The Nixon Doctrine and U.S. Naval Strategy
Abstract
The United States, is currently faced with the dilemma of trying to formulate a Pacific strategy which will permit an adequate projection of US power in the region while at the same time affording the means to concentrate on pressing domestic problems. As the Administration wrestles with the problem between withdrawal and involvement, an increase in naval power appears imminent in US Pacific strategy under the Nixon Doctrine. Naval power will continue to provide a multiple of strategic options desired under the lower profile called for by the Nixon Doctrine. It is also a means of projecting US power in the Pacific and directly influencing the balance of power in the region while reducing the danger of direct involvement overseas. Disturbing conflicts in the proposal for increased reliance on naval power are the declining status of US Navy ships in face of the rapidly increasing capability and threat of the Soviet Navy and our insufficient sealift capability. If the American people and the Congress do not exhibit the will to provide the means necessary to pursue an increased reliance on naval power, the United Stater, may well find its capability to influence events in the Pacific region significantly reduced.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Feb 11, 1972
- Accession Number
- AD0764416
Entities
People
- George A. Aitcheson
Organizations
- United States Army War College