Prior and Posterior Probabilities and Semantic Information,
Abstract
According to logicians, high 'semantic information' must be desired by a scientist. It is associated with 'surprise'. Indeed, if scientist is defined as one for whom all errors are equally undesirable and all correct statements are equally desirable, then it does follow that (A) the scientists (though not a decision-maker in general) receiving perfect evidence gains least when it is a priori most probable (and thus 'least surprising'); and (B) the scientist receiving imperfect evidence gains, on the average, most from the message with the highest difference between two posterior probabilities derived from it: that of the proposition most probable a posteriori and that of the a priori most probable one. Of these results, (A) is probably, and (B) possibly, an adequate rendering, in terms of decision theory, of some parts of the logicians' discussion related to 'semantic information.' (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1972
- Accession Number
- AD0759831
Entities
People
- Jacob Marschak
Organizations
- University of California, Los Angeles