

AD-760 414

ARE WE ACHIEVING MAXIMUM USE OF THE
RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICER

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8 January 1973

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STUDENT ESSAY

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THE RESERVE COMPONENT OFFICER?"

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL ARSENY A. MELNICK
INFANTRY

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AD 760414

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT
(Essay)

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Lieutenant Colonel Arseny A. Melnick
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1. REPORT IDENTIFYING INFORMATION			
A. ORIGINATING AGENCY US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. 17013			
B. REPORT TITLE AND OR NUMBER "Are We Achieving Maximum Use of the Reserve Component Officer?", by LTC			
C. MONITORING NUMBER Arseny A. Melnick. 8 Jan73.			
D. PREPARED UNDER CONTRACT NUMBER(S)			
2. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A PC # 3.00 MIF # 1.45			

DDC FORM 50 AUG 65

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Arseny A. Melnick, LTC, Inf.
TITLE: "Are We Achieving Maximum Use of the Reserve Component Officer?"
FORMAT: Essay

The question of whether we are achieving maximum use of the Reserve component officer is a vital problem of today. The purpose of this essay is to point out the lack of adequate policy standards and their implementation of Army regulations regarding the education, experience and branch qualifications as applicable both to the Army National Guard and the USAR.

The present policy-making in this area displays an ineffective training management system in the Reserve components as well as a lack of policy adequate to train future generals from these components.

The essay is based on an analysis of the Department of the Army studies, supplemented by a survey of Reserve officers. From the evidence gathered and contained herein, it would appear that much improvement can be made in maximizing the use of qualified Reserve officers. That is the goal of this essay--to effectively analyze the inherent sources of this problem and to root them out.

The body of the essay is divided into subsections dealing with Personnel, Management, Promotions, Selection of General Officers, the National Guard, and other services, respectively. It is concluded with recommendations by this writer as to where improvements can be made in these various areas.

INTRODUCTION

In preparation of this review, the writer has given considerable thought as to whether or not the Reserves and the Guard are making use of component officers to their maximum extent in all possible areas and also what plans the Army should envisage for these men in the future. In an attempt to resolve this question, considerable published material was digested and extensive interviews conducted. The writer has considered many of the recommendations and points raised in the recent Army Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces,¹ as well as samplings of the earlier Hollingsworth Report² and has attempted to incorporate those various concepts within this review. Secondly, in order to obtain first-hand information from those sources most directly involved in these matters, various letters were submitted to component chiefs across the nation for their personal response. The purpose of these responses was to set down why the recommendations outlined in the above-mentioned studies were either accepted or rejected by the various chiefs. The results were extremely interesting and form a vital core of this essay. They provide special insight into the problems surrounding the Reserve Officer in today's modern Army (the correspondence is included in Annex A-E).

¹US Army Combat Development Commands Strategic Studies Institute, Army Study of the Guard and Reserves, (15 May 1972) Volume 1 through 4.

²US Department of Army, Board on Reserve Component Officers, Review of ARNG Federal Recognition Standards and Promotion Procedures for Reserve Component Officers, (29 December 1967) Volume 1 and 2.

PERSONNEL

It appears that both of the Army studies did indicate a serious deficiency in the procurement of officers for the ARNG and USAR. As a result, both components have had to resort to the use of Officer Candidate Schools. Few graduates of these schools have had any active duty, and most have not had more than six months active duty as enlisted men, indicating a considerable lack of experience.³ The 2nd Lieutenants produced by this system are not required to complete any basic branch officer course until they are considered for promotion to Captain. These officers are then being assigned to troop leadership positions despite the availability of large numbers of more experienced officers in the Individual Ready Reserves (IRR).

Some of the other major problems directly affecting the maximum use of the Reserve component officer both of the Guard and USAR are personnel assignments and promotions as follows:

1. The average age of the senior officers in combat and combat support units is in excess of the guide prescribed for in AR-140-10 for assignment to and removal from the table of organization and equipment. (TOE)⁴

2. The average level of active duty experience among officers in combat and combat support units is low and is continuing to decline.

³US Department of Army, Board on Reserve Component Officers, Vol. 2, pp. B-4 - B-6.

⁴US Army Combat Development Command Strategic Study Institute, Vol. 2, p. 135.

3. A significant sub-element of the problems concerning age is the perpetuation of tenure and unit assignment; in particular, in combat billets.

It appears that many unit officers, particularly in the ARNG, lack the active duty commissioned service and training necessary to insure individual technical proficiency through training and leadership in their units. It further appears that trained and experienced Reserve officers in the IRR are not being utilized geographically because of various obstacles in lateral mobility between the USAR and the National Guard.

A further factor which affects the efficiency and maximum use of the Reserve officer is the linkage between full-time civil service employment of technicians and maintenance of unit status. Many of these technicians are over-age for combat unit assignments and maintain their position tenaciously, since without a unit assignment, they cannot retain their civilian employment. Generally, they hold a dual status as technicians and as officers of their unit--a stagnant situation prohibiting very little movement to upper ranks for other officers.

MANAGEMENT

Responsibility for training supervision has been delegated to the Army area headquarters by USCONARC. The four continental armies have a combined span of supervision with a total of 18 Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMS), 45 General Officer Commands (GOCOMS) and the National Guard of 50 states. It is apparent that this organizational structure for training management is over-extended. The

ability of the CONUS Armies as now organized to supervise the training of such a large number of commands effectively is questionable.⁵

The United States Army Administration Center (USAAC) has the responsibility to provide for career planning and appropriate training of the non-unit reservist. USCONARC supervises the training of Ready Reserve units and the ARNG. The Army must have programs that a part-time officer can reasonably expect to participate in and at the same time have incentives and compulsory measures that will lead to his desired level of participation.

It has been the writer's experience that although various military schools are available to the Reserve component officer; because of time limitations, only a few can take advantage of the same.

One of the serious problems is the lack of a definite policy in guidance to insure that career development opportunities are made available and are encouraged. This is aptly stated in the Hollingsworth Report:

"Reserve Officer Career Planning

(9) There is no centralized career planning at the Department of Army level for Reserve Component Officers who are not on extended active duty. Responsibility rests with the individual officer to take positive action to obtain the military educational level required by his branch and grade for advancement. Career Planning information is provided in a Department of the Army pamphlet, National Guard Bulletin, and other publications."⁶

⁵Ibid., p. VII 29.

⁶US Department of Army, Board on Reserve Component Officers, Vol. 2, p. H-4.

No means are provided to assure varied assignments regardless of the degree of initiative on the part of the individual officer. Without adequate assignment opportunities, the Reserve officer cannot become qualified no matter what the extent of formal educational programs. He faces problems in this regard not shared by his active Army component.

Limited assignment opportunities indicate a need for planning at a reasonably high command level regarding position requirements and qualifications.⁷ An attempt to enforce personnel management is exhibited to a limited degree in AR140-10, which currently requires that in selecting officers for a command position all officers available, non-unit and unit, will be considered and the best qualified selected for the position. The Army Study of the Guard and Reserves established that this provision of the regulations is not being enforced. The ARNG does not have a similar directive.

The writer conducted a survey among mid-western Reserve officers of various branches at Camp McCoy during the summer of 1972, and found that in an informal interview with 105 officers, the predominant feeling was that the present Reserve system presents a "lack of meaningful-task-training," as well as "lack of opportunity to rotate in various assignments," etc. The paramount feeling was that these officers would welcome a challenge which would induce a greater Reserve commitment.

⁷Ibid., H-6.

The training and retention of the IRR as a filler for the Active Army is just as important so that meaningful and qualifying training must be required of this group.

Some changes to AR140-10 which apply to USAR units as to age criteria, will have to be implemented if we are to realistically upgrade the quality and vigor of the Reserves.⁸ Unfortunately, a similar directive does not exist for the ARNGUS. This is the usual problem of holding on way past the normal retention period, which inhibits advancement opportunity for junior officers.

Tightening up of supervision in the IRR seems to be in order, particularly to those officers who refuse unit positions. No career management system can be effective where it depends solely on voluntary participation.

It has been the writer's privilege in a course of interviews to discuss with several senior officers in the Army Reserve component as to what plans, if any, the Army has for graduates of the Logistician course given by ALMAC at Ft. Lee, Virginia, as well as graduates of the Non-Resident course at the War College. Surprisingly, there are no plans for utilization of these outstanding officers. The money spent to put these highly-qualified men through the various courses is not being utilized to its full extent. Many of these officers have had extensive civilian experience and have attained high educational qualifications in their civilian pursuits. At ALMAC, in particular, the majority of officers are just

⁸ibid., H-14.

about ready to retire under ROPA. It appears the Army has failed to pre-plan any use of these officers except, of course, in the event of an all-out mobilization. Although the age requirement is still low for the War College, its graduates at present do not have any prospect of being utilized to any great extent because higher commands that are available are somewhat limited.

PROMOTIONS

Selection of the best qualified officers for promotion is an important factor in the maintenance of a highly qualified Reserve component officer corps.

The greatest assurance of equality of consideration is provided when a board uses the same set of standards in evaluating all members of a peer group.⁹ The Reserve system is based on years of service and years of promotion service, but there is also a selection system known as "Unit Promotion," which provides for consideration of promotion to officers geographically available for unit assignment based on vacancy within the unit.¹⁰ Such promotions provide for a reduced number of years of promotional service.¹¹ This means encouragement of unit affiliation and points out some of the weaknesses of the USAR and ARNG promotional systems, due to the fact that in neither system can the best qualified officer always be

⁹Leventrosser, William F., Congress and the Citizen Soldier, (1967) p. 77.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 79.

¹¹US Department of the Army, Career Planning for US Army Reserve Officers, (October, 1969), No. 140-1, p. 8.

geographically present. Selection of the ARNG officer is made by the State under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe.¹² The law provides for a unit promotion both in USAR and ARNGUS for promotion to captain by a selection board. Promotions for major and up are retained by the Department of the Army. Over 62 boards are considering individuals for promotion to captain within their respective area of consideration.¹³ It is quite apparent that this decentralization works against the application of accepted standards and reduces the Army's authority to influence the quality of selection at the highest level. It would, therefore, appear desirable to eliminate some of the boards and consider a centralized system.

There are many other factors that contribute to the ineffective use of the Reserve Officer; particularly, a declination policy which permits an officer to reject promotion so that he may retain his unit assignment.

Unfortunately, military experience has not been considered a factor in promotions since many non-unit officers have been promoted strictly on point credit and educational achievement. A further review of some of the field grade records indicates many senior officers have not had any unit assignment for the past ten years and have merely participated in the Reserves by taking extension courses and classes in USAR schools, and the related ACDUTRA each year. It is doubtful whether these senior officers with such little command experience or other unit

¹²US Department of Army, Board on Reserve Component Officers, Vol. 2 p. E-2.

¹³Ibid., p. E-9.

experience could be expected to perform adequately as battalion commanders or even as staff officers at a level commensurate with their grade.

Thus the quality and leadership potential of these officers to the service should be strictly scrutinized. A review of some of the records indicates very little documentary evidence of the officer's demonstrated performance of duty. One of the most glaring shortcomings, particularly of the Federal recognition boards, is the fact that they are not even using officer efficiency reports in considering an officer in the ARNG for federal recognition.¹⁴ There is considerable inequity in the promotion between ARNG and USAR officers.¹⁵

SELECTION OF GENERAL OFFICERS

Although the regulations state that the best qualified officer will be nominated, there is no one standard provided as to the desirable qualifications. The studies of the Hollingsworth Report indicate that many officers selected lack command and/or appropriate staff experience. It appears that these officers were assigned in General's positions and were subsequently promoted to General officer grades with only an administrative type of assignment and lack any significant command experience.¹⁶

Thus the critical decision is not the promotion selection itself, but rather the assignment to the position in the first place. Under the present system whenever

¹⁴Ibid., p. G-5

¹⁵Ibid., p. E-13

¹⁶Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 11-10-4

a board is convened, the Department of Army names at least three officers who are qualified with appropriate recommendations for the job. However, in actual practice all qualified officers in a geographic area are not considered. Most boards do not really have complete dossiers on all officers who would be eligible. Normally those in authority only recommend the man who is holding the position thereby honoring the regulation in form but not in substance. The same criticism can be made on selection of General officers in the ARNG, which is even less selective.

It appears that the educational level of Reserve General officers is somewhat less than that of the Regular Army officers. Although regulations do not specifically elucidate, most active Army officers selected for General in the past few years have almost without exception attended the Army War College or other comparable senior service colleges. Courses offered at these colleges are designed to acquaint the officers with national and international strategy. Surely the Reserve Officer should be as well-qualified so that in the event of mobilization, he would be prepared to assume immediately whatever responsibilities are considered commensurate to the General officer grade.

It should be noted that the Hollingsworth Report has recommended that the Department of Army require that only those Reserve officers who have satisfactorily completed the Army War College (either resident or non-resident course) be eligible for promotion to general. However, there is some cleavage at higher levels as to whether or not this recommendation should be instituted. One reason perhaps is the fact that, should it be implemented now,

many of the candidate officers currently being considered would disqualify.

These and other deficiencies bring us into our next topic, which concerns a brief exposé of current inadequacies in the National Guard program and their relation to the Reserve Officer.

NATIONAL GUARD

The Guard has only the unit vacancy form of promotion. Such promotions may move them out of the units (as in the Reserves) and then usually out of the Guard.¹⁷ This is one of the reasons why there is a greater percentage of declination in promotions here than in the Army Reserves. The dilemma of the Guard officer is further magnified in the event that civilian employment requires that he move to another state. In that case, he must then develop a whole new set of relationships either with the new state Guard or the Reserves. This type of situation, along with the generally accepted fact that one needs political connections in the senior echelon of the Guard, keeps a large portion of the Reserve officers out of the Guard. There is a strong indication that the Guard has not attracted very many Vietnam veterans or ROTC graduates for the same reasons. The State Officer Candidate Schools, which were alluded to earlier in this report, were the result. Many senior Guard positions require a full time commitment and many years in the same position, along with a highly developed technician status. This type of situation

¹⁷National Guard Bureau, "Career Planning for Army National Guard Officers," Pamphlet 600-1, (1970) p. 4-1.

precludes qualified executives from participating in the Guard to any viable extent.

The ARNG promotion system is based on the commander's ability to observe the young officer. He alone decides who should be promoted.¹⁸ This system does not give the greatest possibility of a selection of the best qualified officer from among all of the officers who may be available and it is subject to influence of friendship and community relations. Thus there is a serious deterrent to promotion for many potentially well-qualified officers. Only 6.8% of the Army ARNG officers and 54% USAR unit officers in the grade of 2nd Lieutenant had completed the basic branch course in 1967.¹⁹ The 1971-72 Army Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces indicates that no substantial improvement has been made.

Partly because of these circumstances, the quality of the Guard officer from an educational basis is somewhat lower than the Reserve officer and is usually relegated to the small town businessman and civil servant. The Guard has no provisions for mobilization designees in senior active Army headquarters.

EXPERIENCE OF OTHER SERVICES

The Marine Corps and Navy have organized units in the Reserves, but neither has a unit vacancy promotion system. All promotions are on a service wide basis for all grades. In both services, and also in the Air Force Reserves,

¹⁸US Department of Army, Board on Reserve Component Officers, Vol. 2, p. E-5.

¹⁹Ibid., p. E-7.

promotions to General and flag rank are unassociated with geography or position held. All Marine officers after two years in a pay slot must step aside for at least a year. These vacancies are advertised and all interested officers may apply. During the "off period" these officers may attend school and take extension courses to prepare themselves for senior command positions. The Navy has a similar period of limitation applicable to all command billets.

It appears that their system does allow for changes in assignment, and thus develops more well-rounded officers, allowing time for schooling. The overall effect of this system has been good since it has strengthened those units and apparently has reinforced the traditional Marine esprit de corps.

The Air Force Reserve has a similar policy of a non-unit vacancy approach for the selection of General officers. Other than that, it appears that the Air Force shares the same problems as the Army with respect to the Air National Guard.

CONCLUSIONS

Many aspects of the present system have demonstrated that we are not achieving maximum use of the Reserve component officer. The result has been that the best men do not get to the top and our career development pattern is not optimum.

An analysis of the present procedure and statutory framework seems to indicate that we have accepted a marginal line management system which denies us flexibility in developing solutions to our problems. What should be done to improve the situation must be tempered by what possibly can be accomplished in the current power structure environment. The status quo is inadequate for the challenges ahead of us. "The whole tradition of excellence demands not only that our institutions, but individuals comprising the institutions put honest money on the table in the pursuance of excellence," stated Lt. Gen. Hollis, Chief of Reserve Components, in an interview with the writer in conjunction with research on this paper.²⁰

It is quite evident that the most effective use of the Army's resources of trained and experienced Reserve officers is not being utilized because of obstacles to lateral mobility between and within the Reserve components.

The age of a large number of senior officers in combat units exceeds the guidelines set forth in the regulations previously alluded to in this report. Some of this can be attributed to the inflexibility of the present Reserve component officer

²⁰Interview with Harris W. Hollis, LTG, Office of Reserve Component, USA, Pentagon, Washington, 1 October 1972.

career program, whereby loss of assignment in a particular unit can make it extremely difficult for an officer to participate further in the unit program. The requirement that technicians hold a TOE position has placed them in competition with other members of the unit. This creates tension since the technicians compete for command assignment and the grade attached thereto as a means of protecting their livelihood. The dilemma regarding age and assignment must be resolved if we are going to fully utilize the Reserve officer.

Unlimited tenure for officers in the Army Reserves Component and the difficulty of regaining a unit assignment has placed a high professional economic premium on retention of the unit status at the expense of professional development.

RECOMMENDATIONS

If we are to improve lateral and upward mobility, either new regulations or statutory requirements should be imposed by the Army so that all Reserve officers will be considered on an equal basis for assignments in both the ARNG and USAR, without discrimination as to the component in which they may be currently serviced.²¹ This approach would do a lot to break down barriers between the two Reserve components and utilize experience and talent irrespective of Reserve components.

Some thought might be given to separating the technician from the TOE

²¹See Annex E, Enclosure 1, Recommendation D, indicating a recent change in AR145-1, which requires ROTC graduates to accept assignment in ARNG or IRR.

position and creating a separate TD for him.²² This would enable the technician to continue in his military and technical status until he reaches the age of retirement, and would obviously open up a large number of promotion opportunities for non-technician members of both Reserve components. This would remove some of the disparities which presently exist. My suggestion of creating a separate TD would still permit the technicians to be available for mobilization.

Assignments should be limited to three years so that other officers in the geographic area would be permitted to assume vacancies when they occur. In the event qualified officers are not available, an extension of one year could be authorized. The requirement that all qualified officers in a unit's geographical area be considered for vacancies in each ARNG and USAR unit would do much to correct the present situation. This kind of restructuring would open upward lateral mobility within the various Reserve units and encourage qualified officers to remain in the active Reserves. A broad area of schooling and other inducements would have to be available for those officers who are leaving units so that they could complete their Reserve obligations. At the end of one year they would be eligible to be considered for a unit vacancy in their geographic area. This method has been successfully used by the USMCR and is, therefore, worth considering by the Army.

A system of centralization of ARNG and USAR officer assignment and promotional procedures seems to be in order, taking into consideration the

²²See Anex E, Enclosure 1, Recommendation A, which indicates this is already in effect for USAR.

constitutional provision reserving appointment of ARNG officers in the various states. This limitation could be resolved without legislation, by providing federal equipment along with operating funds only to those states willing to participate in an acceptable system. This type of program would go a long way in equalizing Reserve components. The officer assignment system would open up opportunities to the IRR pool of officers and the unit structure. This type of centralized system would encourage rotation of service between unit and non-unit service and would also offer long-term USAR students an opportunity to apply their training to a unit assignment. A centralized assignment system would encourage non-unit officers to participate in such programs. It is essential that officers get more on-the-job-training either in staff or command positions.

It is this writer's thought that more opportunity should be given to senior Reserve officers to fill MOB DES assignments on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in order to provide for better representation and professional development. There should be more opportunity granted to the Reserve officer to attend resident schools at the various joint service colleges, such as the Armed Forces Staff College, Industrial College of Armed Forces, and the National War College. It would appear that attendance at such courses by a greater percentage of Reserve personnel would contribute toward the professional development of the Reserve officer. Rotating command positions for these graduates and utilizing them in some staff position at the Pentagon would be a challenge. Perhaps in time the Army will be able to fit these men into a realistic assignment program beneficial both to them

and the nation. It is my belief that the implementation of these recommendations would greatly affect the upward mobility and flexibility of the component. Ultimately, those best qualified would get to the top, a situation which would improve the quality of leadership and advance the image of the Reserves.

SUMMARY

In implementing some of the foregoing approaches, the writer believes that the average senior officer's age would be driven down, while the level of experience among junior officers should rise. It would require that the ARNG command structure provide greater assurance that only fully qualified officers be utilized in order to protect the Reserve components against non-military influence on officer career management.

A barrier has always existed between the Regulars and the Reserve components and has since their inception.²³ Much has been done to alleviate this but it seems that the Reserve officer is permitted to climb the ladder of military rank only to a certain point, usually to Colonel, after which there appears to be some limitation as to how far he may go. Very few Reserve officers who have achieved a General position actually have a voice in formulating Army policy.²⁴ Many officers who have integrated into the Regular Army cannot genuinely appreciate the dual responsibility of the citizen soldier and the difficulties and obstacles he must


²³Leventrosser, William F., p. 180.

²⁴Just, Ward, Military Men, (1970), pp.125-127.

overcome to serve in the Reserves.

During the course of his study of this subject, this writer has learned that the current AR135-156 regulation is being revised so that all eligible officers, not just those that are assigned to a unit in which the vacancy exists, will be considered for Brigadier General.²⁵ Undoubtedly other changes will be forthcoming, all of which will ultimately serve the Reserve officer more adequately. I believe that it is the Army's intent and policy to promote officers on the basis of merit. Although this has not always been the practice in the past, it appears this goal will be achieved more fully as time goes on.

Every succeeding generation of military planners attempts to set up a structure which will best meet the needs of the nation at that time. We are called upon to use past experience as a guideline but always to be ready to chart new courses for the future. As Lt. General Hollis aptly stated during his interview with the writer herein, "There has to be a better way to do it than the way we are doing things now." He closed with this comment: "Our wisdom is only partial, and we are not given to see the end of time and that even our present solution may be inadequate for the future."²⁶


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²⁶ Interview with Harris W. Hollis, LTG, Office of Reserve Component, USA, Pentagon, Washington, 1 October 1972.

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8. US Department of Army, Board on Reserve Component Officers. Review of ARNG Federal Recognition Standards and Promotion Procedures for Reserve Component Officers, 29 December 1967, Volume 1 and 2 , UA 42 A3154, BG James F. Hollingsworth, Chairman.

This Report offered a broad general basis of information helpful in determining current procedures of promotion and unit assignment. It served as one of the chief research tools of this essay. However, its application in future policy changes should be carefully considered in view of conditions cited within this paper, as well as changes implemented since its publication.
9. US Department of the Army, Career Planning for U.S. Army Reserve Officers, No. 140-1, 1969.

August 21, 1972

Lieutenant General Harris W. Hollis
Chief, Office of Reserve Components
Department of the Army
Pentagon
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Hollis:

I am preparing an academic paper as part of my requirement for the United States Army War College on the subject, "Maximum Use of the Reserve Component Officer."

In the course of my research, I have reviewed several studies, particularly a recent Army study of the Guard and Reserves which was completed and published on 15 May 72. I have reviewed some of the questions raised in the Hollingsworth report of 29 Dec 67.

Therefore, I kindly request additional data from your office as to reasons and rationale for some of the actions taken regarding the problems and the position taken by your office.

I request a detailed response regarding some of the problems so that I may encompass your position and rationale as part of my research paper fulfilling the requirements of the War College.

Particularly, I am now referring to the various recommendations submitted by the Reserve and Guard studies of May, 72, as follows:

- A. Why has your office not gone along with the recommendation to have a separate TD for technicians assigned in support of each major ARNG and USAR command?
- B. Why has your office not adopted the recommendation to limit the tenure of non-technical technician officer service in units of the ARNG and USAR to three years and then require other qualified officers to be notified of said vacancies so that younger officers can move in to this position?

ANNEX A

- C. Why has your office not gone along with the recommendation regarding personnel that all qualified non-unit officers in a geographic area be notified in writing of unit vacancies and invited to apply for a 3-year tour of duty in the assignment to implement the rotation of command experience?
- D. Why hasn't your office gone along with the recommendation that all reserve officers of the army be considered on an equal basis for available assignments either in the ARNG and USAR?
- E. Why hasn't your office gone along with the recommendation that all reserve officers promoted out of a unit assignment be replaced upon completion of basic tour and be eligible to compete for the next unit vacancy one year after entering non-unit status? Wouldn't this type of recommendation open up more competitiveness and retain only the most dedicated reserve officers opposed to the present system permitting stagnation and cliques?
- F. Why haven't CORC and CAR gone along with the recommendation that a plan be developed for the application of alternative drill options for those reserve component units that do not have a time sensitive contingency requirement? Wouldn't this extend and broaden the reserve component and induce more interest rather than the present policy of only paying those in "selected units?"
- G. Why haven't the respective headquarters adopted a centralized officer promotion system as opposed to the present unit and ROPA provision so that promotions can be made at the highest level truly based on the best qualified officer available where officers in each grade would compete for the vacancy?
- H. Why haven't the various headquarters adopted the recommendation that members of the IRR be required to show evidence of participation in the reserve component program other than as a student as a prerequisite for a promotion?

An additional note in reading, there are several other problems concerning the Reserves that are rather critical; particularly, that the average age of senior unit officers in combat and combat support units is in excess of the guide prescribed in AR140-10 for assignment or removal from units. Secondly, the average level of active duty experience among officers in combat units is low and continues to decline. What plans and policy provisions has your office undertaken to eliminate some of these problems that will plague the services in event of mobilization?

It has been this writer's experience in interviews with officers and graduates of ALMAC (USAR) at Ft. Lee, as well as graduates of the War College Non-Resident course at Carlisle Barracks, that there doesn't seem to be any planned program to realize the assets of these officers. There is no placement program, and apparently there should be some planned program for O-6's who are graduates, of either of the above colleges in order that their talents may be utilized. Approximately \$2,500 is spent of the taxpayer's money to put a student through the War College and yet to the writer's knowledge, there isn't any planned program to utilize the highly qualified personnel who are graduates of said college.

Perhaps more emphasis should be made on a career development program as well as a rotation command position to utilize this pool of reserve talent.

Rotation in general positions as well as special staff positions should be made available to officers of this caliber. What plans, if any, does your office have regarding this particular problem? The reason for my inquiry is that the analysis of the Hollingsworth report of December 67 clearly indicates on page 11-10-4 that the current Army regulations are lacking concerning the assignment of USAR general officers as to specific guidance in regard to the criteria used in selecting them as well as lack of provisions as to the desirable qualifications. In fact, the studies of the Hollingsworth report indicate many officers selected lack command and/or appropriate staff experience. It appears from various reviews that these officers were assigned to a general officer's position and subsequently promoted to general officer grade with only administrative type of assignment and lacking any command experience. What action, if any, has your headquarters or the Department of Army taken to rectify this apparent problem? There are overtones that many of the prospective general slots are made to suit the situation and tacitly comply with the requisite that an officer hold an assignment prior to promotion. Thereafter, the potential candidate is holding the position (general slot) and is generally promoted into the same without too much examination as to his requisites or pre-requisites for the promotion.

It is the writer's contention that many highly qualified officers thus become disenchanted with the Reserve program because of this obvious artificial barrier to higher command due either to ineptness on the part of the Army in developing general officers or the other possibility--the contention that political "savvy" is the only "road to a star."

Furthermore, the writer has observed that there are no standard policies and procedures for selecting officers to occupy ARNG general officer positions among the several states, nor is there a system common to USAR.

Needless to say, any comments regarding future utilization of Reserve Officers would be most welcomed by this writer so that he could include the proposed

August 21, 1972

policies as well as past or present policies that have been implemented in order to assist him in preparing an essay on this subject.

Respectfully submitted,


LT. COL. ARSENY A. MELNICK
USAR Inf
719 Forestridge Drive
Youngstown, Ohio 44512

SIMILAR LETTERS WERE SUBMITTED TO EACH OF THE FOLLOWING HEADQUARTERS:

1. Lt. General Richard G. Stilwell, Department Chief of Staff for Military Operations, DA Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
2. Major General J. Milnor Roberts, Chief, Army Reserves, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
3. General Ralph E. Haines, Jr., Continental Army Command, Ft. Monroe, Virginia.
4. Major General Francis S. Greenlief, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

Replies were received from all except from the Office of the National Guard Bureau. (See Annex A-E).



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CHIEF, OFFICE OF RESERVE COMPONENTS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

11 SEP 1972

Lieutenant Colonel Arseny A. Melnick
719 Forestridge Drive
Youngstown, Ohio 44512


Dear Colonel Melnick:

Thank you for your letter of 21 August 1972 concerning your Army War College research paper. I applaud your choice of topic, but I fear that your selected research documents may not provide you with the information you seek.

The report of the Hollingsworth Board is a good reflection of the situation which existed in 1967, but individual conclusions of the report must be related to the environment which existed at that time, rather than to the world of today.

The study conducted in May of this year is not yet complete, and it would be premature for me to comment on it at this time. A fourth volume, containing comments on the study recommendations is yet to be released and may cause the final report to be revised. I do not expect to be able to comment on the Army position until November. In the interim, I would be happy to have you visit my office for a brief interview, followed by informal discussions with members of the ORC staff.

I regret that I cannot provide you with detailed information at this time, and I wish you success with your research efforts.

Sincerely,

HARRIS W. HOLLIS
Lieutenant General, GS
Chief, Office of
Reserve Components

ANNEX B



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

6 September 1972

LTC A. A. Melnick
719 Forestridge Drive
Youngstown, Ohio 44512

Dear LTC Melnick,


It was a pleasure to receive your letter of August 18 expressing interest in the Army Study of the Guard and Reserve Forces.

The study is quite detailed, consisting of a main report of three volumes, and a fourth volume, "Comments on Study Recommendations." While various drafts of the study have been published and distributed for comment, the study has not yet been officially released, and Volume IV, "Comments," has yet to be forwarded to the Secretary of the Army. This action is anticipated in mid-September, and any implementing guidance would follow, probably in October.

Pending final Department of the Army approval and release by the Secretary of the Army, it would be inappropriate for me to attempt to forecast any implementing actions ODCSOPS may be directed to take with respect to specific recommendations.

For additional information pertaining to the recommendations cited in your letter, I suggest you contact LTC David M. O'Rear, Headquarters, Department of the Army, DAMO-PLW, the Pentagon, Washington, DC. LTC O'Rear should be able to advise you of the proposed implementation in late October.

Sincerely,


RICHARD G. STILWELL
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations

*You make pertinent comments
and ask equally pertinent
questions — see list below
concern repeated. Will get
with your interest. — RGS*

ANNEX C



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAR-PE

29 SEP 1972

Lieutenant Colonel Arseny A. Melnick
719 Forestridge Drive
Youngstown, Ohio 44512

Dear Colonel Melnick:


This is in reply to your letter requesting detailed information on the Army Reserve for an academic paper.

Much of the material which you desire encompasses voluminous studies that were conducted in the past and over a considerable length of time. Our agency is not adequately staffed to research and provide you the detailed answers you have requested.

We would be most happy to discuss these programs and policies with you, should the opportunity for you to visit the Washington, D. C. area ever present itself.

I regret that I am unable to provide the information requested.

Sincerely,


ROBERT L. MOORE
Colonel, Armor
Executive Officer

ANNEX D



ATPER

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES CONTINENTAL ARMY COMMAND
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23351

19 SEP 1972

Dear Colonel Melnick,

Your letter requesting information concerning the Army Reserve and National Guard was referred to me for reply since it is in my area of staff responsibility. It was interesting and thought provoking and you have chosen a timely subject for your academic paper.


Information to assist you in the preparation of your paper is attached as follows:

- a. Inclosure 1 - Information concerning Recommendations A-H cited in your letter.
- b. Inclosure 2 - Information concerning your comments relative to the Hollingsworth Report.
- c. Inclosure 3 - Information concerning applicability of the recommendations of the Board for Dynamic Training for other than combat arms.

I trust that this information will assist in your evaluation and the preparation of your academic paper. Please feel free to visit this headquarters on an informal basis to obtain any additional information you may desire from appropriate staff agencies.

With warm regards,

3 Inclosures
As stated


A. H. SMITH, JR.
Major General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel

Lieutenant Colonel A. A. Melnick
719 Forestridge Drive
Youngstown, Ohio 44512

ANNEX E

RECOMMENDATIONS
A-H

Recommendations A-H, if adopted, will result in improved utilization of Reserve officers as well as provide incentives to attract and retain dedicated, quality officers. Comments keyed to specific recommendations are as follows:

- a. Recommendation A - Currently in effect for the USAR.
- b. Recommendation D - A recent change to AR 145-1 requires ROTC graduates to agree to accept assignment in ARNG or IRR if an appropriate troop assignment is not available.
- c. Recommendation F - The CONARC position relative to this recommendation is contained in the copy of the letter to DA at attached Inclosure.

ATOPS-RF-TNG (2 Jun 72) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Tailoring of Training Time to Mission Requirements

HQ CONARC, Ft Monroe, VA 23351

13 JUN 1972

TO: HQDA (DAAG) WASH D C 20310

1. This headquarters agrees that the unsuccessful Selected Forces experiment of 1968, and the initial adverse reaction of some junior grade Reserve Component officers and enlisted men to the additional time required for participation in certain OSD Reserve Component tests, indicate the infeasibility of any action to increase the number of Reserve Component unit training assemblies or extend Annual Training periods beyond those now prescribed. Results of the CONARC Test Program (OSD Tests) will provide greater insight into any upward variations, in connection with your proposal. The results of the increased 1972 Annual Training period for the 1/123d Armor Battalion will also be of interest.
2. It appears that a reduction in the authorized training time for selected non-time sensitive units such as some civil affairs detachments, highly professional units such as judge advocate detachments and medical units, and those units not requiring repetitive training to maintain proficiency would be desirable if the funds thus saved could be applied to enhancing the readiness posture of early deployment units. Those funds might well be utilized in the early deployment units for such programs as: an increased advisor and technician effort; improved facilities for training, maintenance and storage; additional paid drill assemblies for key individuals for the purpose of cadre training and training preparation; additional mobile training teams; priority procurement of training devices; increased strength authorizations; and provision of high speed transportation to training areas capable of supporting mission training.
3. In view of the potential readiness gain of early mission units and monetary savings that might accrue, this headquarters considers that the above discussed proposal is desirable; however, consideration must be accorded to its impact on the remainder of units in the Reserve Component Troop Basis.
4. This proposal would accentuate the differences between high and low priority units which might result in a caste system among the Reserve Components with attendant adverse morale aspects. Examples of the factors adversely affecting morale would be the reduction in income and possible disruption of career patterns in low priority units; and variations in training time among units, even in the same area, with its implications of unfair treatment in high priority units and reduced prestige in low priority units. An additional factor to be considered would be the capability of a high priority unit, conducting 41 paid assemblies, to retain

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best available copy.

13 JUN 1972

ATOPS-PF-TMG (2 Jun 72) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Tailoring of Training Time to Mission Requirements

and recruit personnel in a zero or near-zero draft environment if other units in the same geographical area were conducting fewer assemblies.

5. In summary, this headquarters is in conceptual agreement with your proposal for enhancing the readiness potential of early mission units. This could be accomplished through an orderly process of reducing training times made available to certain units, and applying monies saved to support specific programs for the early mission units; however, further investigation into the morale aspects of the problem is considered necessary prior to initiation of such major policy changes. In addition, legislative limitations and the feasibility of changing or amending public law are subjects for consideration.

6. A copy of this correspondence has been dispatched to the COMUSA with instructions that this matter be given further study and that COMUSA representatives be prepared to present recommendations at the COMARCOM Reserve Forces and 603 Test Program Conference tentatively scheduled for 31 October through 2 November 1972.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

RICHARD C. HOFMEIER
LTC, AGC
Deputy Adjutant General

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HOLLINGSWORTH REPORT

Comments concerning the Hollingsworth Report are considerably affected by a proposed revision of AR 135-156, "Reserve Components, General Officer Assignments, Promotions, Retention In and Removal from an Active Status," which is now at CORC awaiting Secretary of the Army approval. The following information concerning your comments in this area are attached:

- a. Inclosure 1 - Current criteria for general officer assignment.
- b. Inclosure 2 - Current criteria for general officer promotion.
- c. Inclosure 3 - Major changes incorporated into the proposed revision.

USAR GENERAL OFFICER ASSIGNMENT ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Five years continuous service in an active status immediately prior to assignment.
2. Two years service for promotion purposes in the grade of colonel or brigadier general.
3. Sufficient time remaining in an active status to serve six months and one period of annual training and be evaluated in the position prior to the scheduled semiannual promotion board in either May or November, and have five years to serve in the higher grade, prior to mandatory removal.
4. For assignment to USAR combat units, training divisions and Army Reserve commands, 2 years of command experience in one of the combat arms at battalion level or higher and appropriate staff experience.
5. Successfully completed or received constructive or equivalent credit for any Command and General Staff Course of instruction which results in the award of a diploma, except the Special Associate Course Division; or a resident course of instruction at a senior service school.
6. Meet standards of medical fitness.

USAR GENERAL OFFICER PROMOTION ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS

1. Meet the requirements for assignment to a general officer position.
2. Be assigned to a general officer slot.
3. As of the last day of the month in which the board is scheduled to convene (May and November) have served in such general officer position for at least six months to include one period of annual active duty for training.
4. Have sufficient time remaining to serve 5 years in the higher grade prior to reaching age 60.
5. Meet the standards of medical fitness.

CURRENT REGULATION, AR 135-156

- a. Requires an officer to have two years service in grade of colonel or brigadier general for assignment to a general officer position.
- b. Directs commanders who nominate officers for general officer positions to consider (1) geographic proximity of prospective nominee, (2) officers holding assignments other than in unit in which the general officer position vacancy exists.
- c. Does not require any type of board be established at CONUSA level to consider and recommend officers for assignment to a general officer position vacancy.
- d. Credit for time in general officer position was authorized no earlier than the date the assignment was approved by CORC.

REVISED REGULATION, AR 135-156

- a. Deletes this eligibility requirement for assignment and adds it to the promotion eligibility requirements.
- b. Directs that consideration be given to (1) as a matter of priority, all qualified officers already serving in the appropriate grade for the position, (2) all eligible officers and not just those who are assigned to the unit in which the vacancy exists. Change does not mention geographic proximity.
- c. Requires that the Army commander appoint an advisory board to review records and recommend to him officers of the next lower grade considered best qualified for assignment to general officer positions. Board is to be composed of senior officers with at least one member being a USAR general officer. Guidance is also provided with respect to selection of the nominees for assignment.
- d. Authorizes an officer to be given credit for time in position based on assuming command if he meets the eligibility requirements for assignment or on date assignment is approved by CORC, whichever is earlier.

CURRENT REGULATION, AR 135-156

e. For promotion, requires that the officer must have served in such general officer position for at least six months to include one period of annual training.

f. Requires for promotion, that an officer have sufficient time remaining to serve five years in higher grade prior to reaching age 60.

REVISED REGULATION, AR 135-156

e. Deletes the requirement for a brigadier general to serve six months in major general position prior to being eligible for promotion consideration. Requires that a colonel serve at least six months in a brigadier general position but deletes the requirement to serve one annual training period in the brigadier general position.

f. Changes the five year requirement to three years of service in grade of major general, thus, changing maximum age for promotion of brigadier general to major general from age 55 to age 57. Requirement for five years service in grade of brigadier general prior to reaching age 60 still applies.