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MODERN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE: AN
ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW

D. M. Condit

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
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by
D.M. Condit

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THE AUTHOR

D. M. Condit is a senior research scientist with the Kensington Office of the American Institutes for Research (AIR/K). In this capacity and as project director for various tasks, she has been involved in research on revolutionary warfare for many years. Some of her AIR reports include Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II, A Counterinsurgency Bibliography, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict (3 vols.), Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict, Population Protection and Resources Management in Internal Defense Operations, U. S. Military Response to Overseas Insurgency. Before joining AIR/K, D. M. Condit was a member of the research staff of the Operations Research Office of The Johns Hopkins University (1952-1956). Included among her activities there are two pertinent publications, Allied Supplies for Italian Partisans During World War II and A System for Handling Data on Unconventional Warfare.

PREFACE

This work, which began in the spring of 1972, has afforded an opportunity to summarize many years' experience in the field of revolutionary warfare research. The major underlying question that dominates research in this field springs from its very nature as a historically observable event, that is, as a phenomenon recurring throughout human history, but one in which settings, actors, ideologies, and operations constantly change. Under these circumstances, is it possible to learn from past experience? In one view, each instance of revolutionary activity is idiosyncratic and unique, and therefore meaningless insofar as drawing inferences or "lessons" applicable to the future. In another view, there is hope and belief that some broad bands of generalization may eventually explain at least certain aspects of the subject, so that it may be approached with greater rationality and less dependence on chance. At the present time, it would appear somewhat unclear as to which view is more correct. Certainly, however, human experience is generally applied, consciously or not, to most forms of human endeavor. Current research failures in reaching the desired goal, furthermore, do not necessarily preclude future successes. As a matter of fact, the field of revolutionary warfare remains in great need of more systematic exploration.

Revolutionary warfare indicates a situation in which insurgents seek to break the hold of government over themselves and their fellow men, while governments simultaneously seek to maintain law and order and to end the challenge to their authority. Although one may sympathize with either principal according to the specific circumstances, for the researcher the important element is the functional role that each side plays.

It is, of course, a function of government to maintain the ability to rule. As human history progresses, however, there is increasing effort on the part of men to have their governments rule by consent rather than by force. This means the greater use of political accommodation and participation, but it does not preclude the necessity for the use of force in certain kinds of situations. The interplay between political accommodation and military force is, indeed, one of the complex and fascinating aspects of modern revolutionary warfare. Each instance of such warfare, in fact, indicates some resolution of the conflict between persuasion and compulsion in the affairs of men.

In a work as brief as this one, it is obvious that only a limited portion of the subject has been addressed. The hope is that many elements will have been brought together in such a way that further understanding is developed and

further study stimulated. To whatever extent this hope is realized, a debt is owed to those who helped by their comments and discussion. Chief among these are Dr. N. Fredrick Wikner, Colonel Donald S. Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel William R. Bell, and Mr. Jerrold K. Milsted of the Department of Defense; Colonel Carl Bernard, professor of military science at the University of California; Dr. Scott Thompson, of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and Dr. Preston S. Abbott, Mr. L. D. Brummitt, Dr. Arnold E. Dahlke, and Dr. Lorand B. Szalay of the American Institutes for Research. Needless to say, the author assumes responsibility for whatever errors of omission or commission inhere in the report.

SUMMARY

OBJECTIVE

The purpose of this work is (1) to review, order, and analyze aspects of the phenomenon of modern revolutionary warfare from the point of view of a government involved either in supporting, preventing, or fighting revolutionary violence; and (2) to suggest some specific ways in which research would enable the United States to deal more effectively with the problem in the future.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS PAPER

Since the second objective is dealt with in a separate, restricted report, the present paper concerns mainly the first objective. The study is organized into six chapters, the first of which deals with definitional aspects and problems and addresses the question as to whether modern revolutionary warfare continues to be a threat to the United States in the mid-1970s. In the second chapter, the evolving theory and practice of revolutionary violence are considered, and five models are briefly described. Government support for revolution and the possible uses of revolutionary techniques are the subjects of the third chapter, which also considers possible constraints on U.S. support for revolution. The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters are concerned with ways in which governments faced with a revolutionary challenge may react to deal with the threat—either by trying to deter or prevent the violence; by quickly resolving the violence once it has started; or failing that, by attacking it on a long-term basis.

Except in passing, casual comments, this paper does not address one aspect of revolutionary war—the special problems involved when one government tries to aid another one to deal with an internal war. To attempt such an assessment at this moment—when the data of Vietnam have not been fully analyzed, when the final results of the action are not yet clear, and when the action may not even be over—would be presumptuous in the extreme. Furthermore the data of Vietnam alone are not sufficient for the analysis that is required. The experience of Vietnam must be placed in perspective and comparatively analyzed with the experience of other cases before one would feel free to generalize on the involvement of third parties in revolutionary warfare situations.

DEFINITION

Modern revolutionary warfare has been given many definitions, some highly restrictive in nature, others all-encompassing. For this paper, it is viewed as subsuming a whole array of activities involved in (1) a violent, illegal, domestic challenge to a government on the order of and variously termed internal war, insurgency, insurrection, rebellion, and so forth; (2) the government's response to that challenge; (3) possible foreign involvement on the side of the revolutionary force; and (4) possible foreign involvement on the side of the governmental force. In the view of the writer, modern revolutionary warfare involves some degree of internal systemic change as a revolutionary goal and the use of illegal force as a means.

THE CONTINUING THREAT?

A critical question at this point in time is whether there is any need for the United States to worry about a future involvement in revolutionary warfare. There are those who would answer this question in the negative on the basis that past involvement in Vietnam has proved the point that any U.S. reaction to revolutionary warfare must be wasteful and counterproductive. This suggests that a pattern of non-response would be a solution to the problem.

Contrarily, it is the contention of this paper that every future case of revolutionary war must be carefully considered as to the possible threat it poses to U.S. interests. There is strong evidence of the continuing impact of revolutionary warfare on world order. First, revolutionary activity appears to be currently as threatening as at any time in the twentieth century, certainly a century of such warfare. Second, there is evidence that, in numerous places where such activities are not currently overt, they are nascent, with organizations-in-existence ready to exploit the appropriate moment. Third, because nuclear warfare is by its nature so awesome and dangerous that direct confrontation is extremely hazardous (some say "unthinkable"), it is considered by many to be advantageous to the great powers to test strength through the relatively safe channel of revolutionary activity in third countries. Fourth, whereas the experience of Vietnam may make the United States reluctant to be involved in another revolutionary episode, that very reluctance increases the value and advantage of such warfare to powers which remain ideologically antagonistic. A definite pattern of non-response by the United States would indeed invite revolutionary aggression directly or indirectly inimical to U.S. interests. Fifth, the increasing desperation and apparent irrationality of revolutionists and the possibility that they might get hold of nuclear weapons magnify the entire scope of the problem.

MODELS OF MODERN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

While the current threat of revolutionary warfare to the United States and world order appears to be at least as potent as in the past, its nature has been constantly evolving and changing. It is believed that the best way to understand this phenomenon is through an examination of its practice, and particularly through the doctrines promulgated by its proponents and practitioners. History thus elaborated and idealized in theory, rather than the rude contradictions and turmoil of actual experience, becomes the textbook for future practitioners and forms the background of ideas from which revolutionary plans are drawn for the future.

In chapter II of this paper, revolutionary theories based upon the experiences of the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Africa, and the Mideast are reviewed as leading and differing models for present and future revolutionists. Soviet revolutionary theory emphasizes the need for the prior existence of a highly organized and disciplined revolutionary party and for certain conditions to obtain before the start of violence. The Chinese, Cuban, African and Mideastern models elaborate and modify this basic Soviet theory. In current views, revolution is seen as an increasingly spontaneous and participatory event, with violence regarded as an entity useful in itself. Defining the existence of the state as a form of violence, revolutionists justify the need and legitimacy of violence against the state. Some revolutionaries have used terrorism in such a way as to carry the action beyond national boundaries (e.g., the Palestinian guerrillas) and past a strict ideological orientation (e.g., African liberationists) to create a revolutionary trend that may be termed transnational and post-ideological.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Interestingly enough, governments have also exploited revolutionary techniques in a number of situations including both offensive and defensive postures during general war, localized warfare, and even peacetime. These uses, as well as some possible defensive and offensive uses of revolutionary warfare in conjunction with nuclear war, are posited in chapter III. It is certainly feasible for governments, including this one, to consider support of revolutionary warfare as a useful tactic.

At the same time, the United States remains under a number of constraints in the possible support of revolutionary warfare in foreign areas, both in relation to the ideologically-opposed communist powers and the less ideologically committed Third World. First, the United States has generally lacked the useful, committed local proxies that have abetted and shielded communist efforts. Second, the United States lacks the cohesive motivational force of a communist

philosophy, with its built-in incentives to revolution. Identification of the United States with an abundant economy may be attractive, but many nations are unready for industrial modernization, attempts at modernization create stress and pain, and capitalism as a philosophy is identified with an alien and unattractive colonial and imperialist past. Despite its failures to "deliver," communism continues to attract revolutionary fronts; despite its successes, capitalism does not "sell." Third, partly for the first two reasons, the United States lacks a revolutionary clientele, particularly one that would accept direction in return for support. Fourth, the success of insurgency is, despite popular myth, highly uncertain. Fifth and further, revolutionary success has often required time—for example, 26 years in China, 27 years thus far (and still no unification) in Vietnam—and even time does not necessarily spell success, as the Greek communists and Angolan nationalists have discovered. Could this country afford to wait so long for a policy of aid to revolution to bear fruit? Sixth, the passage of time increases the cost of supporting insurgency in terms of price escalation, possible embarrassment, concessions made elsewhere, and opportunities lost in the interim. Seventh, one of the prices must be the cost in internal stability, as even the U. S. S. R. has discovered. Can it be that encouragement of external revolution also encourages internal instability? Eighth, a further price is likely to be a high cost in external relations, as other regimes and governments ponder the security of their relations with the United States. To support a policy of aiding revolution abroad would mean undoing the work of over 25 years in attempting to develop a stable international system—just as both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China appear more ready to accept the constraints of the state system. Feasibility, value, and cost all appear to argue against any new and radical policy of support for external revolution.

DETERRENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

To deter or prevent revolutionary warfare has been the desire of most governments; indeed, it is a major portion of present U. S. defense strategy in certain overseas areas. A rational approach to deterrence operating within the limits of a constitutional framework suggests that the causes of strife be ascertained, so that ameliorative and corrective steps may be taken to resolve problems before a situation of internal war is reached. Causal explanations of revolutionary warfare are therefore briefly reviewed in chapter IV, in the hope that they will lead to insights into the outbreak or escalation of revolutionary violence.

Causal explanations of revolutionary violence are certainly not lacking. The unfortunate thing, however, is that they vary so widely, and appear to be so contradictory. Whereas the nature of man, or the nature of certain men, is seen by some as the explanation of insurgent terror, other views exonerate man and place the blame on government. Economic explanations are prolific and equally diverse, with poverty bringing on rebellion in one view, while economic

Summary

Improvement is a major factor in another explanation. An attempt at synthesis appears in the view that sees economic change as the culprit: Rapid economic growth produces both winners and losers, both of which are forces of instability, and thus growth is "a major force leading toward revolution and instability." Agrarian problems and land maldistribution are seen by others as even more potent forces toward revolution in the Third World, where it is widely held that most men still prefer land ownership and agriculture to any kind of urban employment.

Marxist views, which trace economic inequity and exploitation as the cause of an inevitable class warfare, bring together the two factors of economic malfunction and societal dysfunction. Non-Marxist observers have also noted the important role in revolution played by class antagonism, the transfer of intellectual allegiance from the establishment, and a failure of self-trust among the ruling class. One student of revolution refers to "ideological cramp," which occurs when new and old social myths—the commonly accepted systems of symbols—come into faction.

Class warfare as a causative element in the onset of revolution is one possibility, but it fails to account for revolutionary violence based on communal rather than class differences. In this latter type, race, religion, language, regionalism, and even political affiliation transcend class differences and pit multi-class groups against each other. Because communal violence tends to utilize an ideological verbiage, however, the true issues are often beclouded.

Although economic considerations are usually seen as primary in class warfare explanations and contributory in communal warfare explanations, there is at least another causal view which dismisses them as indifferent. In this view, revolution may occur in times of economic prosperity or in times of poverty; it makes no difference. The "main and indispensable condition" is, rather, a disruption of the social or cultural system.

The many explanations offered for the start of revolution—only a few are suggested above—unfortunately fail to yield a manageable set of specific indicators on the basis of which pragmatic measures might be taken. Also, one suspects that there may be some critical point at which each of these various factors may become valid, since even those countries without a revolutionary condition exhibit some degree of economic and social imbalance. Comparative studies of societies that are and are not experiencing revolutionary activity appear to be necessary before causal explanations may provide a basis for practical management actions.

QUICK RESOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

If causal explanations of revolutionary violence appear to be internally contradictory and insufficiently tested against reality, most incumbent regimes, as a matter of practice, have sought to maintain their authority, not so much by preventing revolutionary warfare, as by ending it as quickly as possible after its start. In the discussion of this subject in chapter V, quick resolution is defined as one occurring within a year of the start of open insurgent violence.

Apparently most cases of revolutionary warfare are short-lived; and most short-lived cases are apparently resolved in favor of the government, although it is not known precisely to what extent, how, or why. In this paper, two important aspects of quick resolution are explored: (1) the conditions or events that are thought to precipitate violence, and (2) some of the problems and constraints that influence the government's initial actions.

Numerous precipitants of revolutionary warfare have been postulated, most of which appear to center upon government weakness, as shown in various ways, as the salient factor. Financial crisis, military catastrophe, or defection of the armed forces are all, in certain views, government weaknesses that may well precipitate conflict. But revolutionary warfare may also be the result of conscious insurgent decision. Lenin's activities leave little doubt that he saw the need for such a decision, although always in relation to certain "objective conditions," including the support of an "advanced class," a "revolutionary upsurge of the people," and the selection of a turning point in the relations between government and revolutionists when the latter possessed the greater resolve and initiative. In this set, the factors of conscious insurgent decision and government weakness are combined. Other students of revolution have pointed out that violence in one area tends to trigger revolutionary activity elsewhere, in what may be termed an "echo effect." Also, inappropriate government action, involving either too little or too much force, is often seen as a precipitant of revolutionary violence.

In dealing with the onset of internal war, the government is faced with at least four major problems: (1) identification of the leaders, goals, and capabilities of the insurgency; (2) determination of the initial strategic emphasis; (3) decision about the degree of force to be used; and (4) the maintenance of popular support. Furthermore, the government must often react before it solves these problems. There are apparently no precise conclusions available at present as to what kind of initial response is most apt to succeed in quickly resolving revolutionary violence under given conditions. Governments presently proceed along the lines of their best guess rather than following any definitive prescription.

Summary

Granting that little is known about which measures most consistently lead to a quick resolution, one may ask what the long-range effects of certain actions may be, particularly since it has been suggested that initial responses frame the crucial parameters of the conflict. Comparing the early problems enumerated above with the military outcomes in 44 previously studied* cases that were not quickly resolved, it would appear that time tends to forgive much. Governments eventually won approximately as often—whether or not they initially identified the insurgents, their initial strategic emphasis was military or political, or the degree of force was strong and rapid or delayed. Only one characteristic of the early response period seems to have had any clear-cut and strong relationship with later military outcome: Governments tended eventually to win those cases where they received initial popular support, ranging from neutrality to positive approval, more often than those where they lacked such support.

LONG-TERM RESOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Revolutionary violence that persists for over a year or more is considered in this paper to be long-term, but whether the survival of the conflict for so long is a calamity or a windfall for the government may be moot. In any event, it is apparently not overwhelmingly unfortunate for the government since, based on analysis of the above-mentioned cases, half of the governments eventually won a military victory. The military win is extremely important for the government if it wishes to achieve a political settlement to its liking. Of the governments that achieved military success, 86 percent also achieved political success. By comparison, governments that were unable to do better than a military draw translated this into compatible political terms only 26 percent of the time, and the very few governmental military losers were invariably also political losers.

Granting the importance of the military outcome, one may ask whether there were any characteristics of revolutionary warfare that generally (but not necessarily in every case) tended to be strongly associated with a government military success. Comparative analysis indicated that there were certain characteristics highly related to military success, most of these concerning either lacks or deficiencies in the insurgents' performance or successful performance on the government's side. Interestingly enough, only one characteristic of the revolutionary environment or background demonstrated a high relationship to government military success: Governments tended to win when the insurgents had been organized as a movement committed to violence for less than a year before the outbreak of hostilities.

*See notes 1 and 2 following chapter VI.

Six characteristics indicating failures in insurgent performance were strongly related to a government military success. When the insurgent capability in intelligence and counterintelligence was not at least as effective as that of the regime, the government tended to win. If the insurgents were not able to spread their operational enclaves over an area exceeding one-third of the territory of the country, government chances of a military victory were improved. And of the six highly related characteristics, four concerned insurgent logistical deficiency: insurgent logistical problems severe enough to hamper their offensive operations, lack of improvement generally in the insurgent supply situation, failure of the revolutionists to achieve access to major external sources of funds, or their lack of access to foreign logistical support. Eleven other characteristics of insurgent performance were related to government military success at less high but still suggestive levels.

A word should perhaps be said about those characteristics that did not yield a strong or even a mild association with military success. These include some of the most fondly held ideas as to what is required for military success. For example, no strength-of-force ratios could be shown to be highly related. Again, no matter how important communist involvement was in the generation of the revolutionary warfare, it was apparently generally unimportant to the eventual military outcome. These nonfindings, in fact, suggest new needs to review many long-held ideas about long-term revolutionary warfare.

Finally, it may be asked whether a set of two or more characteristics would not better explain the outcomes of these past cases than any characteristic considered singly, as above. It was found that one set of five characteristics was able to account for military outcomes in 40 of the 44 cases. The set included the following five characteristics contributing to a government win: (1) government possession of popular support at the beginning of the conflict, (2) government success in making it difficult for the revolutionists to obtain sufficient arms to continue operations, (3) insurgent failure to obtain important amounts of logistical support from external sources, (4) limitation of insurgent operations geographically so that they did not occur simultaneously in both urban and rural areas, and (5) limitation of the insurgent supply base to the capital city and urban areas rather than its spread to rural or mixed urban-rural settings. This set of characteristics is explanatory in a historical sense for the studied cases but should not be construed into prediction for the future, where revolutionary warfare may or may not occur in the same ways as in the past. Still, these findings, which remain tentative, do provide the basis for qualitative insight and hopefully for further quantitative work.

Summary

RESEARCH NEEDS FOR THE FUTURE

Although the matter of future research requirements is handled separately from this paper, a brief descriptive overview is included in this summary in the following paragraphs.

In suggesting possible research for the future, it is necessary to take into account not only the present extent of knowledge on this subject, but also operational requirements and constraints of the future. In this writer's view, there is an immediate need to deal with (1) terroristic actions by relatively small but possibly highly mobile revolutionary groups. Beyond this, there are problems involved in any possible resumption of (2) large-scale demonstrations, disorders, and riots in urban revolutionary situations; (3) revolutionary activity as part of a confrontation of powers resulting from an energy crisis or other massive dislocation of the international order; and (4) possible large-scale revolutionary disorder spread over very large areas, deriving from the same kind of situation as in (3) above but enlarging out of control on its own impetus.

The research suggestions made in the course of this work and separately presented represent the point of view of one person, relate mainly to social science research, and deal with revolutionary warfare subjects using cases and comparative analysis rather than single area (or theoretical) approaches. Empirically-based work is badly needed for a subject that is too often approached on the principle of what should work rather than what does work. Overemphasis on the former approach has in fact created many serious operational problems in the past. Limitations and constraints on the uses of power in revolutionary situations, furthermore, need to be seriously studied without preconception or bias.

Suggestions are made for three types of work in specific subject proposals, background research, and thinkpieces. Six specific subjects are proposed for support: (1) control of urban terrorism; (2) crowd management, mob control, and street fighting; (3) ways to limit the escalation of violence in revolutionary situations; (4) methods of resolving revolutionary conflict quickly; (5) home country reactions as a management and policy factor, and (6) consolidation of government success in revolutionary conflict situations. Three kinds of background research are suggested for partial support since they contribute to the management of revolutionary conflict: area studies, intercultural communication and interaction research, and information backup. Six subjects are also suggested for thinkpieces.

CONTENTS

The Author	ii
Preface	iii
Summary	v
Chapter I. Introduction: Definitions and Threat Assessment	1
Definitions	1
The Continuing Nature of the Problem	5
Notes	9
Chapter II. Models of Modern Revolutionary Warfare	11
Model I: Russia	11
Model II: China	13
Model III: Cuba	18
Model IV: Africa	23
Model V: Other Variations	25
Notes	28
Chapter III. Government Support for Revolutionary Warfare	33
Government Uses of Revolutionary Warfare	34
During General War	34
During Localized Warfare	37
During Peacetime Conditions	41
Constraints on Government Support for Revolutionary Warfare	43
The Lack of Useful Proxies	43
The Lack of a Charismatic Revolutionary Ideology	44
The Lack of an Appropriate Revolutionary Clientele	44
The Uncertainty of Success	46
The Requirement for Time	48
The Increasing Cost over Time	48
The Cost in Internal Stability	49
The Cost in External Relations	49
Notes	51

Chapter IV. Deterrence of Revolutionary Warfare	53
Causal Explanations of Insurgent Violence	53
The Causal Protagonist: Man or Government?	54
Economic Maladjustment	57
Social Dysfunction	60
Deterrence Reviewed	65
Notes	67
Chapter V. Quick Resolution of Revolutionary Warfare	71
Precipitants of Internal War	72
Financial Crisis	72
Military Crisis	72
Defection of the Armed Forces	73
Conscious Insurgent Decision	74
"Objective Conditions" as Precipitants	75
The Echo Effect	76
Government Action	77
Some Problems of the Initial Response	78
Early Identification	79
Initial Strategic Emphasis	81
Degree of Force	82
Popular Reactions	83
"Quick Resolution" Reviewed	85
Functioning of Precipitants	85
Initial Responses to Violence	86
Notes	92
Chapter VI. Long-Term Resolution of Revolutionary Warfare	95
Military Success—A Major Factor in Governmental	
Political Survival	98
Environment and Background in Relation to	
Military Outcome	98
Outcome-Related Characteristics	98
Non-Related Characteristics	99
Insurgent Performance in Relation to Military Outcome	102
Outcome-Related Characteristics	102
Non-Related Characteristics	107
Government Performance in Relation to Military	
Outcome	110
Outcome-Related Characteristics	110
Non-Related Characteristics	118
A Possible Explanation of Outcome	120
Notes	121

Distribution List	123
DD Form 1473	125

Charts and Tables

Chart 1. Governmental Uses of Revolutionary Warfare	34
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Tables

1. Military Outcome by Dominant Insurgent Political Organization	46
2. Military and Political Outcomes for 13 Well-Supported Insurgencies	47
3. Initial Identification of Insurgent Organization and Long-term Military Outcome	89
4. Initial Strategic Emphasis and Long-term Military Outcome	89
5. Initial Degree of Force Used by Government and Long-term Military Outcome	90
6. Initial Popular Support for Government and Long-term Military Outcome	90
7. Government Military Outcomes Compared with Government Political Wins	97
8. Interval Between Insurgent Organization and Occurrence of Violence Compared with Government Military Wins	99
9. Insurgent Effectiveness in Intelligence and Counterintelligence Compared with Government Military Wins	102
10. Insurgent Concentration of Operations Compared with Government Military Wins	103
11. Insurgent Logistics Problems Compared with Government Military Wins	104
12. Insurgent Supply Trend Compared with Government Military Wins	104
13. Insurgent Sources of Funds Compared with Government Military Wins	105
14. Insurgent Access to Foreign Logistical Support Compared with Government Military Wins	105
15. Government Neutralization of Major Insurgent Leadership Compared with Government Military Wins	111
16. Government Concessions to Insurgent Demands Compared with Government Military Wins	111
17. Government Provision of Political Alternatives Compared with Government Military Wins	112
18. Government Reliance on Paramilitary Forces Compared with Government Military Wins	113

19. Government Coordination of Forces Compared with Government Military Wins	113
20. Government Military Operations by Geographic Location Compared with Government Military Wins	114
21. Government Trend of Popular Support During Conflict Period Compared with Government Military Wins	115
22. Government Interdiction of External Insurgent Support Compared with Government Military Wins	116
23. Government Ability to Interdict Insurgent Arms Compared with Government Military Wins	116

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION:

DEFINITIONS AND THREAT ASSESSMENT

This paper represents an attempt to review, order, and analyze some aspects of the phenomenon of modern revolutionary warfare from the point of view of a government involved either in supporting, preventing, or fighting it. From this basis, there is an opportunity, not only to bring together some of the major ideas that have been circulating about modern revolutionary warfare, but to suggest avenues for an approach to further work in this field. In a separate paper such an approach has been briefly outlined; it attempts to provide for utilization of what has already been done, thus building upon the past, and for new work in areas of maximum need. This entire work, therefore, has a specific focus on revolutionary warfare as a matter concerning policy and action from the establishment's perspective.

The policymaker concerned with basing his decisions on what is known about revolutionary warfare is apt to be dismayed at the paucity of "hard" conclusions, as well as the extreme fecundity, often personalistic nature, and faddish pseudo-intellectualism that have beset much of the literature on the subject. Widespread belief in communist superiority in revolutionary warfare, for example, pervades the field with little regard to evidence. When one further considers that there is no adequately explanatory theory of revolution, wide disparity in the findings of many studies, failure to provide for external confirmation and validation of study findings, a high degree of politicization surrounding study in the field, and that the subject, furthermore, does not submit easily to the scientific method—one is apt to throw up one's hands in confusion and frustration. Adding to the whole disturbed picture is the recent popularity of revolutionary warfare among intellectuals and students and in the communications media, where misinformation, unfortunately, may flow as easily and as quickly as information. It is with regard to these considerations that one must realize the difficulties under which policy is approached, for whatever the state of knowledge on this subject, policy must continue to be made and actions taken.

DEFINITIONS

"Modern revolutionary warfare" is viewed in this paper as subsuming a whole array of activities involved in (1) a violent, illegal domestic challenge to

a government on the order of and variously termed internal war, insurgency, insurrection, subversive warfare, rebellion, guerrilla warfare, paramilitary warfare, and so forth; (2) the government's response to that challenge, variously described as counterrevolution, counterinsurgency, internal defense and development, stability operations, paramilitary warfare, police actions, anti-bandit war, and pacification; (3) foreign involvement on the side of the revolutionary force, often termed in the United States "unconventional warfare"; and (4) foreign involvement on the side of the governmental force, sometimes also described in recent years as counterinsurgency, internal defense and development, and stability operations.

Within this vast array of terms, often amounting to a massive terminological confusion, what is precisely meant by "modern revolutionary warfare"? Revolution is defined in its political sense by Webster's Third New International Dictionary as "a fundamental change in political organization or in a government or constitution: the overthrow or renunciation of one government or ruler and the substitution of another by the governed." This definition suggests but does not necessarily include violence as an indispensable element of the revolution, since fundamental changes could conceivably be accomplished in a nonviolent form. Also since it includes the overthrow of a "ruler" as a part of the definition, it suggests but does not require change in the political system itself as an indispensable part of the revolution. History is replete with examples of the overthrow of individual rulers, often quite violently, without any accompanying change in the political system. Both the use of overt violence and the goal of systemic change are considered in this paper to be major elements of the term, modern revolutionary warfare.

The noted historian Carl J. Friedrich has called political revolution the "sudden and violent overthrow of an established political order." This definition includes elements of both violence and systemic change, but its emphasis on suddenness seems inappropriate, since revolutionary violence may be considerably protracted over a period of years, as in China or in South Vietnam, which are as much examples of modern revolutionary warfare as the Soviet Union, to which Friedrich's definition applies quite well.

For others, revolutionary war involves far more than political change. Sigmund Neumann defines it as "a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development." Under this definition—which also well describes the Soviet revolution—how many other revolutions would one, however, still have? The French revolution qualifies easily, but would the American or English revolutions? Chalmers Johnson speaks of revolution as a "form of social change undertaken in response to specific conditions of the social system. . .," a term so broad that it encompasses all forms of rebellion and perhaps even

Introduction

much that would fall into the rubric of everyday events. But Johnson also requires "the use of violence by members of the system in order to cause the system to change."³

At this point it might be helpful to specify, beyond systemic change and violence, what is meant by modern revolutionary warfare as used in this paper. Because of the focus of this paper, there is as much interest in defining this phenomenon by its characteristics during occurrence as by the results it brings. It certainly means a serious domestic challenge to the viability of the incumbent government by the use of means that are generally considered illegal, specifically, political subversion, armed insurgency, and organized violence. It may also include such measures as urban terror attacks, guerrilla warfare, or even set battles between conventional forces on both sides. These are the military tactics of modern revolutionary warfare; they are an embodiment of the "violence." But there is no necessity that each of these tactics be used and certainly not that there should be any fixed progression of stages. Indeed it is often normal to find all such measures being used simultaneously or in alternating sequences and combinations.

When the word "modern" is added to the term "revolutionary warfare," the connotation is generally to the 20th century, although the great revolutions of England in the 17th century and of the American colonies and especially of France in the late 18th century form an intellectual continuum with the convulsive revolutionary attempts in Europe during the mid and later 19th century and even with the socialist and bolshevik revolutions in Russia in 1917.⁴

Twentieth-century revolutionary warfare, like some of its earlier historical counterparts, may also include the phenomenon of outside aid to the participants. Aid to resistance movements and guerrilla forces behind Axis occupation lines was widely given by Allied forces during the second world war. In U.S. Army terms, such activities are called "unconventional warfare." Aid to a government facing revolutionary attack has been generally known in the United States for the past several years as "counterinsurgency." If these terms are applied generically, other examples of counterinsurgency include the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Chinese reaction in Tibet in the 1960's, while other examples of "unconventional warfare" include Soviet and Chinese aid to the Viet Cong, Egyptian aid to the Yemeni insurgents, or alleged Israeli aid to the Sudanese rebels.

For definitional purposes, the discussion in this paper is not deeply concerned with typologies of revolutionary warfare, although these are intriguing. Johnson, for example, discerns six types of revolution based on the criteria of targets, identities, ideology, and spontaneity: the Jacquerie,

the millenarian rebellion, the anarchistic rebellion, the Jacobin communist or "great" revolution (the least common type), the conspiratorial coup d'état, and the militarized mass insurrection.⁵ Huntington distinguishes praetorian violence from communal violence or from new-style urban violence and all three from a fourth form of revolution represented by a coalition of urban-rural elements.⁶ As Orlansky has noted in his comparison of four different typologies, much overlap and inconsistency arises in the systems that have been attempted. As a result, Orlansky finally ends by endorsing Eckstein's advice "to consider internal wars as all of a piece at the beginning of inquiry and to make distinctions only as they become necessary or advisable. . . ."⁷

No one will dispute that a government needs to distinguish between and among its opponents; but in point of fact, in the modern world it is the ability of ideological revolutionists to come in, to "capture," and to orchestrate all the various types of insurgent and rebellious groups which adds so much to the threat that any one of the less ideologically motivated groups may pose to a government. For this reason and, even then reluctantly, only the coup d'état has been generally excluded from consideration in this paper. This decision seems particularly wise in those cases where the coup has been semi-institutionalized simply as a means of changing personnel in power positions.

Just as no attempt is made in this paper to limit the discussion by utilizing a given typology of revolutionary warfare, there will be no attempt to distinguish between functions that are essentially the same but have been called by varying names. For political and propaganda reasons, the terminology of revolutionary war—diffuse and vague as it legitimately is—has been applied without any consistency. What is "unconventional war" to one major power bloc has been variously termed, for example, "aggression," "aid to bandits," or "international terrorism." And what may appear to one power side as "counterinsurgency," has been called a number of unpleasant names by the other, for example, "American imperialism," "Soviet repression," or "Zionist aggression." The only limit has been that of imagination and vocabulary. Such name games serve a very useful purpose in a political sense, but they have little research value. In this paper, therefore, no account will be taken of political propaganda terminology, and the same words will be used to describe the various phenomena whether they represent a Free World or a communist activity.

It should also be noted that "modern revolutionary warfare" is viewed in this paper as neither intrinsically moral nor immoral. Insurgents and governments may be either "good" or "bad," and their individual acts may vary along a wide range of values, dependent in operation on the value system, the time frame, and the cultural setting of both the actors and the viewers. Since firm criteria are not available by which to judge morality

In many, even most, revolutionary situations, the actions of both insurgents and governments will be viewed in this paper as functions of given roles. Every attempt furthermore will be made to discuss modern revolutionary warfare in terms that will promote a cold look at a subject which ordinarily engenders too much heat.

THE CONTINUING NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

A critical question at this point in time, as the United States slowly emerges from a long and painful experience in Vietnam, is whether there is any need for this nation to consider further involvement in any kind of revolutionary warfare. Public opinion would seem to be strongly against it, although some of those who condemned involvement in Vietnam often appeared at times to favor involvement in Biafra—or Bangladesh—or Israel—or South Africa. If one accepts the argument that involvement in Vietnam proves that any U.S. reaction to revolutionary warfare in the future must be wasteful and counterproductive, it would appear that all flexibility of action is lost. That is, this argument suggests that a pattern of nonresponse would be a set solution to the problem.

On the contrary, it is the contention of this paper that future instances of revolutionary warfare will confront the United States with new problems and that every response—whether of involvement or non-involvement—should be carefully considered. It is further contended that violent, armed revolution will continue to occur in various places in the world at various times and that it will continue to be a factor of potential significance in the foreseeable future.

It is, of course, quite possible that there may be revolutionary activity by internal groups in the United States. While this may be a serious problem, it is not the one that this paper is primarily addressing. Rather, this paper is concerned with the implications that exist for the United States by reason of the revolutionary activity that occurs elsewhere in the world. The first question of concern then is the evidence that may be deduced for the continuing significance of revolutionary warfare as a potential threat for the United States in external situations.

The first evidence that modern revolutionary warfare exists as a problem area is that it appears to be a currently flourishing phenomenon. In early 1973 the United States is winding down more than a decade of involvement in Vietnam, where such warfare has been going on more or less continuously since 1946. The situation in Cambodia and Laos is, however, still uncertain. At the same time communist and non-communist insurgent threats in Thailand appear to be growing, and the Philippines is undergoing martial law and a tremendous government reorganization in the wake of a growing revolutionary

threat. Further examples include Ireland, which continues to be a morass of brotherly hate. Urban terrorism in Latin America creates international incidents through the kidnaping of foreign business executives and diplomats and national turmoil through the assassination of highly placed government officials. Palestinian revolutionists attempt to achieve a world forum through terroristic action, as witness the 1972 massacres of civilians in an Israeli airport or of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich or the 1973 executions of kidnaped U. S. diplomats in Khartoum. This list is exemplary only and by no means complete.⁸

The second evidence of a possible future threat is that, where revolutionary operations are not currently overt, they are often nascent or between "rounds." Known revolutionary organizations wait for conditions to allow them to start or to resume revolutionary activity. Certain areas of Africa appear to fall in this category—for example, Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Ethiopia. In many parts of the world, on the other hand, sordid economic conditions afflict masses of people and would seem merely to await the revolutionary organizer. The Indian sub-continent, the Mideast, and Latin America are candidates.

The third element that raises the threat potential is that nuclear power has so increased the risks attendant on waging conventional war that revolutionary war-by-proxy has become extremely valuable as the only kind of overt aggression that may be waged with relatively impunity. Direct confrontation by major powers now carries risks that are absolutely unacceptable unless the threat is of such magnitude that it involves national survival itself. Aggrandizement through insurgent activity, on the other hand, is still possible as a means of testing ideology and strength, as well as improving strategic geographic position. Even where regular battles and campaigns may be fought, revolutionary warfare is to be expected in addition. The major non-Western powers have shown their capability in this field.

The fourth point insofar as threat is concerned is the fact that the future utility to others of internal war as a means of aggrandizement has probably been increased by the U. S. experience in Vietnam. The reaction of the United States to that experience suggests that this country will be reluctant to intervene in another revolutionary situation in the near future. This fact must surely give further appeal to the use of such warfare in various areas as a means of bringing down pro-United States governments and of further isolating the largest Western power. Unless international realities have changed quite drastically, any lowering of the U. S. capability to deal with revolutionary warfare in a decisive manner because of complex political constraints must be viewed as a probable reason for its increased occurrence. For example, the Arab bloc is not likely to eschew revolutionary warfare tactics in its struggle against Israel in the Middle East, and

Introduction

that struggle strongly involves Western interests. Certain Latin American countries carry a high probability of experiencing internal conflict, which could affect American interests in the Western hemisphere. Further, "The Soviet regime," as George Kennan wrote in October 1972, "continues to be inspired by an ideology hostile in principle to the Western nations, from which it dares not depart."⁹ Can one reasonably expect that it will forsake except temporarily a strategy of such usefulness as revolutionary warfare?

A fifth reason for anticipating a continued thrust in this field is the added element of apparent irrationality in much of the insurgent activity that is currently occurring. According to the revolutionary theorist, psychologist Frantz Fanon, outraged but impotent people express and rid themselves of frustration through acts of violence: "At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force."¹⁰ Much of today's terrorism has this stamp. In the past, irrational people have stampeded highly rational governments into acts of folly. One cannot now assume that revolutionary terrorism may not have similar consequences for major powers and the world community. Conventional weaponry has given armed terrorists tremendous clout, but the threat and dangers are increased many times by the fact that nuclear technology is becoming more widespread. As miniaturization progresses, as the number of countries possessing a nuclear capability increases, so do the chances for a revolutionary group to obtain nuclear weapons whether by gift, theft, or know-how. One must face the question whether any revolutionary group attaining a nuclear capability would refuse to use it because of policy and humanitarian considerations. It is conceded that nations facing a survival threat would use the bomb if they possessed it. Should it be expected that a revolutionary group facing a survival threat would necessarily practice any restraint? This possibility raises the dangers inherent in revolutionary warfare by a quantum measure.

The United States, of course, cannot control the world. Conversely, it cannot expect to escape the consequences of acts which, either alone or together, may seriously erode its position in the world. At the moment, with the current popularity in certain influential circles of a view that sees increased safety for the United States in a highly fragmented and multi-polar world communist movement, there appears to be an easy assumption that the more communist nations, the better. In this scenario, the United States can afford to be indifferent to the success of pro-communist revolutions. Yet it may be well, even while absorbing this euphoric viewpoint, to remember that the one area of agreement which both Russia and China have had and still can share—even compete to demonstrate—is their "anti-imperialism," their antipathy to the Western world and to the strongest of the Western powers. Who can say that this agreement will be lessened or less useful when other nations join the communist and anti-Western blocs? Who can say that, when the era of good feeling we are now experiencing ebbs, there will not be a return to other, harder strategies?

Despite U. S. disenchantment with external involvement in revolutionary warfare, there is no opting out of the decision process for the next case. Any U. S. decision not to be involved is a decision to play one kind of role and to allow certain things to happen. That is involvement, just as much as a decision to participate actively is involvement. It is a logical fallacy to believe that this country can be uninvolved in relation to events that may have serious consequences for its relative power position on the international scene. This is no simple argument for U. S. aid to a revolutionary group or to a government facing revolutionary activity. The best decision may, rather, be for no involvement whatsoever. But the decision must be made.

To make any of these judgments on a rational basis, however, requires some knowledge, not only of U. S. requirements and needs, but of the nature of revolutionary warfare in its various manifestations and dimensions.

NOTES

¹Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Revolution: Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy (Nomos VIII; New York: Atherton Press, 1966), p. 5.

²Sigmund Neumann, "The International Civil War," World Politics, I, 3 (April 1949), 333-334, n. 1.

³Chalmers Johnson, Revolution and the Social System (Hoover Institution Studies 3; The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1964), pp. 4, 16.

⁴See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1957).

⁵Johnson, op. cit., pp. 26-68.

⁶Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," in Civil Violence and the International System, Part II Violence and International Security (Adelphi Papers No. 83; London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), pp. 1-15.

⁷Jesse Orlansky, The State of Research on Internal War (Research Paper P-565; Arlington, Va.: Institute for Defense Analyses, August 1970), pp. 49-66; quotation on p. 66.

⁸See, for example, the article, "Guerrillas Will Be With Us a Long Time . . .," from The Economist of 9 Sept. 72, and reprinted in The Washington Post (14 Sept. 72), p. A-18.

⁹George Kennan, "After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970's," Foreign Affairs, 51, 1 (October 1972), 219.

¹⁰Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, [1963]), p. 73.

Chapter II

MODELS OF MODERN REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Whereas many facets of revolutionary warfare appear to remain fairly constant, its basic nature seems to have changed subtly but considerably since the early part of the century. In Russia in late 1917, for example, a highly developed, revolutionary movement with a sophisticated ideology and concept of organization took over a weak and vacillating social democracy that had only months earlier ended the Romanov dynasty. The revolutionary process was perceived and conducted as a highly rationalized activity, rational in terms of its response to social, economic, and political reality. By the start of the 1970's, on the other hand, revolutionary warfare was perceived by many revolutionists, not so much in terms of response to objective reality, but in terms of subjective perceptions and the idea that violence was good in itself; to this extent, one may term it more existential and irrational, although it is too early for one therefore to brand it as necessarily unsuccessful.

Some of the major signposts along this road of revolutionary change, as expressed in terms of theory and practice, are discussed below. There is, of course, a wealth of cases and theorists from which to choose in such an undertaking; the selection for this paper was made on the basis that both the cases and the theorists have been and appear still to be highly influential among revolutionists. This does not mean that the ideas they expound, for example, the use of violence, are not derivative from still earlier generations of revolutionists.

MODEL 1: RUSSIA

In the Russian experience, the principles evolved by Marx, Tkachev, Lenin and others for successful revolution included two vital elements: First, a highly trained, highly organized, small minority organized as a semi-clandestine political party prepared to carry out the seizure of power; and second, a revolutionary situation in which government authority had broken down so that people might join in revolutionary activity with little fear of retribution. Marx perceived such a situation as this occurring as the result of a historical process following the advent of industrialization and the evolution of a capitalist system; in short, for Marx, revolution had strong overtones of inevitability.

For the others, revolutionary conditions were something to be actively induced, to be created. Peter Tkachev saw the first stage of the revolutionary process as the seizure of power by determined conspirators, to be followed by the establishment of a dictatorship by the revolutionary party, the abolition of all reactionary institutions, and the establishment of socialism.¹ In Lenin's view, overthrow of the state was the work for the party operating within what he termed "objective conditions." Nonetheless, the conditions of unrest, peasant revolt, army mutinies, and governmental paralysis that ushered in the bolshevik revolution were as much the acts of fortune as of the party. If Marxian "inevitability" appeared to create these objective conditions, Lenin's immense gift was to recognize them for what they were and to strike at the precise moment. The November 1917 takeover by the bolsheviks thus appeared to test a theoretical amalgam and to crown its success.²

Once Lenin and the party became the establishment, however, almost their first work was to face a series of major military and insurgent threats posed over the next three years: the Austro-German forces in the Ukraine and the pro-Allied Czech mutineers in the Urals during 1918; the White armies of Admiral Aleksandr Kolchak in Siberia and of General Anton Denikin in the Ukraine during 1919; and Marshal Josef Pilsudski's Polish army and Baron Peter Wrangel's White army on the fringes of the Ukraine during 1920. In addition, there were three full-scale peasant uprisings in the Ukraine under the Rada-Directory, the Ataman Grigoriev, and the anarchist leader Nestor Makhno.³ Then in the winter of 1920-1921, the Soviet leadership had to face a large-scale Basmachi movement in Turkestan, peasant insurrection in Russia proper, workers' strikes and demonstrations and party opposition in Petrograd, and in March 1921 the mutiny of revolutionary sailors at Kronstadt.⁴ With the conclusion of this long period of travail, the successful counterinsurgent communist government viewed revolutionary theory and practice as something which the government itself possessed as a monopoly; opposition, even dissent, were absolutely forbidden to those at home.⁵ Insurgency was available, however, for foreign export.

The first successful foreign test came almost fortuitously in 1919 in Outer Mongolia, a state so primitive that it was by Marxian definition unprepared for communist takeover. By mid-1921, however, the Russian-trained Mongolians, Sukhe Bator and Choibalsan, with the help of a Red army, overcame the scattered forces which together were performing a counter-insurgent function—the Khaika tribesmen of the Jebtsun Damba Khutukhtu, the Chinese forces of Cheng Yi, the Western Mongol Oirats under Ja Lama, and White Russian army remnants under the Baron Roman Fedorovitch Ungern von Sternberg. The success of the revolutionaries was unorthodox in Marxian terms, and Lenin prescribed a gradualist line appropriate for underdeveloped areas. Officially constituted as the Mongolian People's

Revolutionary Models

Republic, the government was modeled after the Soviet form to the extent possible. Outer Mongolia thus became the first viable Soviet satellite state and the communist prototype for the export variety of Soviet revolutionary warfare.⁶

In viewing the Soviet model of revolution, the early experiences appear to have been portentous for the future. First, once the bolshevik revolution succeeded, it quickly became the revolutionary "establishment," and any further change had to occur within establishmentarian auspices. Russian actions in the 1950's and 1960's in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia appear to have extended this principle to the European satellite nations. Second, the Russian communists saw, quite early in Outer Mongolia, that the communist revolution might occur in unexpected places, that it might not follow pure Marxian lines, and they were modestly adaptive. At the same time, the failure of communist attempts to seize power in Germany, Hungary, and other European countries during the 1920's predisposed Russian leaders to look beyond Europe for revolutionary success.

MODEL II: CHINA

As the Mongolian insurgents to the north were closing in on success in mid-1921, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Kung-Ch'ang-Tang) was being formed in July. From this time forward, party members worked to bring a communist revolution to China, at first mainly through the means of communizing the revolution already begun by Sun Yat-sen. For convenience, these years may be divided into four phases: 1924-1927, 1927-1936, 1937-1945, and 1946-1949.⁷

In January 1924, Sun Yat-sen, at a low ebb in his fortunes and rejected by the Western powers, accepted an alliance with the Chinese communists that allowed them to join his Kuomintang party. Although the communists cooperated in actions against the warlord regimes, they also made attempts at internal takeover from within Sun's Kuo-Min-Tang (hereafter referred to as Kuomintang). Correctly assessing the Kuomintang as potentially the most powerful political organization in China, the communists succeeded in taking over certain Kuomintang forces. This period came to an end, however, in the spring of 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek split with the radicals and managed to set up a center of noncommunist Kuomintang authority in Nanking. This first attempt is rated as a communist defeat.

On 1 August 1927, with the revolt of certain Kuomintang units under communist control, the second phase of the revolutionary effort began, with the communists openly fighting the nationalists. This period of base building

and overt conflict, mainly in the countryside, was to last for ten years, during which communist fortunes waned, waxed, and waned again. In 1934-1935, their forces were obliged to make what has come to be known as the Long March, a retreat of several thousand miles to a sanctuary in the north. At this point the communists were in a state of near disaster.

Two events were to come to their rescue. In January 1937, all armies finally linked up, Mao Tse-tung—since 1935 political leader of the CCP as well as a military leader—was able to announce the formation of a new communist government with its capital in Yen-an. In September of that same year, the communists were able to form a united front alliance with Chiang's nationalist Kuomintang, ostensibly to meet the threat of the renewed Japanese invasion of China. The ensuing truce in the internal fighting during the eight years of the Japanese occupation is widely credited with giving the communists an opportunity to recover, to build bases anew, and to hoard supplies for the future.

At the time that Japan surrendered to the Allied forces in August 1945, the communists were ready to resume the internal war on a far larger scale, but they were still much below the nationalists in strength. By 1947, with equipment stocks further improved by left-over Japanese supplies from Manchuria and American equipment captured from Kuomintang and warlord troops, the communists were able to launch an offensive in Manchuria and counteroffensives in north and central China. Fighting took on conventional overtones. Initially superior, the nationalists were plagued by over-extension of lines, supply distribution problems, incompetent leaders, lack of coordination between commanders, and—in the eyes of some viewers—their failure to institute a much-needed system of radical economic and agrarian reform that might have gained them public support.⁶ By the end of 1949, having destroyed the nationalist armies and taken the major cities, the communists had won a military victory and controlled mainland China.

This successfully concluded, 26-year-long communist effort left Mao Tse-tung in a commanding position, both in China and as the new apostle of insurgency. In the latter role, his specific contributions are widely considered to have been the creation and use of a peasant base to make a "proletariat" revolution and his emphasis upon the military side of the revolutionary operation.

It would appear that Mao's innovation was not so much the mere utilization of a peasant base for a proletariat revolution. Russian society, in fact, was mainly agrarian, and Lenin had had to fit peasants into the Marxian scheme. In Outer Mongolia, the Soviets had already accepted a nonproletariat-based revolution. Furthermore, Lindsay has pointed out that Comintern directives

Research Suggestions

The Future of Modern Revolutionary Warfare

A "study" of this kind should attempt an assessment of the capabilities of the great communist powers to recapture a greater degree of control over local communist parties, so that they might achieve some degree of rationality in the utilization of "wars of national liberation." One might ask whether and under what kind of conditions it would be advantageous for them to use this technique again. For example, would a vast revolutionary war sweeping down Africa further Russian plans in the Mideast?

New Faces of Terrorism

Terroristic techniques change rapidly, and innovations are quickly picked up and played again in areas remote from the original site. Should one therefore expect a rash, say, of assassinations, because the original aerial techniques were so quickly adopted and repeated? What new techniques might be expected if assassinations do not appear to yield the desired results? A companion thinkpiece, to follow this one, would be--

Possible Techniques to Cope with Terrorism

This subject is certainly a top priority need, and any writer on this topic should be both knowledgeable in all kinds of available technological responses and free to express his views, even his "fanciful" views. It is perfectly apparent from recent events--e.g., the Olympic massacre in Munich--that many law enforcement agencies are apparently unready and untrained to prevent or to react to such occurrences. One can only wonder at the infrequent use or nonuse of temporarily disabling chemical agents in the many cases of aerial terrorism and crowd disturbances that have occurred. Can diplomats themselves be trained in simple practices or techniques to save their own lives, techniques perhaps not always effective but frequently so? Can an efficient explosives detection device be made available for wide-spread use? What has been done to explore possible new techniques and tactics of bargaining with such terrorists? Is there a "protocol" within the cultural milieu? Is it better to appear to "bargain" even though no major concessions are to be made? The whole field needs a certain kind of free-wheeling exploration for which thinkpieces provide the proper vehicle.

Interfaces Between Software and Hardware Research

New weapons systems have sometimes been developed at considerable expense only to find that their political implications are too costly to allow

from 1931-1935 and favored a policy of maintaining large rear areas and an "absolutely" centralized command. Their slogans of "Attack on all fronts," "Don't give up an inch of territory," and "Divide the force into six routes" were castigated by Mao as "'Left' opportunism." He was also to claim that these too-adventurous ideas were in turn followed by over-cautious plans or "'Right' opportunism" which caused the communists to lose South China base areas.¹³

What then in essence was the militarism that Mao advocated a year after he had become leader of the party and the end of the Long March? In a work written in December 1936 to "sum up the experience" of 1927-1936 for his lectures at the Red Army College in northern Shensi, Mao expounded at length on the problems of the strategic defensive, which included "counter-offensive" operations, but he never completed a rejected chapter on the strategic offensive.¹⁴ It is probable that this account represents Mao's basic views on fighting revolutionary war. His "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan" and "On Protracted War," composed in 1938, are concerned with a wholly different and even more complex situation, not so much that of revolutionary warfare, but of reacting to an enemy occupation so as to ensure for his organization both a patriotic stance and survival in such a manner that revolutionary opponents might be overcome after the occupiers left.

Mao based his military strategy for the revolutionary situation of 1927-1936 on a general understanding of the laws of war and the laws of revolutionary war, but more particularly on the singular conditions and experiences of China. For the period he was addressing, he defined those conditions as being three in number. First, that China was a vast, semi-colonial, unevenly developed country that had already undergone the revolutionary struggles of 1924-1927. Second, that the Nationalist forces were "big and powerful." Third, that the Red Army was "small and weak."¹⁵

Since the Nationalist forces were stronger and their major tactic was to "encircle and suppress" Red forces, Mao defined the period as being militarily in the stage of the "strategic defensive," a period that would last until the relative balance between Nationalist and Red forces had changed in favor of the latter. In this period Mao claimed that even fairly large defeats of the Red armies were "only partial and temporary." In his terms, the Long March became a continuation of the Red Army's strategic defensive, despite the fact that the Red Army had lost up to 90 percent of its party membership, armed forces, and base areas. "Only the total destruction of the Red Army would constitute complete defeat. . . ."¹⁶ Thus he envisaged a protracted war that would endure until the communists won or were totally destroyed.

For this period, Mao supported the division of Red forces between the Red Guards or people's guerrilla forces and the Red Army, which he felt should "complement each other like a man's right arm and left arm. . . ." Also, "When we talk of people in the base area as a factor," he was to write, "we mean that we have an armed people." The guerrilla character of the Red Army itself was something that Mao felt should be honestly admitted "without shame," as its strong point. Nonetheless, he also felt that a conscious effort should be made to make it more centralized, uniform, disciplined, and thorough. Within the army, as within the base areas and guerrilla forces, Mao believed in strict political discipline and the system of political "representatives."¹⁸

In Mao's terms, the period of the strategic defensive consisted not only of retreats to conserve military strength, but also of counteroffensives. He did not contemplate undertaking a counteroffensive, however, unless conditions were propitious: an actively supportive population, favorable terrain, concentration of the main forces of the Red Army, discovery of enemy weak spots, a tired and demoralized enemy, and the previous occurrence of enemy mistakes. At least two of these conditions should obtain, according to Mao, before a counteroffensive was contemplated.¹⁹ With these conditions, Mao saw the possibility of "victory or defeat to either army," but this, he pointed out, could be determined only by a "decisive battle."²⁰

To win the battle, Mao felt it essential that his army force be concentrated but highly mobile. Territory would not be defended, and base areas would be abandoned when necessary. Mao also held that campaigns and battles had to be of "quick decision"—even though the revolutionary war in China was to be strategically protracted. Quick decision was a necessity at a time when the Red Army lacked supplies and was outnumbered by an enemy that could be reinforced by other nearby armies. Still, "quick decision" was subject to interpretation that might seem unusual from a Western viewpoint: It did not mean "undue impatience," and Mao complained of campaigns of a year's duration that might better have been extended, in his view, by two or three months. Finally, he condemned any "contest of attrition," seeking neither territory nor an enemy retreat or rout as the objective of battle. Mao wanted to inflict casualties on the enemy and to annihilate his units, thus lowering Nationalist strength in relation to Red strength and increasing both the amount of captured supplies and the number of captured soldiers available for recruitment into the Red Army.²¹ Mao expected the enemy to serve him in every way, that is, to deliver both recruits and supplies right to the front lines.

In reviewing Mao's doctrines, it should not be thought that he neglected or de-emphasized political work or the creation of active support for the revolution among the inhabitants, particularly of base areas. But much of

the reason for this work was to create good conditions for the Red Army campaign. Strategic retreat, for example, meant that some part of the base area would be forfeited to the enemy and great suffering would occur for the people of the area. To sustain this, the people had to have faith that the loss would be temporary and would be more than made up in the long run. "However, whether or not the people have faith," wrote Mao, "is closely tied up with whether or not the cadres have faith, and hence the first and foremost task is to convince the cadres."²¹ Obviously then, Mao felt that political work and popular support were integral to military success, but one must note that the desired end, the reason for the work, was certainly military success.

In summation, Mao's brilliance as a strategic thinker results from his pragmatism, his observation of specific detail, his looking ahead, his "hard view," his dovetailing of all aspects of strategy. Even in those early days, Mao patterned people to the cloth, not the cloth according to the people. Most persons could be utilized for the revolution; those who still opposed it must be annihilated. With a new political instrument, Mao forged a mighty Red Army and did not hesitate to use it to win a military victory.

The Chinese version of revolutionary war had a profound effect upon the world, particularly for such Asian leaders as the Vietnamese Ho Chi Minh and Giap. The revolutionary experience of the Vietnamese communists from 1930 to the present, in fact, parallels in many ways that of the Chinese communists. In other insurrectionary areas of the world, however, neither Soviet nor Chinese communist revolutionary ideology appeared to coincide with the reality of the revolution. One of these was Cuba.

MODEL III—CUBA

When President Fulgencio Batista left Cuba on 1 January 1959 in flight from the guerrilla columns led by Fidel Castro and others, Cubans and the world alike wondered what sort of person Castro really was—this apparently successful revolutionist who had not read Mao. The ideology of Castro's rebel army was not Marxist, it lacked the tight organizational structure expected of a leftist revolutionary group, and it had received the support of Cuban communists only belatedly and in conjunction with other political support. Post-accessional events moved rapidly to place Castro and Cuba in the Soviet orbit, but even Castro's avowal that he had always been a communist failed to convince those who saw in his actions no significant amount of communist orthodoxy and, certainly, in his revolution great deviation from its doctrines.²²

Revolutionary Models

The first insurgent theorist to emerge from the Cuban revolution was one of its major fighters, the Argentine Ernesto "Ché" Guevara, whose political stands did not always agree with those of Fidel Castro despite their close relationship and collaboration in the revolutionary struggle.²⁴ Guevara's book, *La Guerra de Guerrillas*, was translated and published in the United States in 1961. Its major thesis, "the essence of guerrilla warfare," is based on three fundamental points: (1) that popular forces can win militarily against an army; (2) that the insurrection can start before all the necessary conditions exist in that it can later create these conditions; and (3) in the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, "the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting."²⁵

If the revolution goes according to the Guevara ideal, it will begin with a small armed group, hiding in the wilds and striking a "fortunate blow" which becomes well-known. A few peasants and others will then join the guerrilla group, which will continue its tactics of attacking the enemy and retreating immediately, but in more and more inhabited areas, until eventually it is able to strike and destroy the vanguard of an enemy force. During this time new adherents will continue to join the group. As it grows, it seeks and finds an inaccessible place in which to start small manufactures; and in this area it begins to act as a government, with a court, laws, and indoctrination of the peasants. It defeats an enemy action against its base area. As it continues to expand, groups slip off to go into other areas and start the process all over, but from a higher base of experience. "The leaders learn steadily as the war develops, and their capacity of command grows under the added responsibilities of the qualitative and quantitative increases in their forces." Success comes, in Guevara's view, when the process of guerrilla growth and activity continues to increase to the point that the enemy can be brought to battle under favorable conditions: "there he is annihilated and his surrender compelled."²⁶

Guevara's theories grew out of his experience in Cuba; he was to test them, first in Africa in 1965 and then, for eleven months beginning in November 1966, in Bolivia. According to Daniel James, editor of Guevara's *Complete Bolivian Diaries . . .*, the purpose of the Bolivian adventure, was to cause sufficient trouble that the Bolivian authorities would ask for U. S. military aid. It was hoped that such intervention would involve the United States in still "another Vietnam," arousing intense anti-American feelings among both pro-communist and moderate groups in Latin America and thereby catapulting the entire continent into revolution.²⁷ Guevara's small group, however, failed spectacularly, and he was defeated and killed by Bolivian authorities on 8 October 1967. One result of his failure has been a search by other revolutionists for a more successful model of revolution.

Among the post-Guevara writings, elaborating his position and probably the most influential of the theoretical explanations of Castro's revolutionary war, is Régis Debray's slim volume, Revolution in the Revolution? published in 1967. Debray, a French honors graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris and student of the French Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, first went to Cuba in 1961, where he was impressed by the literacy campaign then going on among the peasants. In 1966, still in his mid-twenties, Debray returned to Cuba, this time as the holder of a chair in philosophy at the University of Havana. There he prepared his book with the aid of unpublished revolutionary documents and discussions with various still living participants in the Cuban rebellion, "including long days spent with Fidel Castro himself." It is claimed that Castro reviewed the manuscript before its publication.²⁸

If one accepts Debray as spokesman for the meaning of the Cuban revolution, Castro's M-26 insurgency opened a chasm in the communist theory of revolutionary warfare. Whereas Mao had been flexible, accommodative, and innovating insofar as orthodox communist revolutionary doctrine was concerned, the Cuban experience threw down the gauntlet to that tradition. It was the vanguard of new ways, new styles, new organizations, new ideological reflexes; most of all, it spoke of and to new men, specifically young men.

In Debray's view, the Cubans, despite their lack of Marxist ideology, stood for the proletarian socialist revolution but found some aspects of communist revolutionary doctrine unacceptable. Many prevalent theories of revolution, including some associated with Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Ho—writes Debray—are contrary to the conditions of life in Cuba and other Latin American countries. As a result, Debray categorically rejects various ideas—for example, that there are specific objective conditions necessary for the outbreak of revolution; any subjection of the guerrilla force to the party "as just one more component added to its peacetime organization"; the creation of a dual political and military command; sending guerrilla cadres to school for political cadres; any need for political specialists and, conversely, any need for military specialists; the creation of a guerrilla base as a prelude to active operations; defense of specific base areas; and the use of armed propaganda before military action begins.²⁹

To some extent, Debray may not appreciate the pragmatism of his predecessors. For example, Mao was emphatic that the tactics of revolutionary war must be derived from the specific conditions of the area, and he derided the concept of defending the territory of specific base areas. The depth of disagreement between the Latin American revolutionaries and their predecessors becomes clearer, however, as one views Debray's advocacy of "a new conception of guerrilla warfare" deriving from the Cuban experience.

Revolutionary Models

Debray's concept embraces four major points: (1) the distinction that must be made between conditions in Russia and Asia on the one hand and in Latin America on the other; (2) the necessity of an armed struggle; (3) the guerrilla force as the major entity, embracing in itself both the military and the political vanguard; and (4) guerrilla warfare as the prime necessity for the development of the revolution. Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

Debray's examination of the physical, demographic, and social differences between Latin America and other places of successful communist revolution, particularly Asia, is extremely cogent. He points out that the high density of rural population, the overpopulation of villages and towns, the predominance of the peasantry, and the fact that the major protagonist was often a foreign occupier in the eyes of the population provided the basis for many tenets of Asian revolutionary theory. Such conditions made it possible for the guerrillas to live as "fish in the sea," for armed propaganda activity to be undertaken with relative ease, and for base areas to be developed before the guerrillas' struggle began.

But in Latin America, Debray points out, guerrilla activity has occurred in "regions of highly dispersed and relatively sparse population," where no one goes unnoticed and strangers are distrusted. The symbols of power are accepted as traditional and enjoy high prestige. They are "unassailable" until they have been shown to be vulnerable. Another aspect of the Latin American situation is that the system of local domination is not only entrenched but aware and vigilant. Rather than having a disproportionately small number of forces at its command, as the Japanese or French had in Asia, the Latin American elite has at its command greater numbers of security forces than there are guerrillas. As a result of these conditions, Latin American guerrillas are highly visible, any armed propaganda activity invites disaster which creates further disbelief on the part of the peasants, and measures to develop base areas are a waste of time until peasants are convinced that the elites are not invincible.²⁰

Because of these conditions, Debray's second tenet calls for blows, not words, and he defines the socialist revolution as "the result of an armed struggle against the armed power of the bourgeois state." Furthermore, on this point, there is no room for compromise; it must be a "struggle to the death." While Debray does not advocate undertaking decisive battles that may be disastrous for the revolution, he does aver that, once guerrilla war has risen in the mountains, "the fighters must wage a war to the death, a war that does not admit of truces, retreats or compromises."²¹

The third tenet of Debray's thesis is that in Latin America the guerrilla force, the military foco, is the main element of the revolution, not only in a military sense but in a political sense:

Under certain conditions, the political and the military are not separate, but form one organic whole, consisting of the people's army, whose nucleus is the guerrilla army. . . . The guerrilla force is the party in embryo.³²

Whereas in Russia, China, and Vietnam, the party leadership was in control of and became the vanguard of the revolution, this did not happen in Latin America. Here the military revolutionists became the vanguard of the party. Debray feels that this point represents the "decisive contribution" of Cuba and other Latin American revolutions "to international revolutionary experience and to Marxism-Leninism."³³

Since the guerrilla force is the nucleus of the party, Debray's fourth principle calls for the strengthening of guerrilla warfare. To do this the guerrilla force must be flexible, mobile, clandestine, vigilant, distrustful, and "independent of the civilian population, in action as well as in military organization. . . ."³⁴ Debray quotes Castro to the effect that the guerrilla base is "the territory within which the guerrilla happens to be moving; it goes where he goes."³⁵ The guerrilla force does not undertake the defense of the population; that depends "on the progressive destruction of the enemy's military potential"—his men and, above all, his weapons.³⁶ Only after a period of active operations and of slow entrenchment in a particularly favorable location, admonishes Debray, should the establishment of a base area even be considered.³⁷

The increase of guerrilla activity, according to Debray, has a benign political effect upon the revolutionary war. No one survives without making vast adjustments to a new and different life calling for a cooperative endeavor. Men are melded together because no one survives alone. Furthermore, guerrilla life is a political education: "The best teacher of Marxism-Leninism is the enemy, in face-to-face confrontation during the people's war."³⁸ When there are forces able to repulse the enemy, armed propaganda can begin. When liberated zones are finally created, the guerrilla force can "dress rehearsal" a socialist revolution and learn more by doing than by any academic training. Guerrilla life, moreover, breaks down residual bourgeois attitudes still held by revolutionaries of such extraction, who often form the leadership of the worker-peasant alliance. In the guerrilla army, writes Debray "the political word is abruptly made flesh."³⁹

In comparing Debray on Cuba (1953-1959) with Mao on China (1927-1936), it is noteworthy that both emphasize the importance of specific area conditions to the revolutionary war. Both endorse military operations, but whereas Mao elevates the military side to a complementary partner of the political, Debray extols guerrilla warfare as the critical factor, as indeed

the only useful political activity. Whereas Mao recognized the power of the gun, the gun was to be firmly controlled by the political party. Debray, on the other hand, is saying that the holder of the gun becomes the party.

The change is crucial: No longer does the young revolutionary have to pass through the party steps and gradations, subordinating himself to its rigors, bureaucracy, and discipline. No longer do so-called "necessary conditions" have to be found, or pre-created; no longer does one have to do long and tedious preparatory political work; no longer is there a wrong moment for revolution. In Debray's explanation of the Cuban experience, do-it-yourself revolution has been given a respectable theoretical framework.

MODEL IV—AFRICA

Many of the ideas that evolved from the Cuban revolution had already been acquired by other revolutionists as a result of their own experience of anti-colonial revolution in Africa. In Wretched of the Earth,⁴⁰ published in 1961—the same year as Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare and six years before Debray's exegesis of the Cuban revolt—Frantz Fanon, a black Martinique psychologist, set forth a number of premises that extend the philosophical bases of revolutionary theory. Fanon's book was considered to be the "bible" of the ghetto uprisings in the United States during the late 1960's. It is still the basis for much of the current "political prisoner" philosophy in such places as Attica and Lorton prisons.⁴¹

Fanon's first and major point concerns the absolute necessity of violence. Colonialism itself he defines as "violence in its natural state," and thus the only possibility of ending it is by "greater violence." Compromise of any kind will not do: In Africa, the native does not want to compete with the white settler, but to replace him.⁴² As Fanon writes, "... between oppressors and oppressed everything can be solved by force."⁴³ Violence, furthermore, serves two other functions in Fanon's view, one at the collective level, the other at the individual. Collectively, violence binds people together as a whole, mobilizes their activity, allows the destruction of collaborationist traditional leaders, breaks down tribalism and regionalism, and creates a new nationalism. At the individual level, Fanon avers that violence is cleansing and restorative, giving to its participants new hope and determination, new self-respect and courage.⁴⁴

Understanding of the need for violence in the African situation comes, according to Fanon, from the peasants and people rather than from the nationalist parties and party leaders. The reason for this lies in the fact that parties are made up of townspeople who distrust the peasants. In the context of Africa, the town followers of the political parties represent

"modern ideas," while the country people are defensive of the old social order and remain suspicious of modern Africans.⁴⁵ The colonial authorities played off both sides, sometimes isolating and repressing the parties by an appearance of upholding the traditional order of the countryside and sometimes by coming to an agreement with the parties at the expense of the countryside. Nonetheless, writes Fanon, it is the country people who still remember the original anti-colonial battles and the names of their long dead leaders, and it is they who erupt into armed or even unarmed violence.⁴⁶

At this point, in Fanon's view of revolution, the reaction of the political parties is extremely vacillating and weak. When violence begins, the party leaders go abroad or underground, or pretend to have no connection with the revolt. They neither oppose nor aid it. They hope it will continue, but they do not organize or direct the effort, nor do they try to integrate or educate the peasants.⁴⁷ The nationalist parties, declares Fanon, face a terrible predicament: On the one hand, they desire "to break colonialism"; on the other hand, they want to come to "a friendly agreement" with it. This dichotomy brings about a division in the party between those who want to pursue only legal means and those who want to supplement legal means by illegal. Eventually, the revolutionary "illegalists" break away from the party and go to the countryside.⁴⁸ There they learn that the rural masses think of liberation only "in terms of violence." In turn, these ex-townsmen "open classes for the people in military and political education," but even so, the masses quickly move into armed struggle.⁴⁹

During the confusion and upheaval of the ensuing guerrilla warfare, the leaders of the rising, these ex-party rebels, find that direction and control of the peasant rebellion are necessary, that an army and central authority must be created. There must be a clear enunciation of objectives, organization, a place of action, and above all education of the masses to accept these new needs. Furthermore, the educatory process must be sensitive and sophisticated. The native must learn to refuse and overcome the blandishments and concessions of the colonial government and settlers; at the same time, he must discern variations within the settler camp. "The settler is not simply the man that must be killed. Many members of the mass of colonialists reveal themselves to be much, much nearer to the national struggle than certain sons of the nation." The peasant-revolutionist, according to Fanon, must learn these shades of meaning if he is to rule.⁵⁰

Nor can the revolution neglect the cities. The rebellion must include urban centers as well, if the colonial system is to be destroyed. Organizing this action is, however, a problem for the leaders since the town represents unhappy past associations and they will find themselves rebuffed by former party friends. Thus the rebellion will infiltrate into the towns through the mass of dispossessed and uprooted tribal people who, having lost their land,

live in fringe shanty-towns. But this lumpenproletariat of Africa—"one of the most spontaneous and most radically revolutionary forces of a colonised people"⁵¹—also represents a revolutionary weakness. Like the chiefs, caids, and witch-doctors who form the traditional collaborators, the lumpenproletariat may serve the colonial government. Their ignorance and incomprehension make them easy targets: It is they who served the French in Algeria and the Portuguese in Angola. As a result, Fanon warns that the revolutionaries must give full attention to these people and be very quick to organize them.⁵²

In all this revolutionary work, the "nationalist militant who had fled from the town in disgust . . . disappointed by political life, discovers in real action a new form of political activity. . . ." In so doing, he transforms the peasant revolt into a revolutionary war and is himself transformed into the "embryonic political organization of the rebellion."⁵³ In Fanon's exegesis, all of this is possible through violence, and none of this would occur without violence. "Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them."⁵⁴

MODEL V: OTHER VARIATIONS

In defining colonialism as "violence in its natural state," Fanon enunciated a doctrine that was to be exceedingly useful for today's revolutionists. If one defines colonialism as violence, in and of itself, there is no longer any need for an outbreak of hostilities in order to justify the need for revolutionary violence. Moreover, Fanon denied the colonial power the right to come into an area through hostile action and then to declare it pacified and peaceful, claiming that the aggression continued to exist as "frozen violence" whether or not it was overtly manifested. The traditional idea that aggression ended with the conclusion of hostilities was thus unilaterally nullified. This view was given sanction in 1962, when India's Minister of Defense Krishna Menon argued in the United Nations that, even though Goa had been a Portuguese colony for some 450 years, the original act of Portuguese colonialism had created a state of permanent aggression, thus justifying India's annexation of Goa in 1961. Since the advent of independence for most African countries, the doctrine of "permanent aggression" has been even further extended to include "neo-colonialism" or "exploiting other people abroad without actually ruling them."⁵⁵

Professor Ali Mazrui, formerly of Makerere University in Uganda, finds proof for this argument in the current status of the ex-colonial powers. "If imperialism amounted to frozen aggression, and was therefore an externalization of domestic tensions," he posits, "the disintegration of empires

should witness a process of re-internalizing those tensions.⁵⁶ Thus he expects to find—and finds—increased internal tension in Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands.

Paralleling the idea that colonialism exists as a state of violence is the argument that even indigenous government may also exist as a state of violence. While Marx saw internal tension arising in the individual nation state through the economic exploitation of the working classes, making inevitable a class warfare, Mazrui and others see other, equally good reasons for internal tensions: "... tribalism in Africa, racialism in the United States, and other varieties of militant ethnicity elsewhere have in the modern period been at least as profound forms of internal cleavage as has the class dimension."⁵⁷ In the revolutionists' view, such cleavages do not have to be expressed in forms of physical violence; they exist in the absence of certain defined conditions or the presence of other defined conditions. These conditions, moreover, are defined in the perception of the "oppressed."

If the oppressed may define the existence of the conditions which create frozen war—"structural violence" in neo-Marxist terminology⁵⁸—then it follows that revolutionary violence is justified under a great many situations, indeed almost any. This conceptualization is much broader than the orthodox communist line, and suggests one of the differences between classical Marxist and neo-Marxist (or perhaps post-Marxist) thought.

Under this latter concept, revolutionary violence might, theoretically speaking, be as justified by a given tribe in Kenya or Nigeria, for example, as by blacks against whites in a Western nation. Furthermore, it would logically apply as much against the state capitalism of the U. S. S. R. as against the private capitalism of the United States. Indeed, some Soviet dissidents have taken this position, but the argument has been used mainly against the so-called "imperialist" powers of the Western world.

One of the most striking aspects of the argument is the call, in certain circles, for the white man to rebel against himself, that is, against his government. For example, in a preface to Fanon's Wretched of the Earth, the French existential philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre demands that the white man admit his guilt and choose his place in the revolutionary struggle, curing violence with violence. "For violence, like Achilles' lance, can heal the wounds that it has inflicted."⁵⁹

Carried to its ultimate, the argument presupposes the existence of governmental aggression whenever economic inequity or social injustice are perceived by the oppressed and therefore vindicates the use of revolutionary violence. Since governmental establishments may be defined as still practicing this "frozen war," two things follow. First, revolutionary

violence is continuously necessary; and second, every act against any establishment can become an act of revolution. Revolution thus takes on new dimensions of worldwide consequence.

Several techniques used by guerrillas since the mid-1960's illustrate this new concept of revolution. Abduction of foreign diplomats in Latin America by revolutionists has been able to focus international attention on what would traditionally have been an internal matter. Aerial terrorism is another tactic whose objective and implications are both local and international. Since planes may be crossing international boundaries or passengers may be of other nationalities, other countries may become considerably involved.⁴⁰ The 1974 episode, wherein Japanese terrorists in sympathy with the Palestinian guerrillas attacked the Lydda airport in Israel, killing and wounding a number of travelers who were there, including many Puerto Rican tourists, is an example of a tactic that succeeded in internationalizing the revolutionary issue for the Palestinians. The abduction and killing of nine Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympic games in Munich is a further example. The incidence of letter bombs sent through the mails in early 1973 provides yet another example of terrorism with international repercussions.

Furthermore, since these exploits are highly newsworthy, the international news media carry the deeds of the guerrillas to a worldwide audience. For the Palestinians this free publicity is extremely important, for they despair of military victory and feel that their Israeli enemy is more sophisticated and far more powerful in "gaining access to the influential media of the international system." Still, one may demur that the tactics are counterproductive, that terrorism breeds fear rather than favor. This is precisely the point. In Mazrui's words, "the purpose . . . is to manipulate fear as a mechanism of combat." In the case of aerial terrorism, Mazrui claims that even ordinary travelers have to "develop a vested interest in a solution of the Middle Eastern problem." That they might hate the tactics, increasingly dislike the Arabs, or develop stronger feelings for Israel is beside the point. More than anything else, the theory posits, they would want to end the Middle Eastern trouble to ensure their own physical safety.⁴¹

Whereas Fanon emphasized the integrative functions of violence, both on an individual and collective basis, Mazrui has given voice to the further values of violence as a means of raising revolutionary issues to a transnational plane, even where their ultimate goals are nationalistic in character. This is of value to insurgents, particularly in those cases where they lack the strength to force the issue locally through military means. It would thus appear to be a tactic of despair and desperation. Nonetheless, it is one that offers considerable challenge to a government that cannot control it and may offer a distinct threat to a government that appears to be its target.

NOTES

¹Max Nomad, Apostles of Revolution (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 220; Irving Louis Horowitz, ed., The Anarchists (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 475-477.

²Leonard Schapiro, "Changing Patterns in the Theory of Revolution and Insurgency," The Royal United Service Institution Journal, CXV, 659 (Sept. 1970), 3-12.

³Ronald Thompson, "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1917-1921)," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. II, The Experience in Europe and the Middle East (Washington: The American University, 1967), pp. 87-108.

⁴Ibid., p. 104.

⁵Leonard Schapiro, "'Putting the Lid on Leninism': Opposition and dissent in the communist one-party states," Government and Opposition (London), 2, 2 (February 1967), 181-203.

⁶Robert A. Rupen, "Outer Mongolia 1919-1921," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. I: The Experience in Asia (Washington: The American University, 1968), pp. 71-89.

⁷For the section on China, see generally Michael Lindsay "China (1927-1937)," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. I: The Experience in Asia (Washington: The American University, 1968), pp. 31-68; and also Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 75-150.

⁸Michael Lindsay "China (1927-1937)," loc. cit., pp. 58-62.

⁹Ibid., pp. 38-39.

¹⁰Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains," in Selected Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 26-30.

¹¹Ibid., p. 29.

¹²Mao, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," loc. cit., p. 109.

¹³Ibid., pp. 88, 99, 110, 118-119.

¹⁴Ibid., n. on pp. 75-76.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 77, 93-94.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 98 for quotation; also p. 137.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 137, 139; Michael Lindsay, "China (1927-1937)," loc. cit., p. 96.

¹⁹Mao, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," loc. cit., pp. 111-112, 118, 137.

²⁰Ibid., p. 120.

²¹Ibid., pp. 130-133, 135-140, 142-145.

²²Ibid., p. 119.

²³Régis Debray, Revolution in the Revolution?—Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America (New York and London: MR Press, [1967]), pp. 20, 107; Alan Angell, "Castro and the Cuban Communist Party," Government and Opposition (London), 2, 2 (February 1967), 241-243.

²⁴Daniel James, "Introduction," in The Complete Bolivian Diaries of Ché Guevara and Other Captured Documents (New York: Stein and Day [1968]), pp. 13-14.

²⁵Ché Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: MR Press, 1961), p. 15.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 74-75.

²⁷Daniel James, "Introduction," loc. cit., p. 7.

²⁸See publisher's jacket blurb to Debray, op. cit.

²⁹Debray, Revolution in the Revolution? pp. 19; 24-25; 68-82 and 88; 67-90; 90; 114; 64; 27, 29, and 44-45; and 47-56, in that order.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 51-53.

³¹Ibid., p. 56 (Debray's italics).

³²Ibid., p. 106 (all italics in original).

³³Ibid., for quotation; see also pp. 95-107.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 41-42.

³⁵Ibid., p. 65.

³⁶Ibid., p. 41.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 64-65.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 89, 111 for quotation.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 55-56, 84, and 113.

⁴⁰Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), originally published in France as Les damnés de la terre (François Maspero, 1961).

⁴¹David E. Simcox, "Purgatory in Exurbia," Foreign Service Journal, 49, 10 (October 1972), p. 20.

⁴²Fanon, op. cit., p. 48.

⁴³Ibid., p. 56.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 93. For an illustration, see Fawaz Turki, The Disinherited: Journal of a Palestinian Exile (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

⁴⁵Fanon, op. cit., p. 88.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 93.

⁴⁷Ibid., pp. 93-94.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 99-100.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 101, 102.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 108, 112-116; quotation on p. 116.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 102-103.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 109-110.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 108-114; quotation on p. 114.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 117.

⁵⁵Ali A. Mazrui, "The Contemporary Case for Violence," in Civil Violence and the International System, Part I: The Scope of Civil Violence (Adelphi Papers No. 82; London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 18.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 19. This argument knowingly reiterates and turns the earlier proposition of Cecil Rhodes that imperialism would lower the risk of civil war.

⁵⁷Ibid.. See also Loo Kuper, "Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 4 (September 1972) 400-421, for a comparison of the Marxist doctrine of revolution as the result of the polarization of classes based on economic process and the conception of revolutionary struggle in terms of the polarization of groups based not on class but on racial and ethnic difference.

⁵⁸Mazrui, "The Contemporary Case for Violence," loc. cit., p. 18.

⁵⁹Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface," in Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 25.

Revolutionary Models

60Mazrui, "The Contemporary Case for Violence," loc. cit., p. 21.

61ibid., all quotations on p. 21.

Chapter III

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

The proliferation of revolutionary warfare and its changing nature—as well as its apparent success and the difficulties of counterinsurgency—have aroused interest in the idea that this country should support rather than counter revolution. Some internal critics have charged that the U. S. Government has consistently supported conservative or rightist governments against allegedly more progressive and leftist insurgents. There appears in these arguments the suggestion that, if this country were only to support revolution, it could recapture the élan of its own revolutionary beginnings, become forwardlooking and humanitarian in outlook, and advance rather than hinder the progress of mankind toward happiness and democracy.

There have been many opportunities since World War II to support civil violence. At various times, suggestions have been made that the United States might aid revolutionists in such disparate places as Hungary, Biafra, Bangladesh, Ireland, Indonesia, South Africa, and the Dominican Republic. Indeed, this list indicates only a few of the conflict situations in which special interest groups in this country have advocated support of revolution as a worthwhile exercise of national endeavor. In none of these cases was strong support given in behalf of the rebels, but past behavior is not necessarily controlling in future decisions on such matters.

Before going further into consideration of the question as to whether the United States might find it worthwhile to support revolution, it may be well to view the question in a somewhat more general light. What are the situations in which a government, any government, might support revolutionary warfare? Modern views of revolutionary war and the role of government in its support do not necessarily limit such involvement simply to the support of foreign insurgents during a local conflict in another territory, although that is the most widely known and practiced form. For the sake of scope and balance, this paper will posit various situations and ways in which governments have utilized revolutionary warfare techniques in the past and might also in the future. Consideration will also be given to the constraints that apply to such government support.

GOVERNMENT USES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Theoretically a government may support revolution under a variety of contexts: in the spectrum of nuclear or general conventional war, in cases of localized conflict, and even under peacetime conditions. History also shows that governments have used revolution both as a defensive weapon, usually within their own geographical boundaries and normally without terming it "revolutionary" warfare, and as an offensive weapon, usually in foreign areas. The following chart posits some of these variations:

Chart 1

GOVERNMENTAL USES OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Context	Defensive Uses	Offensive Uses
General War	As a post-strike force to help defend the country in the event of full-scale enemy attack (e.g., Soviet partisans in the Ukraine during World War II)	As an adjunct to full-scale nuclear or general war waged against another country (e.g., Allied support to underground movements in countries attacked by Axis forces in World War II)
Localized	As a means of bolstering a government's fight against overt insurgency operations, usually as part of an overall counterinsurgent effort (e.g., British use of Mau Mau pseudogangs in Kenya)	As a means of weakening or overthrowing another government, or absorbing it (e.g., Soviet, Chinese, and North Vietnamese support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam)
Peacetime Conditions	As a means of gaining intelligence of possible internal disaffection or as a means of influencing internal policy (e.g., government tolerance of illegal peasant expropriation of lands in Latin America)	As a direct pressure adjunct to diplomatic maneuvering in other countries or in the United Nations (e.g., Arab governments' support of Palestinian guerrillas)

During General War

For those who doubt the future occurrence or likelihood of either general nuclear or conventional war, it may seem unrealistic to posit the use of revolutionary warfare during such circumstances. Consideration, however, should be given not only to the likely event but also to the possible event.

Defensive Uses in Major Wars

If history has nothing to say about the use of revolutionary warfare during nuclear war, it does have something to say about the use of unconventional warfare during periods of general conventional war. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union trained and supported partisan forces that worked independently and in concert with Soviet armed forces, in making guerrilla attacks on German rear areas. They were an important part of the Soviet war effort, wearing down and harrying German forces. They also preserved a Soviet government presence in areas where German armed forces had initially been greeted warmly. Elsewhere in Europe, where governments had been forced into exile by the Axis takeover and occupation of their lands, local resistance groups sprang up. From the point of view of exiled governments such as the Free French or Dutch, the resistance had a double value, both as a possible military weapon of some potential use and, far more importantly, as a reminder of the political presence of a "legitimate" government cast out by foreign invasion. It was for precisely this latter reason that resistance groups were viewed as problems by the occupation authorities: The presence of a resistance expressed the people's hopes for and belief in a return of their own native governments and the destruction of an alien but functioning government system.

Although the wartime resistance groups were pro-Allied in orientation and were generally supported both by their governments-in-exile and by the Allied powers, it is enlightening that in the eyes of these supporters also, the resistances should often have taken on a revolutionary hue, thus making the political price of resistance support clearer. Even during the war, a number of the governments-in-exile realized that they were threatened by the political aims of the resistance movements. In France and Italy, for example, the wartime participation of communist parties in the resistance promoted their postwar growth and strength, since it enhanced their public reputations as patriotic groups and gave them operational experience in clandestine organization and actions. In Greece the communist resistance movement of EAM/ELAS was able to attempt two postwar military efforts at overthrowing the newly reconstituted Greek government. Both efforts required strong military action to put them down. In Yugoslavia, the strength of the communist resistance under Tito, combined with a Russian drive into Yugoslavia in late 1944, successfully precluded any return of the Yugoslav monarchy and established a communist government in that country.

In Asia also, the price of Allied support for the resistance appeared to be high. In China, Mao Tse-tung accepted such support and pressed his wartime advantage by creating strong communist base area support within China; at war's end he was able to attack his Kuomintang opponent and win decisively by 1949. Resistance support had unexpected postwar consequences

elsewhere in Asia. In the Philippines, the Hukbalahap guerrillas, experiencing a major growth during the war, when they received U.S. support, challenged the elected government of that country for six postwar years, 1948-1954. American support for the Vietnamese communist resistance forces of Ho Chi Minh during World War II seemed to have an especially ironic ring by the 1960's, when U.S. forces were strongly involved in supporting a South Vietnamese government threatened by communist takeover.

It is doubtful that the Allies, in creating, fostering, and supporting the resistance groups of World War II, fully realized their future revolutionary potential. Granting the grim criticality of the early wartime situation, however, it is possible that they would have utilized such forces under any conditions, feeling the need to mobilize every ounce of strength against the Axis without regard to future consequences. The same kind of reasoning may hold during nuclear war.

The feasibility of the defensive use of revolutionary warfare by a government after nuclear attack upon its territory would appear to depend in large measure upon the physical condition of the area and the will of the people. In a contaminated area, it would appear highly likely that the devastation resulting from a nuclear strike would mean the almost complete disorganization and disorientation of all normal life and government. Under such conditions, it seems doubtful that one could reasonably expect any local paramilitary force to function. On the other hand, a government might utilize paramilitary forces from other areas, either to aid in rescue operations, to seal the borders of the contaminated area, or to prevent panic in yet-unattacked areas. Although there would scarcely be any intent to create a revolutionary force, a paramilitary force operating under such conditions would appear to have a high political potential, perhaps of unexpected direction—granting its own and the country's survival. That is, the government, in its desperate struggle to secure the survival of the nation, might well create a force that would be able to seize the opportunity offered by a truly revolutionary situation. It would appear that the problems experienced by the Allies in World War II would be multiplied many times under the pressure of nuclear attack, again assuming that the nation survived. Where every effort must be bent to the effort of survival itself, however, the long-term results of necessary actions cannot prohibit the taking of those actions.

Offensive Uses in Major Wars

Lacking any precedent, the offensive use of revolutionary warfare in conjunction with nuclear attack by an aggressor nation is difficult to postulate. It is conceivable, however, that an aggressor, striking with nuclear power in

order to obtain the paralyzing shock effect, but wishing to hold down the degree of devastation in areas marked for later economic exploitation, might see an internal revolutionary force as a highly advantageous adjunct. First, considering the degree of turmoil that could be expected to result from nuclear attack, a disruptive revolutionary force, operating to counter the defending government's desperate attempts to react, might well be all that was needed to bring about a complete defeat. Second, local revolutionary forces, working in conjunction with highly trained aggressor raiders, could lead these groups to strategic sites where they might sabotage any return strike effort. Third, a revolutionary movement, operating in coordination with the aggressor's attack, might well be able to take over the reins of the defending government itself, quickly deposing it and then quickly accepting the aggressor's peace terms. Such a scenario, successfully carried out, might allow the aggressor to face the world with a fait accompli, at the same time claiming the face-saving formula that the will of the local people had been met. Other nations would then have the difficult choice of accepting this claim or of accepting the risks of further nuclear exchange if they acted against the aggressor. Granted, this is a high risk game for the attacker, but not necessarily an unattractive one.

All of this is highly hypothetical conjecture, yet the actual opening scenario of World War II might have seemed as unlikely, if read a decade before its occurrence. On the one hand, the combination of the most sophisticated weapon with the oldest kind of warfare seems fantastically naive; on the other hand, it may be just the imaginative combination that awaits a strategic innovator. As more countries obtain the technology of the bomb, the variations of unorthodox combinations and possible uses would appear to rise.

During Localized Warfare

The clearest form of revolutionary warfare occurs in those instances of localized warfare or civil conflict, where insurgents and government forces confront each other in an open, overt clash, often characterized by the use of guerrilla tactics and underground organization, sometimes verging into more conventional military tactics, and often lasting over a considerable period of time. External forces may supply help to either or both sides, but the conflict usually remains confined within the territory of the afflicted state. The twentieth century is replete with such instances.

Although governments have been traditionally the antagonists of the insurgents, the situation created by civil violence is so amorphous that governments have been able to utilize revolutionary warfare techniques under localized warfare situations in both defensive and offensive capacities.

Defensive Uses During Localized War

One defensive use of revolutionary warfare occurs when a government facing attack from insurgent elements elects to support other potentially revolutionary elements in the population as a counterbalance. Such activity usually occurs in tandem with other, more direct responses to the conflict. For example, the British colonial government in Kenya opted during the fight against the Kikuyu (1952-1960) to enlist and arm tribesmen who might be potential insurgent recruits. Later, it was able to create "pseudogangs" composed of newly-captured insurgents who then fought against their former Mau Mau comrades still in the forests. In Algeria (1954-1962) the French were able to use against the FLN forces, not only Arab local defense forces, but also certain Arab guerrilla bands that had not joined the insurgents. In South Vietnam and Laos, U.S. Special Forces succeeded in organizing the Montagnards and Miao against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces.¹ These techniques are not new and represent standard ways in which governments have attempted to utilize revolutionary activity against revolutionists.

Essentially, such techniques are co-optative in nature; that is, the government secures the services of potential or active insurgents, either before or after the fact of their enlistment in the insurgency. Their value to the government is very clear. Every man in a counter-gang, for example, expresses by his very existence in that status his disillusionment with the insurgent cause and his innate belief in the ultimate success of the government—to the extent of willingness to risk his own life to fight his own ex-comrades. This is a lesson not lost on the insurgents—or the population. Furthermore, since every man in a counter-gang has been trained by the insurgents, or at least comes from the same milieu, he is thus better prepared to fight the guerrillas than if he had been originally recruited by the government. Figures comparing regular troop performance with counter-gang performance often bear out the superior cost-effectiveness of the latter in locating and destroying the insurgent force.

Paramilitary forces, on the other hand, offer a more equivocal situation. Fearing that every man in a paramilitary force is not only unavailable to the revolutionary side but also a witness for the government, insurgent forces mark paramilitary units as special targets for attack. The weakness of such forces only tends to increase their vulnerability. Nonetheless, governments often tend to downgrade such forces because of their indiscipline and slack performance, their frequent venality, and poor treatment of civilians. It is of little avail that these qualities are often more an index of governmental indifference, poor training, inadequate support, and inferior leadership than any innate lack of ability of the men themselves. Having recruited the force, governments frequently fail to expend the human and material resources necessary to train and control them. The government then faces a dilemma.

Government Support

If it disbands the force, some part will undoubtedly go over to the insurgents and have to be fought, while another part will probably become the nuisance of a sub rosa independent band, and a further part will join a restless mass of unemployed who must be taken care of and controlled in some way. If the government maintains these people, but does not train and control them, they may become inadvertent advertisements for the insurgent cause.

While in one sense the use of paramilitary forces, including countergangs, is the use of a revolutionary warfare technique rather than the use of revolutionary warfare, the government, in facing the problems of control and leadership, begins to come to grips with the revolutionary issues. The ex-insurgent fighter, the man in the paramilitary force is the natural political constituency of the revolutionists. The insurgency's failure to hold him or to recruit him is an important minus for the insurgency, an important plus for the government. In fighting him, the insurgency must fight its own people. But to maintain this situation, the government is hard put—not only to offer sufficient support, training, and leadership—but also to make the political commitment to the future that will meet the aspirations of this "common man." Suffice it to say, this area offers many opportunities for improvement.

The problems are quite as great when it is an external power supporting an insurgency-threatened government that is involved in the defensive use of revolutionary warfare. In the role of supporting power behind the South Vietnamese and Laotian governments, U. S. Special Forces have attempted to organize the Montagnard tribes in Vietnam and the Miao in Laos. Problems have arisen however, not only over the implementation of goals, the efficacy of the measures, and their value to the counterinsurgency effort, but also over such long-term issues as their socio-cultural effects and the resultant relationship between the tribes and the indigenous governments from which they have long been estranged.

Another example from South Vietnam of a governmental use of revolutionary procedures comes from the revolutionary cadres organized and trained under the Phoenix-Phung Hoang projects to attack the Viet Cong insurgent infrastructure by means including counterintelligence work and terrorism. These methods, criticized for everything from administrative inefficiency and lack of command emphasis to the use of terrorism, have apparently found little support among the Vietnamese or American people, and the experience has raised doubts concerning the government's ability to play the insurgent role. By failing to abide by its own laws, a government loses legitimacy in the eyes of its own population. If the insurgent appears to use extra-legal means with impunity insofar as the popular view is concerned, the government may still have to pay a price. Thus constraints on the government's defensive use of revolutionary techniques during localized warfare may operate somewhat to the government's disadvantage.

Offensive Uses During Localized War

The most usual and also the most clearcut exploitation of revolutionary warfare by a government occurs, as has been noted, when it gives support to insurgents operating in another country. The reasons may be fairly complex, but ultimately such support is given with the idea that overthrow of the existing indigenous government will improve the power position of the supporting country. Support for "wars of national liberation," as Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev called the revolutionary conflicts of the 1960's, has long been a hallmark of Soviet policy. Chinese aid also has gone to external revolutionary groups. The most obvious example of such external support for revolutionary warfare is the Viet Cong insurgent movement in South Vietnam, which has been all but swamped by the degree of such support. In fact, North Vietnamese regular troops have been the dominant contender against the South Vietnamese since at least 1965. Soviet and Chinese support, often operating through lesser communist or neutralist nations, has gone to a great number of other revolutionary groups. It has found its way, not only to South Vietnam but to other Asian countries, as well as to insurgencies in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Because of the international connotations which such widespread support of insurgency has had, great attention has been paid to this communist weapon against the West.

External support of insurgents during localized war has also been given by noncommunist powers. The Algerian rebels, for example, were able to secure large-scale support from a number of external sources, significantly from the Arab world. African nations have given aid and sanctuary to Africans fighting colonial or white governments, as for example, the insurgents of Angola, Portuguese Guinea, Rhodesia, and South Africa. The Cypriot insurgency against British rule received critical aid from Greek sources.

The effect of large amounts of external support has been both to maintain many insurgencies in danger of dying away and to help others to attain their ultimate aims. Communist involvement in particular has had the effect of adding a strong ideological note to the general subject of revolutionary warfare and has created in the noncommunist world considerable interest in conflicts that might otherwise have gone little noted. On the one hand, there has been an exaggerated admiration of communist prowess in the field of support for revolutionists during localized warfare; on the other hand, there has been an exaggerated fear of or belief in communist infallibility. Granted that communist involvement has produced great problems for Western powers, it should be strongly emphasized that support for revolution has disadvantages as well as advantages for the supporting power. Because of the special thrust of this chapter and the interest which this particular governmental exploitation of revolutionary warfare has received,

the subject of the constraints that operate--particularly for the United States--will be separately addressed at the end of this chapter.

During Peacetime Conditions

The positing of any form of government support for revolutionary warfare under peacetime conditions would seem to be contrary to the definition of revolutionary warfare used in this study, which requires the demonstration of violence. However, governments have always taken the position that preparation for war, even revolutionary warfare, is ultimately a part of the process of war. There has, furthermore, been a tendency recently to reinterpret certain governmental actions in terms of revolutionary activity, although this may be more of a semantic change than a change of activity or function. For the sake of completeness, however, some attention needs to be paid to these views.

Defensive Uses in Peacetime

The defensive use of revolutionary warfare by a government during peacetime seems to be a paradox. Why would any government, within its own territory, support the growth of revolutionary activity, which if successful might bring about its own overthrow? Yet devious means have sometimes accomplished major purposes, for governments as well as for rebels. The Chinese government's support of the expression of critical ideas in the "let-a-hundred-flowers-bloom" campaign and the ensuing repression of the intellectuals who did criticize the government could be termed entrapment, but it could also--and has been--viewed as the use of a revolutionary technique.³

The Chinese cultural revolution of the 1960's, which let loose the Red Guards against certain elements in Chinese society, including some parts of the government bureaucracy itself, has been more openly and perhaps accurately termed the extension of revolutionary warfare into government administration.⁴ Little is definitely known of this period of Chinese history, however, and there is no certainty about the facts. One explanation has been that Mao Tse-tung, unable to effect desired changes and reforms, used the Red Guards to create a situation of political and social fluidity, in which his policies were finally able to prevail. On the other hand, a letter purportedly written by Mao in July 1966 and only surfacing in late 1972, casts doubt upon this view. If valid, this letter suggests that Mao was at best only a "reluctant follower" of the cultural revolution and that it was more the work of Lin Biao.⁵ Whatever the final answer may be to this maze of events and conflicting interpretations, it appears to be appropriate to view the cultural revolution as a radical and revolutionary act started within the aegis of government, although precisely how or why is yet unclear.

Another possible governmental use of revolutionary activity—this time through non-response rather than initiation—is suggested by the events in Chile in 1971. When Indians and peasants independently and aggressively "liberated" landowners' farms and property—beyond those lands legally expropriated by the government under the land reform law—the government of Marxist President Salvador Allende apparently acceded in or made only token moves against what were, according to the laws of the land, clearly illegal acts.⁶ One may argue that such acts, carried out on a large scale, could lead to widespread revolutionary change. Thus it may have been that the government—by its acquiescence at one level and possible support at another—hoped through revolutionary means to accomplish a more sweeping systemic change in the country's social and economic organization than the president's first electoral mandate (36 percent of the presidential vote and a narrow plurality) suggested could be achieved by normal organizational procedures.

Offensive Uses in Peacetime

Government exploitation of revolutionary warfare as an offensive weapon during conditions of peace usually occurs in relation to diplomatic maneuvering against other countries. In this event, the revolutionary warfare threat must be real enough that it becomes a direct-pressure adjunct to the diplomatic offensive. History affords two examples in the active support and encouragement given by Nazi Germany in the late 1930's to German separatists in Czechoslovakia's Sudetenland and to local Nazis in Austria. Both efforts resulted in short-lived insurgencies followed by German annexation of Austria and most of Czechoslovakia, even before World War II began. Current examples of such use of revolutionary techniques may be seen in the Arab countries' support of the Palestinian guerrillas, support which serves the serious purpose of making tangible and real the Arab claim to Israeli lands and sharpens the Arab sword in the United Nations. Another example of such use is the support for various revolutionary movements operating in white Africa and accompanying the diplomatic thrust of the Organization of African Unity.

Even very low-scale peacetime support for revolutionary warfare by governments is accompanied by certain problems, however. Cuban support for revolution in Latin America for example, was expressed in terms that become irritating even in countries originally sympathetic to Castro's revolution and government, for example, Venezuela.⁷ Furthermore, support for revolution as a means of exerting diplomatic pressure rather than as a means of furthering the revolution may end in denormalizing the revolutionists who are thus used. It may even happen that there could be some form of backlash exerted against a foreign government that appeared to utilize the passions of a convinced and desperate people so cold-bloodedly.

CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

At the beginning of this chapter, the question was raised whether the interests of the United States might not be better served by supporting rather than fighting revolution, thereby associating itself with the "wave of the future" rather than the "lost cause" of governmental stability. By first addressing the problem in a generic fashion, it has been possible to suggest various ways in which government have attempted to use revolutionary movements and techniques for their own advantage. In addition, it has become apparent that there are numerous problems for the insurgency-supporting power, often not clearly perceived by an insurgency-threatened power. At this point, one may well ask what specific difficulties might accompany a possible U.S. decision to support and exploit revolutionary warfare in external areas.

The argument against such a policy centers around a number of constraining factors, particularly those of feasibility and cost-effectiveness. Such an argument posits the following points, which will also be discussed below in greater detail: That the United States lacks the proxies that have abetted and shielded communist efforts. That the United States lacks the cohesive ideological power of a communist philosophy, with its incentive to revolution. That there is, at least currently, a lack of a mutually compatible revolutionary clientele. That, in any event, the success of insurgency is highly uncertain. That success often requires a great deal of time. That as time goes on there is likely to be an increase in the cost of supporting insurgency. That fostering external revolution may affect internal stability. And finally, that fostering external revolution may have a deleterious effect on foreign relations in relation to any possible benefits of such an approach.

The Lack of Useful Proxies

Unlike the Soviet Union or China, the United States, if it decided to foster revolution abroad, would almost certainly become directly involved since it generally lacks the local revolutionary proxies that the communist powers have traditionally acted through. Such a proxy—i.e., a local communist party, a friendly neighboring government, etc.—has in many cases sheltered the supporting government from the risks of obvious involvement and, when that has been impossible, has at least hidden the extent of the involvement. Using proxies, it is possible for support to be given in sizeable quantities over long periods of time without any embarrassment over the lack of operational success. Even where the insurgency does fail, as in the case of the Chinese-supported Indonesian communists in 1965, the supporting power has suffered relatively little adverse impact. The local proxy provides a shield by which the supporting power can escape serious consequences. As an observant writer has noted, it makes "local success more likely and local failure less compromising and costly."

The Lack of a Charismatic Revolutionary Ideology

Despite its own "revolutionary" beginnings, the United States possesses no exportable revolutionary ideology so powerfully stated, internally coherent, and convincingly presented as communism. Whatever the contradictions between Marxism and the world of reality, the tenets of Marxism remain potent. Although Marx saw revolution as rising from the growth and decadence of capitalism, Marxism as an ideology has performed best in the non-industrialized world, proving itself to be markedly flexible and adaptable. The traditions of village life, in Africa and in Asia, have been found to be more compatible with the communistic tenets of Marxist ideology than the individualistic and rationalistic tenets of either entrepreneurial or technological capitalism with which the United States is ideologically associated. Furthermore, conscious efforts have been made to amend Marxist doctrine to accommodate the needs and desires of awakening peoples. It may be that the adapters of Marxism have been more determined, pragmatic, and cynical about man; but the fact is that, even as they have moved to satisfy modernizing aspirations, they have been able to include each man in his niche in the developing socialist state—a niche satisfying the simultaneous aspiration both for modernity and for conformity to tradition. The strength of the Marxist ideology may be measured to some extent at least by the strength of the continued belief in its promises.

Capitalism, on the other hand, generally lacks an exportable "bible" and has been built on a fairly extensive layering of political and economic experience that does not exist in the Third World. Its ideology, based on liberal-democratic justificatory theory, has proved neither so powerful nor so pervasive in those areas where the "springboard conditions" for economic growth and competitive market conditions have not been reached. Furthermore, attempts at modernization and industrialization in the developing world have often created such dislocation and pain that capitalism has lost favor in the very process of birth. Another disadvantage of the capitalist ideology is that it does not appear as a local indigenous package; rather, it has been strongly identified with the Western powers, with colonialism, with imperialism, with class elitism, and with foreign patronage. For many peoples, it comes plainly addressed as an alien and unattractive philosophy.⁹

The Lack of an Appropriate Revolutionary Clientele

Given the generally non-ideological posture of the United States, it is possible that this country might not be able to operate successfully in an attempt to support revolution. Surely it would not be worthwhile to support revolutionary war everywhere—or just anywhere. The only important value would appear to be in cases involving great powers, or states having strategic importance to the great powers. Support for revolution within a great communist

power bloc carries, obviously, the highest risks. It cannot be forgotten, for example, that despite apparent earlier U. S. support for a policy of liberation for the Iron Curtain countries, Hungarian freedom fighters were not aided during the Hungarian revolt of 1956—certainly a reflection of the consideration of risks. At the minimum, a policy of revolutionary support presupposes the probability of direct retaliation in kind, to which the United States might prove in the end the more susceptible. Indeed, one of the most noteworthy developments of recent years has been a growing social instability in the industrial nations of the West, including the United States. Furthermore, the great communist powers have shown the strongest determination and most striking ability in dealing with possible insurgency within their own borders. It is thus highly unlikely that this would prove a winning game.

In the case of lesser states having strategic importance to the great powers, there is a possibility here for U. S. support of certain revolutionary movements. Begging the question as to whether it is appropriate for the United States to do so, let one only consider some of the problems of attempting to support revolution in an unnamed country of importance to, but not currently allied with the West. What is the probability of the revolutionists accepting such support and its concomitant control? Some revolutionaries might be willing to take the support, but would they become the followers that such support presupposes? If not, what then would be the value of this approach? In many parts of the world, Africa and Asia for example, where capitalist nations are actively associated with memories of colonialism, residual fear and hatred determine current revolutionary politics. In Latin America, anti-Americanism is a fact of political life. After all, it is offered as a serious explanation of Guevara's final, fatal adventure in Bolivia that he hoped to involve the United States in a counter-insurgent role in that country in order to gain sympathy for the rebellion. Concealed U. S. support might be acceptable to some revolutionists, but would these be the ones prepared to put through programs designed to procure a better life for their people? Would U. S. support change their basically anti-American stance? If the answer to these questions is negative, one must question the strategic value of such a clientele, both in terms of long-range, external good will and internal public approval for such a policy.

It is difficult to conceive of serious revolutionaries, most of whom are infused with world views antagonistic to capitalism, accepting U. S. support. It is even more difficult to think of their accepting some form of restraint on their actions as a quid pro quo. Even the Soviet Union, it may be noted, has not been able to control all the revolutionaries it has over time supported. Without such control, the value of offering support appears to be negligible.

The Uncertainty of Success

A policy of support for revolution, furthermore, carries no guarantee of final success. Being a revolutionary does not presume victory, no matter what the popular idea may be. Although there is a school of thought that assumes communist infallibility in matters of revolution, life does not necessarily bear this out. Indeed, even communist-dominated insurgencies fail in their military phase approximately as often as do non-communist insurgencies. For example, the table below gives data on the military outcomes for cases of 20th century revolutionary warfare involving overt conflict with government forces for a period of one year or more. Communist insurgencies lost at approximately the same rate as conservative-traditionalist rebellions, and the apparent difference in loss rates between communists and noncommunist-liberals was not important.¹⁰

Dominant Insurgent Political Orientation	No. Cases	Insurgent Military Wins/Draws vs. Losses	Insurgent Losses (%)	
Communist	19*	7	5	42
Noncommunist, liberal	13	6	7	54
Conservative, traditional	11	6	5	45
Not applicable, unknown	8			

N = 44

Table 1: Military Outcome by Dominant Insurgent Political Orientation.

Granted such a high rate of insurgent failure, the surprise may be that the communist powers have continued with their policy of export revolution for so long. Clearly, one of the benefits must be the extreme discomfiture they have been able to cause the West, particularly the United States, whether or not eventual success was secured. It is not certain, however, whether the United States can use the same technique. Could it, for example, continue a policy with as high a failure rate as this, given its vulnerability to internal criticism?

It may legitimately be objected that the above table includes communist revolutionary movements that did not get high rates of external material support, for example, in Malaya and the Philippines. It is pertinent therefore to consider the fate of those insurgencies, whether communist or not, that did

* Includes Burma (1948-1960), Cameroon (1955-1962), China (1927-1937), Greece (1946-1949), Indochina (1946-1954), Laos (1959-1962), Malaya (1948-1960), Outer Mongolia (1919-1921), Philippines (1946-1954), South Korea (1946-1954), South Vietnam (1956 to November 1963), and Venezuela (1958-1963).

Government Support

receive high rates of support. Such rates are considered high or important, in this context, when equipment and materiel have been supplied in amounts (a) forming a third or more of all support, or (b) necessary for insurgent survival, or (c) enabling the insurgents to undertake major offensive operations. Of 44 studied instances, 13* received important amounts of foreign logistical support, not necessarily from communist powers.

There is no doubt that the 13 insurgencies that received large-scale foreign support were far more formidable revolutionary opponents of their governments than the group of 31 insurgencies that did not receive such large-scale support. Insurgencies, in fact, obtained military wins or draws in 77 percent of the 13 well-supported conflicts, compared with only 39 percent of the 31 less- or non-supported cases.¹¹ From the defending government's viewpoint—and that of its governmental supporters—foreign support for insurgents is bad news.

The question that concerns one at this point, however, is whether the reverse can be said. In other words, does an insurgency-supporting government achieve its objective? One means of measuring this would be that the insurgents were able to translate their military wins and draws into political wins. Of the 13 cases in the example above, it is known that three of the well-supported insurgencies were government military and political wins. Two cases, on the other hand, were clearcut military and political victories for the insurgents. In eight cases the insurgents and the governments fought to a military standstill or stalemate, with neither side able to claim a real victory. In these eight cases, the insurgents were able to wrest a political victory in three instances, while the government won politically in two, and a political stalemate was reached in another three.¹² The table clarifies this situation:

Insurgent Military			Insurgent Political		
Wins	Draws	Losses	Wins	Draws	Losses
2			2		
	8		3	3	2
		3			3

Table 2. Military and Political Outcomes for 13 Well-Supported Insurgencies

* Algeria (1954-1962), Angola (1961-1965), Cameroon (1955-1962), Cyprus (1954-1958), Greece (1946-1949), Haiti (1958-1964), Indochina (1946-1954), Indonesia (1946-1949), Jammu-Kashmir (1947-1949), Laos (1959-1962), Outer Mongolia (1919-1921), Portuguese Guinea (1963-1965), and Southwest Africa (1904-1907).

By extrapolation, it would appear that--although large-scale foreign support decreases the chance of a military win for the defending government--such support does not ensure the political outcome that the insurgency-supporting government ostensibly wants to achieve.

The Requirement for Time

A policy of support for external insurgency, furthermore, creates a requirement for patience on the part of the supporting power. A state of revolution is not achieved overnight, often not within the decade. Revolutionary success, if it comes at all, may take considerably longer. From the start of the communist revolutionary movement in China to its final success was a matter of 26 years. The Indochinese Communist Party was founded in 1930 and worked mainly underground for 16 years before it started the large-scale military rebellion against the French in 1946. Partial political success was achieved at Geneva eight years later in 1954; but the final round, begun around 1956 and aimed at establishing communist rule over South Vietnam, had only reached a tenuous ceasefire by early 1973.

Time is, furthermore, no guarantor of success for revolution. The Greek Communist Party is practically powerless today, although it worked from 1941 on for control of Greece, including two periods of open armed warfare, one in the winter of 1944-1945 and again from 1946 to 1949. Angola, Portuguese Guinea, and Mozambique are still Portuguese dependencies in Africa despite prolonged attempts at revolution. Latin America has proved a singularly barren field for communist-supported military insurgency.

The question that must be faced, in the light of the experience of the "other side," is whether this country, already discouraged by a decade or so of counter-insurgency effort, could sustain a quarter or half century or more of support for revolution before it saw any tangible results. Furthermore, before final judgment is rendered, one must remember that the communist propaganda machine that was able to exploit even American successes in Vietnam as "failures" (e.g., containment of the communist offensive during Tet in 1968) will surely be able to exploit, both on the U. S. domestic front and in the world press, any American failure to succeed at another policy, especially if that policy requires a lengthy time for fulfillment.

The Increasing Cost Over Time

Beyond the time factor mentioned above and the price of attack by a formidable propaganda machine able to manipulate a certain current of world opinion and American thought, there are additional, more mundane prices exacted once

Government Support

a policy of support for revolution is entered upon. There is the possibility that the call for support may escalate far beyond what was anticipated in economic terms. There is the price that has to be paid in loss of prestige should aid have to be withdrawn at some inopportune moment. There is the possibility that the revolutionists could embarrass the supporting government. There is the political price of such aid in terms of concessions made in other areas or loss of opportunities presented in the interim. Two of these are considered below.

The Cost in Internal Stability

Revolution appears to be a highly infectious commodity. Support for revolution abroad may thus carry a tangible degree of risk for the internal stability of the supporting country. Even for the Soviet Union, the winds of revolution have come close, particularly and dangerously in the satellite areas of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. In these places, where nationalism operates against the U. S. S. R., it has not hesitated to use all necessary military force to put down insurgents desiring only moderate change. But even at home, the Soviets have felt the breath of dissent. Revolutionary rhetoric abroad conflicts strongly with repression at home, as Russian intellectuals have not failed to note.

It is thus not idle to ask whether, if the United States supports revolution abroad, this will not in turn give impetus to internal demands, for example the newly-discovered "nationalism" of ethnic groups within the country. Can the government in fact support revolution abroad and deny its right at home? Is it prepared to use whatever methods are necessary to deny internal insurgents? The possible consequences of this policy are indeed grave.

The Cost in External Relations

Furthermore, one may well inquire as to the effect of a policy of support for revolution abroad on U. S. relations with other areas. What government would know it was safe? What regime would feel free and secure in dealing with the United States? There is no need to belabor the point. Let one only consider how the French or West German governments might react if the United States were to support the IRA revolutionists against the governments of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland—a suggestion that has appeared from apparently serious U. S. sources. The present political tremors in Southeast Asia, as regimes contemplate the effects of a U. S. withdrawal from support for the South Vietnamese government, suggest that a more drastic policy change would cause the most serious realignments in U. S. foreign relations.

Finally, as part of the problem and price of any U. S. attempt to support revolution abroad, one may consider the current status of U. S. relations with the great communist powers. Previously, it has been U. S. policy to maximize the cost to them of fomenting violent revolutionary change that would insidiously change the balance of power. This policy has had some degree of success; certainly there are recent indications that both the U. S. S. R. and China are now more ready than heretofore to seek rapprochement and support international stability. The search for primacy appears to have moved from the use of direct or indirect aggression to the exploitation of diplomatic and economic means. In this, the constraints of the state system are being ever more observed.

Is this then the time for the United States to make a radical change in policy direction? The opinion expressed in this paper is that it is not. While the policy of countering revolution has not always been successful and has often been painful, neither has the practice of supporting revolution been overwhelmingly fruitful. Feasibility, value, and cost all appear to argue against any new U. S. policy of support for external revolution. Now at last may be the moment when policies of stability, not change, are more in line with historical momentum, at least in the near term.

NOTES

¹"How We Ran the Secret Air War in Laos," The New York Times Magazine (29 Oct. 1972), 16 ff.

²Wayne L. Cooper, "Operation Phoenix: A Vietnam Fiasco Seen From Within," The Washington Post (18 June 1972), B-1.

³Robert C. North, Chinese Communism (New York, Toronto: McGraw-Hill Book Co. (1966)), pp. 193-194, 198-200.

⁴W. A. C. Adia, "China: Government by Permanent Rebellion," Government and Opposition (London), 2, 2 (February 1967), 219-239. Michel Oksenberg, "On Learning from China," in China's Developmental Experience, Proceedings of The Academy of Political Science, 31, No. 1 (March 1973), 1-16, views the cultural revolution as a way of securing change.

⁵"Mao Said to Bow to Lin in '66," The Washington Post (17 Nov. 1972), A-18.

⁶"Peasants Are Seizing Farms in Chile," The Sunday Star (7 Feb. 1971), A-22; "Chile Peasants Defying Allende, Seize More Land," New York Times (18 Feb. 1971), C-3. For a more general treatment of this subject, see Gerrit Huizer, "Land Invasion as a Non-Violent Strategy of Peasant Rebellion," Journal of Peace Research, 2 (1972), 121-132.

⁷Philip B. Taylor, "Venezuela (1958 Until 1963)," in D. M. Condit, Bert H. Cooper, Jr., and Others, Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict, Vol. III, The Experience in Africa and Latin America (Washington: The American University, 1968), pp. 473-474.

⁸Pierre Hassner, "Civil Violence and the Pattern of International Power," Civil Violence and the International System, Part I: Violence and International Society (Adelphi Papers No. 83; London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 21.

⁹For an interesting comparison of the relative strengths and disparities in appeal of capitalism and communism for the Third World, see C. B. MacPherson, "Revolution and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Revolution (Nomos VIII) (New York: Atherton Press, 1966), pp. 139-153.

¹⁰D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict: Individual Characteristics of Internal Conflict in Relation to Military Outcome (Unpublished study: Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1971), pp. 69-70. Also see n. 1, p. 121.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 124-125.

¹²Ibid., pp. 237-241. Data for this table were derived from the appendices on the cited pages.

Chapter IV

DETERRENCE OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Although some may extol the use of revolutionary violence, most persons recoil from the horrors of civil conflict, with its consequences of individual death and maiming, family division and breakdown, erosion of communal social values, and weakening of the state. Deterrence or prevention of revolutionary warfare rather than the fighting of such wars is the aim of most governments, whether for altruistic or selfish reasons. Indeed, deterrence of localized warfare in other areas is an objective of present U.S. defense strategy.¹

To suggest that revolutionary warfare can be prevented is to make an assumption that it involves a process possessing some innate logic, with events occurring in some kind of rational sequence for which reasonable causal explanations can be deduced. Indeed, unless some degree of progression and explanation are available, there will be little or no hope that steps can realistically be planned to avoid the long and sanguinary struggle that revolutionary warfare so often entails.

In order to have any confidence in the possibility of preventing civil conflict, knowledge is required, first, as to its causes; and second, as to those measures that will produce an amelioration or correction of the causes. The more specific it is possible to be as to the exact nature and degree of the causes and the necessary measures, the more possible prevention would appear to be. While little work has been done to systematically study the effectiveness of various corrective measures, there is a large literature concerning causal explanations.

CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS OF INSURGENT VIOLENCE

For the purposes of this analysis, it is pertinent to review very briefly some of the major theories concerning the cause or causes of revolutionary violence. This chapter will address those conditions considered to be long range and underlying causes rather than those final conditions or events that act as precipitants to trigger the outbreak of violence.* Causal explanations will be grouped, for the purpose of quick review, around three major aspects

*Precipitating events will be discussed in the next chapter.

of the phenomenon--the nature of the protagonists, economic maladjustment, and social dysfunction. In cataloging various hypotheses according to this scheme, it was often necessary to make an arbitrary decision as to what appeared to be the dominant theme. It should be emphasized, therefore, that many theories are highly complex and concern elements of each aspect.

The Causal Protagonist: Man or Government?

Ever since Eve, as the original insurgent, tempted Adam with the forbidden fruit, there has been a school of thought that centered upon human nature itself as the causal culprit in the start of revolutionary warfare. In one view, it is the nature of only certain people to rebel.

In a variant of the "great man" theory of history applied to revolution, the assumption is made that, underlying conditions being ready for political violence, this still might not occur unless the proper person or persons were available to light the fire. As argued by such writers as Brian Crozier, "rebellions are made by rebels," and thus the rebel precedes in time the occurrence of rebellion. "All political rebels are frustrated men," in his view, but they "vary enormously" in what frustrates them and how quickly their frustration threshold is reached.¹ Serious studies of the nature, presumably unique, of a revolutionary personality assume the underlying difference between revolutionists and ordinary men.² Crozier actually suggests that it may be a matter of a "biochemical phenomenon," an X-factor, or chromosomes.

On the other hand, in another view the ultimate cause of revolution is the nature of man in general and his natural desire to do the forbidden, to test the limits of his political scope. The British colonial government, according to Pye, "came to adopt the view that most civil disorders sprang from man's inherent and compulsively irrational urge to violence and mischief."³ Certainly, revolt in this view did not symbolize a last resort of desperate men cast in an intolerable situation, but might better be explained in terms of mischief or adventure. From this basic, schoolboys-will-misbehave attitude, the British colonial governments developed a non-moralistic and remarkably unemotional reaction to insurgent warfare. To prevent insurgency, people had to be "controlled and restrained by the pressures of society, the dictates of firm government, and the general good sense and instincts of responsibility of men of authority." Governments had to strengthen social sanctions and to help people, particularly "less civilized and less technologically advanced peoples," to develop and internalize a more sophisticated constraint system.⁴

Modern scholars, and particularly American writers, reject the view of human nature as the cause of revolt. Gurr, for example, specifically states that

political violence is "not an ineluctable manifestation of human nature, nor is it an inevitable consequence of the existence of political community."⁶ If human nature is not inherently to blame, however, it is still strongly involved in the more complex socio-psychological explanations that are advanced for the genesis of revolutionary warfare. A psychological frustration-aggression hypothesis, for example, holds that strong feelings of being wronged, anger at this situation, and frustration as to meaningful ways of reacting lead, almost inevitably, to aggressive outlets.

According to Dollard and others, this psychological explanation is implied in the Marxian doctrine of class warfare, where workers' frustrations eventually lead to the organization of a revolutionary class and to aggression against the state, which is seen as the protector of the exploiting capitalistic class.⁷ Since Freud, however, believed that aggression was an innate tendency in man, the simple frustration-aggression hypothesis may not move one very far from the old "human nature" argument.

That aggression is a very complicated behavior, far more complex than the relatively simplistic frustration-aggression hypothesis, is the position held by certain psychologists who find it difficult to trace the genesis of violence strictly to the nature of either man or society. Although the argument over the sources of human aggression is somewhat academic, it has an extremely practical meaning if one is interested in preventing violence. Berkowitz, for example, has pointed out that the roots of violence are complex and "not to be found in any instinctive aggressive drive." Given this position, he holds that governments can find "no easy cure in the provision of so-called 'safe' aggressive outlets." And while there may be a means to prevent aggression from turning to violence, he feels there are neither simple nor easy answers.⁸

Whatever validity the frustration-aggression hypothesis may have in explaining the derivation of revolutionary behavior, it has been widely incorporated in a number of theories. In the most comprehensive treatment yet available of a theory concerning the wellsprings of political violence, Gurr draws strongly on the frustration-aggression hypothesis, while considerably elaborating and refining it. "Discontent," he writes, is "not a function of the discrepancy between what men want and what they have, but between what they want and what they believe they are capable of attaining."⁹ This, in Gurr's terms, is relative deprivation.¹⁰ When the deprivation gap grows and general discontent becomes focused into political discontent "against political actors who are held responsible, by their errors of commission or omission, for depriving conditions," then political violence is likely. The magnitude of that violence will, in turn, be determined by the relative strength and institutional support of the government and the insurgents.¹¹

Gurr's theory, while highly condensed and overly simplified in this paper, places the blame for political violence on society. "The disposition to collective violence depends on how badly societies violate socially derived expectations about the means and ends of human action." Violence is thus "most likely to occur" in those societies that "rely on coercion to maintain order in lieu of providing adequate patterns of value-satisfying action." Granting society's role as an inciter to violence, it may also become, in Gurr's view, a dampener. "This disposition to violence, discontent, can be tempered by socially implanted attitudes that condemn violence. . . ." He also believes that the provision of constructive means by which to attain social and material goals will result in a far lower violence rate. Thus, while Gurr does not explicitly spell out the steps a government might take to ameliorate the "disposition to violence," he does hold out the hope that socially wise action can prevent revolutionary warfare.

Thus far, these causal views have centered upon man, aroused by nature or society, as the major determinant of revolutionary warfare. A variant of this idea is one which places the blame for such violence on government itself and thus makes the major determinant, not the insurgent, but his government. Pye, for example, sees this view as typically American: "Indeed a fundamental article of faith in American political thinking is that any government with a rationally sound administration and morally correct policies will not be threatened with revolts." Just as Americans popularly believe there are no bad boys, only bad parents, Pye contends that they believe there are "no bad peoples, only evil and corrupt governments." For this reason and others--e.g., sympathy for underdogs, ingrained dislike of all authority--Americans tend to believe that revolt is itself a symptom of bad government. Thus Pye notes that Americans are "deeply uneasy about being in any way identified with governments striving to suppress rebellions."¹² These feelings found tangible expression in the late 1960's and early 1970's in the emotions surrounding the peace movement in the United States (which also owed much to other additional factors) and in American reactions even to research projects such as the well-known but aborted Project Camelot that was intended eventually to identify sources of revolutionary violence and the means of correcting causal conditions.

Some support for a view equating bad government with insurgency comes from unexpected quarters, with unexpected results. According to Pye again, traditional Chinese government philosophy believed that insurgency sprang from the "immoralities of government" and the "natural rascality of subjects," to which was added a third tenet. Basically, the Chinese felt that "insurrections occurred when people got notions in their heads and became confused in their minds," for which state governments were largely responsible. Government innovation was viewed as disruptive and destabilizing, leading to increased expectations on the part of the citizenry, and highly likely to take on a direct political character. Governments that changed things too much were thus asking for their own overthrow. In this early Chinese view, preventive action involved not change but

stasis: Government's proper role was to train people "to keep to their stations and to accept the structure of society."¹⁴ Indeed, this has been a basic tenet of traditionalist and conservative governments almost the world over.

Obviously, man, government, and society are inextricably involved in revolutionary violence and warfare, but the emerging theories seem to provide governments with few pragmatic ideas beyond the necessity for "good" government—whatever that is—within the context of a "responsive" society.

Economic Maladjustment

Granting that man is the fixed element in the insurgent equation and that it is difficult to change his innate nature, indeed, even to agree as to what it is, the search for a causal explanation of revolutionary violence has quite frequently turned to specific elements of man's economic situation—but again, with mixed and somewhat confusing results.

One of the earliest characteristics of environment to be blamed for political violence is poverty. Tanter and Midlarsky, for example, remind the reader that Plato attributed to poverty the attributes of meanness, villainy, and revolution; and that Aristotle concurred, proposing poverty as a possible cause of political revolution.¹⁵ Doubting this diagnosis, Trotsky remarked trenchantly that, if poverty alone created revolution, the world would be in flames. It has been widely noted that, at an economic level where man's existence is a "constant preoccupation with survival" and where those above him possess and use unrestrained coercion, there is "no revolution and no other political behavior among the general public."¹⁶

Nonetheless, the role of poverty as the underlying cause of revolution has been important in recent American political thinking. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the alleviation of poverty via the allocation of foreign aid was a foremost doctrine of U. S. foreign policy, justified on the grounds of creating political stability and being in the long-term interests of the United States.¹⁷ Robert S. McNamara, secretary of defense under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, felt that, —"given the certain connection between economic stagnation and the incidence of violence"—the alleviation of poverty was essential to the cure of revolutionary violence.¹⁸ Encouragement of economic growth, modernization, and industrial development have been seen as preventive devices, necessary to forestall inopportune internal political conflict.

The doctrine has not, however, been without its scholarly detractors. For example, a contrary and long-lived thesis has been that the cause of revolutionary violence is not poverty, but the growth of affluence. Analyzing the reasons

for the French revolution in 1789, de Tocqueville noted the "singular fact" that it was preceded by a "steadily increasing prosperity" which "everywhere promoted a spirit of unrest."¹¹ Furthermore, it was precisely those parts of France where the standard of living was most improved that were the "chief centers of the revolutionary movement." Brinton, comparatively analyzing four major revolutions, saw as the first of the uniform "prodromal symptoms" of each, the fact that "these were all societies on the whole on the upgrade economically before the revolution came . . .," and the revolutionists appeared to be "not unprosperous people." It was "restraint, cramp, annoyance, rather than downright crushing oppression" that seemed to release their revolutionary ardor.²⁰

The possibility that revolution might stem from the advent of better economic conditions led to a new emphasis and a search for the necessary causal conditions in economic change. This hypothesis has particular pertinence in the modern world, where such change is pervasive and where revolutionary violence has been noticeably present. Olson, for example, takes issue forcefully with the idea that economic growth is stabilizing. Rather, he asserts that "rapid economic growth is a major force leading toward revolution and instability."²¹ In support of this thesis, he points to two facts. First and "contrary to what is usually assumed, economic growth can significantly increase the number of losers." And second, "both the gainers and the losers from economic growth can be destabilizing forces."²² Huntington takes the point of view that the "processes of development or modernization in the Third World" seem likely to stimulate three forms of civil violence: (1) that by special groups acting to achieve gains within the established order; or (2) that by racial, religious, or ethnic groups seeking to escape the established order; and (3) that by new-style urban revolutionists seeking to take over and totally change the established order. At the same time, he suggests that revolution "involving a coalition of peasantry and urban middle class" is significantly reduced by modernization.²³

Support for these hypotheses linking modernization and civil violence comes from the empirical studies of the Feierabend and others. They posit that "rapid change will be experienced as an unsettling, frustrating societal condition and hence will be associated with a high level of internal conflict."²⁴ They found that traditional countries—by definition stable—and the already modern countries—no longer experiencing rapid economic change and on the whole economically satisfied—were both relatively stable politically. Rather, it was the transitional nations, ". . . by and large, all characterized by relative economic deprivation, a high rate of change on many economic dimensions but a low rate of growth on national income . . ." that showed a "strong tendency to political instability."²⁵ Change is thus seen as both destabilizing and creative of further demands that may eventually turn into political violence. At this point, the situational variant of rapid economic change is seen as a cause of frustration and the acting-out of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.

Although the results of these studies are tentative, they provide cogent reference points for policy. The end result of modernization—the economically satisfied nation making sizeable gains in national income—is apparently an agent of internal political stability, although subject to waves of internal dissidence and extremist terrorist attacks, as was clearly demonstrated during the 1960's. What looms as particularly important, however, are the possible dangers to political stability that occur before that final stage is reached, particularly the dangers inherent in the process of modernizing. Thus modernization has been variously seen as both a possible preventive and a possible cause of revolution.

While economic modernization is a nebulous concept in many societies, dissatisfaction with the distribution of land is a clearcut and positive grievance. Inequities in land holdings are highly conspicuous and have immediate and drastic repercussions on the lives of individuals and families. Agrarian reform, often viewed as the basis for future economic wealth and power, is one of the most frequent demands made in revolutionary situations. Because of the potency of the land question and the important role it has played in many revolutions, it must be assumed that maldistribution of land may be a basic cause of revolution. Tanter and Midlarsky, for example, hypothesize that, where a revolutionary gap between man's aspirations and expectations is owing largely to "a high level of inequality in land distribution," the probability of revolution should exist. Although they are not adamant that land inequality is indeed an operational form of expectations, they do report evidence that in fact "revolutions occurred in those societies with a higher degree of land inequality."²

The land question remains a major economic variant in the search for a causal explanation because many countries in the world remain predominantly peasant, and because the majority of peasants seem to "prefer land ownership to any alternative urban employment."³ Klatt quotes the Stanford Research Institute's survey of Mekong Delta inhabitants to illustrate this preference, which obtained among 100 percent of owner tenants, 97 percent of tenants, 87 percent of farm workers, and 86 percent of owners. Klatt further claims that "there is no country in Asia in which unsolved land questions have not caused internal conflicts, led to extensive insurrections, and, on occasion as in West Bengal and Kerala, brought down a government."⁴ Land continues to be an issue for communist exploitation. It is noteworthy that—despite the setbacks and failures of revolution, despite the post-revolutionary collectivization of peasant holdings in those countries in which communist revolutionary warfare was successful, despite the economic failure of collectivization in all communist countries—the communists continue to be able to arrange alliances with dissatisfied agrarians in revolutionary situation.

Is land reform then the powerful preventive of insurgent conflict, at least in mainly agricultural societies? Failing in some form of effective land reform,

Klatt's forecast is gloomy: "If the right decisions are not taken, the recent benefits due to technical and economic advances may well be lost in a bloodbath of insurgency and revolution."²⁹ Yet looking at the frequent failure of land reform policies in the many countries where it has been tried, only a qualified assent can be given. Even Klatt, for example, in seeking ways in which land reform could be made more effective, suggests the use of still untried alternatives. He advocates "effective reduction of tenants' rents," and a "genuine land-to-the-tiller programme," involving the participation of all potential beneficiaries. Furthermore, he points out that the government must step in to take over functions, such as banking, that were formerly provided by landlords, and that it must also provide for compensation to landlords and opportunities for them to make productive industrial investments.³⁰ Still, there is no firm evidence that even these measures, once taken, will provide the necessary impetus back to national stability.

Granting the confusion that exists even today concerning the steps that a government should take to augment the process of economic change and minimize its destabilizing features, it is not surprising that early observers of the revolutionary process should have connected economic change and dysfunction with governmental inefficiency. Brinton, for example, noted governmental inefficiency as one of the symptoms which appeared in each of his studied situations, and he related it in a particular way to economic conditions. In addition to neglect and failure to make changes in old institutions, Brinton felt that governmental inefficiency reflected the strains of new conditions, "... specifically conditions attendant on economic expansion and the growth of new moneyed classes, new ways of transportation, new business. . . ." Governments "adapted to simpler, more primitive conditions" found themselves unable to cope with the problems attendant on major economic change.³¹ The problems of France in the late 18th century and those of numerous countries in the late 20th century do not, in essence, seem so dissimilar.

While economic explanations of revolution never seem quite specific enough, it is difficult to believe that any adequate explanation of revolutionary warfare can avoid accounting in some manner for the observed economic dysfunctions of prerevolutionary society. The problem appears to lie in adequately accounting for that type and degree which leads to revolution as against that which exists in a quite stable society.

Social Dysfunction

The Marxist view of the cause of revolution—still the most integrated and internally coherent—links economic inequity with societal dysfunction. It posits the occurrence of revolution as the result of growing conflict between classes of people, classes defined by their relationship to the means of production. Under

its terms, capitalism creates both an exploiting and an exploited class, between whom conflict must inevitably occur. Since the government is controlled by and operates in favor of the exploiting classes, the exploited workers must first destroy it in order to secure their rights to the means of production. If the Marxist explanation of revolutionary conflict is correct, little can be done by a government to prevent it. Reformism, for example, is specifically castigated: the only acceptable preventive of revolution, in Marxist terms, is apparently for the government to agree to its own destruction.

While this view may, or may not, seem logically compelling, depending on the cast of mind of the reader, the plain fact is that a great deal of reformism has been accomplished and that the most industrialized and capitalist nations of the world have not experienced communist revolutions. Furthermore, the exigencies of life have thrust upon those who followed the Soviet revolution a whole series of accommodations by which communism has accepted many capitalist practices and theories. Class warfare has—at least so far—not proved to be inevitable.

Class problems have, however, played a large role in past revolutions, and observers have remarked upon the fact that these problems have been exacerbated as the classes grew economically closer together. Noting that a rich merchant with an aristocratic son-in-law was "likely to feel that God is at least as interested in merchants as in aristocrats," Brinton, for example, came to the conclusion that "revolutions seem more likely when social classes are fairly close together than when they are far apart."³² Such closeness was also true for other classes. De Tocqueville, for example, pointed out that the French peasants in 1789 had been "long enfranchised" and were accustomed to owning land. Nonetheless, they still "nursed in secret their grievances, jealousies and rancors" bred in previous years. The most deeply rooted of these feelings was their "indomitable hatred" of an inequality which the feudalistic class structure made obnoxiously obvious.³³ If, in fact, the lessening of class distinctions did not lessen the hatred of class distinction—but even seemed to increase it—this is a matter of strong interest in any causal explanation of revolutionary activity and for any preventive measures that may be undertaken.

The bitter antagonism of the social classes noted by Brinton combines with two other of his "tentative uniformities" of revolution. It was not only that the classes were antagonistic, but that there had also been a prior desertion of the intellectuals from the establishment and a failure of self-trust among the ruling class.³⁴ Each of these two characteristics will be considered in turn.

Lyford P. Edwards, who in 1927 called the transfer of the allegiance of the intellectuals from the established order an "advanced symptom of revolution," nonetheless proved that it was a phenomenon of long standing in pre-revolutionary society. By 1750, he noted, there was not "a man of intellectual

distinction" in France who did not attack the doctrine of the divine right of kings. Furthermore, many of the most radical intellectuals were invited into the salons of the aristocrats themselves, a fact that may have contributed much to the latter's observed lack of self-trust.³⁵ In Russia, it was much the same. "The gradual transfer of the allegiance of the Russian intellectuals can be traced readily for three generations," wrote Edwards. "For decades before its final overthrow, the government of the czars was without a public apologist of even second-rate ability."³⁶

If this characteristic is an "uniformity" of the revolutionary situation, it may have particular pertinence for the 1970's, as the much-publicized revisionists and anti-establishment views of U.S. intellectuals are pondered. In any case, it is difficult to overlook what Brinton termed the "most reliable of the symptoms we are likely to meet."³⁷

The importance of this "symptom" is increased by the fact that it contributes to other manifestations of breakdown. For example, the defection of the intellectuals appears critical because this group has so much to do with what Pettie terms "ideological cramp." Asserting that "in an integrated society all men's wills are governed by a commonly accepted system of symbols"—for example, those symbols involved in systems of morality, religion, and tradition—Pettie sees the entire system as society's myth. Any society, then, in which "opposed myths are present is to a degree subject to disintegration and faction." In its final stage, "The disintegration of myth and society go hand in hand."³⁸ Intellectuals, in their function as ideological arbiters, can thus play a major revolutionary role by weakening or destroying the social myth that binds society together.

Yet even as one accepts the fact that the "transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals" accompanies the downfall of society, one must question whether this is inevitably a symptom of revolution. Not only is there intellectual disaffection in America today, but it has certainly been in strong evidence during other periods, for example, from 1918 into the early 1920's and during the depression years in the mid and later 1930's. Yet still, there was no revolutionary warfare during these earlier periods. Today, in Russia and throughout Eastern Europe, intellectuals decry the lack of personal freedom as much as the cruelty and callousness that have characterized government dealings with political deviance. While revolutionary warfare has been attempted in parts of Eastern Europe, it has not occurred everywhere nor has it happened in Russia.

Furthermore, one must ask whether some degree of intellectual defection is not always with society and whether indeed it is not the appropriate role of intellectuals, by questioning what is, to pave the way for what is to be. If this is so, is one then to judge intellectual disaffection as a "reliable symptom" of revolutionary violence or, rather, as simply a symptom of the need for change?

Self-distrust of the ruling class, as Brinton puts it,³⁹ or the decadence of the elite, as other observers have classified this characteristic, is viewed by many as an integral part of any causal explanation of revolution. Pettee observes, most cogently, that the best of each generation tends to be drawn into new groups, while the old groups or professions, which are the natural supporters of the government, grow anemic. According to his argument, this "old elite" is beset by the weight of habit and old institutional forms, overly comfortable in its caste, and "dissolved" by the very power it possesses. As a result, it becomes isolated from the rest of society, begins to suffer from a failure of imagination and intellect, and lacks confidence in dealing with the new situations facing government.⁴⁰ At the same time as already noted, it is facing attack from intellectuals who begin to form around a new elite. The coming of the revolution makes the failure of the ruling class obvious.

Yet, again, how useful a symptom of revolution is this acted self-distrust, this decadence of the ruling class? Pettee perhaps has made no more sage observation than his remark concerning the difficulties inherent in measuring its health: "Even in medicine, death is sometimes a great aid to diagnosis."⁴¹ It is "self-evident" to many people that any ruling class that loses power has become decadent. That is, it has become saturated with self-indulgence, inefficient in pursuing objectives, and often tolerant in the face of sadism and cruelty. Yet most of these same characteristics are viewed as evidence of raw vitality and brute strength in a new, revolutionary regime. Not only that, but no class is uniformly decadent; and one outstanding man may salvage a situation. "Tottering" regimes have stayed off disaster for years. Indeed, what Churchill has been credited with doing for England in the 1940's, did not Lenin do for the Russian revolutionaries after his return in 1917? Before such a "cause" or "symptom" of revolution may be pragmatically applied, we need to know: Is decadence the reason for death or death the reason for the assignment of decadence?

So far the discussion has concerned problems between classes within a given social order, but revolution has occurred as well in situations where problems have involved conflict between people divided according to communal interests rather than those of class. In these cases, internal war has occurred as a result of interests centered around race, religion, language, regionalism, and even political affiliation—interests that have been the concern of persons of all classes within the communal group. Thus high and low social orders in one group coalesce against all classes of another group.

Race, for example, generally divided blacks against whites in postwar colonial Africa without regard to class, with exceptions to this rule based mainly on individual feelings, beliefs, or interests. Furthermore, such exceptions were on the whole generally reabsorbed to the communal group, by violence if necessary. In post-colonial Africa, ethnic difference still persisted, however, as a component

of revolutionary warfare: It divided black Ibo of all classes from the rest of black Nigeria; and black Hutu serfs, ostensibly fighting Tutsi overlords in Rwanda, killed Tutsi of all classes including the lowest.⁴² Traditional political affiliation, not class status and not necessarily ideological differences, essentially divided the two sides in the Colombian violencia that netted over a hundred thousand victims in the decade between 1948 and 1958. Religion—at the present time exacerbated and possibly overshadowed by nationalism—tends to divide Jews of all classes from Palestinians of all classes over the question of Israel.

What are the causes of communal violence, particularly in a world where race, religion, and regionalism seem at first glance to be almost archaic factors? Huntington points out that "underlying most communal violence are . . . fundamental issues. Who constitutes 'the people' who are to provide government for the people? Who belong to 'the nation' on which the nation-state rests?"⁴³ For many countries, the growth of nationalism and increasing democratization in the form of political participation may induce communal strife. Modernization, also, according to Huntington, "may stimulate communal violence. . . ."⁴⁴ Increased contact and competition between communities resulting from economic development, large-scale social mobilization, and political participation, seem to create feelings of alienation and thus renewed dependence of the individual citizen on an identity that is achieved through birth and "which consequently cannot be taken away. . . ."⁴⁵

One of the problems in identifying communal violence has been the extraordinary amount of ideological verbiage used to "dress" revolutions that were essentially communal in nature. As Huntington notes, "The communal wolf dresses in ideological sheep's clothing."⁴⁶ Other aspects of communal friction make it difficult for governments to cope: the high degree of polarization between the two competing groups, the commitment of practically everyone in the group as a whole, and the noncompromising nature of the desired solutions. Internally, governments have sought relief through charismatic leaders and strong social goals. External problems of sufficient danger have sometimes led to avoidance of internal communal strife. Accommodation may be thwarted, however, when the difference between people is symbolized, not by goods or status or power, all differentiated by class and thus subject to change, but by a skin color or belief achieved through birth and thus ineradicable. In these cases prevention of violent conflict would appear to be difficult—that is, if the government is not prepared to accede to demands for separatism with its loss of large areas of land.

It has been argued that separatism may be the lesser evil for a government facing communal violence. But where does separatism end? Does not granting the desires of one ethnic group accelerate the demands of the next? The result, if carried out extensively, can only lead to the balkanization of states. For precisely this reason perhaps, communal violence frequently excites little interest in the great powers. Unless their prestige or other factors operate

directly in the situation, as for example in the Pakistan-Bangladesh conflict (and even here involvement was held down), they have little to lose as other states become smaller and weaker.

In most of these discussed views of social dysfunction as a cause of revolution, economic matters have been important: in class warfare, for example, economic problems are seen as dominant; in communal strife, economic difficulties are usually highly contributory. There is, however, at least one serious view of revolutionary causation that sees economic matters as completely indifferent and ascribes major importance to social imbalance.

Writing in the 1930's, Pitirim Sorokin stated that "the main and indispensable condition for an eruption of internal disturbances is that the social system or the cultural system or both shall be unsettled." Rapid social change is the prime cause of revolution in this view; and it matters not at all whether "this occurs in periods of bloom . . . decline . . . prosperity . . . poverty. . . ." Sorokin is very definite on this point, that economic conditions do not cause revolutionary activity: "However hard living conditions may be in a given society, if the framework of its relationships and values is unshattered, no disturbances will be forthcoming."⁴⁰

Granting Sorokin's theory, the task of deterrence might prove quite difficult. Liking the phenomena of social disturbances to those of criminality, different mainly in scale, he sees the result as "increased demoralization, 'revolt against the law and obligatory mores' . . ." Once the "sociocultural framework is unsettled and broken . . .,"⁴¹ it becomes impossible to inculcate generally accepted forms of conduct or to exert the pressure of an unanimous public opinion. Sorokin's argument stressing sociocultural breakdown thus directly challenges the emphasis on economic materialism of the Marxist view, but it may complement that view which explains revolution in terms of the effect of rapid change caused by industrialization and modernization.

DETERRENCE REVIEWED

This quick overview of some of the causal explanations for the occurrence of civil conflict should indicate the wide range of the explanations that have been suggested and the apparent direct contradictions between a number of them. It is also noteworthy that a number of the explanations seem to cluster around certain points; one could probably accommodate several of these "causes" within a single explanation.

One cannot ignore the fact, however, that despite the appearance of a number of explanations of considerable depth and penetration, none outlines in the necessary specificity those conditions that cannot be ignored in any serious attempt to avoid the onset of revolutionary warfare.⁴² Most explanations, in fact, ascribe

the rise of revolution to conditions that also arise in politically stable states. One is thus confronted with the possibility that the explanations are not entirely valid, or that they become valid only at some point in time when criticality is reached. This leaves quite open the crucial question of how to determine the "boiling point" at which apparently normal conditions become potential revolutionary causes.

To find a causal explanation of sufficient scientific and practical value for a government to depend upon, it requires at least two things: Not only must the explanation be specific enough that it can be operationalized, but the explanation as a whole must operate coherently both for the presence and absence of revolutionary warfare. That is, political violence should occur whenever the same conditions arise in similar settings and should not occur when such conditions are absent. This is not only a necessity for logic, but it would be only in such an event that a government might have some faith—beyond the intuitive political wisdom of individual leaders—that the conditions warrant changing.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that most of those who suggest causal explanations for civil violence do so on the basis of study of revolutionary situations rather than the comparative study of prerevolutionary periods and "normal" or at least nonrevolutionary periods. The reader may easily recall, for example, situations of rapid change that have not lead to revolution as well as those that have. What distinguished the rapid change experienced in the revolutionary case as against the rapid change that occurred in the nonrevolutionary case? What criteria can be set so that the situation leading to revolution can be recognized? In other words, is not the arrival of revolution being used to validate "causes" that may be occurring elsewhere without the arrival of revolution?

The search for an adequate causal explanation of revolution is further impeded by the fact that the variables to be considered are so many and so complex and cannot be considered in isolation. Economic factors do not operate singly nor in isolation from socio-cultural factors. Widespread unemployment, for example, does not occur without the simultaneous operation of other economic conditions, and none of these events takes place without affecting the social structure or the political milieu. This overlap is, however, a difficulty that plagues all social science research and is not peculiar to the study of revolutionary warfare. Since considerably more progress has been made in the general area of social science as a whole than in the specific field of revolutionary causation, it is perhaps reasonable to expect this field to yield further results from somewhat more intensive and systematic plowing.

NOTES

¹Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget before the House Armed Services Committee, 9 March 1971, Defense Report on President Nixon's Strategy for Peace: Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office [1971]), p. 21.

²Brian Crozier, The Study of Conflict (Conflict Studies No. 7; [London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1970]), pp. 2-3.

³See, for example, E. Victor Wolfenstein, The Revolutionary Personality (Washington: The American University, 1966).

⁴Lucian W. Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions," in Harry Eckstein, ed. Internal War (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), p. 159.

⁵Ibid., p. 160.

⁶Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 317.

⁷John Dollard et al., "Frustration and Aggression: Definitions," in James Chowning Davies, ed., When Men Revolt and Why: A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution (New York: The Free Press, c. 1971), pp. 166-173.

⁸Leonard Berkowitz, "The Study of Urban Violence: Some Implications of Laboratory Studies of Frustration and Aggression," in Davies, op. cit., p. 187.

⁹Gurr, op. cit., p. 359.

¹⁰Cf. theories of James C. Davies ("Toward a Theory of Revolution," The American Sociological Review, 27 (Feb. 1962), 5-13) and Raymond Tanter's and Manus Midlarsky's "revolutionary gap" between aspirations and achievement expectations ("A Theory of Revolution," The Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI (Sept. 1967), 284-280).

¹¹Gurr, op. cit., pp. 319, 321.

¹²Ibid., p. 317.

¹³Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions," loc. cit., p. 159.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 161.

¹⁵Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution, XI, 3 (September 1967), 289.

¹⁶Davies, op. cit., p. 151.

¹⁷Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," in Davies, op. cit., pp. 215-216.

¹⁸Robert S. McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office (New York: Harper & Row, c. 1968), pp. 145-147.

¹⁹Alexis de Tocqueville, "How, though the reign of Louis XVI was the most prosperous period of the monarchy, this very prosperity hastened the outbreak of revolution," in Davies, op. cit., pp. 95 and 96.

²⁰Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), p. 284.

²¹Olson, "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," in Davies, op. cit., p. 216.

²²Ibid., p. 219.

²³Samuel P. Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," in Civil Violence and the International System Part II: Violence and International Security (Adelphi Papers Number 83; London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971), p. 14.

²⁴Ivo K. Felerabend and Rosalind L. Felerabend, "Aggressive Behaviors Within Politics, 1948-1962: A Cross-National Study," in Davies, op. cit., p. 242.

²⁵Ibid., p. 246.

²⁶Raymond Tanter and Manus Midlarsky, "A Theory of Revolution," loc. cit., pp. 276-277.

²⁷Klatt, "Agrarian Issues in Asia: II Reform and Insurgency, International Affairs (London) 48, 3 (July 1972), 411.

²⁸Ibid., p. 408.

²⁹Ibid., p. 411.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 409-410.

³¹Brinton, op. cit., p. 285.

³²Ibid.

³³de Tocqueville, "How though the reign of Louis XVI . . .," loc. cit., p. 97.

³⁴Brinton, op. cit., p. 285.

³⁵Lyford P. Edward, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago, Illinois: The University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 42-43.

³⁶Ibid., p. 43.

³⁷Brinton, op. cit., p. 264.

³⁸George Sawyer Pettee, The Process of Revolution (Vol. 5 of Studies in Systematic Political Science and Comparative Government; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1938), pp. 41-42, 45, 48.

³⁹Brinton, op. cit., pp. 52-69.

⁴⁰Pettee, op. cit., pp. 55-58.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 55.

⁴²Leo Kuper, "Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary Change," Comparative Studies in Society and History, 14, 4 (September 1972), 401.

⁴³Huntington, "Civil Violence and the Process of Development," loc. cit., p. 10.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 13.

⁴⁷Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics Vol. III: Fluctuation of Social Relationships, War, and Revolution (New York: The Bedminster Press, 1962 [c. 1937]), p. 469.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 500.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 501.

⁵⁰See opinions offered in Perez Zagorin's paper on "Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography," Political Science Quarterly, LXXXVIII, 1 (March 1973), 23-52. It is useful to compare the above article with Lawrence Stone's "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, XVIII, 2 (January 1966), 159-176.

Chapter V

QUICK RESOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

If present knowledge of the long-range "causes" of revolutionary warfare has been insufficient to enable governments to prevent the outbreak of such conflict, incumbent regimes have—as a matter of practice—sought to maintain their authority by ending any revolutionary violence as quickly as possible after its start. A "get-it-over-fast" course of action has been suggested, indeed, as the one most likely to favor the government. For the purposes of this paper, "quick resolution" will be defined as one occurring within a year of the start of open insurgent violence.

Although revolutionary warfare is often considered as essentially a long-term proposition, this is not necessarily the case. For example, according to Sorokin, whose survey of internal disturbances covered a total of almost nine thousand years of ancient through modern history for ten countries,* the "pre-dominant type" of internal disturbance is one of a few weeks' duration.¹ Of Eckstein's twelve hundred "unequivocal examples" of internal war between 1946 and 1959,² culled from The New York Times, obviously a large number were short-lived. One way or another, most governments have apparently gotten it over quickly, either winning or losing in the process.

If one is interested in how revolutionary violence is to be quickly resolved, it would seem desirable to know those conditions or events that precipitated the violence and the steps taken to deal with it. Such information should provide a basis for analytical comparisons, both between government successes and government failures and between short-term and long-term revolutions. Indeed, long-term revolutions were—at least until the end of the first year—still short-term situations. Are there significant differences between these various sets?

Since there are large gaps in our knowledge, particularly in the situation of the short-term revolutionary endeavor, this chapter can only attempt to set the stage for inquiry into the subject. It deals with some of the propositions

*Greece, 600-146 BC; Rome, 509 BC-476 AD; Byzantium, 532-1390 AD; France, 531-1908 AD; Germany and Austria, 709-1294 AD; England, 656-1921 AD; Italy, 526-1922 AD; Spain, 467-1923 AD; The Netherlands 678-1886 AD; Russia, 946-1921 AD.

and ideas concerning elements that are thought to trigger revolutionary violence and some of the constraints that surround the government's initial actions. First, concerning the precipitants—

PRECIPITANTS OF INTERNAL WAR

Why does aimed insurrection occur when it does? What conditions presage it? What are its immediate symptoms? In dealing with government response to outbreaks of internal disorder, one is not so much concerned with long-range* causes—the time for correcting these has long since passed—as with the events that act as the initiators or precipitants of violent outbreaks.

Financial Crisis

Those who have studied the opening events of past revolutions tend to agree that a generalized and growing evidence of government weakness is the greatest inducement to insurgent violence. Brinton saw such weakness specifically manifested in the form of financial crisis in each of his four studied revolutions. The subject of taxation was central to the issue of these revolutions. A growing argument between citizens and the state over the imposition and payment of taxes appeared to lead eventually to a serious consideration of ways and means of eliminating and replacing the existing government. In three of the four cases, "The dramatic events that start things moving, that bring on the fever of revolution, are . . . intimately connected with the financial administration of the state."³

Since the government's financial crisis appears to follow often upon a series of attempts at socioeconomic reform, that is, attempts to correct factors considered to be causative, it would be an irony of history if efforts to overcome "causes" should lead to "precipitants" of internal war.

Military Crisis

Military catastrophes or defeat of the government in an external war are also widely credited with bringing about civil disturbance. Writing of the first Russian revolution against the monarchy in March 1917, Lenin (who did not return to Russia until April) flatly stated: "This crisis was precipitated by the series of extremely severe defeats sustained by Russia and her allies. They shook up the old machinery of government and the old order and roused the anger of all classes of the population against them; they embittered the army, wiped out a very large part of the old commanding personnel. . . ."⁴ Russia,

* See Chapter IV.

furthermore, was not the only defeated nation that saw revolution at the end of the first world war; it also came to Bulgaria, Germany, Austria, and Turkey. There are other examples that come easily to mind: France, after defeat by the Germans in 1870; Russia, after defeat by the Japanese in 1905; Turkey, after defeat by the Italians in 1912. Coming to more modern times, it was after the second world war that the internal wars that dismantled the French, British, and Dutch colonial empires took place. Although these nations had been on the ultimately victorious Allied side, their initial defeats by the Axis had proved their vulnerability. Return to their old colonial territories was therefore not accepted docilely.

Nonetheless, this possible regularity in precipitating incidents is not undisputed. Sorokin, for example, claims that his data "do not definitely show a positive association between unsuccessful wars and big disturbances nor between victorious wars and the absence of such. At best they yield only a very slight association between unsuccessful wars and disturbances."

Defection of the Armed Forces

Intimately but not necessarily connected with prior military defeat is the disaffection of the army, which has been considered by some to be a determining characteristic for the occurrence of civil disorder. Knowledge that the army will not fight, that it will be at most neutral, emboldens those who are inclined toward civil conflict. Revolutionists seek to create this situation, as is shown in the instructions given in a 19th century manual on street fighting: "Women and children go on ahead of the men of the popular forces. When they meet the soldiers, they throw themselves at their feet. They embrace them and chat to them whilst their menfolk shoot the officers. At this point the soldiers lower their rifles." General P.-G. Cluséret, who wrote this after a career as war minister of the Paris Commune of 1870, was drawing upon his earlier experience as a French officer who had fought the insurgents of 1848 with considerable success. "I have experienced this [situation] when I was an officer; and to any officer such a moment is a thousand times more dangerous than any battle."

One of the reasons Lenin gave for his opposition to any bolshevik attempt to take over the Provisional Government in July 1917 was that, prior to the defection of many soldiers during Kornilov's September attempt at counter-revolution, the army was still loyal to the government.⁶ The importance of the army's loyalty is given further dramatic exemplification by the fact that the Russian military counterinsurgency effort in Hungary in 1956 did not utilize either the Hungarian army or Soviet occupation troops. Rather, Soviet occupation troops were withdrawn from Budapest and some left Hungary entirely, while new units—presumably lacking any sentimental ties to the

revolutionists—were brought in.⁹ On the opposite side of the fence, ex-President Fulgencio Batista blamed the loss of his government on Cuban armed forces defection.

Apparently one of the strongest inducements to the beginning or increase of revolutionary violence is the knowledge that government soldiers cannot be counted upon to support the government. Conversely, observation tends to reinforce Brinton's conclusion that no revolution succeeds while the government controls its armed forces and is able to use them effectively.

Conscious Insurgent Decision

There is at least one school of thought that ascribes the start of revolutionary warfare to conscious insurgent decision. It may be assumed that the existence of revolutionary warfare implies the existence of revolutionists. The question of debate, however, is whether such revolutionists simply spring up as a mass of outraged humanity acting in concert at some point in history or whether there is a revolutionary organization capable of planning and directing its activities so that at some point in time masses of people join with it in precipitating a revolution. Popular history following successful revolutions has tended to see events in terms of a spontaneous uprising of outraged citizens. Those who have emphasized prior revolutionary organization and planning as the precipitant of revolution have, on the other hand, often been associated with unpopular regimes. As a result, the "plot theory" has not been an entirely respectable position to hold.¹⁰

To some extent, this has been changed as a result of Marx and Lenin and especially the latter's emphasis on the role of conscious planning and preliminary organization. As has already been noted, Marx tended to see the occurrence of revolution as almost a bit of historical machinery, but he was not impervious to the importance of the moment of uprising. "Insurrection," he was to write, "is an art,"¹¹ thus implying the need for a successful artist, the leader who chooses the correct moment.

Lenin, of course, concurred, saying that to refuse to treat insurrection as an art—provided certain conditions obtained—was "a betrayal of Marxism and a betrayal of the revolution."¹² According to Lenin, the art required very definite steps by the bolshevik revolutionists in the fall of 1917: First, to immediately "cement the bolshevik group, without striving after numbers, and without fearing to leave the waverers in the waverers' camp." Second, to draw up a brief declaration of major principles and program. Third, to send the bolshevik group to the factories and the barracks, for "Their place is there. the pulse of life is there, there is the source of salvation for our revolution. . . ."¹³ There were also a few more things Lenin thought it possible for leaders of a Russian revolution to do:

Quick Resolution

... organize a headquarters of the insurgent detachments, distribute our forces, move the most reliable regiments to the most important points, ... arrest the General Staff and the government, move against ... [loyal detachments] ... mobilize the armed workers ... occupy the telegraph and the telephone exchange. ...¹⁴

The frenzy of activity suggested by the above leaves little doubt that Lenin saw a definite need for prior revolutionary organization and planning. Certainly, he saw the start of revolutionary warfare as the result of conscious insurgent decision. Nonetheless, it should be noted again that, in treating insurrection "in a Marxist way, i.e., as an art,"¹⁵ Lenin always emphasized the need for certain "objective conditions" to have been attained; it was in conjunction with these that party activity operated.

"Objective Conditions" as Precipitants

Lenin's greatest genius may have been his ability to identify in September the objective conditions for a successful revolution in November—that is, before the revolution occurred. It is important to note that these conditions had not obtained the previous July. These conditions, the criteria that Lenin used for starting an uprising, were three in number. The first was the support of the "advanced class" for the revolution, which in Russia was formed of the workers and soldiers of Petrograd (Leningrad) and Moscow (thus also embracing the condition of army defection). An earlier bolshevik attempt at insurrection in July had been wrong, according to Lenin, because the support of this class was lacking; by late September, however, it was present. His first point was emphatic: "To be successful, insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced class."¹⁶

The second condition necessary for a successful insurrection, according to Lenin, was a "revolutionary upsurge of the people." In July, he noted, there was no countrywide upsurge, no great discontent with the government. By the end of September 1917 following the Kornilov revolt, there was widespread feeling among the peasants that their desires for land reform would not be realized.¹⁷ According to Lenin, even the supporters of the Provisional Government editorialized that "So far practically nothing has been done to put an end to the relations of bondage that still prevail in the villages of central Russia. ..."¹⁸ Lenin could hardly ask for more in the way of a "revolutionary upsurge of the people" than a "peasant revolt in a peasant country. ..."¹⁹

The third of Lenin's conditions for successful revolutionary warfare was reliance upon that "turning point" when resolve and activity are at their highest for the revolutionists; and at their lowest for the government. Lenin found "no

vacillation on any serious political scale" among the governmental enemies of bolshevism in July. But looking at the situation in September, Lenin noted great wavering among both the parties of the government and among the Allied powers. The first were suffering from the loss of a majority and unable to decide upon a coalition. The military World War I Allies, meanwhile, according to Lenin, could not decide "between a war to a victorious finish and a separate peace directed against Russia."²⁰

Lenin's three precipitating factors—support of an advanced class, revolutionary upsurge of the people, and a change in the relative strength of insurgents and government—seem in many respects to be more like some of the long-range "causes" discussed in the previous chapter, rather than merely triggering conditions. Yet it should be noted how quickly each of these conditions changed, in degree at least, in the Russian situation. What apparently did not hold true in July—when a bolshevik attempt to seize power proved abortive—had become a very active ingredient of the situation by the end of September. This fact suggests again that it may not be merely the existence of a given condition that is critical but rather that one or more conditions conducive to governmental weakness and societal instability reach a certain magnitude.

The Echo Effect

Almost diametrically opposed to the above ideas and particularly the idea of criticality is that view of revolution which sees it as often occurring in response to the example of revolution elsewhere. Insurgency next door leads to rebellion at home in this view—the external echo effect. And insurgency at home leads to further revolution at home—the internal echo effect.

A near-perfect example of the external echo effect is offered by the events of 1848 following a successful revolution in France. According to historians, the violent events of February 1848 in Paris, which led in France to the abdication of Louis Philippe and the creation of the Second Republic (1848-1852), led elsewhere to large-scale revolutionary disorders.²¹ The news of the successful French revolution created instant insurrection aimed at dismantling the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On 12 March there were clashes between students and government troops in Vienna, leading to Metternich's resignation on the 13th. On 15 March the Hungarian Table of Deputies accepted a liberal platform amounting to a constitution, which the king-emperor of Hungary accepted, leaving Hungary claiming virtual independence from the Hapsburg empire except through a personal union. On 18 March, Italian revolutionists initiated the "Glorious Five Days" in Milan, which began a rebellion in Lombardy.²² By the end of March, the Croats had organized a national committee which sought separation from Hungary. By 8 April, the Czechs had forced the Austrian government to promise a constituent assembly for the Kingdom of Bohemia. In addition, there were revolutionary movements in Moravia, Galicia, Dalmatia, and Transylvania.²³

Quick Resolution

As if this were not enough, the February revolution in Paris "acted as a catalytic agent" to revolutionary demands in Germany, this time aimed not at destroying but at creating an empire. On 15 March barricades went up in Berlin and mob activity and street fighting occurred for several days. On 31 March the Frankfurt Vorparlament met and ordered elections by direct manhood suffrage. The new Frankfurt National Assembly met in May, suspending the Diet of the Germanic Confederation and setting up a provisional government. Meanwhile the question of German ethnicity came up strongly in the two provinces of Schleswig and Holstein, possessions of the King of Denmark, who sought to incorporate them more firmly into Denmark. When Danish troops entered Schleswig, revolt broke out in both provinces.²⁴

The external echo effect (some would claim the conspiracy theory) certainly appeared to be operating in Asia during the late 1940's when revolutionary conflict broke out in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma, Indochina, Indonesia, Jammu and Kashmir, and South Korea (not to be confused with the Korean War). In Africa, the decade of 1962 to 1963 saw revolutionary conflict spring up in Kenya (1962), Algeria (1964), Cameroon (1965), Portuguese Guinea (1968), the Congo (1960), and South Africa (1961).

The internal echo effect has already been observed in the course of the earlier discussion, with a series of revolutionary occurrences within a given country. For example the socialist-democratic revolution that ended the Romanov dynasty in Russia was accomplished in March 1917 but was, as has been noted, followed by a further bolshevik attempt in July to seize power. After this failure, the more radical bolsheviks under Lenin and Trotsky finally attained their goal in the revolution against the Provisional Government in November 1917.²⁵ The French and English revolutions also exhibited the internal echo effect. Each comprised a series of small revolutions, rather than one single cataclysmic event, with power being seized first by moderates and then by increasingly radical groups—seized through the use of force.²⁶

Government Action

The moment of insurrection, the beginning of armed operations, may come about, however, not only through such factors as conscious insurgent decision or the operation of an echo effect, but also by reason of government action. This action could, of course, be consciously provocative in order to lure the insurgents into a showdown situation at a moment when the government felt its strength was high. On the other hand, such a consciously controlled act seems beyond the scope of many governments facing insurgency, and usually a number of other problems at the same moment. In most cases, the government probably brings on insurrection through a mistake.

One such example occurred in December 1944, when the communist party in Greece called for a large-scale demonstration in Athens to support the resignation of its ministers and thus bring about the eventual downfall of the currently constituted government. Ostensibly, it would secure a dominant, or at least a larger, share of cabinet posts in the next government. Unfortunately, the Athenian police lost control of the crowd and then fired upon it. Although they were supposed to have had blank ammunition, some seven persons were killed and others wounded. The crowd, infuriated by being fired upon, reacted violently, but dispersed quietly when British soldiers were brought in. The government had, however, provided the communists with a propitious moment: Athenian public opinion was violently opposed to the government's action; world attention was drawn to the Greek situation, with sympathy for the communists dominant; and those voices within the party that stood for violence over political means were strengthened. By using force to an extent that was simultaneously too much and too little, the government provided a perfect illustration of its current indecision and weakness. Furthermore, while the military situation was not perfect for the communists, it was apt to worsen over time as the government became stronger. Thus the Left seized the moment when it had "its martyrs, its cause, its excuse, and even its propaganda."¹

History provides other examples when the lack of "adequate" government force appeared to favor the onset of revolutionary violence. Brinton describes the lack of decisive military power with which Charles I attempted to control events, the "amazing disregard of the police necessities" with which the British in colonial America tried to impose unpopular measures, the lack of a "few disciplined troops with street guns" that would have made a major difference in the French government's situation in Paris in 1789, and the failure to move loyal troops into Petrograd in Russia in early 1917.² Government failure to control anomic violence is also a possible precipitant of revolutionary conflict. Assassinations of popular figures, mobs that run out of control, crippling strikes or demonstrations provide a crucial test of government strength.

By its use of force, too much or too little, the government may precipitate the moment of insurrection. On the other hand, one may suspect, if not prove, that revolutionary warfare would eventually occur anyway in many cases. The unanswered question, when considering government action as a triggering mechanism, is whether such action drives essentially reasonable people to violence or whether such action provides, rather, the psychological moment when violence-oriented insurgents may most propitiously start an insurrection.

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE INITIAL RESPONSE

Whatever the triggering mechanism, once the issue is joined the government must respond in some fashion to the insurgent violence in an open test of

Quick Resolution

relative strength. This response may range from the regime's resignation from power to the most forceful military countermeasures.

Since few governments are ready to concede defeat before they have made at least some effort to cope with the insurgent threat, the possibility of regime abdication will be disregarded for this paper. Rather, one may more profitably consider a few of the major elements involved in the initial response by a government eager to maintain itself in a governing position. The first factor thought to be essential is the identification of the insurgent leadership, capabilities, and intentions—the degree of the threat. A second question that must be dealt with almost immediately is whether the government should emphasize a political or a military response. A third element in the government's initial reaction must be—if the response is to be military—the degree of force that will be employed. A fourth condition that the government must face is how to maintain its credibility with the population. Each of these factors will be discussed somewhat more fully in the following sections.

Early Identification

It is a truism that successful battles are built on good intelligence, and in revolutionary warfare also the government needs to identify the insurgent leadership and capabilities in order to meet adequately the challenge it now faces. Insurgent aims and intentions are crucial to the employment of an appropriate strategy.

The problems in achieving intelligence information are, however, tremendous. It is often impossible for the government to penetrate a subversive organization within the short time required for a reaction, and frequently it is difficult even to capture any knowledgeable prisoners. Urban revolutionists have the advantage, in terroristic attacks, of striking suddenly and then just as suddenly disappearing; in crowd and mob violence, they tend to allow others to stand in the forefront so that their own leadership is protected. Rural guerrilla groups usually choose terrain that offers natural sanctuary; they may also keep constantly on the move so that their whereabouts are not easily detected. Thus the early response of the government must often be made in the face of extreme ignorance as to the precise nature of the opponent.

That ignorance frequently extends to the real nature of the insurgent aims. In order to deal sensibly with the situation, the government is called upon to assess, in a very early stage, whether the stated aims of the insurgents are real. If these aims were realized, would the revolutionists be satisfied? Peasant revolts over land distribution or market laws have frequently been examples of aims that have been real—in which adherence to the revolution dissipates when the goal is reached. On the other hand, there are insurgent

aims which are merely positions to be used to create anti-government bias. If they were granted, the insurgents would claim disaffection at some minor detail in their fulfillment, or they would switch to other goals until they found one that the regime could not grant. Student leader Mark Rudd, for example, is supposed to have been very cynically frank in describing how U. S. leftist students had "manufactured the issues" in their search for viable programmatic goals which would create widespread student unrest. Identification of the nature of the goals and their reality as actual goals as against propaganda statements to capture adherents becomes very difficult unless the government can identify and assess the policymakers of the insurgent organization.

Even so, it is not always possible for a government to appraise the situation correctly, partly at least because the final goals of the insurgents may not be entirely clear even to the revolutionists. There is a certain element of organic growth, restlessness, change, confusion within the insurgency even as it begins operations. Leaders vary in their goals and tactics, and the ascendancy of a given group may change the aims or means of the organization. In the Greek Communist Party of the 1940's there was constant tactical shifting from political to military means to achieve strategic dominance in Greece. In Kenya in the early 1950's, the aims of the insurgency were not consistent or concrete: There were always those who aided with the use of legal means to obtain lesser goals over a longer time period against those who were ready to attack instantly on a do-or-die basis for instant independence. In the United States in the 1960's, the fragmentation of student groups over both tactical and strategic aims has been widely manifest. In Ireland the leadership of the IRA is diffused and shifting, with strong personal interest and personal status for some vested in a continuation of the violence. The success of violence in the early period of operations gives immense prestige to its proponents within the insurgent ranks and tends to raise and solidify the revolutionary goals.

Is good intelligence on leadership and capabilities inseparable then from the achievement of the government's goal in this early period—to resolve the insurgency problem quickly? It is believed to be, but this is one of the great gaps in knowledge of the many that we have been meeting. It is known, however, that good, even excellent intelligence does not necessarily lead to quick success. To document this, one needs only to turn to those instances of long-term violence in which the government was able to identify the revolutionists well before the outbreak of overt operations but where operations lasted well over a year—for example, in the early Philippines (1900-1901), Cuba (1906-1909), China (1927-1937), Nicaragua (1927-1933), the Philippines (1943-1954), Burma (1943-1960), Kenya (1952-1960), or Cuba (1953-1959). Furthermore, there are cases where the counterinsurgents lacked good initial intelligence but were still quickly able to put down the revolutionists, as in East Germany in 1953 or in Hungary in 1956. What these cases point out, more than anything else, is that good intelligence—however important it may be—does not make up for other deficiencies

which may operate to overcome the effects of good intelligence. Meanwhile, the government's decision upon its strategy must be made.

Initial Strategic Emphasis

How should the government facing an overt threat from active insurgent operations react? Obviously, it must use that degree of force necessary to contain the particular threat of the moment. Then what does it do? Generally speaking, is it wiser to keep any further reaction as unobtrusive as possible—or should massive force be applied to wipe out the insurgency? If one accepts Pye's dictum that "the first acts of the government establish the crucial parameters of the conflict . . .,"³⁰ it is obvious that significant strategic decisions may have to be made in the face of a distressing lack of definite information. The decision to adopt either a mainly military or a mainly political strategy is not simple, and either one may fail.

Socio-political solutions are sometimes favored over military measures at the start of revolutionary warfare. This was true, for example, of the German government during the 1848 revolutions, of the Cuban government in 1906, of the British colonial establishment in Palestine in 1933, of the Russians in Hungary for a brief period in 1956, of the Lebanese in 1958, of the Venezuelans in 1958. In every case the government accepted certain risks. A socio-political reaction may look like a sign of weakness and thus lead the insurgents to follow the government's initial concessions with demands for more. Signs of weakness may alarm those citizens who normally support the government. Furthermore, if a non-military reaction seems like weakness to some, it may also appear to be an admission of guilt to others. The government's very willingness to make changes in the electoral system, for example—which would seem to extend the participatory process and thus lower the basis for violence—may suggest on the contrary that the government was (a) wrong and (b) susceptible to illegal violence. What may begin as a humanitarian approach may in the end hurt the regime's claim to legitimacy.

Military reactions to the onset of revolutionary violence seem to have been frequent and widespread. In Algeria, Angola, East Germany, Greece, Indochina, Israel, Madagascar, Morocco, the Philippines, South Korea, and Tibet, to name a few, incumbent regimes have struck out with strong military measures once overt insurgent actions occurred. The reasons for a military response may be complex: These governments obviously had the resources, they may have felt that severe measures were necessary to keep the situation from getting out of hand. Past success in using severe measures must have influenced the choice of strategy, given the history of a number of these countries.

One of the risks a strong government reaction brings, however, is that, should the government fail and the revolutionists survive, their reputation may be correspondingly augmented. Even if successful, the incumbent also risks to some degree a loss of popular sympathy, which is dangerous if the revolutionists are not entirely destroyed. To a large extent, such a reaction appears to be determined by the degree and extent of popular sympathy for insurgent aims, the popularity of the "underdog" position in a given society, the government's ability to make its actions credible, or its ability to control public knowledge of them. In this regard, government troops have been able to be a great deal more repressive when fighting guerrillas in isolated places than in a cosmopolitan center. It is easy for revolutionists to die unknown, unheard, and unsung in the countryside; in the city few deaths occurring during acts of violence are totally unnoticed. If this is so, one would expect that an initial political strategy would be more likely when the government is dealing with urban-based terrorists; a military strategy, when the regime can seal off communications and isolate the guerrillas in a remote area.

Degree of Force

If a military strategy is decided on, or if military operations must be undertaken while a political strategy is simultaneously pursued, a major question arises as to the proper degree of force to be used. Should the government strike out quickly and strongly in an attempt to eradicate or at least disperse the revolutionists? Or should the government try to avoid elevating the conflict level, delaying any massive application of force in the hope that the insurgency will be politically denuded or dissolved?

The answers to such questions remain remarkably difficult and equivocal. In any given conflict, the government is often divided within itself, with some officials counseling a policy of military restraint while others advocate a tough approach. Furthermore, each of these groups will typically have very good reasons and arguments bolstering its position. The decision is only rarely forced by the strength and power of revolutionary operations. Those who counsel restraint are influenced by the innate weakness of the government; or fear of increasing the spread of insurgency; or expectation that this, like other similar past experiences, will fade away if given a little time; or the feeling that the use of major government force should await public acceptance of its necessity. Advocates of the use of immediate, massive force want to catch the insurgency before it has a chance to spread, to show the government's determination, to deter adventurism, to inhibit any effort at external support for the revolution, to limit bloodshed in the long run.

Quick Resolution

Each side can and does argue that its position enhances the legitimacy of the government. The side of delay argues that overreaction will only show panic and fear while a subdued reaction will demonstrate governmental rationality and compassion. Those who are persuaded of the need for major force point to the fact that sudden sharp reactions are more easily accepted by the populace than small harassing encounters carried out over a long period. Furthermore, in this view, the government, once it has destroyed the initial revolutionary thrust, can afford to be generous. Against this, the defenders of restraint suggest that the early use of major governmental force sets the tone of the conflict and precludes at too early a point, any political accommodation. Which view is more generally correct?

Both positions, furthermore, can be supported by the recall of history. One may cite the reactions of pro-regime forces in Greece (1946), Madagascar (1947), East Germany (1953), Haiti (1958), or South Africa (1961) as examples of quick, forceful government reactions to the outbreak of revolutionary violence. On the other hand, the use of major military force was initially delayed in such cases as Morocco (1921), Hungary (1956), Indonesia (1958), Kenya (1962), and Venezuela (1958). All these governments, without distinction, achieved eventual military wins. Which argument is more effective?

While every policy decision is an idiosyncratic undertaking, there are circumstances, such as the onset of internal conflict, in which general guidelines could be helpful. On a question in which the pros and cons are apparently both convincing, appear nicely balanced, and unclearly related to later events—and in which the sincerity of the proponents of either side is equally convincing—decisions tend to be reached on the basis of individual personality, national tradition, or inertia. Thus to large extent and to a high degree, governments appear to depend upon the functioning of chance.

Popular Reactions

One of the determining elements in the government's initial decisions as to strategy and degree of force is the possible reaction, both current and future, of the people in the country. No regime, no matter how arbitrary, leaves this factor completely out of account; the arbitrary government, in fact, depends on the apathy of the general populace, its toleration of the government's actions, as proof of its legitimacy. In some ways, popular approval of the government is the practical measure of legitimacy, whether the government be arbitrary or constitutional.

When revolutionary warfare occurs, there is a breach in the wall of the governmental structure. The violence demonstrates both the nonadherence

of some segment of the population to the regime and its inability to perform one of the functions of government, the maintenance of law and order. This gap in the credibility of the regime as a legitimate government may be closed or it may be widened by the actions that are taken to deal with the conflict. From the very start, then, the government is concerned to maintain the support of the population, or at least its quiet toleration or apathy.

The government's selection of a strategy for dealing with the insurgency reflects, among other points, the regime's best guess as to how the public will react. The degree of force, whether high or low, is tailored to some extent at least on the regime's perception of what the public wants or will tolerate. Too much, and popular reactions may sway in sympathy toward the insurgents; too little, and the public may blame the government for not enforcing law and order.

In dealing with the problem of popular reactions, particularly at the beginning of revolutionary warfare, the government often has a difficult decision to make concerning how much public attention it will give to the insurgents. Should it debate the revolutionists' demands? Should it explain its own position? Should it counter insurgent propaganda against itself?

Arguments can again be made on both sides of these issues. On the affirmative side, it may be stated that communicating with its citizens is a governmental duty, that only an informed populace can give its government the intelligent support that it needs. On the negative side of the argument, many practical reasons are voiced against discussion of insurgent demands. For one thing, it gives the revolutionists greater coverage than they might otherwise get. It endows the insurgents with an aura of respectability and credibility to have the government seriously argue their points. Further, it has been argued that in order to respond compellingly, the government has to reveal more about what it knows than is wise.³¹ Thus any gain in popular reaction might be more than offset by a drop in intelligence capability.

In many countries, the government is not under obligation to discuss the issues, and where populations are apparently uninterested in the insurgent demands, governments have found it advantageous not to create any interest. Where interested and aware electorates exist, the situation is entirely different. How much discussion should there be? Of what kind? On these points there is much advice but little agreement.

"QUICK RESOLUTION" REVIEWED

First of all, it must be acknowledged that most cases of revolutionary warfare are apparently of short duration. Furthermore, since there have been relatively few governmental turnovers in comparison with the number of instances of "unequivocal examples" of internal war, most cases are apparently quickly resolved in the incumbent regime's favor. The precise extent of or reasons for this phenomenon are, however, unknown. Two avenues of possible value have been explored in this paper: First, the conditions or events that have been thought to initiate violence have been discussed; and second, consideration has been given to some of the problems and constraints that influence the government's initial reactions.

Functioning of Precipitants

What is known about the precipitants of revolutionary violence is, unfortunately, derived mainly from the study of cases in which violence was not immediately put down. The general strike, the mob, the sporadic guerrilla attacks that the government succeeds in stilling do not arouse much attention. It is not news when the administration does its job in a routine and rapid fashion. Thus there are gaps in our knowledge: Are the precipitants of such relatively easily-ended insurrections essentially different from those that last longer? Is there some association between the precipitating event and the early ending?

Furthermore, is there some possibility that certain types of precipitating events may favor a resolution for the government? Were the triggering incidents essentially different for those cases in which governments ultimately prevailed as compared with cases of government draws or losses?

In order to assess the importance of precipitants it seems necessary to know how frequently they may operate without the occurrence of insurrection, even though an insurgent organization may exist. When and under what conditions does financial crisis occur without internal conflict breaking out? To what extent are insurgent operations to be expected after a successful revolution elsewhere? Are all or even most government errors, even egregious ones, "rewarded" with the outbreak or increase of revolutionary violence? Don't some nations suffer military disaster without triggering insurgent operations? Precipitants, like causes, must operate in a generally precise fashion if one is to regard them as useful tools in measuring governmental vulnerability to revolutionary warfare.

In some subjective rank ordering of governmental dangers, defection of the armed forces strikes at least this observer as the most dangerous and therefore

possibly most likely precipitant of violence. All other precipitants seem of lesser nature; this one leaves the government essentially defenseless. With a loyal army, the government can and does overcome other factors. For example, the insurrections that swept the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1848 in echo of the successful February revolution in Paris were mostly put down by vigorous military action. Government force has been decisive in cases of insurgent operations initiated by reason of government mistakes, or financial crisis, or conscious insurgent decision. On the other hand, before one accepts defection of the army as a "definite" precipitant, one would want to know how many instances there are where insurgents have not struck even in the face of the occurrence of such defection.

Military morale and loyalty seem doubly important as precipitants because they are things which governments may be able to do something about, while other precipitants appear less susceptible to such action. Governments, no matter how powerful, find it difficult to stop revolution from occurring elsewhere. Given time, all governments are bound to make mistakes under conditions of stress. Financial crisis may be beyond control. But the army is an integral element of the governmental structure and should be amenable to some degree of management. Experience suggests that defection doesn't grip all elements of any army equally at the same moment. There is room for governmental decision and action. Furthermore, this is an area where U.S. security assistance programs for other nations may operate in a positive manner.

The possibility of a combination of precipitating factors operating simultaneously seems highly likely; and Lenin's three "objective conditions" offer one version of what the set should include--support of an advanced class, a revolutionary upsurge of the people, and the functioning of a turning point in the relations of government vis-à-vis the insurgents. Selection of a set of such conditions appears to indicate that Lenin felt that many factors should operate simultaneously in favor of the revolutionists before they should undertake the risks of direct confrontation, even against a very weak government. One may speculate from this that the relatively strong government may not need to worry overmuch about precipitating conditions, that rather it is the already weakened and problem-ridden government that must monitor most carefully the occurrence of precipitating elements.

Initial Responses to Violence

There are at least two major results of the government's initial response to the occurrence of revolutionary warfare that one would like to be able to estimate. First, what kind of initial response is most apt to achieve a quick resolution of the conflict? And second, what effect do the government's first

Quick Resolution

reactions have on later developments, should these measures fail to end the conflict quickly? Each of these points will be discussed in turn.

Short-Term Results

When the government's counterrevolutionary measures succeed within a relatively short space of time, that is, less than a year, the regime is generally applauded. The threat of internal turmoil and conflict are over, at least for a while, hopefully for a long time. The government tends to relax, and the people continue in their accustomed ways. Or at least this seems to be the scenario.

The frustrating thing about that view is that it omits so much of what needs to be known. For example: Which measures appeared to work best? Under what conditions? Did they work in most cases where they were used—or were they only chance occurrences? Which measures failed? Under what conditions? How long does a period of quiet continue after various types of government responses?

Beyond the measures applied during the conflict period, what follow-on and consolidation measures did the government apply in the post-conflict period? Did it attempt to correct what it saw as basic deficiencies, just grievances, root causes of dissatisfaction? Were economic conditions improved? Was the basis enlarged for greater participation in the political process? Was the period of post-insurgency quiet significantly longer for those governments that undertook to correct conditions after the revolutionary warfare had ceased than for those governments which did nothing?

Can a government successfully deal with insurgency by treating it as part of the political process and more or less living with it, as in postwar Burma? Are there response models that differ according to the kind of insurgents, or the cultural mores of certain areas? These are only a few of the questions for which one would like answers.

On a specific case basis, there are often good answers to such questions. But what do they mean unless the cases are comparatively analyzed? If we accept the need for ameliorative consolidation operations in the post-conflict period on the basis of cases A, B, and C—about which we happen to know—are we not rejecting by neglect the data of cases D, E, and F—about which we do not know?

At the present time the U. S. Government is proceeding along doctrinal lines for which the "proof" is lacking. While doctrine implies assurance of

what should work, some careful checking needs to be done on whether it in fact does work. In the short run—and in the long run.

Long-Range Effects

Granting that, in the present state of knowledge, one cannot definitely assert that a specific set of initial reactions appears to hold a critical advantage over another set in achieving a quick resolution to revolutionary conflict, it may be prudent to inquire as to the long-range effects of such actions. Some writers have indeed suggested that the government's initial handling of the situation sets the tone—creates the "crucial parameters" of the conflict. Whether and to what extent this is true is extremely important. If the incumbent government cannot be sure that a given action will resolve the conflict, it may not want to adopt such a measure if it would thereby chance jeopardizing the future.

Like many others, this question of long-range effects is one about which very little is known. Viewing any conclusions as highly tentative and suggestive in nature, one may only attempt at this time to ask whether any of the problems discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter have a strong association with the later outcome of the conflict. Does early identification of the insurgency characterize those governments that ultimately emerge victorious? Which strategy—that emphasizing political or military means—is more related to ultimate government success? Does the degree of force initially applied appear to be associated with later government wins or losses—that is, who is right, the "hard" or "soft" liners? How does initial popular reaction appear to be related to long-range outcome?

Using as a base, 44 cases of revolutionary warfare in the 20th century, 22 government military wins and 22 government military nonwins (draws and losses), one may ask whether the group of cases characterized by early identification of the insurgent organization were composed mainly of government winners. Although the researchers tended to be prejudiced in favor of the affirmative, they could find no support for their belief in the data. Governments that identified the insurgents soon after the organization phase had begun and before the outbreak of overt operations won slightly less often, when operations lasted more than a year, than those whose identification process was less successful. The slight difference in the two rates is, however, meaningless.²²

Quick Resolution

Identification of Insurgent Organization	Total Cases	Government Wins	Percent Wins
Early identification	18	9	47%
Later identification	26	13	52%
N = 44			

Table 3. Initial Identification of Insurgent Organization and Long-term Military Outcome.

The above figures do not mean that identification of the insurgency should be disregarded as an important step. It does suggest that time may be somewhat more forgiving than was originally thought, and that initial capability in this regard neither precludes nor foreshadows an ultimate victory for the government. This idea was reinforced in another inquiry that considered initial intelligence capability in general at the beginning of the conflict and for which slightly different criteria were used. Here, 18 governments were rated as "good" in this respect, 26 "poor." Their win rates were 53 percent and 46 percent respectively, rates that also yielded no indication of any important individual association with later military outcome.²²

From the same tentative point of view--heuristic at best--one may consider a possible relationship between the initial choice of strategic emphasis and later military outcomes. For these cases--for which a fast resolution of the conflict was with only a few exceptions impossible--there generally appeared to be no particular impediment to a later government win, whichever strategy was first pursued.

Initial Strategic Emphasis	Total Cases	Government Wins	Percent Wins
Mainly Political	12	7	58%
Mainly Military	32	15	47%
N = 44			

Table 4. Initial Strategic Emphasis and Long-term Military Outcome

Although the percentage of wins following an initial political emphasis at first appeared to be promising, no particularly strong relationship between it and long-term military outcome could be ascertained.²⁴

Still again, it may be asked what association might be shown when the initial degree of force was considered. All of these governments used some force. Was there a difference, however, between the outcomes in those cases where the initial reaction was quick and strong rather than delayed? Again—and again surprisingly—there appeared to be no particular association between this condition and later military outcome.²⁵

Initial Degree of Force	Total Cases	Government Wins	Percent Wins
Rapid, strong	25	13	52%
Delayed	19	9	47%
N = 44			

Table 5. Initial Degree of Force Used by Government and Long-term Military Outcome

Finally, one may ask whether any relationship might possibly exist between the initial popular view of the government in the country as a whole at the beginning of revolutionary warfare and its long-term outcome. Considering popular reactions to be favorable to the government even when they could best be characterized as grudging support, apathetic indifference, or strict neutrality, the survey of 44 cases indicated that a high relationship exists between this variable and later military outcome.²⁶

Initial Support for Government	Total Cases	Government Wins	Percent Wins
Neutral to Supportive	19	13	68%
Nonsupportive to hostile	25	9	36%
N = 44			

Table 6. Initial Popular Support for Government and Long-term Military Outcome

Quick Resolution

The strong association between initial popular attitudes and ultimate outcome is highly suggestive and deserves further probing. It is possible that this relationship may mean that the initial reactions of the government are in fact less important insofar as ultimate success is concerned than may be thought—granted that (1) the government can contain the threat if not end it and (2) the population remains neutral to supportive of the government. It seems extremely important to discover the real determinants of public attitude, beyond the facile conjectures that press upon us. Furthermore, popular expectations may differ to a considerable extent in different cultures. If so, American policy advice to other governments, taking into account different social systems and different cultural perceptions, may become more flexible and realistic.

More definitive information on the quick resolution of revolutionary warfare is altogether necessary if governments are to be able to deal with this type of violence with any degree of efficacy. Totalitarian governments relying on the massive application of force appear to have found at least one way of quickly ending insurrection and keeping dissident populations in line. If this is unacceptable to more liberal and constitutional powers, they have very few guidelines as to how to treat the matter differently. It would appear that at the present time our knowledge is insufficient to tell us whether it is chance or certain specific conditions and actions that play a major role in determining whether revolutionary warfare will be quickly ended or will continue for a long time.

NOTES

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⁴ V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 2 (New York: International Publishers, 1967), p. 4.

⁵ Sorokin, op. cit., pp. 487-493, quotation on p. 492.

⁶ (General) P.-G. Cluséret, "Street Fighting," Transl. and printed in RUSI (London) 117, 665 (March 1972), 60.

⁷ Ibid.

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¹¹ Lenin, op. cit., p. 363.

¹² Ibid., p. 365.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 368-369.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 369-370.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 366.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 365-366.

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 365-366.

¹⁸ Dyelo Naroda (29 September 1917), quoted in Lenin, op. cit., p. 372.

¹⁹ Lenin, op. cit., p. 375.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 366.

²¹ Langer, op. cit., p. 630.

²² Ibid., p. 654.

²³ Ibid., pp. 673-674.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 675-676.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 1026-1029.

²⁶ Brinton, op. cit., pp. 267-270.

²⁷ D. M. Condit, Case Study in Guerrilla War: Greece During World War II (Washington: The American University, 1961), pp. 93-94, quotation on p. 94.

²⁸ Brinton, op. cit., pp. 90-93.

²⁹ Lewis S. Feuer, "Student Unrest in the United States," The Annals, 404 (November 1972), pp. 176-177.

³⁰ Lucian W. Pye, "The Roots of Insurgency and the Commencement of Rebellions," in Harry Eckstein, ed. Internal War (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, c. 1964), p. 167.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 176-177.

³² D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict: individual Characteristics of Internal Conflict in Relation to Military Outcome (Unpublished study; Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1971), p. 134. This work is further described in Chapter VI, n. 1.

³³ Ibid., pp. 157-158.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 137.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 136.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 188.

Chapter VI

LONG-TERM RESOLUTION OF REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

When the government finds that it has been unable to resolve quickly the problem of revolutionary warfare, it may be presumed that it is now involved in a long-range action, arbitrarily defined in this paper as lasting, even if spasmodically, for more than a year.

The fact that operations have lasted—and are lasting—so long is generally looked upon as a disaster for the government, but this is not necessarily the case. Some governments have been so weak at the start of insurgent operations that mere survival seems to be a miracle. Some have been uncertain how to proceed in the face of public ambiguity concerning the insurgency. Some have bought time needed to expand their police and security forces. Some have honestly tried to use ameliorative measures to meet what were granted to be just grievances only to encounter even stronger demands. Some have made false estimates of the situation and initial blunders. Some have assessed the danger of a long-term, low key operation as less dangerous to themselves than a major offensive.

For whatever reason that the conflict has lasted so long, the insurgents' advantage, if it is one, is not overwhelming. Based on the experience of the previously mentioned 44 studied cases, in which 22 were government military wins, the government has an approximately even chance of prevailing even in these long-term instances. Until one is able to compare this rate with that for quickly-resolved cases, it is impossible to get a more accurate estimate of the disparity or disadvantage to the government of not settling things quickly. In any event, the government's long-term position is not hopeless.

The intent of this chapter is to explore some of the measures that governments have taken when confronted with long-term revolutionary operations and to discuss characteristics that have been pertinent to their survival over the long pull. To a major extent this work is based on a previous AIR study of characteristics of revolutionary warfare in relation to the government's military success.¹ It should be specifically noted that, in this chapter, one is dealing with generalizations and that, therefore, any given finding may or may not apply to a specific case. Individual circumstances and individual need may override any finding of the analysis presented here. The fact that a generalization does not apply to a given experience does not, however,

invalidate its usefulness. In fact, generalization of this sort is valuable as a means of avoiding the misapplication of lessons from one case to another without careful reflection and consideration of other possibly contradictory experiences.

MILITARY SUCCESS--A MAJOR FACTOR IN GOVERNMENTAL POLITICAL SURVIVAL

A major assumption of this chapter is that a government should be concerned with military success even though the insurgency problem that confronts it appears to have more political and economic than military overtones. That revolutionary warfare "requires a political solution, as everyone knows," is so much the daily text of newspapers and journals that it has passed into the lore of common wisdom. Experiential evidence does not refute this dictum, but experience also suggests that government military success generally accompanies and precedes government political success. First, then, one may seek to define military and political outcomes.

For the 44 studied situations, military outcomes were defined in the following manner. Cases of government military success had to meet four conditions: (1) destruction or disbandment of the major part of the revolutionary force, (2) integrity of the major part of the government's military force and its control over most of the country and the seat of government, (3) cessation of revolutionary operations or at least their diminution to a tolerable level posing no real threat to the government, and (4) resumption of normal civilian activity. Military draws were those in which any one of the following conditions obtained: Either revolutionary operations were still continuing, or neither side had achieved a military win when other events interrupted to end the conflict at a different level, or the forces of both sides remained intact with the strong possibility that conflict would resume. Government military losses on the other hand, had to meet two criteria: (1) Security forces had to have disintegrated, suffered defeat, or withdrawn from the area because of insurgent activity or defection to the insurgent side; and simultaneously, (2) insurgent forces remained intact and in control of the major part of the country.

A government political win was defined as the ability of the government, for five years following the termination of conflict, to maintain control in a political form systemically and basically agreeable to the government that had originally faced the insurgency. This definition, it should be noted, does not necessarily preclude a change of personnel in the regime.

Long-term Resolution

From the government's viewpoint, military success is definitely preferable to either a loss or a draw, as the table below demonstrates:

Government Military Outcomes	Total	Government Political Wins	Percentage of Political Wins
Wins	22	19	86%
Draws	19	5	26%
Losses	3	0	0%
N = 44			

Table 7. Government Military Outcomes Compared with Government Political Wins.

One of the striking aspects of the above table is how seldom governments "lose" according to the above criteria. Only slightly less striking is the fact that the government, if it aims to achieve a political settlement favorable to itself, can ill afford anything less than a military win. In internal conflict, military draws do not generally endow the government with the political strength to achieve at the conference table what it cannot win on the "battlefield." Because government military draws appear to be almost as unfavorable as losses to eventual political success, they were combined into a nonwin category. The criterion was thus dichotomized into a win-nonwin situation.

While a government military win appears to enhance the likelihood of a government political win, it should not be thought that a military victory is the only or even the foremost element in certain revolutionary wars, nor that it always assures success, nor that political success cannot occasionally be achieved without a full military win. From the opposite viewpoint, it is also true that some military wins have been followed by political settlements that were not in accord with the desires of the government that faced the original outbreak of violence. Nonetheless, it is important to note that government military success generally remains an element very strongly related to the ultimate political settlement of revolutionary warfare in a manner satisfactory to the incumbent regime.

For this reason, it appears reasonable, in a paper addressing the problem from the governmental viewpoint, to seek those characteristics of the revolutionary situation that generally appear to operate favorably insofar as government military success is concerned. This is not to say that they always operate favorably. Every characteristic, indeed, exhibited cases where negative results obtained even when a generally favorable response was operative. In analyzing past cases in this manner, furthermore, it should be realized that the work is descriptive of the past and is not necessarily predictive of the future. Nonetheless,

It would be a step forward if tendencies could be discerned. In this spirit, in the next three sections of this chapter various characteristics of the environment and background, of the insurgents' performance, and of the incumbents' performance will be considered as to their individual relationship to government military success.

ENVIRONMENT AND BACKGROUND IN RELATION TO MILITARY OUTCOME

It seems eminently reasonable that one should ask whether there were any specific factors inherent in the environment or background of the considered cases that appeared to be strongly associated with government military success. Were certain temporal, physical, or sociocultural patterns related to a government military win? How did economic or political conditions in the country relate to the military outcome? Did countries having a legacy of previous violence show a tendency for their governments to win—or lose? Were certain possible preconditions or precipitants of conflict linked to a given military outcome?

A strong point must be made here that a possible relationship between any considered precondition of conflict and military outcome says nothing, in itself, about the causes of revolutionary warfare. Without a "control group" of cases in which insurgent violence did not occur, one cannot know, for example, that the marked inequality in the distribution of wealth that was noted in 39 of the 44 studied cases of revolutionary warfare might not also occur at the same rate in non-revolutionary countries. In this paper, one is thus examining only the possible relationship of the precondition with final military outcome: For example, were cases in which there was marked inequality of wealth distribution more or less likely to be government military wins?

Outcome-Related Characteristics

It was extremely difficult to find a strong association between government military success and the environment in which the revolutionary violence was generated. Although 48 conditions of the environment were examined, only one characteristic appeared to be highly related to government military success: When the insurgency had been organized as a movement committed to violence for less than a year before the outbreak of hostilities, the government tended to win.

Long-term Resolution

Occurrence of Violence After Organization	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Within one year	14	9	64%
One-to-10 years later	21	6	29%
Unknown	9		
N = 44			

Table 8. Interval Between Insurgent Organization and Occurrence of Violence Compared with Government Military Wins.

This finding gives some strength to the idea that less mature revolutionary organizations may be easier to defeat than those that have gone through a longer period of maturation and strengthening. It suggests also one specific circumstance under which the government's early adoption of a military strategy might be appropriate. Even so, there are numerous considerations to be taken into account before a government rushes into an early emphasis on military operations.

Two other conditions of the environmental background were suggestively, if not strongly, associated with government military success. Governments tended to win military victories at a somewhat higher rate when the regime was totalitarian-dictatorial in nature rather than constitutional-parliamentary or even authoritarian-oligarchic. Again, governments were somewhat favored when the conflict occurred in an area where the use of force to create political change had occurred within the past five years. These findings appear to mark out areas for further study rather than to suggest appropriate behavior or strategy.

Non-Related Characteristics

The overwhelming impression that is left by the analysis of environmental and background characteristics in relation to final military outcome is the paucity of findings. Of the 48 characteristics that were surveyed, 45 showed no relationship to military outcome, even at the lower "suggestive" level.

Aspects of the Environment and Culture

What sorts of things yielded so little association with military outcome? This too may have strong heuristic value. No relationships emerged between

final military outcome and the temporal occurrence of the conflict before or after World War II, its geographic location, the size or insularity of the country, the existence of favorable "guerrilla" terrain, or for tropical or temperate climatic conditions.

Among the sociocultural factors that were reviewed, not one emerged as either strongly or suggestively related to military outcome. The population density of the country, the degree to which it was agricultural, or urbanized, or westernized, its literacy rate, or the linguistic heterogeneity, ethnic balance, or religious disparateness of the population showed no particular association with military outcome. The existence of a minority elite with a disproportionate amount of power—even when this factor was considered to have been a "cause" in the outbreak of violence—showed no special relationship to final military outcome. Other characteristics widely considered to have been "causal" in the outbreak of violence also yielded no particular association with final military outcome: These included the existence of divisive ethnic issues, religious issues, regional differences, or urban-rural conflict. Sociocultural characteristics considered in a general sense showed no relationship with military win or loss.

Economic and Political Factors

More surprising, even disconcerting, is the fact that economic characteristics of the pre-violence period appeared to be unrelated to final military outcome. At least, no association was found to exist between a government military win and the stage of the country's economic development, any inequality in its wealth distribution, or the degree of its economic discontent. Economic distress in underdeveloped areas, a pessimistic perception of the economic trend, or the apparently important role of a popular "revolution of rising expectations" at the start of revolutionary operations provided no clues.

Although two political characteristics were related to some suggestive degree to military outcome, ten other characteristics showed no particular relationship. Whether the government was indigenous, representative, efficient, or tolerant of political opposition showed no apparent relationship. Analysis of characteristics concerning the degree of political disaffection in the country, or its long-term nature, the legality of a communist party, or the communist role in the outbreak of violence offered no positive results. Neither political conditions in general nor specific kinds of political conditions (e.g., political instability, repressive government, foreign political control) yielded even a suggestive level of relationship to military outcome.

Aspects of Violence

In deciding upon which characteristics to analyze, preference was, of course, given to those that had appeared, at least intuitively to the researcher, to be related to military outcome. It was originally thought that a high level of violence in the country's recent past might have a strong relationship. The only aspect of this factor that showed any relationship to military outcome was, as has been noted, the tendency of governments that had been changed by violence within the past five years to win over the revolutionists. One may only speculate as to the meaning of this; perhaps a revolutionary tradition of its own helps a government to overcome the next wave of revolutionary violence. However, four other attempts to link past violence to final military outcome resulted in failure. A recent history of armed conflict, a high degree of general violence in the past 25 years, the traditional involvement of an indigenous military elite in the political process, and violence considered as a "cause" yielded no findings of particular relationship.

Finally four speculations on the relationship of the preconditions and precipitants in various combinations offered no clues as to a possible strong association with final military outcome.

Background Factors and Revolutionary Violence

What may one think of this large number of propositions—many embodying cherished notions of causal explanations of revolutionary violence—that have given no hint of relationship with final military outcome? The conclusion suggested in this paper is that—whatever the merits of these particular conditions as "causes," about which it has already been established that nothing can be said, characteristics of the background appear to lose their dominance once a period of active revolutionary warfare starts. At this point, other conditions apparently play a far more important role insofar as the final military outcome is concerned.

That internal conflict, like external conflict, may not be won or lost on the basis of the factors that are thought to be the causes or precipitants of the violence is not necessarily surprising. Perhaps it says something about the general naivete of thinking on this subject, however, that strong relationships should have been somehow expected to emerge. Although the findings presented here remain tentative and obviously need further verification, they meanwhile suggest that the government faced with revolutionary violence of a long-term nature may carry less burdensome emotional baggage from the past than was originally thought. If so, the focus of inquiry under the condition of open, long-term violence shifts to the performance of the two principals, the government versus the insurgents.

INSURGENT PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO MILITARY OUTCOME

Analysis of insurgent performance in these past, long-term cases of revolutionary violence did indicate that a strong expectation of government military success appeared to exist when the insurgents failed to obtain certain support or to master certain very hard-core capabilities. The theme of this section may be briefly stated in terms of insurgent failure leading to government success.

Outcome-Related Characteristics

Of the insurgent performance characteristics that were analyzed, six showed a high relationship to military outcome, while another sixteen were suggestively related. Of these, the first two concerned aspects of intelligence and territorial dispersion.

Intelligence and Area Dispersion Characteristics

Insurgent intelligence failures quite obviously, according to table 8, aided the government. Specifically, when the revolutionists lacked an intelligence-counterintelligence apparatus at least as effective as that of the government, the government was clearly favored. One must note the relativity of effectiveness; an intelligence network that might be quite poor compared to that of a major power was more than equal to the task if the opponent's network was even weaker. In this area at any rate, it would appear to behoove the government to maintain a high standard of capability, at least compared with that of the revolution.

Relative Effectiveness Of Insurgent I-CI Networks	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Less effective	17	13	76%
Equally effective	18	7	39%
Unknown	9		
N = 44			

Table 8. Insurgent Effectiveness in Intelligence and Counterintelligence Compared with Government Military Wins.

Long-term Resolution

A second characteristic of insurgent performance that appeared to be important to the military outcome was the general geographic dispersion or concentration of operations within the country as a whole. If the operational enclaves of the revolution were not dispersed throughout the country and remained concentrated in an area not exceeding one-third of the country, the government was again strongly favored. As indicated by table 10, the government won 72 percent of the cases where insurgent operations were geographically limited, as against only 35 percent of those where they were able to extend their control over a larger geographic area.

Concentration of Insurgent Operations	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Concentrated in one area	18	13	72%
Dispersed through- out country	26	9	35%
N = 44			

Table 10. Insurgent Concentration of Operations
Compared with Government Military Wins.

Insurgent Supply and Foreign Support Factors

Another area of insurgency deficiency that seemed to improve government chances was insurgent supply problems. Indeed, of all the aspects of insurgent performance that were analyzed, supply gaps or deficiencies appeared to be particularly crucial to the military outcome. Although these characteristics were related individually to outcome, the apparent frequency with which the relationship showed up under varying conditions merits further special attention to this problem. Four separate aspects of this condition were highly related to a government military win. Governments tended to attain a final military success (1) when insurgents had logistic problems serious enough to hinder their offensive operations, (2) when insurgent supply problems did not improve, (3) when insurgents lacked external sources of funds, and (4) when they lacked general external logistical support.

In 72 percent of the cases where insurgent supply problems hampered insurgent operations, governments found military success. It is important to the sense of this inquiry that supply problems alone were not sufficient--they had to detract from operational considerations.

Effect of Insurgent Logistics Problems on Offensive Operations	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Seriously hampered insurgent operations	25	18	72%
No serious effect	12	2	17%
Unknown	7		
N = 44			

Table 11. Insurgent Logistics Problems Compared with Government Military Wins.

Government chances were also definitely improved when the revolutionists did not experience general improvement in supply difficulties over the course of time. To an extent, of course, this characteristic addresses the same sort of problem as the previous one, although from a slightly different slant. More insurgent organizations, for example, exhibited lack of improvement in supply problems than manifested a serious difficulty with offensive operations because of supply lacks.

Trend in Insurgent Supply Situation	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
No definite improvement	30	20	67%
Improvement shown	14	2	14%
N = 44			

Table 12. Insurgent Supply Trend Compared with Government Military Wins.

Investigation also showed that governments were strongly favored in the military arena when the revolutionary organizations they faced lacked major external sources of funds. When, in fact, the insurgents were limited mainly to local sources, governments won a military victory in 70 percent of those cases, as compared with only 19 percent of the cases where revolutionists gained access to external sources of funds.

Long-term Revolution

Insurgents' Access To Major Sources of Funds	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Mainly local sources	23	16	70%
Major external sources	16	3	19%
Unknown	5		
N = 44			

Table 13. Insurgent Sources of Funds Compared With Government Military Wins.

Insofar as military outcome was concerned, it was not only important whether insurgents could obtain foreign sources of funds, but whether they could get foreign logistical support. When the revolutionary organization either could not command this type of help or the government could interdict such supplies, the government's chances of final military victory were again much enhanced, as table 14 shows.

Insurgent Access to Foreign Logistical Support	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Obtained little or no support	31	16	61%
Obtained important amounts	13	3	23%
N = 44			

Table 14. Insurgent Access to Foreign Logistical Support Compared with Government Military Wins.

Other Related Aspects of Insurgent Performance

At more modest but suggestive levels, a number of other characteristics of the insurgents' performance were also related to military outcome. Some of these were variations of themes already found to be highly related. Insurgent geographic concentration or dispersion, for example, looked at in several different ways, was moderately related to government military success. For example, governments tended to defeat revolutionists who found their greatest strength, even after the opening of the conflict, in the capital city and urban

centers of the country. Again, where the operational enclaves of the revolution, when added up, totaled less than 10 percent of the country, the government was apt to win. It has been already noted that the government was highly favored when the insurgents lacked an intelligence-counterintelligence apparatus as good as the government's; in addition, even a general insurgent failure to have good operational intelligence was suggestively related to government military success.

Some insurgent political failures were also mildly related to government military wins. When the revolutionists were (1) unable to articulate their aims in terms acceptable to the majority of the population, or (2) failed to give political indoctrination to their rank and file, or (3) lacked a dominant insurgent personality with appeal for the country as a whole, the relationship with military outcome was at least high enough to be suggestive.

Insurgent failures in revolutionary leadership, strength, or training were also modestly associated with government military victory. Lack of a separate insurgent military and political leadership, changes in top echelon field leadership during operations, loss of revolutionary numbers during the course of operations, failure to give serious military training to insurgent rank and file, lack of sufficient numbers of trained men to conduct military training, or insurgent inability to give definite programs of combat training abroad all appeared to be related to some interesting degree with government military success.

Certain supply and equipment failures in the insurgent organization beyond those that were mentioned above as being highly related to military outcome, seemed to predispose somewhat toward a government military win. When revolutionists were not individually armed with personal weapons, or they faced a critical lack of arms and ammunition for a considerable period of time, or they relied on local sources for arms and ammunition, the government appeared to possess a tangible advantage.

Finally, it is noteworthy that even the insurgents lack of "psychological aid and comfort" such as comes from diplomatic or ideological support offered by foreign powers or political groups seemed to give a slight edge to the government. Indeed, the overwhelming reaction of the analyst must be the somewhat unsurprising one that many of the mistakes or lacks of the revolutionary movement benefit the government.

Non-Related Characteristics

The above characteristics or conditions, highly or less strongly associated with military outcome, suggest measures which the revolutionists could not afford to neglect, or did so only at a definite risk. Other characteristics of insurgent performance, however, appeared to have little or no relationship with final military outcome. These non-associated characteristics are important both to governments and to insurgents for, taken in connection with related characteristics, they suggest pertinent differences between types of conditions.

Insurgent Organization and the Role of Communism

Although urban-based insurgencies were mildly associated with a government military success, no relationship could be found to exist between military outcome and the place of original organization of the insurgency, or the number of insurgent organizations involved in revolutionary warfare, or the degree of hostility and unification that took place among the organizations.

Considering the role that communism has so obviously played in the generation of revolution, it may surprise some that no single characteristic concerning the role of communism in the insurgent organization appeared to be either strongly or mildly related to final military outcome. Analyzed characteristics included such conditions as (1) the general, over-all dominance of communism in the insurgent organization structure, (2) communist participation from the start of the insurgent organization, (3) communist domination and control from the start of operations, or (4) external communist propaganda support. This lack of relationship is the more unexpected since an early query concerning extension or loss of communist control during the conflict was abortive, only one instance being found where initially dominant communist parties did not gain or extend such control. Do these nonfindings suggest that, while communism may be very important indeed to the genesis and control of revolutionary organizations, communist insurgencies may be as vulnerable as others to government military action? The whole issue appears to need a new and penetrating look.

Insurgent Political Characteristics

With the exception of the already noted characteristic of revolutionary articulation of political goals acceptable to the population at large, insurgent political goals were apparently also unrelated to final military outcome. Specifically, the acceptability of revolutionary political goals to the insurgent population (rather than to the general population) yielded no particular

association with outcome. Analysis of six other characteristics related to political aims resulted in a failure to disclose any relationship. These included goals related to territorial claims, change of the political system, nationalism, acceptability of national claims, and ethnic issues. It also made little apparent difference to military outcome whether the revolutionists maintained their political aims during periods of stress.

Insurgent political action, like political goals, was—with the exception of the moderately related characteristic of political training and indoctrination for the revolutionary rank and file (see above)—apparently unrelated to military outcome. At least, no relationship could be adduced between government military success and the insurgents' development of an effective underground, use of mass organizations, formation of a revolutionary government, propagandizing of civilians, or propagandizing of government forces. Since few, and least of all the present writer, are willing to believe that these political actions are unimportant to final outcome, it will be necessary to look further and deeper into the ways in and conditions under which such actions are carried out to discover the critical aspect which does influence outcome. That is, if the mere creation of an effective underground organization does not relate strongly with final military outcome, what conditions or circumstances operate to negate its value?

Insurgent Leadership, Strength, and Training

Despite the fact that three characteristics relating to insurgent leadership were at least suggestively associated with final military outcome (i.e., symbolic leader for the country as a whole, separation of military and political leadership, and changes in field leadership, as noted earlier), other characteristics failed to yield any particular relationship. No association could be ascertained when there was an insurgent leader whose charisma extended only to the insurgent area. No major association was discovered between outcome and the insurgents' possession of indigenous tactical leadership. Furthermore, no variables reflecting the background of the dominant insurgent leadership yielded a strong relationship to final military outcome; this included class, age, education, or world travel experience.

Although general increases in revolutionary strength over time were suggestively related to military outcome, nothing may be said concerning any possible relationship between that criterion and the urban-rural composition of the insurgency, any particular percentage of revolutionary supporters in the general population, any particular percentage of revolutionary participants in the general population, or even the ethnic distinctiveness of the revolutionaries. This last seemed somewhat astonishing, but ethnic distinctiveness was followed

Long-term Resolution

with a government military win in four cases (Kenya, Malaya, Madagascar, and South West Africa), while in four others it was not (Angola, Cameroon, Iraq, and Israel).

Of characteristics related to insurgent recruitment and training, only the giving of military training and the availability of cadres for military training were, as already noted, suggestively associated with military outcome, the lack of either of these appearing to benefit the government. Nothing may be said, however, concerning any relationship to outcome for the insurgents' use of forced recruitment, sporadically or generally; the place of military training; the size of combat units; the creation of, or the use of a disciplined revolutionary force.

Insurgent Intelligence and Operations

Of only three characteristics related to intelligence capability, one turned out to be highly and one suggestively related to military outcome, as already noted. Only the aspect of counterintelligence considered separately was not associated in any particular way.

Concerning various aspects of insurgent violence and combat, two characteristics—the size of and the concentration of the operational area—have already been cited as suggestively and importantly related, respectively. It was impossible, however, to find any particular relationship between military outcome and other characteristics of combat—the sudden or slow joining of the conflict, its intensity, the revolutionists' use of conventional tactics, the operational level they had achieved by the end, the availability to the insurgents of tactical air support, their use of naval operations, their frequent use of terrorism against civilians, the combat terrain or population density of the operational area.

Insurgent Supply Characteristics

Of all the various aspects of the insurgents' performance, it has been noted that the logistical side appeared to be extremely important, both in numbers of characteristics that were related to military outcome (four of seven) and the individual degree of relatedness. Only the availability to the insurgents of logistical air support, logistical naval support, or crew-served weapons showed no relationship, and two of these were represented by so few cases that analysis could not be performed.

Characteristics of foreign support for revolutionary warfare, practically a subset of insurgent logistics, were also extremely important in relationship

to military outcome. As has been noted, when insurgents had external sources of funds, or of arms and ammunition, or important amounts of logistical support in general, or access to definite programs of foreign combat training, or even foreign moral support, governments in turn showed a tendency to lose. However, insurgent reliance on foreign sources for food and clothing or for sanctuary showed no particular association with military outcome. Neither world attention nor dual bloc support for the insurgents were fruitful inquiries.

While it is clear that there are insurgent lacks or deficiencies that clearly benefit the government, the number of characteristics of insurgent performance that displayed no particular association with military outcome augment the common sense dictum that governments cannot depend solely upon insurgent failures to achieve military success. Thus one turns to characteristics of the government's performance with some degree of calculation and interest.

GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE IN RELATION TO MILITARY OUTCOME

A proportionately higher number of government performance characteristics were related at strong levels to military outcome than were characteristics of the environment/background or insurgent performance. In fact, of 59 analyzed governmental characteristics, ten were highly related and eleven less strongly related to a government military win. Government actions may indeed be as or more important than any other factors in the final outcome of long-drawn-out cases of revolutionary warfare. Some government actions appeared to be more important than others, however.

Outcome-Related Characteristics

Political Aspects

Four characteristics concerning governmental political action were associated with final military outcome, three at high levels. Governments strongly tended to find military success when they had achieved any one of these political goals: (1) neutralization of insurgent leadership, (2) avoidance of political concessions, or (3) promulgation of political alternatives.

Although there are specific cases in which the government's capture, killing, and co-optation of a significant portion of the top insurgent leadership did not appear to have a decisive effect on the military outcome of the revolutionary action, as for example in Algeria, analysis of the 44 cases yielded a high relationship between this characteristic and final military outcome, with the government winning in 74 percent of the cases in which such neutralization was achieved.

Long-term Resolution

Neutralization of Major Insurgent Leadership	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Successful	19	14	74%
Not successful	25	9	32%
N = 44			

Table 15. Government Neutralization of Major Insurgent Leadership Compared with Government Military Wins.

A second characteristic of political action that was highly related to military outcome was the government's evident refusal to make political concessions to insurgent demands, as indicated in table 16.

Concessions to Insurgent Demands	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
No Concessions	25	16	64%
Concessions	19	6	32%
N = 44			

Table 16. Government Concessions to Insurgent Demands Compared with Government Military Wins.

Apparently governments that attempted to placate insurgent demands and public opinion simultaneously have risked the negative reaction of being viewed as too weak, or as offering "too little, too late," or as reacting only because of revolutionary demands. On the other hand, the government's ability to propose what may be viewed as a new political alternative rather than a concession has tended to be strongly associated with military success, as shown in table 17. The elements that go into distinguishing "alternative" from "concession" are important; one widely held hypothesis is that the latter derives from a position of basic governmental weakness, the former from governmental strength.

Provision of a Political Alternative	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Alternatives	20	14	70%
No alternatives	24	8	33%
N = 44			

Table 17. Government Provision of Political Alternatives Compared with Government Military Wins.

Political "alternatives" may in some cases, appear to be mainly psychological. For example, the alternative was considered to be largely subsumed within the person of the charismatic leader, President Sukarno of Indonesia, during the 1958-1961 period of revolutionary warfare. Sometimes the alternative has been a new political program, involving tangible social or economic rewards as, for example, were offered in Malaya or Venezuela. This analysis suggests as a possible thesis the idea that carefully managed political action taken during the conflict period contributes to military outcome, just as military outcome contributes to final political success.

Another characteristic related to the above three was also related to military outcome, but at a less strong level. When governments did not shift their strategic emphasis, that is from political to military emphasis or vice versa, during the course of the conflict, they showed a fairly strong tendency to win a military victory. Despite certain notable exceptions—as for example in the Philippines, Kenya, and Venezuela—strategic consistency and continuity appeared to be desirable.

Military Characteristics

Insofar as government military strength, organization and training were concerned, two characteristics demonstrated a high relationship to military outcome. For one reason or another, governments that relied heavily on the use of such paramilitary forces as home guards, village militia, etc., did far less well than those governments that did not rely so heavily on irregular forces.

Long-term Resolution

Reliance on Paramilitary Forces	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Little reliance	25	16	64%
Heavy reliance	19	6	32%
N = 44			

Table 18. Government Reliance on Paramilitary Forces
Compared with Government Military Wins.

Actually, the idea that prompted this inquiry was based on the opposite hypothesis gleaned from the very successful use of paramilitary forces in Kenya. When the analysis was made on the basis of a larger number of cases, however, the extensive use of paramilitary forces appeared to be generally unprofitable from the government's standpoint. This finding suggests again that what is successful in a given specific instance may not prove useful either in another specific instance or on an across-the-board basis.

A standard bit of military doctrine, that it is very necessary to coordinate the operations of all forces in a campaign, was another characteristic that, even if only relatively successful in practice, yielded, as shown in table 19, a strong association with government military success.

Coordination of Military Forces	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Successful	24	16	67%
Not successful	20	6	30%
N = 44			

Table 19. Government Coordination of Forces
Compared With Government Military Wins.

Of the 24 cases in which the government demonstrated a general ability to coordinate army, navy, police, air, and paramilitary forces as and when these were used, governments were militarily successful in 67 percent of the cases.

Compared with the above highly related characteristics, the general availability of an adequate number of effective tactical leaders was associated with

military outcome only at a lower level of strength. Because governments usually started at a much higher level than their insurgent opponents, with a cadre of trained troop leaders and an institutionalized training program, only a very few were considered to have lacked an adequate leadership base. While the win-difference between the two groups was demonstrable, the relationship with military outcome remained suggestive but not strong.

Another attribute of military operations that was found to yield a high relationship to outcome in these 44 cases of revolutionary warfare was the locale of government military operations. In four of the cases, military operations occurred mainly in urban areas, and here the government won each time. (It is tempting to speculate on the eventual fate of the urban-based Tupamaros and the IRA Provisionals.) Disregarding these urban cases, termed "not applicable" because of the scarcity of their numbers, the government won far more frequently when operations were confined to mainly rural areas rather than being spread over both rural and urban areas.

Geographic Location of Operations	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Mainly rural	26	16	58%
Mixed rural-urban	14	3	21%
Not applicable	4		
N = 44			

Table 20. Government Military Operations by Geographic Location Compared with Government Military Wins.

A second related characteristic of military operations, associated at a lower level of strength with outcome, was the government's de-emphasis on defensive tactics. In other words, those governments that made major use of such measures as fort-and-blockade lines, minefields, fortified lines, etc., tended to win somewhat less often than governments that placed less emphasis on these tactics. However, it is highly possible that the need to rely on such measures may indicate other problems—not only a possibly static and unaggressive military stance on the part of the government but also the fact that the insurgents had external support and sanctuary across borders, and so forth.

Popular Support Aspects

It has been constantly said that revolutionary warfare is a matter of capturing "hearts and minds." Can one say, as a result of analyzing 44 past cases, anything about this phenomenon in relation to military outcome? That popular support is important and is quite highly associated with military outcome was evidenced by the data of two studied characteristics. As has already been noted, those governments whose populations were generally neutral-to-supportive rather than nonsupportive-to-hostile at the beginning of operations showed a strong tendency to win. (See table 6, p. 90.) Additionally, those governments for whom popular support rose in the country as a whole during the conflict period also showed a strong tendency to win, as shown in table 21:

Trend of Support for Government ¹	No. Cases	Government	
		Military Wins	Percent Wins
Increased support	25	16	64%
Decreased support	19	6	32%
N = 44			

Table 21. Government Trend of Popular Support During Conflict Period Compared with Government Military Wins.

Popular support, it will be noted, increased for 25 governments during the conflict period (table 21) while only 19 governments initially possessed such support (table 4). Was it possible then for many of the initially unpopular governments, also by chance 25 in number, to increase their support levels while the conflict continued? As it turned out, only 8 of the 25 initially unpopular governments had been able to do so, but for them it was well worth while: In-depth analysis revealed that these 8 governments won in 63 percent of the cases, while the 17 other initially unpopular governments that failed to increase their support base over time won in only 24 percent of the cases. What is not known from this inquiry, is how the initially unpopular governments that increased their support accomplished this feat. Was it a function of political action, as previously discussed characteristics might suggest? Was it a function of military success over time, the population increasingly approving of a strong government? Was it a function of insurgent mistakes? Was it a function of the government's ability to separate, physically or psychologically, the insurgents from the population? This study affirms the importance of popular support, but far more is needed to be learned as to how such support is obtained, maintained, or recaptured.

Interdiction Aspects

The last two characteristics of incumbent performance that were very strongly related to military outcome concern the government's ability to interdict external support for the revolutionists and specifically the arms they needed for insurgent operations. From the point of view of the insurgents, foreign support was quite important insofar as military outcome was concerned. In the present inquiry, it was found that the government's ability to interdict external support for the insurgents was also strongly associated with military outcome.

Government Prevention or Reduction of External Insurgent Support	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Interdicted	13	8	62%
Not interdicted	13	2	15%
Not applicable or unknown	18		
N = 44			

Table 22. Government Interdiction of External Insurgent Support Compared with Government Military Wins.

Further analysis of the 18 "not applicable or unknown" cases showed that most of these were instances where the insurgents were quite isolated and without access to foreign supplies; of these cases, the government won 13 or 67 percent. There was thus nothing in the data to indicate that the absence of foreign supplies for the revolutionists, for whatever reason, was not favorable to the government.

When the government succeeded in making it generally difficult for the insurgents to obtain sufficient arms to continue operations, the government's tendency to win was at its highest point in this analysis: Control over insurgent arms was the characteristic most highly associated with government military success.

Government Control over Insurgent Arms	No. Cases	Government Military Wins	Percent Wins
Generally successful	18	15	83%
Not successful	26	6	23%
N = 44			

Table 23. Government Ability to Interdict Insurgent Arms Compared with Government Military Wins.

Long-term Resolution

The importance of logistical interdiction was demonstrated by still another characteristic. When the government was able to separate the revolutionists from their local support base by resettling the population, a suggestive level of association with military victory obtained. Thus 11 of the 17 governments strong enough to impose resettlement won militarily, for a rate of 65 percent, while 11 of the 27 governments that did not use resettlement were successful, a rate of only 41 percent.

Intelligence Aspects

In addition to the above ten highly related and four suggestively related government performance characteristics already discussed, there were an additional seven conditions associated with military outcome at a lower, suggestive level. Three of these concerned military intelligence: When the government could maintain a generally good intelligence capability throughout most of the conflict period, or improve its intelligence capability over time, or maintain a generally good counterintelligence capability, it also showed a tendency toward military success.

Psychological Operations

Two other suggestively related characteristics concerned psychological operations and an effective amnesty campaign. Those governments that directed a deliberate psychological effort toward that part of the population deemed likely to support the insurgency apparently had their efforts pay off. At least, this characteristic was associated at a fairly high level with military success. Whereas amnesty offers in themselves apparently meant little, the data showed that successful amnesty offers were suggestively associated with government military success. It should, of course, be noted that in this instance the success of the amnesty offer might also be a reflection of other intervening conditions such as growing government military success.

Other Aspects

Two final characteristics that were related to military outcome at suggestive levels present a confusing picture. When it was found, for example, that the existence of a government supply problem was associated with government military victory, detailed analysis was called for. First of all, there were only a very few cases in the category with supply problems. Further, of the total of eight cases with such problems, it was found that five of the six winning governments were external powers with a home country base from which they eventually received adequate supplies, while the sixth received large amounts of foreign

support. Moreover, all six governments were vigorous, determined, and seriously committed; their military vigor in fact appeared to have created to some degree their supply problem, while it also may have had much to do with eventual success. A second perplexing characteristic was the association with military success shown by governments not employing naval or river operations. The suspicion here was that what was being measured as much as the non-use of such operations was the non-need for them—that is, the insurgents' inability to gain access to a shore, their isolation within a landlocked area, or lack of foreign support.

Non-Related Characteristics

It may be asked whether those characteristics of government performance that were apparently unrelated to military outcome included so many surprising elements as did factors concerning the environment/background or insurgent performance. The degree of surprise may be considerably less, but there were a number of governmental characteristics widely considered to be critical to military outcome that did not, on analysis, yield any particular association with government military success. Again, it should be noted that these non-related characteristics, as well as those that were highly associated, indicate areas for review and further analysis. If nothing else, they suggest that "common knowledge" is an extremely unreliable guide to governmental action.

Although four aspects of political action were related to military outcome, as discussed earlier, no such association could be found for four other characteristics. The military outcome was apparently indifferent to the fact that the government might represent a foreign rather than an indigenous authority; whether or not there was a strong, popular government leader; or whether an indigenous communist movement supported the regime (as has occurred). An attempt to test the value of political co-optation of insurgent leaders failed because of too few cases.

In the area of military strength, organization, and training, every attempt to find any relationship between a strength-of-force ratio and military outcome failed. It made no difference whether incumbent forces equaled less-than-one percent or from one-to-eight percent of the country's total population; nor whether there were one-or-fewer or eight-or-more government forces for each active insurgent. Governments in both cases won and lost at approximately the same rate. Can it still be maintained that a certain ratio of government forces per insurgent forces is necessary—"as everyone knows"? In the case of ethnically dissimilar governments—a matter that was of itself indifferent to outcome—it made no difference whether or not the regime relied extensively on the use of indigenous or foreign troops. And surprisingly enough, neither special tactical training nor the use of a unified military and political command—as important as these were in certain cases—displayed any particular association with military outcome on the general level.

Long-term Resolution

Insofar as military operations were concerned, it was apparently indifferent to the outcome whether or not governments emphasized military operations as the most important aspect of their campaigns, whether the military phase extended over a time period that lasted more or less than two years, or whether military operations added together amounted to more or less than two years. One may therefore ask whether long war is then disastrous from the government's viewpoint—"as everyone knows." The characteristics of air support for ground operations, area bombing, air supply, and air reconnaissance—not one of which any sensible person would wish to be without under certain circumstances—nonetheless did not demonstrate any particular relationship with military outcome. Two attempts to probe government logistical practices failed. It was impossible to discover whether the habit of living off the land was detrimental to a government's military effort since too few cases could be identified to make analysis feasible. On the other hand, so many governments had access to major sources of foreign supplies that comparison was impossible.

In a war in which population attitudes are admittedly important and have been demonstrated to be highly associated with military outcome, it was nonetheless extremely difficult to find specific psychological operations characteristics related to military outcome. The use of psychological operations campaigns directed toward vulnerable populations and the existence of effective amnesty offers were, as already noted, related on suggestive levels. But no association was found to exist between military outcome and such conditions as poor behavior of government forces toward inhabitants, psyop efforts directed toward insurgents, the offering of amnesty, the timing of amnesty offers with a military success, special sub rosa live-and-let-live agreements with insurgent leaders at tactical levels, or harsh treatment of prisoners held by an incumbent power. This leaves one with a dilemma: The attitude of the population seems to be critical, but what affects it remains completely unclear.

The data were almost equally unrewarding in prescriptive content as to socio-economic programs that may be associated with military outcome. Neither the institution of agricultural reform, nor socio-economic programs directed at the insurgent population, nor socio-economic measures in general showed any particular relationship with government military success. On the other hand, the data were also silent as to any possible value that might have derived from the imposition of states of emergency or martial law or the use of strong population control measures in general, although the specific use of resettlement was suggestively associated with military outcome.

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION OF OUTCOME

In reviewing these many characteristics--each related or not as the case may be to military outcome on an individual basis--the question arises as to whether it might not be possible to develop a better explanation of outcome by combining two or more characteristics. In other words, could not past outcomes be better explained by a set of characteristics that would take into account cumulative or interactive effects?

When such an attempt was made,² it was discovered that five characteristics acting together could account for these past outcomes in 40 of the 44 cases. One of the characteristics in this set described a condition that obtained at the start of the warfare: (1) government possession of popular support at the beginning of the conflict; while the remaining four concerned supply and territorial limitations occurring during or throughout the course of operations: (2) government success in making it difficult for insurgents to obtain sufficient arms to continue operations, (3) insurgent failure to obtain important amounts of logistical support from external sources, (4) limitation of operations to either rural or to urban areas rather than their simultaneous occurrence in both urban and rural areas, and (5) limitation of the insurgent support base to the capital city and urban areas rather than its spread to rural or mixed urban-rural settings.

In this set of five characteristics, the most potent single condition was the ability of the government to make it difficult for the insurgents to obtain arms and ammunition to continue operations. This single characteristic alone accounted for much of the explanatory power of the set.

Is such a set of characteristics--explanatory in a historical sense for 44 past cases of long-term revolutionary warfare--able to render any insight into the future? Insight certainly and a basis for certain qualitative judgments, but these findings should not be construed into prediction. True prediction is impossible on the basis of this work, not only for the technical reason that it concerns a group of cases meeting certain criteria and thus closer to a "population" than a sample, but also because history provides no assurance that even a true sample of past cases of revolutionary warfare would offer a fair sampling of future cases. What this analysis thus offers is a historical review of 44 cases of revolutionary warfare analyzed in a systematic and fairly rigorous manner. The emerging findings must remain tentative, but they provide a basis both for more qualitative and judgmental work in this field, as well as for further research utilizing quantitative and statistical techniques.

NOTES

¹D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict: Individual Characteristics of Internal Conflict in Relation to Military Outcome (Unpublished study; Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1971), is the source for all data, including tables, in this chapter. The bases for definition, case selection, coding, and determination of relationship are given in detail in the above study. Essentially, the chi-square test, modified by Yates' correction for continuity to accommodate small cell frequencies, was accepted as the basic means for estimating the relationship between each individual characteristic and military outcome. The results were interpreted simply as reflecting association between independent and dependent variables, rather than in the more conventional manner of delineating statistical significance.

²D. M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., Strategy and Success in Internal Conflict: II. Sets of Characteristics of Internal Conflict in Relation to Military Outcome (Unpublished study; Kensington, Md.: American Institutes for Research, 1971). The basic tool, as described in this analysis, was a stepwise multiple regression program, which operated from the top variable down through the list. Further work was also done through the use of an automatic interaction detection procedure, a process that yields a typology describing combinations of characteristics that best explain high and low values on the criterion. Both procedures address the question, can military outcomes in the studied cases be accounted for by sets of characteristics acting together?