

AD-760 451

HAS THE UNITED STATES ABANDONED THE  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Oliver A. Willey, Jr.

Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

23 October 1972

DISTRIBUTED BY:

**NTIS**

National Technical Information Service  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE  
5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield Va. 22151

WILLEY O.A.

(1)

# STUDENT ESSAY

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the Department of Defense. ~~any requests for distribution or reproduction will be referred to the Chief of Staff, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17004~~

23 OCTOBER 1972

AD 760451

## HAS THE UNITED STATES ABANDONED THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA?

BY

COLONEL OLIVER A. WILLEY, JR.  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S CORPS

Reproduced by  
NATIONAL TECHNICAL  
INFORMATION SERVICE  
U S Department of Commerce  
Springfield VA 22151

STUDENT  
DEPARTMENT OF  
DEFENSE  
REGISTERED  
OR

LIBRARY  
DEC 27 1972  
ARMY WAR COLLEGE

### NONRESIDENT COURSE

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA




23

USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT  
(Essay)

HAS THE UNITED STATES ABANDONED  
THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA?

by

Colonel Oliver A. Willey, Jr.  
Adjutant General's Corps



US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
23 October 1972

;

AUTHOR: Oliver A. Willey, Jr., COL, AGC  
TITLE: Has the United States Abandoned the Republic of China?  
FORMAT: Essay

In view of President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China, February 21-28, 1972, and the beginning of an era of dialogue, the basic question is whether or not the United States has abandoned the Republic of China. United States' China policy and its impact on the United States' commitment to the Republic of China was examined. Data was gathered by using a literature search covering the period since 1943. The United States has not abandoned its commitment to the Republic of China, but has supported it in word and deed. However, during the dialogue, the United States acknowledged that there is but one China with Taiwan a part of that China. It also reaffirmed its interest in a peaceful settlement by the "two Chinas" of the question of who should control Taiwan. The United States will continue to seek improved relations with the People's Republic of China as essential to world peace and must adjust its policy to include the whole area of Asia, not just Taiwan. The United States is standing firm in its commitment to the Republic of China as the search for a peaceful solution continues in the 1970's.

## INTRODUCTION

On February 25, 1971, President Nixon, in his Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's acknowledged, "The twenty-two year old hostility between ourselves and the Peoples Republic of China is another unresolved problem, . . ." and further stated, "we are prepared to establish a dialogue with Peking."<sup>1</sup> Thus, the stage was set for the historic event that was to occur a year later with the visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China, February 21-28, 1972.

Starting with President Nixon's announcement of his impending visit on July 15, 1971, and intensifying during the period prior to the actual dialogue, national and international interest increased as to what the outcome of this venture might be for both the United States and the Republic of China. The United States had recognized and supported the Republic of China government on Taiwan as the sole government of China since the Nationalist China government was forced to flee the Chinese mainland to Taiwan in December, 1949.<sup>2</sup> In making this first overt step toward resolving the differences between the two countries by peaceful means, to include the dilemma of who does or who should govern China, a doubt exists for many as to what the United States' current position is and will likely be in the dispute between the "two Chinas."

---

<sup>1</sup>Richard Nixon, U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building for Peace (25 February 1971), pp. 105, 107 (hereafter referred to as, "Nixon, Building for Peace").

<sup>2</sup>William M. Bueler, U. S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan (1971), p. 1.

Skepticism over this effort for improved relations with the People's Republic of China is that not only has the United States given too much and is receiving too little in return, but may have set the stage to abandon its commitment to the Republic of China. My purpose is to determine whether or not this is true.

#### THE DILEMMA

The United States' involvement in the fate and future of Taiwan began in World War II with support of the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China, headed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek against Japan. It solidified with the Cairo Declaration issued December 1, 1943, following a conference of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo. The Declaration stated, "All territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China."<sup>3</sup>

This was the first formal commitment made by the United States to the Republic of China. This was followed at the Potsdam Conference, July 26, 1945, with the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union seeking to carry out the terms of the Cairo Declaration by demanding Japan's unconditional surrender.<sup>4</sup> The Japanese surrender came September 2, 1945. Later in 1945, the Allied Command granted Chiang Kai-shek's government authority to administer Formosa pending

---

<sup>3</sup>George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed (1965), pp. 25-26.

<sup>4</sup>Lung-Chu Chen and Harold D. Lasswell, Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community (1967), p. 83

the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty.<sup>5</sup> However, the Peace Treaty signed on September 8, 1951, did not address the legal transfer of Formosa to China. Thus, the dilemma of who has legal control of Formosa began.<sup>6</sup>

When Chiang Kai-shek was defeated in his struggle with the Communists of Mainland China, he retreated to Formosa and on December 10, 1949, declared Taipei the "Temporary Capital of China."<sup>7</sup> Chiang Kai-shek has each year since that time reaffirmed this declaration and issued a pledge to return to the mainland.<sup>8</sup>

On January 5, 1950, President Truman announced his "hands-off" policy concerning the status of Formosa and the civil conflict of China. He stated that, "The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China."<sup>9</sup> One week later Secretary of State Dean Acheson defined the defensive perimeter of the United States in the Pacific and excluded Korea and Formosa. The push into South Korea by North Korea on June 25, 1950, brought a prompt reversal in United States policy with specific implications for Formosa and Chiang Kai-shek. On June 27, President Truman announced United States resistance to the Communist aggression in Korea.

---

<sup>5</sup>Jerome Alan Cohen, et. al., Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S.-China Relations (1971), p. 14.

<sup>6</sup>Chen and Lasswell, pp. 127-132.

<sup>7</sup>Kerr, pp. 384-385.

<sup>8</sup>"Recovery of Mainland Still Taiwan's Stated Goal," New York Times, 7 October 1971, p. 6.

<sup>9</sup>Morton Abramowitz and Richard Moorsteen, Remaking China Policy: U.S.-China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking (1971), p. 94.

He further stated that any occupation of Formosa by the Communists would be considered a threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces in the area. The United States Seventh Fleet was ordered to preclude any further conflict between the Communists on the one hand and Chiang Kai-shek on the other hand.<sup>10</sup>

The Communist threat to Formosa was very real and Chiang Kai-shek wanted more than a safe neutrality behind the United States Seventh Fleet. Chiang Kai-shek's government was able to secure the initiation of massive United States economic and military aid programs.<sup>11</sup> On February 2, 1953, President Eisenhower "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek by announcing the withdrawal of the United States Seventh Fleet as a shield to protect Communist China from the Nationalists on Formosa.<sup>12</sup> Thus began a period of conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists that was to increase in intensity until December 8, 1954, when Chou En-lai announced his intention to liberate Taiwan.<sup>13</sup>

#### THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT

In response, as one of the number of treaties concluded by the United States during an era of military containment of Communist China,

---

<sup>10</sup>Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy (1952), pp. 124-128.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 132-146.

<sup>12</sup>Robert Blum, The United States and China in World Affairs, ed. by A. Doak Barnett (1963), p. 118.

<sup>13</sup>Congressional Quarterly Service, China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967 (1967), pp. 64-71 (hereafter referred to as "Congressional Quarterly Service").

the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China was signed on December 2, 1954. The significant provisions read:

Article V. In the event of an armed attack, each party ". . . would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article VI. ". . . 'territories' shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan, the Pescadores; . . ." and ". . . such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement."

Article VII. The United States government is granted ". . . the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement."<sup>14</sup>

A note dated December 10, 1954, to George K. C. Yeh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, from Secretary John Foster Dulles, which is a part of the treaty, confirmed an agreement by both parties:

. . . that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement. . . . [and that] Military elements which are a product of joint effort . . . will not be removed from the territories described in Article VI to a degree which would substantially diminish the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement.<sup>15</sup>

Secretary Dulles' note is of major significance as the Nationalists agreed to accept a limitation on their ability to take independent action. Thus, once again Chiang Kai-shek was "released" by the Treaty. The Treaty covers just Taiwan and the Pescadores, and not the offshore islands. However, at President Eisenhower's request in January, 1954, in the face of continued rising tensions stimulated by both sides, the Congress adopted the "Formosa Resolution." This

---

<sup>14</sup>US Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 6, Pt. 1, 2 December 1954, pp. 433-454 (hereafter referred to as "United States Treaties").

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 450.

authorized the President ". . . to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack, . . ." and ". . . such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands. . . ." <sup>16</sup> This left it up to the President's discretion to use United States forces to defend the offshore islands and constituted a stronger American commitment than in any other area of Asia. From this point on the "offshore island crisis" gradually abated, only to rise to the forefront in the latter part of 1958 with the intensive Chinese Communist bombardment of the offshore islands. President Eisenhower considered the situation grave and reacted accordingly. Finally, on October 23, 1958, Chiang Kai-shek and Secretary of State Dulles issued a joint communique in which both the United States and the Republic of China agreed that while Chiang Kai-shek's mission of return to the mainland still existed, it must be accomplished without the use of force. <sup>17</sup> Military action in the Straits declined and a passive policy for the "peaceful liberation of Taiwan" has been adopted by the Communists to complement Chiang Kai-shek's goal of return to the mainland, but without the use of force.

---

<sup>16</sup>US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States-Republic of China Relations, Hearings, before a subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Cong., 1st. Sess., 1971, p. 83 (hereafter referred to as "Congress, US-Republic of China Relations").

<sup>17</sup>Congressional Quarterly Services, p. 90.

## THE DIALOGUE WITH PEKING

President Nixon visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai from February 21 to February 28, 1972. He had an opportunity to exchange views with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and to participate in extensive discussions with Premier Chou En-lai. Both sides considered these discussions beneficial and a Joint Communiqué was issued at the conclusion of the President's visit on February 27, 1972. Each side presented in general terms their overall position and attitudes toward many aspects of the world situation. Of major significance was a review of the dispute involving Taiwan. The People's Republic of China stated its position as follows:

The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."<sup>18</sup>

The United States stated its position as follows:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful

---

<sup>18</sup>"Shanghai: Joint Communiqué," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 February 1972, p. 475.

settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.<sup>19</sup>

The Communique closed with both sides saying: "They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world."<sup>20</sup>

#### HOW BINDING IS THE UNITED STATES COMMITMENT?

Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China provides that, "Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party."<sup>21</sup> This gives either country a legal escape clause; however, there are several factors that make the use of this approach difficult. There is no indication that the Republic of China is likely to be the one to initiate termination. Communist China still remains a potential threat. The biggest obstacle to the initiation of action to terminate by the United States is the impact such termination would have on our world image as a nation that upholds its commitments.

The United States, if it desires a reason to terminate the Treaty, could take the approach that the purpose for which it was created no

---

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., p. 475.

<sup>21</sup>United States Treaties, p. 437.

longer exists. As the Treaty is defensive in nature, the United States could contend that the Republic of China has had sufficient time to prepare for its own defense based on the military aid and assistance given by the United States. The recognition of the People's Republic of China by the United Nations as the sole representative of China in the international community has left the Republic of China merely a contender for legitimacy in the civil war. Thus, the basis for the Treaty which contends that the Republic of China is the sole representative of China has changed. However, the United States, because of the long period of its commitment, has perhaps in addition to this legal commitment, acquired a moral commitment--or at least an expectation--toward continued support of the people of Taiwan. Therefore, any quick action to abandon our role and support could be at the expense of the people of Taiwan.

One test of how important and visible one country's commitments are to another country is the number of times the commitment is publicly reaffirmed by persons in a high position in the government. This Treaty has been reaffirmed publicly several times since 1954 and more recently by the President twice in less than a year. First, in his Report to the Congress, February 25, 1971, on the United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's;<sup>22</sup> and again in his Report to the Congress, February 9, 1972, on the United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's,<sup>23</sup> just prior to his visit to Peking. Upon his return to the United States President

---

<sup>22</sup>Nixon, Building for Peace, p. 107.

<sup>23</sup>Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace, 9 February 1972, p. 35 (hereafter referred to as "Nixon, The Emerging Structure of Peace").

Nixon indicated that no special deals were made that would change any of the United States' commitments.<sup>24</sup>

These verbal reaffirmations of our written commitment have been augmented by deed as well. Taiwan has received massive economic and military aid over the years designed to strengthen its defense posture against any possible Communist aggression.<sup>25</sup> It does not appear that the United States will suddenly abandon its commitment in the near future.

#### IMPACT OF DIALOGUE ON RELATIONS WITH THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Taiwan's position of importance in Asia and the world appears to be diminishing. The announcement in the Joint Communiqué is only the most recent of a number of events to impact on Nationalist China. First came the July 15, 1971, announcement that the United States would no longer stand against Red China's entry into the United Nations, thus reversing a position held and defended for over two decades; and then the major blow in October when the Republic of China lost its seat in the United Nations. The dialogue serves notice that the United States' position of total support for Taiwan is shifting to provide accommodation with the People's Republic of China as being more vital to the interests of United States security and world peace. Change in the United States' position toward the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China is taking place.

---

<sup>24</sup>"Return to Washington," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 28 February 1972, p. 484.

<sup>25</sup>Congress, US-Republic of China Relations, p. 37.

With each new move toward better relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, it becomes clearer that a reshaping of United States policy and attitudes toward the dilemma of the "two Chinas" must occur and be the basis for a new and more effective China policy in the 1970's. For over two decades the United States has opposed the Chinese Communist regime and actively oriented policy toward a containment of the People's Republic of China. In doing this the United States acquired a strong commitment to the Republic of China. With the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and the beginning of a dialogue, the United States is actively committed toward improved and eventually normal relations with the People's Republic of China.

It is appropriate to look at the alternatives that can provide the foundation and the direction for United States policy in the 1970's in seeking a solution to the Formosan dilemma. There are four alternatives for consideration. First, a "one China" policy which is essentially the one pursued by the United States since 1949 in which that one China is represented by a Nationalist Government of Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek. Second, a "one China" policy in which the People's Republic of China Communist regime headed by Chou En-lai is the only China. Third, a "two Chinas" approach in which the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China co-exist with each regime having control over its own territory, but Taiwan being a province of China. Fourth, a variation of the above in which there is "one China, one Formosa," recognizing an independent sovereign state for Taiwan.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>Thomas J. Weiss, "Taiwan and U. S. Policy," ORBIS, winter 1969, pp. 1177-1187.

## WHERE THE UNITED STATES IS HEADED

It has become clear that the United States cannot and will not continue to support a "one China" policy with that one China being the Republic of China. The Joint Communiqué indicated United States acknowledgement that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of that China.

The admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and our current position has dispelled the myth that Chiang Kai-shek's Formosa represents all China--a position the United States has supported for over two decades. A great many of the China experts believe that the United States should support "one China" and "one independent Taiwan," but this is not the current position.

The inevitable passing of Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung could soften the current firm opposition of both sides to any approach other than a "one China." In reality there has been one China--one Taiwan--for over two decades. With each passing year, and certainly with the passing of Chiang Kai-shek, the situation could occur where the people of Taiwan could exercise self-determination as to their desire to be a part of China or to seek independence.

The United States in the 1970's must pursue the goal of improved relations with China as vital to achieving and maintaining world peace and must adjust its other objectives and interests accordingly. This will definitely impact on United States policy and support of Taiwan. The United States desires a peaceful settlement of the problem and will likely maintain its defense commitment with Taiwan to insure that any settlement is through peaceful means. The dilemma was born of the civil strife between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung

and it would be too easy for the two countries to once again seek a military solution to the problem.

The United States has agreed to reduce its military presence on Taiwan in working toward a total military withdrawal based on a reduction of tension in the area. This provides a real opportunity for the People's Republic of China to downgrade the importance of Taiwan as an obstacle to improved relations. United States military presence on Taiwan is not necessary to honor the United States commitments, as a response to defend Taiwan can be launched from distant locations. The United States should continue to discourage and to refrain from supporting any offensive action by the Republic of China directed toward the mainland.

The People's Republic of China has rarely made reference to Treaty commitment and did not mention it in the final Joint Communiqué as an item of contention. This avoids making it difficult for either the United States or the Republic of China at some future time to abandon or to revise the treaty. The United States' own self-interest in maintaining a high degree of "credibility" in treaty commitments to other nations does not permit an abrupt abandonment, but this does not mean that a commitment can never be changed. The process takes time and there must be some real basis for change or termination.

Timing will be vital and the United States must remain attuned to any change in its relationships with the People's Republic of China or the Republic of China that are in furtherance of our national interests and serve to solve the dilemma. Continued patience by all three governments is essential. ". . . Taiwan is for the United States

not so much of a problem susceptible to being 'solved' as a situation requiring continued management."<sup>27</sup> Therefore, the United States' role may not be so much one of providing a solution as to insuring an environment conducive to a peaceful settlement between the "two Chinas."

Normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China supports our national interests in the 1970's as an essential step toward world peace. In the dialogue the United States is not challenging the "one China" approach, but it is once again reaffirming its desire for a peaceful solution to the dilemma and has opened the door to improved relations and real progress toward a solution.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The United States has not abandoned the Republic of China, but has honored in word and deed its treaty commitment since 1954. On February 9, 1972, President Nixon, just prior to his visit to the People's Republic of China, publicly reaffirmed to the Republic of China the United States' intention to ". . . maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties and our defense commitment."<sup>28</sup>

The United States has begun to depart from its long standing policy of "containment" directed toward the People's Republic of China in favor of an era of dialogue. The continuation of these dialogues and a sincere effort by both countries toward improved relations are essential to world peace. United States relations with the Republic of China have changed and are likely to continue

---

<sup>27</sup>Cohen, et. al., p. 120.


<sup>28</sup>Nixon, The Emerging Structure of Peace, p. 35.

to change as the United States, in furtherance of its own national interests, must adjust its policy to include the whole area of Asia and not just Taiwan. President Nixon acknowledged in the dialogue that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of that China. He reaffirmed interest in a peaceful solution of the problem by the "two Chinas." Thus, the United States has withdrawn its backing for Chiang Kai-shek's claim that his Nationalist Government on Taiwan represents all China. The United States will continue to reduce its military presence in Asia to include Taiwan.

Any new United States policy must reflect a recognition of the conflicting pressures, interests, goals, and perspectives of public opinion and should be sensitive to how it affects relations with other key nations and areas of the world. If the United States redefines its policy slowly and judiciously, it is likely that Chiang Kai-shek and his government will adjust to our new posture without any traumatic upheaval.

The United States will not abandon Taiwan nor its commitment but will work hard to create and further an environment that will facilitate a peaceful solution derived by the "two Chinas." It is not possible to predict at this time the deals, accommodations, and negotiations between Taiwan and mainland China that will make this possible. The death of Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek will impact heavily on which way and how fast a solution may occur. This dilemma in which the United States has been involved for nearly 30 years will require time and patience on the part of the countries involved. Because of its critical role in the advancement of world peace, no

approach to a solution to this problem should be overlooked. Continued progress toward a solution is truly one of the challenges of the 1970's.

  
OLIVER A. WILLEY, JR.  
Colonel, AGC

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Abramowitz, Morton, and Moorsteen, Richard. Remaking China Policy: U. S.-China Relations and Governmental Decisionmaking. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.  
  
(Proposes a plan of action to improve U. S.-China relations. The dilemma of Taiwan is addressed.)
2. Hallentine, Joseph W. Formosa: A Problem for United States Foreign Policy. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1952.  
  
(Provides a good background on developments in US Policy toward Formosa from WW II to 1952.)
3. Barnett, A. Doak. A New U. S. Policy Toward China. Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1971.  
  
(An examination of current problems and proposed policy changes for the 1970's.)
4. Barnett, A. Doak, and Reischauer, Edwin O., ed. The United States and China: The Next Decade. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.  
  
(An examination by members of the National Committee on United States-China Relations of China policy issues and the policy options open to the United States.)
5. Blum, Robert. The United States and China in World Affairs. Ed. by A. Doak Barnett. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966.  
  
(Developed as the fifth volume of "The United States and China in World Affairs" Series as an analysis of United States relations with China with a look at the problem of Taiwan.)
6. Bueler, William F. U. S. China Policy and the Problem of Taiwan. Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1971.  
  
(Background information on the evolution of US policy toward Taiwan from 1949 to the present.)
7. Chen, Lung-Chu, and Lasswell, Harold D. Formosa, China, and the United Nations: Formosa in the World Community. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967.  
  
(A policy-oriented study of the dilemma of Communist China for the United Nations and the United States focusing on Formosa with a proposed "one China, one Formosa" solution.)

8. Cohen, Jerome Alan, et. al. Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in US-China Relations. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.  
  
(Based on the League of Women Voters Education Fund and the National Committee on United States-China Relations Conference, March 5 and 6, 1971, it examines key questions on the Taiwan factor in US-China Relations in the 1970's.)
9. Congressional Quarterly Service. China and U. S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1967.  
  
(A review of the events, personalities and issues affecting US involvement with China, Formosa, Korea, Viet Nam.)
10. "Deeping Gloom In The 'Other China.'" U. S. News & World Report, 28 February 1972, p. 22.
11. Dulles, Foster Rhea. American Policy Toward Communist China, 1949-1969. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1972.  
  
(Outstanding background on US reaction to the Chinese Communist drive for domination in Asia.)
12. Fairbank, John K. China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967.  
  
(A modern look at US-China relations with one of the three main parts on "The Taiwan Problem.")
13. Fairbank, John K. "Taipei Can Coexist with Peking." New York Times, 12 August 1971, p. 33.
14. Fairbank, John K. The United States and China. 3d ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.  
  
(Outstanding study of China's past that makes more understandable what may be China's future.)
15. Halloran, Richard. "Taiwan Is The Prize in Renewed Struggle." New York Times, 6 March 1972, p. 14.
16. Kerr, George H. Formosa Betrayed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.  
  
(An authoratative presentation of the Formosan dilemma from 1941 to 1965 from the viewpoint of the impact on Formosa and its people.)
17. Fleirman, Robert. "Taiwan Without Fears." New York Times, 8 May 1972, p. 37.

18. Newman, Joseph. A New Look at Red China. U. S. News & World Report. Washington: 1971.  
  
(A new look at relations between the US and Communist China by a news media that examines the Formosan problem.)
19. "New Relationship with Red China." U. S. News & World Report, 13 March 1972, pp. 19-21.
20. Nixon, Richard. U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Building For Peace. A Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1971.
21. Nixon, Richard. U. S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Peace. A Report to the Congress, 9 February 1972. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1972.
22. "Peking's Terms For Closer Ties With U.S." U. S. News & World Report, 9 August 1971, p. 22.
23. "President Nixon's China Initiative: A Conference Report." ORBIS, Vol. 15, No. 4, Winter 1972, pp. 1206-1219.
24. Ravenal, Earl C., ed. Peace With China? U. S. Decisions For Asia. Washington: Institute For Policy Studies, 1971.  
  
(A look at the Nixon Doctrine as the basis of an attempt to elicit the meaning of US policy toward China.)
25. "Recovery of Mainland Still Taiwan's Stated Goal." New York Times, 7 October 1971, p. 6.
26. Reischauer, Edwin O. "What the Taiwanese Really Feel." New York Times, 20 March 1972, p. 39.
27. "Return to Washington." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 8, No. 9, 28 February 1972, pp. 482-485. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
28. "Shanghai: Joint Communique." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 8, No. 9, 28 February 1972, pp. 437-476. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
29. "Taipei's Statement on the Communique." New York Times, 29 February 1972, p. 16.
30. US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States-China Relations: A Strategy for the Future. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1970. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1970.

(The first comprehensive review by Congress of US policies toward

Communist China since 1966 using some of the US's top Asia experts to address the future for Taiwan.)

31. US Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States-Republic of China Relations. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Asian and Pacific Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1971.

(An examination of military and political aspects of US relations with the Republic of China before and after the UN vote to seat the People's Republic of China in the UN.)

32. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China. 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966. Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1966.

(Excellent background information on US policy up to 1966 presented by experts on Asian affairs.)

33. US Department of State. United States Treaties and other International Agreements, Vol. 6, pt. 1. "China-Mutual Defense Treaty," TIAS No. 3178, 2, 10 December 1954.

34. Weiss, Thomas J. "Taiwan and U. S. Policy." ORBIS, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 1969, pp. 1165-1187.