The Arab-Israeli Conflict of June 1967: A Limited War

Abstract

The primary question is whether or not the war in the Middle East in June 1967 was a limited war. Data was gathered from a variety of literary sources, but much of the material and interpretation was based on the author's personal experience as the Operations Officer of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization-Palestine from 1966 to 1970. The background of the situation prevailing in the Middle East, and the major events preceding the war are reviewed in order to examine the question of whether this war was part of a grand strategy on the part of either side. Both Arab and Israeli strategy and defense plans are reviewed. It is concluded that this war, like so many others, was not inevitable, but resulted from a series of miscalculations and over- reactions by all parties concerned.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Mar 26, 1973
Accession Number
AD0760905

Entities

People

  • Robert L. Day

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Agreements
  • Air Force
  • Air Power
  • Aircrafts
  • Civil Defense
  • Civil War
  • Commerce
  • Emergencies
  • Geography
  • Middle East
  • Military History
  • Military Strategy
  • Students
  • Supersonic Aircraft
  • United Nations
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • International Relations and Conflict Resolution
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Systems Analysis and Design