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HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES
ARMY: 1898 TO 1916

Julius J. Jorgensen, Jr.

Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania

24 March 1972

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HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY:

1898 TO 1916

A RESEARCH REPORT

by

Colonel Julius J. Jorgensen, Jr.
Air Defense Artillery

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An historic analysis of the nation and the United States Army for the period 1898-1916. Four little wars are described and analyzed as perceived by the professional military, the political leadership, and the civil body politic: 1) War with Spain; 2) Philippine Insurrection; 3) Boxer Rebellion; and 4) Mexican Punitive Expedition. Tasks and activities of the peacetime Army are similarly analyzed: 1) Civil Disorders; 2) Disaster Relief; 3) Reform and Reorganization; and 4) Enrichment of Professionalism. It is concluded that: there exists on-going American suspicion of a large standing Army; American belief in the citizen - soldier concept; Congressional penury and public disinterest in peacetime is quite typical and not surprising.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We began the nineteenth century with an army numbering only 296 officers and 4,166 men, whose existence was permitted with most grudging reluctance. At the close of the century, the nation had successfully accomplished its first major adventure into the arena of international politics and its armed forces, albeit both fortunate and only partially tested as a result of the military operations in Santiago and Manila, were being recognized as a significant contributive factor in the nation's embryonic emergence as a world power. The need for a land force in excess of 100,000 was acclaimed by the Congress and the Republican Administration and doubtful only as to the form its organization would take. The central issues at the turn of the century pertained to the size of the Regular Army, the state of preparedness of the citizen-army, and the spectre of imperialism and militarism. "Americans", wrote Russell Weigley on military history, "are (still) seeking the proper path towards an American Army".¹

On the political scene the United States was enunciating the Monroe Doctrine as its principal element of foreign policy; Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona were yet to be admitted to the States of the Union; the 16th Amendment legalizing an income tax and the 17th Amendment transforming the election of United States

Senators from state legislators to the people were also yet to be adopted and ratified. "Carrying a Big Stick" and "the Open Door policy" were vogue expressions in the minds of the proponents of the progressive movement. The opponents were many, varied, and vociferous, giving rise to anti-imperialism, "yellow journalism", and peace prizes. The early 1900's accurately reflected the United States ambivalent character toward war and peace and, in particular, the problem of determining sufficiency of adequately prepared land forces in peacetime.

OBJECTIVE

The raison d'etre for the United States Army as perceived by the professional military, the political leadership, and the civil body politic will be examined for the period 1898 to 1916. The period has been described as the Army's renaissance, an era of reform and reorganization, of the spirit of professionalism as the republic moved from historic continentalism to imperialism and world power. An historic analysis of these factors coupled with the identification of specific tasks undertaken by the army will be the central thrust of this study. Military operations, in general, will be described only as they impact on United States Army military institutions and concepts; hence, the details of military campaigns in this historical analysis have been avoided.

RESEARCH TECHNIQUE

The research technique used in this report will include:

(1) selected readings from the library holdings of the United States Army War College and the U.S. Army Military History Research Collection in the fields of general American history, military history of the United States Army, and civil-military relations; (2) definitive analysis of U.S. War Department Annual Reports of the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Army; and (3) an exhaustive research of the Army and Navy Journal for the period 1 January 1898 through 31 December 1916.

Chapter II will portray the attitudes of the American people and its government as it moved toward "manifest destiny" and an expansionist policy in foreign affairs. Chapter III will discuss the War with Spain and the state of unpreparedness of the Army as it mobilized and deployed for intervention in Santiago and Manila. In Chapter IV, the role of the Army in the Philippine Insurrection will be reviewed in terms of political decisions and military operations, colonial administration, and public criticism. The China Relief Expedition, otherwise known as The Boxer Rebellion, and the Mexican Punitive Expedition will be discussed in Chapters V and VI, respectively. Chapter VII will deal with the constructive works of the Army in the Panama Canal, domestic relief and civil disorders, and the continuing but lessening problems with Indians. Chapter VIII addresses Army reorganization

and reform through the establishment of the Army General Staff, the Maneuver Division, and the inception of the Mobile Army. The role of the militia in national defense will be examined through analysis of the Dick Bill of 1903. The character of the Army, its preparedness, and its fitness in terms of professionalism will be discussed in Chapter IX. Chapter X concludes with an analysis of the forces that propelled the army to reorganization and reform in the post-War with Spain period during a time of public and media hostility and Congressional indifference.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTE

1. Russell F. Weigley, Towards in American Army (1962), p. 254.

CHAPTER II

MANIFEST DESTINY

In 1890 the United States, Germany, and Great Britain entered into a tripartite agreement over the Samoan archipelago, which placed the Samoan Islands under the three powers' joint protection.¹ This action marked the United States first entangling alliance and heralded the beginning of its adventure into power politics. Isolationism was to be replaced by expansionism - the manifest destiny of a free and democratic nation now avowedly preparing itself to accept the responsibilities of a great power. America was to commence its new role in external affairs by being a police power in the Caribbean (1901), a mediator of the Russo-Japanese War (1905) through our good offices in the settlement of the Far Eastern Question, and our participation in the mediation of the Moroccan Crisis at the Algeiras Conference (1906) in Spain. In freeing Cuba we would also become involved with other states of the Spanish Colonial Empire, become a Far Eastern Power entangled in the rivalries of the European states in China, which, in turn, would inevitably involve us in the European power complex.² The United States was also to flex its newfound naval strength by dispatching its fleet around the world in 1907-1909. By this action President Theodore Roosevelt "sought to demonstrate to Americans and the rest of mankind that

the Navy of the United States was ready for what the diplomats of world-power politics called 'eventualities'".³ This new manifest destiny was espoused by men of high ideas, active and positive in their pursuit of the larger role of American involvement in world affairs, and with economic motives clearly in sight. It was, however, the humanitarian motive that attracted public attention and support to the endeavors of the expansionists.

THE EXPANSIONISTS

Early proponents of expansionism included Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, and the missionary Josiah Strong.

Mahan, the naval strategist and historian, was writing in the Atlantic Monthly in 1890, the very year in which the Census Bureau declared that there was no longer a land frontier: "Whether they will or no, America must now begin to look outward."⁴ Henry Cabot Lodge would provide statesmanship as the nation politically moved to control Hawaii and maintain interest in Samoa. But as the plight of the Cubans under the repressive colonial policies of the Spanish regime became known, throughout America humanitarian concern came to the forefront as a principal cause for United States intervention. The church picked up the mantle of moralism and championed military intervention with the zeal of missionaries, at once providing the opportunity to Christianize all of the

peoples of the Spanish Far Eastern empire. Theodore Roosevelt would, like no other individual in this period, represent the imperialist movement. He would dispatch Dewey to Manila, lead the Rough Riders up San Juan Hill, seek the engineering of a canal in the Isthmus of Panama, and promote the construction of a dozen battleships. His aim was to achieve a powerful and impressive Army and Navy. But every great and strong military establishment "requires a menace on which to grow".⁵ Duty, destiny, dollars, and divinity were employed by the expansionists to fix the character of the menace - the Spaniards - as the country moved toward military intervention.

DUTY

Why expansionism? Senator Shelby M. Cullom, Illinois, said: "It is time that someone woke up and realized the necessity of annexing some property".⁶ The editor of The Journal of Commerce cited in 1895 "this remarkable fashion of hanging the flag over every schoolhouse and of giving the boys military drill".⁷ A wave of nationalism toward the flag and toward symbolic patriotic songs swept the countryside. The Republicans renominated McKinley for President in the campaign of 1900 and he asserted that "to ten millions of the human race there was given a new birth of freedom" and to the American people "a new and noble responsibility".⁸ The Republicans argued for the fulfillment of our duty and Teddy Roosevelt said: "Don't haul down the flag!"

DESTINY

Reporting on manifest destiny, the Army and Navy Journal commented: "The policy of isolation which befitted our infancy is not that which befits us now".⁹ And, "The balance of power is no longer to be adjusted between the nations of the Old World, but between the nations of all of the world".¹⁰ Duty and destiny became the expansionist's view of the nation's responsibility of extending to other people, perhaps to other lands, the benefits of its own freedom and democracy.

DOLLARS

The Mahan school of thought had linked commercial supremacy and naval power together in a carefully elaborated system of mercantile imperialism. Commercial and business interests also supported the acquisition of Cuban and Philippine bases of operations to compete with European powers in the exploitation of colonial markets, foreign investments, and outlets for increasing productions of farms, mines, and factories. The Seattle Post - Intelligencer interviewed James J. Hill, 1 June 1898, the Great Northern Railroad baron, who originally denounced imperialism; "If you go back to the commercial history of the world," he announced spaciozely, "you will find that people who controlled the trade to the Orient have been the people who held the purse strings of nations".¹¹

The eventual urging of American banks to take over the loans of the Central American republics, thereby eliminating European influence at the source, further strengthened economic imperialism and gave birth to "dollar diplomacy".

DIVINITY

Unexpected support for an expansionist policy came from the Protestant Church. Missionary groups argued that the United States had a moral obligation, forced by dictates of humanity, to extend beneficent rule of the United States to the downtrodden. "Was it not the duty of the world's strongest Christian nation to lead the heathens to Jesus?"¹² The Roman faith, too, had a minor swing toward expansion.¹³ Religion had joined the great crusade, hand-in-hand with duty, destiny, and the dollar. Imperialism was to be served through our benevolent assimilation of the Spanish Empire.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

The anti-expansionists were equally forceful in presenting their views against greedy commercialism, criminal aggression, and militarism. Unfortunately for their cause, they were out of office. The anti-imperialist bloc was represented, in the main, by former President Cleveland, Andrew Carnegie, William Jennings Bryan, Senator Hear of Massachusetts, and Mark Twain. Their anti-imperialist liturgy contained arguments against (1) annexation of

foreign territories; (2) the flouting of our constitution which, in their contention, makes no provisions for colonies; (3) the power of the chief executive to authorize the political and economic enslavement of a foreign population; and (4) the inevitable enlargement of the army and navy which would only lead to a European type of garrison state dominated by the military.

Anti-imperialists favored economic rather than political penetration overseas; annexation was expensive to govern, and annexation was laden with unseen but explosive problems of race, religion, and politics. It was colonial rule of subjected people. Why not send 65,000 missionaries instead of soldiers to persuade the Filipinos that it is our right to govern them, and that it is right for them to yield?¹⁴

In 1899 William Jennings Bryen said:

When the desire to steal becomes uncontrollable in an individual he is declared to be a kleptomaniac and is sent to an asylum; when the desire to grab land becomes uncontrollable in a nation we are told that 'the currents of destiny are flowing through the hearts of men'.¹⁵

And in response to the manner in which Spain was administering her colonies, Representative John Sharp Williams of Mississippi asked: "Who made us God's globe-trotting vice-regents to forestall mismanagement everywhere?"¹⁶

By far the strongest attacks against the proponents of imperialism were directed to the military. Anti-military sentiments

were highly vocalized. Militarism, they decried, meant conquest abroad and intimidation and oppression at home. The public could express disavowal with foreign relations every fourth year (franchise); while waiting, use the army as a whipping boy. The military was conceived as the sole instrument of national policy. Anti-militarism will be discussed in detail in Chapter LX, Professionalism.

YELLOW JOURNALISM

Inflammatory editorials and passionate patriotism all contributed to the martial spirit of imperialism. American newspaper ferocity toward Spain was due to the accidental circumstances that Mr. Hearst and Mr. Pulitzer were at the time locked in their famous struggle for supremacy in the field of international journalism.¹⁷ The yellow press exerted an almost hypnotic effect upon public opinion and congressional attitudes by printing atrocity stories using inflammatory language and sensational headlines. Two themes persisted: (1) a call to free the people of Cuba from Spain's oppressive rule; and (2) jingoistic expressions such as "going to war to preserve the peace".

PREPAREDNESS

The attention of the newspapers and the attention of the public were concentrated on the manifest destiny of our nation with regard

to the Spanish Empire, but little attention was, and had been, given to the state of preparedness of the army. We were proclaiming ourselves a great nation with interests extending beyond our territorial limits and we had not the means to meet our needs. The United States was not ready for war; it was totally unprepared; its mobilization, training, and operations would be marked with inefficiency and bungling. As late as 9 March 1898 the Congress was to approve a special military appropriation bill, known as the Fifty Million Bill, wherein President McKinley allotted \$16 million to the Army for seacoast fortification and nothing toward preparedness of a Mobile Army to Cuba. The daily newspapers, whose sharp comments heightened the emotions toward intervention, now directed their attack against military men and military methods.

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

1. The United States was to later annex American Samoa in 1899.
2. Walter Millis, Arms and Men (1956), p. 168.
3. Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Beard's New Basic History of the United States (1968), p. 331.
4. Foster Rhea Dulles, The United States Since 1865 (1969), p. 159.
5. Millis, p. 191.
6. Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (1960), p. 13.
7. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (1931), p. 35.
8. Beard and Beard, p. 327.
9. "Manifest Destiny," Army and Navy Journal (21 May 1898), p. 737.
10. Ibid.
11. Wolff, p. 81.
12. Ibid., p. 34.
13. The U.S. Roman Catholics were largely in conflict with Castilian Catholic colonies.
14. Joseph Dana Miller, "Militarism or Masochism?" in The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society (1969), pp. 91-92.
15. Wolff, p. 191.
16. Ibid., p. 210.
17. Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 63.

CHAPTER III

WAR WITH SPAIN

The authorized strength of the Army in 1898 was 2,116 officers and 25,706 men out of a national population of 73 million Americans - a disproportionately small percentage of soldiers under arms. Warlike relations with Spain were becoming a reality: the U.S. battleship Maine was ordered to Havana, Cuba on 25 January and in February diplomatic relations between the governments of the United States and Spain were strained when the Spanish Minister to Washington made disparaging remarks toward President McKinley and resigned.

On 15 April the Secretary of War ordered the Regular Army regiments, with few exceptions, to proceed to various ports in the south in preparation for deployment to Cuba. Mobilization of army forces was painfully slow and abounding with political considerations.

MOBILIZATION

Mobilization was to occur as a result of a number of Congressional acts, each step barely fulfilling the needs of the service and adding to the delay in military preparedness.

On 2 March 1898, soon after sporadic insurrection in Cuba had burst into full-fledged war with Spain, Congress voted to

maintain the wartime Regular Army strength at 65,000 men and to enlist 35,000 volunteers; the volunteers to be enlisted for a term of two years and four months and to be recruited from the country at large. The War Department was not in consonance with the plan and proposed instead the expansion of the Regular Army force to 104,000 men. These personnel were to be a federally sponsored volunteer force completely under control of the Regular Army, which would circumvent the problems of dual federal-state auspices. The Regular Army was concerned about the special command and control relationship enjoyed by National Guard units: they took orders not from the War Department but from the governors of their respective states; and they elected and demoted their officers by popular vote.

The simplest solution, according to the War Department, would be to dispense with National Guard units and enlist individual guardsmen in a new volunteer army with Regular Army officers assigned to each unit.

The Congress adopted on 22 April a compromise expansion bill. The Regular Army was to be supplemented by means of a Presidential call for volunteers for federal service, but any military organization that volunteered as a body would be accepted as a unit, and the states might even raise new organizations, with officers appointed by the governors, also to be accepted as units into the federal volunteer army.¹ On the following day, the President issued his first call, for 125,000 volunteers.

The compromised mustering of the National Guard satisfied its objective in maintaining viable identity; it was their contention that the volunteer plan proposed by the War Department was designed to crush the strength of the National Guard through absorption into an expanded Regular Army. The Regular Army, on the other hand, looked with suspicion on the combat readiness of the citizen-soldiers and believed the National Guard regiments to be "primarily social and political clubs . . . (with) an easy-going type of discipline that bordered on negligence."²

A few regiments were raised nationally as United States Volunteers, but nearly all were apportioned to the states. Recruits, in the main, enlisted in their own home regiments instead of the Regular Army; they preferred to go into the Volunteers where they found comrades and an easier life.³ The compromise bill had allowed an enlistment of two years or "for the war", a term over which the recruit might gamble on a shortened enlistment by joining the volunteer army.

Because of the above advantages to the Volunteer enlistment, the Regular Army attained a strength level of 50,000 men of an authorized ceiling of 65,000. Even so, the recruits were so plentiful that the Regular Army indulged itself in rejecting more than three-quarters of its applicants for reasons of failing to meet physical, mental, or moral standards.⁴

The Act of 22 April, in addition to providing 125,000 volunteers, also authorized the Secretary of War to organize from

the nation at large volunteer units "possessing special qualifications" and not to exceed three thousand men. These units became the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Regiments of United States Volunteer Cavalry (the 1st Regiment became the famous Rough Riders under Theodore Roosevelt). The same statute also provided for 10,000 enlisted men who possessed immunity to tropical diseases. Ten infantry regiments resulted, six white and four black, designated the 1st through 10th United States Volunteer Infantry - better known as "The Immunes", It was believed then that "colored people" possessed special immunity to diseases of the tropics.

After Manila, when troops were necessary to occupy the Philippine archipelago, President McKinley issued his second call, for 75,000 volunteers. By the end of May 1898, there were 124,804 volunteers mustered. At the close of the war on 12 August, there were 58,688 Regulars and 216,029 Volunteers.

In summary, it took the War Department three months to raise, train, and deploy the Volunteer Army only to discover that the Cuban campaign was essentially the Regular soldier's war. The Cuban Expeditionary Force was to consist of 14,412 Regulars and 2,465 Volunteers, (the Rough Riders, 2nd Massachusetts and 71st New York National Guard regiments); reinforcements eventually raised the Volunteer strength to 7,443.⁵ The political pressures generated by state constituencies saved the entity of National Guard units, and these, when mustered, would lack "equipment,

tentage, and anything approaching genuine field service experience".⁶ Some volunteer units, the 71st New York Regiment as an example, would be publicly chided for breaking under fire. The 7th Regiment of New York (not to be confused with the earlier mentioned 71st Regiment) which was considered to be one of the best trained National Guard units in the country, simply declined to volunteer for service and remained out of the war.

THE MAINE

As had been mentioned earlier, the second-class battleship U.S.S. Maine had been ordered to leave Fort Royal, South Carolina for Key West and thence to go to Havana for a "friendly" visit. The deployment was viewed by some as a "courtesy visit" and by others as a deliberate and provocative act. Mark Hanna, for one, compared it to "waving a match in an oilwell".⁷

The warship blew up in the harbor of Havana on 15 February 1898. Of the 350 men and officers on board, 252 had been killed or drowned and eight others had been mortally wounded.

From the official point of view:

There was never any official charge by the American Government that the Spanish Government was in any way implicated in the affair, if indeed the explosion was caused by a mine or a torpedo. But to the popular mind the destruction of the Maine was just another proof of Spanish duplicity and treachery. The tide of public excitement ran higher.⁸

The public assumption was that the explosion was caused by treachery. "Intervention is plain and imperative duty." The New York Journal declared while the New York World screamed "The Only Atonement - Free Cuba".⁹ A popular slogan swept the country:

Remember the Maine!
To Hell with Spain.

U.S. INTERVENTION

America's intention to intervene in Cuba was expressed on the 19th of April when both Houses of Congress passed resolutions demanding the withdrawal of Spanish forces from Cuba. Spain declared war on the United States on 24 April and on the following day the Congress declared that a state of war between the United States and Spain had existed since 21 April, and the Spanish - American War began.

MANILA

Although war with Spain had not been declared until late April, as early as 25 February the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt,¹⁰ had directed Commodore Dewey to form a squadron of the ships scattered among various parts of the Pacific with the definitely stated purpose of preparing for offensive operations against Spain.

Dewey, Hong Kong:

Secret and Confidential. Order the squadron, except Monocracy, to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war with Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic Coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands. Keep Olympia until further orders.

11
Roosevelt

A month later, 24 April, Mr. Long, Secretary of the Navy, dispatched the following message to the commodore:

Dewey Hong Kong:

War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

Long

Commodore Dewey sailed from Hong Kong on 30 April for Manila. He engaged the Spanish fleet on 1 May, destroying seven vessels (two of them unable to move at the start of the battle) of half the displacement of the seven American protected cruisers. The Spanish lost all of their ships and 381 men; the American casualties were seven wounded sailors.

SANTIAGO

The Spanish problem was not how to win the war, for this was patently impossible, but how to appear gallant and resourceful in defeat. On 9 April the Queen Regent of Spain had decided to grant

an immediate armistice in Cuba at the "request of the Pope and in deference to the wishes and advice of the representatives of the six great European powers".¹² In the United States there was widespread popular demand for intervention. Virtually ignoring the Spanish decree, President McKinley went before Congress on 11 April with what was in effect a war message.

Planning for the conduct of the war had been minimal. The Army and Navy Defense Board had proposed the early landing of invasion forces on Cuban soil subsequent to preliminary assembly, drill, and equipage at Chickamauga National Park, Tennessee.¹³ On 31 May Major General William R. Shafter received orders to embark from Tampa to Santiago. After much delay and confusion, the expeditionary force of 17,000 men loaded on 8 June, sailed on the 14th of June, and was off Santiago on 20 June. Disembarkation commenced two days later against no opposition. The primitive Cuban War ended by capitulation on 17 July 1898 - a war that had lasted 109 days.

As soon as the surrender of Santiago was completed, a separate expedition to Puerto Rico was undertaken. The island was occupied by American forces after meeting only light resistance.

Under a temporary peace protocol of 12 August, Spain relinquished all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, ceded to the United States, Puerto Rico and other Spanish Islands in the West Indies, and invoked immediate suspension of hostilities. The protocol

also, and this was of singular importance, made provisions for American occupation of Manila "pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines". The Treaty of Peace was signed in Paris on 10 December 1898. The transfer of the Philippines to United States sovereignty was concluded and a gift of twenty million dollars was paid to Spain. The policy of "benevolent assimilation" had been successful.

COMPLAINTS AND CRITICISM

In a military sense, the United States was most fortunate to have engaged an inept enemy.¹⁴ The Cuban Expeditionary Force of 17,000 men engaged an enemy numbering 35,000 in the Province of Santiago and an additional 164,000 Spanish troops in all of Cuba. American losses were 386 killed or mortally wounded; however, 5,000 were to die of disease. The Army was totally unprepared and pathetically small at the outbreak of war due to (1) Congressional penury, (2) a 30-year period of peace, (3) the traditionally expressed American distrust of professional armies, and (4) American belief in the citizen soldier.¹⁵

THE REGULAR ARMY

Conditions within the Regular Army left much to be desired. The Army had been garrisoned in 77 separate posts tactically

situated, in the main, as a result of the Indian Wars and politically retained. The majority of the posts were one and two - company garrisons averaging 700 men. Most officers had never seen a regiment or had experienced combined arms training, there being no provisions for brigade-size formation of troops since the Civil War. There were no mobilization plans for assemblage, training, and deployment of an expeditionary force and no higher organization to manage the conduct of the war - the bureaus within the department being oriented toward non-combat functions.

There was considerable uncertainty and perplexity as to the future. The nation now had three islands (Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Manila) on its hands, whether or not it wanted them. The only institution to which it could turn for control, police, and civilization of the new soil, was the army.¹⁶

TRAINING CAMPS

The enthusiasm and martial spirit held by the young men of the nation who volunteered to serve was soon dissipated in a complete collapse of morale in the southern training camps. Camp Thomas at Chickamauga National Park was suited to accommodate not more than 20,000 troops for any length of time, yet it had 7,000 Regulars and 70,000 Volunteers undergoing preparation for movement to combat. There was much disaffection on the condition of the camp; troops became morbid and discontent. The National Guard

officers lacked experience and training in the basic needs of the soldier - personal hygiene and sanitation - and the loss through disease became appalling.

SUPPLY

Army historians cite as an example of the Army's deficiency within its supply departments the problems of rifles, uniforms, and canned beef. The Krag-Jorgensen rifle was smokeless and automatic and had been issued to the Regular Army. A shortage of these rifles compelled the Volunteers to be armed with the single-shot, black powder Springfield rifles that proved to be highly undesirable. There was no khaki cloth, so the soldiers fought under the hot Cuban sun wearing the heavy blue woolen winter garrison uniform; not until 20 July 1898 would 20,000 suits of light clothing reach Santiago. Lastly, the troops were fed on "embalmed beef". Both fresh and canned meat supplied to the troops were criticized by their commanders in the field as "having the same odor as an embalmed body".¹⁷ The Commissary General came under severe criticism; the Administration was later to appoint a Presidential Commission to investigate the charges.

Supplies were shipped in carloads without invoices or bills of lading and there was much confusion in freight arrangements at Tampa. There was a lack of storehouse facilities and roads and freight ships were blocked. Ganoe, the Army historian, relates:

There were boxcars on the sidings with provisions and clothing of many varieties, but the outside was unlabeled. An officer looking for beans would open a car to find patent-leather shoes. The volunteer soldiers were sometimes seen begging for food in the streets (Tampa, Florida), while supplies in the cars lay rotting. 18

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

The greatest victory of the campaign in Havana was won by the Medical Corps' discovery of a cure of yellow fever, the method of its propagation, and the means for prevention of this disease. This matter will be considered in greater detail in Chapter VII, Domestic Activities.

Santiago was one of the filthiest cities in the Western Hemisphere. There was little or no knowledge by the natives and refugees of hygienic practices. The Medical Corps taught the indigenous population by rigid discipline and the introduction of rigorous measures the techniques of keeping their premises free of pollution. Within a month the death rate in Santiago dropped from an average of 70 to 20 per day. 19

The degree of immunity to yellow fever by certain troops, especially that aspect of the program that favored "colored troops", was questioned even then. Also, physical examinations for entrance into units of "The Immunes" were lax and therefore negated any semblance of satisfying the special recruitment act as envisioned by the Congress.

The Medical Bureau was also to be criticized for obstructing, in 1898, the recruitment of female nurses. This was of particular significance in light of the disproportionately large loss of lives both in the United States and Cuba as a result of sickness and disease; the nurses' presence was needed for the care and comfort of exceedingly large number of hospitalized soldiers.

LESSONS LEARNED

The War with Spain demonstrated at the onset a need for a General Staff. The leadership required in the field soon depleted the small bureaus of talent to adequately plan and execute support for the expeditionary force. This deficiency was so pronounced that the first major reorganization of the army subsequent to the cessation of hostilities would be the creation of the Army General Staff.

There were legislative deficiencies. The increase of the Regular Army came after the war. The term of enlistment for volunteers was too short and provided a legal loophole for early release prior to the conclusion of hostilities. The appointment of officers in the National Guard by governors without first meeting standards of professionalism as determined by the War Department produced an officer corps that was politically oriented and generally unqualified to lead because his commission was by popular appeal within the regiment. To further protect the

autonomy of National Guard regiments, the Congress forbade more than one Regular Army officer to be assigned to each volunteer regiment.

Discipline was extremely lax in the Volunteer regiments; the elected officers had little control over their men, and knew nothing about how to take care of them. The consequences were typhoid and dysentery. The lack of training rendered these regiments of comparatively small value.²⁰

The question of training recruits became a central issue among the senior officers of the Army. One faction sought state camps since, in its opinion, the United States had no adequate installations or equipment for receiving them. The other faction believed it best to concentrate both the Regular and Volunteer forces in a relatively small number of camps. Exposing the Volunteers to the Regulars, divorcing the recruits as soon as possible from the parochial influence of their homes,²¹ and situating them in a few camps in the southeast in preparation for deployment out of Tampa were the reasons supporting the eventual selection of fifteen camps in the Gulf Department.

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

1. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (1967), p. 296.
2. Wolff, p. 90.
3. William Addleman Ganoes, The History of The United States Army (1924), p. 373.
4. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 298.
5. Ibid., p. 306.
6. Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 153.
7. Wolff, p. 37.
8. Lester B. Shippee and Royal B. Way, "William Rufus Day," in The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy (1928), p. 75.
9. Dilles, pp. 165-166.
10. As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he had given critical orders to the fleet without the knowledge or consent of his superior, Secretary Long.
11. Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 112.
12. Ibid., p. 137.
13. "Campaign Plans," Army and Navy Journal (9 April 1898), p. 597.
14. Raymond G. O'Connor, American Defense Policy in Perspective: from Colonial Times to The Present (1965), p. 125.
15. H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire: The War with Spain and Overseas Expansion (1965), p. 86.
16. Ganoes, p. 391.
17. "The President's Commission," Army and Navy Journal (24 December 1898), p. 392.

18. Gance, p. 375.
19. Ibid., pp. 397-398.
20. Frederick Louis Huidekoper, "The Military Unpreparedness of the United States," (1916) in American Defense Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present, p. 128.
21. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 298.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION

Officially the War with Spain had been fought for Cuba alone, and the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay had been attacked and destroyed by Commodore Dewey to eliminate it as a possible menace to our West Coast. But a broader objective, unlike the situation regarding Cuba, was being considered for the Philippine Islands. The islands were gaining international stature in the interest shown by a number of nations. Germany sided with Spain; the Kaiser preferred feeble competitors rather than strong competitors. The United Kingdom and France ostensibly remained neutral although the British offered to buy the islands if the United States were to withdraw. Russia, in fear of growing United States power, hoped that the Philippines would stay with Spain. Japan, willing to help, offered to administer the archipelago with the United States. The United States, on the other hand, was still in the throes of determining whether the islands ought to be retained once the Spanish had been defeated and the islands occupied.

The Army commander in route to the city of Manila was also perplexed as to his true purpose. Major General Wesley Merritt, Commanding General of VIII Corps, writing to President McKinley, said: "I do not yet know whether it is your desire to subdue and hold all of the Spanish territory in the islands, or merely

to seize and hold the capital".¹ General Nelson A. Miles, Commanding General of the Army, had this impression: ". . . the force ordered at this time is not expected to carry on a war to conquer an extensive territory," but simply to establish a garrison which would "command the harbor of Manila and relieve the United States fleet under Admiral Dewey with the least possible delay".²

The naval commander, in the late summer of 1898, was assuming a more aggressive posture than exhibited by either the ground forces or the administration. The German Asiatic Squadron sailed into Manila Bay and initiated interfering tactics with the United States squadron then blockading the harbor. Dewey signaled his advisory: "Do you want war with us?"³ The martial spirit of the nation prevailed and the United States moved to "free all of the Philippines" from the oppressive rule of Spain.

AGUINALDO AND THE FILIPINOS

There were eight million Filipinos at the turn of the century who lived on 7,083 islands that extended 1,152 miles (North to South). They descended from Malaya, brown-skinned people, and hence were referred to benevolently by the Americans as "our little brown brothers".

In June of 1898, ¹Sinor Don Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, a member of the Katipunan (patriots league), established a revolutionary government, set himself up as a dictator, and declared Philippine

independence. He was overthrown by the Spanish Government and exiled to Hong Kong, only to resurface again in 1898, as the leader of the insurgent forces. He was a leader with infinite patience and full support of the peasantry. Perception of the issue by the Filipinos and Aguinaldo at this time is most important.

The Filipinos were resisting annexation because they assumed that America's rule would be about as tolerable as Spain's had been. The words of Richard Cobden concerning India apply verbatim to the Philippines: "Its people will prefer to be ruled badly - according to our notions - by its own colour (sic), kith and kin, than to submit to the humiliation of being governed by a succession of transient intruders. . . ."4

Only the city of Manila was being held by the Spaniards. The insurrectos under Aguinaldo controlled the greater part of the Island of Luzon. The Americans, like the insurrectos, were on the outskirts of Manila awaiting orders to lay siege to the capital. The Filipinos knew that they could capture Manila alone. But their concern was over the increasing build up of American forces. Aguinaldo was to wonder "who the Americans expected to fight".5 The first offensive, the siege of Manila, was to occur on 13 August 1898, one day following the signing of the peace protocol. The Filipinos were to learn then that the United States forces would engage both the Spaniards and the insurgent forces.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

American military operations in the Philippines commenced in 1898 and terminated in 1916, comprising three successive wars. The Pacific segment of the Spanish-American War was concluded in seven months and covered Manila Bay, the fall of the city of Manila, and the Treaty of Paris, 10 December 1898. The second segment can be referred to as the Philippine Insurrection which commenced on 4 February 1899 after a direct confrontation between United States Army troops and the insurgent troops of Aguinaldo's Provincial Government. President Roosevelt proclaimed on 4 July 1902 the establishment of peace throughout the Christian-inhabited portion of the Philippine archipelago and the establishment of a civil government. The final segment of the war was directed against the non-Christian natives inhabiting the Southern Islands, principally Mindanao and Jolo. War with the Muslim Moros would continue until 1916.

On 30 June 1898 the first expeditionary forces from the United States arrived off Cavite; by 1 August the force would number 10,000 men. American and insurgent forces were prepared to take the city of Manila. The governor-general of the Spanish Forces in the city, recognizing the hopelessness of the tactical situation, proposed that a mock battle be arranged, (in order to save Spanish honor). He would not use artillery if the United States refrained from shelling Manila. If the insurgents were to be

excluded, Spanish resistance would be noisy but innocuous. Unfortunately, Aguinaldo's Filipino Army did become involved by supporting the American expeditionary force and some light resistance occurred. Manila fell after a single day's conflict; United States losses were 17 killed and 105 wounded.

In December 1898, by the Treaty of Paris, the islands were ceded to the United States. Later that month President McKinley ordered the War Department to extend the military occupation of Manila to the entire archipelago. This move touched off armed Filipino resistance.

In January 1899 the Filipinos asked that Americans bring no more reinforcements and occupy no more territory until some kind of modus operandi could be accommodated. Their persuasion was directed toward some concessions bearing upon their independence, or, at least, an American protectorate arrangement. The position of the United States was submission or war.

It was war. Private William W. Grayson, Company B, 1st Nebraska Volunteer, was posted as a sentry on the evening of 4 February 1899 on the outskirts of Manila. Aguinaldo's troops disregarded his command to halt, the young soldier opened fire, and the United States Army undertook to "civilize them with a Krag".⁶ Americans pressed the war against the "insurrectionists", who considered themselves "patriots". Forty thousand Tagalogs attacked Manila for three days in a continuous and aggressive manner; the Americans held and threw them back. Neither

side advanced its lines, nothing of importance happened, an estimated two million rounds of ammunition had been expended, and the losses were 250 for the Americans and approximately 3,000 of the insurgents.

Attacks, captures, counterattacks, evacuations, and recaptures took place through October with no conclusions visibly gained. United States Army lines had not been extended and resultant low morale and extreme depression swept through the ranks. Aguinaldo, in turn, recognized that united insurgent resistance was useless, and that the only alternative was to break up into small groups and engage in guerrilla warfare. By the end of 1899 the insurgent government was retreating slowly, evacuating one "capital" after another. Guerrilla engagements increased from 229 during the last four months of 1899 to 422 guerrilla clashes during the first four months of 1900. United States forces in the Philippines now numbered in excess of 50,000 men and Aguinaldo escaped into Isabela Province in Northern Luzon.

The year 1900 brought (1) atrocity stories as the Army attempted to bring the insurgency under control, (2) offers of amnesty to the Filipinos for their oath of allegiance to the United States, (3) the introduction of martial law, and (4) the resumption of the argument for increasing the strength of the Regular Army "to a hundred thousand men who would settle the Philippine question once and for all".⁷ There was such disillusionment in the Army.

The Army in 1901 established 502 strong points throughout the Philippines in an attempt to subdue the guerrillas.⁸ Fifty-five of the 77 provinces were under military rule. The main thrust of the insurrection had been blunted; however, fighting with primitive tribesmen on the coast of Mindanao would continue until 1916.

ABATEMENT

The abatement of insurgency operations can be attributed to the capture of Aguinaldo by Brigadier General Frederick Funston in March 1901. On 19 April Aguinaldo issued a proclamation acknowledging the sovereignty of the United States "without any reservations whatsoever".⁹ He devoted himself thereafter to the interest of the people.

President Roosevelt announced the end of insurrection (prematurely) on 4 July 1901 and granted pardon and amnesty to the natives. Occupation troop strength in 1902 had been reduced from a peak of 70,000 to 34,000 and the military strong points from 552 to 195.¹⁰ The office of the military governor was abolished and the first civil administrator appointed.

What was the Philippine Archipelago now? "Is it a nation, a state, a territory, a republic, a colony, an annex, an ally, or a dependency?" wondered the Philadelphia Public Ledger. The Supreme Court decision concerning the status of annexed territories was

contained in the Insular Cases of 1901: there are two kinds of acquired territories: incorporated and unincorporated. The Philippines were an unincorporated territory. Filipinos had "fundamental" rights (life, liberty, and property rights) but not "formal" or "procedural" rights; only incorporated territories possessed all three.

In review, Dewey had destroyed the Spanish fleet, the Army had occupied Manila and the provinces, the Senate had ratified the peace treaty ceding the islands to the United States, the electorate ratified McKinley's annexation policy, and lastly, the Supreme Court legalized the annexation.

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

The achievements in the administration of civil duties on the part of the Army officer in the Philippines were most commendable. The Army officer became the jack-of-all-trades in establishing American-style colonial administration as it replaced the corrupt and oppressive Spanish administration. The Army's charter was never clearer. President McKinley associated to Elihu Root, as he took charge of the War Department, that the principal task of the War Department would now be the administrative and legal one of governing the insular territories acquired from Spain.

During the occupation of Manila in August 1898, General MacArthur was appointed Provost Marshal of the city, General Green

was placed in charge of customs and finances, and other Army officers assumed duties associated with courts, sanitation, public works, and education. It was a task of a very delicate, trying, and constructive nature.¹¹

Highways and harbors were improved, schools built and amply staffed, sanitation measures instituted, fair modes of taxation came into being, civil graft was markedly reduced, and Filipinos were introduced into the Philippine Commission. These altruistic works and acts brought high credit to the Army.

The range of duties of an officer in civil administration can best be described by relating an editorial contained in the Army and Navy Journal of 20 April 1901 concerning Lieutenant N. G. Bishop, Artillery Corps, 1st Colorado, then Director of Licensing, Manila:

The department now embraces the licensing of business not provided for elsewhere in the government; the management of the markets and the collection of market taxes; the management of the matadero and the collection of the meat tax; weights and measures, carriage taxes and taxes for carts and horses; building permits; registration of live stock, public land rentals, and the collection of various other small imposts and taxes. All of these, with a few exceptions, were farmed out for collection and supervision to individuals under the Spanish regime, but Lieutenant Bishop has reclaimed them to proper administration and broken up this corrupt system.¹²

In The History of the United States Army, William A. Gano would write of the duties of the Army officer from the Spanish-American War to World War I: student, leader, governor, judge, jury, councilor, fighter, constructor, alms-giver, executive, peacemaker. He would think "first of his duty to his nation".¹³

Surely the forcible annexation of the Philippines could be argued on a moral basis; but just as surely it must be recognized that America, in the instrumentality of its Army, did govern her new ward with decency.

COMPLAINTS AND CRITICISM

The American Army had been sent to the Philippines in an act of mercy to save "our little brown brother". As has been specified earlier, it was also to assist the natives in overthrowing Spanish colonial rule. The rules of the game changed once the Army arrived in the islands, the enemy had surrendered early after a mock battle and the "friendlies" quickly became a second and much larger threat. It is doubtful that the American public at large perceived this new political and military arrangement. Their indulgently paternalistic view of the Filipinos soon changed to one of contempt toward colored colonials. Newspaper accounts of atrocities by American soldiers, charges of military censorship, characterization of the Army as a brigand group of outlaws, and the sight of church paraphernalia all added to a heightened attack on the soldier and the Army.

ATROCITIES

Stories of atrocities - water cure, torture of guerrilla prisoners, looting, wanton destruction of property - quickly diluted official news releases that the Filipinos were our friends and that the American soldier was on a humanitarian mission. When perplexed officers introduced harsh policing of disaffected areas and severe methods for prying information from guerrillas, the anti-imperialists attacked the Army in full cry.

Americans had used the water cure as a coercive measure in retaliation for acts committed by the insurrectos. Four or five gallons of water were forced down the throat of a captive, whose "body became something frightful to contemplate," and then were squeezed out by kneeling on the victim's stomach; the captive almost invariably talked.

A second example of atrocity concerned the deriding of the religious beliefs of the Moro tribesmen. A Juramentado would work himself up into a religious frenzy, kris (Malay dagger) in hand, running amok and charging blindly, seeking to kill American soldiers until such time as he was disposed of. In order to stop this fanatic practice, it was reported that the soldiers would first kill the assassin and then bury him with the carcass of a pig - thereby shutting Heaven's gates to a devout Muslim. The second means, which came later, was to replace the .38-caliber service revolver with the .45-caliber automatic pistol and heavier slug.¹⁵

Press releases in 1900 recounted stories of soldiers using dumdum (expanding) ammunition and noting that the United States had neglected to ratify the 1899 Hague Convention clauses concerning humane warfare.

Some of the stories were distorted; nevertheless, public opinion was inflamed. Political pressure from the homeland prompted Congressional investigations and general courts-martial followed.

CENSORSHIP

General Ewell S. Otis developed a taciturn and unmovable relationship with the press. He was charged with censorship, with distorting releases, with possessing ultra-optimistic views that incorrectly reflected existing conditions in the field. Correspondents cabled: "We believe the dispatches incorrectly represent the existing conditions among the Filipinos in respect to internal dissension and demoralization resulting from the American campaign and to the brigand character of the Army".¹⁶ It was not just censorship; there was general resentment of Otis as a commander. He was also charged with decisional blunders concerning the appointment of a Catholic priest as Superintendent of Manila schools and his favoring the return of Roman Catholic real estate. His faulty concept of the nature of the insurgency war prompted him to believe that the combat effort was producing favorable

results at a time when he would not extend United States lines to make contact with the guerrillas. His glowing reports to the United States spoke of "scattering" the enemy while the press wrote of American forces having to again meet and engage the elusive insurgents. The Army was accused of attempting to coverup the lack of operational successes against the insurgents.

CHURCH DESECRATION

In late 1899 there were reports of church desecration by American soldiers. General Otis attributed these acts to the Chinese and the insurrectos; but United States troops arriving home brought crucifixes, vestments, candlesticks, chalices, and other holy articles made of gold. Americans reacted with disbelief, anger, and a desire to hush up the affair.

Censorship, the various acts of atrocities reported by the press, and our relation with the Roman Catholic Church in the Philippines, triggered a new wave of criticism toward the military whose announced purpose in the islands was to extend American benevolency.

BRIGANDAGE

In time the most vitriolic criticism stemmed from the forces of anti-imperialism. The fanfare and the flag-waving for them had passed and what remained was their continuing conservative dislike

for the "new paths and prospects they offered of the militarism, the international brigandage . . . which they had so often condemned".¹⁷

Albert Robinson of the New York Evening Post (1899) would write: "A war that kills five thousand men on both sides, maims, cripples, and breaks down ten thousand and causes endless misery to countless thousands more, is a curious variety of humane war".¹⁸ In the same vein, Mr. Hoar, in 1903 in the United States Senate, said: "What has been the practical statesmanship which comes from your ideals and sentimentalities?" "You have devastated provinces. You have slain uncounted thousands of the people you desire to benefit. Your generals are coming home from their harvest. . . ." ¹⁹

The New York Evening Post also reported Congressional "sentiment" concerning the American role in the Philippines. The Congress, it stated, "would snap at an opportunity to let go" of the islands, waiting for some chance or condition to extricate us from "the scrape we got into through ignorance and the flamboyant national spirit created by the war with Spain". The Army and Navy Journal commented: "even if it were generally agreed that we should withdraw . . . nobody has proposed a plan whereby we can do so with honor and with established security for native and American interests".²⁰

The antagonists were to place a stain upon the Army by falsely stigmatizing the military establishment as an institution

of cruelty and oppression while knowing full well that the Army could not reply.

LESSONS LEARNED

The tenacity of the Filipino Insurgent had been underestimated by the Army. The assumption that insurrection by irregular forces can be speedily ended without a greatly increased force proved to be in error. Alternating displays of harsh measures and ostentatious generosity both failed to break the Filipino resistance. As the field commanders introduced new methods of coping with the complex problems of insurgency warfare, the mood of the nation was such that the people simply failed to grasp the expanded magnitude of the war. Misunderstanding and mistrust were to follow.

The United States Army had been deployed to the islands under an umbrella of high public regard and flag-waving patriotism that reflected the martial spirit of the times. Once Congress had determined the shape of the volunteer forces and the mechanics of enlistment, enlistment objectives were readily attained. Problems associated with the movement of troops from Tampa to Santiago were, in the main, corrected for troop movement out of San Francisco to Manila. However, new problems surfaced once the forces arrived in Manila Bay - a clearly stated military objective. The emergence of the United States as an imperialistic, world power at this juncture in time and circumstances was at best obscure. In a large measure the unresolved question concerning the annexation or

independence of the Philippines contributed to the undefined mission of the Army.

Leniency through disarming the captives and offering amnesty seemed merely to cause more blood to be spilled. Drastic applications of force drew volatile response from the public. There appeared to be no middle-road in the conduct of the war that would satisfy the ethicists some six thousand miles away.

In the fall of 1899, there appeared provocative leaflets, letters, and pamphlets throughout the military establishment encouraging the troops not to reenlist. The theme of the literature reflected anti-imperialistic invective and reasoning, cited statistics of disease among the soldiers, documented atrocity stories, and reflected the perfidy of United States diplomacy in the Pacific. The War Department labeled the material seditious and instructed General Otis to destroy it because such material could only give aid and comfort to the enemy. In turn, the government was charged by the anti-imperialists with suppressing freedom of opinion at home, and in a manner not unlike a speech criticizing the administration. The predicted next step, the anti-imperialist said, would be stamping out the freedom of speech.

Tactically, the war in the Philippines became a "second lieutenant's war".²¹ The strong points established throughout the islands became little garrisons with constant small operations, breaking large combat groups into smaller ones, and capturing arms.

Sergeants supervised training and construction duties normally allotted to field grade officers.

General Otis was criticized for sending in 1898 comparatively large forces in two or three directions, instead of sending large numbers of small mobile columns in all directions to occupy insurgent territory. His caution may have prolonged the war from a few months to three years.²² It is deemed important to carry this lesson a step further. In considerable part, because General Otis would not aggressively extend the lines much beyond the city of Manila to grapple with the insurgents, disillusionment and depressingly low morale set in with the American soldier; a definite by-product of inactivity.²³ General Otis' replacement would immediately initiate extensive combat operations to restore morale and confidence to the soldier.

A final lesson concerns the framing of national objectives in moral tones. All rationale can be accepted under a banner of patriotism and martial spirit, but when events turn for the worse, even temporarily, moral issues become the least palatable and most difficult to defend.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

1. Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 222.
2. Ibid.
3. Wolff, p. 115.
4. Ibid., p. 11.
5. Ibid., p. 102.
6. Samuel E. Morrison and Henry S. Commanger, The Growth of the American Republic (1962), p. 429.
7. Wolff, p. 335.
8. Waigley, History of the United States Army, p. 317.
9. R. Ernest Dupuy and William H. Baumer, The Little Wars of the United States (1968), p. 87.
10. Ibid., p. 92.
11. Gano, p. 397.
12. "Varied Duties of Army Officers," Army and Navy Journal (20 April 1901), p. 812.
13. Gano, p. 461.
14. Wolff, p. 253.
15. Dupuy and Baumer, p. 94.
16. Wolff, p. 262.
17. Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 391.
18. Wolff, p. 295.
19. Ibid., p. 362.
20. Editorial, Army and Navy Journal (18 February 1905), p. 667.

21. Oliver L. Spaulding, The United States Army in Peace and War (1937), p. 338.

22. Dupuy and Baumer, p. 94.

23. Another cause of low morale was combination of exhaustion, climate, casualties, disease, and the end of the war with Spain.

CHAPTER V

CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION

The interest of the United States in the Pacific, as a result of the Philippine Insurrection, was to extend to China for the very same reasons - commercial and humanitarian. For fifty years European nations had nibbled at China's vast periphery: Russia had moved into Manchuria, seized Liaotung Peninsula, and established bases at Dalny and Port Arthur on the Yellow Sea; Germany had control of the Port of Tsing-tao through treaty arrangements; Great Britain controlled the Ports of Weihaiwei in the North and Hong Kong on the mainland in the South; France, adding to her initial grab of Indochina, had exacted spheres of influence in the three southernmost Chinese provinces; and Italy controlled San Men Bay on the East China Sea. In September 1899 Secretary of State John Hay announced a policy of commercial equality toward China by interested states.

OPEN DOOR POLICY

The Open Door Policy, originally promulgated in the form of identical notes to the great powers, who then held "spheres of influence" in China, called for the observation of equal commercial rights in thirteen of China's eighteen provinces and three additional provinces in Manchuria. A similar note in 1900 upheld

China's territorial integrity and independence as well; extraterritorial rights of foreign missionaries had been demanded and exacted by the respective powers.

The Boxer Rebellion, as it came to be known, was no rebellion at all. It was, in fact, an anti-foreign crusade aided and abetted by the Chinese Government and aimed at the extirpation of all foreigners and foreign influence through the confines of the empire.

BOXER UPRISE

A group of fanatical anti-foreign Chinese nationalists, organized as the Order of Literary Patriotic Harmonious Fists (called Boxers), in 1900, rose up against foreigners in their country.¹ Tzu-Hsi, Dowager Empress of China, recognized that her regime was threatened by the many inroads of European countries, favored the Boxers who were bent on ridding the country of "foreign devils" and "Devil's disciples". Terrorism and murder of foreigners occurred; the international diplomatic corps, Americans, and hundreds of Chinese refugees fled to the foreign legations and Peking. Boxers as well as Chinese regular forces then besieged the Legation Quarters.

The defense of the enclave rested with detachments of soldiers and sailors from eight nations: 55 Americans; 82 Britons; 31 Russians; 52 Germans; 47 French; 27 Austrians; 29 Italians; and 25 Japanese; a total of 20 officers and 389 men. The Legation

Quarter was an area roughly three-quarters of a square mile.

On 28 May, when the diplomatic corps sensed that religious persecution was only a facade and that the ultimate aim of the Boxers was the extermination of all foreigners, the corps requested armed guards for the legation from an assortment of foreign warships then gathered off Taku Bar in the Yellow Sea.

The 9th Infantry was withdrawn from Tarlac, one hundred miles north of Manila, on 18 June and arrived in China on 6 July 1900. Major General Adna R. Chaffee would command these and other Army units that had arrived directly from the States. The allied expeditionary force numbered 19,000 (including 2000 Americans). Events took place from the coast of the Gulf of Chihli at the north of the Pei-Ho (North) River, through Tientsin, to Peking some seventy-five miles northwest. Peking was under siege by the Boxers for fifty-five days; the expeditionary force would free the legation on 15 August and scatter the Boxers throughout the countryside.

By the end of October 1900, the China Relief Expedition had melted away. The American troops were withdrawn to Manila with the exception of one regiment of Infantry (15th U.S.), one squadron of Cavalry, and a battery of Artillery (formerly Reilly's).² These regular forces remained in China until September 1901 under the terms of the Boxer Protocol. The continued holding of Peking by foreign troops would be marked with indifference by the Chinese.³ England, France, and Japan each had in excess of a thousand men in garrison in Peking as late as 1909.

The losses among the defenders of the legation were 66 killed and 158 wounded.

The significance of this minor expedition is twofold: (1) it was the first experience of United States forces with allied troops since the Revolutionary War; (2) there was no appointed supreme commander of the allied expeditionary force and some national rivalry existed.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

1. Richard Eofstader, William Miller, and Daniel Aaron, The United States; Tha History of a Republic (1967), p. 635.

2. Spaulding, p. 392.

3. Editorial, Army and Navy Journal (6 March 1909), p. 747.

CHAPTER VI

MEXICAN PUNITIVE EXPEDITION

In 1910, when troubles across the Mexican Border first developed which had necessitated some military action on the part of the United States along the Rio Grande, there was insufficient evidence to determine whether the rebellious elements were bandits or revolutionists. By 1911 it was clear that Mexico had erupted into a social revolution aimed against the dictatorial regime of President Porfirio Diaz. Diaz was to resign in 1911; two things of importance occurred: (1) he would be replaced in accordance with constitutional processes by Francisco Madero and (2) the United States would form and assemble at San Antonio, Texas, a Maneuver Division of some 6,700 troops. The United States was "charged" by some with sending troops to the border to "bolster the Mexican Federalists and to discourage the insurgents".¹ In fact, the troops along the border maintained an attitude of complete neutrality and received high praise for their conduct during a troublesome and diplomatically delicate time. There were no acts of indiscretion. After the completion of the scheduled summer maneuver, the division was disbanded but the individual units continued to patrol the border.

Mexican Federalist troops under Madero engaged Zapatista rebels in southern Mexico. The United States, perceiving that a condition of anarchy existed in Mexico, ordered all United States

troops to be held in readiness for field service. Five days later, on 9 February 1912, the Army detailed a squad (one officer and 12 men) to escort Mexican Federalist troops across American soil. The Federalists were en route to Juarez and Chihuahua by way of Lardeo and El Paso. Their arms and ammunition were packed separately while journeying through Texas. It was yet another step toward American intervention.

In February 1913 fighting erupted again in the streets of Mexico City between the Federal Army and the Rebel Army under General Diaz. The United States dispatched a force of six battleships to Mexico to afford necessary protection to its citizens and foreign residents. Three battleships sailed to Vera Cruz and one battleship sailed to Tampico, all on the East coast of Mexico; two armed cruisers sailed to Mazatlan and Acapulco on the West coast. It was a considerable force to "show the flag".

General Madero was deposed by a new military chieftain, General Victoriano Huerta. While Madero was being transferred on 22 February from the National Palace in Mexico City to a cell in the federal district penitentiary he was assassinated, supposedly while trying to escape under cover of attack by Maderist supporters.

President Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta regime that had been established through violent means and which had brought about both injury to United States nationals in Mexico and loss of mutual goodwill.² American support shifted to the Constitutionalists under General Venustiano Carranza.

American involvement in the internal affairs of Mexico took another step a year later (February 1914) when the President lifted the embargo on shipment of arms into Mexico from the United States, a move to help the Carranza government.

TAMPICO AND VERA CRUZ

On 9 April 1914 a boat's crew of the flagship of Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo, then lying anchored in the harbor, was arrested by the Mexican federal commander at Tampico at the landing pier and marched publicly through the streets. To some it was a reaction by the Federalist to the new support given to the Constitution-
alists by the United States Government; but to Admiral Mayo it was a flagrant national affront. He dispatched a message to General Zaragoza of the Federalist forces, on 10 April calling attention to the arrest, and said:

I do not need to tell you that taking men from a boat flying the United States flag is a hostile act. . . . I must require that you send by suitable members of your staff formal disavowal and apology for the act. . . . Also that you publicly hoist a United States flag in a prominent position on shore and salute it with twenty-one guns.³

President Huerta refused. Admiral Mayo had acted without consultation with Washington; the President supported him and on 20 April he asked and received Congressional sanction to use force to uphold United States rights and to secure redress for the insult.

The following day United States Marines landed in Tampico, Mexican ports were sealed by blockade to sever communication to the outside world, and the Army was ordered into Mexico to relieve the Marines. The Yperango, a German cargo steamer, was known to be heading for Vera Cruz with arms and ammunition for Huerta's government troops so Vera Cruz was also occupied by American forces. The 5th Provisional Brigade, formed a year earlier at Texas City and Galveston under Brigadier General Frederick Funston, was transported with great dispatch to Mexico. The experience gained through the Maneuver Division materially assisted the unit in arriving at Vera Cruz on 28 April. Funston, against heavy opposition ashore, relieved the naval forces, assumed command, and then, quite typical of his ingenuity and the humanitarian aspect of the mission,⁴ organized a military government, took steps to preserve law and order, protected the water supply into the city, all of which reflected an excellent record of tact and diplomatic maneuvering by the Army in yet another ready-made war to be conducted peacefully.

MEXICAN INTERVENTION

The ABC Powers - Argentina, Brazil, and Chile - met at Niagara Falls, Ontario, in June 1914 to serve as mediators for the settlement of the internal strife that had gripped Mexico. They proposed: (1) the retirement of Huerta; (2) the establishment of a Mexican Provisional Government pledged to support agriculture and political reforms; and (3) no indemnity payments to the United

States for occupational costs at Vera Cruz. General Huerta refused, but soon thereafter was eased out of office. Carranza took over the Presidency in August 1914; in October, the United States and a number of Latin American nations recognized Venustiano Carranza as de facto President of Mexico. American occupational forces under Funston were withdrawn on 23 November 1914.

Yet another revolt was to occur. In 1915 Huerta's best general, Francisco "Pancho" Villa, took command of the opposition forces. Bandits had launched repeated independent raids across the border on American towns, the most important raid directed against Columbus, New Mexico. These raids were acts of banditry and were viewed by the United States as not being representative of the Mexican nation. Unable to tolerate further raids, President Wilson mobilized the Regular Army along the Rio Grande border and in March 1916 sent an expeditionary force under General John J. Pershing deep into Mexico to break up Villa's band. The National Guard was not called in until June 1916.⁵

Pershing's orders contemplated hostilities against Villa only, while maintaining a state of peace with the Mexican Government, and hence required that no town be entered and no railroad or telegraph facilities be used without permission of the Mexican Government. In general, the mission was to be a punitive expedition while providing complete respect for the sovereignty of Mexico and in the maintenance of cordial relations with its people.

The Army of 6000 men penetrated over 400 miles deep into the interior, scattered the bandits, and failed to capture Villa. The expeditionary force was ordered out of Mexico on 30 January 1917 and the last man crossed the border by 5 February 1917.

LESSONS LEARNED

The results of the intervention vary in accordance with the views of the principal antagonists. The dignity of the United States was not to be taken lightly. The nation would not tolerate the nuisance raids into its territory. American intervention preserved the integrity of Mexico, and by implication, all nations of the Western Hemisphere. In a more practical vein, the intervention, along with its attendant mobilization of National Guard forces for border patrol duty, would serve as the principal training vehicle for the Army in preparation for World War I.

To the President of Mexico, Carranza, the punitive expedition constituted an act of war and, therefore, he was free to take any measures that he might see fit. The demeanor of the American troops in Mexico would not signal an expansion of the conflict.

Lastly, the violation of Mexican territory outraged most of the peoples of South America.

CHAPTER VI

FOOTNOTES

1. "The Mexican Situation," Army and Navy Journal (27 May 1911), p. 1176.
2. Dupuy and Baumer, p. 123.
3. "Details of the Mexican Situation," Army and Navy Journal (25 April 1914), p. 1080.
4. Spaulding, p. 405.
5. The 150,000 National Guardsmen on the border as a show of force would reduce tension and give second thoughts to the government that might precipitate further US involvement in Mexico.

CHAPTER VII

DOMESTIC ACTIVITY

Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison in his annual report of 13 December 1913 said: "But much remains to be done not so much to popularize the Army as to fix it at its proper place in the estimation of the people".¹ Then the report reviewed the things accomplished by the Army since the Spanish-American War. "Most of these duties were quite outside the scope of military duties," he said, "at least as commonly understood, . . . requiring a high order of intelligence and skill, a broad spirit of humanity and the exercise of self restraint and forbearance in most trying circumstances."²

The military needs of the nation were many and varied. The organization of the Army, its readiness, and its effectiveness would be called upon to provide conspicuous public service over and above the demands for purely military operations. The Army was to prove itself a public necessity.

PANAMA CANAL

The expansionist movement of the United States into the affairs of the Western Hemisphere and the Pacific Ocean would gain an Anglo-American characteristic in its approach to the control of access to the principal bodies of water on the globe. The focal points would be the British controlled Suez Canal and the American

dominated projected canal in Central America.³ It would be to the "common interest" of both states for the control of the flow of international commerce.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 between the United States and Great Britain provided for the joint construction and fortification of an Isthmian Canal. Secretary of State John Hay and Sir Julian Pauncefote of Great Britain negotiated an agreement (Hay-Pauncefote Treaty) on 18 November 1901 which abrogated the earlier treaty and permitted the United States to build the canal, fortify it and manage it without regard for any European Power, guaranteeing only that it shall be kept open on equal terms to the ships of all nations in times both of peace and war.

Panama had been a province of Columbia since 1836. Columbia signed a treaty ceding a six-mile wide canal zone to the United States upon a cash payment of 10 million dollars and a \$250,000 annuity. The Senate of Columbia, however, rejected the draft treaty. Annoyed by the delay, a patriotic Panamanian force provoked a revolt in 1903 against Columbia and declared the independence of Panama. On 30 October 1903, the U.S.S. Nashville, along with two other vessels, was ordered to the probable scene of hostilities and instructed, in case of rebellion, to siege the Panama Railroad and prevent the landing of Columbian troops within fifty miles of the Isthmus.⁴ The new Republic of Panama was then recognized in Washington on 18 November 1903 and the United States

200,000 left homeless. The city was left completely paralyzed; all commercial communications ceased, the water supply was non-operative; fires raged throughout both the business and residential areas. At 0800 hours General Funston, in the absence of Major General A.W. Greeley, Commanding General of the Division of the Pacific, had taken charge of the city as it restored itself to normalcy. The Army was to provide about 6,000 officers and men to fight fires, maintain order, protect property, and extend relief.

The first message received in Washington from General Funston was at 2340 hours, 18 April, addressed to Secretary of War Taft.

The message read:

We need thousands of tents and all the rations that can be sent. The business portion of the city destroyed and about 100,000 people homeless. Fire still raging. Troops all on duty assisting the police. Loss of life probably one thousand. Best part of residence district not yet burned.

Funston.⁶

The Army was to salvage a holocaust. It established 117 food stations and for the first few days fed 325,000 persons. Rations (400,000) were shipped from Portland, Seattle (300,000), and Los Angeles (200,000). Commissary storerooms at Fort Mason, Fort Miley, and the Presidio were open for free distribution of foodstuffs. Hospitals and tent cities were established at the Golden Gate Park. The Army Signal Corps restored telegraph and telephone communication.

Regular Army troops, along with the 1st Regiment of the California National Guard, patrolled the streets to prevent looting.

concluded a treaty with Panama under the same terms as those offered Columbia.

President Roosevelt appointed a commission to construct the canal. Private contracts were awarded and progress under the civilian commission proved unsatisfactory. The spoils system, evident in railroading and construction works, became the dominant element in the engineering of the canal. The President turned to the Army - the organized body of well disciplined men - to save the canal. President Roosevelt appointed Colonel George Goethals, in 1907, Chairman of the Panama Canal Commission, Chief Engineer, and Civil Governor of the Canal Zone. The Army would construct the canal, govern the populace, and represent United States interest in its dealing with the other Central American states. Harmony and cooperation existed in the canal work and the canal was opened ahead of schedule to commercial traffic in August 1914. Slides and cave-ins were to mark the difficulties in constructing the canal; the greatest accomplishment; however, was the advancement made in sanitation works by Colonel W. C. Gorgas against Yellow Fever, Malaria, and the bubonic plague.⁵

SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE

At 0514 hours on 18 April 1906, the City of San Francisco and surrounding communities were struck by an earthquake and fire catastrophe. Over five hundred people were killed and more than

guarded banks and public institutions and aided firemen in dynamiting buildings to prevent the spread of the fire.⁷

Conditions in San Francisco bore the menace of anarchy. General Funston had all military forces reporting to the Mayor of the city in the maintenance of public order and peace. The methods and measures used by the Army were "either formulated or endorsed by the Mayor as necessary to public interests".⁸ Martial law was not declared. Four looters were killed; none at the hands of the Regular Army.

What was to later ensue was a reinforced public acclaim for the effectiveness and preparedness of the Army in time of peace. Public trust and admiration and dependence upon military authority as a call to duty by the Army was never more graphically illustrated. The catastrophe had no parallel, either in the volume of property losses or in the number and impoverishment of its victims. The Army afforded prompt succor to the distressed; there was no famine, no epidemic, no widespread threat of looting and rioting. The highly visible authority and discipline of the Army were respected by the civil populace yet the Army had subordinated itself to civil authority. It would be called an Army of "conservators of public interest;" "of builders and protectors in time of peace."

NATURAL DISASTERS

The Army was frequently called into forest fire and flood service to take up relief work. Notable in this period of military

history were: (1) the forest fires in August-September 1910 in Montana, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon; (2) flooding of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers in May 1912; and (3) flooding again in the Mississippi Valley in March 1913. The Army would typically distribute supplies, care for refugees, establish sanitation controls to stop epidemics, and assist in lessening the effects of the disaster. Tentage, food, and medical supplies were provided to the afflicted but it was the organization and discipline of the Army that proved to be the impetus to its effectiveness.

STRIKE BREAKING

At the turn of the century the government and the various states began to expand their responsibilities to protect public health and safety. Social legislation abolished child labor practices, safeguarded women in industry, established workman's compensation, and otherwise addressed the problems of the factory.⁹ Antagonism between labor unions and the law became acute. Leadership for the belligerent arm of the labor movement was provided by the Industrial Workers of the World, called "The Wobblies", organized in 1905, and having not more than 60,000 members. Their purpose was to abolish the wage system by overthrowing the entire capitalist system; their tool was strikes and free-speech arguments.

The Army was called in to quell those disturbances. Two examples will be cited. In the coal strike of 1902, 150,000 United

Mine Workers went on strike in Colorado over a wage dispute. President Roosevelt laid plans for government seizure of the coal mines and the strike ended with the miners receiving a substantial wage increase. For the first time the federal government had intervened in a labor dispute not just to protect property, but to assure a strike settlement in the public interest that took both labor's and management's rights into consideration. A second strike occurred in the coal regions of Colorado, Montana, and Arkansas in 1914. The Colorado National Guard was unsuccessful in suppressing disorder between the strikers and mine operators of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, in which some fifty persons, including women and children, had been killed. President Wilson, on 28 April 1914, ordered federal troops to the scene to take control.¹⁰ The disputes concerned pay, hours of labor, and recognition of the union. The presence of the disciplined troops of the Army restored respect to authority and the warfare ceased. State militia forces were withdrawn and the strikers surrendered their arms to the soldiers.

Police work by Federal troops in coping with widespread outbreaks of labor disturbances forced the cancellation of many encampments scheduled for the summer of 1914.¹¹

RIOT DUTY

Labor disputes often precipitated civil riots and again the military was called to intervene. The city of Coeur d'Alene was

placed under martial law in May 1899. Rioters suspected of complicity in the acts leading to murder and destruction of property had fled from the state of Idaho into Western Montana. The commanding general of the Coeur d'Alene district dispatched a company of United States infantry into Montana, captured twenty-five suspects, and returned them to Idaho to await examination. Brigadier General H.C. Merriam, in speaking of the riots, said: "Duty of this kind is the last that the soldier covets, but he does not hesitate to perform it, and for this we hear the cry of militarism. . . ."12

The civilian population would not always acquiesce to military authority. The unfortunate occurrence at Evansville, Indiana in July 1903, shows the results of public distrust in the soldier. A description of the affair follows. A negro who had slain a policeman was placed in jail and a mob demanded that he be surrendered for lynching. The demand was refused by the sheriff, who, realizing his inability to protect the prisoner, invoked the aid of the military. A mob numbering several thousand persons stormed the jail and attacked the troops; seven rioters were killed and twenty-five wounded. The Army and Navy Journal would comment editorially "that the troops acted with commendable moderation and self-control, submitting patiently to injury and insult without provocation and firing only at command. But they dispersed the mob".13

Lynchings, strikes, and riots were frequently with the nation; the Army was called upon to maintain domestic law and order which required soldiers to supplement the work of the police when the latter were overwhelmed by mob violence. Disciplined and well trained soldiers proved to be the most effective authority for the application of force in connection with civil disorders.

BROWNSVILLE INCIDENT

The United States Army would have its dark days too. The trouble at Brownsville, Texas occurred in August 1906 because the citizens there intended that it should; it was an incident between racially excited citizens of the community and inflamed Negro soldiers of Fort Brown. Twelve men of the 25th United States Infantry were charged with murderous assault that resulted in the death of one man.

The military investigators at Fort Brown reported that a soldier strolling in town failed "to get entirely off the sidewalk for a white man and a woman, and, it is said, the soldier actually brushed against the woman's dress".¹⁴ The white man was an inspector of customs and was therefore always armed. He struck the Negro soldier with his revolver, knocking him down. The victim related the incident to fellow soldiers in the barracks who, after midnight, returned to Brownsville and shot up the town. Their action was justified by them as seeking redress for the

incident and the signs in town saying: "No Negroes Allowed Here".

In a letter to the editor of the Army and Navy Journal, a citizen related the community's version of the incident. Negro soldiers visiting saloons were "politely informed that only white people were served there; . . . the men were sullen and insolent - appearing in the streets in parties of four . . . so that white people were forced into the roadway in order to pass".¹⁵

A Citizens Committee of Brownsville insisted upon the removal of all Negro soldiers and within a few days three companies of the 25th Infantry were transferred to Fort Reno, Oklahoma. The incident immediately became a national issue and, in particular, an issue between President Roosevelt and the Congress. Observing that none of the soldiers had admitted guilt to the murder of the citizen and that all would be considered guilty through association, the President on 9 November summarily discharged without honor 160 men of Companies B, C, and E, six of whom had won the Medal of Honor.¹⁶

By an Act of Congress of 3 March 1909, provisions were made for the affected individuals to present themselves before a court to determine their qualifications for reenlistment, return to the colors, and restoration of lost time.¹⁷

MEDICAL SERVICE

The ratio of deaths due to disease and hostile fire in the Spanish-American War was thirteen to one. On the 9th of July 1898

three suspected cases of yellow fever were discovered among the troops in Santiago - one month later the Commanding General of 7 Corps asserted "that the Corps must be moved or it will perish"¹⁸ and pressed for evacuation. The Corps had been struck down by yellow fever and malaria. Withdrawal of the Corps was completed by the end of August 1898. A special camp was established at Montauk Point, Long Island. Five thousand deaths due to disease occurred in Cuba.

Army medical officers gained fame in epidemiological medicine by triumphing over the spread of typhoid, tuberculosis, diphtheria, yellow fever, malaria, and scarlet fever. Compulsory vaccination was introduced for all military personnel; sanitation works (screening of barracks, draining of marshes), and preventive hygienic medicine were persistently applied both in the field and camps. Thoroughness and intensity of purpose marked the Army medical scientists pursuit in destroying the causes of the various communicable diseases.

Anaebic dysentery, cholera, small pox, and beri-beri, the chief causes of death and disability among the native troops, would all be dramatically reduced or eradicated by the effectiveness of the Army Medical Service.

INDIAN OUTBREAKS

The nation would continue to be surprised by new Indian outbreaks even though the Indian Wars had terminated. Indian

grievances were directed against the local Indian Agent and the Federal government for alleged mistreatment of their tribes on the various reservations. The Army was called to suppress disorders, capture and return Indians to their reservations, and act as mediator in the settlement of disputes.

In September 1898 the Pillager branch of the Chippewa Tribe near Leech Lake, Minnesota refused to surrender bucks to the local sheriff, armed themselves with Winchester rifles, and threatened to fight to the death rather than submit to government rule. A detachment from the 3rd Infantry, Fort Snelling, was dispatched to Leech Lake. At the dinner hour the detachment had been ordered to stack arms whereupon a rifle belonging to a recruit accidentally discharged. The ambushed Indians nearby felt that they had been uncovered and immediately opened fire. Reinforcements were called for, the Indians were taken peacefully, and order was restored.¹⁹

On 9 October 1902 the Secretary of the Interior reported to the War Department that there was a danger of conflict between rival factions of Choctaw Indians and asked for a body of troops to preserve the peace. Two companies of troops from the 25th United States Infantry were dispatched to Tuskehoma, the capital of the Choctaw Nation. In and about the council building were about 200 Indian Police, deputy United State marshals, and other private individuals, most of them armed. The Indian Agent desired to have

the building cleared; but the U.S. marshal objected to any interference by the troops. The soldiers compelled all persons to surrender their arms. Major C.G. Starr, 25th Infantry, reported: "This action seemed taken in good part by all except the U.S. marshal, who threatened me with all manner of dire consequences of the law, demanding my orders, and generally made himself obnoxious, but to whom I paid little attention."²⁰ The cool head of the military had prevailed.

In July 1906, 300 Ute Indians broke out of their Uintah Reservation and escaped across Wyoming. The governor called for United States troops, they intercepted the fleeing Indians without bloodshed and led them back to Fort Meade, South Dakota. The grievance in this instance was economic distress.

The following year a minor skirmish between Utes and Indian Police and soldiers resulted in the death of three Indians. The Indians had opened fire against the party in the belief that the agents intended to forcibly take their children from them due to the coming of winter and the shortage of food. The Indians disturbing the peace were captured by the troops and placed in the guard house. The mediatory rule of the Army would come to the forefront. Captain Carter J. Johnson, 10th Cavalry, reported to the War Department: "I held council with the Utes in camp Utes are very hungry. Women and children are suffering. Agent demands harsh and severe remedies. . . . One hundred pounds of flour and a little patience is a more potent factor in the solution of this

problem than one hundred soldiers."²¹ The implicit confidence the Indians had in the Army representative prevented further bloodshed and most importantly, allowed a solution without coercion or intimidation that was not otherwise possible under civil authorities.

Another example of mediation concerns the Hopi Indians of Arizona, in November 1911, who refused to send their children to agency schools on the reservation as instructed by the Department of the Interior. Colonel Hugh L. Scott, 3rd Cavalry, who was well acquainted with the customs and habits of the Hopi Indians, was chosen to conduct negotiations. He gained the Indian's confidence, pointed out in sign language the necessity to educate their children, and brought the peacemaking mission to a successful conclusion. Colonel Scott would again be called on (December 1913) to induce Navajo Indians of New Mexico to surrender to civil authorities in an incident that caused terror and fear in the San Juan Valley. That too was concluded successfully.

In summary, the Army was frequently called to perform a multiplicity of tasks in domestic affairs which required immediate response, effective leadership, experienced and well disciplined personnel, and an unbiased neutrality to the issues or situation at hand. More often than not, civil authority was either ineffective, absent, or had collapsed when the Army was called to restore peace and order. This was especially meaningful in the relationship with local law enforcement officers and Indian

Agents as the Army task ran counter to their desires. Criticism would mount as the Army enjoined strike breaking and disruptive riots but the will of the nation was preserved by the one instrument of the Federal government so organized to cope with oversized confrontations.

CHAPTER VII

FOOTNOTES

1. "Secretary Garrison and Army Ideals," Army and Navy Journal (13 December 1913), p. 455.
2. Ibid.
3. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and The Rise of America to World Power (1956), p. 148.
4. Hofstadter, et al., p. 639.
5. See "Medical Service," this chapter.
6. "The San Francisco Earthquake," Army and Navy Journal (21 April 1906), p. 948.
7. The Army was severely criticized for the dynamiting of buildings.
8. General Greeley's Report to the War Department regarding the "Services of the United States Army in the City of San Francisco," Army and Navy Journal (21 July 1906), p. 1316.
9. Dulles, p. 190.
10. "Federal Troops to Colorado Mines," Army and Navy Journal (21 May 1914), p. 1255.
11. Gano, p. 450.
12. "Coeur d'Alene Riots," Army and Navy Journal (6 October 1900), p. 127.
13. Editorial, Army and Navy Journal (11 July 1903), p. 1137.
14. "The Trouble at Fort Brown," Army and Navy Journal (1 September 1906), p. 16.
15. "The Affair at Brownsville, Texas," Army and Navy Journal (8 September 1906), p. 42.
16. George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1901-1912 (1958), p. 213.

17. Gano, p. 434.
18. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 310.
19. "The Leach Lake Fight with Indians," Army and Navy Journal (5 November 1898), p. 238.
20. "Trouble Among the Choctaws," Army and Navy Journal (15 November 1902), p. 250.
21. Dispatch from Thunder Butte, South Dakota to War Department, 1 November 1907, Army and Navy Journal (1 November 1907), p. 252.

CHAPTER VIII

REORGANIZATION AND REFORM

In the early 1900's the Army was structured for command and control purposes into ten independent staff departments. The Adjutant General's Department had the most important coordinating influence within the War Department and was viewed as being "senior" to the others, generally due to the personality of the incumbent Adjutant General. There were three supply departments - Quartermaster, Subsistence and Ordnance - and four functional departments - Pay, Medical, Signal, and Engineers. The Inspector General and the Judge Advocate Departments completed the bureaus. There were also three ancillary and virtually independent agencies: Board of Commissioners (Soldier's Home), Records and Pension Office and Board of Publications.

The Army of less than 30,000 men was distributed throughout 77 military posts in the United States; six had garrisons of one company each, and seventeen had garrisons of two companies each.

The duality of control exercised by the Commanding General of the Army and the Secretary of War caused bickering and confusion.¹ The division of authority between the civil and military heads of the Army was unclear and contentious. The bureaus insisted that they were under the exclusive authority of the Secretary of War and not answerable to the Commanding General of the Army. The

heads of the special staffs also managed to free themselves from strictly military control until they were in reality subject only to the authority of the Secretary of War.

The Spanish-American War precipitated the reorganization of the Army by the changing demands of supporting an active and expanded foreign policy.² The Army as organized was simply inadequate to encounter the tasks of an imperial nation with newly acquired territories throughout the western and Pacific Hemispheres.

As early as 1898, the chairman of the House Military Committee, Mr. Hull, suggested that the Army may have to : (1) be increased by fifty to one-hundred thousand men, principally infantry and coastal artillery for home defense; (2) enlarge the capacity of military schools without lowering the standards of the Army; and (3) move to a General Staff system similar to the German Army.³

THE GENERAL STAFF

Opposition to the concept of a general staff was headed by the Commanding General of the Army, General Nelson A. Miles. The bureau chiefs and their subordinates in Washington as well as the permanent tenure civilian bureaucrats were also opposed to the concept because they saw their power threatened by reorganization. A second major source of opposition was the National Guard. There were in 1901 national forces composed of the Regular Army and the

Volunteers and National Guard forces treated as militia. It was the intent of the Secretary of War, Elihu Root, when reorganizing, to incorporate the National Guard forces into a Federally controlled reserve.⁴ It was evident to Root that the National Guard lobby would be able to defeat any reform to the reserve system so he abandoned the idea in the hope of strengthening the chances for passage of the reorganization bill.

The General Staff Act was approved 14 February 1903, to become effective 15 August, one week after the scheduled retirement of General Miles. The bill abolished the separate office of Commanding General of the Army, provided for a Chief of Staff to act as chief military advisor through the Secretary of War to the President, established a General Staff within the War Department and General Staff positions with troops, and changed the War College Board to the Army War College. A joint Army and Navy Board would later be established. The reorganization addressed the problem of reconciling civilian control over the United States Army while maintaining military efficiency. Effective command was reconciled with constitutional democracy and civilian responsibility.⁵ Though the public had called for reform, there remained the fear that the General Staff plan might rekindle criticism by the anti-imperialist, by giving them an excuse to talk about European-style militarism.

The Army General Staff eventually became successful. It planned military tasks, prepared the army for new eventualities, it

secured additional reforms such as the divisional organization and maneuvers, and it demonstrated that there was no incompatibility between a good army and the American order of society.⁶

The General Staff would be continuously under attack. General Ainsworth as Adjutant General in 1904 would build his bureau into a formal rival of the General Staff. There remained a sharp division of interest between the old, traditional power relationship and the modernization process under the new concept.⁷ The extent of the conflict can be illustrated by the question of authority concerning the methods employed by the General Staff in forwarding official papers and issuing orders. The form of indorsement used by the General Staff read as follows: "Respectfully referred by direction of the Chief of Staff to. . . ." The legality of the right of the Office of the Chief of Staff to command was questioned. The contenders insisted that the correct form of indorsement would be by the authority of the Secretary of War and would read as follows: "Respectfully forwarded by order of the Secretary of War to. . . ." The Old Guard gave up their prerogatives grudgingly.

A suspicious Congress in 1912 reduced the strength of the General Staff from 45 to 36. Resentment continued; when war was declared in 1917 there were nine officers on the War Department General Staff.

THE MANEUVER DIVISION

The Reorganization Act of 2 February 1901 provided for the establishment of a board to study and report on the question of Army posts and permanent campgrounds for the yearly Army maneuver. The board was also to study the military necessities of the country with a view to withdrawing garrisons from frontier forts required in the Indian campaigns and when the plains and Western mountain ranges were sparsely settled. Although posts were identified and employed for the conduct of maneuvers, "hitching post" forts were retained in light of Congressional fondness for posts that put money into the pockets of constituents.

Field maneuvers were held in 1902 and 1903 with Regular forces and in 1904 the Regulars were joined with National Guard forces. Congress failed to provide funds for maneuvers in 1905. The 1906 encampments were fraught with more marching and training in the field than at any previous time. "Formal ceremonies were kept to the minimum; and spectacular exhibitions, such as sham battles having no military value, were eliminated."⁸ Congress appropriated \$700,000 for joint maneuvers in 1906 but there were too few troops in the United States, due to Cuban Pacification, so the maneuvers were not held.

The need for divisional size units and the exercise of these units on a large scale was now being recognized. In an editorial appearing in the July issue of the Journal of the United States

Infantry Association (1909), a convincing plea was made for a properly proportioned army, measured by divisions of about 20,000 troops, of all arms, divided into tactical commands. It would be an American Army organized along tactical units and not a mere aggregation of troops. More importantly, the Journal argued for the benefits of uniform training among all units and the ability to absorb, at least tentatively, National Guard regiments. General Leonard Wood would argue that divisional units would best support mobilization plans and allow the training of general officers in maneuvering large bodies of troops. Secretary of War Dickinson, in 1910, argued for: (1) the abolition of small posts that were but an accidental result of Indian troubles, prevented training, and focused on administrative tasks instead of operational training and, (2) the sound economies of large posts for training and mobilization.

In March 1911 a Maneuver Division, so called, was assembled at San Antonio, Texas. It was to be composed of three Brigades of Infantry, one Brigade of Field Artillery, one Independent Cavalry Brigade, and thirty-six Companies of Coast Artillery. It is best remembered for the delay in getting the regiments assembled. This improvised division was demobilized later, but the units - 6,700 strong - remained scattered along the Rio Grande border.

In 1913 another maneuver division was assembled; it mustered 11,450 men instead of a Table of Organization strength of 22,000

It marked the maximum forces that could be scraped together in the United States.⁹ The Maneuver Division, like the Navy's cruise around the World, were to provide valuable training for the grim war that was to come. The nation would say: "How beautiful"; but General Wood said, "How little!"¹⁰

THE MOBILE ARMY

There had been a definite and natural evolution in the policy of Army distribution. Earlier distribution was determined by the requirements of Indian warfare and when that cause ceased to be necessary the personnel of the Army continued to be influenced by old tradition and old ideals. Studies by the War College Division of the General Staff in 1911 pointed out that a Mobile Army should be trained as a team in combined arms and that any dispersion which prevents such training is made at the expense of efficiency and economy. There had been no brigades or divisions existing in time of peace, the highest tactical organization being the regiment. The delay in the presentation of a plan for the Mobile Army had not been due to any inability of the officers to grasp the essential importance of such concentration of forces. According to the Army and Navy Journal the delay was due to habit of the War Department of "waiting for the growth of public sentiment in Congress which would make possible the appropriations of funds requisite for the bringing together of bodies of troops. . ."¹¹

The Congress held another view. It had been the complaint of Congress that it never had been able to learn what the Army thought on any military propositions because of the divergent opinions given on every piece of military legislation. Hopefully, the mobile branches (Infantry, Cavalry, and Field Artillery) would join in a sustained policy of properly organizing our military resources in time of peace to meet the needs of war.

The Reorganization Bill of 1912 created three infantry divisions and one cavalry division within the limits of the United States. Each Infantry division was to consist of two or three brigades with a proportion of divisional artillery, cavalry, engineers, and other auxiliary troops. The country was divided into four geographical departments - Eastern, Central, Western, and Southern - with headquarters, respectively, at Governor's Island, Chicago, San Francisco and San Antonio. In addition, three separate Coast Artillery districts were formed: North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Pacific Coast. The War Department also arranged the organization of the National Guard into twelve divisions.

The reorganization was a great step forward in the restructuring of the Army. It paved the way for constant, rational improvement. It concentrated the attention of the officers upon the necessity for proper organization and training. It facilitated the withdrawal of the Mobile Army forces from the various geo-

graphical departments without the associated collapse of the command structure occasioned by the departure of the major units. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson highlighted the limitations of the reorganization by declaring the brigades and divisions would be maneuvered together, either alone or with the National Guard, "as often as the funds are provided by Congress".

THE DICK BILL AND THE MILITIA

Volunteer regiments were brought into the military service during the Spanish-American War and by early 1901 twenty-five of these Volunteer regiments were to be mustered out. Congress would authorize an additional ten regular regiments as replacements, which would provide the Army with thirty regiments of Infantry, fifteen regiments of Cavalry and a Corps of Artillery. The total strength of the Regular Army was to be 100,619 officers and men of which 12,000 were natives of the Philippines (Scouts) and Puerto Rico (Regiment).

The Army and the nation would address the question of disequilibrium: "forces not in being" do not provide effective deterrence. The controversy was, should the "Army be a professional force modeled on the armies of Europe or a non-professional force reflecting the ability of a popular government to entrust arms to its citizens".¹² Secretary of War Root believed that "with our 80 millions of people (1903) there never will be the

slightest difficulty in raising an army of any size which it is possible to place in the field".¹³

The need for reform centered on the dual Federal-State status of National Guard forces, the undefined and unsettling relationship between the various states and the Federal government in controlling the disposition of guardsmen. The National Guard units were generally characterized as being untrained, ill-equipped, and deficient in the simplest skills of cooking, shelter and supply.¹⁴ Troublesome to the Army was the legal question of the right, or lack of authority, of the Federal government to order National Guard forces to serve overseas in support of major war effort. Or, as the guardsmen contented, could they only be called to serve in maintaining order and repelling invasion within the limits of the United States?

Emory Upton had dispaired of the "hopeless military future of the United States"¹⁵ based on his lack of confidence in the quality of the citizen-soldier with short-term training. Upton had suggested a federally sponsored volunteer force under control of the Regular Army. Secretary Root proposed that the National Guard be treated as an already organized volunteer force and that the members respond individually to calls for volunteers.

The Dick Bill of 21 January 1903, so named after its principal sponsor, Congressman (General) Charles W. Dick of Ohio, was a compromise between the state militia and the concept of a federal reserve. It would designate the military manpower of the country

as either "organized militia" or "Reserve Militia". It favored the states and placed the National Guard forces in the "organized militia". The law retained the principle of universal military obligation and discarded the personal weapons provisions of the superseded Militia Act of 1792. It would bring increased uniformity to the various state National Guards by establishing minimum federal standards in training, drill hours, and qualifications for appointments that were to be met in order to receive federal financial aid.¹⁶

Neither the public, nor Congress, nor the Dick Bill would find comfort in the continuing problem of defining an adequate Army immune to the charge of militarism. The quest for a solution would continue. In his Annual Report of the Secretary of War for 1912 entitled "The Organization of the Land Forces of the United States", General Wood suggested the creation of a "National Militia which would eventually supersede state militia". The constitutionality of militia service overseas was redefined in the Volunteer Act of 1914, which reverted to the Spanish-American manner of allowing individual members to volunteer or, requiring that the National Guard units be accepted and remain intact if three-fourths of the unit's membership volunteered. The Army reformers would search and probe for solutions leading toward a more responsive and effective citizen-soldier reserve force.

THE DETAIL SYSTEM

The detail system was introduced in 1904. Officers were detailed from the line to special and General Staff assignments. To insure that they did not lose touch with the rest of the Army, General Staff officers could only serve for a period of four years, after which they returned to duty with troops. There were other reasons; the most notable was a suspicious Congress who desired to preclude General Staff officers from "acquiring political and other special influence incident to long tenure" in the Washington area.¹⁷

The proviso was strengthened in August 1912 when Congress passed the Manchu Law, so named because the departure of Army officers from the Washington area as a result of the act resembled the expulsion of the Manchu Dynasty in China. The law provided that majors and below who had not served two years of the previous six years with a troop, battery, or company should immediately be returned to troops and serve the required time. It necessitated a large number of transfers and changes in assignments, especially of those officers serving on special staffs of schools and staff departments. Its purpose was well served - it broadened the overall number of officers who would gain experience in higher level staff planning through assignments on the General Staff.

CHAPTER VIII

FOOTNOTES

1. Otto L. Nelson, Jr., National Security and the General Staff (1946), p. 14.
2. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 314.
3. "Our New Army," Army and Navy Journal (26 November 1898), p. 305.
4. By means of examinations as to their qualifications to hold commissions in the volunteer force.
5. Weigley, Toward an American Army, p. 176.
6. Ibid., p. 175.
7. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Duty in Peace and War (1947), p. 32.
8. Canoe, p. 427.
9. Dupuy and Baumer, p. 123.
10. Millis, Arms and Men, p. 203.
11. "Tactical Organization of the Army," Army and Navy Journal (8 February 1903), p. 696.
12. Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. ix.
13. Millis, Arms and Men, p. 180.
14. Ibid., p. 174.
15. Weigley, History of the United States Army, p. 337.
16. Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 150.
17. Nelson, p. 92.

CHAPTER IX

PROFESSIONALISM

It was a parsimonious time for the service. It was also a period of intense intellectual activity. Spaulding, in The United States Army in Peace and War, described the occupations of the Army for the period as falling into three classes: (1) education, (2) suppression of disorders and relief of distress at home, and (3) incidents related to our Southern neighbors, Cuba and Mexico.¹

As the Army moved from simple colonial tasks to military preparedness for broadening United States responsibility in international relations, in a frightful era of Congressional neglect and distain, it perceived the need for enriching the professionalism of its officers and soldiers. As the overall strength of the service diminished, the need for a highly efficient, tough, and well disciplined Army became evermore apparent.

PREPAREDNESS

In the Report of the Secretary of War for 1899, Elihu Root addressed the larger tasks of the Army by declaring that "the real object of having an Army is to provide for war" and that "the regular establishment in the United States will probably never be by itself the whole machine with which any war will be fought". Root invisioned this machine as a military organization capable of

prompt mobilization, scientifically deployed and managed, efficiently dispatched, and daily exerting potential power.² This concept of military preparedness scarcely occurred to most Americans. For many, war was still a matter of young men "springing to arms".

General Leonard Wood in 1910 expressed "preparedness" in times akin to "seapower" as used by Admiral Mahan. It was a concept of military strength in the abstract, the ability to project strength to meet any unforeseeable contingency. It was certainly a move toward a mass army. In the same year, President Taft considered the United States defense system as entirely sufficient since "there is not the slightest prospect of a war in any part of the World in which the United States could conceivably have a part".³

Professor Robert Matteson Johnston of Harvard University, lecturing at the Army War College in 1915, argued against the concept of mass armies: "Might not a non-mass army offset its numerical inferiority by superior strategy?"⁴

Again referring to General Wood on preparedness: the volunteers "come with a rush . . . during the early stages of the war, but their enthusiasm soon passes away and the bounty and the draft follow". The bounty was an attempt to produce efforts which should have been produced by patriotism. In a speech given at St. Paul's School (for boys) in New Hampshire on 15 June 1915,

General Wood said: "You are going to respond whether you are trained or not".⁵

Reduction in force, following suppression of the Philippine Insurrection, did occur. The traditional policy of the government, which holds that the maintenance of large armies in time of peace is both unnecessary and undesirable, was again held relevant. It would be up to the Army reformers to stress the proviso: that the smaller Army be higher in effectiveness. The Army would weed out the deadwood, the unfit and the unyielding, it would establish a broader and more meaningful educational system, it would alter its promotion system to recognize merit over seniority and thus add zeal and enthusiasm to military service, and, it would grope for a solution toward a trained provisional force.

ANTI-MILITARISM

The size of the Army was not only a factor in the argument with respect to national preparedness, it was also an important factor in the issues that divided political parties. An increase in the size of the Army was viewed as a threat to liberty. The Republicans would sponsor the outward thrust of a new nation and her weak army while the Democrats would express popular distrust of the army as an institution.

The Army, in all of its reforms and reorganization programs, was still quite vulnerable to criticism. Representative McLachlan

of California, in a speech in the House of Representatives (3 March 1911),⁶ described the Mobile Army as "almost entirely deficient in field training" and "entirely unprepared to take the field". He attacked the time spent in "caring for useless and extravagant posts" and the general ineffectiveness of the military force.

The Army of this period was still the "old Army", looked upon with profound suspicion by the labor unions, the liberals, and the pacifists. Leading clergymen, educators and publicists were stimulated by the Carnegie Ten Million Dollar Peace Endowment to support salaries of propagandists in sympathy with the preachings of universal brotherhood and the disarmament of standing armies. The glitter of Carnegie gold did much to mislead the public and perplex the representatives in Washington regarding the needs of the Army in preparation for War.

CHARACTER OF THE ARMY

During the long period of peace immediately preceding the Spanish-American War, the Army was popularly regarded with languid interest if not indifference. The average citizen did not possess an understanding as to the general character and purpose of the Army, treated it as a sort of necessary evil which he would gladly abolish if he could, but which he was willing to tolerate, provided it kept out of sight and didn't bother him. One of the

fortunate aspects of armed intervention was the drawing together of the people and the Army so that the value of the Army as an institution became evident and needed. The public found its Army reassuring and credible and responsibly discharging its duties intelligently, conscientiously and with tireless zeal. The Army had become a student army and a working army, not an organization of idlers, a developer of physical fitness and character. In spite of neglect and disfavor the Army had gone quietly ahead strengthening its organization, improving its methods and training itself to the tasks of peace and war. It was an obedient, patriotic force. Elihu Root best expressed the character of the Army at the turn of the century:

I beg to suggest that the manifold services which have been rendered by officers of the Army of the United States during the past year in almost every branch of civil government, and the effective zeal and devotion which they have exhibited in succoring the distressed, teaching the ignorant, establishing and maintaining civil law, fighting against pestilence, introducing sanitary reforms, and promoting and aiding peaceful industry should be regarded as proof, if any were needed, that American soldiers do not cease to be American citizens, and that no danger is to be apprehended from a reasonable enlargement of the army which affords such evidence of its character and spirit.⁷

MILITARY EDUCATION

The Army looked inward, in times of peace, to examine its potential, to analyze its strengths and weaknesses, and to evolve innovative and propitious changes to its organization, mission, and methods of operation. The institution and process most notably suited for this task was the formal military school and college. The period immediately following the War with Spain occasioned the great thrust in creating the Army School system.

In February 1900, Elihu Root, by executive order, convened a Board of Officers for the purpose of establishing a War College which could "more or less act as a General Staff" until such time as Congress could be successfully approached to pass the necessary legislation.⁸ The Congress was to act in May. The object of the college was "the direction and coordination of the instructions in the various service schools". Congress, seeing the results of trained and scientifically educated officers, gave a generous allowance for the continuance of the War College in 1902. The college would eventually alter its orientation from being an adjunct to the General Staff functioning in plans and administration to functioning in military education and research.⁹

The Army next turned to the general military education of its officers. Heretofore, the Post Lyceum, or local study organization, was used as the chief pedagogical means of instructing officers in leadership; these local lectures would be upgraded

and expanded into Garrison Schools,¹⁰ thoroughly controlled and standardized by the War Department, at posts with at least four companies assigned. Instructions at the Garrison School would prepare the officer for attendance at the special schools of the various branches of service.

By General Order 115, dated 27 June 1904, the War Department established: the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe for the training of Coast Artillery officers in coastal gunnery; the Engineer School and the Army Medical School in Washington, D.C.; the School of Submarine Defense for Coast Artillery officers studying mine defense; the Signal School, Infantry School, and Cavalry School at Fort Leavenworth; and the School of Application for Cavalry and Field Artillery at Fort Riley, the latter two schools teaching single and combined-arms training. To these schools were added a School of Fire for Field Artillery (3 June 1911) and a School of Musketry (9 June 1913) at Fort Sill and the Army Staff College (27 June 1904) at Fort Leavenworth.

General Leonard Wood, in 1915, organized instruction camps at Plattsburg, New York, for the voluntary training of civilians; this program would materially support the readiness posture of the United States as it moved unknowingly toward World War I.

Finally, the notion of military training for boys in high school was introduced with the view of teaching the value of obedience and instilling the habit of discipline, not easy things

to accomplish in 1909. Reporting on this, the Pioneer Press (14 March 1909) of St. Paul, Minnesota, commented:

The whole atmosphere of American life is at war with the notion of discipline. This is to be noted in the relations in the home and family and in the insubordination of the young. . . . The military training proposal presents an opportunity for instruction and training of a kind far more vital than any one set of subjects that is ordinarily taught in high school.¹¹

The National Defense Act of 1916 would provide the legal basis for the continuation of businessmen's summer camps and student military training through an Officer's Reserve Corps (ORC) and a Reserve Officer's Training Corps (ROTC).

QUALITY AND FITNESS

In an article entitled "What's the Matter with the Army?" the Army and Navy Journal commented on the reasons why the Army in 1907 was deteriorating. "More pay" was considered and thought not to be the solution to the trouble. "Charge it to junior officers" was similarly considered and discarded. The central factor was the self-seeking "get-out-and-grab" ambition of the officers illustrated by undoubtedly too much talk among themselves as to (1) how to get a brigadier generalship, (2) how to get a staff detail, and (3) how to get on the General Staff.¹² An awareness of the complete absence of a merit system for the advancement of officers and for the selection and placement of such

officers to positions of higher trust appeared to many as a bad feature of the Army establishment. Not only military efficiency but the question of standards of physical fitness was raised.

Prior to the 1890's, promotion was exclusively by seniority within the regiment. Promotions depended upon the number of vacancies created by the death or retirement of senior officers. Promotion opportunities came only when Congress expanded a particular arm such as the Coast Artillery Corps for coastal defense of the United States. It was impossible, otherwise, to advance a single step beyond an officer's place in his branch of service, no matter how great his merit, nor how mediocre those immediately above him might be. It was not until 1920 that promotions by seniority on a single list for the entire Army would be adopted.

Physical fitness standards were established in May 1908. Field officers, "of an age tending to corpulency," had to undergo test rides (on horseback) and other exercises to determine whether they could stand the strain of battle.¹³ Officers were required to ride thirty miles for three consecutive days; older officers would ride six hours for the first two days and seven-and-a-half hours for the remaining days until they had completed the required thirty-mile distance. Field grade Coast Artillery officers were required to walk fifty miles in three days and in a total of twenty hours. This program caused officers to gain physical stamina far above that of the average citizen.

The Army historian, Ganoë, writing of the profession, allowed that the officer and soldier progressed in professional skills or he was cast aside. He had not only to keep physically fit but also demonstrate his capacity for leadership and the proper execution of his tasks.¹⁴ The Army purged itself of the laggards.

The military establishment would seize the opportunity to increase its effectiveness in countless ways. Only a few are mentioned: the Army sent military observers to the Russo-Japanese War, established national Military Athletic League Tournaments throughout the United States,¹⁵ held the first National Rifle Tournament (8 September 1903), and organized the Army League to support the goals of the United States Army by soliciting the help of the civilian business community.

And in the August edition of the Military Surgeon (1913), a medical officer assigned to Fort Strong, Massachusetts, uncovered a common practice among a number of men in the barracks, that of "pulverizing and snuffing up the nose" a drug called "Happy Dust". "So far as known the practice of using the drug is without precedent in the Army, but medical officers should be warned of its possibility", said the medical officer.¹⁶

CHAPTER IX

FOOTNOTES

1. Spaulding, p. 398.
2. Millis, Arms and Men, p. 175.
3. Ibid., p. 202.
4. Weigley, Towards an American Army, p. 185.
5. Russell F. Weigley, The American Military: Readings in the History of the Military in American Society (1969), p. 42.
6. "Our Army Sharply Criticized," Army and Navy Journal (18 March 1911), p. 851.
7. Extract from the Report of the Secretary of War for 1900 as contained in American Military Thought (1966), p. 241.
8. Nelson, p. 46.
9. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (1957), p. 241.
10. Spaulding, p. 395.
11. "Military Training in High Schools," Army and Navy Journal (27 March 1909), p. 837.
12. "What's the Matter with the Army?" Army and Navy Journal (28 September 1907), p. 93.
13. Gano, p. 431.
14. Ibid., p. 441.
15. The character of these events was more spectacular and athletic than fundamentally military.
16. Editorial, Army and Navy Journal (6 September 1913), p. 7.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS

It all sounds so familiar - Congressional fiscal restraints, public disinterest, attack by the news media, suppression of an insurrection that was none of our business - as if the United States Army and the nation had been down the road before!

TRADITIONS

There are certain traditions long held by our countrymen that were reaffirmed as our nation moved into major world power status: (1) American distrust of a large standing army and fear of a garrison state; (2) American belief in the citizen-soldier; (3) American incumbency to extend democracy to other nations, often with missionary-like zeal; and (4) American propensity to turn to the Army to preserve law and order in the absence or collapse of civil authority. One tradition was violated: neither the War with Spain, the Philippine Insurrection, nor the Mexican Punitive Expedition was defensive in nature. For whatever reason, expanding commercial markets abroad or extending Christianity to our little brown brother, the United States initiated offensive wars.

FACTS OF LIFE

Traditions aside, there were also facts of life that characterize the events of this period. First, the Army was unprepared

for war. Legislative deficiencies, Congressionally imposed penury, and the absence of a threat combined to reduce the effectiveness of the Army. Great and strong military establishments require a menace to grow.

Secondly, the United States is rarely alert to pending war. In 1915 the country was looking upon the World War in Europe as a spectator; few Americans believed that the United States might enter. Our mobilization efforts are initially less than full measure, tempered with political expediency, and inadequate to meet the needs of the military establishment.

Thirdly, wars of insurgencies are tied to the political question: "Whom do we support?" The Insurrectos were our friends and our enemies. We supported, in turn, the Government of Mexico and the insurgents. Political structures are vulnerable to erosion in a climate of insurrection.

In the fourth place, it is a fact of life that maintaining an enduring consensus within the United States in favor of foreign intervention, where the defense of the United States is not threatened, is fragile at best and subject to the vagaries of public opinion.

Lastly, most of what we do as an Army is outside the domain of military duties.

INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTER

By their very nature, armies acquire institutional characteristics and views of themselves. Samuel P. Huntington described the Army's image of itself as the government's obedient handyman performing without question or hesitation the jobs assigned to it: "the country's general servant, well-disciplined, obedient, performing civil functions".¹ Nevertheless, the officer corps went underground. The sensitivity of the Army to criticism from the anti-imperialist, the yellow journalists, and the public "do-gooders" caused the military to withdraw from public accommodation and to establish a low profile in public affairs. Some critics in a negative vein would claim arch-conservatism as the predominant characteristic of the military while others would welcome the profile as reinforcing the doctrine of separation of military from political endeavors. Yet being non-politicized, the Army could concentrate on military things. In the current perspective, is the United States Army more nervous to criticism?

The post-Spanish American War was an agonizing period for the Army. Was there an awareness of a "guilt complex" following the Philippine Insurrection, a diminishing degree of self-respect due to our distinct advantages over the downtrodden native? Was the cost of imperialism disillusionment and erosion of morale? Martial spirit thrust the military to the forefront of public acclaim and support, but when favorable expectations faded, the

Army was left with altruistic values of benevolent assimilation, humanitarianism, and the welfare of mankind as props for its activities in the Philippines, and defending values like these is difficult at best. The public expresses disavowal with foreign relations every fourth year through the franchise; while waiting, they use the Army - the most discernable instrument of national policy - as the whipping boy.

What does it take to do a job? Men, money, chain of command, and discipline: The United States Army.

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CHAPTER X

FOOTNOTE

1. Huntington, p. 261.

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