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ANALYSIS OF SELECTED U. S. STRATEGIC
FORCE MODIFIERS

K. H. Jacobson, et al

Stanford Research Institute

Prepared for:

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (Army)

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By: K. H. Jacobson M. M. Earle, Jr. B. Randall

Prepared for:

**OFFICE, CHIEF OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

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
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
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FOREWORD

As part of the continuing analysis of alternative U.S. strategic force postures the Strategic Studies Center has been analyzing selected modifiers which will influence the composition and level of U.S. forces. This report extends for STRATOP-84 the analysis of allied views, negotiations, economic and domestic considerations and nuclear proliferation undertaken in support of STRATOP-83. A separate report has been published on U.S. nuclear material requirements and production capabilities, another major force modifier. The two reports represent two man-months of effort.

The report has been prepared under the direction of M. Mark Earle, Jr., who also developed material on economic considerations. The principal author was Kenneth H. Jacobson. The late Burr J. Randall prepared the section on negotiations as well as the Appendix B. Dr. H. W. Rood reviewed the report; his comments have been incorporated directly into the technical note.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

I INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the defense planning process has become increasingly complex. The attenuation of bipolarity in the international system, the weakening of alliance cohesion, the Sino-Soviet split, and the softening of the Soviet-American rivalry are only a few of the developments which have challenged traditional methods of defense planning. The nature of the threat to American interests is no longer clear of unambiguous, and the possible impact of non-military factors on force planning, such as the influence of the U.S. domestic political climate or the possible impact of arms control negotiations is difficult to project.

The changing character of defense planning is reflected in recent force posture statements by Secretary Laird who advances a new approach centered on the concepts of Net Assessment and Total Force Planning. The first involves a "comparative analysis of those military, technological, political, and economic factors--which impede or have the potential to impede our national security objectives with those factors--available or potentially available to enhance accomplishment of those same national security objectives."¹ The second emphasizes the need to plan for "optimum use of all military and related resources to meet the requirements of Free World security."² The thrust of the new approach to force planning is to conceive security within the broad context of the overall political, economic, military, and technological environment within which strategic interaction will be taking place.

The new approach to defense planning necessarily involves consideration of factors with which defense planners have been only peripherally involved, such as likely patterns of foreign trade, political developments

¹ Secretary Melvin R. Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 15, 1972), p. 6.

² Ibid., p. 9.

in allied capitals, and the development of non-defense related technology. The probable impact of these factors raises new kinds of questions for American security planners--questions which are frequently not amenable to precise, quantitative solution.

It is the purpose of this report to analyze the possible impact of five selected factors on U.S. strategic nuclear force planning (as a distinct part of overall defense planning). The critical factors examined here are described as strategic force modifiers, those political, economic, social, and technological factors which--acting individually or in combination with others--can alter the framework for U.S. strategic force planning.

Force modifiers analyzed in this report are: 1) the domestic political climate; 2) arms control negotiations; 3) the question of nuclear proliferation; 4) allied views on security matters (NATO Europe and Japan); and, 5) economic considerations. Allied views of NATO Europe have received detailed attention in Appendix A to this report. A classified analysis of the impact of nuclear materials constraints on U.S. strategic force planning, by William J. Daugherty, Phillip J. Dolan, and Pamela G. Kruzic, has been published separately as SSC-TN-8974-67.

Each modifier can have impact at various points during the strategic force planning cycle. The choice of a nuclear strategy, the mix of force components, force levels, and qualitative force characteristics may in turn be affected by the interaction of strategic force modifiers. The way in which such factors will interact in the mid-range period cannot be predicted, but it is the intention of the research team to indicate the general direction in which force modifiers may be driving strategic force planning and to suggest important implications for defense planning.

Section II presents a summary of the report. In Section III the defense planning implications of the five selected force modifiers are examined.

II SUMMARY

The advent of approximate nuclear parity, the attenuation of bipolarity in the international system, the weakening of alliance cohesion, the Sino-Soviet split, and the softening of the Soviet-American rivalry are only a few of the developments which have contributed to the emergence of a new strategic environment. It is an environment in which the normal uncertainty associated with military planning has been compounded, for the threat to American interests is no longer clear and unambiguous. It is an environment in which less obviously military or strategic factors will become increasingly important considerations in U.S. national security planning. The tempo of change is reflected in the new approach to defense planning adopted by Secretary Laird which embraces the concepts of Net Assessment and Total Force Planning. This new approach emphasizes consideration of qualitative factors--political, social, and economic--as well as the utilization of quantitative techniques in evaluating the overall strategic environment.

The need to consider qualitative non-military factors raises new problems for defense planners. In the past questions such as the impact of international negotiations or international trade patterns were considered in relative isolation from defense planning. Today such factors have become integral to an evaluation of strategic relationships. The possible impact of such factors is, of course, difficult to project. It is the purpose of this report to analyze the possible impact of five selected factors on U.S. strategic force planning. They are described herein as "strategic force modifiers," those political, economic, social, and technological factors which--acting individually or in combination with others--can alter the framework of strategic force planning.

The strategic force modifiers selected for examination in this report are: 1) the U.S. domestic political climate; 2) arms control negotiations; 3) nuclear proliferation; 4) allied views on security matters; and, 5) economic considerations.

The U.S. domestic political climate is in a period of transition, characterized by the breakup of the New Deal majority coalition, the decline of organizational élan within both major political parties, and the increasing independence of the American voter. There is a wide range of speculation about the future of American party government. Of direct concern to national security planners are three general political trends which are likely to endure into the mid-range period. These are: 1) the growth of anti-military sentiments fueled by the war in Indo-China, which are widespread among young voters; 2) the breakdown of Congressional bipartisanship on matters of foreign and defense policy, symbolized by the weakening of the internationalist wing in the U.S. Senate; and, 3) the emergence of new interest groups within the American political system which share a common interest in the reduction of defense spending. These trends will probably militate against the modernization of U.S. strategic systems and the continued deployment of U.S. forces abroad. Barring a new wave of Cold War tension, they may even combine to limit appropriations for defense related research and development.

Arms control negotiations continue to act as an important force modifier in the mid-range period. Treaties which have already constrained force posture options include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), Outerspace Treaty, and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The Moscow Accords are a current example of the interaction of negotiations and strategic force planning. The Moscow agreements place stringent limitations on ABM deployment and establish quantitative limits on ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and ballistic missile submarines. The effect of the ABM limitations makes it impossible for either side to deploy significant damage limiting ABM defenses, and locks both countries into a posture of mutual deterrence through assured destruction. The Interim Agreement on offensive missiles and its accompanying protocol, on the other hand, allow for system modernization and replacement. Three important conclusions derived from the analysis are: 1) the tempo of arms limitation negotiations has increased markedly since 1959; 2) the increasing number of agreements and on-going negotiations will add to the complexity and constraints of strategic force planning; and, 3) increasing emphasis will be placed on negotiations to achieve U.S. political/military objectives.

Currently there are at least seven near-nuclear nations: Australia, The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), India, Israel, Italy, Japan and Sweden. The ease with which nuclear information can now be disseminated, the worldwide weakening of alliance bonds (particularly nuclear guarantees), and the growing perception that the United States and the Soviet Union may be inclined to settle outstanding political disputes between themselves without consulting third parties raise the likelihood that one or more of these countries may opt to obtain a nuclear weapon capability in the period under study. It is not possible to predict which of these countries will be the first to acquire nuclear weapons, nor can one anticipate American reaction to such acquisitions. U.S. reaction would no doubt vary according to: 1) the political context within which proliferation took place; 2) relations between the proliferating nation and the United States; 3) the character of the national leadership exercising the nuclear option; 4) the threat against which proliferation was directed; 5) reaction in the international community; and, 6) the effect of the proliferation on the central strategic balance between Washington and Moscow. What the prospect of proliferation does suggest for U.S. strategic force planning is the need to deter nuclear blackmail against the allies of the United States and the need to terminate regional conflicts between Nth countries. These requirements suggest a wider range in U.S. force employment options and continued flexibility in strategic systems.

The views of the European allies of the United States will also serve to alter the framework of U.S. strategic force planning. The importance of Europe in the international system envisioned by the Nixon Doctrine attests to the likelihood that European security perspectives--particularly those in Bonn, London, and Paris--will become more weighty in Washington. European reaction to specific U.S. force planning decisions is difficult to predict even in the short term. It is possible, however, to indicate probable adverse reaction to certain U.S. foreign and defense policy options. Europeans could be expected to resist: 1) any significant reduction of U.S. force levels in Europe; 2) any unilateral American initiative to fundamentally alter the current NATO strategy or force posture; 3) any direct Soviet-American agreement at SALT II or through MBFR which decoupled the European theater from the United States (such as

an agreement to withdraw U.S. forward based systems (FBS)); and, 4) any military arrangements within NATO which might appear to limit the freedom of political maneuver especially for Bonn, London, and Paris.

The projected retrenchment of American power in Asia, domestic political developments, and the potential threat of Soviet and Chinese military power all suggest that Japan is being pushed toward a political and military role in Asia commensurate with its growing economic power. Unlike the Europeans, the Japanese are not intimately linked to the United States through a military command structure. Their security is less immediately affected by shifts in U.S. defense policy, and the range of options available to them is greater. Like the Europeans, the Japanese will be concerned that U.S. strategic forces remain capable of providing extended deterrence. Should the U.S. deterrent be degraded as a result of further negotiations or unilateral force reductions, Tokyo could reluctantly decide to become a nuclear power. Such a decision is likely to signal the end of the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty and the beginning of a neutral foreign policy for Tokyo. Implications for force planning appear to be that if close Japanese-American cooperation is to be maintained, U.S. strategic forces must be sufficiently large, survivable, varied and flexible to provide some measure of extended deterrence to Japan.

Probably the most commonly acknowledged modifiers of defense decision-making are economic considerations including the economic performance in the near term and the long-run, allocation of resources to defense and non-defense uses, and the changing role of the dollar in international economic transactions. The near term pressure to hold down defense spending can be expected to continue. Yet, the defense budget remains one of the most effective instruments for stimulating the economy and it is therefore likely that current budget levels will be maintained into 1974. For the period 1974-1984 the potential of the economy for stable growth appears strong. During this period defense budgets could be expanded at a moderate rate of 2-3 percent per year, while domestic programs could be allowed to grow at a somewhat higher rate. Removal of the dollar from its exclusive position in international economic transactions can be

expected to provide a short-run stimulant to the economy; the long-run effects are also beneficial but more readily measured in political than economic terms.

Table 1 highlights significant force planning implications of the selected force modifiers.

Table 1
STRATEGIC FORCES MODIFIERS: PLANNING IMPLICATION HIGHLIGHTS

CUMULATIVE EFFECT	DOMESTIC POLITICAL CLIMATE	NEGOTIATIONS	NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
PLANNING IMPLICATIONS HIGHLIGHTS	Political climate influenced by Vietnam experience. Pres-sures to reduce defense spend-ing and reorder national priorities remain strong. Public support for follow on SALT with USSR.	Tempo of negotiations in-creases, adding to the com-plexity of strategic force planning. Negotiations will remain a favored instrument for achieving U.S. political/military objectives.	In an environment in which several Nth countries have acquired nuclear weapons, U.S. must be able to: (1) deter nuclear blackmail of its allies, and (2) terminate regional conflicts between Nth countries.
	• Foes of defense spending will concentrate on "triad redundancy" arguments. • Opposition to SOF modern-ization, Safeguard site defense for NCA probable. • Pressures for unilateral force reductions (bombers, older ICBMs) likely. • Possible opposition to R&D in new defense technology should be anticipated.	• SALT I places strict limits on ABM development and deployment. • SALT I rules out assured survival as a strategy option for the mid-range period. • SALT I places no con-straints on improvement of SOF. If both sides exercise replacement and modernization options, U.S. nuclear suffi-ciency becomes more dependent on MIRV technology. • SALT II likely to focus on intercontinental bombers, tradeoffs between U.S. FBS and Soviet SOF.	• Proliferation suggests the need for a wider range of force employment concepts, continued flexibility in available systems. • Retention of triad could have benefits beyond main-tenance of an assured second strike capability. • Prospect of prolifera-tion argues against unilateral drawdown of U.S. SOF. • Growth of Nth Country strategic arsenals may cause U.S. and USSR to re-examine levels of ABM inter-ceptors permitted them by SALT I.

Table 1 (continued)
STRATEGIC FORCES MODIFIERS: PLANNING IMPLICATION HIGHLIGHTS

CUMULATIVE EFFECT	ALLIED VIEWS (NATO EUROPE)	ALLIED VIEWS (JAPAN)	ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
NATO countries seek continued U.S. military presence in Europe. Europeans will argue forcefully for the retention of U.S. forward based systems (FBS) as visible link to U.S. strategic deterrent.	• NATO countries would oppose unilateral reductions of U.S. force levels. • Europeans would resist U.S.-Soviet SALT II or MBFR deal to withdraw U.S. FBS. • Europeans would oppose unilateral U.S. initiative to alter current NATO strategy or force posture.	Nixon Doctrine, domestic political developments, growth of Soviet and Chinese strength are pushing Japan to assume a more active regional role. Options open to the Japanese more numerous than those available to Europeans. • U.S. strategic forces must be received in Tokyo as being sufficiently large, survivable, varied, and flexible to provide some measure of extended deterrence to Japan. • If the U.S. strategic deterrent is degraded, Japan could reluctantly exercise the nuclear option. • Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan is likely to signal end of U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty.	Near term pressure to reduce DOD budget likely, but, for the next several years, expenditures will probably remain at current levels. • The controllability of the federal budget is decreasing. Some 50% of budget expenditures are now considered uncontrollable. • Adjustments to the international monetary system resulting from a free-floating dollar exchange rate are not fully apparent. Some short-run stimulation to the economy is expected. • Near-term shifts to non-defense programs more likely to result from growth in real output than from radical reductions in DOD budget. • Long-run potential of economy is sound. Planners may assume defense budgets at current levels through the mid-range period.
PLANNING IMPLICATIONS HIGHLIGHTS			

III ANALYSIS OF SELECTED STRATEGIC FORCE MODIFIERS

A. U.S. Domestic Political Climate

From the Truman Doctrine of 1947 until the late 1960s American presidents enjoyed broad public support to maintain extensive overseas commitments. The national consensus was reflected in the Congress where U.S. foreign policy was assured of bipartisan support and where military appropriations and foreign aid bills passed with minimum debate. Since the late 1960s, however, it has become apparent that this consensus has broken down; and that the American political system is undergoing fundamental change.

The absence of consensus is not confined to issues of foreign policy and defense. Most analysts agree that the New Deal coalition of labor, the south, minority groups, and intellectuals, which was fashioned by Franklin D. Roosevelt and insured the dominance of the Democratic Party from 1932 to 1968, has broken apart. At present no new majority coalition has emerged, and the course domestic politics will take in the mid-range period is far from clear.

A serious impediment to the creation of a new majority coalition is the weakness of the two major political parties. Neither has been able to increase its proportion of registered voters. There is a growing tendency among younger voters toward independent registration. Even among voters who identify with either of the parties, party discipline has diminished. The greater geographical mobility of voters, the decline of patronage available to political machines, rising costs of political campaigning, and the increased use of the direct primary to express voter preferences are some of the factors that have led to a reduction in the role of political parties.

Political columnist David Broder paints a pessimistic picture of the future of American party government. He argues that political realignment is long overdue, as evidenced by rising public frustration with the

political process, but suggests that the structure of both parties has deteriorated to the point that reform may no longer be possible.¹ Other analysts express more optimism. Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg contend that there is a potential majority of voters in the center of the political spectrum to which both parties should direct their appeals. They see a broad consensus existing on the "social issue" of public order, drugs, and permissiveness, and are less emphatic about the need for political realignment.² Kevin P. Phillips, on the other hand, sees the failure of the Great Society as the watershed in the breakup of the New Deal coalition. He predicts the emergence of a new conservative political majority based on urban Catholics, middle class suburbanites, and the growing population of the so-called "sun belt" of Florida, Texas and the southwest.³

Given this range of interpretation about the future course of American politics, projection of the interaction between defense planning and the political system is a hazardous enterprise. From the perspective of the defense planner, however, there are three trends now operating in the domestic arena which appear likely to endure into the mid-range period. These trends, which are consistent with the electorate's inward looking orientation--that is the increased public attention being given to domestic problems as contrasted with issues of foreign policy and defense, are: 1) the growth of anti-military sentiments; 2) the breakdown of Congressional bipartisanship on matters of foreign and defense policy; and, 3) the emergence of new interest groups within the American political system.

Anti-military attitudes among the young and in key sections of the opinion-making elite are a phenomenon common to most industrialized

¹ David S. Broder, The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America, (New York, Evanston, San Francisco, and London: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), especially pp. 189-244.

² Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (Garden City, New York: Coward McCann, 1970).

³ Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1970).

democracies in the West. In the United States such attitudes have become sharper and more widespread during the country's long involvement in Indo-China. Since large numbers of new voters have reached voting age in a period when such attitudes were fashionable, it is reasonable to expect that these attitudes may enjoy a fairly lengthy half-life even after the war itself has been concluded. One indicator of the depth of such attitudes may be the rate of military enlistment after the U.S. Department of Defense moves toward its goal of "zero draft." Barring renewed belligerence on the part of the communist powers, however, the anti-military sentiments aroused by the Indo-China conflict are likely to remain a constraint on defense planning.

For roughly twenty years between the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the late 1960s, American presidents could rely on public support for their foreign and defense policies. This support was reflected in the Congress, where partisanship, in the words of a then contemporary slogan, "stopped at the water's edge." Today debates over re-ordering national priorities and the treaty and war-making powers of the President are but two manifestations of the fact that issues of foreign and defense policy are no longer separate from the contention of domestic politics. "President Nixon," one authority has observed, "is the first postwar President to conduct a foreign policy in the setting of domestic dissent. None of his predecessors labored under a similar handicap."¹ Partly as a consequence of the national experience in Vietnam and partly because of reaction to the anti-Americanism prevalent in the developing world, the Congress has become less "internationalist" in outlook. This mood was particularly evident on October 29, 1971 when the Senate temporarily threw out the foreign aid bill. Until a new consensus is forged, issues touching on U.S. involvement abroad are likely to stir intensive congressional debate.

¹Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Half Past Nixon," Foreign Policy, No. 3 (Summer 1971), p. 20.

A third factor likely to influence U.S. strategic force planning in the period under study is the emergence of new American interest groups, which can be expected to demand an ever increasing share of tax revenues. One such example is the "education lobby," which has become more powerful in recent years with the expansion of education and the entry of more teachers and educational administrators into the labor market. Public servants, such as policemen and firemen have also become more numerous and better organized. What many of the new interest groups have in common is an interest in increased government spending in the non-defense sector. As the political influence of these groups increases, there will undoubtedly be more legislators at various levels of government that will view their demands sympathetically. In effect, the emerging interest groups will be competing with established groups for budget dollars, and may well offset the influence of those groups that have traditionally supported an internationalist foreign policy and large defense budgets.

There are those who would argue that the political impact of these trends will begin to dissipate after the War in Indo-China is concluded. But it is well to bear in mind that large number of voters have entered the electorate since the United States first became militarily involved in Southeast Asia. The political attitudes of the bloc of voters have been molded in a period of great uncertainty about national purpose, widespread social criticism, and the emergence of a range of seemingly insoluble social problems. What is significant about the existence of a political generation, notes one American political scientist, "is that patterns established in the formative youthful years tend to persist. The impact of events then lingers, even if the events themselves do not."¹ Rightly or wrongly, younger voters have associated the domestic crisis of the 1960s with the War in Indo-China, and more importantly, with U.S. "over commitment" in the international arena and heavy defense spending.

¹Louis M. Seagull, "The Youth Vote and Change in American Politics," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCXCVII (September 1971), 90.

Given the probable endurance of these trends, it is reasonable to project a domestic political climate in which pressures to reduce defense spending and re-order national priorities will remain strong. These pressures may gather momentum from the successful outcome of SALT.I. As expectations for more extensive disarmament rise, Congress may prove to be reluctant to appropriate funds for strategic force modernization and defense related research and development (R&D).

The recently negotiated Moscow Accords lock the United States into an Assured Destruction posture for the near term. Domestic political acceptance of this condition is probable, and fundamental disagreements over the issue of strategy are unlikely to surface, except among experts in the defense community. The political consensus will probably be that the continued vulnerability of the United States and the Soviet Union insures observance of the Moscow Accords, and increases the likelihood of further disarmament agreements.

The projected political climate suggests that any change to the current force posture is likely to stimulate lively debate. Public support for follow-on arms limitations agreements with the USSR can be anticipated. Foes of defense spending can be expected to mount arguments against the alleged redundancy of the triad,¹ and to oppose the modernization of U.S. air defenses, specifically the development and deployment of AWACs, over-the-horizon radar, improved interceptors and the advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM-D). The question of redundant strategic offensive systems is likely to be the single most divisive issue relating to strategic force planning since it involves the future of already planned new programs like the B-1 bomber, site defense of Minuteman (SDM), and the undersea long-range missile system (ULMS). Controversy over "triad redundancy" may even create unusual short-term

¹ See for example the line of argument advanced in the National Urban Coalition's Counterbudget: A Blueprint for Changing National Priorities 1971-1976. (New York - Washington - London: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 257: "Part of the reason for our current surplus capability is the maintenance of a triple deterrent--Polaris submarines, Minutemen land-based missiles, the B-52 and FB-111 bombers... This redundant triple deterrent can be reduced... Maintaining a mixed strategic-offensive force does not require that bomber or land-based missile forces be significantly modernized or even kept at current levels."

political alliances. For example, advocates of a "blue-water nuclear strategy," who seek a gradual shift in the mix of strategic offensive force components, may find themselves advancing arguments superficially similar to those who advocate a reduction in the number of independent strategic offensive systems.

The domestic political climate can be expected to produce controversy over strategic force levels. Manpower, of course, is likely to act as a constraint on all defense planning. New incentives for recruitment and re-enlistment are already in effect and Secretary Laird has even raised the possibility that legislation may be required to enable the Department of Defense to draft people into selected reserves.¹ Foes of defense spending may also be expected to use the triad redundancy argument in disputing the need to maintain current force levels. Opposition can be expected to programmed strategic force modernization, such as enhanced survivability for the G-H model B-52 bombers or improved air defense components, on the grounds that funds should not be expended on "redundant" systems. Arguments for retiring older bombers and ICBMs can also be anticipated--even if no agreement is reached with the USSR at follow-on SALT.

Domestic opposition to the development of an accurate MIRV, which surfaced considerably before the signing of the Moscow Accords, is an indicator of probable political resistance to qualitative force improvements in counterforce capabilities. Opponents of such improvements will claim that improved systems are destabilizing to the central balance between Washington and Moscow, contrary to the spirit of the Moscow Accords, and guaranteed to provoke compensating programs in the USSR. It is even possible that research in new technology, as for example laser ABMs, would be opposed for similar reasons.

B. Negotiations

Over the past twelve years the tempo of Soviet-American arms control negotiations has increased (see Table 2). Agreements reached between

¹Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Annual Defense Department Report FY 1973, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 15, 1972), p. 169.

Table 2

**ARMS-CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS
INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR
1959-1972**

SHORT TITLE	MAJOR EFFECTS OF AGREEMENT	OPENED FOR SIGNATURE	ENTERED INTO FORCE	YEARS SINCE LAST MAJOR AGREEMENT
ANTARCTIC TREATY	Prohibits Military activity and bans nuclear weapons	1 Dec 59	23 Jun 61	-
HOT LINE	Provides direct communications between Washington and Moscow	20 Jun 63	20 Jun 63	2
LTBT	Limits nuclear testing in atmosphere, in outer space, and under water	5 Aug 63	10 Oct 63	0
OUTER SPACE	Bans the earth orbit of nuclear weapons	27 Jan 67	10 Oct 67	4
LANFZ	Prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America	14 Feb 67	22 April 68	1
NPT	Limits proliferation of nuclear weapons	7 Jan 68	5 Mar 70	2
SEABEDS TREATY	Prohibits emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor	11 Feb 71	18 May 72	2
IMPROVED HOT LINE	Improves reliability of direct communications between Washington and Moscow	30 Sep 71	30 Sep 71	1
ACCIDENT'S AGREEMENT	Exchanges information between U.S.-USSR in event of nuclear incident	30 Sep 71	30 Sep 71	1
BW CONVENTION	Prohibits development and production of biological weapons and toxins	10 Apr 72	*	*
ABM TREATY	Limits U.S.-USSR ABM defense to (2) sites	26 May 72	*	*
INTERIM OFFENSE LIMITATIONS	Freezes U.S.-USSR ICBM launchers and SLEB launchers for 5 years	26 May 72	*	*

* NOT ENTERED INTO FORCE

Washington and Moscow have come to exert an increasing influence on strategic force development. The LTBT prohibits nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. The Outerspace Treaty prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth. The NPT binds signatories not to transfer nuclear weapons to any non-nuclear state or to assist any non-nuclear state in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

As significant as the effect of specific agreements, however, is the arms control climate which a dozen years of negotiating has produced. The tempo of negotiations has increased despite serious superpower disagreement over Indo-China, Czechoslovakia, and the Middle East. There is apparent agreement between both sides that limits must be placed on their rivalry, that their mutual concern with strategic stability outweighs lesser policy objectives, and that negotiations afford both sides an opportunity to achieve their objectives at reduced risks.

The prospects for further agreements between Washington and Moscow have risen with the success of SALT I.¹ By terms of the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, both parties are obligated to continue active negotiations for the limitation of offensive systems. Other negotiations are already in the offing. The NATO ministers have agreed to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to pursue mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) negotiations with the Warsaw Pact. A Law of the Sea Conference is in preparation for 1973. Indeed the era of negotiation heralded by the Nixon Doctrine has become a reality, and it can be anticipated that negotiations will continue to be a favored instrument for achieving U.S. policy objectives.

¹On May 26, 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union signed three agreements in Moscow: 1) a treaty limiting ABM sites and launchers; 2) an interim agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive forces; and, 3) a protocol to the interim agreement establishing ceilings on ballistic launchers and ballistic missile submarines for both sides. National technical means of verification are to be employed to police the Accords, and each side agrees not to interfere with the other side's means of verification or to undertake concealment measures which would impede verification.

As the tempo of negotiations increases, so will the complexity of strategic force planning. An arms control environment complicates the problem of projecting the threat. Breakthroughs in military technology not subject to treaty limitation will take on added significance. The interplay between treaty limitations and available technological options may become the single most important consideration in the calculations of defense planners during the mid-range period. Adding to strategic force planning complexity is the problem of harmonizing U.S. negotiating positions at the various forums where negotiations will be taking place. Because of the present compartmentalization of task groups and the close restrictions placed on sensitive information, it will not be easy to coordinate U.S. negotiation positions and ensure their conformity to overall strategic policy objectives.

Another factor adding to the complexity of strategic force planning is the interaction between the outcome of negotiations and U.S. public opinion. Progress in negotiations has already had a direct impact on the domestic political climate. Success at SALT I has raised expectations for more extensive disarmament, and may be expected to reinforce those trends militating against force modernization and military R&D programs. Political euphoria over arms control agreements may also set in motion pressures for unilateral force reductions.

The full range of treaty restrictions which might be imposed on U.S. strategic forces in the mid-range period cannot be forecast, but the force planning implications of the Moscow Accords in themselves suggest significant modification of the U.S. strategic force posture. Implications for the choice of a strategy, force component mix, force levels, and qualitative force characteristics are analyzed below.

The range of nuclear strategy options available to the United States has been reduced by the Moscow Accords. Stringent limitations placed on ABM sites and numbers of interceptors rule out Assured Survival as a viable strategy option for the mid-range period, unless, of course, the ABM Treaty is modified under Article XIV of the Treaty, which permits each side to propose treaty amendments.¹ The effect of the Moscow Accords

¹One way in which the United States and the Soviet Union might jointly move from Mutual Assured Destruction to a condition of Mutual Assured Survival is outlined in Appendix B. In essence the approach requires amendments to the ABM Treaty and the gradual drawdown of strategic offensive forces by both sides.

is to lock both parties into a strategy of Mutual Deterrence through Assured Destruction, a posture in which no serious effort is made by either side to limit urban/industrial damage by the other. Should significant reductions of strategic offensive forces result from SALT II, however, it is conceivable that both the United States and the Soviet Union might be negotiating themselves toward the joint adoption of a Minimum Deterrence strategy toward the end of the mid-range period. The Moscow Accords may also affect U.S. strategy for NATO. There is already speculation that SALT II will explore possible tradeoffs between the Soviet advantage in numbers of strategic offensive launchers and U.S. forward based systems (FBS) in the European theater.

The Moscow Accords affect every major strategic force component except intercontinental bombers. Strict limitations have been imposed by the ABM Treaty which is of unlimited duration. Article III of the Treaty limits deployment to two sites, each with one hundred interceptors. Qualitative limitations are also imposed. Article V of the Treaty prohibits both parties from developing, testing, and deploying sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems or components. In Article IX of the Treaty both sides agree not to transfer ABM systems, including interceptors, launchers, or radars to third states. In contrast, the Interim Agreement does not prohibit qualitative improvements in ICBMs and SLBMs, and is subject to renegotiation five years after having gone into effect. While the Interim Agreement freezes numbers of ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on 1 July 1972, it does not restrict numbers of warheads and permits further advances in MIRV technology. The strategic force component most affected by the Accords is clearly the Safeguard program. Although development will proceed at the Grand Forks Safeguard site, there are indications of probable political opposition to the construction of a Safeguard defense site for the National Command Authority (NCA) at Washington. This is but one example of the probable interaction between the results of arms control negotiations and trends in U.S. domestic politics.

¹"The...concept of minimum deterrence implies that the two nations involved have in effect signed a reliable nonaggression treaty with their populations as hostages to insure adherence to this treaty." See Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961), 11-12.

The Protocol to the Interim Agreement sets explicit levels on elements of the U.S. strategic triad. The United States is limited to 1054 ICBMs (100 Minutemen and 54 Titans), 710 SLBMs 44 ballistic missile launching submarines, and 200 ABM launchers. Under the Interim Agreement the United States could replace the 54 Titan ICBMs with three more submarines armed with 18 missiles each. At present the United States has 41 Polaris/Poseidon SSBN in its sea-based deterrent force. Under presently programmed MIRV deployment the present number of U.S. warheads will be expanded to 14,000 by 1976. An important defense planning implication for U.S. strategic force levels which has been raised by the Moscow Accords is that while domestic political pressures and budgetary constraints may work to reduce force levels, the force ceilings established in Moscow may come to be regarded as irreducible numbers to insure sufficiency in the absence of further agreements.

No restrictions are placed on the characteristics of strategic offensive systems by the Moscow Accords. If both sides exercise their replacement and modernization options, U.S. nuclear sufficiency will become increasingly dependent on MIRV technology and progress in defense related R&D. ABM improvements are not prohibited by the Moscow Accords, but the ABM Treaty restricts research and development to fixed land-based systems. Article II of this treaty defines an ABM system and its components in terms of interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars. An implication which might be drawn from these precise definitions is that ABM system employing a kill mechanism other than missiles is not prohibited. There is, however, an agreed upon interpretive statement which provides that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles (e.g., laser) are developed, limitations on such systems will be subject to discussion in the Standing Consultative Commission created by Article III of the Treaty.

C. Nuclear Proliferation

The gradual loosening of alliance ties, uncertainty surrounding nuclear guarantees in an era of strategic parity, and the rising costs of conventional armaments suggest that the prospects for nuclear proliferation could increase toward the end of the mid-range period. Nuclear information is easily disseminated. Neither secrecy nor high development costs appear to be the effective deterrents against nuclear

diffusion that they were once imagined to be. In a world in which collective defense arrangements have lost much of their postwar allure and in which superpower commitments may be less readily procureable, the impulse of near nuclear powers to exercise the nuclear option may prove difficult to resist. The sudden emergence of a regional military threat or nationalist and military-industrial pressures are two examples of developments which could spur a national leadership to initiate a military-nuclear program.

The international legal framework designed to check nuclear proliferation is the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which entered into force on 5 March 1970. At present it lacks the force which its proponents hoped it would have. Of the five nuclear weapons states, only the United States, the United Kingdom, and the USSR signed and ratified it. Neither France nor the PRC are signatories and both countries continue to conduct atmospheric tests prohibited by the Treaty. The seven countries most often described as near nuclear weapons states--that is those states believed capable of developing nuclear weapons within the mid-range period--fall into three categories with respect to the NPT. Sweden has signed and ratified the treaty. Australia, the FRG, Italy, and Japan have signed but not ratified the NPT; India and Israel have done neither.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by any of the near nuclear states would not in and of itself represent a threat to U.S. security. Four of these countries (Australia, The FRG, Italy and Japan) are allies of the United States, and a fifth (Israel) is dependent upon the American commitment to defend its territorial integrity. Neither of the neutrals--India and Sweden--can be regarded as a potential military threat. Moreover, the number of nuclear warheads that the United States will possess in the mid-range period appears sufficient to deter Nth country attacks on CONUS while still maintaining an assured second-strike capability against both major communist powers.¹ The challenge to U.S. strategic

¹ Conversely, the superpowers, limited to minimal strategic defenses by the Moscow Accords, may be deterred from attacks against Nth countries, depending of course on the kinds of weapons acquired by the Nth country. The credibility of a minimum deterrent strategy against a superpower is the rationale behind the independent French nuclear force.

planning is likely to arise in future crisis management. Washington should be prepared to: 1) deter Nth country nuclear blackmail of its allies; 2) restrain its own nuclear armed allies in a crisis; and, 3) terminate conflicts between Nth countries before such conflicts can involve the larger nuclear powers.

U.S. reaction to specific instances of Nth country proliferation would no doubt vary according to a number of factors: 1) the political context within which the proliferation took place; 2) relations between the proliferating nation and the United States; 3) the character of the national leadership exercising the nuclear option; 4) the threat against which the proliferation was directed; 5) reaction in the international community; and, 6) last but not least, the effect of the proliferation on the central strategic balance between Washington and Moscow. There are, however, some general strategic force planning implications raised by the prospect of proliferation which are worthy of consideration. Proliferation may effect nuclear strategy, the mix of U.S. strategic force components, force levels, and qualitative force characteristics.

The tempo of proliferation is unlikely to be so rapid as to require the adoption of an "all-azimuth" U.S. nuclear strategy in the mid-range period. At the same time the prospect of nuclear proliferation suggests that some departure from Mutual Assured Destruction will be necessary. Successful crisis management in an environment characterized by nuclear diffusion will depend on flexible and discrete targeting options and force employment concepts designed to deter Nth country provocations and terminate conflicts between smaller nuclear powers. A more flexible strategy, in turn, suggests that the maintenance of the triad can have other benefits beyond the maintenance of a second-strike capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Intercontinental bombers, for example, can retain their utility as a strategic force component even after they have lost the capability to penetrate sophisticated air defense. They can serve as credible deterrents to Nth countries. By the same reasoning it can be argued that U.S. strategic force levels should not be drawn down to the point that the entire arsenal is required to deter Soviet and Chinese attacks. Some hedge should be provided against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Nth countries.

A strategic environment characterized by nuclear diffusion highlights the importance of continuing ABM research development, and testing. Even though the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to stringent limitations on ABM development and deployment, the growth of Nth country (and Chinese) nuclear capabilities may cause both countries to re-examine the number of interceptors permitted them and the restrictions imposed on qualitative improvements.

D. Allied Views (N/IO Europe)

Though perhaps not as critical as the influence of economic constraints or domestic political pressures, the views of America's European allies will be an important consideration in U.S. defense planning during the 1970s. The importance of European views derives from the importance of Europe in the new international system envisioned by the Nixon Doctrine. The nations of Western Europe, gradually drawing more closely together, are seen as partners of the United States who share the American goals of international stability and the reduction of tensions. In his most recent foreign policy report to the Congress, President Nixon noted that "the essential harmony of our purposes is the enduring link between a uniting Europe and the United States."¹ Partnership between the United States and Western Europe, reinforced by American military strength, is seen as the basis for fruitful negotiations with the communist powers.

Thus, there can be little doubt that U.S. strategic force planning will have to consider the preferences and views of America's European allies. The views examined in this report (which are treated in greater detail in Appendix A) are those reflected in official publications or those advanced by Europeans with specific competence in foreign policy, defense policy, or political-military affairs. Popular views or semi-official views of Western Europe's numerous political parties--admittedly important in their own right--are not addressed here. Any summary of views necessarily glosses over considerable differences of opinion.

¹ Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 9, 1972), 40.

Security perspectives vary widely from Scandinavia to the Eastern Mediterranean. They differ according to a country's size and strategic location and also between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Because British, French, and German views are likely to prove most weighty, not only in deliberations in Brussels but also in their potential impact on American defense planning, they have been given primary attention.

In Western Europe there is a growing appreciation that the rise in Soviet military power coupled with uncertainty about the American commitment to NATO's defense has created new problems for European security. A deliberate Soviet attack is not thought to be likely, but the threat of Soviet political coercion and the danger that Western Europe could be drawn into war originating from a political crisis are believed to be real. With the advent of strategic parity, the concept of extended deterrence is viewed as much less credible. If a European balance is to be preserved, a visible presence of the United States is seen necessary. In addition, the Europeans seek a theater posture that maximizes deterrence and does not invite large-scale destruction if deterrence fails. Prolonged conventional defense is regarded as an unrealistic option. The value of tactical nuclear weapons is seen in the linkage they provide between NATO theater forces and the U.S. strategic deterrent and in their utility in maintaining intrawar deterrence.

European reaction to specific U.S. force planning decisions is difficult to predict even in the short term. It is possible, however, to indicate probable adverse European reaction to certain U.S. foreign and defense policy options.

Any unilateral decision by Washington to significantly reduce U.S. force levels in Europe would have serious effects within the Alliance. Marginal reductions would probably have little impact--indeed they appear to be anticipated, at least in Bonn. Large-scale reductions, however, could be perceived by the allies that Europe was being slipped out from beneath the cover of the U.S. strategic umbrella.

Because of European sensitivity over possible American withdrawal, proposed changes to NATO defense are likely to be viewed both as a cover under which American troops could be brought home and the first step toward the adoption of "tactical nuclear" strategy. Aside from the fact

that European political leaders are likely to fear that any proposed changes in NATO defense could serve to undermine the level of deterrence that the Alliance already possesses, they would also be understandably concerned about the political ramifications of another great debate about NATO strategy similar to the one which preceded the adoption of Flexible Response in 1967.

Apprehension over bilateral Soviet-American negotiations on European security matters can be anticipated. When the United States and the Soviet Union first agreed to discuss the limitation of strategic arms, informed Europeans expressed the fear that the United States might be prepared to purchase greater stability in the overall strategic balance at the expense of European security. America's willingness to inform and consult with its allies about SALT developments has helped to allay these fears, but new fears could materialize over a superpower deal on MBFR. In particular, Western Europeans can be expected to resist any Soviet-American agreement resulting in the withdrawal of U.S. forward based systems (FBS) from Europe.

Despite apprehension over American withdrawal and despite efforts to preserve what remains of extended deterrence, the leading powers of NATO Europe are anxious to retain their freedom of maneuver. The foreign policies of France and West Germany aim at ending the division of Europe. To varying degrees, and in different ways, the Gaullist policy of Détente and the Ostpolitik of the Brandt regime seek to build upon what has already been achieved in a period of reduced tensions. In spite of the adverse shift in the international balance of forces which has heightened the threat to European security, neither France, the Federal Republic, nor indeed any of the Western European nations which have increased trade and cultural contacts with the East want a return to confrontation in central Europe. Any U.S. military proposals which might appear to diminish the sphere of European political freedom are likely to be opposed by Bonn and Paris.

Specific strategic force planning implications are more difficult to project given the variety of European security perspectives. Obviously, the aspect of U.S. nuclear strategy which is of most concern to Europeans is the future status of extended deterrence, specifically the linkage between CONUS based U.S. strategic forces and NATO theater

forces. The central concern of European defense ministries will be to persuade Moscow that "coupling" continues to exist. To this end NATO governments will press Washington to continually reaffirm its commitment to use nuclear weapons in Europe's defense. Neither the mix of U.S. strategic force components, force levels, nor qualitative force characteristics are likely to be affected by European views, but the capability of U.S. strategic offensive forces to survive enemy attack, perform multiple missions, and acquire discrete targets will influence European political judgment about the viability of extended deterrence. NATO ministers also argue forcefully for the retention of U.S. FBS in the European theater, and will resist reductions in levels of U.S. general purpose forces. If FBS are withdrawn from the European theater, some movement can be expected toward the creation of an independent nuclear force (INF) among the governments of NATO Europe.

E. Allied Views (Japan)

In Europe the balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is bipolar and largely military. In the Pacific the balance is triangular (the United States, the USSR, and the People's Republic of China (PRC)), more political than military, and comparatively fluid. One of the key strategic questions to be answered in the mid-range period is Japan's place in the emerging Asian power balance, specifically whether it will choose to play a political and military role commensurate with its growing economic power.

Since the end of U.S. military occupation, issues of national defense have been accorded a low priority in Japan. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been anxious to repudiate the Japanese militarism of the past. It has deliberately kept the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) small, and has been content to preside over phenomenal economic expansion under the shield of the U.S. nuclear guarantee. The task of Asian peace-keeping in the postwar era has been borne primarily by American forces in the Pacific.

In recent years, however, pressures have mounted on Tokyo to assume a more active regional role. Most notable among these pressures is the shift of U.S. foreign policy under the Nixon Doctrine. Washington has served notice on its allies that they must assume a greater burden in

providing for their own defense and contributing to regional stability. In scaling down its Asian commitments the United States has not renounced its nuclear guarantee to Japan; but the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine is that while Washington intends to maintain its defense links to certain key countries, it will no longer accept the responsibility for preserving order in the whole of non-communist Asia.¹ The retrenchment of American power in the Pacific calls for a greater Japanese defense efforts and suggests to Tokyo that the defense of such vital Japanese interests as South Korea and Taiwan may fall eventually to the Japanese SDF.

The new American relationship with China, symbolized by President Nixon's recent trip to Peking, has increased pressure on Tokyo to adopt a more independent course in foreign policy. Premier Sato's government had been emphasizing a joint U.S.-Japanese approach to the China problem, and the announcement of the President's China trip, without prior consultations with Tokyo, caught the Japanese off guard.²

There are also domestic political reasons which suggest that the issue of defense may take on higher priority. Although Director General of the Defense Agency Nakasone has taken the stand that Japan should not aspire to nuclear weapons and should remain strong enough only to resist direct attack, there are indications that change is in the wind. The memory of war and defeat has faded as an entire generation has come of age since 1945. Nationalist feelings have begun to re-emerge. Defense is once again a subject of public discussion as the Japanese elite has come to appreciate some of the issues raised by American retrenchment and Tokyo's growing economic stake in the political stability of the Pacific Basin.³

¹ Alastair Buchan, "A World Restored?" Foreign Affairs, L (July 1972), p. 652.

² Frank Gibney, "The View from Japan," Foreign Affairs, L (October 1971), 109.

³ Hedley Bull, "The New Balance of Power in Asia and the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, XLIX (July 1971), p. 675.

Japanese security perspectives are also affected by the military capabilities of the two great communist powers. The modernization and lengthening reach of the Soviet navy presents a potential threat to Japanese maritime and investment interests. Tokyo's dependence on raw materials --particularly Middle Eastern petroleum--is greater than any other country's.¹ Most of the overseas supplies needed to fuel the Japanese economy pass from the Persian Gulf through the Malacca Straits. Control of this sea lane by a hostile power could exert powerful political leverage on Tokyo. Another potential threat is the PRC's nuclear arsenal. Although the Japanese have never regarded the PRC as particularly menacing, this perception could change following U.S. withdrawal from outposts on the Asian mainland.

A lower American profile in Asia, domestic political developments, and the threat of Soviet and Chinese military power all suggest that Japan will be forced to adopt a more activist foreign policy. Yet given the fluidity of the Asian Balance and the range of options open to Tokyo, the direction of Japanese policy in the mid-range period is far from clear. Breaking the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Security Treaty will be a primary foreign policy objective of both the Soviets and the Chinese. Maintaining the Treaty's continued cohesion will be Washington's principal Asian foreign policy objective. Tensions in Japanese-American relations surfaced in the past year. The return of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972 has only partially offset the effect of the twin "Nixon shocks"² in the summer of 1971. The Japanese were surprised by the timing and the manner of U.S. announcements that the President would visit the PRC in 1972 and that the United States had taken unilateral action in the economic sphere to protect American exports.

Assuming that Japan elects to become a major regional actor, the Asian balance in the mid-range period will depend on future interaction patterns between Washington, Moscow, Peking, and Tokyo. The range of

¹Strategic Survey 1971 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1972), p. 59.

²Foreign Policy Research Institute and Japan Society, Inc., Conference on U.S.-Japanese Political and Security Relations: Implications for the 1970s, February 4-5, 1972, Summary Report, (New York: March 1972), pp. 4-5.

possibilities is considerable. One author recently cited five: 1) a revival of the Sino-Soviet alliance to contain Japanese influence in Asia and oust American influence permanently; 2) a post SALT Soviet-American understanding to contain China, in which Japan played a minor role; 3) a U.S.-Soviet-Japanese understanding to contain China; 4) a Sino-Japanese economic entente aimed at reducing in the influence of the superpowers; and, 5) a bilateral Russo-Japanese entente.¹

In order to foreclose the least desirable possibilities U.S. foreign policy will have to be sensitive to Japanese views, and the maintenance of the Mutual Security Treaty may require some U.S. concessions in the area of foreign trade. The Japanese, in turn, will be guided largely by their perception of America's continuing will to influence the course of world affairs. Unlike the Europeans, the Japanese are not intimately linked to the United States through a military command structure. Their security is less immediately affected by shifts in U.S. defense policy, and the range of options available to them is greater. Apart from the vital issue of trade, what is important to Tokyo is the general tenor of U.S. foreign policy. The choice of Japanese defense strategy for the mid-range period is likely to be guided by Tokyo's assessment of: 1) the pace and extent of U.S. withdrawals in Asia; and, 2) the depth of isolationist sentiment in American politics. One important indicator of American intentions will be the strength and location of the U.S. Seventh Fleet after the War in Indo-China is concluded.

Like the Europeans, the Japanese will be concerned that U.S. strategic forces remain capable of providing extended deterrence. Should the U.S. deterrent be degraded as a result of further negotiations or unilateral force reductions, Tokyo could reluctantly decide to exercise the nuclear option. Such a decision would not be reached easily. Not only are the Japanese the only people to have experienced nuclear war, but the Japanese islands themselves are small, heavily populated, and particularly vulnerable to heavy collateral damage in the event of a nuclear attack. It is probable that such a decision would be taken only if the Japanese leadership perceived that the central strategic balance was

¹Buchan, op. cit., pp. 654-655.

shifting clearly and unmistakably in favor of the Soviet Union. A Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to signal the end of the Mutual Security Treaty and the beginning of a neutral foreign policy for Tokyo.

Implications for force planning appear to be that if close Japanese-American cooperation is to be maintained, U.S. strategic forces must be sufficiently large, survivable, varied, and flexible to provide some measure of extended deterrence to Japan.

F. Economic Considerations

Economic considerations will continue to exert significant influence on defense planning in the mid-range period. Four specific considerations will have special relevance: 1) performance of the economy in the near term; 2) adjustments in international economic relations resulting from the changed role of the dollar in international monetary transactions; 3) allocation of public resources between defense and non-defense programs; and, 4) the potential of the economy for long term economic growth.

While the early 1960s were generally characterized by rapid economic growth, the dominant characteristics of the period 1969-1972 have been moderate-to-low per annum growth in output, high rates of inflation, significant turbulence in international relations, and controversy over the priorities of resource use.

The return to a low-inflation, moderate growth condition has proved more difficult than government officials and economists initially anticipated. The Nixon Administration has set an unemployment target of around 5 percent in 1972, and seeks to reduce the rate of inflation to 3-3.5 percent by the end of the year. These goals are more conservative than those of 1971, and reflect a cautious outlook for the simultaneous solution of conflicting economic problems. The near term performance expectation is that 1971 performance will continue for 1972. Although the rate of inflation is being reduced slowly, the growth of real product is accelerating. Even though unemployment is not declining rapidly, the stage has been set for future reductions.

In general the federal budget is expansionary. The Administration continues to employ the concept of a "full employment" budget as the

primary approach to economic stabilization; i.e., spend federal funds at rates compatible with full employment conditions. Complicating the use of the budget as an instrument for stabilization is the growing inflexibility of the budget itself. Many service program benefits are distributed in such a manner that fiscal authorities are less able to control expenditure rates in order to achieve performance objectives. Table 3 presents the results of an analysis of those accounts in the federal budget which are considered to be relatively uncontrollable. Note that these accounts now constitute 50 percent of the budget on an adjusted basis. By 1975 the percentage may increase to 55-57 percent. Not only does this trend reduce the effectiveness of the federal budget as a fiscal instrument, but it also places greater pressure on controllable programs (such as defense) to assume a proportionally greater role to achieving stabilization.

By far the most dramatic elements of the New Economic Plan announced by the Nixon Administration at the end of 1971 were the wage/price freeze and the changed role of the dollar in international economic transactions. The wage/price freeze has helped to reduce inflation, although its effectiveness is as a short term measure and as a symbol of the Administration's determination to check inflation. The development of a new international monetary system has only begun. While the United States is not considered to be a major trading nation--only 4 percent of U.S. GNP is exported as compared with 20 percent for Japan--the political utility of the dollar's acceptance as a stable world currency was considerable. This advantage appears to be lost. On the other hand, the new flexibility of exchange rates should lead to an increased short-run demand for U.S. goods, thereby providing more jobs for U.S. workers.

The economic consideration most immediately affecting defense planning is the allocation of resources between defense and non-defense programs. The allocation of resources between defense and non-defense programs in 1962 and 1969 is shown in Table 4. Note the significant increase in domestic expenditures for education and health for 1969. International and defense programs have received a correspondingly lower priority in the same period. A survey of current literature, however, indicates that an increasing number of analysts are acknowledging that so long as

Table 3

RELATIVELY UNCONTROLLABLE FEDERAL OUTLAYS

Outlays in Billions of Current Dollars		Percentages of Total Outlays						
		Relatively Uncontrollable Outlays			Total Sample			
Retirement and Social Insurance	Other Accounts ²	Total Sample	Uncontrollable Outlays	Federal Outlays	Retirement and Social Insurance	Other Account	Total Sample	Relatively Uncontrollable Outlays
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Actual								
1960	\$15.6	\$19.2	\$ 34.8		\$ 92.2	16.9%	20.9%	37.8%
1961	18.5	19.8	38.2		97.8	18.9	20.2	39.1
1962	19.8	20.9	40.7		106.8	18.2	19.6	37.8
1963	21.5	22.9	44.4		111.3	19.3	20.7	40.0
1964	22.2	23.9	46.1		118.6	18.7	20.1	38.8
1965	22.5	24.4	46.9		118.4	19.0	20.6	39.6
1966	25.6	25.1	50.7	\$ 47.9	134.7	19.0	18.6	37.6
1967	27.2	32.1	59.3	57.1	158.3	17.2	20.3	37.5
1968	29.6	37.7	67.3	82.4	178.8	16.6	21.1	37.6
1969	32.5	43.2	75.7	118.6	184.6	17.6	23.4	41.0
1970	37.3	49.0	86.3	130.2	196.6	19.0	24.9	43.9
1971	46.3	55.3	101.6	145.7	211.4	21.9	26.2	48.1
Estimates								
1972	52.7	63.5	116.2	162.8	236.6	22.3	26.8	49.0
1973	57.0	65.0	122.0	174.6	246.2	23.2	26.4	49.1
Projections ⁴								
1972	41.4	51.9	93.4	109.4	170.8	19.2	24.1	45.9
1973	43.7	55.1	98.9	120.0	191.8	19.3	24.3	46.8
1974	46.0	58.3	104.3	130.6	212.8	19.3	24.4	47.6
1975	48.3	61.5	109.8	141.3	233.8	19.4	24.7	48.5

¹ Retirement and social insurance taken from function 701 account in "Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1971" and "Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 1973". The figures quoted after fiscal year 1962 are net of offsetting receipts.

² Rest of sample taken from the following accounts from the references cited in footnote 1 above:

351 Farm income stabilization

505 Postal service

652 Providing or financing medical services

850 Interest

901 Legislative functions

902 Judicial functions

903 Veterans benefits and sources

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

850 Interest

³ The adjustments to the relatively uncontrollable outlays involve removing prior year obligations, removing the miscellaneous "other" item and including military retired pay for the years for which it was not quoted.

⁴ Projection based on 1960-1971 data and estimates for 1972 and 1973.

Table 4

EXPENDITURES FOR NATIONAL GOALS 1962 AND 1969¹
(Billions of 1969 Dollars)

	<u>1962 Actual</u>	<u>1969 Actual</u>	<u>Percentage Change</u>
Consumption	418.5	579.6	38.5
Private Plant & Equipment	62.0	98.6	59.0
Housing & Urban Development	84.0	94.7	11.3
Housing	37.5	35.4	-5.6
Urban Facilities (excl. housing)	46.5	59.3	12.8
Social Welfare & Manpower Training	46.5	73.1	57.2
Social Welfare	46.4	71.1	53.2
Manpower Training	N.A.	2.0	Not available
Health	43.5	63.8	46.7
Education	41.8	61.2	48.1
Transportation	38.2	61.5	61.0
National Defense	66.5	78.8	18.5
Research & Development & Space	21.1	26.2	24.2
R & D	17.1	20.9	22.2
Space	4.0	5.3	32.5
International Aid	6.1	5.3	-13.1
Natural Resources	7.1	10.1	42.2
Agriculture	8.2	7.8	-4.9
Environment	N.A.	5.5	Not available
Total GNP	843.5	1167.0	38.3

¹ Lecht, Leonard, "Changes in National Priorities During the 1960s"
(DRAFT), Symposium Paper -- Strategy in a Decade of Change, SRI/FPRI.

the current defense strategy is not radically altered, major reductions in defense allocations will not be possible. But there is also a growing consensus that the country should shift from a "services" to an "income" strategy for domestic welfare programs. This shift would place increased pressure on the defense budget for a given level of federal expenditures.

Finally, mid-range defense planning will be conditioned by assessments of the economy's potential for stable growth. Maximum growth is that associated with expansion of Potential Gross National Product (PGNP), where PGNP reflects a full employment situation. For example, the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank estimates that the U.S. economy is currently 40 billion dollars below PGNP as a result of the 1969-1971 recession. The economy is expected to return to PGNP levels in late 1974 and to fluctuate around maximum aggregate output through the mid-range period. This growth should ease some of the current pressure on the DOD budget.

Appendix A

THE IMPACT OF ALLIED VIEWS ON U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE PLANNING

1. Introduction

Strategic force modifiers may be defined as those political, economic, and social factors which can interact so as to alter the framework within which strategic force planning is made. Though perhaps not as critical as the influence of economic constraints or domestic political pressures, the views of America's European allies will be an important consideration in U.S. defense planning during the 1970s. The importance of European views derives from the importance of Europe in the new international system envisioned by the Nixon Doctrine. The nations of Western Europe, gradually drawing more closely together, are seen as partners of the United States who share the American goals of international stability and the reduction of tensions. In his most recent foreign policy report to the Congress, President Nixon noted that "the essential harmony of our purposes is the enduring link between a uniting Europe and the United States."¹ Partnership between the United States and Western Europe, reinforced by American military strength, is seen as the basis for fruitful negotiations with the communist powers.

Thus, there can be little doubt that U.S. strategic force planning will have to consider the preferences and views of America's European allies, particularly those held in influential circles in Bonn, London, and Paris. The views which will be discussed in this Appendix are those reflected in official publications or those advanced by Europeans with special competence in foreign policy,

¹Richard M. Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: The Emerging Structure of Peace, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 9 1972), p. 40.

defense policy, or political-military affairs. Popular views or semi-official views of Western Europe's numerous political parties --admittedly important in their own right--are not addressed here.

Any summary of views necessarily glosses over considerable differences of opinion. Security perspectives vary widely from Scandinavia to the Eastern Mediterranean. They differ according to a country's size and strategic location and also between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Because British, French, and German views are likely to prove most weighty, not only in deliberations in Brussels but also in their potential impact on American defense planning, they have received primary attention in this Appendix.

2. The Western European Perception of the Threat

In general, America's NATO allies do not regard deliberate military aggression from the Warsaw Pact as an immediate threat. If there is a broad consensus in Western Europe, it is that despite the growth of Soviet military power, the overriding strategic balance has not shifted far enough to invite deliberate Soviet attack. The USSR is perceived to be deterred from such action, not by the certainty of U.S. response to aggression, but by the Soviet leadership's uncertainty that such a response would not be forthcoming. At the same time, developments in the past few years have caused some European defense ministries to adopt a somewhat more sober estimate of the threat to European security.

In the first place, the rapid Soviet buildup of strategic weapons and naval capabilities is an inescapable fact. "The balance of strategic forces," notes the most recent West German White Paper, "has shifted in favor of the Soviet Union."¹ The emergence of the Soviet Union as a full-fledged superpower with an ever-expanding global reach

¹Federal Republic of Germany, Minister of Defense, White Paper 1971/1972: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces, (Bonn: Press and Information Office, December 3, 1971), p. 40.

raises the possibility that Moscow might exploit this power through a campaign of political coercion against NATO Europe. In the second place, the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine demonstrated that the USSR's Collective Leadership would not shrink from using force to retain hegemony in Eastern Europe. Of equal importance, however, was another aspect of the Czech crisis. The sudden shift of Czech policy under Dubcek reflected the USSR's uncertain hold over Eastern Europe--a fact demonstrated again in Poland in the fall of 1970. Both factors--the USSR's determination maintain its position through force, and the instability of its client states--suggested that military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact might easily result from a political crisis in Eastern Europe. An obvious scenario which has suggested itself is a civil war in Yugoslavia following the death of President Tito.

Both the threat of Soviet political coercion and the danger of war arising out of a political crisis have been accentuated by the steady penetration of Soviet power along NATO's flanks. The growing Soviet military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean poses an obvious security problem to the governments of Greece and Turkey, runs counter to French interests in North Africa, and suggests the possibility that Moscow might one day be in a position to control the flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe. Less publicized, however, has been the USSR's naval expansion of NATO's northern flank. The Seidenfaden Report, published by the Danish Parliament in September 1970, called attention to the sizable advantage the Soviet Baltic Fleet enjoyed over NATO's Baltic forces. Later the same year, the Norwegian Minister of Defense warned of the buildup of the Soviet Arctic Fleet operating out of a complex of bases in the Murmansk-Kola area.¹

¹Egil Ulstein, Nordic Security, Adelphi Paper No. 81 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, November 1971), pp. 12-13.

3. The Western European Perception of the U.S. Commitment to Europe

So long as the United States possessed an effective nuclear monopoly over the Soviet Union, the umbrella of strategic nuclear deterrence was credibly extended to Western Europe--even while Moscow was deploying a large force of I-MRBMs against European targets. The credibility of the American guarantee was challenged first by the USSR's successful testing of an ICBM, and suffered further from the discussion of "limited war" and conventional defense of Europe in the early 1960s. European fears, eloquently articulated by Charles de Gaulle, centered on the possibility that the superpowers might agree upon "rules of engagement"¹ for a war in Europe--rules which could lead to Europe's devastation, while the homelands of the major antagonists remained unscathed. Such concern precipitated serious debate in NATO which resulted in the withdrawal of France from the command structure of the alliance.

Despite a divergence of security perspectives on both sides of the Atlantic, extended deterrence remained a viable concept. Throughout most of the 1960s the United States maintained its lead in strategic nuclear power. This lead was reinforced by the belief that even if the United States would not automatically respond to an attack on NATO with a strategic strike against the USSR, the possibility that it might was sufficient to maintain the credibility of NATO's deterrent posture.

The advent of strategic parity brings with it a fresh challenge to the concept of extended deterrence. Informed Europeans question how strong the link between NATO theater forces and the United States. In view of the superpower standoff at the strategic level, these Europeans perceive a greater number of options available to Moscow in achieving its objectives in Europe, and also the greater need for a strong theater deterrent as a means of foreclosing some of these options. The era of parity has exacerbated

¹ Michel Debre, France's Global Strategy, Foreign Affairs, XLIX (April 1971), p. 403.

European anxiety which had begun to surface in the early 1960s. One author has recently cited three specific fears: 1) that the United States is withdrawing its strategic-nuclear umbrella from Europe; 2) that in the wake of such a withdrawal, the USSR would be able to use its I-MRBMs as a "psychological bludgeon" against NATO Europe; and, 3) that Western Europe exerts too little influence in the nuclear-decision-making of the Alliance.¹

4. Western European Desiderata for NATO Security

To allay the first of these fears, the Europeans seek continued visible evidence of the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe. "The presence of U.S. troops," noted the 1970 West German White Paper, "plays an indispensable role in the defense of Europe. At the same time these troops constitute the link between Europe and the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Thus, the U.S. forces are both of political and psychological importance. If their number or strength were substantially reduced by unilateral action, this would lead to a profound change in the minds of the Europeans. A feeling of defenselessness could develop which might engender a critical political situation."² Fully aware of the pressures within the United States to reduce American troop strength in Europe, the Federal Republic has striven to ease the financial burden that the United States bears by maintaining some 300,000 troops in Europe. At the same time, the West Germans have repeatedly pointed out that because of the special psychological value of American troops, German (or other European) troops cannot be substituted for them if the balance of forces is to be preserved in Europe.

¹Walter F. Hahn, "Nuclear Balance in Europe," Foreign Affairs, L (April 1972), p. 507.

²Federal Republic of Germany, Minister of Defense, White Paper 1970 on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Armed Forces, (Bonn: Press Information Office, May 20, 1970), p. 30.

It is a truism that deterrence, not defense, is the central concern of NATO Europe. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that no concept for nuclear war-fighting has been developed in Europe. The Europeans want a NATO theater posture that maximizes deterrence and does not invite large-scale destruction if deterrence fails. For this reason, they tend to be less concerned about the "stability" of the European nuclear balance than some American commentators on defense policy. Quick reaction alert (QRA) missiles and aircraft and the independent French nuclear deterrent are seen as adding layers of deterrence to NATO's overall deterrent posture. In addition, the West Germans in particular are anxious to preserve the notions of forward defense and controlled escalation--that is "to meet any aggression with direct defense at approximately the same level... and to deter through the possibility of escalation,"¹ and reject any strategy which would trade German territory for time.

The official NATO strategy of Flexible Response, which was adopted in 1967, is itself deliberately flexible. It does not call for an automatic large-scale nuclear response to aggression, but neither does it countenance prolonged conventional defense of Western Europe. The West Germans, once the most vocal foes of conventional defense, have paradoxically become the most ardent European advocates of the modernization of NATO's conventional forces. This shift is probably occasioned by three political calculations: 1) the Federal Republic seeks to discourage any reduction of American forces in Europe; 2) the idea of tactical nuclear defense is unlikely to be palatable to the West German electorate; and, 3) open advocacy of nuclear defense might undercut the possible appeal of the Ostpolitik in Eastern Europe. In addition to these political calculations, there is evidence that even though the Germans continue to hold conventional defense of Europe to be unrealistic, they have come to accept the fact that in order to be effective, deterrence

¹Ibid., p. 28.

must be based on balanced forces. Bonn's Defense Minister, Helmut Schmidt expressed German acceptance of Flexible Response when he wrote:

It is reasonable and credible. There is no alternative to it. A return to massive nuclear retaliation would be incredible, as would be a fallback on purely "tactical nuclear" defense--the former being unimaginably cruel to the Americans, the latter to the Europeans. The strategy of flexible response is the only one which combines credibly effective deterrence with non-suicidal defense, sharing the risks in a fair way between North Americans and West Europeans.¹

Regarding the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons, the major European powers would prefer that their use be early and limited. Forward defense and controlled escalation are seen as the key. Early use would first and foremost demonstrate NATO's willingness to accept the risk of an escalated conflict. Theoretically, it would also cause the aggressor to weigh the cost of further aggression against the implicit threat of nuclear strikes against his homeland, and place the onus of escalation to intensified violence upon him. Demonstrative early use would also serve to reinforce the coupling of NATO theater forces to the U.S. strategic deterrent. Limited use, on the other hand, would hopefully reduce the likelihood of heavy collateral damage in the Federal Republic.

The importance of controlled escalation, or intrawar deterrence, also lies at the core of the semi-official strategy guiding the employment of independently operating French forces. According to General Charles Fourquet, initial conventional contact with French forces will reveal enemy intentions. If the aggressor continues his attack, French forces would then initiate a deliberate escalatory step by employing tactical nuclear weapons against enemy ground forces, thereby forcing the enemy to reconsider his objective and strengthening the

¹ Helmut Schmidt, "Germany in the Era of Negotiations," Foreign Affairs, XLIX (October 1970), p. 42.

credibility of a possible subsequent strategic strike by France against his homeland.¹

In, short, Europeans seek to maximize deterrence in Europe. There is agreement that NATO's forces should be modernized and its infrastructure improved. NATO's present level of conventional forces, while numerically inferior to those of the Warsaw Pact, is seen as sufficient to preserve the balance of forces on the continent, in view of the essentially defensive mission of the Alliance. The special psychological value of American forces in maintaining the balance is central to European thinking, and their unilateral reduction would be viewed as removing an essential element of deterrence. The principal deterrent functions of nuclear weapons are seen in providing: 1) a link between NATO forces and the U.S. strategic deterrent, and, 2) a means of maintaining intrawar deterrence in the event of a Soviet conventional attack. As indicated above, deterrence not war-fighting has been the principal concern of European defense planners.

5. U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Decisions Which Would be Received Unfavorably in Europe

European reaction to specific force planning decisions is difficult to predict even in the short-term. It is possible, however, to indicate probable adverse European reaction to possible lines of U.S. foreign and defense policy.

Any U.S. decision to significantly reduce force levels in Europe which is arrived at unilaterally would have serious effects within the Alliance. Marginal reductions would probably have little impact--indeed they appear to be anticipated at least in Bonn. Large-scale reductions, however, would signal to the allies that Europe was being slipped out from beneath the U.S. strategic umbrella.

¹Charles Fourquet, "Use of Different Systems in the Strategy of Deterrence," Revue de Défense Nationale, (May 1969) Reprinted in Atlantic Community Quarterly, VII (Summer 1969), pp. 250-251.

Similarly, any American initiative which is seen as an attempt to fundamentally alter NATO strategy and force posture would be greeted with suspicion and perhaps even alarm. Because of European sensitivity over possible American withdrawal, proposed changes to NATO defense are likely to be viewed both as a cover under which American troops could be brought home and the first step toward the adoption of "tactical nuclear" strategy. Aside from the fact that European political leaders are likely to fear that any proposed changes in NATO defense could serve to undermine the level of deterrence that the Alliance already possesses, they would also be understandably concerned about the political ramifications of another great debate about NATO strategy similar to the one which preceded the adoption of Flexible Response in 1967.

Apprehension over direct Soviet-American negotiation concerning European security matters can be anticipated. When the United States and the Soviet Union first agreed to discuss the limitation of strategic arms, informed Europeans expressed the fear that the United States might be prepared to purchase greater stability in the overall strategic balance at the expense of European security. America's willingness to inform and consult with its allies about SALT developments has helped to allay these fears, but new fears could materialize over a superpower deal on MBFR if the United States shows too great an eagerness to initiate MBFR discussions.¹ There is a deep distrust in Western Europe that a Washington-Moscow arrangement could have the effect of separating the problem of strategic stability from the problem of the European balance of forces. Concern that a combination of SALT/MBFR agreements could lead to the decoupling of the U.S. strategic deterrent from Europe and the withdrawal of American troops is very real. From the European standpoint, such agreements could result in a balance of forces in which greatly diminished NATO forces, effectively severed

¹ Christoph Bertram, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Europe: The Political Aspects, Adelphi Paper No. 84 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, January 1971), p. 21.

from the U.S. strategic deterrent, would be left to face still large Warsaw Pact forces and the Soviet I-MRBM arsenal. This kind of concern evidently lies behind British coolness and French opposition to MBFR negotiations.

Despite apprehension over American withdrawal and despite efforts to preserve what remains of extended deterrence, the leading powers of NATO Europe are anxious to retain their freedom of maneuver. The foreign policies of France and West Germany aim at ending the division of Europe. To varying degrees, and in different ways, the Gaullist policy of Détente and the Ostpolitik of the Brandt regime seek to build upon what has already been achieved in a period of reduced tensions. Despite the adverse shift in the balance of power which has heightened the threat to European security, neither France, the Federal Republic, nor indeed any of the Western powers which have increased trade and cultural contacts with the East want a return to confrontation in central Europe. Any military arrangements which might appear to diminish the sphere European political freedom are likely to be resisted.

6. Significant Trends in European Thinking

The lengthening shadow of Soviet strategic and naval power, uncertainty about the extent of U.S. commitment, and recognition of the fact that deterrence in Europe will probably rely more on NATO's theater posture and less on the U.S. strategic deterrent have stimulated new thinking in Europe which is quite likely to influence the future course of U.S. strategic force planning. Evidence of this new thinking is seen in the defensive orientation of the West German Bundeswehr and the unofficial discussions about the prospects of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation.

In the 1970s the Bundeswehr is rapidly becoming a purely defensive force composed largely of short-term draftees. Once liable to 18 months service, West German draftees are now called for only 15 months, and this new army is being structured for light infantry and anti-tank tactics. Recently developed weapons systems include the

"Pandora" and "Medusa" missile warheads designed to sow anti-tank mines in large quantities. "Dragon Seed" is another system under development which is designed to spread anti-personnel mines in great numbers.¹ Aside from the fact that this kind of "defense only" posture has domestic political appeal and is consistent with thrust of the Federal Republic's Ostpolitik, it is also a reflection of the view that the strategic situation has changed in recent years and that this kind of low profile defense best serves West German security interests. At the same time, however, there is renewed interest among West German military circles in the development of a new doctrine governing the employment of tactical nuclear weapons. The new orientation of the Bundeswehr has already led defense planners in Washington to consider the future structure of the American component to NATO theater forces, and there are those who argue that American forces on NATO's central front should be organized along the lines of the Bundeswehr.

Another line of European thinking is seen in discussions about Anglo-French nuclear cooperation as a first step toward the eventual development of a European nuclear force. The likelihood of a SALT agreement limiting Soviet and American BMD deployment has given the small European deterrents a new lease on life. Under such an agreement, London and Paris could retain a limited countervalue deterrent against the Soviet Union in the 1970s.² Admittedly, this kind of cooperation faces numerous hurdles. The significance of the discussions lies in the fact that they attest to mounting European cynicism about the future of extended deterrence. Many Europeans have become convinced that if deterrence in Europe is to be preserved, Western Europe must depend on its own resources to compensate for the waning credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee.

¹Earl F. Ziemke, "West Germany's Security Policy," Current History LXII (March 1972), p. 264.

²Andrew J. Pierre, "Nuclear Diplomacy: Britain, France and America," Foreign Affairs XLIX (January 1971), pp. 285-287.

Both developments signal a greater European willingness to take the initiative in matters relating to Western European security. The time may be past when Europe would wait for Washington to take the lead in defining requirements for the collective security of the Alliance.

7. Summary

In Western Europe there is a growing appreciation that the rise in Soviet military power coupled with uncertainty about the American commitment to NATO's defense has created new problems for European security. A deliberate Soviet attack is not thought to be likely, but the threat of Soviet political coercion and the danger that Western Europe could be drawn into war originating from a political crisis are believed to be real. With the era of strategic parity, the concept of extended deterrence is viewed as much less credible. In order that the European balance be preserved, a visible presence of the United States is seen necessary. In addition, the Europeans seek a theater posture that maximizes deterrence and does not invite large-scale destruction if deterrence fails. Conventional defense is seen as an unrealistic option. The value of tactical nuclear weapons is seen in the linkage they provide between NATO theater forces and the U.S. strategic deterrent and in their utility in maintaining intrawar deterrence. Europeans could be expected to resist: 1) any significant reduction of U.S. force levels in Europe; 2) any high-handed or unilateral American initiative to fundamentally alter NATO strategy or force posture; 3) any bilateral Soviet-American agreement regarding mutual balanced force reductions which effectively separated the European theater from the U.S. strategic deterrent; and 4) any military arrangements within NATO which might appear to limit the freedom of political maneuver for Bonn, London, and Paris. New trends in European strategic thinking are reflected in the defensive orientation of the West German Bundeswehr and the unofficial discussions about the prospects for Anglo-French nuclear cooperation.

Appendix B

FROM MAD TO MAS: A SUGGESTED APPROACH

There is nothing in the accords reached between the United States and the USSR which formally commits either party to a strategy of Assured Destruction. Admittedly, the ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, and permits no meaningful damage limiting ABM defense. It is also true that the interim agreement placing numerical limitations on strategic offensive systems is of but five years duration. On face value these facts suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union are locked into a posture of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). It is the purpose of this Appendix to demonstrate that neither side need remain wedded to Assured Destruction and that both sides can consciously move toward a posture of Mutual Assured Survival (MAS) if they adopt such a strategy at SALT II.

Less publicized than either the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms is the Joint Declaration of Principles to Guide Soviet-American Relations, signed by President Nixon and Party Chief Brezhnev in Moscow 29 May 1972. Ultimately this agreement may overshadow the two specific arms control agreements.

Two of the twelve agreed principles bear directly on the possibility of moving from what appears to be a MAD posture to one of MAS. The second principle commits both parties "to avoid military confrontation and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war." The sixth principle commits both parties "to make special efforts to limit strategic armament" and declares that both "regard as the ultimate objective of their effort the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security."

At the current state of SALT negotiations, a low level ABM defense and a five year quantitative freeze on offensive systems has been agreed upon. If both nations adhere to the principles outlined above, however,

the possibility arises that there can be a joint transition from MAD to MAS. One possible path that such a transition could follow is outlined as follows:

- Both sides could elect to amend the ABM treaty through the Standing Consultative Commission established by the treaty. The decision to amend the treaty could be prompted by military expansion of existing nuclear arsenals (PRC, France) or Nth country proliferation.

- Meanwhile SALT II could concentrate on stabilizing the balance in strategic offensive arms. Each side could agree not to threaten the other's second strike capability. This could be achieved by agreements limiting MIRV flight tests and improvements to MIRV accuracy. Alternatively the two sides could agree: 1) to allow the development of mobile ICBM launchers; 2) to permit the construction of one SLBM launcher for each ICBM launcher destroyed; and, 3) to permit site defense of ICBM fields. Any of the latter three measures would tend to reduce vulnerability and increase stability.¹

- If the strategic balance were stabilized along the line suggested above, both sides might feel confident enough to move toward joint reductions in strategic offensive arms. Each side, for example, could agree to destroy 100 of its most vulnerable missile launchers per year for a given period of years without replacement. Such an arrangement would require elaborate destruction and verification procedures, and the nuclear arsenals of other powers would have to be considered.

Following this pattern, the United States and the Soviet Union might--after a period of some years--reduce their strategic offensive forces to a level which could make MAS possible. Additional ABM defenses might prove desirable and could be expanded as offensive forces were reduced. This is one way the transition from MAD to MAS could be made through the mid-range period.

¹ Not all defense analysts will agree that the shift from ICBMs to SLBMs will tend to reduce vulnerability and increase stability.