Optimal Choosing Problems.
Abstract
The report deals with generalizations of a class of optimal stopping problems often referred to as the secretary problem. Generalizations pursued include a random N, and a more elaborate payoff structure. If the decision maker chooses a candidate its actual ranking among all candidates is then determined and he receives the corresponding payoff weight. Rather than knowing the exact number of candidates available for viewing (N), the decision maker has an a priori probability distribution with a finite upper bound on the actual number available. Further, when viewing any candidate, he does not know prior to his decision of acceptance or rejection whether or not there are any remaining candidates. Thus, if he rejects a candidate and there are no more to be viewed, then forced stopping occurs, in which case he receives a payoff less than all other payoff weights. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1972
- Accession Number
- AD0755249
Entities
People
- Willis T. Rasmussen
Organizations
- Stanford University