Game Theoretic Missile War Strategies,
Abstract
The dynamics of a ballistic missile war were modeled by a set of nonlinear differential equations. The dynamic model defines the changes in missile stocks and sustained casualties for both countries. Strategies for the countries were defined to be the time history of the missile rate of fire and counterforce-countervalue targeting proportions. A zero-sum differential game problem was defined by specifying a payoff function comprised of a linear combination of the terminal numbers of missiles and casualties. The calculus of variations was applied to the problem to derive first order necessary conditions for a saddle point equilibrium. The necessary conditions indicated that equilibrium strategies were of the bang-bang form. It was shown that for a constant countervalue effectiveness the targeting strategy would be a single switch from counterforce to countervalue targeting or countervalue targeting throughout. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 01, 1972
- Accession Number
- AD0755801
Entities
People
- Michael Joseph Gunn
Organizations
- University of California, Los Angeles