Observation Tower during the attack, was assigned through motorcycle messenger to the fire site Sohst Company on Ellerholzdamm to fight a widespread fire in the lumberyard. After the fire was brought under control, the Brigade was put at the disposal of Air Sector A, but was not put into action.

The greatest difficulties in fire fighting were in obtaining the necessary water supply, because in every instance the municipal water supply broke down and the laying of extended hose lines meant a delay in starting fire fighting operations. Despite this, however, the fires were contained and spread of the fires to neighboring firms was averted in every case.

The number of men of Brigade HFB 12/B was the same in all actions. There were no casualties. The vehicles remained in good order, but some equipment was lost, i.e., was taken by other units.

The quarters of Squad HFS 12a/B were partially damaged by fire; however, they can be repaired and put back into use.

The state of health of the crew of Brigade HFB 12/B is satisfactory. The only temporary casualties were several men with dysentery.

(Signed) Figer
Master of FPP
Brigade HFB 12/B

Fire Department
Emergency Unit 3/B

Hamburg-Warburg, August 10, 1943

Activity Report of Unit 3/B

For the Time Period July 25 to August 3, 1943

Sunday, July 25

2:12 a.m. Squad HFS 31a/B assigned to fire site Im Busch, Hindenburg-strasse. False alarm. Fire was at Honartsdeich 1a. Squad HFS 31a/B went into action on its own initiative.

2:43 a.m. Unit 3/B assigned to fire site Honartsdeich. Master Tychsen reports back to Division from Fire Station 15. Lt. Zastrow takes command at fire site.

3:35 a.m. Unit 3/B goes from site Honartsdeich to site Sloman-Schoer, Kamerunweg. Unit commander takes charge of Squad FB32/B active at the site.

4:05 a.m. Lt. Böttcher of Division C, Fire Station 8, gives orders to Unit Commander to take command at damage sites Norderwerft, Norderhof and Stülcken Wharf and to establish quarters at the gateman's cottage on Stülcken Wharf. Lt. Zastrow and Master Tychsen recovered one dead man out of the air raid shelter on Norder Wharf.

5:05 a.m. Establish headquarters at gateman's cottage Stülcken Wharf.

Fire Sites: Norderhof, Norder Wharf, Herrenberg, Wine Cellars Vinicola, and Stülcken Wharf with the following buildings: Submarine Magazine, Boiler room, boiler smithy, employee recreation building, carpenter shop, and pipe storeroom.

Forces Employed: F. D. Units 33/B, 22/B, 23b/B, 16b/B, 23b/C, 21/C, 12/C, 31b/B, Volunteer Fire Departments Finkenwärder Companies 1 and 2, Volunteer Fire Department Altenwerder, 17a/C.

8:30 a.m. Soup distributed.

9:30 a.m. Unit moved to Fire Station 8. Assigned by Lt. Böttcher, together with 33/B, 31b/B, 11a/C, and H&L 3/B to conflagration in Altona at Gr. Bergstrasse/Reichenstrasse.

10:00 a.m. The assigned units moved out to Altona.

10:15 a.m. Arrived at headquarters of Unit 3/B at Nobis Gate. Headquarters established in the Karzentra Building. Approximately 50 people were brought to safety after being rescued from the air raid shelter at Lohestrasse and Marienstrasse.

Fire Sites: Residential Buildings Neueburg/Reichenstrasse/ Grosse Freiheit/Kleine Freiheit/Marienstrasse/Pfeiffersgang.

Forces Assigned: Units 33/B, 23a/B, 11b/C, HFS Howaldts Works, H&L 3/B, Hose Truck 2/C, IndFS 15a/C.

Water Supply: From the Elbe at Fish Market Altona and from water storage basin Gr. Freiheit.

Situation Report to: Group West via Fire Station 3.

Successes Achieved: All fires were encircled and hosed down. Number of hoses used: 2 B and 16 C hoses.

6:00 p.m. Received provisions: Two pieces of bread with jam (from the Party) and drinking water obtained from the Karzentra. Turned over fire site to Fire Station 3.

6:30 p.m. Orders from Division B: Move out to Hansamühle, Neuhof. (Units 33/B, H&L 3/B, Hose Truck 2/C.)

7:15 p.m. Arrived Hansamühle. Orders by Lt. Böttcher to Lt. Zastrow to put fire engines in position at pumping station Rossdamm, and extinguish burning oil drums and barrels on the northeast side of the factory. Three B and 2 C hoses used. Water taken from Rose Harbor. The fire was kept to its original site.

Monday, July 26, 1943

1:20 a.m. After extinguishing the fire at Hansamühle, the site was turned over to the Plant Civil Defense forces for further action, if needed.

1:30 a.m. All units return to quarters.

2:50 a.m. New assignment received via motorcycle messenger from Fire Division B that fire at Hansamühle has flared up again and must be put out.

2:58 a.m. Arrive at fire site (Units 33/B, H&L 3/B and Lieutenant). The continued cooling off of the tanks had been neglected by the Plant Civil Defense forces. Assigned one squad at a time to keep fire down and tanks cool. Used 3 C and 2 B hoses with success. Water was taken from Neuhofer Ships Canal.

4:00 a.m. Fire at site completely extinguished and site turned over again to Plant Civil Defense to cool off further. Notification sent to Fire Division B.

12:20 noon Received report by bicycle messenger of Ritz & Co. at Brückenstrasse No. 51, Wilhelmsburg, that about 50 persons were trapped in an air raid shelter hit by high explosive bombs and that storage and factory rooms were on fire. Squad HFS 33a/B and Emergency Squad sent to site.

12:28 p.m. Arrive at Ritz & Co. fire site. Set up command post in an office building. The fire was limited to its original site with 4 B and 12 C hoses, counting hoses used by relief forces of Squad HFB 23/C. The Youth Service took on the rescue of the trapped employees. Experience at this fire site showed that an air raid shelter located underneath a factory may present a great danger to the lives of its occupants. If flammable materials are stored in the building, the fire can spread very rapidly making escape from the building impossible. Also rescue by outside help can be extremely difficult, if not impossible.

5:00 p.m. Units returned to quarters after extinguishing the fire.

Tuesday, July 27, 1943

7:20 p.m. Orders received via motorcycle messenger from Division B to go back to old fire site at Hansamühle to put out a fire in a soybean oil pit. Sent Unit 33/B. Assigned one squad at a time, one after the other. Used 2 B and 3 C hoses to put out the fire. Water was taken from Neuhofer Ships Canal.

9:15 p.m. Fire extinguished and once more site was turned over to Plant Civil Defense forces with new instructions on keeping the fires out.

9:30 p.m. Unit returned to quarters.

Wednesday, July 28, 1943

1:30 a.m. Emergency squad ordered to go to a Woolen Mill in Wilhelmsburg. No fire; it was a false alarm.

1:50 a.m. Orders received from Fire Department Division B via motorcycle messenger by 3/B commander at Command Post in Fire Station 15 for HFB 33/B to go to the fire site Schlinck & Co. on Rotenhaüserstrasse. The copra storage shed and the detergent fabrication building were on fire; the soap storage shed and a machine room of the latter had roof fires. Assignment was made by squads in which 2 B and 4 C hoses were used. Units or fire fighting squads from Franhop and Linstorf had also been assigned to the site by Major Bosselmann; they employed 2 C hoses each.

2:00 a.m. I made a reconnaissance trip from Schlinck & Co. to fire sites in East Wilhelmsburg. I found 5 residential houses at Niedergeorgswärderdeich, 5 houses at Honartsdeich, and one house at Altendeich on fire. At the corner of Jenerseitedeich and Neuerweg several houses were on fire. At the corner of Niedergeorgswärderdeich and Kirchhof there were fires.

3:30 a.m. Forces were assigned to sites in East Wilhelmsburg by Lt. Zastrow as follows: Engine Company of Nazi Party Wilhelmsburg, 1 fire squad from Rönneburg, Squad 34a/B, Engine Company Lammerich, Engine Company Harburger Iron and Bronze Works, Engine Company Anton Günther, Engine Company Rhenania-Ossag, Harburg, Marmstorf, Squad 32a/B, Neuenfelde. Fought fires and started afterhosing operations on residential houses.

4:20 a.m. Lt. Zastrow checked all fire sites. Sealed off and extinguished fires at Niedergeorgswärderdeich. Obtained water from ditches.

5:30 a.m. Lt. Zastrow returned to headquarters at Fire Station 8.

6:30 a.m. On request from Party Headquarters through Division 8, Wesermünde Company 2A was assigned to Freight Station Wilhelmsburg by Lt. Zastrow.

6:35 a.m. Brigade 5, Wesermünde, assigned by Lt. Zastrow to Lagerstrasse, Warburg, to fight five conflagrations.

7:10 a.m. Wesermünde Brigade 2 B assigned to fire site at Freight Station in Wilhelmsburg.

7:15 a.m. FFS Hanstedt assigned to fire site at Honarrsdeich.

7:10 a.m. 1 FT 15 and 2 FT's 25 from Bremervörde assigned to Thamling and Mehldau at Lagerstrasse fire site.

9:15 a.m. The fires at Schlinck & Co. were kept to their original sites and extinguished. Fire watch at the site was turned over to the Plant Civil Defense personnel and the other two above-named units.

9:30 a.m. Brigade HFB 33/B returned to quarters.

11:15 a.m. Squad 34a/B assigned to new fire sites in east Wilhelmsburg.

12:30 p.m. Lt. Zastrow with Emergency Squad and Motorcycle Messenger go to Krugkoppel Bridge. Units conduc. afterhosing at Hochallee 91, Klosterstern, Osterstrasse, Schulweg, Bundesstrasse 74, Hansastrasse 81. Out-of-town forces assigned to assist.

4:50 p.m. Squad 32a/B returned to quarters.

7:30 p.m. Units all returned to quarters.

Thursday, July 29, 1943

3:00 a.m. Squad 34a/B sent from Fire Station 15 to Niedergeorgswärderdeich 51.

3:30 a.m. Squad 34a/B arrived at fire site; used one B and 2 C hoses to extinguish fire.

8:02 a.m. Squad 34a/B assigned to job of afterhosing of office building on Pelzerstrasse.

8:40 a.m. Squad 34a/B assigned to fight fires on Bergerstrasse, Hermarenstrasse, Rathausstrasse, Knochenhauerstrasse, and Pelzerstrasse.

4:38 p.m. Squad HFS 33a/B ordered to go to an old fire site at Siemens Union Building on Lagerstrasse where a lumber shed with stacks of lumber in it was on fire. One B and one C hose were used to put out the fire.

6:00 p.m. Squad 34a/B returned to quarters.

6:30 p.m. Squad 33a/B returned to quarters.

Friday, July 30, 1943

2:05 a.m. Took Emergency Unit on reconnaissance in Busch and Wilhelmsburg East.

2:20 a.m. Sent Squad 33a/B to Hindenburgstrasse [illegible], to fight roof fire. Squad 33b/B and Brigade 32/B sent to Im Busch 72, where garages and shops on fire. Squad 31a/B sent to Im Busch 65 to extinguish roof fire; latter used 2 B and 6 C hoses and fire was contained with minor damage to site.

2:23 a.m. Emergency Squad proceeded to fire sites under command of Lt. Zastrow. Arriving units assigned. At fire site Honartsdeicherweg 12 where the stables and a summerhouse were on fire Engine Company 2 of the Party with 3 C hoses was assigned. At Jenerseitedeich 33, where a high explosive bomb detonated but caused no casulaties and at the old school on Niedergeorgswärderdeich where high explosive and fire bombs landed, the Volunteer Fire Department First Company, Kirchdorf, was assigned. They were also assigned to fight fires in the residential house across the street where a high explosive bomb detonated leaving 2 dead and 2 injured. One man with head wounds taken to Rescue Station No. 113 by automobile.

Brigade 33/B used 3 C hoses to contain the roof and garage fires at Hindenburgstrasse 18 and Im Busch 72. Courageous action by the Self-Protection forces at Hindenburgstrasse 18 prevented a widespread roof fire. Brigade 32/B extinguished fires in the garages of the Seeland Company with one B and 4 C hoses.

3:30 a.m. Brigade 33/B returned to quarters.

3:35 a.m. Brigade 33/B assigned to fire sites in Speicherstadt Brooktor (Division A territory).

4:10 a.m. Brigade 32/B returned to quarters.

4:45 a.m. All units returned to quarters.

5:10 a.m. Order received from Lt. Hauns to report to Dr. Schubert at Adolf Hitlersplatz.

5:20 a.m. Dr. Schubert ordered Lt. Zastrow to take over command of the fire area enclosed by Mönckebergstrasse-Bergstrasse-Schmiedestrasse-Schauenburgerstrasse-Pelzerstrasse-Johannisstrasse-Rathausstrasse-Knochenhauerstrasse. Additional forces were requested. Squads 32a/B and 31a/B were assigned to supply water from the Alster. Brigade 32/B was assigned to fight fires at Mönckebergstrasse 25-31, Rathausstrasse 31, Kl. Johannisstrasse 3-9, Rathausstrasse 13-18, and 21-23, Pelzerstrasse 7, and Schauenburgerstrasse 20-24. Squad 31a/B was assigned fire fighting duties on Schauenburgerstrasse, Pelzerstrasse, and Kl. Johannisstrasse.

1:00 p.m. Brigade 32/B relieved and returned to quarters.

Forces arriving later included: brigade of Brunsbüttelkoog, brigade from Wesermünde, Units 23a/C, H&L 3/B and Hose Truck 3/B. Altogether 10 B and 28 C hoses and 1 water tower were utilized.

Successes achieved: Because of the widespread fires, the fire fighting operations were difficult at first because of lack of manpower. However, the danger of the fires spreading further was removed.

Provisions: Butter, cheese, sardines, bread and smokes were issued.

1:30 p.m. Afterhosing operations were turned over to the unit from Wesermünde. Moved back to Fire Station 15.

Tuesday, August 3, 1943

2:30 a.m. Lt. Zastrow went on reconnaissance to Jenerseitedeich 120. Residential house on fire. Volunteer Fire Department First Company Korchdorf with 1 B and 3 C hoses assigned.

3:00 a.m. Brigade 33/B received orders from Division B to go to the fire site at the Industrial Railroad Station. The alarm proved to be false since no fires were seen.

3:30 a.m. Brigade 33/B returned to quarters.

3:45 a.m. Brigade 32/B and HFS 33b/B received orders to go to Bartels on Moorwärder where 5 residential houses were reported to be on fire and people were in danger. Squad 31b/B from Moorwärder already on duty at site. Master Tychsen also assigned Hose Truck 3/B to assist.

4:05 a.m. Units arrived at fire site of Municipal Workshops. About 250 stick firebombs had fallen on the site. Carpenter shops, lumberyard and equipment shed were on fire. The Expanded Self-Protection forces, ten men in all, were active with 2 C hoses when the Fire Department units arrived. The fires were fought with one B and 5 C hoses. At the residential house Moorwärder 45, the fire was fought with 3 C hoses; at houses Moorwärder 43 and 43a, the fire was fought with 5 C hoses; at Moorwärder Nos. 38, 42, and 46 where sheds were on fire, 3 C hoses were used. The residential house at Moorwärder 58a contained the air raid shelter which had been hit by a high explosive bomb. Six people were rescued alive and seven dead people were removed by the Army and the Self-Protection forces. A request for an ambulance and medical attendants was made via Bartels and Squad 31b/B.

4:25 a.m. Squad 33a/B was ordered by Lt. Schmidt to go to Moorwärder.

4:45 a.m. Squad 33a/B arrived at the fire site and was put into action at houses Moorwärder 38, 43, and 43a. Water was taken from the North Elbe and the fires were contained to their original sites; afterhosing tasks were turned over to the LFS 31b/B.

8:02 a.m. The Heavy Fire Brigade 33/B returned to quarters.

8:15 a.m. The Municipal Workshop site was turned over to the Self-Protection forces to watch and Brigade 32/B returned to quarters.

6:10 a.m. Squad 32b/B was ordered to go from Fire Station 15 to fire sites at Stiftstrasse and Steindamm in Hamburg.

7:00 a.m. Squad 32b/B arrived at damage sites Stiftstrasse 15, 21, and 36 and Brennerstrasse 58, 66, and 68 where roof and total fires were developing.

2:30 p.m. Squad 32b/B relieved and returned to quarters.

2:50 p.m. Squad 33a/B sent to an old fire site at Niedergeorgswärder-deich 167 to perform afterhosing tasks.

5:10 p.m. Squad 33a/B returned to quarters.

General Remarks

The blocking off of damage sites by the police did not take place in any of the fire sites assigned to us. The fire fighting operations were severely hampered by this failure by the police because part of the fire fighting forces had to take over this task, in order to protect passersby from collapsing house fronts.

During all actions by the units from July 25 to August 3, 1943, not a single crew member sustained serious injuries, although all units worked hard and without regard to their personal safety. This success can be attributed solely to the efforts of commanders and officers of the units who kept calling the crews' attention to dangerous conditions.

It should also be mentioned here that the out-of-town forces, in general, and the volunteer fire companies, in particular, were unsuited to cope with conflagrations because they had no practical experience and also were afraid to damage their uniforms. However, the Fire Squad Brunsbüttelkoog (Squad Leader Peters) which was assigned to the conflagration at Adolf Hitlerplatz made significant contributions to the fire fighting.

As regards the municipal water system, the following should be noted: The number of existing water storage basins is not nearly large enough. Because of this, many units were not successful in putting out fires because the way to the nearest independent water supply led through streets which were no longer passable because of the raging fire storm or because of the debris lying in the street. The large amounts of water that were needed to fight the fires had to be brought in over long distances whereby many fire engines were lost to the direct fire fighting tasks.

Successful fire fighting operations suffered further through the fact that in many cases the couplings were ripped out of the hoses.

A further handicap was the fact that the forces in the beginning were often too weak for the task at hand because the units were scattered. It is advisable to keep the squads together when assigning them and to put them to work at a certain area, so that the squad leader knows where and how he should assign his men to the best advantage.

It should also be emphasized that wherever the Self-Protection forces courageously stuck to their posts and did their share, many a building was saved. The hose bridges in many cases, especially those from the Air Force Special Units, were too high and got caught under the vehicles.

The state of health of the men of the Third Emergency Unit is good.

(Signed) Zastrow
Lt. of FPP*

* Includes information provided by Makowski, Master of FPP (HFB 33/B) and Timmann, Brigade Sergeant (HFB 32/B).

Fire Department Division VIII Hamburg-Harburg, August 11, 1943

RE: Report About the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg, July 24/25, July 27/28, July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

First Attack of July 24/25, 1943

No damage occurred in the district of Division VIII. All forces were assigned to Hamburg on a stand-by basis.

- 1/VIII was ordered to Adolf Hitlerplatz and assigned from there.
- 2/VIII was ordered to Fire Station 6 and assigned to duty in that vicinity.
- 3/VIII was ordered to Fire Station 16 and assigned to duty in that vicinity.
- Volunteer Fire Units were ordered to Jungfernstieg and assigned to duty in that vicinity.

Orders were transmitted by telephone. Telephone connections from Group Headquarters to Fire Division VIII could be made only via the OB line. Fire Division VIII handled communications with Fire Divisions B and C. During the enemy attacks, telephone connections were unimpaired within the Sector, except for the Fire Department network, which failed.

Relief was not available during the first 24 to 36 hours of fire fighting.

Provisioning was totally absent. The Welfare Feeding Station worked bureaucratically according to peacetime regulations and without appreciation for the needs of the crews. What food was issued to the units was made possible by our own field kitchen and iron rations, not by Bureaucratic civil servants who have no idea how the men in the fire line feel.

No disposition of units took place according to a plan. The units moved from one fire site to the next on the basis of a shortage of manpower and observed intensity of the fires.

Successes Achieved

Accomplishment of the fire fighting in most cases was to prevent smaller fires from growing into conflagrations and to prevent the further spread

of such fires. The afterhosing of sites which were total losses also helped in this regard. Extinguished many individual fires such as the fire in City Hall tower (by Brigade 13/VIII).

General Observations

The Self-Protection forces were not present in sufficient numbers. Therefore the fires were not fought effectively when they first started. Not enough water was stored in the buildings under the jurisdiction of the Self-Protection units.

Fuel stored in attics was a main cause of house fires. The ignited fuel ate its way through floor after floor and then the fire could not be put out by Self-Protection. Recommendation: Fuel must be removed from attics.

Doors and gates were frequently locked, even in Industrial Civil Defense plants. (See special report 2/VIII of August 11, 1943.) Recommendation: All gates should be opened at the time of alarm and all doors unlocked.

Lumber stored in house blocks was the reason for the development of block fires. Recommendation: All stored lumber should be completely removed from houses.

Building mode of most apartment houses: Stairwells were not fireproof. When the roof caught fire, flaming masses fell down through the stairwell to the main floor and the staircase would be aflame from top to bottom. After that there was no possibility to get to the upper floors except by ladder from the outside. In many cases, lack of fire fighting equipment and water led to a total loss of the building. Future building recommendations: Stairwells should be fireproof throughout. The same goes for the ceiling between the top floor and the attic.

Lack of City Maps: The lack of maps of the whole city area at the Division Headquarters was felt repeatedly. Because of disrupted telephone connections, orders had to be transmitted by messenger. Because of lack of maps, transmission of orders was laborious and delays in communications occurred. Recommendation: All units should be equipped with more maps of Hamburg.

Field Telephones: Use of available field instruments in addition to the Fire Department equipment proved most helpful. Recommendation: Extend the communications network with Fire Department equipment.

Motorcycle Messengers: Most motorcycles, especially those with sidecars, were too old and worn out, and there were constant breakdowns.

Motorcycle messengers were greatly overworked and many became casualties on the streets. No replacements were available, because a request to train sufficient personnel had been turned down by Headquarters some time ago.

Communications System: The ability to switch the Fire Department telephone network to the Harburg Central Exchange (37 10 51 via House Phone 810) made communications with the units of Fire Division VIII possible. These working connections, however, were overloaded. Recommendation: To reactivate the official telephone line 37 08 17. The connection is all ready. The only thing left to do is to connect it to an instrument.

Command Units: The command units worked very well at the Command Posts. Past training paid off, and it is suggested that the intensive training should be continued.

Water Supply: The independent water network was insufficient. Subterranean water basins could not be located. For example, the water storage basin at Eimsbütteler Market was still completely full on July 27, while a great water shortage prevailed elsewhere in the vicinity. Recommendation: Increase the independent water supply to one basin for every 200 meters along the streets with a minimum capacity of 1000 cubic meters for each basin.

Conditions of Vehicles: The repair shop 93 at Fire Station 14 kept up rather well with the mounting repair work. Reinforcements were furnished from the personnel of Fire Division VIII. Therefore, readiness of the units' equipment during the attack remained at nearly 100%. The situation was aided by the fact that no damage took place in Harburg itself. Replacement parts were frequently lacking. Stripping parts from vehicles which had become unusable because of major damage helped. Repair by crews at the damage sites was seldom possible because sufficient tools and repair equipment were generally not available. Recommendation: All vehicles should be equipped with necessary repair tools.

Attack of July 27/28, 1943

No damage took place in the area of Sector VIII. A large percentage of our forces had remained in Hamburg for the night. During the air attacks, the units were assigned independently by unit commanders as follows:

- 1/VIII in the Eimsbüttel area
- 2/VIII in the Eimsbüttel area
- 3/VIII in the Veddel area

Transmission of Orders: Field telephone connections were available between the Division Chief and the two units in the Eimsbüttel area. The field telephone connection with Fire Station 4 was interrupted during the attack. Water had to be brought in across long distances.

The units went into attack by squad; each squad was assigned several fire sites. No relief was available to the crews. After water became available at the fire sites, the fires that were fought were usually confined and prevented from spreading.

General Observations

The Self-Protection forces, especially the males, worked very well in many cases, particularly in view of the large-scale destruction from the attack of July 24/25. In the public air raid shelter, where we stayed during the alarm, the women were apathetic and afraid. A strong storm and shower of sparks prevailed in our area; however, these were not caused by the fires in our sector, but by the conflagrations in Territory East.

Provisions were more satisfactory on July 28 than they had been on July 25; however, there was still not enough food and it was not hearty enough. A condition of general exhaustion prevailed among the crews.

On July 28, at 10:00 a.m., we received a new assignment at Alsterdamm without prior rest. Hence, no tasks could be found at that site which the units were equal to, because all were too exhausted. Despite this fact, however, fighting morale remained high.

Attack of July 29/30, 1943

No damage occurred in the area of Sector VIII. All units were in their quarters from about 8:00 p.m. on July 29. Assignments were made by telephone according to plan:

- 1/VIII in Warehouse district
- 2/VIII in Isepiatz and vicinity
- 3/VIII in Alsterdamm

- Volunteer Fire Unit at Mittelstrasse and St. John's Church

Transmission of orders to the Divisions took place only by messenger. The water shortage was very critical at all sites. Also, there was a shortage of hose material for the volunteer unit. Fires were spreading rapidly soon after the attack began.

Toward 1 p.m., one fire unit from Flensburg and one fire unit from Plön County were assigned together to go to Lange Reihe. The Flensburg unit took water from the Alster. Volunteer Fire Unit Plön attacked fires one squad at a time, and was successful. Training of the Volunteer Fire Department to work cooperatively must be improved considerably. In the vicinity of Lange Reihe, no more Self-Protection forces were present. Most apartments and stores were locked up.

Attack of August 2/3, 1943

Damage occured in the district of Division VIII. Two units, 1/VIII and 2/VIII, were assigned to the damage area near the Railroad Station, Phönix, and Noblee & Thörl. Two brigades were sent to Neugraben. (See special report 2/VIII.)

The large-scale flight of the population from Hamburg was shockingly apparent at this time. The Self-Protection and Expanded Self-Protection forces were virtually nonexistent, and the Industrial Civil Defense units were decimated. The Industrial Civil Defense unit of Rhenania was present and worked in an exemplary fashion.

Orders were transmitted according to plan. No reinforcements were available and the units were later sent from the above sites to sites in the vicinity of Gänsemarkt.

General observations were similar to those made in the previous attacks. The motorized fire engine companies of the plants were mobilized. Delays in assignment took place because of the shortage of vehicles.

(Signed) Hüdemann
Captain of FPP

VG

Lead Squad 2/VIII Hamburg-Harburg, August 11, 1943

RE: Activities During Air Attack of August 3, 1943, from 2:10 a.m. to 5:50 a.m. at the Following Plants:

1. Noblee & Thörl Oil Refinery, Hamburg-Harburg, Otto Telchowstrasse.

2. Phönix Rubber Products Company, Hamburg-Harburg, Wilstorferstrasse.

3. Harburg Railroad Station.

1. The Emergency Fire Unit 2/VIII was ordered to Phönix to fight the fire there at 2:10 a.m. on August 3, 1943.

On arrival, the factory gates were closed and only after repeated knocking and ringing, the janitor came and opened the entrance gate. When asked about the location of the blaze, he replied that he did not know anything about a fire. The glow of fire clearly visible when approaching Phönix turned out to have originated from a fire at the neighboring plant of Noblee & Thörl. Assuming a false alarm, the unit moved on to the plant of Noblee & Thörl on Otto Telchowstrasse. Here, too, all entrance doors were closed. Even prolonged knocking, ringing, and calling out did not bring anyone to open the door. By climbing over the gate, the crew gained entrance to the grounds and access to the fire site. Not a single fire watch guard was found on the whole factory grounds. About 20 minutes afterward the janitor and three fire watches arrived at the scene. These men, contrary to orders given to the chief plant warden Stachow, had gone to the public air raid shelter at Harburg Railroad Station. Therefore, the plant was left completely without any fire protection. The missing men (1 officer and seven men) with a portable fire engine had been ordered by management to stay at Hittfeld from where they were supposed to be mobilized in case of need. They did not arrive at the fire site until 3:10 a.m.

It is inexcusable that there were no fire watches posted in such a vital defense plant. If fire watches had remained at the plant, the fire would never have been able to gain the foothold that it did. Even the Chief Plant Air Raid Warden was with the plant fire company at Hittfeld. However, once the Industrial Civil Defense forces arrived on the scene, their work was adequate for the task.

2. While we were at Noblee and Thörl, it was ascertained that the roof of the tire depot 5a and 5b of Phönix Rubber Products Company had been hit by stick firebombs. The fire that developed was put out by the Industrial Civil Defense forces of Phönix with the assistance of one heavy fire brigade and two hook-and-ladder trucks. It should be noted that communications with the fire watches were not functioning at this site either; otherwise, the gatekeeper, who was supposed to direct arriving fire fighting forces to the fire sites, should have been aware of the fire.

In contrast to the situation at Noblee & Thörl, all Industrial Civil Defense forces and all fire watches were at their posts. However, it was lamentable that members of the Industrial Civil Defense stood around in the yard during the fire and had to be urged by the Fire Department to take part in the fire fighting operations.

3. The main reception building of the Harburg Railroad Station was hit by 10 stick firebombs which ignited fires in the roof as well as in the first class and second class waiting rooms. The fires were attacked by Emergency Brigade 24/VIII and the Federal Railroad Civil Defense forces. The latter were numerous and worked very hard under the direction of Federal Railroad Inspector Fröhlich.

The afterhosing operations at each of the three fire sites were turned over to the respective Industrial Civil Defense forces.

At the first-named concern, the opinion seemed to be prevalent that as soon as the Fire Department crews had arrived at the fire site, further efforts by the Industrial Civil Defense forces were no longer required. Also a certain amount of hesitation to take part in the fire fighting tasks while the air raid was still going on was noted.

The firm of Noblee and Thörl should again be very emphatically informed that the appointed fire watches and fire fighting forces must, at all costs, remain at the plant during an air alarm because removal of these key persons could easily lead to a complete catastrophe.

(Signed) Wulff
Master of FPP
Unit Commander 2/VIII

Lead Squad 2/VIII Hamburg-Harburg, August 10, 1943

Report of Experiences During Air Attacks on Hamburg from July 25 to August 3, 1943

1. The number of water storage basins was insufficient during the Major Catastrophe. It was necessary therefore to lay long hose lines to open bodies of water and this took up too much time and too much of the available hose material.

2. The shortage of over-pressure valves often led to the bursting of hoses. Not only the hose trucks, but also the fire engines should carry over-pressure valves.

3. The hoses burst most frequently at the fittings, proving that the fittings should be affixed more carefully to the hose material. Also the connecting pipe was too thin.

4. After use, the hoses were often individually rolled up. This is very impractical. Double-rolled hoses can be laid out much faster.

5. In many cases the large coal supplies stored in the attics proved to be disastrous. Once the coal caught fire, it was extremely hard to extinguish and quickly burned through from floor to floor. These coal supplies thus played a decisive role in bringing about the total destruction of many residential buildings.

6. The entrance gates to factories must be left open d ng air raid alarms. During the fire at Noblee and Thörl on Otto T wstrasse, the gates were closed and had to be opened by the fire c. themselves; this delayed the attack on the blaze by at least ten minute. The same situation prevailed at the Phönix Rubber Products Company in Harburg.

7. During the drive from fire site to fire site, it was often noted that a number of fire engines would be parked on stand-by for long periods of time, while at other places whole house blocks would be in flames without a single fire hose being used.

8. In the various large business buildings, it was noticed that the Self-Protection forces were either not present at all or else were only present in very small numbers. They had lost their nerve by the severity of the attacks.

9. Lack of small civil defense tools on the various fire vel felt very keenly. Especially in fires on ships, these tools ar indispensible.

10. Experience has shown that during a Major Catastrophe phone connections will be severed. In those cases, only the messengers can maintain communications. We did not ever of these motorcycle messengers during the recent Major Ca and many more should have been assigned to this task.

11. Some units fought on the fireline for many hours until completely exhausted without ever being relieved, while so town units were either not put into action at all or served periods of time.

12. Some brigades and squads, especially those from o got to maintain communications with their command post at the fire sites. This is understandable during a Major nevertheless should not be allowed to happen. Lack of in progress at a site impeded the work at the Command Post in

13. When moving out in columns, debris and bomb craters should be watched for. It is advisable to send a motorcycle scout ahead in order to check the streets for passability.

14. Provisions should be secured at all costs. Most of all, there should be liquids available to the crews. The lack of water is much more seriously felt than lack of solid food.

(Signed) Wulff
Master of FPP
Unit Commander 2/VIII

Appendix 5

EXCERPTS OF REPORTS ON EVENTS AND MESSAGES, PERSONAL ACTIONS AND EXPERIENCES, PERFORMANCE OF OUT-OF-TOWN UNITS, INDUSTRIAL DAMAGE AND MISCELLANEOUS INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURRED DURING THE WORLD WAR II AIR ATTACKS ON HAMBURG

301h

Log of Events for July 25, 1943

Air Raid Alarm No. 319. Alarm Sounded at 12:33 a. m. Wind: NNW, 3 meters per second

12:51 a. m. Enemy planes arriving from Hensmoore Heide.

12:53 a. m. Three or four planes over Altona, flying northwest to periphery of city.

12:59 a. m. Several planes over Pappenbüttel.

1:00 a. m. Planes turn from Hamburg to Harburg.

1:01 a. m. Concentrated air attack on Harburg.
High explosive bomb, strong smoke formation at Deutscher Ring.

1:02 a. m. About 10 planes in Hamburg Air space.

1:03 a. m. Around Michel, high explosive bombs; at Grossneumarkt, high explosive bombs.

1:05 a. m. Behind Dorotheenstrasse, air mine thrown, hits on city park.

1:06 a. m. High explosive bombs near city hall. Electric lights flickering; they go out and then come back on.

1:09 a. m. Direct hits at RR station Altona, Heiligengeistfeld, Barbek, Wilhelmsburg, Martin Lutherstrasse, several hit. Conflagration direction of City Park Group West. Pferdemarkt hit. Harbor being attacked violently. (Reports piling up.) New fire site at Fuhlsbüttel. High explosive bombs all around Victoria Barracks. Approaching flights continue from the direction of Cuxhaven.
HQ moved to Grcup West and Rothenburgsort.

1:15 a. m. About 100 high explosive bombs. Attack from direction of Fuhlsbüttel, Mundsburg, Barmbeck. More planes approaching from West and Southwest. Firebombs and high explosive bombs fall on Tittel & Kruger Woolen Mill. Flottbecker Chaussee, Brahmsstrasse, Administration Building of St. George's Hospital hit. Renewed attack on Bahrenfeld, Flottbek.

1:25 a.m. Uninterrupted dropping of high explosive and firebombs. Eppendorfer Hospital, Pavilion 36 and Nurses Residence hit by firebombs.

1:28 a.m. No damage reported in Sector VIII. In Air Sector V hits at Hammersteindamm, Angerstrasse, Ritterstrasse 128. Conflagrations at Alfredstrasse, Lübeckerstrasse, Hammerbrookstrasse, Wandsbeker Railroad Station, Persil Works Sonninstrasse, Sector IV, Fühlsbüttelerstrasse, Papenstrasse 31, Eilbek.

1:35 a.m. St. George's Church hit by high explosive bombs. Wilhelm Fette, Bahrenfeld struck by high explosive and firebombs.

1:36 a.m. Fires at Hammerbrookstrasse 99, Wandsb. Stieg 63, Barbeck, Air Sector V, Hohenfelder Allee. Rossberg 37 reports roof fire, Rennbahn 115 hit by high explosive bomb.

1:38 a.m. Additional bombing explosions, direction of Eimsbüttel; approaching planes near Hamburg.

1:39 a.m. Numerous planes approaching from direction of the sea. Conflagration in direction of Hammerbrook. At Sachsenstrasse houses 1 to 7 and 6 to 8 destroyed. At Rathausstrasse Bethesda Hospital on fire.

1:44 a.m. Fire Departments Bremen, Wismar and Bergedorf requested by Zirkusweg. Hansa Carpet Company, Altona, on fire, assign Industrial Civil Defense group. Gr. Allee, Vierländerstrasse 54 on fire.

1:47 a.m. Radio tube factory at Horst Wessel Allee on fire. Industrial Civil Defense assigned, also Volunteer fire departments. Alarm Stage III.

1:50 a.m. No damage in Harburg. Tretorn-Asbest Co., Dorotheenstrasse, Barbek, own forces in action. Phosphorus bombs raining down on City Park. Attack continues undiminished. Stülcken Wharf hit.

1:58 a.m. Telephone Exchange at Binderstrasse on fire.

1:59 a.m. Sachs & Deisselberg, Rödingsmarkt, on fire.

2:00 a.m. More planes approaching from Cuxhaven.

2:03 a.m. Dispatch Master Schlimer with Motorcycle to Group West to obtain information on situation there. Request two fire fighting units from Bremen. House next to Atlantic Hotel on fire; it contains important army materiel. Administration building of Air Defense Command allegedly collapsed. Thirty new planes reported approaching the city.

2:05 a.m. Area of Niendorf, Lokstedt, Eppendorf, Eimsbüttel to Main RR Station estimated having 250 to 300 fires. Fires at Engelstrasse and Bankstrasse. Conflagration at Schwanenwik 26.

2:14 a.m. Army Emergency Corps arrives, 2000 men (1000 to East, 1000 to West). Fires at Fruchtallee Corner Eppendorfer Weg, Schlussstrasse 54, Propaganda Department, State Library, Bundesstrasse 96, Gymnasium Corner Hoheweide (allegedly 700 people trapped there). Old Folks Home Tiefstücken, Raienfelderstrasse 15, Ritterstrasse, Richards Church, Papenstrasse 64, Hirschgraben 20/22, Eilbecker Allee 318, Rotterstrasse 35 and 82, Wandsbeker Chaussee 73 and 136, all on fire. Sector I urgently requests reinforcements; water system destroyed. Hospital Martinistrasse on fire.

2:30 a.m. Three fire fighting units needed by Sector IX; four brigades sent to Bahrenfelder Railroad Station; 10 brigades sent to Precinct 95, industrial installations on fire.

2:35 a.m. Hohe Luft Department Store on fire; Sternwolle Company enveloped by flames. Gerhard Wagner Hospital, F Pavilion, St. George Hospital, Barmbeck Hospital, Sloman House, City Hall Tower all on fire. Whole street of Hohe Bleichen on fire. Wendenstrasse 440-470, Borstelmannsweg 107 and 109, Beim Strohhaus 57-69, Grosse Allee, Führstrasse 18, all on fire.

2:47 a.m. At Hamburger Fremdenblatt (Newspaper) on Grosse Fleiche, explosions feared. An der Alster 81, school on fire. Dr. Schubert goes to City Hall.

2:51 a.m. Hammersteindamm 104/106 on fire, Harbor asks for reinforcements. Stülcken Wharf, Blohm & Voss, Herman Wharf on fire. Switching yards, Imsinckstrasse on fire.

2:52 a.m. Apparent conflagration at Hohe Bleiche. Water shortage at Eppendorf Hospital.

3:00 a.m. Sectors I, II, VII, IX especially hard hit, including RR station at Altona, Hinrich Lohsestrasse. Ten units are required as reinforcements.

3:02 a.m. All clear!

In An der Alster all houses reported on fire. Hospital Richard Strasse corner Eilbeker Weg, 200 persons trapped. Fire fighting forces too weak to combat fires.

3:22 a.m. Fire Department Division III to Dresdner Bank, Jungfernstief, Lt. Markmann, Fire Station III.

3:29 a.m. Conflagrations at Schenkendorfestrasse, Schillerstrasse, Kanalstrasse, Zimmerstrasse, and Reeperbahn. Ask for five more fire department units.

3:45 a.m. The following units promised to Group West:

1 Emergency Unit from Kiel
1 Emergency Unit from Neumünster
5 Emergency Units from Bremen
1 Emergency Unit from Lübeck
2 Emergency Units from Oldenburg.

Lt. Colonel Westphal to Group Harbor. Conflagration in Warehouse District threatens to spread to Pickhuben. Asks that two brigades from the Second Unit be assigned. Granted.

4:00 a.m. Ukrainian Training Course VIII unit assigned to Harbor. All industrial civil defense units ordered to Harbor.

4:05 a.m. Fires at Dresdner Bank, Command Post of Division III. Fire Station III moved to Hapag Travel Bureau, 324-364 Jungfernstieg.

4:10 a.m. Situation of Major Catastrophe declared.

4:45 a.m. Two out-of-town units to arrive within one half hour.

5:45 a.m. Lt. Müssfeld to City Hall: Send two brigades to City Hall immediately.

6:15 a.m. Army barracks at Bundesstrasse in danger of explosion from ammunition.

6:20 a.m. Fire Station 9 received a direct hit.

6:45 a.m. One unit from Kiel arrives at Fire Station III. Assigned to the conflagration in Inner City.

7:00 a.m. Three units arrive from Eidelstedt. Three units arrive from Bremer, two units assigned to East, one to the Party H.Q.

8:50 a.m. Following areas of conflagrations are still without fire fighting forces:

1. Grindelallee, Rentzelstrasse to Schlump
2. Heinrich Barthstrasse to Rutschbahn
3. Schlankreihe from Grindelberg to Bundesstrasse. (Received one FD unit at 9:10 a.m.)
4. Police barracks in Army camp Bundesstrasse.
5. Schroeder Stiftstrasse, Sedanstrasse.
6. Schlump RR station.
7. Schäferkampsallee.
8. Kl. Schäferkampsallee to hospital.

Fire fighting forces are needed at all fires.

9:10 a.m. Available forces: 1 unit from Oldenburg, sent to Grindelallee; 1 unit from Oldenburg, sent to Heinrich Barthstrasse.

9:15 a.m. Lt. Col. Westphal pulls forces out of Harbor District and assigns them to Sector VII.

9:25 a.m. Lt. Col. Westphal sends messenger to Command Post Group West to ascertain where the out-of-town forces are most urgently needed.

11:00 a.m. Lt. Col. Schwarzenberger consults on situation in Group East. He then orders the fighting of single fires to be abandoned; Group East forces are pulled out and moved to the area of Group West to fight the conflagration.

1:30 p.m. Report from Lt. Col. Eckmann:

1. Motorized Division, 3 units (10 squads) left Dortmund at 6 a.m. (appr. 350 km) arrived in Hamburg at about 3 p.m. Where should they be sent?
2. Motorized Division from Münster left for Hamburg at 1:00 p.m.
3. Ten fire fighting units have left Berlin for Hamburg.

C.D. Warden Grimm reports that about 20 vehicles are parked at Curio House without doing anything and refuse to be assigned despite fires in the vicinity. Air Force Captain receives orders to ascertain what kind of vehicles are involved and order assignment.

Two C.D. regiments from East Prussia in action. Take one hour's break as ordered by Local Party H.Q. No assignment is deemed worthwhile at other fire sites.

Log of Events for July 28, 1943

Air Raid Alarm No. 330

Wind: SSE, 6 meters per second. High Tide: 5:18 p.m.
Low Tide: 9:45 p.m.

Alarm sounded at 11:40 p.m., July 27, 1943

12:55 a.m. Marker bomb for City Park dropped at Ollsdorf.

1:03 a.m. Several flares observed in the vicinity of the city. Fifty planes at Neumünster, some to the south and some in the direction of Lübeck. Flak appears over the observation tower. Telephone connections with City Park are suddenly interrupted.

1:07 a.m. About 10 planes appear above Hamburg. Additional planes are reported over Lübeck and apparently are now heading for Hamburg. Rain of phosphorus reported in Hanfeld, Air Sector VIII. High explosive and firebombs at Woolen mill.

1:10 a.m. Telephone exchanges 22 and 23 are destroyed. Bombs at Mackensen and Hindenburg barracks.

1:13 a.m. Vicinity of Berliner Tor is saturated with high explosive bombs. Approach of planes continues. Fire Departments from Kamp and Preetz receive orders to report to pilot station at the city limits. One plane is shot down. New formations of planes are reported approaching Air Sector VIII, from the direction of Lübeck, and also from the south. The first of these planes have reached Hamburg. Conflagrations are reported all around the Main Fire Station. The roof of the main fire station has been torn off. High explosive bombs have been dropped for a period of 16 minutes.

1:21 a.m. Heavy bombing on the Group East sectors.

1:23 a.m. Two emergency fire units from Lübeck and four from Kiel arrived. One unit from Preetz and one from Sittensen were assigned to the Hamburg Fire Department.

1:27 a.m. Heavy attack on Wandsbek reported in progress. Army Supply Depot is on fire. The Grassbrook Gas Works burning on all sides. Heavy vibrations felt at the Command Post. Large fires reported all around Steindamm. Sector I requests the release of all reserve forces.

1.32 a.m. C.D. Motorized Division 32 approaching Hamburg; it is ordered by the Group West C.O. to proceed at once to Sectors VI and X.

1:35 a.m. High explosive bombs and firebombs have been dropping incessantly in the area from the Barmbeck RR Station to St. George.

1:36 a.m. More planes reported to be approaching from the north. Group Harbor area is hit hard by planes coming from the east; the area is without lights. Sector Building IV is on fire.

1:41 a.m. Sectors A & B receive three emergency units each from Group West.

1:45 a.m. Sector III itself in urgent need of additional forces; the Division cannot spare any personnel. Ditto for Sector VII.

1:57 a.m. Planes appear to be departing. Only one plane is reported to remain above Hamburg. About 150 planes are reported to be still near Stade.

2:02 a.m. Air raid shelter at Bürgersäle with about 300 persons received a direct hit.

2:04 a.m. Sector A cannot control fires with available forces, despite three units of reinforcements. One additional unit sent from Fire Station 8 to Fire Station 15. Pier 16 reported to be on fire. Motorcycle messenger on the way. H.Q. Wilhelmsburg reports Pier 77 on fire. Also, residential block at Neuhof is on fire.

2:05 a.m. Direct hit on Fire Station 16 reported. Capt. Dahling is severely wounded. Also Lt. Sorgenfrei. Besenbinder Hof reported to be surrounded by fires from all sides.

2:06 a.m. Personnel of Sector IV H.Q. are trapped in a cellar; they cannot get out and have asked for assistance. Sector VII sends three brigades to the Army Hospital in Wandsbek.

2:10 a.m. The Colonel leaves for the Group East Command Post.

2:23 a.m. Alarm Stage 3.

2:24 a.m. A few planes are reported to be above Wedel. Other city parts are free from enemy planes.

2:25 a.m. Fires are reported all along the way from Fire Station 2 to Fire Station 1. An enormous fire storm along with a tremendous amount of smoke is in progress in the area of Brooktor, Ripsoldtstrasse, Grosse Allee, and Hammerbrooktor. The roof of main fire station is supposedly still on fire. No more forces left to assign to fire sites anywhere.

2:30 a.m. Colonel telephones in that Sprinkenhof is on fire.

2:32 a.m. The attack apparently is still in progress; the Flak guns are still shooting.

2:35 a.m. Lt. Eckmann reports that, at Paulinenplatz, people are standing on the roofs completely surrounded by flames. He requests ladders; they are dispatched by Fire Station 3.

2:40 a.m. All Clear.

Approximately 500 planes have attacked Hamburg since midnight. They Colonel calls in: Enormous fire storm.

2:50 a.m. Lt. Westphal reports that the center of gravity of the attack was at Magdeburger Wharf, that the land connection to the Group Harbor sector is blocked, and requests that waterborne fire fighting forces be sent to that sector. The center of gravity of the attack in Wilhelmsburg apparently was at the Schlinck Oil Refinery, near the railroad station.

3:00 a.m. Dr. Schubert, in a trip from Berliner Tor reports that everything is on fire in the area. All along the way from Berliner Tor to Horst Wesselstrasse in Wandsbek, a sea of flames exists. The same picture pertains to the areas of Steinhauerdamm, Angerstrasse, Lübeckerstrasse, Wandsbeker Stieg, Neubertstrasse, Alfredstrasse, Fievergrathstrasse, Landwehr, Wandsbeker Chaussee, Conventstrasse, Wagnerstrasse, and Erlbeker Weg.

3:15 a.m. Capt. Lüdermann was supposed to give up three emergency units to Wandsbek; however, he assigned them already in his own sector (II) and it is no longer possible to pull them out.

3:20 a.m. One squad of the Fire Department and one squad of C.D. Motorized Division sent from City Hall to the Main Fire Station.

3:23 a.m. In Police Precinct 44 the Main RR station is on fire. No fire fighting forces available.

3:25 a.m. The Police President orders all Industrial Civil Defense and Expanded Self-Protection establishments, who request additional fire fighting forces, to obtain them from the Concentration Camp Neuengamme.

3:40 a.m. Army takes over the assignment of all fire fighting units in Sectors IV, V, VI and X.

3:55 a.m. Suggestion is made to the Police President to request fire fighting units from cities that are further away. Six units from Dresden are promised.

4:10 a.m. Conflagrations occurring all over Wandsbek. In Sector VI buildings on Wagnerstrasse, Marschnerstrasse, Beethovenstrasse, Bachstrasse, Hamburger Strasse, Winterhuder Weg, and Volksdorferstrasse are all completely on fire.

4:25 a.m. Numerous telephone connections are still working to the Eastern Group H.Q., between Group East and Group Harbor with the Fire Department H.Q. and the Main Fire Station.

4:35 a.m. Col. Zaps sent a messenger to report that the Wandsbek Hospital is in flames.

4:45 a.m. Four emergency units from Kiel are assigned to fight the fires at the Main RR Station, Sprinkenhof and Adolf Hitlerplatz.

4:50 a.m. The City Hall is in flames; also Police Department building.

5:50 a.m. Message from Fire Station 5 to Local C.D.H.Q. reports that the Bunker Bausstrasse is supposedly on fire on the inside and that they urgently need some tank wagons. C.D.H.Q. denies the request and orders them to reconnoiter first to find out the actual situation.

6:05 a.m. Löffler reports back that the planking underneath the bunker allegedly is on fire. One tank wagon is sent to Bunker Baustrasse via Bürgerweide.

6:37 a.m. Lt. Borselmann reports the arrival of four emergency fire units from Bremen who are assigned to fight fires at Lombard Bridge.

6:42 a.m. Col. Westphal leaves to report on the general situation to the Police President.

6:45 a.m. Group East reports that Captain Dähling at Fire Station 16 is severely wounded and that his driver is lightly wounded. Fire Station 16 was badly damaged by a high explosive bomb. Lt. Schwarzenberger is on his way to Fire Station 6, where according to rumors, members of the Fire Department are supposedly trapped under debris. Four emergency units from Kiel and one company from Preetz arrive.

6:50 a.m. Capt. Lüdermann reports that 1-1/2 brigades and 1 company of the Motorized Division 28 from Essen have arrived and that 2 hose trucks are on the way.

6:58 a.m. Col. Zetscher from Bremen with eight emergency units drives to Lombard Bridge at the corner of Alsterdamm.

7:30 a.m. Col. Zetscher spoke with Lt. Hatje Group West; he had sent one company to a Bunker which could not get through. He sent them back to try again.

8:10 a.m. Two fire companies of Division 32 from Hanover were assigned to the Group East area at fires located between Lerchenfeld and Wartenau.

10:40 a.m. One unit from Bremerhaven, which had been assigned to Bollhörner Brückenstrasse was re-assigned to Heinskamp.

10:35 a.m. Lt. Werhe notifies the Colonel that no special events are now taking place.

8:45 a.m. Dr. Schubert calls and reports that, in the area of Hammerlandstrasse, Süderstrasse, and Heidenkampsweg, hundreds of dead and living persons are lying on the streets and that trucks are urgently needed to take them away. Trucks are ordered to the area by Major Richert.

9:00 a.m. Col Westphal goes to East H.Q.

9:01 a.m. Major Elbel reports that the subway tunnel near RR station is in service, that all the people have been rescued from Leder Schüler and that everyone has been rescued from the shelter of the Refrigeration Company Jenisch.

9:05 a.m. Brigade 23 is assigned to Hapag Building, Alsterdamm. Major Elbel asks if four tank wagons can be obtained from the Steinhauer Corporation Yard.

9:35 a.m. Major Elbel reports that all four tank wagons were burned. Major Elbel is ordered to go to Rugkoppel (the Command Post).

9:50 a.m. One tank wagon is assigned to Inspector Beutin at Fire Station 1 to supply water for Spinkenhof.

10:30 a.m. A Harbor unit from Bremen is sent to Heinskamp from Billhorner Brückenstrasse.

11:30 a.m. Situation report received from Col. Schmidt of Fire Division B as follows:

Rhenania Ossag, barrel manufacturing department building is on fire as well as the office building, the fats building, the bone grinding department building, the oil mixing building, and the refinery building. Twenty-five hoses are being used to fight the fires. Sergeants Krüger and Sturr received head, face, and leg injuries; they were taken to Harbor Hospital.

Schenck & Co., machine hose, copra shed, soap shed, and warehouse are on fire. Nine C hoses are being used to fight the fire.

Lagerstrasse, an oil fire is in progress. Because of the quick spread of the fire and the weak defense forces available, one engine had to be abandoned; it was destroyed by the fire.

Other Sites: Piers 34 and 35 were on fire; but fires have been extinguished. The fires at Veddel have destroyed more than 50% of the houses. The fire station was hit by two stick firebombs. These were extinguished by the

Self-Protection forces. The SS "Westfalen" belonging to the waterborne Brigade 26 was hit by a high explosive bomb and has sunk. The fire truck of the Decontamination Brigade 24 was destroyed by a high explosive bomb. Hansa Mill was completely on fire but the fire was put out. The messages sent to Col. Westphal by the Group at 1:14 a. m. did not reach Division B until 9.30 a. m.

Log of Events, July 29/30, 1943

333rd Air Alarm Wind: SSE Low Tide: 12:02 midnight

11:58 p.m. Air alarm.

Midnight Head of enemy plane formations near Helgoland. Approaching on wide front.

12:15 a.m. Planes reported over Wilster; planes reported approaching Freiburg.

12:17 a.m. New formation reported approaching toward Holstein; head of formation near Heide.

12:25 a.m. Several planes reported near Sasel, Trittau, Zollenspieker; all heading towards Hamburg.

12:30 a.m. High explosive bombs landing on City Park over a 4 to 5 km radius.

12:40 a.m. Two additional formations of planes reported near Emden, heading to the East. One new formation reported near Wilhelmshaven, easterly course; a large number of glow bombs reported from Fuhlsbüttel, Barmbek, etc.; and several heavy detonations reported to be near Party Headquarters.

12:49 a.m. Division VIII reports a fire at Phönix Tannenbaum.

12:50 a.m. Division VIII reports high explosive bombs at Phönix, phosphorus bombs at Thorl on Dampfschiffsweg.

12:54 a.m. Group Harbor reports large fires at Reiherstieg, and heavy high explosive and firebombing at Blohm & Voss and Stülcken. Situation Report: Stülcken Wharf on fire. Bombs distributed over the whole wharf area of Blohm & Voss.

12:59 a.m. New enemy formation reported over North Sea, Winterhude, Lockstedt. Fire and high explosive bombs landing at Barmbeck. Mine Bomb in Martinestrasse.

1:00 a.m. So far, four planes have been shot down by nightfighters.

1:02 a.m. Inquiry at radio center regarding the situation at Main Fire Station. Dorn reports that bombs are raining down and the Fire Station has probably been hit.

1:04 a.m. Radio Central reports that approximately 50 high explosive bombs have landed; that firebombs are raining down and that high explosive bombs are again coming down; everything in the vicinity is on fire.

1:05 a.m. A "bomb tree" reported above City Hall; telephone communications with Division B and C are interrupted.

1:07 a.m. New formations reported approaching Meldorf.

1:09 a.m. Group Harbor reports that telephone communications between Group Harbor and the Sectors have ceased.

1:10 a.m. Inquiry on situation sent to Dr. Unglaube.

1:14 a.m. Several enemy aircraft reported at Wedel and Hemmohr.

1:18 a.m. Call to Col. Schwarzenberger reporting a heavy rain of bombs on the Group East territory.

1:18 a.m. Sector II reports that it put forces into action; Sprinkenhof is on fire.

1:19 a.m. Call to Col. Westphal reporting a plane shot down in Finkenwärder. Sector A reports that units went into action at warehouse district and Brook. Communications with other Sectors are cut off.

1:20 a.m. Roof of Propaganda House is on fire. The fire is being contained by Self-Protection forces, they will call back within five minutes, if their forces are not sufficient to handle the situation.

1:21 a.m. Dorotheenstrasse 176 on fire.

1:27 a.m. One Company under Major Dabbat sent to Fire Division A to fight the fire at Warehouse "B."

1:29 a.m. New enemy planes at the mouth of the Elbe.

1:30 a.m. On inquiry about Main Fire Station Dr. Unglaube replies: No fire yet. High explosive bombs falling nearby without interruption.

1:30 a.m. Large fires reported at Alsterdorferstrasse. Fire at Propaganda House has been extinguished. Fires at Reiherstieg since the beginning of the attack. High explosive bombs and firebombs fall onto the harbor district, Stülcken Wharf is on fire.

1:35 a.m. The fire at Sprinkenhof has been extinguished. Magener reports that the underground shelter was hit in such a way that men cannot get out. (Wonders if there is panic.) The major damage areas are: (1) Mühlenkamp to the Alster, (2) Alsterdamm Strasse and neighboring streets, (3) Eppendorfer Landstrasse and neighboring streets, and (4) Fuhlsbüttel.

1:51 a.m. Received reports as follows: Sector I - all forces in action, using additional forces from Sector VII; Sector II - the same; Sector III - no news; Sector VII - have no further units available; and Sector IX - no reports received.

1:52 a.m. Only one unit from Group East sent to Alsterdorferstrasse in Sector I.

1:53 a.m. Volunteer Fire Departments Alarm Stage 3 is requested. Two emergency units sent from Sector VIII to Fire Station 12. Sector II in action at Isestrasse and Mittelweg.

1:58 a.m. Numerous conflagrations reported in the 17th Precinct. Brigades are being put into action.

1:20 a.m. Message from C.O.: During fire fighting operations, the rescue of human lives has top priority.

1:55 a.m. From Air Sector VIII four enemy planes shot down: No. 1 at Ehestorf; No. 2 at Fischbeck; No. 3 at Elsdorf; and, No. 4 at Wilstedt. No damages worth mentioning.

2:01 a.m. Two more emergency units requested. Warehouse district in flames.

2:03 a.m. Lt. Schliemann goes on reconnaissance.

2:05 a.m. Message from Dr. Schubert: Katharinenstrasse on fire. Also some fires in the Old City.

2:08 a.m. Message from warning control room in Hamburg. Hamburg is free from enemy planes.

2:10 a.m. One C.D. Motorized Division sent to Isestrasse and one to the Warehouse District.

2:11 a.m. This attack was stronger than the first one at 12:30 a.m. About 600 enemy planes estimated.

2:12 a.m. Stock exchange on fire.

2:15 a.m. Message from Third Flak Division: No fighting engagements at present; Hamburg free of enemy planes.

2:15 a.m. Stock exchange, Jungfernstieg, Neuerwall, Ortlepp reported on fire.

2:15 a.m. Lt. Westphal calls in to report: Messengers from Sector B say that Schliemann & Vogt and Bollenweber are on fire. One F.D. unit was notified to go to Warehouse District, it left about five minutes ago.

2:10 a.m. Message: All forces in damage area of Radio Station, Grindelhof, Grindelallee, and Bronstrasse report to Fire Station 4. Request one more F.D. unit.

2:20 a.m. Karstadt Department Store (Mönckebergstrasse) in flames.

2:23 a.m. Headquarters urgently requests fire fighting units.

2:25 a.m. Lt. Colonel Schliemann calls up: He is at the Main Fire Station, will return.

2:28 a.m. Lt. Luther calls up: Air Sector III needs five fire units. All buildings on Mönckebergstrasse on fire. Three fires in General Knochenhauerstrasse. Also fires in buildings on Oberstrasse, Hagedornstrasse, and Harvestehuderweg. Urgently need fire fighting reinforcements.

2:33 a.m. Major Riedel reports to Main Fire Station: He is requested to report to Lt. Colonel Westphal.

2:37 a.m. Lt. Böttger, Sector C, has no damage to report and will furnish two fire units. Has sent two fire units to area of Mönckebergstrasse.

2:41 a.m. General Knochenhauerstrasse and vicinity needs one F.D. unit.

2:43 a.m. GEG Besenbinderhof on fire. Party Headquarters is in danger of burning.

2:46 a.m. Communications with Group East are no longer possible.

2:46 a.m. Dr. Unglaube is to set out in the direction of Sector I and take emergency forces with him.

2:47 a.m. Report from Tower Watch of Air Sector VII: Constant explosions in the direction of Geesthacht; presumably the munitions factory is on fire.

2:48 a.m. A messenger reports to Lt. Col. Dr. Schubert: Conflagration at Rathausmarkt and the Labor Department Building at Besenbinderhof is on fire. Send all available fighting forces, at least a brigade, immediately.

2:56 a.m. Two units sent to Fire Station 4 area at the east shore of Binnenalster between Lombards Bridge and Adolf Hitler Platz.

3:00 a.m. Major Grabbe calls: Numerous fires in Lange Reihe on Danzigerstrasse. Group West requests one unit for Winterhuder Marktplatz, one for Fire Station 4, one for Fire Station 3. (Taken care of.) Fire Division II requests an additional unit for area St. John's Church, Grindel, Knochenhauerstrasse. Unit to report to Fire Station 4.

3:02 a.m. Lt. Col. Schliemann calls: He is at Fire Station 10. Orders one fire squad and one brigade assigned to Fire Station 4, St. John's Church, Grindel, Knochenhauerstrasse, unless it has already been arranged for. Rescue station at Armgartstrasse 24 is on fire and cannot be saved; Sector V should pull out forces somewhere else and assign to this site. (Four C.D. Motorized Divisions are on the way: Nos. 12, 19, 28, and 32.)

3:02 a.m. Two units are on their way to Knochenhauerstrasse and Mittelweg. Sector VI on fire: Large cinema Mundsburg, Oberaltenallee, Winterhuderweg down to the Alster. Fire area from Hartwikusstrasse, along Hofweg, Langenzug, Osterbeckstrasse, Dorotheenstrasse, large factory buildings

of Nagel & Kemp, Bambus & Co., Wasmut & Co., all around Fire Station 10. The area is so extended that it cannot be ascertained if these are single fires or not. So far no strong fire storm is in evidence. In order to effectively fight the fires in this area, the whole front would have to be realigned and 20 to 30 units would be required for this. One unit from Leipzig has arrived at Fire Station 10 so far. Only fires in single houses are being fought. All along the Alster, forces can act for Fire Station 10. From Sierichstrasse and Hofweg it is relatively easy to advance to the outside. A renewed request for forces from Fire Station IV for the area St. John's Church, Grindel, Knochenhauerstrasse is received. (Even more important is St. George's Church.)

3:10 a.m. One additional F.D. unit needed for the warehouse district. Four motorized units and eight Fire Companies from Rothenburg/Sittensen are to arrive in 1/2 hour. They are to be sent to residential districts, i.e., to Barmbeck (Mittelweg and vicinity are comparatively small). People to be rescued from shelters in the area. Send them in the direction of Aussenalster, Sierichstrasse, and Hofweg, and to penetrate to the streets in the eastern part of Barmbeck. They are to fight the fires according to the individual situation, not division-wide, but by brigade. Send Division Lead Squad ahead with staff and send pilots along.

3:16 a.m. Situation in Sector B has crystallized. Additional forces are no longer needed.

3:21 a.m. Group Harbor inquires if all waterborne brigades are in action. Forces from Lohmühlen Hospital, because the two burning pavilions cannot be saved, are assigned to the Hospital on Bülaustrasse.

3:25 a.m. Message from Fire Station 1: School of homeless persons at Armgartstrasse 24 cannot be preserved.

3:28 a.m. Situation report for Group West: Many large single fires in the territory.

3:35 a.m. Decontamination brigade chief 14/VII reports in by telephone. Colonel orders him to go immediately to damage area with Group Barmbeck to rescue people and to recover dead bodies.

3:36 a.m. Two more F.D. units for Hoheluftchaussee and surrounding streets requested.

3:37 a.m. Sergeant Peters reports that he is being assigned to recover bodies. (Connection interrupted.) Emergency Brigade 14/VII at Berliner Tor. No motorized fire engines available. Have to rescue people in direction of Barmbeck. Encourage people, so they won't let themselves be burned. Get them going in the direction of the Alster, but stop them there.

3:40 a.m. Three fire vehicles are at Baumwall. One squad directed to report to Lt. Col. Dr. Schubert at Adolf Hitlerplatz. The others directed to work on their own with 3 hoses.

3:43 a.m. Hindenburg Barracks are on fire. Fires on Hindenburgstrasse and Sierichstrasse are spreading. Need fire fighting forces urgently.

3:50 a.m. Alsterdorfer Prison is reported on fire.

3:50 a.m. SOS Refirgeration Co. on Rosenstrasse is on fire. Need fire fighting forces urgently. (But none are available.) Small fires at Blohm & Voss in Sector C. Stülcken reportedly has their fire under control. Dr. Unglaube reports that no conflagration is noticeable in Winterhude and the Alsterdorfer Institution and Prison is on fire.

4:00 a.m. Dr. Schubert reports in to Headquarters: No forces are available. Also, in case Police forces are at the disposal of the Command Post at Adolf Hitlerplatz, assign them there. Master Meyer at Fire Station 4 reports large damage area around St. John's Church and General Knochenhauerstrasse. Fire fighting forces from Neumünster are dispatched to the area. Large residential buildings are on fire to the north of Fire Station Barmbeck and Jarrestrasse. At the Freight Station in City Park, many elevated cars are on fire. Heidenreich & Harbeck, and Harburger Rubber Works, north of Harburger RR Station are on fire. Can't get through this area in direction of Ohlsdorf because of the strong shower of sparks and great heat. But no marked fire storm. Great heat in Fuhlsbüttelerstrasse.

4:20 a.m. Mundsburg seems to be engulfed by fire. It has to be ascertained if the route from the Overseas Home in the direction

of Deichtormarkt, along the Alster, is still passable. It is no longer passable along Mundsburg because of the debris and great heat. Assign one fire brigade or 2 squads to Klöppenhaus. The messenger should decide if two squads are sufficient. Large fires between Winterhuder Marktplatz and Langenzugkanal reported; residential houses are on fire. (Assign necessary forces after need is ascertained.)

4:20 a.m. Telephone message from Major Richert: Request 20 additional units. (Reply: Can't be done. Try from County Weser/Ems.)

4:30 a.m. Firm Heidenreich and Harbeck urgently needs fire fighting assistance, otherwise will be total loss. Fire Station X has no more forces at its disposal.

4:32 a.m. Message from Captain Lebius: Finkenau Maternity Hospital, 200 women trapped. Fire Station X has dispatched a heavy fire brigade and one lieutenant with automobile at 4:15 a.m. Also two tank trucks from the C. D. Motorized Division were assigned to the site.

5:05 a.m. Neumünster forces did not report to the fire sites as ordered. Instead, they reported to Adolf Hitlerplatz and wanted orders. They are directed to go to Fire Station IV for duty at St. John's Church, all of them. So far, St. John's Church and vicinity has five fire squads and one emergency unit (from its own sector). So far no other forces available. (Check on the Neumünster incident. They reported to Lt. Col. Dr. Schubert at Adolf Hitlerplatz Command Post.)

5:25 a.m. Two Fire Trucks 25 are available at German Wharf Finkenwärder. One Fire Truck 25 is available at Blohm & Voss, and two vehicles are available at Howaldt Works. These are put into action at Eppendorfer Landstrasse, Breitenfelder Strasse and vicinity. Four motorized companies that arrive at Veddel and have been assigned to fight small fires should set out at once for Police Precinct 18 on Hoheluftchaussee. Send motorcycle messengers ahead to scout the way which can be taken by the companies. Send one motorcycle messenger to alert the Wharves and one to notify the companies. Messengers are to report how many forces have become available.

5.34 a.m. Message from Dr. Unglaube: Conflagration taking place in

area between Barmbeckerstrasse, Maria Luisenstrasse, Possmoorweg, Sierichstrasse to Körnerstrstrasse, Schillerstrasse, Mozartstrasse, Bachstrasse, and Barmbeckerstrasse. A large fire is developing in the area to the east of Fire Station 10.

5:35 a.m. Precincts 44, 45 (St. George) need urgent help. Four squads of the volunteer fire department at Fire Station 14 set out for St. George.

5:40 a.m. Report from Group East: Conflagration taking place in Wandsbek fr . Holstenstrasse to Nordmarkstrasse. Need two fire units with two hose trucks. Direct them to report to Air Sector V.

5:[illegible] a.m. Message from Major Zettner: Four fire units from Fire Department Bremen are on the Auto Bahn at Harburger Chaussee. They should be assigned to fight the conflagration in Wandsbek, Holstenstrasse to Nordmarkstrasse.

5:55 a.m. Two units should proceed in direction of Sierichstrasse, and from there go to the damaged area in Group East. Two brigades are pulled out from Wandsbek and are assigned to fight a fire in the Post Office Hühnerposten. Two fire brigades and 1 hose truck are needed at Hühnerposten.

5:56 a.m. Orders for Hühnerposten are withdrawn. All units from Bremen are to be sent back to Barmbek.

5:57 a.m. Message from Air Sector V: Four fire units have set out for Sierichstrasse to fight conflagration as directed; two Motorized Divisions have been sent to Wandsbek.

6:00 a.m. Telephone call from Maj, Zettner to Lt. Col. Dr. Schubert: All available units are to report to Major Zettner at the Command Post at Adolf Hitlerplatz.

6:02 a.m. Message from Col. Hartmann: Motorized Companies which were assigned to fight small fires, have set out on their own initiative, reportedly toward Eppendorferlandstrasse. All forces that become available are to be assigned to the area of Eppendorferlandstrasse and Hoheluftchaussee in order to fight the fires there.

6:04 a. m. Message from Capt. Jacobs: (Situation Report About Air Sector I): There are many single fires in Sector I, scattered over the whole area. The major damage area in the Sector is at Winterhuder Marktplatz.

6:13 a. m. Forces are Efeuweg and Jarrestrasse assigned in addition to own Sector units include: parts of Motorized Division 29 (presumably one unit). Fire Station 11 was hit by fire sticks but was saved from destruction. Further spread of fire not likely. If possible, send reinforcements. No forces available.

6:15 a. m. Message from Lüdemann: Send hose trucks immediately to Mittelweg, St. John's Church. Water storage basins are empty and must lay a hose line to the Alster. No hoses are available on site at present. Will send forces as soon as available. Buildings on Milchstrasse on fire; fire might spread to State Government Building. Nearby water storage basin cannot be used, since duds are located all around it. (Pay no attention to duds. These will not explode for a week. The water storage basin must be utilized. It is imperative that the State Government Building be preserved.)

6:15 a. m. Orders to Lüdemann: The water storage basin endangered by duds must be utilized in case there is no other water available and the State Government Building is threatened. Fire engine should be positioned as safe as possible, using all available pump lines.

6:17 a. m. Message from Col. Schliemann: The chances of saving the Köpperhaus are good. Many Motorized Division units are standing along Hartwicusstrasse. In the meantime, four fire units from Bremen have set out for Barmbeck. One hose truck unit is on the way to the State Government Building; it has been directed to report to Capt. Lüdemann.

6:17 a. m. The fire in Barmbeck has not grown to the proportions feared at first.

6:20 a. m. Damage area of the Second Emergency Units includes Grindelallee to Rentzelstrasse where the buildings are completely on fire. The fire is spreading to neighboring streets. The Volunteer Fire Unit Pinneberg arrived at the scene.

6:23 a.m. Message from Dr. Schubert: Steeple of St. Catharine's Church collapsed at 5:40. Need one unit at Dovenfleth which should come by way of Hüxter and Fischmarkt. Also, one hose truck needed at Adolf Hitlerplatz.

6:23 a.m. Message from Brunswig: Theater is no longer in danger of complete destruction; fire fighting is being continued. Need one hose truck at Lange Reihe to supply water from the Alster.

6:25 a.m. Eleven phosphorus bombs reported to be lying on the Student's Athletic Field between HSV-Platz and Museum. Need forces to remove them.

6:26 a.m. About 100 persons are trapped by surrounding fires in a pipe bunker at Rönnhaidstrasse and Mesterkamp. Assistance requested immediately. In addition to fire fighting forces with a truck, first aid personnel, and two casualty transport squads are assigned the task of rescuing the people. The Motorized Division 21 is assigned to the fire site Winterhuder Marktplatz, Efeuweg. One Division is not sufficient. Report that, unless more assistance is forthcoming, the fire here will spread. Phosphorus and firebombs had landed on the area. (When the above damage site was reported, there was no question of the fire spreading. Rather, the impression was conveyed that no F. D. forces at all were needed.)

6:35 a.m. An additional 15 Fire Units were assigned to fight the conflagration in the area of Group East. Of these, seven went to Air Sector VI and eight to Air Sector V.

6:40 a.m. Four fire units from Kiel with two hose trucks were dispatched to St. John's Church. Other units, as available, are to be sent to the Pipe Bunker Shelter on Rönnhaidstrasse. It was suggested that the other remaining forces be divided. One unit to go at once to the Bunker on Rönnhaidstrasse, one unit to go to Sector I, and one unit to go to Eppendorf. Volunteer Fire Department Pinneberg was ordered to supply water for Alte Rabenstrasse, from Grundallee to Grindelallee. Two additional units were sent to St. John's Church.

6:55 a.m. Message from General Meyer: Where are forces assigned? Fire Department personnel should only be assigned to save human lives and definitely not to preserve personal belongings.

7:25 a.m. Civil Defense Police Unit from Brunsbüttelkoog directed to go to Fischmarkt by way of Mühren and to report to Lt. Böttcher at the collection point.

7:30 a.m. Captain Henne is directed to take over the unit that is stationed at the Esplanade; the unit should be told to take orders from him.

7:35 a.m. The Fire Boat "Master OHM" is directed to fight those fires that it can reach with its 200 meters of hose material. The fire unit from Wesermünde is directed to go to Fire Station 12 and report for duty.

7:40 a.m. Main Fire Station I reports that the two F. D. units which are expected to arrive in the near future, are expected to report to the Station as soon as the head of the column arrives. Report is to be made from the station so that further orders can be issued. Suggest that a motorcycle messenger be sent ahead via Heidenkampsweg and, as soon as he sights the units approaching, report back to us.

7:45 a.m. A Lt. Colonel from Bremen reports at the Main Fire Station with two units. A house block at Essen and Uferstrasse in Barmbeck is on fire. One unit sent to that site with directions to take a pilot from the Main Fire Station if there were no people in the unit who know Hamburg well and to show them the streets to go over on the map. The second unit is directed to remain at the Main Fire Station for the time, at the disposal of the High Command for future direction.

7:50 a.m. A 250-man army unit lead by Count von Bassewitz was directed to set out in the direction of the area, Adolfstrasse/Hofweg/Barmbeck.

8:05 a.m. Lt. Col. Schliemann reports that he has gained the impression that this attack is not as extensive as was the last one. He wants to push through from Fire Station 10 to Wandsbeck and find out if it is possible to pull off forces from Essenstrasse and Uferstrasse to fight the fires in Wandsbek from the east or if they should be attacked from the west.

8:07 a.m. The Lt. with two units--Bremen West and Bremen Land--should be on stand-by at Main Fire Station.

8:20 a.m. Lt. Dümmer reports that two Emergency Fire Units, located at Sector VIII, Harburg, are available for re-assignment. Directed them to set out for Fire Station 12, Hamburg, and report there for new assignment.

8:25 a.m. The fire fighting forces of St. Anne's requested fuel; they were told that fuel must be obtained from the Main Fire Station, since there are no vehicles available for its transport.

8:32 a.m. Fire fighting squad 13b/IV at Fire Station I was ordered to go to Klöpperhaus and report to the fire fighting forces assigned there. The Bremen unit remained at Main Fire Station on stand-by.

8:30 a.m. Stock exchange requests help. Two fire fighting squads from Wedel/Borsfleth and two squads from Dabbert were assigned to that site.

8:35 a.m. One Fire Truck 15 from Finkenwärder and one Fire Truck 25 from German Wharf with crews are available for re-assignment. One was immediately dispatched to Adolf Hitler Platz to report to the Command Post there. One Fire Truck Finkenwärder was directed to report to the building across the street from the Bieberhaus, where an army depot is located.

8:45 a.m. Major Schütze at the Main Fire Station reports that the three units from Lübeck which were previously assigned in Wandsbek are now assigned as follows: 1 unit to the Maternity Hospital Finkenau; 1 unit to the North German Yeast Processing Co., and 1 unit to R. St. 100. He also reports that he has been on duty since 6:30 a.m. He is directed to go into the Barmbeck area in order to take stock of the situation.

8:50 a.m. Three squads of Volunteer Fire Department Pinneberg, at Fire Station 4, are ordered to go to Rappolthaus immediately.

8:56 a.m. Units of Volunteer Fire Department Pinneberg, remaining at Fire Station 4, to be assigned to site at corner of Wiesendamm and Thielowgasse.

9:00 a.m. Dr. Unglaube reports that he is unable to get through to Barmbecker Marktplatz with the two units, because the

Market Place is surrounded by flames. The fire units already assigned there had to leave their vehicles and the vehicles burned. The two fire fighting forces are now assigned to fire sites at Uferstrasse/Lerchenfeld/ Richardstrasse and are trying to advance to the north. Dr. Unglaube plans to drive with two motorcycle messengers in the direction of Osterbeckstrasse in order to find out if additional forces are required there. He was directed to go only into those streets from which it is possible to return and make a report.

9:10 a.m. Lt. Hatje of Group West reports: In Jarrestadt a catastrophe is developing. All available forces in the territory are assigned there. Send additional forces immediately, in the direction Goldbeck/Osterbeck Canal. Message call to Fire Station: First squad from Bremen is to set out immediately in the direction of Goldbeck/Osterbeck Canal in Jarrestadt, south of Wiesendamm. Water is to be taken from the Goldbeck-Osterbeck Canal between Wiesendamm and Jarresstrasse. The route to be taken is via Adolfstrasse, and then Sierichstrasse to Langenkamp, then turn to the right on Langenkamp. Squad to go into action on its own initiative in area of Goldbeck and Osterbeck Canal to Jarresstrasse at Nagel and Kemp. Use their own judgment in selecting fire sites. Time is of the essence! Must move out immediately!

9:15 a.m. Report by Lt. Col Schliemann that the danger to the 100 people trapped in the bunker is not as bad as feared. He himself was in the bunker. The Volunteer Fire Departments from Himmelpforten, Mittelkirchen, Borstel, and Stade reported in. They are directed to set out immediately for the Main Fire Station and report there. A Fire Engine 8 from Finkenwärder is directed to go to Fire Station I and report there.

9:20 a.m. Motorized Company St. Anne's is ordered to set out immediately by way of Main Railroad Station, Steindamm, Lohmühlenstrasse, Schwanewik, and Adolfstrasse to go to Langenkamp. They are to take water from Goldbeck and Osterbeck Canals and to go into action on their own initiative. Time is of the essence!

9:45 a.m. Report by Lt. Col Jürgensen, that he traveled from Fire Station 10 across Osterbeckstrasse to the Schauburg Movie

House at Dehnhaide that the fires in the area have all burned out so that fire fighting forces are no longer required, and that the army is already busy with clean-up operations in the area. Lt. Col. Jürgensen is to return from Barmbeck RR Station to here by way of Wandsbeck.

9:55 a.m. Volunteer Fire Department units Rendsburg arrived at Fire Station 4. They are directed to go into action immediately at the Stock Exchange fire site. Available water sources are to be shown to them on the map.

10:15 a.m. Lt. Col. Schliemann reports: All fire fighting in Schauburg, Barmbeck, Dehnhaide, has stopped because all fires have completely burned themselves out. There is no point in sending new forces. Clean-up operations have been started by the Army. No dead bodies have been found although several Air Raid Shelters in the vicinity were inspected. There was plenty of good air everywhere and the people's morale is high. At Osterbeck Canal, in the vicinity of Maria Louisenstrasse, a large number of fire vehicles are reportedly parked.

10:25 a.m. Fire fighting forces at Osterbeck Canal were sent to the Stock Exchange. (If forces are idle anywhere, they are to be sent to Fire Station 10 or to Main Fire Station.)

10:30 a.m. Fifteen trucks from the Main Fire Station assigned to the task of recovering bodies at Süderstrasse and Rothenburgsort (Traunspark).

10:40 a.m. One unit of the Volunteer Fire Department from Eutin sent from Fire Station 12 to telephone exchange, Averhoffstrasse. (It must be saved because important communication lines go through there.) Vehicles are to be made available for evacuating women.

10:45 a.m. Emergency Squad Töpfer directed to go to Fire Station 2 from the SS "Buchheister" immediately and to wait there for further orders.

10:50 a.m. Dr. Unglaube reports: The assignment of 10 to 12 units to penetrate west, south, and east from Schleidenplatz a well worthwhile effort.

10:55 a. m. The 2 F companies and 2 I companies of C. D. Motorized Division 42 are to be assigned to fire sites at Schleidenplatz.

10:58 a. m. New orders for the unit assigned to the Stock Exchange: Go to Schleidenplatz, Barmbeck, immediately. Report to the leader of Motorized Division 42 and request assignment. In case Schleidenplatz cannot be reached, break through to the west, south, and east on your own initiative.

Hamburg Fire Department
Message Log, July 30, 1943

Air Alarm: 11:58 p.m., July 29, 1943

Attack Starts: 12:35 a.m., July 30, 1943

Firebombs fell on Altona, Fuhlsbüttel, Barmbeck, Jarrestadt, and Harburg. High explosive bombs fell at Stülcken Wharf, and on Eppendorf Martinstrasse, and Lohstedt. Large fires at Reihestieg in Harburg.

July 30, 1943

1:00 a.m. from Group Harbor: Assign fire fighting forces immediately to burning piers in harbor.

1:00 a.m. from Group West: Numerous conflagrations at 17th Precinct. Fire Brigades are being assigned.

1:05 a.m. from Group East: Many high explosive bombs and firebombs fell at the Main Fire Station (Berlinertor).

1:11 a.m. from Fire Division III: Spranin[illegible]hof in flames, assign fire fighting forces.

1:20 a.m. to Police President from BdO: During fire fighting operations, rescue of persons is to be given priority. (Signed) von Bassewitz

1:20 a.m. from Col. Westphal, Group Harbor: Forces assigned to Warehouse District and Brook. From other sectors, no news at all. Communications interrupted.

1:25 a.m. from Police President (to Groups and Divisions): Pass on message from von Bassewitz (see above).

1:27 a.m. from Group East and Harbor: City Hall on fire; large fires around Inner Alster. Pier B in Harbor on fire. Major damage area is in region of Mühlenkamp to the Alster; two additional emergency units requested. One unit from Leipzig assigned to Group East.

2:01 a.m. from Group Harbor. Division A reports that two additional emergency units are needed. Warehouse district is on fire.

2:10 a.m. from Fire Division II: All forces of Fire Division II assigned in area of Radio Station, Grindelhof, Grindelallee, and Bornstrasse. Request one emergency unit to report to Fire Station 4.

2:10 a.m. from Group Harbor: Telephone lines down. Available forces are not sufficient. Need two additional units. Fire sites are as follows: (1) Wharf Warehouse B, (2) Sandtor Wharf, Block O, (3) Neuer Wandrahm, Block P, (4) Brooktor 8, Administration Building Hapag, (5) St. Anne Shore, Hansen & Stuht, Blocks Q and R, (6) Holland Brook, Block U, (7) Block E on Brook, (8) Dalmannstrasse, Harbor construction.

2:20 a.m. from outside source: Karstadt Department Store in Mönckebergstrasse on fire.

2:20 a.m. from Fire Division A to All Units: General Command requests fire fighting forces urgently. Three fires in General Knochenhauerstrasse. Large fires in Hagedornstrasse, Harvestehuderstrasse, and Oberstrasse. Very urgent!!

2:20 a.m. from Group Harbor: Rescue station Harburg on fire. No more forces left. Urgent!

2:28 a.m. from Sector III: Karstadt Department Store and large office buildings on fire. Need five emergency fire units.

2:35 a.m. to Fire Division A: No further fire fighting forces available at this time. As soon as some become available, will make them available.

2:36 a.m. from Fire Division III: All forces assigned. Need five additional units to fight fires on Mönckebergstrasse and Rödingsmarkt.

2:40 a.m. from Group Harbor: Fire Division C has no assignments, has 2 emergency units available; Fire Division VIII has no assignments, has 1 emergency unit available.

2:43 a.m. from outside source: G.E.G., Besenbinderhof on fire. County Administration Building in danger.

2:55 a.m. from Captain Brunswig: Constant explosions in the direction of Rothenburgsort.

3:30 a.m. from Lt. Jersemann, Fire Division I: Damage area of Hoheluft Chaussee, Breitenfelderstrasse, Essendorfer, and Landstrasse have widespread conflagrations. Request two emergency fire units. Report to Police Precinct 18 at the corner of Hoheluft Chaussee and Eppendorferweg.

3:40 a.m. from Group West: SOS - Refrigeration Company at Rosenstrasse on fire. Help urgently needed.

3:43 a.m. from 15th Precinct: Hindenburg Barracks are on fire. Fires in Hindenburgstrasse and at Reichstrasse are continuing to spread. Need additional fire fighting forces urgently.

3:55 a.m. from Group West: Gotenhof on fire. Need help urgently.

4:02 a.m. from Army Headquarters: General Wahle asks for one Fire Truck 25 to go to Krohnskamp, where a gasoline depot is in danger. Also to assign one fire fighting group and portable fire engine each to Hindenburg Barracks, Hanseaten Barracks, and the City Hall.

4:17 a.m. radio message from Group East: Large sea of flames in Sector. Try to save quarters of Group East.

4:30 a.m. from Group East: Heidenreich & Harbeck on fire, defense plant. At the Maternity Clinic Finkenau, 200 women are trapped; have assigned 2 portable fire engines and one LFS to rescue the women.

4:35 a.m. from Ruttemann, Division III: One unit from Berlin reports a block fire at Beckerstrasse and Schmiedestrasse. Asks for immediate assignment of two emergency units.

4:45 a.m. from Hotje, Group West: Hopfenmarkt and vicinity on fire. Urgently need help.

4:45 a.m. from Group West: Large conflagration taking place between City Hall and Main RR Station, especially at Harbor, Grimm, Deichstrasse, Bleichertwiete, and Dovenfleth. The Karstadt Department Store is on fire. Also, a large conflagration down to Rödingsmarkt. Large fires in the stockyards at Sternstrasse. Large conflagrations in Police Precincts 24, 25, and 26. Center of catastrophe appears to include St. John's Church, Magdalenstrasse, the Federal Building, Grindelhof, Bundesstrasse Barracks, Jungfrauenthal, and Papendamm. Need fire fighting assistance desperately.

4:46 a.m. to Col. Westphal: Assign volunteer fire units to command post Adolf Hitlerplatz.

4:54 a.m. from Division VI: Conflagrations in Police Precincts 60, 65, and 66. No news from Precincts 61 and 67. Need two more units for Division VI. One Fire Emergency Brigade and one other unit from Lübeck already assigned there.

4:55 a.m. from Dr. Schubert at Adolf Hitlerplatz: Situation is becoming more critical all the time.

4:55 a.m. from Sector VIII: Emergency Unit VIII, which is assigned to Division A at Wharf Q, is ordered to break off fire fighting operations and go immediately to Adolf Hitlerplatz.

5:55 a.m. from Master Meier, Fire Department: Buildings along Grindelallee, from Rentzelstrasse to the connecting railway, are completely on fire. The fires are spreading to the neighboring streets. One emergency unit of the Volunteer Fire Department Pinneberg arrived.

6:05 a.m. from Lt. Col. Schubert: St. Catharine Church Tower collapsed at 5:40. The fires spread from Brandstwiete to Fischmarket. Need one emergency unit at Fischmarket-Dovenfleth and one hose truck at Adolf Hitlerplatz.

6:08 a.m. from Captain Brunswig: Fire at Hotel Reichshof and fires in neighboring buildings mostly under control. Theater not in danger any longer. Fire fighting continues in the direction of Langereihe. Need one hose truck to obtain water from the Alster.

6:25 a.m. from Captain Lüdemann: Captain Lüdemann has taken over the fire area of Mittelweg, Alsterchaussee, Bottgerstrasse, and the Alster. There are eight separate fires in the area and eight squads are already assigned. Urgently need three hose trucks and three heavy fire brigades. Command Post is situated on Mittelweg near St. John's Church.

6:25 a.m. from Group West: Sector I reports separate fires in the areas of Winterhuder Market Place, Efeuweb, and Jarrestadt. Motorized Division 29 is assigned to these fires, but it is not sufficient. If no additional help can be secured, these fires will turn into conflagrations and none of the multistory apartment houses will be salvaged. Fire Station 11 was

hit by phosphorus and firebombs; the fire fighting operations successfully put out the fires. The Sector physician checked the first aid stations at Moorweide and City Park. So far these stations have not had any injured patients.

5:42 a.m. from Col. Schliemann: If possible, send two hose trucks on the double to Mittelweg near St. John's Church.

6:55 a.m. from Captain Brunswig: Several buildings can still be saved at Mühlendamm, amongst them sections of the Old Folks Home. One emergency unit is needed. Forces of the Motorized Division 28 have been assigned to the Command Post at Mundsburger Bridge.

7:20 a.m. to Captain Brunswig: Volunteer Fire Department Pinneberg assigned to Mühlendamm fire site.

7:20 a.m. from Captain Oben, Fire Station II: Waterborne Fire Squad 26b/C available for duty. Anchored at Baumwall.

7:26 a.m. from BdO: Whole block is on fire from Essenstrasse to Uferstrasse.

7:40 a.m. from Fire Station I: Please have ten pilots with motorcycles stand by at the Main Fire Station.

7:45 a.m. from Captain Brunswig: Send the emergency unit from Bremen to the Main Fire Station.

8:15 a.m. from Fire Division III: Stock Exchange Fire Company asks for assistance. Two fire brigades are approaching Riesendamm, namely 2 fire squads from Wedel Borsfleth and two fire squads from Dabbert.

8:40 a.m. from Fire Division A to Fire Station 12: Forces in fire sector Brandstwiete are sufficient. Fire there sealed off and contained. Message received at 9:20 a.m.

8:40 a.m. from Col. Schubert: Request one fire brigade for Rappoldhaus. Fire fighting forces in area Adolf Hitlerplatz suffer from great hunger and thirst. Order Major von Pitoll to station the water tank wagon at Adolf Hitlerplatz.

9:00 a.m. from Fire Division VIII (Leiboldt): Emergency Brigades 14/VIII and 24/VIII return from recovering bodies.

9:03 a.m. from Captain Jacobs, Fire Division II: Catastrophe developing in the Jarrestadt. Assign all available forces there. Request immediate reinforcements. Should go into action on their own, without special assignment. Water to be taken from both the Goldbeck and the Osterbeck Canals. Group West has no more forces at their disposal.

9:20 a.m. to Motorized Company, St. Anne: Leave at once for Main RR Station, Steindamm, Lohmühlenstrasse, Schwanenwikstrasse, Adolfstrasse and Langenkamp. Water to be taken from Goldbeck and Wiesbeck Canals. Go into action on your own. Time is of the essence.

9:45 a.m. from Lt. Col. Eckmann: One wing of the Stock Exchange is on fire.

9:45 a.m. from Fire Station I: Volunteer Fire Department German Wharf has arrived at Fire Station I.

10:15 a.m. from Lt. of F. D. Böttcher: The conflagration in the fire area bounded by Mühren, Brandstwiete, Bergstrasse, has been contained. No more danger for St. Peter's Church. In a short time we will have forces available for reassignment.

10:40 a.m. from Federal Representative: Fires till raging in houses on Krohnskamp, Dorotheenstrasse, Sierichstrasse, Andreastrasse, and at City Hall. (Note: According to Sergeant Müller, Group West, Unit 1/I, has been assigned to the above area.)

10:45 a.m. from Fire Division II: The telephone exchange at Averhoffstrasse is on fire. Assign two fire squads of the volunteer fire department.

11:28 a.m. from Lt. Col. Unglaube: Trip from Fuhlsbüttelerstrasse northward to Banntücher Bahnhof leads across nothing but fields of debris. The area is very difficult to pass through. Banntücher Market Place can be reached from the north. To the east there are only heaps of debris. It is useless to assign fire fighting forces in this area.

12:05 noon from Fire Unit 1/VII (at St. Anne's) to Lt. Col. Schubert at Command Post, Adolf Hitlerplatz: Contained conflagration in the Brandstwiete with the help of other forces. Fire

fighting will be finished in about one hour. Command Post at St. Anne's No. 1. (Signed) Strauss, Distr. Lt.

12:30 noon — to Fire Station 12 (by motorcycle messenger): The units assembled at Fire Station 12 are to be put at the disposal of Sectors VI, X, and V to transport bombed-out people to the collection point at City Park. All forces will be under the command of Fire Chief. (Signed) Von Heimburg.

1:40 p.m. — to Group East: Requested one C. D. Motorized Division for Group East. Please inform the Department where they are supposed to report. (Local Headquarters, Tel. 220). If possible, pull out your own forces.

2:00 p.m. — to Lt. Col. Kaltenstroth, Group Harbor: Dispatch two emergency units from Air Sector VIII to Fire Station 12. Report on arrival. (Signed) Dr. Zaps

2:00 p.m. — to Major Löffler, Air Sector V: Forces arriving at Fire Station are free to relieve presently assigned forces. Please arrange assignments locally. (Signed) Dr. Zaps

2:05 p.m. — from Lt. Col. Westphal (to Group Harbor): Motorized Division 42 assigned to Schleidenplatz. Volunteer Fire Unit (90 men) assigned to Dovenfleth, Drandstwiete, Gröningerstrasse, Fish Market; they are to report to Captain Spohn. Dismiss the two units working at Wilhelmshaven.

10:30 p.m. — from Adolf Hitler Barracks, Bundesstrasse 45 (to C. D. Command, City Hall): A small fire at Bundesstrasse 15 and 43 got out of hand and threatens to turn into a conflagration.

Main Fire Station Hamburg, August 18, 1943

Personal Experience Report of Events on 7/27-28/43

To clarify the events as I observed them during the second attack night at the Main Fire Station--and I do not wish to push myself into the foreground because like thousands of others, I only did my duty--I herewith submit the following report.

After the air alarm was sounded, Dr. Unglaube and I first sat down on the bench across from the Main Fire Station in order to get some fresh air. The attack from the direction of Wandsbek and Barmbeck started suddenly with lightning speed, and we quickly went to the cellar. The crews of Precinct 91, some personnel from Fire Station 1, and the Berlin staff were present as usual in the radio room in the cellar. During the air attack when explosions could be clearly recognized in the vicinity, inspection rounds were made continuously by Masters Stankowski and Piper, Sergeant Dorn and other, as well as myself, to determine whether the fire station had been hit by bombs or was on fire. I understand that Masters Stankowski and Piper even went into the attics searching for fires. Some time went by in this manner.

In the meantime, several radio reports were received from Harbor; however, we could not respond to their requests at that time. Suddenly (I do not know the exact time), someone called: "Captain, people over here are in danger and are calling for help!" I called: "Quick, men, we have to go there," and several men followed me. I recognized the voices of Sergeants Dorn, Henne and Nieling. Dorn took a woman from a Party member who had carried her to the fire station. The front houses at Berlinertor and the terrace at Heitmannspark were searched during these rescue actions, and as far as could be ascertained in the confusion, about nine persons were rescued. We ran along the terrace several times although large stones and pieces of debris were raining down all around us. We heard wild screams which, we found out later, came from horses. After I had made sure that people in this area were no longer in danger, I ran along the street up to the Schneemilch Restaurant. I heard that similar rescue actions were in progress in Minenstrasse and Wismarerstrasse. At that time, it was absolutely impossible to go along either Kolbergstrasse or Hohenstrasse because both were a sea of flames; I therefore returned to the radio room to catch my breath.

I kept watch on the fires all around the Main Fire Station, and very shortly danger of the fire spreading to the Fire Station was imminent because a hurricanelike fire storm had developed. By that time, there was no more

flak-shooting, and the hail of bombs had stopped falling. The fire storm increased rapidly to such an intensity that we were thrown against the building walls. On one of my inspection rounds I met several soldiers at an advertising pillar behind the Administration Building. Master Piper who accompanied me approached the soldiers with the words: "What are you doing here?" and urged them to come with us. They apparently did not want to come along so I went up to them and gave them direct orders--appealing to their sense of duty as German soldiers--to come along with us. This worked, and I assigned them to duty in the Administration Building, along with Master Greve and Office Worked Wiele. (On the following morning, upon their request, I issued certificates to these soldiers confirming their activities.)

After this incident, I went across Berlinertor to the Radio Center and called Lt. Schliemann at Headquarters, because in my opinion at the time the Main Fire Station was in very grave danger of burning down. When I told Lt. Schliemann, "I urgently need help!" I received the answer, "You must help yourself." Because other officers were not present, I went back to the Fire Station, accompanied by Sergeant Dorn and scouted the possibilities for possible evacuation of women. In my opinion, this was not possible by way of Wallstrasse, Berlinertor, or Lübeckertor. The heat had become so tremendous by now that a truck at Westphalenweg ignited spontaneously; flames shot up all over the lower streetcar tracks starting with the wooden covering over the cables. I went with Sergeant Dorn to the Lämmer Market at Torweg; however, I found the gates locked. In the foyer of the High School we discovered a small fire which Master Dorn extinguished. Because I knew that the gates to the Lämmer Market could easily be broken open with an axe, I took no further action here and went instead to the Navy School which had begun to burn. When I entered the Navy School Building, crowds of sailors streamed towards me on their way out, and I called to them to turn around and go back in, but nobody listened to me. I then asked for an officer, and a subaltern from the third floor approached. Upon my question why the building was being evacuated, he replied that there was no use trying to hold the building, as there was no water available. I told him that I thought such behavior was disgusting and added: "The rats are leaving the sinking ship!" I also promised to report this shocking behavior at the proper time. Because the Navy personnel would not stay and no other fire fighting forces were available, I left the building and went back to the Main Fire Station by way of Berlinertor.

Master Tychsen arrived with two vehicles (I am not sure of the exact time); his other vehicles had been lost. I ordered him to put the fire engines to work immediately to seal the side of the fire station toward the living quarters of Captain Brunswig from the surrounding fires. This was carried

out with the help of several men from the Fire Station. Because the water pressure was not high enough to be effective, I told Tychsen to put the second engine at an intermediate switching position. This was done by him and Master Schrock. But when the water pressure was found to be still not high enough, I sent Sergeant Dorn down to check the engine. After a while the water pressure improved, although occasional interruptions in the supply occurred.

At about this time, Colonel Dr. Zaps came around the corner from the direction of Strohhaus. He was somewhat perturbed because in his opinion the men were not fighting the fire at "Eisbein" with sufficient vigor. In my opinion, however, the action was no longer necessary because the roofs had caught fire from the rear as well as from the front and we did not have the wherewithal for fighting the fires effectively. After showing the endangered area on the north side of the station to the Colonel, I gave orders to keep the corner at Brunswig/Geese also under water spray. In the meantime, Sergeant Wilhelm Meyer from Fire Station I connected the engine to the water storage basin and started laying a C hose to the Elbel apartment building. As soon as Tychsen's engine was connected to the water basin, I gave Tychsen orders to lay hose lines from the Meyer engine to the north side of the fire station. I helped lay these lines personnally, assisted by Master Tychsen, some C. D. Policemen and Party Leader Thomsen, and had the hoses manned by Masters Möller, Ohlmeyer and others whose names I cannot now remember. The effect of this action was so good that a Navy petty officer asked me to recover some belongings from the building. I answered him: "First you run away and then you ask us to recover your belongings for you. Get them yourself; I have no more men to spare."

Since I assumed that in the inner rooms of shelters no. 93 and 94, everything possible had been done by the occupants, I no longer bothered about these rooms. During this whole action, I did not see Dr. Unglaube at all and Captain Brunswig only once as he was photographing the burning houses at Eisbein. I supposed that they had other tasks to fulfill elsewhere. When I believed the worst danger to the Main Fire Station to have passed, I went to the women in the cellar and I remember remarking to Mrs. Schliemann: "I think we made it!"

Afterwards I arranged for transportation of the wounded to hospitals, which is documented by my repeated calls made to Headquarters. During this operation, I had not other officer at my side and it was a very difficult task, especially in view of the fact that new people kept streaming in--allegedly on police orders--and I could not help them. As a matter of fact, I had to be very firm a couple of times, and had to take some abuse as a consequence. By and by, transportation squads started arriving and the

seriously wounded were taken away. People who were able to walk were sent to Wallstrassen Bridge, because I had found out in the meantime that the Army had arranged mass transportation from there to points outside the city.

In the third attack night, before the alarm, I developed cardiac spasms and vomiting. I had not slept at all during the last few days and had eaten hardly anything. When I felt a little better, I helped Master Mewes fight the fire in the beams of the Eggerstedt apartment. Sergeant Dorn was already there when we arrived and had thrown a number of buckets of water on the fire. We continued throwing buckets of water in order to dampen the fire, but without success. Master Mewes then went to get a pump engine. In the meantime, Captain Brunswig and Lt. Griese arrived and, with the words: "Captain Mack, this is no place for you any longer!" sent me downstairs.

(Signed) Mack, District Captain of FPP

Main Fire Station Hamburg, August 10, 1943

Report on the Reconnaissance Trip During the Air Attack of July 28, 1943

Shortly after the bombs started falling I was directed to take part in a reconnaissance drive with Colonel Dr. Zaps into the area east of the Main Fire Station.

When we departed, all buildings in the vicinity of the Main Fire Station were already on fire. A fire storm had developed with winds so strong that they scarcely permitted one to remain upright on the street. The heat and smoke made breathing extremely difficult. The air was thick with flying sparks and the storm winds whipped large amounts of these burning particles through the air. The motorcycle messengers following our automobile had great difficulties in keeping up with us.

Along the streets Steinhauerdamm, Lübeckerstrasse, Richardstrasse, Blumenau, Auenstrasse, Eilbecktal about every 10th to 20th house was on fire either on the roof or on the top floor. Along the wider streets, the distance between fires was usually about 200 to 300 meters. It was not till we reached the more densely built up area south of Volksdorferstrasse in the vicinity of Wendenmuthstrasse that the fires engulfed whole blocks of houses. In this area, a fire storm was raging with a strong shower of sparks. We found some units of the Fire Department at work fighting the fires.

Single houses were on fire at irregular intervals along Zollstrasse, Ahrensburgerstrasse, and Jenfelderstrasse. At the Army Supply Depot in Wandsbek only two large sheds were on fire and the situation was such that the permanent buildings could be held by the available fire fighting forces. Along Horst Wesselstrasse, Rennbahnstrasse, and Jüthornstrasse we again found irregularly spaced fires in single houses and buildings. In this area, the Self-Protection forces had brought a fire engine to the water basin. The Colonel personally acquainted himself with the fire situation and directed fire fighting operations until it seemed probable that the remaining undamaged buildings were in no further danger of catching fire. On the trip back to the Main Fire Station, especially in the vicinity of the Karstadt Building, we found about ten buildings which were burning in all floors. We stopped the fire fighting units that had just arrived from Lübeck and the Colonel assigned them to various strategic fire sites. In the vicinity of Hammersteindamm, Wandsbeckerchaussee, and Ritterstrasse, it could be observed that what had been single fires in the upper stories when we passed here before had become conflagrations which engulfed whole neighborhoods. An enormous fire storm had developed and the

streets were blocked by debris from the collapsing house fronts. We had to detour by way of Alfredstrasse, Bürgerweide, etc. Our car was stopped repeatedly by Party functionaries who had gathered large groups of people from the cellars of burning and partially collapsed houses despite the tremendous fire storm, the thick smoke and the unbearable heat. Because we had gained an overall view of the situation through our reconnaissance, Colonal Zaps could give instructions for the best evacuation routes. In this way, hundreds of lives were saved. At this point, no injured persons or dead bodies were seen lying in the streets. During our drive we constantly dispatched motorcycle messengers to transmit the information we had gathered back to local headquarters.

When we arrived at the Main Fire Station, the building was found to be in imminent danger of burning down. I was given orders to take over the protection of the Station. We were successful, after many hours of fire fighting, in saving the building which served as the last refuge for thousands of refugees, and injured and burned citizens from the vicinity.

I gained the impression on my reconnaissance mission that the firebombs had not been dropped in such large numbers that conflagrations were by any means inevitable. Rather, I had the feeling that the protection of the houses by their tenants had either started too late or else had not been undertaken at all. The whole area had been hard hit by high explosive bombs, but we found hardly any civilians engaged in fire fighting. In my opinion, despite the failure of the municipal water supply, the small single fires could have been brought under control in most cases with the emergency water supply on hand in the buildings. Even by the time larger groups of houses were on fire, the spread of the conflagration could still have been prevented. Apparently, however, the morale of the people received serious blows by the rising fire storm, the smoke, the heat and the tremendous rain of sparks, and the population gave up because they felt that they were no match for the forces which had been unleashed.

(Signed) Unglaube, Lt. Col. of FPP

Main Fire Station Hamburg, August 10, 1943

Report About the Reconnaissance Mission Undertaken During the Air Attack of July 30, 1943

When the extremely heavy high explosive bombing attack that was concentrated on the area in the vicinity of the Main Fire Station was abating I received orders to make a reconnaissance trip in Sector I.

At that time it was no longer possible to get to the Alster by way of Lübecker Tor or by way of Wallstrasse and Sechslingspforte because of the debris and high explosive bomb craters in the streets. Also, the damage along Mühlendamm was great so that the street was barely passable. Because the driver was not up to the task, I myself took the wheel. On Mühlendamm and further on along Graumannsweg, Papenhuderstrasse, Winterhuder Marktplatz, Hudtwalkerstrasse, and at Eppendorfer Marktplatz, only single roof fires at irregular intervals up to 200 meters were observed. At the sites where the fires had grown, fire squads were active. As far as I could observe from my rapid drive through the area, I had the impression that on Borstelerchaussee, Alsterkrugchaussee, Langenhorner Chaussee that, aside from a few single roof fires, no damage had been sustained; none was seen in the defense plants. I reported my findings via telephone at Fire Station 11 to local Headquarters. I was given orders to reconnoiter the area Alsterdorf.

At the Alsterdorfer Institution I found one building completely burned out and ten other buildings with fires in roofs and top stories. After scouting the ground, I gave orders for the most effective deployment of the fire brigade present at the site which had already laid out a hose line to the Alster. I again reported to local Headquarters via telephone at Fire Station 11. I received further orders for reconnaissance in the area of Uhlenhorst and West Barnbeck. I found a conflagration developing in the area bounded by Possmoorweg, Dorotheenstrasse, Hofweg, Schenkendorfstrasse, Mozartstrasse, Bachstrasse, and Barmbeckerstrasse, as well as a second conflagration in the vicinity of the Uhlenhorster Canal. I was able to give a situation report with suggestions for assignments to local Headquarters via telephone at Fire Station 10.

During the third reconnaissance trip, my car broke down so that I was forced to stop at corner Körnerstrasse and Mühlenkamp. The west side of Mühlenkamp from Körnerstrasse to Langenkamp was in flames. The unbearable heat and enormous amount of flying sparks had caused the people living on the east side of the street to start abandoning their houses, even though none were on fire at the time. I therefore went from house to

house and impressed upon the air raid wardens and other Self-Protection Service personnel that the situation was by no means hopeless and urged them to take up the fight against the fires on all floors once again. The people went back to their posts with renewed confidence. Shortly afterwards I saw a fire break out in one of the roofs, but it was extinguished in a few minutes. All houses on the east side of the street were saved from destruction by fire.

When I returned to Local Headquarters I was given orders to assign the eight units of a Motorized Regiment which had arrived at Veddel; four units were assigned to duty at the Main Fire Station and the other four to fire sites in the vicinity of Am Markt in Barmbeck. The side streets were blocked by debris and on the way to the Main Fire Station the column could not avoid driving past some bomb craters and unexploded time bombs. I led the four units along the route which I had scouted earlier, namely through Mühlendamm to Hamburgerstrasse. Schürbeckerstrasse, however, was impassable because of the presence of very large bomb craters and debris. We chose a detour leading across Eilenau to Wagnerstrasse which also turned out to be difficult to traverse. We could get no further than Lerchenfeldstrasse. At the Command Post of Fire Sector VI, I found out that Hamburgerstrasse and Oberaltenallee were also impassable and that the returning motorcycle messengers had had to abandon their motorcycles. All telephone lines at Sector VI were down (even the Post Office cable). Assignment of the fire fighting forces could not be postponed any longer, and since it was impossible to turn around in Lerchenfeld, I led the units with almost unsurmountable difficulties through groups of trees between Schürbeckerstrasse and Hochbahn Immenhof back to Uferstrasse. At that point I gave orders to the units to push ahead from Uferstrasse in a northerly direction and pointed out to them that about 200 persons were trapped in a shelter on Finkenau and should be rescued with all speed.

When reporting back to Local Headquarters, I received further orders to scout in the vicinity south of Osterbeck Canal. While proceeding from the northwest towards Fire Station 10 by way of Barmbeckerstrasse, I found the latter so filled with smoke that I could not see more than three to five meters away. The heat was unbearable. The area of conflagration that I had reported earlier could not be saved despite the assignment of numerous fire fighting units. By this time it was impossible to report to Local Headquarters from Fire Station 10. I decided to push ahead to the east and found some of the streets practically impassable because of masses of debris. I had a flat tire in Weidestrasse and, amidst terrible heat and smoke, I was practically surrounded by collapsing buildings. I was finally able to get to Schleidenplatz. Further investigation showed that this square could be reached by fire fighting units from the north and that many houses on the surrounding streets toward the west, south and east, even

though they would be difficult to reach with vehicles, could be saved because only the roofs were on fire. I immediately dispatched motorcycle messengers to Local Headquarters with a situation report and suggestions for assignments. I then pushed on to the areas northeast and east of the Barmbeck Station and found fields of ruins everywhere. At the south end of Bramfelderstrasse and Am Markt, I found many of the fire fighting units putting up a desperate fight in a lost cause. I again dispatched a motorcycle messenger from here to Local Headquarters with a report. This completed my assignment.

My observations during and after the third major air attack could be summarized as follows:

1. The density of firebombs that was delivered was, in general, not too great. I observed rows of firebombs on Alsterkrugchaussee to the north of Fire Station 11 in which the in-row spacing interval was 5 to 6 meters, and was of phosphorus bombs at interval distances of 20 to 40 meters. Furthermore, it was apparent that all fires had started out as single fires and remained single fires for a long time, which, of course, could be attributed to effective fire fighting in the area.

2. In the conflagration areas, with a few exceptions, the fire storm and flying sparks had been much less severe than that which followed the second attack. I find myself at a loss to understand why the population gave up their houses almost without a struggle, as for instance in the vicinity of Schleidenplatz where, due to favorable wind conditions, it would have been easy to contain the fires.

3. The highest density of high explosive bombs fell in the area within a 1.5 km radius north, east, and south of the Main Fire Station. It appears that the enemy tried to prevent reinforcements from other parts of the city from reaching the Main Fire Station.

4. At no poim during my reconnaissance mission was it possible to reach Local Headquarters by telephone from any of the Police Command Posts. Except where telephone lines of the Fire Department were still operating; i.e., in the area Uhlenhorst-Barmbeck, the only way to transmit messages was by motorcycle messenger. This method of communication, without a doubt, resulted in considerable delays due to the long distances of travel involved.

After my return to the Main Fire Station I immediately took steps to reestablish the telephone connections of the Fire Department with Fire Stations 6, 8, 7, 12, and 13 which had been disrupted by high explosive bombs. The extensive cable damage north and south of the Hamburg Elbe

Bridge was repaired within a very short time by using all available forces and disregarding the unexploded duds and time bombs which made the work hazardous. By next evening, all telephone lines were again open for use.

(Signed) Unglaube, Lt. Col. of FPP

Master Sergeant Vietzen
Light Fire Brigade 21/I, Niendorf August 21, 1943

REPORT ABOUT DESTRUCTION OF HOUSE AT GOSSLERSTRASSE 30

Concurring Testimony of Several Eye Witnesses

During the night of July 24-25, 1943, about ten minutes after the sirens sounded and just after the shooting began, a phosphorus canister penetrated my living room located on the second floor and apparently went through to the store located below (drugstore). In any case, not only my apartment, but the store and even the staircase were in flames at once. My family was not at home. My neighbors on the same floor could not use the stairs any more and had to jump from the balcony. Two women, who lived on the third floor, had to be helped down with ropes from one balcony to another, which was accomplished by the Self-Protection forces from our house and from the neighboring house.

The Self-Protection forces also tried to put out the fire in the store. However, large flames leapt out of the broken store windows, fed in large measure by the flammable merchandise. One woman from the fourth floor could not be saved and burned to death.

The cellar too must have been in flames at once, because when the occupants of the neighboring shelter were forced by the heat to break down the wall, they were met by thick smoke. This happened very soon after the bombing began. The house, therefore, was hit by a canister shooting down at an angle and burned from the bottom up.

EXPERIENCE REPORT

Action at Oldesloerstrasse 17, 15 and 21, on July 25, 1943

I received an order from Brigade Leader Fischer to take charge of the rescue of the people trapped at Oldesloerstrasse 19. The task proved to be a very difficult one; however, we were ably assisted by local and foreign workers. The screaming of some children and the moaning of the wounded was very nerve-racking. All available implements from the vehicle were used. The litter did useful service.

While we were still in the midst of rescue operations, we received the message from a civilian that people were also trapped at No. 17. With H. J. Bauer, who especially distinguished himself and was tireless during this night, I rushed there and could not see anything but a heap of debris. Two men were supposed to be buried under the debris. After feverish effort, with assistance by tenants of the house, we succeeded in the rescue. Both men were injured, but in hopeful condition. I then went to the Police Precinct Schnelsen to arrange for transportation of the resuced persons; however, by the time we moved out no ambulance had arrived.

(Signed) Vietzen
Master Sergeant of C.D. Police

Master Sergeant Seelemeyer
Fire Brigade 21/I, Niendorf

August 21, 1943

Experience Report About the Actions on July 25, 1943

We of Squad B were in action at Eppendorferweg 155. It was Sunday morning, about 11 a. m. I was alone at the jet hose.

Suddenly Sergeant Kardel came running. He had been sent by his Squad Leader, Sergeant Gaertner. He called from far away: "Come quickly, next door a man has collapsed, apparently unconscious."

I turned off the jet hose at once and went to the fourth floor of the house next door, where Gaertner was all alone with the fire. The unconscious man was lying on the stair landing, and he had to be brought downstairs quickly. This proved to be extremely difficult since the stairs were already half burned through and had no banister left. Since I am partially paralyzed on my right side due to a war injury, I had to go on the outside. My eyes were swollen because I had lost my glasses. One wrong step and we would all have fallen into the void.

When we reached the undamaged ground floor, we turned the man over to the care of a tenant. Totally exhausted, but happy about our successful rescue, we went back to our posts.

(Signed) Otto Seelemeyer

Fire Department Unit 3/X Hamburg-Wellingsbuettel, October 29, 1943

To Fire Protection Police
Hanseatic City of Hamburg
Attention: Lt. Colonel Schliemann

The inquiry regarding the phenomenon observed by Kurlandt was only partially successful. The man who was supposed to have buried his clothing, could not be found despite inquiries from several residents in the vicinity of the fire site. One resident in Lübeckerstrasse confirmed, however, that this man had definitely been there and had told the witness and others that he received burns on his suit from particles falling from the air, and that he buried his suit jacket immediately.

A 65-year-old man named Fendt who lives at Friedhofsgitter near the site of the occurrence, claims to have seen a similar happening. Because his house has no air raid shelter, a shrapnel-proof dugout was erected in the open. During the attack, he repeatedly observed from there large red balls of fire in the air, which burst and drifted burning to the ground like rain.

Furthermore, I solicited inquiries from the Searchlight Battery which is stationed approximately 300 meters from the Hans Schlemm School and about 600 meters from the damage site. Men from this battery have also seen large glowing bodies in the air. These objects fall burning to the ground after a short time, exactly as described in the attached sketch of Master Sergeant Kreuseler. The Battery Commander, a non-com, was on duty with another battery in Gross Borstel during the attack. He, too, confirms the reports of his regular men that in the direction of Ohlsdorf-Kleinborstel glowing balls hovered in the air which suddenly burst and then rained burning down to the ground. The fireballs hovered at a height of about 300 to 500 meters.

Regarding the sketch by Master Sergeant Kreuseler, Kurlandt deviated somewhat in his description. He claims that the object was more umbrella-shaped and that parts broke off and fell burning to the ground in long ribbons.

I am attaching the fragments which were found. Some of them might be pieces of metal from a shot-down plane. The fragments tied with a red thread are in my opinion not part of an airplane. Unfortunately, the results of the inquiry are not very impressive, because almost three months have passed, all the fields in the vicinity has been harvested in the interval, and most of the fragments have been picked up by children.

(Signed) Tamm, Unit Commander

Note: Sent, together with samples, to the Police President.

Emergency Unit 2/B
Fire Station 12 Hamburg, August 23, 1943

RE: Experiences During the Fire Storm Occurring During the Major Air Attack on Hamburg (Reserve Sergeant Groth, HFB 23b/B)

During the night of July 27/28, 1943, I was in the cellar of the house at Hasselbrookstrasse 3, in Eilbeck. At about 1 o'clock, the house was hit by a phosphorus canister, which penetrated down to the second floor and set the house on fire. I ran upstairs through the store situated above the cellar and found that the full length of the Kiebitzstrasse and Hasselbrookstrasse were in flames on both sides of the street. The same was true of Conventstrasse. The cellar of the house at Hasselbrookstrasse 3 seemed unsafe to me. Therefore, after salvaging some children's clothes from the house for the Family Kreth, I ran back into the cellar and induced the people there to leave the shelter and go to the public bunker at Landwehr Railroad Station. It was then about 1:30 a.m. The Landwehr Bunker was overcrowded; even the entrances were all filled up to the street level, mostly with men. Because of the many fires which had spread quickly over the whole vicinity, a terrific heat had developed in the shelter so that I, with some of the men standing in the entrance, went outside in front of the bunker and stood there. In this way, we had occasion to observe the rising fire storm in detail.

Toward 2:00 a.m., the fire reached its zenith and the terrific heat had kindled a tremendous fire storm, which raged particularly strongly in the square in front of the Landwehr Railroad Station (where the streets Hasselbrookstrasse, Kiebitzstrasse, Angerstrasse and An der Landwehr come together). I was standing, together with several men I knew (Tailor Prinz, Landwehr 53; Peter Kaiser, Hasselbrookstrasse 7, Heinrich Polaender, Conventstrasse 38, and several others) in front of the bunker and could observe how real cyclones were forming and how bursts of fire rushed out of the burning houses and ignited other houses along their path. We also observed that people who tried to run through the fires along Freiligrathstrasse (across from Fire Station 5) were able to advance only with the greatest difficulty, because the fire storm was so strong. Many persons, particularly women, could only keep going when assisted by some strong, helpful men. At times, the fire storm was so strong that whole "bundles of fire" tore loose from the buildings and whirled through the air, and when this happened we were forced to seek shelter from the heat in the entrance of the bunker. The house right across the street from the bunker (a large, five-story corner house) was gutted completely within a very short time. The fire had spread so rapidly, that one woman and two firemen were trapped on the roof,

because they had not had time to escape via the staircase. These three persons were rescued the next morning from the outside with the help of ladders. The fire storm did not abate until most of the burning houses had collapsed. In my estimation it lasted approximately 2 and 1/2 hours or until about 5 a.m.

(Signed) Friedrich Groth
Reserve Sergeant of C.D. Police

Report of Reserve Fire Master Hagedorn About His Experiences During the Air Attacks

In the first night (July 24/25) several houses in Hirtenstrasse had begun to burn by early Sunday morning. These houses were still on fire on Monday morning, down to about the third floor. At about 5 a. m. on Monday, I tried to extinguish the fires by myself by carrying water in buckets from the cellar and throwing it on the ceilings. The tenants were all sitting on the street with their furniture and could not be persuaded to take part in the fire fighting work. Even the block warden refused to assist. The general concensus was: "The houses cannot be saved anyway." Because I could not do it all alone, I ran to the police station three times and called the Fire Department for help. Finally the Volunteer Fire Departments from Nettelnburg and Billwärder arrived and extinguished the fires. The night before these fires had been brought under control temporarily by out-of-town units and in my opinion, the Self-Protection forces should have prevented the flaring up and spread of these fires.

During the next attack (July 30) the first firebombs fell in my house (Hirtenstrasse 38) at about 12:55 p. m.; apparently some of these were phosphorus bombs. The roof and top story of the house caught on fire immediately. During every attack I tried to remain on the roof or in the attic in order to extinguish starting fires at once; this time, however, because of the steady stream of high explosive and firebombs, this was impossible. A new attack wave came every three or four minutes. The firebombs in some cases were only one or two meters apart. It was impossible to go to the roof and start extinguishing the fires.

When I ascended the cellar steps at about 1:15 a. m., high explosive bombs were still detonating in the immediate vicinity. The front door was hurled into the stairwell, and at the same time fire stick bombs fell into the front part of the entrance hall and a fire developed immediately at the entrance. The neighbor houses, Hirtenstrasse Nos. 40 and 42, and the house across the street, Hirtenstrasse 49, were reduced to ruins by high explosive bombs. Our own house, Hirtenstrasse 38, sustained damage only on its roof. The explosions caused us to be thrown from one side of the cellar to the other. Shortly afterwards, the firewall breakthrough in the cellar was opened from the neighboring house. The people from next door entered our shelter, bringing with them a lot of dust, heat and smoke. The emergency exit of our shelter was torn open by a high explosive bomb. We then opened the breakthrough to the house No. 36. The path through, a most difficult one, led through a boiler room. Burning wood parts began to fall down the light shaft and the cellar became full of smoke. It

was obviously impossible to advance any farther in that direction.

Our cellar, in the meantime, was being heated up from above, from behind, and from the side. It became clear to me that we would have to flee. I ordered all available covers, blankets and cloths to be soaked in water and to be used to cover the head and face. At about 1:30 a.m. my daughter and I were the first ones to run through the burning entrance into the street. I urged all the others to follow me. Outside a strong fire storm already existed along with heavy showers of sparks. The fire storm was blowing from the direction ENE and drove us toward the garden at Thörl. Dead people were lying in the street; I noticed that they had fallen face down to the ground.

In Hirtenstrasse all houses on both sides of the street were on fire. Also all the buildings along Hammerlandstrasse and all the villas in the park were aflame. We sought shelter under a tree in the park. After 1:40 a.m. the fire storm increased in intensity. Branches of trees were continuously being torn off. Trees were uprooted and thrown to the ground. The heat, as well as the flying sparks, was unbearable. We repeatedly soaked our covers and cloths in a small pond and covered mouth and eyes. My cap, which I had soaked thoroughly, became bone dry again within 10 minutes. We remained in the park until 7:30 a.m. and then we went eastward out of the fire area to my little truck garden.

Some time after we arrived at the park, another couple from our air raid shelter joined us. The other 38 persons from my house apparently did not dare to run through the fire at the entrance and they burned to death in the cellar. The fire entered the air raid shelter and burned all its wooden parts. The bodies of the occupants were completely charred.

Report of Dipl. Ing. Richter About the Air Attack of July 27/28, 1943

I was air raid warden of the house Hammerlandstrasse 31. The house was a four-story corner building which had three five- or six-room apartments on each floor. The cellar had been finished as an air raid shelter according to regulations. Unfortunately, it was only partially equipped with gas-tight doors and shrapnel-proof walls. The floor of the attic had been covered with a 12cm-thick layer of reinforced concrete after the roof had been destroyed by fire in 1942.

Right after the attack started, large high explosive bombs fell in the immediate vicinity of our house. This caused doors leading from the cellar to the street to be torn from their hinges, so that the smoke which developed later was able to enter the cellar unhindered. The lights went out shortly afterwards. The sixty occupants of our shelter remained calm in spite of the continuous detonations in the vicinity and the most frightening noise caused by the enormous air shock over-pressure.

Because the house swayed violently in short intervals from these explosions we decided it was too dangerous to try to get to the attic to extinguish any firebombs that might have hit the house. Through the open cellar doors we could observe large fires everywhere. After the bombs had stopped falling, several civil defense workers and I prepared to go to the attic. One man, assigned to civil defense fire duty, refused to accompany us.

While in the staircase we began to notice strong smoke and heavy wind. We tried to close the front door which had blown open; and, because of the strong wind pressure, it took two men to close it. When we checked the various apartments we saw that all window panes and even some of the window bars had been shattered. Also most of the inside doors were torn off their hinges. The drapes and blackout curtains were whipped outward. We first extinguished a fire started by sparks entering the skylight on the top floor. Also we were able to extinguish a small room fire quickly. By that time we were already suffering greatly from the smoke and heat. On the fourth floor a bedroom was in flames. The doorknob was so hot that it could only be opened with the forearm protected by a jacket. Upon opening the door, I was hit by such a blast of heat that I sustained burns on cheek and ear and my eyebrows were singed off. The fire source, a bed, was extinguished with the use of a water bucket. The smoke was then so thick that we had to retreat down two floors to get some fresh air.

We returned to the fourth floor equipped with gas masks. The masks proved such a hindrance, however, that we soon had to discard them. Instead, we tied a wet cloth in front of the nose and mouth. The fire, in

the meantime, had spread quite a bit through the house. To get into a room, we had to wait until the wind pressure abated for a moment so that we could open the door without getting burned. We tried to use a portable fire extinguisher from a cover position, without success, to extinguish the fires. The women who were supposed to be responsible for the water supply, could not be persuaded, even with repeated urgings, to leave the basement shelter. When the entrance door of the second floor apartment flew open with a bang and a cloud of black smoke entered that apartment, I decided to withdraw my fire crew, after about 30 minutes of fire fighting, especially in view of the fact that the first signs of smoke poisoning began to appear. When we returned downstairs we found that fires had been started (in curtains, carpets, beds) by flying sparks in rooms on other stories.

When reentering the shelter I saw that the number of occupants had increased to about 150 or 200 persons. Because our house did not catch fire till relatively late, people from various other houses had run to our shelter and all asked for water. Fortunately we had put in a large water supply.

I noticed that the people on the street were beginning to catch on fire so I held the occupants of my shelter in the cellar as long as I dared, reasoning that perhaps in the meantime the buildings all around us would burn out more completely and this would lessen the intensity of the fire storm and the flying sparks. However, after a while the smoke in our cellar became so thick that to remain longer could not be justified. I therefore ordered the occupants to start evacuating the cellar. However, the people standing in the exit into Hirtenstrasse did not dare to leave. I went through the wall breakthrough into the adjacent house and found that the latter was less smoke-filled. I therefore ordered the occupants of my shelter to follow me through the breakthrough. The people nearest the breakthrough, elderly men and women, hesitated and the people further back started pushing from behind. I remained standing in the breakthrough and pulled approximately 50 to 60 people into the house next door.

In the meantime, some courageous people had left the shelter through the Hirtenstrasse exit, and so the cellar gradually emptied out. When no one answered to my calls any longer, I too left the cellar. Because I had swallowed a lot of smoke and was becoming dizzy, it was no longer possible for me to make a search of the shelter.

When I entered the hallway of the neighboring house I found it full of people who still did not have the courage to make a run for the street. Because the entrance door of an apartment near me was already in flames, I forced my way to the front and pulled some men outside with me in the direction of the Ohlendorff Park. Then others started to follow us.

A fire storm prevailed in the park as well, accompanied by heavy showers of sparks, so that some of the trees had started to burn. Fortunately, however, a good sized pond was nearby. While a great many of the people were so exhausted that they sank down onto the grass, others made the rounds with wet cloths and swatted the sparks that fell on these peoples' clothing. The worst we had to endure during the hours that followed were the thirst and the burning of the eyes.

Shortly after we arrived at the park, we witnessed the collapse of the houses we had left. At about 7 a.m. a fire vehicle arrived in Horst Wesselstrasse and, from a hose, gave us water to drink and to rinse our eyes. During our stay in the park, we frequently heard the cries of dying persons who could not reach the park and subsequently burned to death in the streets. Around 9 a.m., we received orders to go to Hammer Park from where our evacuation was arranged.

As far as I have been able to ascertain to date, all the tenants of my house are safe.

(Signed) Richter, Dipl. Ing.
Schluisgrove 7
Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg

Commandant of the Fire Protection Police
Department 91 Hamburg, November 1, 1943

Experience Report of Mr. Schirmer, Residing at Hamburgerstrasse 95, Hamburg-Barmbeck, on Activities During the Air Attack in the Night of July 29-30:

I was alone in my house at Hamburgerstrasse 95 during the attack. At 12:15 after midnight I saw that the Hamburgerstrasse was brightly lit up and that the street was strewn with firebombs lying about 5 meters apart. Within fifteen minutes afterwards, the houses on the other side of the street were on fire. At about that same time, the howling of the fire storm could begin to be heard.

At 12:45, the houses at the corner of Richardstrasse were wholly on fire; ground floor, second floor, and attic. On their left, several houses along Hamburgerstrasse were also burning. In between these were houses in which no fire at all was observed. The flames from the burning houses reached clear to the middle of the street. The display windows of the Karstadt Department Store were also on fire.

At 1:05 a.m., I felt a strong tremor which caused me to slide along the floor in my air raid shelter. The tremor or air shock was caused by a high explosive bomb that had hit the Karstadt building and dropped all the way down to the shelter in the building. Right afterwards, the whole department store building was in flames.

At 1:10 a.m., I was on the stairs in my house when the Karstadt building was hit by a second high explosive bomb. At 1:20 a.m., when I was out in the street, about 30 people came toward me, including an injured member of the Police. These persons came from the shelter at Karstadt. At about this time, about 15 to 20 minutes after the first bomb had hit, part of the Karstadt building along Rönnhaidstrasse collapsed. I do not know if the collapse was caused by another high explosive bomb; if so, I did not hear it fall or explode.

At 1:40 a.m., these people went on their way. Soon after, a new group of people came out of the Karstadt building. These persons did not want to continue on, but wanted instead to remain in my shelter. At about that time I noticed that Hamburgerstrasse in the direction of Mundsburgstrasse was in complete darkness because of smoke and dust; visibility in all directions was very poor.

At 1:45 a.m., the front of the Karstadt building collapsed. Again I did not hear a new bomb hit. About ten minutes later on the way back to the

air raid shelter of the house at Hamburgerstrasse 99, I saw that the part of the Karstadt building along Desenissstrasse had collapsed. Through this collapse, the exit from the shelter under the Karstadt building was blocked, and no more people were able to escape from the cellar.

I returned to my house and noticed that the houses at Desenissstrasse 3 and 5, belonging to my block, were beginning to burn. I obtained several men from the house at Hamburgerstrasse 97 and went with them into the cellar of the house at No. 95. Altogether we were now about 35 persons. I then went up to the third floor of my house which was not on fire. I saw, however, that the houses located behind ours on Heitmannstrasse were burning.

At about 2:45 a.m., the house next to ours at No. 97, caught fire on the third floor and roof. These fires, however, could not be seen from the street. At 3:15 a.m., we decided to leave our house because the fires kept coming closer on both sides, so that we could not have stayed much longer. I carried the last remaining water down to the cellar. The clothes of all the people present were soaked and wet blankets or towels were wound around everyone's head. At 3:30 a.m. we left the house, which at that time was not on fire. We ran past the ruins of the Karstadt building to the Wagnerstrasse Station. It was very hot in the street and a strong shower of sparks was whirling toward us. The storm was approaching from Mundsburg along the Hamburgerstrasse.

We had a hard time moving against the fire storm winds. I was surprised at the size of the pieces of fiery wood which were carried along through the air. A terrific heat wave hit us as we passed the burning Toedt Clothing Store. Some of the people with us abandoned their suitcases and packets in order to save their lives. During the short trip to the Wagnerstrasse Station, which took approximately 6 to 7 minues, our soaking wet towels had become bone dry. At the Station it was considerably cooler and more bearable.

At about 4:30 a.m., I returned to my house at No. 95 Hamburgerstrasse. I found that the Toedt Clothing Store had burned out, but the heat escaping from it was still very intense. The ruins of the Karstadt building had burned out completely. The house at No. 95 was half gutted; the other half did not seem to be really on fire at the time. On the other hand, the houses at Nos. 97 and 99 were completely burned out, a process which had taken only about an hour and a quarter.

At about 7:30 a.m., a woman came to the Wagnerstrasse Station and asked for help to rescue her parents who were trapped in the Karstadt building bunker. By this time the fire storm was more or less over. I tried with

several other men to get into the Karstadt employee shelter at the north end of the building from Rönnhaidstrasse. The entrance doors on that side of the building were burning brightly. We went on to the exit door of the bunker and ran down the stairs. It was very hot on the stairs and the air was very bad, so that it was very difficult to breathe. At the bottom of the stairs, old men and women were lying every which way. They were moaning, completely apathetic, and most of them had sustained burns. With the greatest effort we persuaded some of them to ascend the stairs. Because this was too slow, we literally started beating the people up the stairs. We tried to rekindle their will to live by telling them that ambulances were waiting for them upstairs and would evacuate them. We got about 26 persons out of the shelter in this manner. I then went into the bunker itself which was extremely hot. I found out later on that coke stored there was on fire. I also noticed that the steel safely doors leading to the large shelter room were red hot. In the employee bunker we searched all the different rooms. I ran to the stairway to Desenissstrasse but found that I could not get out that way. I therefore returned to the bunker and left by the Ronnhaidstrasse exit.

At about 8:15 a.m., we were back at the Wagnerstrasse Station. At that time two trucks with prisoners appeared bringing us drinking water, and they evacuated the wounded.

Report by Erich Plümer, Formerly Residing at Hammerlandstrasse 37, Hamburg

When the alarm sounded in the night of July 27-28, 1943, thirty tenants of our house at Hammerlandstrasse 37 occupied our regulation air raid shelter. When the bombs started falling at 12:30, the attack was so concentrated in the immediate neighborhood that the house and cellar swayed continuously. After the bombardment had gone on for about half an hour, I decided to scout out the situation in our house. I found that the apartment on the ground floor was already on fire. This blaze was extinguished quickly, being caused by electrical failure. When I glanced out into Hammerlandstrasse, I saw that the houses across the street were on fire, as were some of the rear houses. Also the houses in Hirtenstrasse were burning. The fire storm by that time was already so intense that the cellar windows were shattered; we boarded them up temporarily with old doors and wooden planks, so that the belongings which the tenants had brought into the shelter would not catch fire.

I next went to my apartment on the third floor to see how things were. The heat was so terrible that all the windows had been shattered and the sparks and burning particles which were flying into the rooms ignited everything almost immediately. I did not find any evidence of firebombs or other munitions dropped by the enemy in the house. The fire storm had become so intense that a terrific howling and whistling could be heard in the cellar.

I did not, at that time, tell the shelter occupants about the situation in the rest of the house, but I did scout out possibilities for flight. Evacuation toward the rear in the direction of Hirtenstrasse was no longer feasible because the houses there were already pretty well burned out. To the front, the fire storm was so strong and the conflagration so enormous that I could not risk going out that way. I then opened the wall breakthroughs to the two adjacent houses and found that on the right side flight would not be possible because strong gases and smoke wafted toward us. Apparently that shelter was on fire. I could not make up my mind to flee to the left because I could not see the exit and had no idea how I would get everyone out.

At about 2 a.m., the back of our cellar started to burn and the air deteriorated rapidly. In the meantime, we had taken in fifteen additional shelterees from other houses along the Hammerlandstrasse, whose shelters were on fire. The clothing of these people had been singed when they crossed the street.

At 2:15 a.m. I decided to leave the house with my wife and children. There was a good supply of water in our shelter and I soaked woolen blankets and towels, wrapped them around my wife and children and took my little five-year-old boy under my arm. We then left the shelter. The other occupants tried to prevent us from leaving because they thought it was impossible to run through the streets. I forced my way through the crowded shelter, however, and reached the open air with my family. The terrific fire storm drove us at once toward Burgstrasse. It was completely impossible to escape the other way in the direction of Borstelmannsweg, as one could not advance against the storm. We let ourselves be carried along by the wind to Horst Wesselstrasse where we stood in the street for about an hour. Shortly after we left, our house collapsed. If we had waited only a few more minutes, we would not have gotten out alive. After our departure, several other occupants followed our example and since then I have ascertained the whereabouts of several of them.

After we had stood in Horst Wesselstrasse for about one hour, I tried to put my little boy down on a brick wall. A moment later his clothes were on fire.

A fire engine, which apparently had a flat tire, stopped close to Schauburg Hamm. It did not take two minutes for this vehicle to burst into flames, and it burned out in record time.

The Fire Department took excellent care of the families on the street. They kept bringing us water to keep blankets and towels soaked and issued drinking water in gasmask containers.

At about 6 a.m., my family and I left Hamburg in the direction of Billstedt.

Report of Dipl. Ing. Dehler, Hamburg Water Department, of His Experiences During the Air Attack of July 28, 1943, as Follows:

I was in my apartment in Reinbek and was informed by telephone that high explosive and firebombs had fallen on our storage depot. A short time later I tried to call the depot; however, I was not able to get through. I therefore decided to drive to the city immediately. I left my apartment at 1:25 a. m. and drove to Hamburg at very high speed.

Because of detours in Billstedt I arrived at Hornerlandstrasse at about 2 a. m. All houses on that street had fires in their upper stories. The people were streaming out of the buildings with their civil defense luggage and were being ordered by Party officials to go to the open field across the street. I got stuck in a bomb crater, but was able to extricate my car. I then proceeded by way of the viaduct under the freight station and arrived at Süderstrasse between 2:20 and 2:30 a. m.

The street was littered with debris and it was difficult to get through. I wanted to go to our storage depot in Süderstrasse, near Heidenkampsweg. There was a strong fire storm along Süderstrasse, blowing from a southerly direction. Some of the houses were burning all the way down to the ground floor, and flames leaped out of the entrances and window openings. Some houses only had fires in the top story, but almost every building had a fire in it somewhere. Here and there I saw dead bodies lying in the street.

At the corner of Ausschlägerweg and Süderstrasse I drove into a deep bomb crater and I could not get out. The heat was considerable. At first I remained in my automobile as thick showers of sparks were in process. Flying sparks entered my car through an open window and I had to put them out continuously, so I closed the window. This however soon made the car unbearably hot. The car windows and door had become jammed so I broke a window and climbed out. I first attempted to climb out of the bomb crater; however, the heat and the flying sparks were too strong and I did not succeed. I used the water which was standing in the crater to keep myself soaked. Debris from the houses collapsing all around kept falling or being blown into the crater; I flattened myself against the south wall of the crater so that the debris would sail above my head. Suddenly I heard moans and saw a boy who had crawled into the torn 900-mm sewer pipe to protect himself. He was stuck deep in the mud. I freed him with the help of my steel helmet. Several other persons either fell or crawled into the crater. Some fell onto pieces of exposed pipe ends and broke their skulls; others drowned in the water. From time to time I looked out of the crater and noticed that the street was becoming full of dead bodies.

I saw peoples' clothing burst into flame and the people would drop to the ground and remain down. The air was unbearably hot and I felt as if I would choke. Lips and windpipe were completely dehydrated. I was in a daze and breathing was difficult.

I remained in the crater for at least one hour. When the heat and wind had abated a little, I climbed out and went on foot in the direction of our storage yard. There were many dead bodies in the street, some of them completely charred, some of them naked. I noticed that a whole cluster of people had crouched for protection behind a telephone booth at the Süderstrasse Wharf. They were all dead. I was able to proceed against the storm only with the utmost difficulty. I first tried to reach a public bunker across the street from our depot. In front of the entrance I found many bodies of people who evidently could not get into the bunker. Therefore I abandoned the idea of trying to enter that bunker and went to our depot. The bunker in our storage depot was undamaged. At first I could not get in. Only when I started pounding on the door did the people inside notice me and let me in. I then spent some time in the bunker.

When it got lighter outside, I left the bunker. I can remember that in Süderstrasse near our bunker an automobile was parked with six persons in it. All six people were dead. After some time, Lt. Colonel Dr. Schubert drove by our storage depot in an automobile and I talked to him.

Civil Defense Police
Fire Fighting Unit 2/IX-Stellingen August 25, 1943

Report About the Assignments of Fire Fighting Unit 2/IX Stellingen During the Night of July 27/28, 1943

On July 28, 1943 at 2:05 a.m. the Fire Fighting Unit 2/IX received orders to proceed to Sector V, Ritterstrasse 126. Brigade 21/IX and Squad 24a/IX moved out immediately by way of Lombardsbrücke, An der Alster, Barcastrasse. A strong fire storm was already blowing from the direction of Graumannsweg (2:40 a.m.), so that these units had to turn and drive into Buchtstrasse. But it was not possible to go forward on Buchtstrasse either, so the units stopped and went to work fighting fires along the latter street as a start.

At the same time, Brigades 22/IX, 23/IX, Hose Truck 4, 5, and H&L 28, a fire truck, and a passenger automobile and two motorcycles were laying a long hose line along Langenfeldstrasse, Kielerstrasse, and Armbruststrasse. At about 3:00 a.m. these units arrived by way of Lombardsbrücke Main RR Station, Gr. Allee. At the end of Gr. Allee and Beim Strohhaus it was impossible to get through because of the conflagration. We therefore went by way of Lindenstrasse and Steindamm. At the lower end of Steindamm all houses were burning on both sides of the street over a distance of 100 meters or more. I tried to go past these houses because the street was still free of debris; I sent both motorcycles ahead as scouts.

After we had already passed the points of greatest heat, a large stone wall near the entrance to Lübeckertor collapsed and fell into the middle of the street. Both motorcycle messengers fell down and the complete unit came to a standstill. This was at about 3:30 a.m. To go on or even to turn back was unthinkable; and, because of the tremendous heat and the flames from the burning buildings, we had to leave our vehicles hurriedly. I, myself, with five other men ran on in the direction of Lübeckertor; the other men, about 35 in number, went in the direction of the railroad station Motorcycle messenger Böhckmann had suffered phosphorus burns on both hands as well as burns on neck and face. All the other crew members reached the open uninjured.

The further that the six of us proceeded in the direction of Lübeckertor the stronger the fire storm became. We tried to get through to the Alster by way of Sechslingpforte. However, this was impossible at the time because the fire storm wind was so strong that one could not remain standing upright. Suddenly the fire storm changed direction. First it had been blowing from Lübeckertor toward the Alster; next it started to come from

the Alster and to blow toward Lübeckertor. Then it turned into a whirling tornado. For about 1/2 hour I was lying trapped under an iron beam in front of the Lohmühle Hospital at Sechslingspforte. At 4:20 a.m. I was able to free myself and reach the Alster. Here I saw that the water was very rough, with waves up to a meter high.

I myself felt the effects of the fire storm for a total of one hour. However, since FB 21/IX was already halted in Barcastrasse at 2:30 because of it, the fire storm must have raged in that area for an hour and forty minutes. The protective goggles were very helpful. The lenses that were made of glass, however, did crack.

The following vehicles were completely burned: 3 Fire Trucks 25, 1 hose truck 4, 5, with trailer, 1 truck, 1 motorcycle. The following vehicles were damaged, but salvagable: 1 motorcycle, 1 passenger automobile, 1 Fire Truck 25. The wounded motorcycle messenger Böhckmann is on the road to recovery at the Reserve Hospital Marienburg.

(Signed) Lörner, Unit Commander
C. D. Police

Fire Division IV Hamburg, September 2, 1943

Re: Experiences During the Air Attacks on Hamburg

During the second attack on July 27/28, our house (No. 70) was hit right in the beginning by a phosphorus bomb. It started a fire on the fourth floor. I went up to start fighting the fire. As soon as I got to the mezzanine, a second bomb hit the building. The pieces were hurled down the staircase and I myself was thrown down to the ground floor.

In order to keep the entrance clear, I moved bicycles and other things that were standing there, over to one side. Because a large fire was raging behind our houses in Wendenstrasse, I tried, together with Sergeant Artmann, to salvage suitcases, baskets filled with belongings, and other items from the threatened shelters into the front basement. The flames and flying sparks threatened to ignite the gas sluice. We boarded up the windows with wooden planks as well as possible. Then the staircase collapsed. The fire had a velocity 10 force.

My attempts to get out of the house on the Wendenstrasse side failed because the staircase was completely in flames. Smoke and debris were then pushed into the cellar by a new high explosive detonation; the doors and the chimney covers were torn from their hinges. The situation was becoming unbearable. We tried to open the wall breakthrough to the neighborhouse only to find that the cellar next door was also on fire. Escape of the occupants of the two air raid shelters by this route was not possible. On the other hand, it appeared inadvisable to remain in the shelter any longer because the danger of asphyxiation was already very great. At the Wendenstrasse shelter exit, the fire storm had such force that it took three men to hold the door shut. At that time I ordered the occupants to take blankets and coats and leave the shelter, two adults and one child at a time. All those present had great confidence in my actions, but they had no idea what was ahead of them and how they would have to fight their way through a flaming hell. I myself remained at the shelter exit and directed the groups of three to fight their way through to the street. I was the last one to leave the air raid shelter.

Mr. Baden, who was bandaged and on crutches, was assisted out by his wife; however, he collapsed at the exit. I pulled him back into the cellar out of the reach of the flames, and, later on, I managed to get him outside with the help of another person. I returned to the shelter where I found my wife and Mrs. Dungehold and then tried to escape the shelter with the two women. The cellar stairs were littered with burning suitcases and pocketbooks.

We advanced through the fire storm and found ourselves in the middle of a burning inferno. To get through to the next air raid shelter was not possible. To find a second person to help rescue Mr. Baden was not possible either, so that we had to leave him to his fate for the time being. We tried to go through the burning area along Teutonenweg to Sorbenstrasse but there, as elsewhere, our exit was blocked. We then decided to get down on our knees against the wall of the schoolyard, with our backs to the fire storm. I repeatedly exhorted all persons present to remain in this position as it was the only way to survive. The fire in the houses at the corner of Sorbenstrasse and Cimbernweg was burning out fast, and although both schools at Wendenstrasse and on Sorbenstrasse were burning brightly, their eventual collapse presented no danger to us because of the wide schoolyard between them and us. However, we were exposed to the white heat and the flying sparks from the burning warehouses and the autopark, as well as from the burning houses on Sorbenstrasse. To live through the two hours in the shelter and now the five hours at the wall until the next morning at 7 was possible only because of my constant encouragement to the twenty or so persons who were with us. Many of the tenants had gone back to the shelter or else did not follow us through the fire storm. The next morning, they were found burned to death.

At 7 a.m., with burns on our hands and feet and with swollen, inflamed eyes, we groped our way out of the burning area and finally arrived at the Elbe Bridge. There we were loaded into motorboats and taken to Zollenspieker. First aid was given by Dr. Peters to the injured. The first plate of soup issued to us was a real tonic. Because Zollenspieker was overcrowded with refugees from the first attack, we were taken across the Elbe where we were loaded into trucks and distributed among billets located in the vicinity. By evening, we were quartered in a private home in Ardendorf as homeless refugees without any belongings. Every day afterwards transports were assembled for transporting refugees to Bavaria. On July 31, I first regained sight in my right eye, and on August 2, in my left eye. For several days my hands were bandaged and I could not wear my boots.

(Signed) Boje, FD Sergeant

Willi Umland
Emil Janssen-Strasse 45
Hamburg 33

August 13, 1943

Experiences During the Air Attack of July 29/30, 1943

On August 12, 1943, the house at Emil Janssen-Strasse 45, Hamburg 33, was inspected by an officer from the Fire Department. Because the tenants who had helped with the fire fighting at this address and I myself were not present, the inspecting officer left word that he would like to have a detailed report on how the preservation of our thirteen-family house and the house next door was accomplished. Following is an account of the happenings in question:

Late in the evening of July 29, 1943 all tenants were absent except: Cashier Wilhelm Hinsch (air raid warden), Housewife Hertha Umland, nee Hennig, Reinhard Hennig (17 years old), and Willi Umland (the writer).

During the air attack we were in the public air raid shelter (bunker) at Alte Wöhr-City Park RR Station. The bunker was well filled, but not overcrowded. During the course of the attack we felt several strong detonations in the vicinity. Towards the end of the raid numerous additional persons came into the bunker.

As soon as the attack was over, I left the bunker to check on our house. Outside I saw that almost all houses on Rübenkamp down to our house were on fire. Many of the roof fires had progressed quite far. A flak battery was located on the roof of the corner house at Rübenkamp and Alte Wöhr. The wooden scaffolding on the roof had caught fire and caused the ammunition to explode. The continuing explosions, however, did not make the street entirely impassable and I managed to get to my apartment and saw that it and our house was undamaged.

Only the roofs of the two corner buildings on our block at Emil Janssen-Strasse 39/41 and Rübenkamp 58, were on fire. Since I could find no tenants in the neighborhood houses and since only one tenant (Puttfarken) was present at Rübenkamp 58, nothing could be done to fight the fires. Firebombs had apparently caused the fire on the top story of Rübenkamp 58, which had spread considerably.

I returned to the bunker to get Warden Hinsch, my wife, my grown son, and any neighbors that I could find. The bunker had become so overcrowded in my absence, however, that nobody could get in or out. All persons, and particularly the women, huddled together in the anteroom and in the passages leading from it. The man in charge of the bunker was not on top of the situation and was not capable of maintaining order.

At first I could not get into the bunker to notify my people, and later on, I and other people had difficulty in getting out of the bunker. The people who had taken it upon themselves to take charge were afraid that a panic might start among the occupants if they were to find out how many houses were on fire. They also maintained that the explosions at the flak battery made it dangerous for people to leave the shelter.

After due consideration of the matter, everyone who had been entrusted with a particular task had to come to the conclusion that now when the attack was over was the time to take action and let the people out who were willing to help. It would have been possible, in my opinion, to marshal sufficient forces to fight the fires which were not yet too far advanced and that many a house and much valuable material could have been saved despite the water shortage. It was possible to circumvent the dangerous situation at the flak station, as was proved later on.

Finally, by use of gentle force, I was able to get out of the shelter. However, I found no understanding of what should be done among the people in charge or among the other men who wore steel helmets. Only a few men followed me out, because most of those who were willing to come were prevented from leaving the bunker. According to my wife, some women left the shelter when urged to do so, later on even while many men remained inside.

After we had salvaged our most important belongings from the house there was still sufficient time to move most of our household goods to the street. After some time our air raid warden reported that the neighborhouse at Emil Janssen-Strasse 43 was no longer in danger of catching fire because of the firewall between it and the house at No. 41. On the other hand, the fire at Rübenkamp 58 kept spreading, but because there were no tenants present to fight the fires, nothing could be done about it.

We soon stopped salvaging our belongings and took up watch at the firewall between our house and Rübenkamp 58 to prevent the fire from spreading to our house. At 6 a.m. Hinsch noticed that a large hole had been burned into the living room floor of his apartment on the fourth floor. There was an open fire at one place and the floor was very hot. Hinsch, our neighbor Carstensen, my wife and my son immediately took up axes and crowbars and tore open the floorboards at the wall and extinguished burning and smouldering beams with the Civil Defense portable fire extinguisher.

As the fire in the neighbor house kept spreading downward, the floorboards at the wall had to be removed in our house in one floor after another, and the fires in the beams and the ceiling molding had to be extinguished. By and by, at around 10 a.m., the other tenants of our house returned from

outside, namely Mr. Bothe and daughter, Mr. and Mrs. Eckhardt, Mr. Rachow and son, and their wives. By combined effort we managed to remove any fire threat to our house permanently.

From the other side of the block, because of the strong firewall, there was no danger of the fire spreading to our house; however, since the house at No. 43 had some shingles torn off the roof and since, because of the strong westwind, flying sparks from the house at Rübenkamp 58 might start a fire, I had my son stand firewatch in the attic. Surveillance of the fire site at Emil Janssen-Strasse 41 and protection of the undamaged house at Emil Janssen-Strasse 43 was taken over by the tenants Tiedgen and Bostelmann and the neighbor Hemgenberger and their wives. During the fire fighting operations, wives and children brought water and sand, because the municipal water supply had long since failed.

(Signed) Willi Umland
Master of FPP

Hamburg, June 10, 1944

Re: Reconnaissance and Scouting Trips on Behalf of the Local Civil Defense Headquarters by Master Schlünz During the Air Attack of June 18, 1944

At the beginning of the air attack of June 18, 1944, I was on time off and in my apartment. I saw about twenty enemy bomber squadrons that flew over the city from north to south in tight formation. The enemy planes could be seen very clearly because of cloudless skies and the favorable position of the sun. Some of these squadrons, apparently those who flew at greater heights, had vapor trails.

After some of the squadrons had passed over our part of the city, narrow black circular waves that were spaced evenly and gradually increasing in size could be seen moving in the air. These circles behaved like the waves caused by throwing a stone into the water. At times, the sky was covered with these overlapping rings, giving the appearance of a wire mesh screen. I presume that these rings were pressure waves from dropping bombs and were visible to the human eye because of favorable weather and light conditions. This rare phenomenon was looked on with awe by many of the tenants.

After I had observed some signs of fires in a southerly direction, I got onto my bicycle and went to the Main Fire Station. The motorcycle assigned to me had been buried by debris from the houses hit by high explosive bombs in the vicinity of the Main Fire Station. I obtained a substitute motorcycle from the Division IV Headquarters on Angerstrasse and reported for scouting assignment at the local Civil Defense Headquarters.

First Assignment

I was directed to find out how many fire fighting units were needed in the damage area around Burchardplatz and the location to which the needed units should report. General Dr. Zaps was reportedly in the damage area.

The only approach to City Hall possible was by way of Nessstrasse and Gr. Reichenstrasse because all other streets leading to it were blocked by bomb craters and debris from collapsed buildings. The main conflagration area included Burchardstrasse, Steinstrasse, Kreuslerstrasse, Möncke-bergstrasse, Pferdemarkt, Breitestrasse, and Jacobi Church. The fires were for the most part confined to business buildings. The nave of the Jacobi Church was completely on fire by this time, and the steeple was

partly burning. I met the General and Major Elbel at the water storage basin at Jacobi Church. It was decided that three fire fighting units were needed. Of these, one unit should assemble at Spitalerstrasse and two at Burchardstrasse to fight the fires and refill the water storage basin at Jacobi Church. I immediately transmitted the request via the quickest route to Colonel Schliemann at the local Civil Defense Headquarters.

Second Assignment

I was next ordered to scout the reported fire at Deutschlandhaus. A fire fighting unit was on the way and needed direction. After the unit was put in action, I was to return at once with a report on the situation.

When I arrived, the front of the Deutschlandhaus at Valentinskamp 2/3 was on fire from the fifth floor upwards; the flames were unusually high. The rear wing of the Drehbahn was also on fire. Unit 1/IV was already assigned to the Drehbahn. I discussed the overall situation with Unit Commander Lange and asked him to meet the approaching unit and assign it to Valentinskamp. I then went back to local headquarters and submitted a brief report regarding the fire situation to Colonel Schliemann.

Third Assignment

I was asked to locate all major fire sites in the city area. It took considerable time to complete the survey, because streets were blocked to traffic and I had to travel much on foot.

Fourth Assignment

Dr. Ziegler of the Planning Board and a floor manager of Karstadt Department Store appeared at the Police President's office and blamed him for not putting enough fire fighting forces at their (Karstadt's) disposal. He indicated that large reserves of cotton goods were stored in the burning basement of the Karstadt Building. I was asked by Major Elbel to check this situation and assign fire fighting forces as necessary. I took both gentlemen with me and made the rounds of the basement rooms of the Karstadt Building with them. Only one corner of the basement was still on fire, as area of perhaps 10 to 20 square meters. The fire was fought with 4 C hoses from two narrow passages and was well under control. Both men were very much impressed with the ongoing effort and had become convinced that the fire fighters were 100 percent on the job, especially in view of the fact that the water was about 20 cm deep in the long dark cellar passages.

After we had made the rounds, we met Major Möbius. I introduced both gentlemen to him with the remark that complaints had been made to the Police President that fire fighting operations at Karstadt were being conducted unsatisfactorily. Suddenly neither one of the men remembered any of their complaints and they vanished soundlessly. During my rounds I did not see any large supplies of cotton goods anywhere.

Fifth Assignment

A man appeared at the Police President's office and complained that his storehouse in Herrlichkeit, containing acetylene and oxygen bottles, was in great danger and could only be saved by immediate assignment of heavy fire fighting units. I was directed therefore to remove one unit from the fire area Burchardplatz and assign it to Herrlichkeit and Herrengraben. In Kl. Reichenstrasse I met General Zaps and told him of my orders. The General instructed me to use forces from the Harbor District if none were directly available at Burchardplatz. In Meyerstrasse I found a Civil Defense Motorized Division on stand-by alert which had not yet been assigned a fire site. I piloted this unit to Herrlichkeit. However, assignment was no longer necessary there because other units had been assigned in the meantime. It would be advisable in the future to check out complaints of this kind and only after this has been done, assign units if necessary.

(Signed) Schlünz, Master of FPP

Attachment: 1 City Map with fire sites marked

Hamburg, July 8, 1944

RE: Reconnaissance Trip of Master Schlünz of Local Headquarters, Fire Protection Police During the Air Attack of June 20, 1944

After extensive damage reports had been received from Harburg and from Harbor District Sectors B and C had been received at local Headquarters, General Zaps ordered me to reconnoiter in Sectors B and C. While I was preparing for this trip, several heavy explosions were heard in the immediate vicinity. Approximately 20 enemy planes were clearly seen flying over the inner city because of clear skies and excellent visibility. At the same moment, an enormous mushroom of smoke formed to the southeast of our Headquarters (in Sector A). General Zaps asked me to check on this fire first and report back.

First Reconnaissance Trip to Sector A

After a short drive into Sector A, the Grasbrook Gas Works could be readily identified as the fire site. The coal bunker and its contents were on fire. Captain Hannss was at the fire site and explained that the three fire brigades that were on their way would be adequate. He had no information about other fire sites or other fire fighting unit requirements in Air Sector A. I then continued driving along Dalmannstrasse which, due to high explosive bomb craters, was almost impassable. Piers 11 and 13 were on fire. I made my first investigation in their vicinity. Because of strong smoke that was enveloping the buildings I could not ascertain whether or not the wharf warehouse was on fire, so continued on foot along the blocked street (see attachment). During this time, the roof of Pier 13 caved in and a heat wave eminated outward. At the warehouse I found a fire squad busy laying hose lines. I ordered this squad to Pier 11 immediately to seal off the fire to the west.

When I returned to my motorcycle, Captain Hannss arrived in his automobile. I reported to him as follows, that: 1) Pier 13 was totally destroyed; 2) One squad had been assigned to Pier 11 to try and seal off the fire; and, 3) At Pier 1, stored goods were on fire and one fire squad was needed. Captain Hannss considered the available fire fighting forces, consisting of one fire brigade and two industrial fire brigades, to be adequate for these tasks. I returned to local Headquarters and reported to Colonel Schliemann.

Second Reconnaissance Trip to Sectors B and C

The trip to the damage area was made via Kl. Grasbrook and Worthdamm and was quick. The oil drums at Stillhornerdamm were going up in flames

with tremendous hissing and howling noises. A great danger of the fire spreading existed because of the prevailing westwind in the first instance, and secondly because the burning oil was beginning to leak into the harbor water. When I arrived, an attitude of defeat and flight prevailed everywhere. Explosions continued to occur all over the plant area. However, I was able to calm the people down and then I assigned the available hoses at the most advantageous locations to keep burning oil away from the shore. A group of prisoners was especially helpful and willing to give assistance.

Worthdamm was riddled with bomb craters, and was very difficult to travel over by motorcycle. The conflagration area extended to Vogelreth on the north. Stillhornerdamm was blocked by fire fighting unit vehicles so I continued my reconnaissance on foot. Buildings along Stillhornerdamm were on fire both to the left and right sides of the street. Oil tanks and factory installations were burning. Minor explosions were occurring continuously. The fire had already spread across Reiherstieg to Ellerholzdamm. At Grevenhof, oil tanks, as well as a motorboat, were on fire. In this fire area, sufficient fire fighting forces were in action.

I damaged my front tire driving over debris (boards, etc.) and had to push my motorcycle to Fire Station 8. Finding no patching material available, I borrowed a light motorcycle to continue the reconnaissance of the Sectors. With this, I drove on across Reiherdamm to Nehlstrasse. The Warehouse Shed 72b was on fire. Stoppers on plugs on the oxygen and acetylene bottles stored in the burning shed kept popping out into the street at short intervals. I informed the brigade captain on duty, who then blocked the endangered street to traffic. Adequate fire fighting forces had been assigned at both entrances to the shed.

I next drove on across Rossdamm to Breslauer Shore. The east wing of Ross Refrigeration Company was on fire, but adequate fire fighting units were on hand. At Hansa Mill I found no fire damage. I had another flat tire. Some workers from the E Plant helped me fix the flat, and I could continue to Schindler-Brückenstrasse where one tank and one factory building were on fire. But, because of favorable winds, the adjacent factories were not in danger of catching fire. Three fire units were assigned, which was sufficient.

I then drove on to the Rhenania Petroleum installation on Reiherstiegdeich. The factory building located on the Rethe Canal was burning brightly. Only minimum fire fighting forces were assigned to the site. There was no danger that the fire might spread to other buildings in the vicinity. The smoke from the petroleum works was so thick at some places that I had to drive with the headlights turned on. I left the motorcycle at the

entrance to the petroleum refinery and continued the investigation of the refinery installations on foot. In order to get an accurate picture of the extent of the fire, I went all through the tank groups and factory installations. This was a very difficult task because of the continuing explosions, the heavy smoke, and the intense heat. Not enough fire fighting forces had been assigned at the time to cope with the fires. Several tank groups in the fire zone had not ignited; I therefore pulled several fire squads out of the line and assigned them to cool off these endangered tank installations.

The lower part of Reiherstiegdeich and Alte Schleusse was so littered with craters from high explosive bombs, and with wood and bricks, that I could only advance by pushing and carrying my motorcycle. At the end of the approximately 200-meter-long obstacle course, I found two residential houses on fire and one house collapsed, debris of which had spilled all over the road. Behind this damage site I found a unit from Lübeck waiting to have the road cleared by civilians and party members. After a short conference with the squad leader, I convinced him of the futility of waiting, and I piloted the unit across passable streets to the petroleum refinery. The embankment, draw bridge and entryways to the factory installations were completely blocked by debris from explosive damage. We had to approach the burning plant from Schloisgrove by way of Hindenburgstrasse. I met General Zaps in Wilmanstrasse and reported to him, using maps, about the fire sites I had inspected. The General ordered me to remove one unit from Schindler and assign it to the petroleum refinery. I learned that fire fighting forces were already on stand-by on Rothenhäuserstrasse. But when I again met with the General at Fire Station 15 he directed me to take the volunteer fire unit from Lauenburg, which was on stand-by at the Fire Station, to the refinery instead of pulling out the unit from Schindler. After a long zigzagging trip through Wilhelmsburg, I piloted the unit to their assignment site. They were assigned to fire sites by Colonel Schwarzenberger. Numerous fire units and small fire departments had driven up and a serious traffic jam built up on Reiherstiegdeich. I personally considered it useless to assign small fire fighting units to a conflagration of this size. The vehicles and crews were standing around, blocking the approaches and disturbing the work of the assigned units and companies. After completing my task, I returned to local Headquarters and gave a short report of my findings in the Harbor District to Colonel Schliemann, using maps.

Third Reconnaissance Trip

After I obtained patching material from the Main Fire Station, I went to Fire Station 8 and repaired my motorcycle. After I finished, Captain Böttcher urgently requested two more fire brigades, because the fires at Pier 72 and the Refrigeration Plant were increasing in intensity and the

destruction of precious raw materials was feared. I promised help, and soon afterwards was able to pilot the unit which I found on stand-by alert at the petroleum refinery, to the Command Post at Fire Station 8. I reported this change in deployment via the police radio truck to Lt. Hatje at local Headquarters. Then I continued my reconnaissance trip to Harburg and marked the fire sites in the Harbor District on the map.

(Signed) Schlünz, Master of FPP

Attachment: City Map of Hamburg Harbor

Note: Good, clear report.

(Signed) Zaps

To Lt. Colonel Dr. Schubert Hamburg, August 13, 1943

Regarding the attached lists of fire units assigned to Hamburg, the following should be pointed out:

1. Many out-of-town units assigned themselves at damage sites without reporting to the respective Sector Headquarters.

2. The total number of out-of-town units cannot be ascertained as the records of Fire Stations III, IV, and V were destroyed by enemy action.

3. At almost all pilot stations of the Security Police, the prescribed forms were not filled out, so that no records exist of the number and kind of fire fighting forces piloted through.

4. There is no information available regarding the number of motorized fire squads of the Expanded Self-Protection, Industrial Civil Defense, or N. S. Party because no records of any kind were kept.

(Signed) Missfeld
Lieutenant of FPP

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 25, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I		12 + 2				2 Units + 4	52 + 29	
II	2	9	3			2 Units + 2	16 +	Unit 3/X
III	5			2	4	2 Units + 2	60 +	Unit 1/VII & Unit 1/V
VII		1		3	2	2 Units + 1	30 +	Unit 3/VIII 1/2 1/VI & 10 VFD
IX	1	15	1	3		2 " " & 5 Sq.	47 +	
IV				3	2	2 Units + 2	110 +	Unit 2/VIII
V				2	1	2 Units + 17	36 +	
VI		7		1		1-1/2 + 1	33 +	
X	6	28	1	2		2 Units + 15	45 +	
A		2		1		2 Units + 1	6 +	
B	1	10	1		1	3 Units + 2	90 +	
C	1	3				2 Units + 3	51 +	
VIII							64 + assigned in other sectors	
	16	89	6	17	10	24-1/2 Units + 55 VFD	640 + 200	5-1/2 Units & 10 VFD

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 26, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I		14			1	2 Units		
II			3	1	1	2 Units		1 Unit 3/X
III	1			1	4	2 Units		
VII			1	3	2	2 Units		
IX						2 Units		
IV				1	1	2 Units		
V				1	1	3 Units + 17		
VI					2	2 Units		
X				1		2 Units		
A						2 Units		
B		1				3 Units		
C	1	4				2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
	2	19	4	8	12	29		1

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 27, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I						2 Units		
II		4	1	2	2	2 Units		
III	1	12	1		2	2 Units		1 Unit 2/X
VII	1	1	2	1	2	2 Units		1 Unit 3/X
IX						2 Units		
IV					1	2 Units		
V					1	3 Units + 17		
VI						2 Units		
X						1 Unit		
A						2 Units		
B					4	3 Units		
C		3				2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
	2	20	4	3	12	28		2

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 28, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I				4	1	1 Unit	52 + 29	
II	1	6	2	3	1	2 Brigades	16 +	
III	2		2	6	4	2 Units	60 +	1/VIII & 2/VIII
VII	1	1	2	1		1 Unit	30 +	
IX				2 Squads		1 Unit	47 +	
IV	1	3		3 Units	3	2 Units	110 +	1 Unit 2/X
V	4			1	3 + 2	3 Units + 17	36 +	1 Unit 1/VII & 1 Unit 2/IX
VI	1	6		7	2 + 3	2 Units	33 +	4 brigades/II
X						1 Unit	45 +	1 Unit 2/I
A		1				2 Units	6 +	
B	1	13		1	2	3 Units	90 +	3/VIII + 10 VFD
C						2 Units	51 +	
VIII							64 + assigned to other sectors	
	11	30	6	26 + 2 sq.	16 com. 5 units	20 units 2 brigades 17 VFD	640 + 29	8 Units, 4 brigades, 10 VFD

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 29, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I						2 Units	52 + 29	
II			1	3		2 Units +	16 +	1/VIII & 2/VIII
III			1	1	2	2 Units	60 +	
VII	1			2 + 1		1 Unit	30 +	
IX						2 Units	47 +	
IV					3	2 Units	110 +	
V	1	1		1	1 + 2 units	3 Units + 17	36 +	1 Unit 1/VII
VI		2		1	3 Units	2 Units	33 +	
X				1		3 Units	45 +	
A						2 Units	6 +	
B						3 Units	90 +	3/VIII
C						2 Units	51 +	
VIII							64 + assigned to other sectors	
	2	3	2	10	6 com. 5 units	26 units	640	4 Units

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 30, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I		10		2		2 Units		
II	18	6		2	2	2 Units		
III	4	5			3	2 Units		1 Unit VII 1 Unit IX
VII						2 Brigades		
IX						1 Unit		
IV					2	2 Units		1 Brigade VII
V					3 + 5 Units	3 Units + 17		
VI	1			1 + 5	6	2 Units		
X		22	1	3	2	3 Units		
A						2 Units		
B		2		1	2	3 Units		
C						2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
	23	45	1	14	20 Co. 5 Unit	27 Units 2 Brigades 65 VFD		2 Units 1 Brigade

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on July 31, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I		11			4	2 Units		
II				2 Brigades		2 Units		
III	1			2 Brigades	6 + 2 Unit	2 Units		1 Unit VII
VII						2 Brigades		
IX						2 Units		
IV					2	2 Units		1 Brigade VII
V					1 Unit	3 Units + 17		
VI	1	2			2 + 2 Unit	2 Units		
X			1			3 Units		
A						2 Units		
B						3 Units		
C						2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
	2	13	1	4 Brigades	14 Com. 5 Units	28 Units 2 Brigades		1 Unit 1 Brigade

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on August 1, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I					2	2 Units		
II						1 Unit + 1 Brig.		
III					2	2 Units		2 Brigades/II
VII						2 Units		
IX						2 Units		
IV					2	2 Units		
V						3 Units + 17		
VI					1	2 Units		
X				1		3 Units		
A						2 Units		
B						3 Units		
C						2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
				1	7	29 Units 1 Brigade		2 Brigades

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on August 2, 1943

Sector	Vol. Unit's	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C. D. Police Emergency Units	C. D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I						2 Units		
II						1 Unit + 1 Brig.		
III			1		2	2 Units		2 Brigades/II
VII						2 Units		
IX						2 Units		
IV					4	2 Units		
V						3 Units + 17		
VI					2	2 Units		
X						3 Units		
A						2 Units		
B						3 Units		
C						2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
			1		8	29 Units 1 Brigade		2 Brigades

Fire Fighting Forces Assigned on August 3, 1943

Sector	Vol. Units	Volunteer Fire Squads	Fire Dept. Companies	C.D. Police Emergency Units	C.D. Mot. Division Companies	Own Sector Forces	Party, ESP and ICD Units	Units From Other Sectors
I						2 Units		
II						1 Squad		
III			1	2	4	2 Units		2 Units/B, 2/II, 1 Brigade/II 1 Unit/IX, 1 Unit/X
VII						2 Units		1-1/2 Brigade/II
IX						1 Unit		
IV				2		2 Units		1 Unit/X
V						3 Units + 17		
VI						2 Units		
X						1 Unit		
A						2 Units		
B						1 Unit		
C						2 Units		
VIII						3 Units		
			1	4	4	23 Units 1 Squad		6 Units 2-1/2 Brigades

Fire Department Special Services Division Berlin, August 1943

To the
Commandant of the
Municipal Police Department
Berlin

RE: Report on Assignment of Vehicles of the Berlin Municipal Police in Hamburg from July 25 to July 31, 1943.

On July 25, 1943, at about 2:00 p.m., I received orders from Police Colonel Huth to assemble the vehicles in questions, to lead them to Hamburg via Highway 5, and to report there to Fire Department Major Riedel. The vehicles were assembled in the yard of the North Division Quarters. At 5:30 p.m. I reported the departure of our column to the Precinct Commander, Lt. Nischk.

The highway was excellent. After Ludwigslust we ran into heavy fog. I warned the drivers to drive slowly and carefully because of the fog. Despite my warning, however, about 50 km before we reached Hamburg FPP Sergeant Ernst Haupt, driver of the Truck No. Pol 99-567 of Unit 8 Berlin, hit the rear of the vehicle ahead of him and crushed the radiator of his truck. The truck had to be towed until we were within 30 km from Hamburg. After arrival in Hamburg, we obtained the loan of a trailer hitch and hooked the damaged truck to another for towing.

Because of various breakdowns involving almost all the vehicles, the column did not arrive at the Command Post in Hamburg until 7:00 a.m. of July 26. Fuel tank trucks and field kitchens were assigned on the same day.

On July 26, 1943, we exchanged the old radiator of Truck Pol-99 567 for a new one and by evening this truck was again ready for assignment. The bill for the radiator (175 RM) was paid.

During the major air attack on Hamburg during the night of July 27/28, the column was parked in a side street leading off of Horner Landstrasse in Hamburg. The vehicles were kept far apart so that they would not present an obvious target for enemy planes. Truck No. Pol-99 567 received a direct hit and burst into flame immediately. It was impossible under the circumstances to extinguish the fire. According to the driver, Sergeant Ernst Haupt, all permits, ration cards, had burned with the truck.

At the time in question I was at the Division Command Post with Major Riedel. Because I had no deputy, I had turned my command over to Police

Inspector Knopf of the Berlin Central Police Bureau who had been assigned to the Division as Administrative Officer.

Phosphorus drops ignited the rear tires of the fuel tank truck No. Pol-99 383 which carried 3000 liters of gasoline. In spite of continuous heavy bombardment, the truck and its load were saved from destruction. In this action Civil Defense Police Sergeants Stahnke, Kybschull, Andersch of Messingwerk Precinct and FPP Sergeant Haupt showed cool heads and outstanding bravery. All crew members who took part in the safeguarding of the vehicles and in the rescue operations showed exemplary courage.

Civil Defense Police Sergeants Kannacker and Rausch, because of their advanced ages, are not equal to the demands of driving trucks on extended out-of-town assignments.

Part of the equipment and clothing of the crews was destroyed. The fuel of vehicles of the five units was replenished from tank trucks at the assigned fire sites, and the men were fed from field kitchens. Fuel was obtained from the Main Fire Station in Hamburg without ration cards.

During the major air attack in the night of July 29/30, the left rear tire of the fuel tank truck Pol-99 566 was splashed with phosphorus drops and caught fire. The truck was loaded with 2000 liters of gasoline. Due to quick and courageous action of FPP Sergeant Robert Schulz of Unit 18-Berlin the fire was extinguished saving both the vehicle and load from destruction.

At about 10:00 p.m. on July 30, I received orders to withdraw the supply column and assemble the crews and vehicles at Lauenburg. After assembling the vehicles, the supply column left Hamburg at 1:00 a.m. on July 31. At about 4:00 a.m., the Division left Lauenburg and arrived at Perleberg at 12:00 noon. After refueling and inspection of vehicles by Division Commander Major Riedel, a rest period was ordered until 4:00 p.m. The supply column left Perleberg at 6:00 p.m. and reached Berlin Quarters at 11:00 p.m. without further incident.

(Signed) Langhoff, Commander
Lt. of Municipal Police Berlin

Administration
Special Division
Fire Protection Police Berlin

August 6, 1943

Activity Report

On July 25, 1943 at about 2:00 p.m., Police Secretary Zingler of Division I-9A was designated as Administrative Officer for the Fire Protection Police Special Division Berlin during assignment in Hamburg in place of the previously assigned Police Secretary Fisher. A six days' supply of provisions (for 325 men) and one box of general supplies was obtained from North Command Post and loaded on the trucks. The supply column, consisting of four field kitchens on trucks, one provisions truck and two passenger automobiles, all under the command of Police Secretary Zingler, departed for Hamburg at 8:20 p.m. on July 25, 1943, by way of Nauen, Perleberg, and Neuenburg. The column arrived in Hamburg at 5:30 a.m. on July 26. On orders from the Division Commander, Police Secretary Zingler with the supply train moved to the 55th Precinct at Hornerlandstrasse 203 in Hamburg-Horn and on arrival began preparing meals. At 11:30 p.m., on July 26, I joined the Supply Division after having been appointed Administrative Officer in Charge and having traveled to Hamburg by train.

At 1:00 a.m. on July 27, 1943, a major air attack on Hamburg took place with the main concentrations of bombs falling on the suburbs of Horn and Billstedt. At the beginning of the attack I had given orders, as Deputy for the Commander who was at Headquarters, to disperse the vehicles in order to minimize as much as possible their being a target for the enemy. The crews were distributed among the various air raid shelters of the Precinct and the cellars of the surrounding residences. The vehicles were kept under surveillance during the attack. The passenger automobile No. Pol. 99567 was hit by several firebombs and ignited. At the same time the left rear tire of a tank truck, which was loaded with 2000 liters of gasoline, started to burn. Because the surrounding houses had caught fire through ignition by high explosive and firebombs, grave danger of an explosion existed. The truck and its cargo were saved through speedy and courageous action of the four truck drivers (Andersch, Kybschull, Stanke and Haupt), who took off the burning tire, substituted a spare and then drove the tank truck with its high explosive load out of the fire area. This action took place under heavy bombardment and under grave risk to the lives of all four drivers.

The air in the cellars of the burning houses began to be unbearable because of the phosphorus bombs all around, so that many of the occupants moved to the halls and corridors of the buildings, but did not dare

go out into the burning streets. In the meantime, Police Secretary Zingler, together with his cooks, started to rescue endangered women and children. After evacuating the surrounding buildings, we received word that a nearby old people's home with 80 inmates had been hit by bombs and was in flames. Through a maximum effort using all the men of the Supply Division it was possible to rescue all the inmates.

During the morning of July 28, I received permission from the Commander to move the Supply Division to Börnsen because of the threat of a renewed attack, the shortage of water, and the necessity to secure the available food supply for the fire fighting units. (During the last air attack, 97,040 lbs of butter that I had stored in the cellar of the 55th Precinct Police Station on the previous day to save it from spoiling, burned because the precinct building was destroyed by bombs and burned out completely.) Feeding of the fire fighting units did not suffer any interruptions because of the above-described rescue operations.

During the night of July 28/29, an air alarm of two hours' duration occurred; however, the new location of the supply column was not hit by bombs. Feeding of the fire fighting crews took place in an orderly fashion the same as the day before.

On July 30, 1943, the Commander issued orders for the immediate departure of the Division from Hamburg. Therefore at 12:10 on July 31, the supply column under my command moved to the designated collection point on the highway before Lauenburg. The supply train received orders from there to move to Perleberg and have meals in readiness for distribution. We remained at Perleberg until 6:00 p.m. and then departed for Berlin by way of Nauen. We arrived in Berlin at about 11:30 p.m. The vehicles were cleaned and on August 2, 1943 were returned to their permanent quarters.

The provisions kept in readienss for Unit Wittke which had been delayed in Hamburg, were turned over to East Quarters who issued us a receipt for same. The leftovers were left at the North Kitchen.

There were no personnel losses during our assignment in Hamburg. Sergeant Zeglin who was ill when assigned from his home quarters, was dismissed by the Police Surgeon in Hamburg on July 27, and sent home.

(Signed) Knopf, Police Inspector

Statistical Data

The five Berlin Units on assignment in Hamburg took up a total of 179 B and 579 C hoses. Twenty water storage basins were refilled.

Total hours on duty added up to 1065.

Total mileage driven (without Administration): 36, 820 km

Total amount of gasoline used: 15, 683 liters (without Administration).

Copy

St. Qu., August 10, 1943

Civil Defense Regiment (Motorized)

RE: Major Air Attacks on the City of Hamburg in the Time Period from July 25 to August 3, 1943

I. General

The major air attacks, not counting some small daytime and night sorties, can be divided into four phases: The attacks on 7/25/43, 7/28/43, 7/30/43, and 8/3/43, respectively.

1. Attack on 7/25/43

This was a concentric attack on Hamburg that lasted from 12:58 midnight to 2:05 a.m., with about 500 airplanes in four waves.

Scout planes came first. The first wave of bombers flew at a height of 6,000 meters, the following waves flew at a height of 8,000 meters. The central area in which the bombing was concentrated included Altona, Neustadt, parts of the city southwest of the Binnenalster to the Harbor, and to the northwest of Outer Alster from Rothenbaum to Harvestehude. Also, a blanket of high explosive and firebombs was laid over an area about 3 km wide and 15 km long from south to northwest in the vicinity of Hansa Harbor and Sailboat Harbor to the RR Station Schnelsen and over an area about 2 km wide and 15 km long from south to northwest in the vicinity of the Harbor to Sophienhof area.

The weather was clear with light fog early in the morning; it was sunny during the day.

2. Attack on 7/28/43

The major air attack came in waves and began as did the air attacks on Kiel and Lübeck. The bombing lasted from 12:30 midnight to 1:55 a.m. About 700 enemy planes were used; they flew at heights ranging from 5,000 to 8,000 meters. The point of bombing concentration centered on the Harbor District, North Elbe, to the Lumber Harbor situated 3 km east-southeast, including the city districts of St. George, Bergfelde, Hamm, Hammerbrook, Eilbeck, and the area enclosed by Eilbecker Weg, Wandsbecker Chaussee, Lübeckerstrasse, Wandsbeck, and Barmbeck.

Smaller conflagrations and row fires occurred in an area about one and a

half kilometers in width and six kilometers in length from Horn to Bergedorf to the vicinity of Billwärder-Havighorst. Smaller damage areas were created in the vicinity of Rahlstedt, with the bombing apparently aimed at army installations. Such areas reached to Tonndorf-Lohe, Oldenfelde and Bramfeld, and in the south to Harburg, Marmstorf, Moorburg, Neugraben and Fahrenfeld.

This attack was the heaviest of the four attacks. Bombs of all calibers, especially dense at points of concentration, were delivered. Whole city districts were destroyed. An unusual amount of phosphorus firebombs were dropped. Many buildings that were spared or saved from destruction in the first attack in the above-named areas were completely destroyed in this attack.

The weather was clear, with light fog early in the morning; it was sunny during the day.

3. Attack on 7/30/43

This was a heavy attack that took place in four waves and was concentrated on the Inner City, lasting from 12:40 midnight to 1:55 a.m. The point of bombing concentration was in the region of the warehouse district of the Harbor out to Kuhwärder Harbor. A thick carpet of bombs was laid onto Sandtor and Grasbrook Harbor and in an area approximately one and a half kilometers wide and nine kilometers long over Old City, Outer Alster, St. George, St. George's Hospital, Hohenfelde, Barmbeck, Bramfeld, garden city Wandsbek to Friedrich Ebert Damm. A major conflagration occurred in the area of Ostrand City Park, Rübenkamp, Forsthof, Hellbrook to the northern limit of Bramfeld. The area of complete destruction reached from the northern boundary of Outer Alster at Rondeel to Alsterdorf including as well the area between Harvestehude and Rotherbaum, Moorweidenstrasse, and Dammtor. The same area was hit during the attack of 7/25/43.

Numerous islands of buildings which had remained standing from previous attacks, were destroyed during this attack.

The weather was clear, with high fog early in the morning; it was sunny during the day.

4. Attack on 8/3/43

The enemy attacked from 12:45 midnight to 2:22 a.m. with about 300 planes. Because of bad weather and strong defenses, the attempt by the enemy to create further large-scale damage areas was prevented. The point of

bombing concentration apparently had been planned for Harburg, Harbor and Neustadt. Damage was generally limited to small areas in the regions of Fischbeck, Neuwiedental, Bestelbeck, center of Harburg, Wilhelmsburg, Industrial Harbor, Neustadt, Altstadt, Billbrook, southwest area of Rahlstedt, Rondeel Pond in Stellingen, Lurup, Gr. Borstel, Niendorf, and Schnelsen.

The weather was turbulent, with thunderstorms and continuous rain occuring.

All four attacks used approximately the same bombing techniques and caused the same kind of damage.

Attack Technique

The attack technique was to encircle and cover the attack area with medium and heavy high explosive bombs, resulting in the blocking of major streets to travel and the ripping open of houses and industrial plants and putting the Self-Protection and Industrial Civil Defense forces out of commission. After this initial phase, large numbers of phosphorus bombs and fire sticks were dropped. To finish off the attack, air mines and high explosive bombs of the heaviest caliber were used. Well-aimed mines were dropped at street intersections, in the yards of house blocks, and on hospitals and industrial plants; large high explosive bombs were dropped onto large building complexes such as schools, hospitals and factories.

Attack Effects

Roofs of buildings were ripped open, doors and windows were crushed; tremendous conflagrations developed in which whole city districts were swept by fire storms and finally completely laid waste. Roads and major thoroughfares were blocked by debris and bomb craters so that it was impossible to bring emergency and fire fighting forces into the damage areas. The enormous conflagrations produced fire storms and air currents of hurricane proportions. Twenty-five and thirty-year-old trees were twisted off one meter above the ground. Buses and heavy trucks were thrown over and ignited by the fire storm with its rain of burning wood particles.

The people cut off in air raid shelters and large public bunkers suffered choking fits because of the heat and the lack of oxygen inside. Occupants who tried to leave their shelters during or right after the attack were caught by the fire storm and burned to death outside. The municipal water lines were badly damaged. Telephone lines, especially those to the local Civil Defense headquarters, were 90% destroyed.

The people who recognized the danger of being trapped in the bunkers and left them were burned to death on the streets with their luggage. A few escaped with their lives by wrapping themselves in wet blankets and by crawling with faces down along the middle of the street.

Many Self-Protection and Plant Civil Defense forces, who courageously and energetically, but unsuccessfully, fought the fires on roofs and in attics were cut off from escape and perished. Most of the Civil Defense Precincts and Command Posts were destroyed in the first attack, which further impeded deployment of the arriving out-of-town fire fighting forces.

Successes Achieved

The Emergency and Fire Companies of Division II were successful in keeping down many blazes and in extinguishing roof, room and warehouse fires. Repeatedly, they fought the fires in five- and six-story houses at their points of origin (roofs) from the top of extension ladders. In most cases, the Companies were successful in preventing the fires from spreading to neighboring buildings. Fires at lumberyards were successfully battled with the use of water cannons.

On July 30, E&F Companies, in a combined effort, were able to seal off and extinguish the conflagration in the five-story business and office buildings in Brandstwiete. The burning Siemens office building located nearby, which contained invaluable defense records, was hosed off so that the important documents could be salvaged.

On August 1, the Division was busy keeping down flareups of old fires. Communications with the Division Command Post were maintained throughout.

The Third Company was active in rescuing people. Patients and personnel of the Hoheweide Hospital were evacuated with the assistance of the Medical Squad, despite the fact that the upper stories of the hospital were ablaze. At Holstenwall and in Peterstrasse, the wounded were rescued and transported to safe points. Near Police Precinct 111, 21 persons who had been buried by debris were recovered alive. At Jungfernstieg 14-16 people and valuables were saved from houses threatened by fire or collapse. In the vicinity of St. Anne's, furniture and valuables were salvaged by the Youth Squad. At St. Sophia's Hospital, on 7/31, 220 sick and wounded, as well as hospital equipment and furniture, were evacuated under the greatest imaginable difficulties and brought to safety.

Numerous bodies were recovered. In Grossmann and Liebigstrasse, twelve people buried alive in a make-shift air raid shelter were located

with a sound-detector, and rescued under great difficulties. Debris was removed and streets cleared. The sound-detectors were a great help.

Experiences

The thick blanket of smoke and soot above the damage area put a great strain on the electric light system. At one railroad installation, torches were used when the electric lights failed.

Fires in warehouses and storage sheds on the small wharves of the Harbor made fire fighting from the waterside necessary. Small portable Fire Engines 8 were loaded on barges and small harbor craft and the fire fighting organized from there.

The Civil Defense Motorized Division 12 extinguished the large fire at the City Hall Tower. They saved an office building at Mönckebergstrasse 18-22, with offices, restaurant, officers club. They checked the spread of fires to single houses, house blocks and public building Also saved were a flour storage depot at the Municipal Bakery, the Lessing Theater, the Children's Paradise, houses on Alstereck, and the large Chasalla shoe store, at which place the fixtures and inventory were salvaged. They extinguished countless single fires. At the Fish Market, a warehouse with about 10,000 sacks of rye for the Armed Forces was saved from destruction. Water storage basins were refilled. At the Lüdtke & Co. Rice Mill, 6,000 sacks of wheat flour were removed from the fire. The major part of the barrel depot of the Töpfer Oil Works was saved from destruction. Fires in the underground oil tanks at Georgswärderdamm 2 were extinguished. Many villas, warehouse and business buildings, public buildings, including a telephone exchange, were saved from destruction. Fires in garages and repair shops at Zimmerstrasse 33 were extinguished. About 3,600 liters of gasoline were protected by the use of a water cannon. Large amounts of meat were salvaged and brought to safety at the Schrader Sausage Plant at Arndtstrasse 15. Numerous apartments were evacuated and clothing, linens and foodstuffs were salvaged.

The Third Company and the Medical Squad saved many trapped persons with the help of sound detectors. Debris was removed to open up cellars. More than 100 persons were recovered alive from the cellars at Unzerstrasse and Bäckerstrasse, who had been trapped. Seventy-four invalids from the nursing home in Oberalten-Allee were evacuated to Fairmsen. A shuttle service was established from the damage sites to Moorweide and St. Pauli Landing Piers to transport refugees. The Portable Fire Engines 15 provided drinking water for the population when they were not used to extinguish partial fires.

Fire Protection Police
Motorized Regiment 3 (East Prussia) **Burgdorf, August 9, 1943**

Assignment of Fire Protection Police Motorized Regiment 3 in Hamburg from July 25 to 28, 1943

Fourth Company (Kirchrode)

July 25, 1943

11:55 a.m. Orders received from Regiment Headquarters: Proceed to Hamburg immediately. Report to Pilot Station Hamburg-Harburg for assignment.

12:20 noon Fourth Company departed Burgdorf.

3:10 p.m. Company arrived at Pilot Station Harburg. Joined with Third Company under the latter's Commander.

3:55 p.m. Arrived at assignment area on Rothenbaumchaussee. Assigned to fire sites by Third Company Commander.

Situation on Arrival

The fires caused by the air attack during the night of July 24/25, 1943--in most instances engulfing the whole building--to which the company was assigned had been previously fought by other fire fighting units but had flared up again and, in some cases, represented a clear and present danger to adjacent buildings.

After a daytime air attack at 4:30 p.m. on July 25, new fires developed in Rothenbaumchaussee and neighboring streets. The roofs of some large buildings (Imbüro Institute, Curio House, among others) were in flames and the main effort of the fire fighting attack centered on these. Several fire department vehicles and private automobiles were burning in the street. The crew of the Fourth Company arrived at the Rothenbaumchaussee fire sector together with that of the Third Company and were assigned by the Commander of Company III at the various fire sites. Water was taken from hydrants, a water storage basin and the canals of the Harbor.

Orders

The First Brigade was ordered to take over fire fighting on Schlüterstrasse, Rutschbahnstrasse, and Grindelhof.

The Second Brigade was ordered to take over fire fighting on Rothenbaumchaussee and Johnsallee.

The Third Brigade was ordered to assist in the fire fighting on Rothenbaumchaussee.

Assignments Carried Out

Through the devoted and unflagging efforts of every member of every crew, the Company was able to complete its numerous sizeable tasks with success. Particular success was achieved by quickly extinguishing a number of new roof fires caused by the surprise daytime raid; these actions nipped threats of a new conflagration in the bud. Valuable large buildings, as for instance the Curio House and the Imbüro Institute, were saved with only minor damage.

In fighting smaller, newly developing fires and blazes on vehicles, the Portable Fire Engine 15 was especially helpful because of its mobility.

The numerous residential building fires which endangered neighboring buildings in the vicinity of Rothenbaumchaussee were fought under terrible difficulties; e.g., strong smoke and great heat. The extensive size of the damage area allowed the crews only brief rest period during their three-day assignment, because the fires kept flaring up and had to be fought and extinguished again and again.

Summary of Assignments

1.	Grindelhof 85	Building completely on fire
2.	Heimhuderstrasse 29	Building on fire
3.	Fröbelstrasse 9	Roof and ceiling fire
4.	Johnsallee 49	Roof and room fire
5.	Rutschbahnstrasse A and B	Roof and room fire
6.	Heimhuderstrasse 8	Residential house, total fire
7.	Moorweidenstrasse 7	Roof fire
8.	Moorweidenstrasse 26	Roof and ceiling fire
9.	Mittelweg 176	House, total fire
10.	Schlüterstrasse 4	Roof fire
11.	Schlüterstrasse 2	Roof and apartment fire
12.	Moorweidenstrasse 26	Roof and apartment fire
13.	Gründelstieg 4	Residential house, total fire
14.	Moorweidenstrasse 26	Apartment fire
15.	Mittelweg 164	Ceiling fire
16.	Mittelweg 162	Roof fire
17.	Alte Rabenstrasse 5-7	Residential house fire
18.	Alte Rabenstrasse 4	Refill water storage basin
19.	Johnsallee 49-51	Roof and room fire
20.	Fröbelstrasse 6	Residential house, total fire
21.	Mittelweg 169	Roof and room fire
22.	Rothenbaumchaussee 32	Roof fire
23.	Rothenbaumchaussee 73	Basement fire
24.	Schlüterstrasse 65a	Residential house, total fire
25.	Schlüterstrasse 42	Residential house fire
26.	Rabenstrasse 5	Residential house fire
27.	Magdelenenstrasse 35	Residential house fire
28.	Rothenbaumchaussee 9-19	Roof fire
29.	Rothenbaumchaussee 5	Roof fire
30.	Rothenbaumchaussee 7	Roof fire
31.	Schlüterstrasse 79	Residential house fire
32.	Schlüterstrasse 6	Residential house fire
33.	Alte Rabenstrasse 6	Residential house fire
34.	Rothenbaumchaussee 3	Roof fire
35.	Moorweidenstrasse 15	Roof fire
36.	Rothenbaumchaussee 32	Residential house fire
37.	Tostorpfstrasse 9	Residential house fire
38.	Put tank fire engine into action	

7/27/43

6:30 p.m. End of Assignment

9:00 p.m. Departure of Company

7/28/43

3:00 a.m. Company arrived back at Permanent Quarters at Kirchrode near Hannover.

Fire Fighting Squads and Equipment Put Into Use:

Seven Fire Fighting Squads were active at a total of 38 fire sites. Small fire tools were used twice; the FT 15's were used 11 times; the FT 8's were used 18 times; and the FT 25's were used 3 times. The pumps were in use for a total of 129 hours.

One B line and 70 C lines were laid, using a total of 2700 meters of B hose and 3945 meters of C hose, as well as 28 stand pipes. In two instances, the Hook and Ladder Truck was used, and extension ladders were put in use 14 times.

State of Health

The state of health of the crews, considering the length of the assignment just completed, is generally satisfactory. Aside from minor abrasions and cuts, there were no injuries.

Provisions

Food was supplied by Company-owned Field Kitchen. Meals were ample and good.

Losses and Damage to Equipment

Lost or rendered unusable were the following:

3 C hoses
1 fire axe
1 suction pump 2.5 cm

(Signed) Borgtlundt
Major of FPP (Res.)
and Division Chief

CIVIL DEFENSE OFFICE - INDUSTRIAL DIVISION
Hamburg District Office

Hamburg, August 14, 1943

To the
Police President
Deutschland Haus
Hamburg

RE: Report about the Major Air Attacks on Hamburg of July 24/25; July 27/28; July 29/30, and August 2/3, 1943

The above attacks extended to all plants in the district with the exception of those in Harburg and Bergedorf. However, even in these two latter localities, some plants were affected. The townships of Geesthacht, Wedel and Wenzendorf were spared altogether by the attacks.

The number of mines, high explosive bombs and phosphorus and stick fire-bombs which fell on the various plants and factory installations cannot be determined with any accuracy because of the density of the attack.

The enemy attacks on Hamburg by far exceeded any expectations in this regard, so that the preventive measures taken by the plant civil defense organizations were not always sufficient to prevent major damage. Despite this fact, however, it was possible to save numerous plants, or to prevent major damage, especially in cases where the civil defense forces attacked the fires vigorously before they became too large and caused too much damage. The plant civil defense organizations have proved by their actions that they are absolutely equal to the task, even though major catastrophes like the attacks of July 25 and August 3 must be expected from now on. It should be mentioned here that the factory forces extinguished the fires as soon as the bombs fell and ignited. Only when the fire storm came up later, did they falter.

The telephone lines went down right after the first attack, so that the plants had to rely on messengers for information. Because the Fire Protection Police forces were strained to the utmost, they were rarely able to give any fire fighting assistance to the ICD plants, so that the plants mainly had only their own forces to rely on for extinguishing the fires.

Particular difficulties arose right in the beginning of the first attack when the municipal water supply failed. The absence of the 60 to 70 water storage basins planned for the ICD plants was sorely felt. Plants which

did not have an independent water supply were solely dependent on nearby water storage basins or water reserves kept in readiness for emergencies.

The very high absentee rate of employees in these factories after the first of the severe air attacks lasted all through the whole week and drastically reduced the ranks of the ICD units. In many cases, even after the first attack, the necessary forces could not be mustered. The reasons for this are: (1) many of the men themselves suffered losses of relatives or of their homes and belongings and felt obliged to take care of personal problems which had arisen; (2) all public transportation had ceased to function and many employees could no longer reach their place of work from far away; and (3) after the second air attack, large-scale evacuation measures were taken by the authorities which transported whole families, including the men, out of Hamburg. Even conscientious and dependable men reported to us that they were not able to convince the officials carrying out these evacuation measures that as Civil Defense members, they should report back to their respective plants. Also, in many cases, after the dreadful experiences of the attack nights, the employees could no longer be persuaded to occupy their posts as fire watches.

An additional difficulty was experienced by the immediate failure of the carefully planned telephone network, which would at least have given the fire watches a feeling of being in touch with Headquarters and with the plant civil defense warden, instead of being completely cut off.

Also, rumors quickly circulated throughout the various plants that the Police Precincts and the Fire Protection Police had ordered their own forces into the public bunkers when the alarm sounded. This had a very adverse effect on the morale of the fire watches.

Up till the present time, 88 factories have been reported as total losses. Altogether, according to reports received, approximately 240 plants suffered partial damage. The first impression right after the catastrophe was that 90 plants were totally destroyed, but the picture keeps changing daily as clean-up operations are being completed in the factories. Thus, several plants were reported as total losses, and after these were cleaned up and water and power were once again functioning, it was found that a large part of the plants was still operative. All factories at present show a desire to get back into production as soon as possible. A major factor is the availability of workers. The employees are returning to their places of employment very slowly. So far, 13 killed and 93 wounded have been reported.

General Experiences:

1. When the alarm began on July 24/25, 1943, it was impossible to

assume, from the meager situation reports, that a major air attack was to be expected. It would have made a great difference if this had been known from the beginning.

2. The population must be informed quicker about the experiences gained from the air attacks (as concerns food, etc.). Even now you still hear reports circulating in many places of a "rain of phosphorus." (Anxiety syndrome!)

3. The blast or shrapnel protection measures taken in advance had excellent results in all cases.

4. The gasoline supplied for the motorized fire engines was not sufficient. Even though the Federal Air Ministry called for a five-hour supply, this was only theoretical. The County Supply Offices reportedly are not in a position to furnish this five-hour supply because of the critical gasoline shortage which prevails at present. In one case, valuable buildings (cold storage depot) had to be abandoned to the fire because of the gasoline shortage, although a short fire fighting effort would have been enough to extinguish the fire. Also replenishments were often difficult to come by because the Fire Stations which had been designated as reserve depots had often been destroyed themselves.

We suggest that suitable ICD plants with tank installations be used as filling stations, so that fuel supplies may be quickly replenished at any time.

5. While fighting conflagations, surveillance of smaller halls and rooms must not be neglected.

6. The iron fire doors must be kept closed at all times.

7. There should be many more large water storage basins built.

8. Fire watches should be roped when they enter smoke-filled rooms, so that they can find their way out again.

9. Fire fighting and civil defense equipment should be dispersed at various locations within the plants, so that they are not all destroyed at once.

10. Large fire beaters have proved very helpful in the case of flying sparks.

11. Measures should be taken so that every employee has a pair of protective goggles.

12. More water in large containers must be kept ready in air raid shelters. Plant civil defense wardens and Civil Defense monitors must be well acquainted with all escape routes. In densely populated city districts escape possibilities out of the area must be mapped out.

13. If escape through burning buildings or burning streets is necessary, outer clothing must be kept wet. It is recommended to throw wet blankets over head and upper body.

14. The hollow spaces between ceiling and roof covering in some houses impeded fire fighting efforts, as the fire would run along these hollow spaces, and it was difficult to reach the actual fire site.

15. Flak and searchlight installations should be taken out of important factories, as they represent points of attraction for the enemy.

16. Tools should be on hand to make the opening of shelter doors possible. Experience has sown that after the detonation of a high explosive bomb or during the fire storm, air raid shelter doors could not be opened.

17. Gas masks proved more hindrance than help during fire fighting. It is much better to use protective goggles. Gas masks handicap the wearer and impair his sight.

18. Auxiliary lighting in air raid shelter rooms failed in many cases and led to panic. Emergency lighting should be safeguarded. Akku lamps have proved very dependable.

19. In general, the supply of burn bandages, burn ointment, boric acid solution, eye cups, etc. was insufficient. Bandage reserves ran out in many cases.

20. There have been complaints that Civil Defense forces, when working outside the plant, received no provisions.

21. Because of increasing difficulties encountered in getting employees to carry out their Civil Defense duties, it is suggested that CD Wardens be deputized as Police Officers.

22. The adjustable fire pumps are particularly useful in fighting newly developing fires.

23. The question has arisen repeatedly if it would not be more sensible to keep fire watches as fire commando squads in the air raid shelters instead of stationing them on the roof during attacks in order to avoid

heavy losses. The prevailing ordinances, however, are in oppostion to this strategy at the present time.

24. It has been shown that women assigned to CD duty must be equipped with protective suits, since women's clothing is very flammable and hinders vigorous movement.

25. Leaders of outside fire fighting units must obey the advice and orders of the plant civil defense wardens as to which parts of the plant have top priority. In one case, 2000 rounds of flak ammunition exploded because the plant CD warden was stopped from saving the ammunition stored in the attic by an outside fire squad leader who told him that he, the squad leader, was in charge there.

The air attacks have destroyed or damaged a considerable amount of ICD equipment and materials. All plants were urged in a circular letter from our office to replenish their reserves and, if they run into difficulties, to report same to us at once.

(Signed) Civil Defense Office,
Industrial Division
Hamburg District Office

Report About the Bombing by Enemy Planes of The J. D. Flügger Lacquer and Paint Manufacturing Plant, Neuhoferstrasse 4, Wilhelmsburg, During the Night of May 2/3, 1941

Weather: Clear skies; north-northeast wind, speed of 2-3 km/hr; air was cool.

Direction of Enemy Planes: Flying from north to south at an altitude of about 5,000 meters.

At 1:00 a.m., the sirens sounded the alarm. The crew of the Civil Defense fire squad, consisting of 21 men, 1 first air worker (female) and one telephone operator (female), immediately went to their respective posts. I went to the Command Post, taking the telephone operator along as an assistant.

At 2:45 a.m., the tower watch reported by telephone: "Firebombs dropped. Fire!"

At the same time, two heavy high explosive bombs fell about 200 meters away. I immediately alerted the fire squad and, without regard to the danger from flak fragments and falling bombs, the crew under my command immediately rushed to the fire site, as indicated on the map. After we extinguished the small fires (seven in all), I gave orders to connect two hoses to the southern 150 mm water hydrant, to fight a large fire that had been observed to flare up in a large wooden shed where flammable materials were stored. Between 5 and 6 firebombs had fallen onto the shed and it was in flames within a very few minutes afterward; the fire watches in the adjacent building were powerless to extinguish the fires because of their rapid spread.

We began fighting the fire with two hoses. I noticed immediately, however, that the pressure from the hydrant (municipal water network) was very low, so I gave orders to activate the motorized fire pump. The latter was connected to take water from the Vering Canal. The fire, which by that time had spread over the whole shed, was battled with four hoses.

In the meantime, a later fire at the adjacent plant (tin works) represented an immediate danger to the main building of our plant at Neuhoferstrasse, because sparks from it were driven over our way by the northwind. This building was a fabricating plant and had to be protected at all costs. I was able, with the help of some of my most capable men, to avert this danger. The small fire in the adjacent plant, caused by a firebomb, was extinguished with water and sand.

I then returned to the first fire immediately afterward. While I had been away, a brigade of the Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg Fire Department had arrived and was fighting the fires with additional hoses. Approximately 1-1/2 hours after it started, we had the blaze under control, so that the danger to the adjacent building and the oil depot was removed. My crew, however, had to continue spraying water with two hoses until 6:30 a.m., because the fire kept flaring up due to the presence of highly flammable raw materials (resins, rubber, chemicals) in the debris.

At 6:45 a.m., I ordered the squad to be relieved after they had fought the fire for four hours without a break; all the men were soaked to the skin, covered with soot, and completely exhausted.

And now to the success of our efforts:

Even though the loss of the large wooden shed with precious raw materials for lacquer fabrication is a serious loss, I was still successful, because of the highly efficient organization and training of my civil defense forces and the vigorous action of my people, to save all the fabrication buildings with irreplaceable machines, as well as the greatly endangered oil and petroleum depot. I was also successful in protecting the complete tank installation and two workshops containing machinery.

I am taking the liberty to point out briefly that it has been my experience during this air attack that the post of tower watch, if he is able to survey the whole plant, as is the case at J. D. Flügger, is of the greatest importance. Through rapid information from him I was able to assign my people within seconds after the bombs had fallen. Furthermore, it is of the utmost importance to have access to an independent water supply in case of municipal water failure, and to have the motorized fire engine in perfect working order.

Hamburg May 6, 1941

(Signed) Borenz Petersen
Plant CD Chief

J. P. LANGE SONS, RYE MILL

Grosse Elbestrasse 97
Hamburg-Altona,
May 13, 1941

REPORT ABOUT THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE PLANT CIVIL DEFENSE FORCES OF THE J. P. LANGE RYE MILL DURING THE NIGHT OF MARCH 12 - 13, 1941

Within the first two hours after the alarm, which began at 11:08 p. m. eleven high explosive bombs fell into the Elbe River at a distance of about 100 meters from our firm, and produced a considerable degree of air pressure and also tidal waves that were up to 30 meters high. Severe shocks were felt in the buildings. The air blast blew the flame of the boiler fire out into the boiler room and broke the regulator valve.

After the first phase of the attack, I noticed a bright fire glow from the direction of Grosse Elbestrasse. Several firebombs had dropped into the street itself, as well as on houses located across the street. Our own workshop building at Grosse Elbestrasse 148 had been hit by several firebombs, as had the copper smithy leased to the Helmut Thiel Company. These firebombs were extinguished without causing much damage in addition to the window panes which were smashed. The second firebomb had fallen into the mill carpentry shop and was immediately discovered and put out. It was easy to reach the core of the fire, despite the materials that were stored in the shop; however, the fire sources were widely dispersed and only after repeated after-hosings was it possible to extinguish the fire permanently. The damage was mostly confined to the broken windows and the burned wood. The third firebomb was not discovered until the early morning hours after the second alarm was over. A six-cornered hole in the roof of the grain silo started us on the search for the bomb. It had burrowed to a depth of about 3-1/2 meters into a filled grain compartment. The bomb was dug out and care was taken to have sufficient fresh air supply to prevent a dust explosion, and it took over two hours to remove the bomb. Charred grain had adhered to the body of the bomb, so that after twelve hours in a grain bin, the apparent diameter of the firebomb measured a half meter.

Since our experience has shown that a mass of grain seems to act as a smothering agent on firebombs we intend to keep all grain compartments filled as far as possible for this purpose. Our silo is lined with wood and has five floors. Because of this particular construction, we are of the opinion that it would be preferable to keep the upper grain compartments

filled to prevent penetration of the bombs to the lower floors. This is desirable because fires can be put out easier and faster on the top floors.

A fourth firebomb which fell into the magazine yard at Grosse Elbestrasse 156 caused only negligible damage. This bomb, too, was put out by plant civil defense forces. The bomb itself was found burrowed 1/2 meter deep into tight-packed ground. Our experiences: Because of insufficient light and the quick tight grip necessary to grab the bombs, injuries to unprotected hands resulted. We therefore immediately procured thick tough leather gloves for the men on duty. We also consider the use of high-performance, smoke-protection filters on gas masks to be indicated. We have procured some of these filters and shall report on our future experiences with them.

Special mention should be made of the vigorous actions and sound judgment of Industrial Civil Defense Worker Krōpelin. All other actions of the civil defense crew were fluid and disciplined.

(Signed) H. Wenzler,
Plant Civil Defense Warden

The above successes were made possible only because there were large amounts of sand and tools on hand. The phosphorus bombs were put out by covering them with sand. On the other hand, burning wood particles were extinguished with bucket sprayers. Experience shows that sand is an indispensable tool in extinguishing phosphorus bombs and therefore large amounts must be on hand.

The annex in the direction of Königstrasse was also hard hit, and the upper floor, which houses our cafeteria, was ignited.

Because the fire could not spread through the outer walls, the fire watch, having their hands full to save the department store, abandoned the annex and it was destroyed by fire.

(Signed) Fervers
Building C. D. Warden

Hamburg-Wandsbek, August 28, 1943

Supplement to the Report of Building Air Raid Warden Fervers of the Karstadt Department Store, Lübeckerstrasse 8-10, Wandsbek, of 8/27/43

The building of the Karstadt Department Store is a concrete structure composed of three building parts. The front part is protected by a 12-cm thick concrete gable roof. The attic under the gable roof has a cement floor and was empty at the time of the air raid. The middle part of the building is covered with a flat concrete roof. This part is vulnerable to air attack because of the large court well which reaches through five floors and has salesrooms on all four sides that are only 10 to 15 meters wide. The third and rear part of the building also has a flat concrete roof and because of the large windows built into the roof structure was especially vulnerable to destruction from falling firebombs. All flammable materials had been removed from under the large skylights. The four massive staircases were equipped with heavy fire doors on all floors.

In recent months, the Karstadt Department Store had drastically increased its supply of water and sand on the urging of the Fire Department, so that there were about 50 barrels with 200 liters of water each and a great number of bags filled with sand on hand.

During the attacks, at least one phosphorus bomb and one fire stick bomb fell through the gable roof of the front part of the building and burned themselves out in the fireproof attic without causing any damage. In the second part of the building, one phosphorus bomb fell through the skylight on the fifth floor and exploded on the ground floor. Here and in the lower floors the fires ignited by this bomb were extinguished by the Karstadt fire watches.

One phosphorus bomb dropped through the concrete roof of the one-story annex in the rear and apparently caused only minor damage. The fire watches put out the fire that started. Four more phosphorus bombs and some fire stick bombs fell onto the concrete roofs; none did any damage except the fourth phosphorus bomb which ignited the searchlight installation of the flak company and completely destroyed it. The gutted cafeteria in the annex was equipped with a fire door toward the staircase, and the fire could not make any headway. On the other hand, the windows in the western staircase were severely damaged by the fire. Again the fire watch did a very good job.

The statements made by Warden Fervers in his report were found to be correct, and on inquiry at the Civil Defense Precinct 100 today, I found that three employees of the Karstadt A.G. have been proposed for decorations. Wulff's actions cannot be verified and no decoration should be requested for him.

(Signed) Höltje, District Captain of FPP

Fire Division B **Hamburg, August 21, 1943**

RE: Verification of the Actions of the Plant Civil Defense Force of Rhenania-Ossag A.G., Grasbrook Plant, during the Air Attacks of July 25 and July 28, 1943

During the daytime attack of July 25, 1943, several oil tanks of the Rhenania-Ossag Company were hit by plastic firebombs, and two of the tanks that were filled with mineral oil, Fire Class 4, caught fire. By vigorous attack with foam jets under the direction of Plant Engineer and Deputy Plant Warden Wrede these tank fires were extinguished in a very short time, before a significant amount of oil was destroyed. A building containing work shops was hit by bombs at the same time and immediately burst into flame. A large-scale attack on the blaze by the Plant Civil Defense forces quickly brought it under control, so that the danger to the adjacent buildings was removed.

During the heavy nighttime attack of July 28, 1943, the crowded fat processing building with oil-saturated wooden ceilings burst into flame instantaneously. The extremely valuable refinery building and the neat's-foot oil refinery which were in the path of the leaping flames, were saved from destruction through the courageous attack on the fire by the plant Civil Defense people with 18 jet hoses, under the command of Civil Defense Chief, Engineer Buchheim, supported by forces of the Fire Protection Police.

The great successes achieved by the Plant Civil Defense forces are to be credited to the systematic training and vigorous leadership of the two Civil Defense Chiefs, Engineer Wrede and Engineer Buchheim, as well as to the understanding and cooperation which the Plant Director, Dr. Nörring, has always shown in Civil Defense matters since he took over the plant. Dr. Nörring personally takes his regular turn, just as do any of his employees, doing Civil Defense duty in his plant.

The above three gentlemen have been proposed for a War Service Medal First Class.

(Signed) Immelman

OXYGEN PLANT WILHELMSBURG
Linde's Refrigeration Company A.G.
20 Wittenstrasse
Hamburg-Wilhelmsburg

May 16, 1941

Industrial Civil Defense District Office
Altstadterstrasse 23
Hamburg,

RE: Damages Caused by Enemy Air Attack

In reference to our report of May 9, 1941, we can now submit an estimate for the work, resp. the total cost of damages caused by flak and bomb splinters as well as by firebombs and air pressure during the air attacks of May 8/9, 1941, and May 10/11, 1941.

1.	20 window panes of different sizes 3 skylight windows, wired 2 garage windows, wired 1 ornamental glass door		
		Total	200 RM
2.	1 window frame 1 storage shed door 2 garage door frames and roof		
		Total	300 RM
3.	4 holes in roof of storage shed, machine room, and apparatus room		
		Total	30 RM
		Grand Total	530 RM

Application for reimbursement of these expenses with invoice attached will be submitted to the proper authorities by the contractor as soon as the work is completed.

Heil Hitler!

Oxygen Plant Wilhelmsburg
of Linde's Refrigeration Co. A.G.

TEMPORARY REPORT ABOUT THE AIR ATTACK OF March 8, 1945

(Air Alarm at: 9 p.m.)

This report is to be submitted in triplicate to the ICD District Office within 24 hours after damages occurred. All information may be given in brief, but should give a clear picture of the defense measures taken and details about the actions taken to fight the damage.

I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PLANT: European Tank Storage and Transportation AG Hamburg Branch, Hamburg-Finkenwärder, New Petroleum Harbor

II. Kind of Business: Petroleum Refinery and Wholesale Tank Storage

III. Total Number of Employees 129

Number of Employees on CD Duty during the attack 31
Of these: (a) Number of Fire Watches --
(b) Members of Plant Fire Squad 27

IV. Plant CD Warden on Duty (Name): Dipl. Engineer H. Paschen

V. Data about the Attack:

1. Time Bombs Were Dropped: 9:28 p.m. to 9:43 p.m.

2. Number and Kind of Bombs Dropped:

Stick Firebombs		
Liquid Bombs		
High Explosive Bombs	115	(Blanket bombing) 28 duds
Air Mines		
Poison Gas Bombs		
Other		

3. Sites of Strikes: (See report)
(Example: Machine room, 2 high explosive bombs; lumberyard, appr. 25 stick firebombs; etc.)

4. Assigned plant civil defense forces to:

(a) Fight fires	27	persons
(b) High explosive bomb damages	--	"
(c) Decontamination	--	"

VI. Successes Achieved:
(Please attach detailed report, in particular data showing if the fire watches were adequate or if fire crews had to be assigned. Were forces not belonging to the plant volunteered and assigned?)

VII. Personnel Losses:

1.	Killed	--	( )*
2.	Seriously Injured	--	( )*
3.	Slightly Injured	--	( )*

* Show in parentheses the number of persons injured, resp. killed, during civil defense assignment (Fire watches, etc.)

VIII. Material Losses: (If possible, separated by building and equipment damage. For example: (1) Machine room severely damaged, machines destroyed.)

IX. Present extent of production loss: 100 percent

X. Map (in triplicate), showing:
1. Sites of bomb strikes
2. Fire Watch Posts
3. Boundaries of fire watch territories.

XI. General Remarks: None

Issued by Industrial CD District Nordmark

(Signed) Paschen

EUROPEAN TANK STORAGE AND TRANSPORTATION AG

Supplement to Temporary Report on
Air Attack of March 8, 1945

V.3. Sites of Hits:

(1) Direct Hit on Pump House of the Crude Oil Distillation Plant.

(2) Direct hit on pipeline.

(3) Direct hit on Tanks 22 and 15.

(4) Direct hit on splinterproof walls of Tank 15, Tank 24, and Tank 19, as well as boiler room.

(5) Direct hit on plant roads.

(6) Direct hit on railroad siding.

(7) Direct hit on Administration building, including worker's residence.

VI. Successes Achieved:

Due to widespread damage areas, our fire fighting squads were not adequate to successfully fight the fires. Outside forces were assigned as follows:

F&E Unit 2/C, Lt. Schulz: 60 men
3 Fire boats
2 heavy Fire Trucks 25

VIII. Material Damage:

(1) Administration building including workers' residence totally destroyed.

(2) Pump house of the crude oil distillation plant: 40 percent destroyed.

(3) Severe damage to pipeline network for steam and oil, as well as water.

(4) Tank 22: Completely destroyed (capacity 4,000 cubic meters).

Tank 15: Severely damaged (capacity 1,500 cubic meters).

Tank 19: Severely damaged (capacity 380 cubic meters).

Tanks 21 and 24: Lightly damaged (capacity 4,000 cubic meters each).

Tank 46: Damaged (capacity 18,800 cubic meters).

Plant roads 30 percent damaged.

Sidings: 20 percent destroyed.

Workshop buildings: 20 percent destroyed.

XI. General Observations:

Through the vigorous and courageous actions of the outside fire fighting forces (E&F Unit 2/C, Lt. Schulz) as well as our own plant CD emergency crew it was possible to extinguish the developing fires in a comparatively short time, before they could do too much damage.

Hamburg-Finkenwärder, 3/9/45

European Tank Storage and Transportation AG, Hamburg Branch

Supplement to Final Report on Air Attack of March 8, 1945

VI. Successes Achieved:

Because of the widespread damage and fire sites, extensive damage was prevented only by the quick actions of reinforced fire fighting forces. Because our fire squad was not large enough for this task, we requested help immediately after the attack was over from the E&F Unit 2/C which is quartered in the Petroleum Harbor. This unit arrived at 10:15 p.m. with 60 men, three fireboats and two heavy fire trucks 25, under the command of Lt. Schulz. In the meantime, the plant civil defense forces laid hose lines about 500 meters in length to the fire sites, so that as soon as the outside forces arrived, the fire fighting could be begun.

At 1:00 a.m., on March 9, the outside fire fighting forces were able to depart. The necessary after-hosing work and surveillance of the extinguished fire sites was taken over by our own forces and they remained on site until 7:00 a.m. of March 10, 1945.

Hamburg-Finkenwärder, March 27, 1945

European Tank Storage and Transportation AG
Hamburg Branch
New Petroleum Harbor

SELECTED PHOTOGRAPHS OF

H. E. AND FIRE DAMAGES

FROM AIR ATTACKS

ON HAMBURG AND OTHER CITIES

DURING WORLD WAR II

423a





H. E. and Fire Damage to Sloman and Schuer Warehouses

Air Attack No. 18 on 7/5/40

H. E. and Fire
Damage at the
Beuer J. Schuppen
Co. and the
Petroleum Harbor

Air Attack
No. 18 on
7/5/40





H. E. Damage to
Apartment
Buildings on
Sierichstrasse

Air Attack
No. 41 on
9/12/40





H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Hübener kai
Schuppen Sheds
No. 9, 17, and 19

Air Attack
No. 57 on
10/(24-25)/40







H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Hübener kai
Schuppen Sheds
No. 9, 17, and 19

Air Attack
No. 57 on
10/(24-25)/40

H. E. Damage to Apartment in Altona

Air Attack No. 64 on 11/13/40

H. E. Damage to
Building
Okenbergerfelde,
Berlinerator

Air Attack
No. 65 on
11/15/40



H. E. Damage to
Apartments on
Claus Groth-trasse

Air Attack
No. 65 on
11/15/40

H. E. Damage to
Apartments on
Claus Grothstrasse

Air Attack
No. 65 on
11/15/40

Fire Damage to
Buildings along
Mittelkanal

Air Attack
No. 66 on
11/16/40





Fire Damage to
Buildings along
Mittelkanal

Air Attack
No. 66 on
11/16/40

Fire at
Desenistrasse
No. 45

Air Attack
No. 72 on
3/1/41



H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Schuppen (shed)
No. 71

Air Attack
No. 74 on
3/(12-13)/41

Fire Fighting
After Oil Tank
Explosion at the
Petroleum Harbor

Air Attack
No. 74 on
3/(12-13)/41





H. E. Damage to
Facilities at the
Petroleum Harbor

Air Attack
No. 75 on
3/(13-14)/41

H. E. and Fire Damage to Apartment Buildings in Kiel, Germany

Air Attacks of 4/(8-10)/41

Hamburg
Fire Trucks
on Standby
in
Kiel, Germany
during
Air Attack of
4/(8-10)/41



H. E. and Fire Damage to Apartment Buildings in Kiel, Germany

Air Attack of 2/(?-10)/41



H. E. and Fire Damage to Apartment Buildings in Kiel, Germany

Air Attack of 4/(8-10)/41

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Apartment
Buildings in
Kiel, Germany

Air Attack of
4/(8-10)/41



H. E. Damage to
Railroad Station
near
Hamburg

Air Attack
No. 80 on
5/3/41







Fire Fighting
at the
Oil Refinery in
Wilhelmsburg

Air Attack
No. 82 on
5/9/41





Fire Fighting
at the
Oil Refinery in
Wilhelmsburg

Air Attack
No. 82 on
5/9/41







H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Oil Refinery
Facilities in
Wilhelmsburg

Air Attack
No. 82 on
5/9/41



Fires and
Fire Fighting
on
Alterdamm,
Klingenberg,
and at the
St. Auschas Church

Air Attack
Nos. 83 and 84
on
5/11/41 and
5/12/41







H. E. Damage to
Shed No. 62
on
Komerunweg

Air Attack
No. 82 on
5/9/41

H. E. and Fire Damage to Warehouse at Nordersand Speichen

Air Attack No. 82 on 5/9/41





H. E. Damage to
Apartment
at
Pentestrasse
No. 43

Air Attack
No. 85 on
5/20/41

H. E. and Fire Damage to Building at Klingenberg

Air Attack No. 83 on 5/(10-11)/41

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings on Köstergrosse, Burstah

Air Attack No. 83 on 5/(10-11)/41



Fire at
Rice Mill
at
Bullenhuserdamm 49

Air Attack
No. 90 on
6/30/41

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Rice Mill

Air Attack
No. 90 on
6/30/41

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Rice Mill

Air Attack
No. 90 on
6/30/41



H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Rice Mill

Air Attack
No. 90 on
6/30/41

H. E. and Fire Damage (Extinguishing Coal Fire) at Schumacher on Hammerdeich

Air Attack No. 94 on 7/26/41



H. E. Damage to
Haltermann
Petroleum
Works,
Wilhelmsburg

Air Attack
No. 94 on
7/26/41







H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Hamburg Main
Railroad Station

Air Attack
No.. 111 on
9/11/41



Interior Fire
Damage at
Catherinestrasse
No. 33

Air Attack
No. 112 on
12/31/41



H. E. Damage to
Structures on
Meindorfstrasse
and
Bilistedt

Air Attack
No. 113 on
1/(14-15)/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Lübeck, Germany

Air Attack of 3/29/42





H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings in
Lübeck,
Germany

Air Attack
of
3/29/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Lübeck, Germany

Air Attack of 3/29/42





H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Lübeck, Germany

Air Attack of 3/29/42





H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Lübeck, Germany

Air Attack of 3/29/42



H. E. and Fire Damage to Petroleum Storage Tanks in Lübeck, Germany

Air Attack of 3/29/42

Fire Fighting
(Hamburg Forces)
in
Lübeck,
Germany

Air Attack
of
3/29/42

Damage to
Ladder Truck
KL 1/II,
during operations
in
Lübeck,
Germany

Air Attack
of
3/29/42



Furniture
and
Personal
Belongings
in
Streets,
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42



Furniture
in
Streets
and
Fires in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42

Fires and
Fire Fighting
in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42



Fires and
Street-Debris
in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42

Fires and
Street-Debris
in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42







H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42



H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42



H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42.

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/28/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42



H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42



H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings in Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Masonry
and
Paving
in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42





Fire Damage
to
Bricks
in
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42

Rostock,
After
Initial Debris
Clean-Up
Following
Air Attack
of
4/26/42
(see page 50)

H. E. and Fir
Damage to
Buildings
and
Residual
Debris
in
Streets of
Rostock,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/26/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings and Residual Debris in Streets of Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings and Residual Debris in Streets of Rostock, Germany

Air Attack of 4/26/42

H. E. Damage to
Buildings on
Catharinestrasse

Air Attack
No. 129 on
1/31/43

H. E. Damage to
Buildings on
Catharinestrasse

Air Attack
No. 129 or
1/31/43





H. E. Damage to Structures at Pentemühle in Hanschilt-Altona

Air Attack No. 130 on 2/3/42

H. E. Damage to Structures at Pentemühle in Hanschilt-Altona

Air Attack No. 130 on 2/3/42

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Tanks and
Barrels
at
Deutsche
Vakuum Works

Air Attack
No. 130 on
2/3/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Tanks and
Barrels
at
Deutsche
Vakuum Works

Air Attack
No. 130 on
2/3/43



H. E. and Fire Damage to Industrial Facilities and Debris Therefrom in Mannheim, Germany

Air Attack of 4/(16-17)/43





H. E. and Fire Damage to Industrial Facilities and Debris Therefrom in Mannheim, Germany

Air Attack of 4/(16-17)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Main Fire Station in Mannheim, Germany

Air Attack of 4/(16-17)/43

Fire Damage to
Concrete
Pillars of
Structures in
Mannheim,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/(16-17)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Brick Walls
in
Mannheim,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/(16-17)/43



H. E. and Fire Damage to, and Debris from, Buildings in Mannheim, Germany

Air Attack of 4/(16-17)/43



H. E. and Fire
Damage to,
and
Debris from,
Buildings in
Mannheim,
Germany

Air Attack
of
4/(16-17)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures in Stuttgart, Germany

Air Attack of 5/13/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures in Stuttgart, Germany

Air Attack of 5/13/43

Fires in
Structures on
Berliner Ter

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43





Fires in
Structures on
Berliner Tor

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings, Streets, and Automobiles, and Debris in Streets After Partial Debris-Clearance of Major Streets of Hamburg

Air Attack Nos. 153 to 154 in the period of 7/(25-28)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings, Streets, and Automobiles, and Debris in Streets After Partial Debris-Clearance of Major Streets of Hamburg

Air Attack Nos. 153 to 154 in the period of 7/(25-28)/43

Ill. 1. and Fire Damage to Buildings, Streets, and Automobiles, and Debris in Streets After Partial Debris-Clearance of Major Streets of Hamburg

Air Attack Nos. 157 to 159 in the period of 7./25-28./43





H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings, Streets, and Automobiles, and Debris in Streets after Partial Debris-Clearance of Major Streets of Hamburg

Air Attack Nos. 153 to 154 in the period of 7/25-28/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings, Streets, and Automobiles, and Debris in Streets After Partial Debris-Clearance of Major Streets of Hamburg

Air Attack Nos. 153 to 154 in the period of 7/(25-28)/43



H. E. Damage to
Bridge Over
Railroad Track

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43





51

H. E. (Shrapnel)
Damage to
Grazing Cows

Air Attack
No. 153 on
7/25/43



Fire Department
Trucks
on Standby at
Main Fire Station
in
Hamburg

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(28-28)/43





Fire Department
Trucks
at
Main Fire Station,
Fire-Destroyed
Fire Trucks
Abandoned on
Steindamm,
and
Debris from
Fire and H. E.
Damage

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43



H. E. Damage
to
Cathedral

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7(27-28)/43





H. E. and
Fire-Destroyed
Fire Truck
and
Ambulance

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43

Debris and
H. E. Plus Fire
Structural Damage

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43

Debris and
H. E. Fire
Structural Damage

Air Attack
No. 154 on
1127-28, 43

Scenes of
Death-in-the-Streets
in the
Hamburg
Fire Storm

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43



H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures and Debris Therefrom Following the Hamburg Fire Storm

Air Attack No. 154 on 7/(27-28)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Structures and
Debris Therefrom
Following the
Hamburg
Fire Storm

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures and Debris Therefrom Following the Hamburg Fire Storm

Air Attack No. 154 on 7/(27-28)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures and Debris Therefrom Following the Hamburg Fire Storm

Air Attack No. 134 of 7/(27-28)/43







H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures and Debris Therefrom Following the Hamburg Fire Storm

Air Attack No. 154 on 7/(27-28)/43



H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures and Debris Therefrom Following the Hamburg Fire Storm

Air Attack No. 154 on 7/(27-28)/43



Fire Damage to
Interior
of
Structures

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Structures
and
H. E. Damage
From a
Direct Hit on a
Personnel Shelter

Air Attack
No. 154 on
7/(27-28)/43



153



H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
H. E. Damage
From a
Direct Hit on a
Large
Personnel Shelter

Air Attack
No. 155 on
7/(29-30)/43

H. E. Damage
From a
Direct Hit on a
Large
Personnel Shelter

Air Attack
No. 155 on
7/(29-30)/43



Fire Damage
to a
Reinforced-Concrete
Pillar
and
H. E. Plus Fire
Damage to
a
Power Plant

Air Attack
No. 155 on
7/(29-30)/43

H. E. Damage to
An
Apartment
Building

Air Attack
No. 155 on
7/(29-30)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings

Air Attack No. 155 on 7/(29-30)/43







H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings (Note Air Intakes of an Intact Personnel Shelter of lower picture in which a large number of people survived through the mass fire)

Air Attack No. 155 on 7/(29-30)/43



H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43





H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/27-30/43



H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43







H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43





H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage to Buildings and Debris Produced

Air Attack Nos. 154 and 155 during the period of 7/(27-30)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Buildings
and
Debris
Produced

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43







H. E. Damage to Ships in the Hamburg Harbor

Air Attack Nos. 154 and 155 during the period of 7/(27-30)/43

H. E. and Fire
Damage to
An Apartment
and
Church
and to
Trees

Air Attack
Nos. 154 and 155
during the
period of
7/(27-30)/43

H. E. and Fire Damage With Wall Built of Debris-Produced Bricks

After Air Attack No. 155 on 7/(29-30)/43

Final Collapse
of
A Small
Burning
Apartment
Building

Air Attack
No. 155 on
7/(29-30)/43

Final Collapse
of
A Small
Burning
Apartment
Building

Air Attack
No. 155 on
7/(29-30)/43

Fire a
Pfeilhaus,
Kälhaus,
Brooktor

Air Attack
No. 149 on
1/15/44



Fires at
Rhenania
and
J. Schindler
Company's
Petroleur
Facilities

Air Attack
No. 158 on
6/20/44



Fires at
Rhenania
and
J. Schindler
Company's
Petroleum
Facilities

Air Attack
No. 158 on
6/20/44

Fires and Fire Fighting at the Petroleum Plants, Rhenania and Ebano

Air Attack No. 158 on 5/20/44

H. E. and Fire Damage to Petroleum Plants Wollkämmerei and Deutsch

Air Attack No. 158 on 6/20/44





H. E. and Fire Damage to Petroleum Plants Rhenania, Harburg, and Ebano

Air Attack No. 158 on 6/20/44

Fire Storm
Effects on
Trees in
Bremen,
Germany

Air Attack
of
8/19/44





H. E. and Fire
Damage to
Dockside
Structures
in
Bremen,
Germany

Air Attack
of
8/19/44





H. E. and Fire Damage to Structures and Petroleum Storage Facilities and the Debris Produced in Bremen, Germany

Air Attack of 8/19/44





Fire and H. E. Damage to Petroleum Plant Nemay/Neye-Misburg

Air Attack No. 188 on 12/31/44

Debris Clearance Along Berliner Tor (near Main Fire Station) as of 2/22/50 (almost 6-1/2 years after the 1943 air attacks)

Debris Clearance Along Berliner Tor (near Main Fire Station) as of 2/22/50 (almost 6-1/2 years after the 1943 air attacks)

Hammerbrook
Area
in
August of 1953,
about 10 years
after the
1943 air attacks



Hammerbrook
Area
in
August of 1953,
about 10 years
after the
1943 air attacks

Hammerbrook
Area
in
August of 1953,
about 10 years
after the
1943 air attacks







Steindamm
near
Berliner Tor
and Area
near
Hammerbrookstrasse
in
August of 1953,
about 10 years
after the
1943 air attacks



Main Fire
Station
on
Berliner Tor
and
Nearby
Apartment
Buildings
in
August of 1953,
about 10 years
after the
1943 air attacks