Asymptotic Stability and Other Properties of Trajectories and Transfer Sequences Leading to the Bargaining Sets.
Abstract
The foundation of a dynamic theory for the bargaining sets started in another paper, where Stearns constructed transfer sequences which always converge to appropriate bargaining sets. A continuous analogue was developed by Billera, where sequences were replaced by solutions of systems of differential equations. In the paper the authors show that the nucleolus is locally asymptotically stable both with respect to Stearns' sequences and Billera's solutions if and only if it is an isolated point of the appropriate bargaining set. No other point of the bargaining set can be locally asymptotically stable. (Modified author abstract)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Mar 01, 1973
- Accession Number
- AD0763670
Entities
People
- Gill Kalai
- Guillermo Owen
- Michael Maschler
Organizations
- Stanford University