Optimum Allocation of Effort for Deterrence
Abstract
Mathematical models of optimum procurement allocation among different types of retaliatory weapons systems are examined. A distinction is drawn between so-called 'numerically vulnerable' (NV) systems (which find safety in numbers and are approximated by fixed missle bases) and 'percentage vulnerable' (PV) systems (which require the enemy to engage in a search effort to counter them). It is shown that it is generally preferable to buy a mix of PV systems and only a single optimal NV system. The models are also applicable to measure-countermeasure problems other than deterrence.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Aug 20, 1962
- Accession Number
- AD0758422
Entities
People
- A. L. Karp
- T. E. Phipps
Organizations
- Center for Naval Analyses