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DEPLOYMENT READINESS. VOLUME I.  
MAIN REPORT AND APPENDIX E

Milton H. Hamilton, et al

General Research Corporation

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management are made. An inventory of his minimum essential supporting information needs and a suggested minor revision to AR 220-1 to collect the data elements not now available are included. A system for detailed reporting on unit training status also is described in depth.

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# DEPLOYMENT READINESS

## Volume I—Main Report and Appendix E

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by

Milton H. Hamilton  
Irving Heymont

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as

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## PREFACE

This study on Army deployment readiness consists of two volumes. The main report and Appendix E, setting forth a proposed collection and display system for required readiness data, are contained in Volume I. Volume II provides more detailed information about factors influencing readiness (App A), development of a detailed readiness reporting system (App B), analysis of existing force readiness reporting systems (App C), and the role of the Secretary of the Army in readiness management (App D).

The background material and data required for the study could not have been assembled in the time required had it not been for the unstinting cooperation of many agencies and individuals. The number who assisted is too great to mention them all by name. A particular debt of gratitude is owed to Mr. Stanley R. Resor, former Secretary of the Army, and Mr. Arthur W. Allen, Jr., former Deputy for Reserve Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), for interviews that provided valuable information on readiness problems at the Secretary of the Army level and interrelationships of the Secretary with other officials involved in readiness management. Colonel Robert S. Young, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), was particularly helpful in furnishing guidance. Several officers of the Readiness Branch, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, assisted in locating data and generously shared their insights into the problems of readiness reporting and management.

Within the General Research Corporation, Dr. C. A. H. Thomson and Mr. Robert Babiskin were of great assistance. Mr. Babiskin prepared the design of the proposed Readiness Reporting System discussed in Annex B.14. Mrs. Betty M. Shifflett and Ms. Barbara A. Price patiently prepared the text and tables.

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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### PURPOSE

The purposes of this study are:

- To examine force readiness and its management by the Secretary of the Army (including analysis of the available means for gathering information necessary for such management).
- To prepare recommendations to improve the capability of the Secretary of the Army to carry out his responsibilities for readiness management.

The original study objective was to develop a system for reporting deployment readiness of Active Army and Reserve Components major units and individual units of the support increments that would assist the Department of the Army in developing force deployability readiness tables for the current quarter and the succeeding quarter. This objective was modified in mid-February 1973 to focus on the responsibility of the Secretary of the Army for force readiness management.

#### SCOPE

Readiness, as used in this study, is the degree to which a unit is ready to accomplish the missions or functions for which it was organized. The subject of deployability, as contrasted to readiness, is not addressed in this study. Deployability includes not only readiness but other factors such as availability of adequate transportation, necessary facilities and logistical support in the operational area, and the timely availability of sustaining units.

The study develops a suggested role for the Secretary of the Army in readiness management and includes an inventory of his minimum essential supporting information needs. A recommendation is made for collecting data elements not now available.

Several information displays for the use of the Secretary of the Army are recommended. These displays present the data normally required at that level for readiness management as differentiated from the more detailed data needed by the Army Staff.

In the examination of the role of the Secretary of the Army in readiness management, the following are considered:

- Factors that influence readiness.
- Characteristics and measurement of readiness.
- Authority and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army for readiness management as defined or implied by statute, DOD memoranda, Army regulations, other documentation, and as practiced.
- Roles of officials other than the Secretary of the Army in readiness matters.
- Trends in readiness management within OSD, JCS, and the other Services including strengths and weaknesses of the systems used or under development.

#### METHODOLOGY

The influences on the role of the Secretary of the Army in readiness matters are examined and a suggested philosophy of management is deduced. Minimum essential information needs are identified. Ongoing actions related to readiness reporting plus systems peculiar to the Air Force and Navy are reviewed for relevance. Based on this, procedures that would obtain the few additional items of information required by the Secretary of the Army are proposed.

Data and supporting information were obtained by:

- Literature searches.
- Interviews of persons knowledgeable and experienced in the subject.
- Visits to Active Army and Reserve Components units.

- Informal discussions with members of the Department of the Army and CONARC staffs.

- Study of pertinent documents and briefings by persons involved in the operations of readiness and deployability reporting systems of the JCS and the other Services.

## Chapter 2

### AREAS OF RESEARCH

#### GENERAL

This chapter describes the background information underlying the conclusions and recommendations of the study. The analysis of readiness, to include the associated reporting systems and management, involved study of many areas that can and do influence the role of the Secretary of the Army.

#### FACTORS INFLUENCING READINESS

Under the FORSTAT system, all Services use measurements in the areas of personnel, training, and logistics as indicators of unit readiness. Within each of these measured areas there are several factors that influence readiness. Table 2.1 lists these factors by area. The significant considerations pertaining to these factors are discussed in App A.

#### Personnel

Personnel strength, stability, individual skill qualifications, and quality directly impact on unit readiness and are quantifiable. Some personnel factors such as motivation, morale, and welfare impact on quality and are not quantifiable. The Army uses strength and individual skill qualification as the prime personnel resource measures in reporting readiness. These factors reflect capabilities in terms of available personnel trained in their individual skills to contribute to the accomplishment of the unit mission.

The impacts of personnel on Army readiness are greatly influenced by actions of both Headquarters Department of Army and field commanders. The bulk distribution of individually qualified personnel assets is centralized and based on specific vacancies. Diversion of personnel from

Table 2.1

FACTORS INFLUENCING READINESS

<u>MEASURED RESOURCE AREA</u>	<u>FACTORS</u>
PERSONNEL	Strength
	TOE
	Authorized level of organization
	Operating
	Available for unit training
	Deployment
	Technicians
	Stability
	Command positions
	Nuclear units
Individual turnover	
LOGISTICS	Qualification
	MOS
	Grade balance
	Technicians
	Quality
	Motivation
	Morale and welfare
	Educational level
	Equipment
	TOE
Authorized level	
On hand	
Serviceability	
Operational personnel	
TRAINING	Supply support
	Maintenance support
	Unit training status
	Missions
	TOE
	Contingency
	Training
	Other
	Time
	Support
Funds	
Facilities	
Training aids and devices	
School quotas	

unit training or malassignments of individuals by unit commanders can distort or dilute Army readiness. From the point of view of the Secretary of the Army, personnel policies that will significantly alter the personnel situation must be weighed against the reported readiness of individual units and the Army collectively. Examples of such personnel policies are manning-level authorizations, early-out programs, reductions in force, or changes in oversea tour lengths.

### Logistics

The availability of adequate quantities of operable equipment and appropriate supply and maintenance support capabilities are the factors that affect logistical readiness. However, equipment on hand and equipment serviceability are the current measures of logistical readiness reporting. Logistics factors are quantifiable, but the impact of shortages of operable equipment on readiness and training is a matter of subjective judgment.

Logistics readiness is also readily influenced by Headquarters Department of Army and field commanders. Although logistics readiness tends to be the most stable of the readiness resource areas, it can be influenced most directly by directed redistribution of materiel assets, replacement of equipment, or additional funding for spare parts or maintenance. The Secretary of the Army's principal concern with the reported logistics readiness data is to determine whether assets are in fact distributed in accordance with established priorities and in the use of such data in the justification of Army requirements to OSD, OMB, and Congress.

### Training

Training readiness of a unit is influenced by the available training time and training support, as well as the unit's personnel and equipment situation. The reporting of training readiness is on a subjective basis. The commander estimates the number of weeks required for the unit to be fully trained under conditions of full mobilization. It is assumed that shortages in qualified personnel and equipment are filled in a timely and progressive manner to permit initiation and completion of required training (Ref 1, p C-1).

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<sup>1</sup>Dept of Army, Field Organizations: Unit Readiness Reporting, AR 220-1, 30 May 1973.

Unlike personnel and logistics, training is the least susceptible to the immediate influence of Headquarters Department of Army. Decentralization of the authority and responsibility for planning, directing, conducting, and supervising training to the lowest command element having the ability to conduct effective training [AR 350-1 (Ref 2)] has tended to reduce the impact of centralized control. The data on training readiness now reported is based on a hypothetical situation. Therefore, current training problems are difficult to identify. Few records of current training status are maintained above company level and the maintenance of such records at the company level is optional.

The Secretary of the Army is strongly concerned with current training status and progress because of the basic Army mission. Further, training requires a large investment of resources for which there should be discernible return.

#### Summary

In summary, many of the factors that influence unit readiness are affected directly by policies and decisions of the Secretary of the Army. Commanders in the field also influence readiness by their actions. For the Secretary of the Army to manage readiness, he needs data to reflect the impact of his decisions and policies and those of field commanders.

#### ARMY READINESS STATUS DATA

##### Reporting

The Army readiness reporting system for both Active Army and Reserve Components is incorporated into the JCS FORSTAT combat readiness reporting system and is described in AR 220-1 (Ref 1).

Table 2.2 displays the specific current criteria for measuring the readiness of US Army units. The measurement of the personnel and logistics areas is computed from quantified data. The training area measurement, however, is based on subjective judgment applied to an assumed situation previously described. The unit commander assigns the lowest readiness condition (REDCON) of all the factors as the overall unit REDCON. He may do otherwise, based on his knowledge of conditions within the unit, but

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<sup>2</sup>Dept of Army, Training, Army Training, AR 350-1, 3 November 1971.

Table 2.2

SPECIFIC CRITERIA FOR READINESS REPORTING, US ARMY UNITS

Component	Factor	How calculated	C1 (Fully ready)	C2 (Substantially ready)	C3 (Marginally ready)	C4 (Not ready)
Personnel	Strength	$X_1 = \frac{\text{Operating strength}^a}{\text{Full TOE strength}}$	$X_1 \geq .95$	$.95 > X_1 \geq .85$	$.85 > X_1 \geq .75$	$X_1 < .75$
	Qualification	$X_2 = \frac{\text{Total MOS qualified}}{\text{Full TOE strength}}$	$X_2 \geq .86$	$.86 > X_2 \geq .77$	$.77 > X_2 \geq .68$	$X_2 < .68$
Training	Time	$X_3 = \text{Commander's estimate of the number of weeks required to be fully trained}$	$0 \leq X_3 \leq 2$ b/	$3 \leq X_3 \leq 4$ b/	$5 \leq X_3 \leq 6$ b/	$7 \leq X_3$ b/
	Equipment on hand	$X_4 = \text{Percent fill of each reportable line item}$	$0 \leq X_3 \leq 1$ c/	$X_3 = 2$ c/	$3 \leq X_3 \leq 4$ c/	$5 \leq X_3$ c/
Logistics	Equipment status	$X_5 = \frac{\text{Number of RED equipment items}}{\text{Number of full TOE items}}$	At least 90% of line items at or above 90% fill	At least 90% of line items at or above 80% fill	At least 90% of line items at or above 70% fill	More than 10% of line items at less than 70% fill
			$X_5 \leq .10$	$.10 < X_5 \leq .20$	$.20 < X_5 \leq .30$	$.30 < X_5$

<sup>a</sup>Reserve Components units exclude Reserve Enlistment Program (REF 63) personnel who have not entered initial active duty for training from their operating strengths.

<sup>b</sup>Training criteria for divisions, separate brigades and battalions, and regiments.

<sup>c</sup>Training criteria for all other units.

must submit justification. The next higher unit commander (but no higher than installation or division level) who can influence the readiness condition of the unit may change the readiness ratings but must explain the basis for such change. Changes may be based on such bases as reallocation of resources, considering as on-hand items in process of issue, and judgmental determination that reporting criteria do not fit local circumstances.

Selected DA recurring reports (listed in Annex B.1) were surveyed to determine other potential sources of information related to readiness. This survey was supplemented by consultations with representatives of ODCSPER, OACSFOR, ODCSOPS, ODCSLOG, OCA, CORC, and ASA (M&RA). It was determined that adequate information is available on personnel and logistics but not on training. There are no reports on the current or projected status of training other than under full mobilization assumptions. This lack inhibits assessment of current unit capabilities and future planning based on peacetime conditions.

#### Displays

The force readiness status data furnished to the Secretary of the Army in the Army Status Report (Blue Book) are contained in five tables supplemented by footnotes and voluminous explanatory material. Personnel and logistics data reflect current status; training readiness data are based on full mobilization assumptions and full TOE. There is a void in information on current or projected unit capabilities with available assets and current training status. The data on division support units are based on deployment of specific units to support specific divisions rather than on capabilities for support of division forces by drawing from all the support units. Other readiness-related data are found in several sections of the Blue Book (for example, sections 3, 5, and 6).

#### JCS AND OTHER SERVICES READINESS STATUS DATA

Three approaches to readiness reporting used by the JCS, the Air Force, and the Navy were analyzed to evaluate their strengths and weaknesses for managerial purposes and to identify trends in readiness management. The systems studied were FORSTAT, the Air Force "Unit Capability Measurement System" (UCMS), and the Navy "Mission Area Reporting System." A description of each system is in App C. The examination revealed wide variance in the criteria used in the JCS FORSTAT reports and in the general approach to

measurement of readiness. Table 2.3 displays the differences in Service criteria for measuring equipment readiness under the FORSTAT system. The variances are readily noticeable. For example, a readiness rating of C-1 in aircraft units varies from not less than 80 percent operationally available in the Marine Corps to not less than 71 percent in the Air Force. The differences in Service criteria for each of the four measured factors are shown in Tables C.1 through C.4 of App C.

The principal strengths and weaknesses of each reporting system are shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5. The Air Force and Navy systems stress reporting current unit capabilities on a multimission basis. Both systems provide for use of the unit commander's subjective judgment as the final determinant of unit capabilities. The Air Force UCMS, unlike the Navy system, estimates projected readiness.

As of July 1973 actions were under way indicating future changes and possibly greater uniformity in readiness status reporting systems. A JCS study group was reviewing the adequacy of existing systems under a range of conditions and was reportedly investigating methods to eliminate subjective estimates. The OSD Comptroller was reportedly seeking revision of FORSTAT to reflect current and future readiness under both peacetime and full mobilization conditions. These actions and developments within the Air Force and Navy strongly indicate a trend to reporting of current and future readiness under conditions other than full mobilization.

#### THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

The statutory and implied responsibilities of the Secretariat and other aspects of readiness management that shape the role of the Secretary of the Army in readiness management are discussed below. A more detailed discussion to include the role of other officials, both Army and non-Army, in readiness management is in App D.

The responsibility and authority for matters related to readiness within the Army are now precisely defined. By statute (section 3012, title 10, United States Code) the Secretary of the Army is responsible for the "training, operations, administration, logistical support and maintenance, welfare, preparedness and effectiveness of the Army." Specific responsibilities assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA) include direction and supervision over matters involving

Table 2.3  
**EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENCES IN SERVICE CRITERIA FOR  
 MEASURING EQUIPMENT READINESS UNDER FORSTAT**

Service	Measured resource area ratings			
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
ARMY	Up to 10% of reportable equipment in RED condition.	11-20%....	21-30%....	Over 30%....
NAVY	No deficiencies in msn esn equipment that cause more than insignificant degradations in any primary mission area. (Not less than 75% of aircraft have msn esn subsystems operational.)	Deficiencies exist...minor degradations...but no loss of any primary mission area. (...57%....)	...major degradations...; no loss of more than one.... (...41%....)	Deficiencies in msn esn equipment worse than C-2 and cause a loss of more than one primary mission area. (Less than 41%....)
MARINE CORPS <sup>a</sup>	Not less than 85% of authorized combat esn equipment is operable. (Not less than 80% of aircraft are operational.)	Less than 85% but not less than 70%.... (Less than 80% but not less than 50%....)	...70%...55%.... (...60%...47%....)	Less than C-3.
AIR FORCE <sup>b</sup>	Aircraft units: 71% of authorized aircraft are operationally ready. Missile units: not less than 85% of launchers and missiles are fully combat ready.	...51%.... ...72%....	...40%.... ...52%....	Less than C-3. Less than C-3.

<sup>a</sup>Criteria for active Fleet Marine Forces organizations only. (Different criteria apply to Reserve units.)  
<sup>b</sup>Criteria for aircraft organizations and tactical and defensive missile organizations only. (Different criteria apply to other USAF reporting categories.)

Table 2.4

PRINCIPAL STRENGTHS OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO READINESS REPORTING

FORSTAT System	Unit Capability Measurement System	Mission Area Reporting System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Compiles data on asset distribution to units measured against full requirements.</li> <li>• Identifies through reason codes problem areas in generalized terms.</li> <li>• Makes provision for commanders to use specific remarks to amplify numerical ratings and reason codes.</li> <li>• Permits incorporation of service-peculiar information needs into the reporting system.</li> <li>• Provides a viable automated reporting system that is generally familiar throughout the Services.</li> <li>• Includes capability to produce a range of data output displays for management purposes.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contains flexibility in its coverage as there are provisions for reporting on multimission roles of units over a range of capabilities.</li> <li>• Predicts the future output potential or unit ability to generate force capabilities over time; hence treats time as a resource.</li> <li>• Facilitates contingency planning and selection of forces for deployments by indicating potential capabilities.</li> <li>• Provides added depth to resource management decisions because it permit closer identification of resources with particular mission capabilities due to multimission reporting.</li> <li>• Generates quantifiable data that can readily be automated with other factors to determine affects on operations, costs, or trend indicators.</li> <li>• Assesses resources and reports unit capabilities in keeping with the design capabilities of the organization and at the lowest level which manages and applies resources for that particular unit.</li> <li>• Provides for commander review and subjective evaluation of unit capabilities that are computed using guidelines and tables that relate available resources to percentages of capability.</li> <li>• Uses standardized worksheets to facilitate collection of data and report preparation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deals with multimission capabilities of units on an "as is" basis.</li> <li>• Provides a measure of capability to perform in mission areas beyond that which can be inferred in an inconclusive manner from the unit's overall C-rating.</li> <li>• Requires mission assessment to originate at the unit level where the commander has personal knowledge of the unit's current operational and suboperational capabilities.</li> <li>• Recognizes in a specified manner the relationships between C-ratings and M-ratings.</li> <li>• Includes management indicators in the form of reason codes.</li> <li>• Permits closer identification of resource shortages or allocations with specific capabilities for operations.</li> <li>• Uses ongoing report system.</li> </ul>

Table 2.5

PRINCIPAL WEAKNESSES OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO READINESS REPORTING

FORSTAT System	Unit Capability Measurement System	Mission Area Reporting System
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Requires readiness assessment based on total asset requirements rather than the range of capabilities that exist due to resource allocations and their use.</li> <li>● Has a single-mission orientation that is not applicable to multimission units.</li> <li>● Ignores weapons systems complexities by applying the same criteria to all.</li> <li>● Lacks a true output measurement as the data are so generalized that they are of little value beyond C-3.</li> <li>● Provides historical data that are of limited value to contingency planning.</li> <li>● Generates C-ratings that are not amenable to data automation and manipulation.</li> <li>● Creates anomalies by use of REDCON-defined capabilities as contrasted to actual existing capabilities.</li> <li>● Passes certain service-peculiar data through the JCS system rather than directly to the Service concerned.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Uses a large volume of detailed data.</li> <li>● Involves a complex process to initially establish DOCs; proliferation of DOCs into unmanageable numbers is a danger.</li> <li>● Needs skilled personnel that may be scarce at the unit level to gather and prepare report data.</li> <li>● Consumes 2 hours per day for preparation at the squadron level (based on test runs), although this should decrease as local experience is gained with UCMS.</li> <li>● Requires considerable computer programming and support for data processing at command and service headquarters levels.</li> <li>● Contains possible biases caused by (1) use of arbitrarily weighted values to compute total unit maintenance skill equivalents; (2) extensive differences in like-type units' authorizations that can affect quantification; and (3) inability to establish valid factors for individual pieces of equipment.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Generates nonquantifiable data for which there is no audit trail as the data are based on subjective evaluations.</li> <li>● Reports results in imprecise terms, i.e., mission degradations are considered insignificant, minor, major, or worse than M-3 (ma,jr).</li> <li>● Risks variances in reporting on like units because authority is decentralized to promulgate specific instructions for assessing and reporting. Possible differences in prescribed operational capabilities and methodologies to estimate ratings are the likely chief sources of disparities.</li> <li>● Lacks specificity in its coverage of capabilities for conduct of sustained operations; emphasis is on immediate capabilities.</li> <li>● Relies on reporting as individual changes in mission area readiness occur with no provision for overall periodic checks such as monthly or quarterly sub-missions by all reporting organizations.</li> </ul>

force structure requirements and force operational readiness (Ref 3).

The authority of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army includes the establishment of objectives and appraisal of performance. The latter underscores the concern of the Assistant Secretary (M&RA) with the manner in which unit readiness is reported and assessed. The Army Staff, under the direction and control of the Secretary of the Army, is charged with the preparation of units of the Army to carry out the missions for which they are organized and to monitor the status of the Army.

Congress and the Secretary of Defense, in specifying the subject areas that fall within the Secretary of the Army's jurisdiction, leave considerable latitude for his style of leadership and management. Matters that involve vital relationships with the Secretary of Defense, Congress, and other principal government officials or the public are supervised by the Secretary of the Army. Readiness of units and individuals falls within this category because it is a large claimant of resources and is the ultimate measure of the effectiveness of the Army in peacetime.

Several trends pertaining to the role assumed by the Secretary of the Army in readiness management were identified as the result of review of pertinent literature and interviews of personnel who have served or are serving at the Secretary of the Army level. Interviews with Mr. Arthur W. Allen, Jr., formerly in Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA), and Mr. Stanley R. Resor, a former Secretary of the Army, were particularly informative. Memoranda for the record on these interviews are in Annexes D.3 and D.4. These trends are:

- Shifts in the use of readiness information from occasional justification of asset requirements to use for day-to-day resource allocations and management purposes.
- Increasing requirements for more detailed data as use of readiness information has expanded.
- Growing need for data on the readiness of the Reserve Components because of the greater reliance on their contribution to national security.
- The need for data on current and projected readiness of major units under other than full mobilization conditions.

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<sup>3</sup>Dept of Army, Organization and Functions: Department of the Army, AR 10-5, 1 July 1972.

The roles of the non-Army DOD elements concerned with Army readiness matters are clear and complement the role of the Secretary of the Army. The Secretary of Defense and his office provide broad policy guidance but are quite specific in program and budget reviews. The JCS recommend the operational employment of military forces, when required. The commanders of unified and specified commands exercise full operational command over the Army and other forces assigned to them. Each of these roles requires those responsible to have knowledge of unit readiness and combat capabilities. There are no basic conflicts with the mission of the Secretary of the Army to maintain forces with the appropriate degree of readiness for employment or potential employment by the unified or specified commanders.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED READINESS REPORTING SYSTEM

In view of the existing void in data on the current readiness status of Army units based only on available assets and current training status and the decentralized responsibility for training, it was determined that the best source of data on the current readiness status of a unit would be the estimate of the unit commander. He has the first hand information on the current status of personnel and equipment assets, unit training, normal personnel losses, future nonavailability of equipment due to scheduled maintenance, and known changes to mission requirements that will aid or detract from unit training progress. Consequently, and in accordance with the original purpose of the study, a system was developed to collect pertinent data from selected Active Army and Reserve Components units on a regular basis by means of comprehensive questionnaires. A supporting automated system was also developed to process and store the data and to generate standard and special reports. The total system provided detailed information on current and projected unit readiness for management purposes. The system provided an audit trail for evaluating readiness estimates and also served as a means for a structured training estimate. The system was fully developed short of a field test and is documented in App B. With the shift in emphasis in the direction of the study, as indicated in Chap. 1, further development of this detailed system stopped.

## Chapter 3

### FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### GENERAL

This chapter describes briefly the findings and recommendations of the study. They are described in more detail in Apps D and E.

#### ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

##### Finding No. 1

The Secretary of the Army has an active role in the management of the readiness of the Army. This role is founded in laws, regulations, and practice. The exercise of this role is influenced by many factors that include the philosophy of management practiced by the Secretary of Defense, the interests of the Secretary of Defense and Congress, and the interests and management style of the Secretary of the Army. The management style of the Secretary of the Army is a key factor in setting the relationships between his staff and the Army Staff.

The Secretary of the Army has played an increasingly active role in readiness management since the early 1960's. This trend is not likely to be reversed. With the end of hostilities in Southeast Asia, congressional interest in efficient use of Army resources can be expected to grow in depth and detail. One manifestation of efficient use of resources is the resultant readiness condition of the Army.

##### Recommendation No. 1

In view of the foregoing, the Secretary of the Army should continue his present active role in the management of Army readiness to include justifying requirements for and the use of resources before OSD and Congress.

## INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

### Finding No. 2

The Secretary of the Army requires, as a minimum, three categories of information on readiness to be in a position to carry out his responsibilities for readiness management. These are:

- Current and forecast readiness of major units with available assets and current training status.
- Capabilities for increased readiness of major units without mobilization.
- Capabilities for achieving a full readiness of major units under full mobilization conditions.

Each of these categories is explained in greater detail in App D.

Readiness reports specified by AR 220-1 (FORSTAT system) do not provide training readiness assessments under nonmobilization conditions and are not designed to predict future readiness. Consequently such reports provide full information only for the last category listed above. Currently there are no reports that regularly provide adequate credible data or information for the other categories. Such data are required for all combat divisions, separate brigade-size units, designated roundout battalions, and support increments.

### Recommendation No. 2

A minor modification to the established FORSTAT system would provide additional information to assist in forecasting readiness of major units under either mobilization or nonmobilization conditions and to assess unit capabilities with available assets in terms related to mission design capabilities.

Annex E.1 contains a recommended change to AR 220-1 to accomplish this as part of the ongoing readiness reporting system. The recommendation is compatible with trends in the other Services and ongoing actions in the JCS and OSD.

This recommendation establishes, as part of the present Army readiness reporting system, two estimates of readiness (called combat potential estimates) based on available unit assets, current unit training status, and nonmobilization conditions. One would reflect the unit's estimated capabilities as of the date of the report; the other would be a forecast of

future capabilities—3 months for Active Army units and 6 months for Reserve Components units. The recommended change to AR 220-1 also includes four new data elements which are estimates of the weeks required to achieve various levels of combat potential or information that the unit either is already at a specified level or cannot achieve a particular level with available assets. The recommendation requires adding one card for Army-peculiar data to the current readiness reporting system.

#### DATA DISPLAYS

##### Finding No. 3

Readiness data focusing on major units and problem areas must be available to the Secretary of the Army in such form as to facilitate decision making. The Army Staff should be prepared to provide backup details as required.

##### Recommendation No. 3

It is recommended that readiness data be displayed for the Secretary of the Army by the inclusion in the Army Status Report (Blue Book) of eight tables on readiness of major units and one management indicator display on the status of the division support forces by type unit. These recommended displays are shown in App E. The recommended displays accomplish the following:

- Differentiate between deployed and nondeployed forces, by unit, by geographic area, or by command.
- Differentiate between Active Army and Reserve Components units.
- Group forces designated for specific contingency plans.

##### Recommendation No. 4

Consolidation of all readiness-related data displays such as the status of selected equipment items into a single readiness section of the Blue Book should be considered. This would facilitate management reviews in terms of the total aspects of readiness.

Appendix E  
 A PROPOSED COLLECTION AND DISPLAY SYSTEM  
 FOR REQUIRED READINESS DATA

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Appendix E  
A PROPOSED COLLECTION AND DISPLAY SYSTEM  
FOR REQUIRED READINESS DATA

DATA REQUIREMENTS

In addition to the readiness data presently available through AR 220-1 reports, the Secretary of the Army requires an assessment of major Army unit mission capabilities based on current assets and nonmobilization conditions. The statement of these capabilities is termed the combat potential estimate. Examination of the potential information sources indicates that the best source of such an estimate is the subjective judgment of the commanders of units concerned. They have first hand information on the current status of units and a personal feel for anticipated routine events and conditions in the near future. The recent Army reorganization and advances in operating procedures should improve their timely knowledge of significant changes that can affect future readiness. In obtaining these estimates, provision should be made for timely comment at appropriate levels in the chain of command to allow for action by those who can influence the unit's readiness. The data should be collected on a regular basis and cover the current status plus a short-term projection over a timespan which commanders can reasonably be expected to forecast. Such projections necessarily are based on the commander's knowledge of the present status of those factors that contribute to unit readiness and likely changes thereto.

MEANS FOR COLLECTION

The procedures established for readiness reporting under AR 220-1 are considered to be adequate for collecting the commanders' combat potential estimate under the above-described conditions. The advantages of building on the ongoing system are:

- Avoids dual reporting systems on readiness.

- Takes advantage of already established system and procedures that are familiar to units.

- Results in economy. For example, the proposed system requires only one additional data card and eliminates the requirement for separate security, report header, and report end cards that are common to automated reporting.

- Simultaneously provides data for both mobilization and non-mobilization conditions.

Annex E.1 is a proposed draft Change 1 to AR 220-1, dated 30 May 1973. The change adds a Section V to Chapter 2 and an Appendix I. A worksheet and instructions for its completion are added to Chapter 2 along with specific instructions for preparing the one additional punch card. Appendix I explains the combat potential estimate in detail. It sets forth the following description of the five levels of combat potential that are to be used for reporting purposes.

Table E.1  
COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATE RATING

Level	Description	Percentage of full TOE mission*
1	For all practical purposes fully combat-ready	86-100
2	Substantial combat capability under all conditions	77-85
3	Substantial combat capability under emergency conditions	68-76
4	Limited combat capability under emergency conditions	50-67
5	Effectiveness too low to warrant use in combat except under the direst emergency conditions	49 or less

\*Applicable for units with quantifiable TOE missions.

Appendix I also describes the conditions and assumptions to be used by unit commanders in estimating the combat potential of their units and provides special reporting instructions.

Under AR 220-1 reporting procedures, one card (KA1) is used to report Army-peculiar data. There are only two blank spaces (68 and 69) remaining on this card based on current reporting requirements. The combat potential estimate of six data elements requires ten spaces for reporting. Consequently, it is necessary to add a separate card to be known as the KA2 card to the system. After allowances for the administrative requirements associated with automated reporting and the six new data elements, 45 blank spaces are available for collecting additional information should this be determined necessary in the future. For example, using a specified reason code, data could be collected on why a division is less than 86 to 100 percent combat effective now or what major factors are retarding the division's progress in achieving the highest level of combat potential possible with available assets. (These two examples are basically questions 41 and 43 of the draft Active Army division questionnaire, Annex B.2)

#### SUGGESTED DATA DISPLAYS

To support the Secretary of the Army in force readiness management, the essential data must be furnished in such form as to facilitate decision making by enhancing understanding of the complexities involved and focusing on the key issues. The suggested data displays fall into the following four categories:

- FORSTAT readiness and combat potential estimate (current and projected) for deployed major combat units, nondeployed Active Army major combat units, and nondeployed Reserve Components major combat units.
- Contingency deployability of selected major combat units and selected support units.
- Full mobilization deployability capabilities of major combat units (Active Army and Reserve Components) and division force support units.
- Selected management indicators.

The specific data display tables that are proposed for use in the Army Status Report (Blue Book) focus on relating data generated through the current AR 220-1 reporting with selected commanders' combat potential estimates. They present data on support units in terms of their capability to support divisions or major separate units.

Tables E.2 through E.8 are the seven proposed data displays that are considered to be necessary to support the Secretariat's role in force readiness and management. The Army staff will need more variations of the data in greater detail.

Tables E.2 through E.4 are basically current status reports covering all of the Army's major combat units. Information is provided on readiness conditions as reported under FORSTAT and on the combat potential estimates that would be reported as the result of the proposed change to AR 220-1. Projections of unit combat potential estimates also are included. The data in these status reports:

- Identify problems and trends in unit readiness.
- Permit evaluation of asset distribution.
- Assist in justification of additional resources.
- Provide an assessment of what can be accomplished with the available assets as presently distributed.

Tables E.5 and E.6 show the deployability readiness of designated forces on a contingency, nonmobilization basis. The force packages can be readily changed as requirements and plans change. For example, if light and heavy corps reserve forces are constituted, they would be reported on as packaged elements. Table E.5 illustrates the use of a technique employing "O's" to graphically display the objective time period for each force package to be ready for movement and "X's" to indicate actual capabilities.

The deployability readiness of major combat units of the Active Army and Reserve Components under full mobilization conditions would be displayed in Table E.7. The support capabilities of division support increments under full mobilization would be shown by Table E.8. The displayed data in Table E.8 are related to the numbers of divisions that can be supported over time phasing rather than to specific divisions.

Table E.2

FORSTAT READINESS AND COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATES -  
DEPLOYED MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

DEPLOYED FORCES

as of \_\_\_\_\_

Major units	Number of Battalions		Personnel				Readiness (FOI/CRAT)			Logistics		Tng Unit prof (C)	Over-all (C)	ALO	current	3 mos projected	Combat potential estimate			
	Inf	Marine	Pot TOE	Str	WOS qual	Equip O/H	Equip status	Legis	Equip status	Weeks to achieve with current personnel and equipment	3						4	5		
	Arms	Arms	Str	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	(C)	
EUROPE																				
3d Inf Div (M)																				
8th In: Div (M)																				
1st Arm'd Div																				
3rd Arm'd Div																				
3d Bde, 1st Inf Div (M)																				
Berlin Bde																				
2d Arm'd Cav Regt																				
11th Arm'd Cav Regt																				
(Prepositioned equipment sets,																				
KOREA																				
2d Inf Div																				
OTHER																				
172d Inf Bde (Alaska)																				
193d Inf Bde (Panama)																				

Table E.3

FORSTAT READINESS AND COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATES -  
NONDEPLOYED ACTIVE ARMY MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

NONDEPLOYED MAJOR COMBAT UNITS  
(Active Army)

as of \_\_\_\_\_

Major units	Number of Battalions		Readiness (FORSTAT)					Logistics		Tag Unit prof (C)	Over-all (C)	ALO	current	Combat potential estimate				
	Inf	Mech Armd	Pct TOE str	Pct turn-over	Str (C)	MCS qual (C)	Equip O/H (C)	Equip status (C)	3 mo: projected					4	3	2	1	
STRAAF																		
1st Cav Div (TRICAF)																		
2d Armd Div																		
4th Inf Div (M)																		
9th Inf Div																		
25th Inf Div (-)																		
82d Abn Div																		
101st Abn Div (Amb1) (-)																		
REFORGER																		
1st Inf Div (M) (-)																		
3d Armd Cav Regt (-)																		
1/6 Armd Cav Regt																		

Table E.4

FORSTAT READINESS AND COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATES -  
NONDEPLOYED RESERVE COMPONENTS MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

Major units	Number of Battalions		Readiness (FORSTAT)						Combat potential estimate					
	Inf	Mech Armd	Personnel		Logistics		Ing unit prof (C)	Over-all (C)	AID	current	Weeks to achieve with current personnel and equipment			
			Pct TOE str	Pct turn-over	MOS qual (r)	Equip O/H (C)					Equip status (C)	6 mos projected	3	2
											(50-67%)	(68-76%)	(77-85%)	(86-100%)

DIVISIONS

- 26th Inf
- 28th Inf
- 30th Inf (M)
- 30th Armd
- 38th Inf
- 42d Inf
- 47th Inf
- 50th Armd

EARLY DEPLOY BDES  
(By Unit)

WORLD-WIDE BDES  
(By Unit)

ROUND OUT BNS  
(By Unit)

Table E.5

DEPLOYABILITY OF DESIGNATED MAJOR COMBAT  
UNITS WITHOUT MOBILIZATION

CONTINGENCY DEPLOYABILITY OF SELECTED MAJOR COMBAT UNITS  
(nonmobilization)

As of \_\_\_\_\_

Units	Number of maneuver battalions	Current overall REDCON	Available for movement after decision day									
			0-2 days	3-7 days	8-14 days	15-21 days	22-30 days	31-60 days	61-90 days	Nonde- ployable		
Abn "D" Package (- spt)												
82d Abn Div												X
Reforger												
1st Inf Div (M) (-)											X	
3d Armd Cav Regt (-)											0	X
1/6 Armd Cav Regt											0	X

Table E.6

DEPLOYABILITY OF SELECTED SUPPORT UNITS WITHOUT MOBILIZATION

CONTINGENCY DEPLOYABILITY OF SELECTED SUPPORT UNITS  
(nonmobilization)

As of \_\_\_\_\_

Units	Number of units	Percent REDCON C1-C2	Available for movement after decision day						Non-deployable	
			0-2 days	3-7 days	8-14 days	15-21 days	22-30 days	31-60 days		61-90 days
Abn "D" Package (-div)										
Reforger support units										
2 + 10 units										

Table E .7

DEPLOYABILITY OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS UNDER  
FULL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS

FULL MOBILIZATION DEPLOYABILITY OF MAJOR COMBAT UNITS

As of \_\_\_\_\_

Units	Number of maneuver battalions	Current ALO	Current overall REDCON	Weeks until available for movement after full MOB decision day (at C1)				
				Planned	Current	+1 mo	+2 mos	+3 mos
<b>STRAF</b>								
1st Cav Div (TRICAP)								
2d Armd Div								
4th Inf Div (M)								
9th Inf Div (M)								
25th Inf Div (-)								
82d Abn Div								
101st Abn Div (Ambl)(-)								
<b>REFORGER</b>								
1st Inf Div (M) (-)								
3d Armd Cav Regt (-)								
1/6 Armd Cav Regt								
<b>RESERVE COMPONENT DIV</b>								
26th Inf								
28th Inf								
30th Inf (M)								
30th Armd								
38th Inf								
42d Inf								
47th Inf								
50th Armd								
<b>EARLY DEPL BDES</b>								
(By Unit)								
<b>WORLDWIDE BDES</b>								
(By Unit)								
<b>ROUNDOUT BNS</b>								
(By Unit)								

Table E.8

CAPABILITIES OF DIVISION<sup>M</sup> FORCE SUPPORT UNITS  
UNDER FULL MOBILIZATION CONDITIONS

CAPABILITIES OF DIVISION SUPPORT INCREMENTS UNDER FULL MOBILIZATION

As of \_\_\_\_\_

Type	Div forces supported by current oversea deployments	Division forces supportable after full MOB decision day						
		Current	+1 mo	+2 mos	+3 mos	+4 mos	+5 mos	+6 mos
Initial Support Increment	Rqr Aval	/	/	/	/	/	/	/
Sustaining Support Increment	Rqr Aval	/	/	/	/	/	/	/

There are many possibilities for management indicator displays using the data that would be available through the revised reporting system. Table E.9 is an example of a display that would have utility for the Army staff and possibly should be included in the Blue Book because of the interest of the Secretary of the Army in division forces.

Table E.9

MANAGEMENT INDICATOR - READINESS OF DIVISION  
FORCE SUPPORT UNITS BY TYPE

READINESS OF DIVISION FORCE SUPPORT UNITS, BY TYPE  
AS OF \_\_\_\_\_

Type	Total units		Number of units				Percent	
	Act A	RC	C1	C2	C3	C4	Auth	Actual
							A1&A2	C1&C2
Adjutant General Co								
Air Defense Bn								
Armored Cavalry Regt								
Armored Cavalry Sqdn								
Armored Tank Bn								
Aviation Co.								
Army Security Agency Co								
Cavalry Sqdn								
Chemical Co.								
Combat Support (Maintenance) Co								
Combat Support (Supply) Co								
Civil Affairs Co								
Engineer, Combat Bn								
Engineer, Construction Bn								
Engineer Co								
Field Artillery Bn								
Finance Sec								
Infantry Bde								
Infantry Bn								
Infantry Avn Aslt Hel Co								
Medical Hospital								
Medical Co								
Military Intelligence Co								
Military Police Co								
Ordnance Ammo DS-GS Co								
Ordnance Mun Safety Det								
Psychological Operations Co								
Quartermaster Petroleum Co								
Quartermaster Air Delivery Co								
Signal, Combat Area Bn								
Signal, Army/Corps Bn								
Signal, Operations Co								
Signal, Construction Co								
TC, Air Related Co								
TC, Wheel Vehicle Related Co								
TC, Rail Related Co								
TC, Water Craft Related Co								
TC, Terminal Operations Co								

Annex E.1

Recommended Procedures for Obtaining  
Combat Potential Estimate Data

(A Proposed Change to AR 220-1, dated 30 May 1973)

RECOMMENDED

CHANGE

No. 1

HEADQUARTERS  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, DC, ..... 1973

FIELD ORGANIZATIONS

UNIT READINESS REPORTING

This change to AR 220-1 incorporates the requirement for submission of the commander's combat potential estimate as a part of the unit readiness reporting system.

AR 220-1, 30 May 1973, is changed as follows:

- |   | Pages               |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. Add.   |                     |
| Section V to Chapter 2.   | 2-5.1 through 2-5.5 |
| Appendix I, Combat Potential Estimate   | I-1 through I-4     |
| 2. File this change sheet in the front of the publication for reference purposes. |                     |

Section V. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDER'S COMBAT  
POTENTIAL ESTIMATE

2-12. General. These instructions set forth the guidance for submission of the commander's combat potential estimate as part of the Army combat readiness reporting system. The specific procedures are detailed in Appendix I. This additional reporting requirement supplements the REDCON data in providing information needed by the Department of the Army.

2-13. Use of DA Form 2715 worksheet. Section D of DA Form 2715 (fig. 2-5) is a specially designed worksheet that is to be used to submit combat potential estimates. It is compatible with an 80-column punch card. See table 2-13 for instructions on completing Section D, DA Form 2715-2 worksheet.

2-14. Instructions for preparing card KA2.

a. Data elements submitted in KA2 cards are required to satisfy Army-peculiar requirements. Transactions will be labeled "KA2" in card columns 6-8 of the card.

b. See tables 2-14 and 2-15 for instructions on preparing the KA2 card. Additional information for preparing individual data elements is given in appendix I.

UNIT HEADLINE REPORT WORKSHEET - SECTION D - CARD TYPE KA2 - COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATES

- a. 

1	2	3

 Card Sequence Number (entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards).
- b. 

4

 Classification (C,S). Minimum CONFIDENTIAL (C) when completed.
- c. 

5

 Transaction Code (A,C,D).
- d. 

6	7	8
K	A	2

 Card Type.
- e. 

9	10	11	12	13	14
W					

 Unit Identification Code.
- f. COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATES
- (1) 

15

 Alerted Now.
- (2) 

16

 Alerted 3 (6 for Reserve Components) Months from Now.
- g. WEEKS TO REACH ACHIEVABLE LEVELS (Enter AA if ALREADY ACHIEVED. Enter NA if NOT ACHIEVABLE.)
- (1) 

17	18

 Level 4 (50-67%)
- (2) 

19	20

 Level 3 (68-76%)
- (3) 

21	22

 Level 2 (77-85%)
- (4) 

23	24

 Level 1 (86-100%)
- h. 

25	-	69

 Blank.
- i. 

70	71	72	73	74	75
W					

 Originator's UIC. (UIC of command submitting reports on punch cards.)
- j. 

76	77
F	S

 Report Type. FS (FORSTAT).
- k. 

78	79	80

 Report Number (to be entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards).

2-5.2

Figure 2-5

Table 2-13. Instructions for Completing DA Form 2715-2 Worksheet. Section D — Card Type KA2 (fig. 2-5)

Item	Block No.	Entry
a	1-3	Entered by HQ transmitting reports on punch cards. See Section III.
b	4	C or S. As a minimum, reports are classified CONFIDENTIAL (para 1-11).
c	5	A, C, or D. For recurring or change reports, enter C. For initial, terminal, or other special reports, refer to section III.
d	6-8	KA2.
e	9-14	Unit for which report is being submitted.
f	15-16	Enter number. See Appendix I.
g	17-24	Enter numbers, preceded by zeros if less than 10. See Appendix I. Enter "AA" for each level already achieved; enter "NA" for each level not achievable.
h	25-69	Leave blank.
i	70-75	UIC of command submitting automated reports. Entered by headquarters transmitting reports on punch cards.
j	76-77	FS (FORSTAT).
k	78-80	Entered by headquarters transmitting reports on punch cards. See section III.

Table 2-14 Card Type KA2 Data Elements

Card Field	Data	Label	Card Column
6-KA2-A	Level of commander's combat potential estimate if unit is alerted for combat employment on the "as of" date of the report..... Edit—Must be a numeric character, 1 to 5. If READY is 4, COPEN must be 2 to 5.	COPEN	15
6-KA2-B	Level of commander's combat potential estimate if unit is alerted for combat employment 3 months (6 months for Reserve Components) after the "as of" date of the report..... Edit—Must be a numeric character, 1 to 5.	COPEP	16
6-KA2-C	Weeks to reach level 4 of combat potential estimate. Enter a two-character alphabetic code, or a two-character right-oriented numeric field preceded by a zero as necessary. Enter AA if already achieved, NA if not achievable, or a numeric if achievable in that number of weeks..... Edit—Field contains AA, NA, or two numeric characters.	COPE 4	17-18
6-KA2-D	Weeks to reach level 3 of combat potential estimate. Enter a two-character alphabetic code, or a two-character right-oriented numeric field preceded by a zero as necessary. Enter AA if already achieved, NA if not achievable, or a numeric if achievable in that number of weeks..... Edit—Field contains AA, NA, or two numeric characters.	COPE 3	19-20
6-KA2-E	Weeks to reach level 2 of combat potential estimate. Enter a two-character alphabetic code, or a two-character right-oriented numeric field preceded by a zero as necessary. Enter AA if already achieved, NA if not achievable, or a numeric if achievable in that number of weeks..... Edit—Field contains AA, NA, or two numeric characters.	COPE 2	21-22
6-KA2-F	Weeks to reach level 1 of combat potential estimate. Enter a two-character alphabetic code, or a two-character right-oriented numeric field preceded by a zero as necessary. Enter AA if already achieved, NA if not achievable, or a numeric if achievable in that number of weeks..... Edit—Field contains AA, NA, or two numeric characters.	COPE 1	23-24

2-5.4

Table 2-15. Card Type KA2 Format

Card Column	Data Item	Explanation
1-3	Card sequence number...	See table 2-6.
4	Classification.....	See table 2-6.
5	Transaction code.....	See table 2-7.
6	Card type K.	
7-8	Card subtype AZ.	
9-14	UIC of reporting unit...	
15	COPEX.....	Level of combat potential estimate (now).
16	COPEP.....	Level of combat potential estimate (in 3 months for Active Army or 6 months for Reserve Components).
17-18	COPE 4.....	Weeks to reach level 4.
19-20	COPE 3.....	Weeks to reach level 3.
21-22	COPE 2.....	Weeks to reach level 2.
23-24	COPE 1.....	Weeks to reach level 1.
25-69	Leave blank.	
70-75	Originator's UIC.....	UIC of command submitting report on punch cards.
76-77	Report type FS.....	FORSTAT
78-80	Report number.....	See table 2-6.

APPENDIX I  
COMBAT POTENTIAL ESTIMATE

I-1. Purpose. This appendix promulgates instructions to be used in preparation of the commander's combat potential estimate portion of the readiness report (DA Form 2715-2).

I-2. Combat Potential Estimate, General. The commander, based solely on his judgment and experience and the information available, will estimate the current and projected combat potential of his unit. For reference purposes the mission statement of the unit as stated in the TOE (or MTOE if different from TOE) represents 100 percent or full combat potential. Descriptions of unit capabilities at various levels of combat potential are given below. The percentage ranges are furnished only as a guide, particularly for those units with TOE missions stated in quantifiable terms.

Combat Potential Estimate Rating

<u>Level</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Percentage of full TOE mission</u>
1	For all practical purposes fully combat-ready	86-100%
2	Substantial combat capability under all conditions	77-85%
3	Substantial combat capability under emergency conditions	68-76%
4	Limited combat capability under emergency conditions	50-67%
5	Effectiveness too low to warrant use in combat except under the direst emergency conditions	49% or less

I-1

I-3. Estimated Levels of Combat Potential (Blocks 15 and 16, Section D).

a. Estimates of combat potential levels will be made for two conditions:

(1) Unit is alerted for combat employment on the "as of" date of the report.

(2) Unit is alerted without advance notice 3 months (6 months for Reserve Components units) after the "as of" date of the report for combat employment.

b. The commander will use the following assumptions in estimating the combat potential level of his unit:

(1) The unit is alerted for deployment overseas and entry into combat with no time for additional training, or if already overseas there will be no time for training after being alerted.

(2) The unit is to enter into combat only with the personnel and all equipment on hand WHEN alerted, excluding known 30 day personnel losses. (Reserve Components: consider as available issued equipment stored at weekend training sites or equipment concentration sites.)

(3) All personnel assigned remain with the unit. (Reserve Components: consider REP 63 personnel awaiting or attending training as not available.)

c. From the table in paragraph I-2, select the level number associated with the current and projected estimates of combat potential and enter them in blocks 15 and 16 of Section D. For example, enter a "1" in block 15 if the commander considers his unit to be fully combat ready now for all practical purposes.

I-4. Estimated Weeks to Reach Higher Levels of Combat Potential (Blocks 17-24, Section D).

a. The commander, using his estimate of current combat potential as the base point, will project the weeks required to reach those higher levels of combat potential which he considers can be achieved with the personnel now assigned and the equipment now available. The provisions of current Army Training Programs (ATPs) are not to be considered as mandatory in forecasting training progress. In making the estimates the time required for preparation for oversea movement (POM) is not to be considered. Also, Reserve Components will not consider the time from mobilization alert to closing at the mobilization station.

b. Commanders of Active Army units will assume that:

(1) The unit is relieved of all significant installation support and miscellaneous peacetime activities; a 48-hour training week is in effect.

(2) The unit will neither gain nor lose any personnel or equipment.

All personnel now assigned remain with the unit.

(3) There are no changes in the current level of training support.

c. Commanders of Reserve Components units will assume that:

(1) The unit is mobilized with only the personnel NOW assigned and all the equipment NOW on hand to include that stored at weekend training sites and equipment concentration sites.

(2) All personnel now assigned remain with the unit except for REP 63 personnel awaiting or attending training.

(3) Adequate training support facilities will be available at the mobilization station.

(4) When mobilized, the unit will not be required to provide significant installation support; a 48-hour training week will be in effect.

I-3

d. Referring to the table in paragraph I-2, the commander will enter an "AA" in Section D for each level of combat potential that he estimates his unit already has achieved; he will enter an "NA" for those levels that he estimates cannot be achieved based on the current unit status and the applicable assumptions. For the remaining levels, he will indicate the estimated number of weeks required to reach each achievable level.

I-5. Special Instructions.

a. A separate remarks card will be submitted if the commander desires to amplify his combat potential estimates.

b. The next higher commander who can influence the readiness condition of the unit, but not higher than installation or division, will forward a combat potential estimate for the submitting unit only if he disagrees with the estimate of the submitting commander. A remarks card will be used for this purpose.

c. Commanders above installation/division level desiring to comment on the combat potential estimate of reporting units will forward these comments through the chain of command to HQ DA by the most suitable communications means, but not as part of the automated readiness report.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA	already achieved
ALO	authorized level of organization
AT	annual training
ATP	Army training program
ATT	Army training test
CAPREP	capability report
DOC	designed operational capabilities
ESC	equipment serviceability criteria
FORSTAT	Force Status and Identity Report
IDT	inactive duty training
ISI	initial support increment
NA	not achievable
ORTT	operational readiness training test
REDCON	readiness condition
REDREP	Readiness Reporting System
RICC-1	Reportable Item Control Code 1
REP-63	Reserve Enlistment Program of 1963
SSI	sustaining support increment
UCMS	unit capability measurement system
UIC	unit identification code