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INTEGRATED GLOBAL FORCE POSTURE
ANALYSIS GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING

William M. Carpenter, et al

Stanford Research Institute

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ABSTRACT

This report analyzes the factors which affect global U.S. force posture guidelines for the late 1970s and early 1980s. The report examines the following areas: changes taking place in the international political, military and economic environment; U.S. interests and U.S. foreign and defense policy in the new environment; the future roles of military force; the relationships among U.S. forces and with allied forces; and the implications of all these factors for future global force posture planning.

DISCLAIMER

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position unless so designated by other authorized documents.

CONTRACTUAL TASK

This Technical Note is in partial fulfillment of Task Order 73-1, under Contract DAAG39-73-C-0058.

FOREWORD

This Integrated Global Force Posture Analysis (Task Order 73-1) is an element of the WY73 research program for the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS). Pursuant to the outline submitted by the Strategic Studies Center of SRI, reviewed and approved by ODCSOPS, this study is a global overview of the factors which affect guidelines for force planning in the changing international and domestic environments. It is a complementary research task to that undertaken in Task Order 73-3, Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis. In accordance with discussions between SSC and ODCSOPS, the major integration of the force posture research program was to be accomplished in Task Order 73-3. The scope of the latter was extended to cover all the major world theaters, and to include an integration of force posture and force characteristics implications for Army general purpose forces. To accomplish this objective, certain areas of investigation originally planned for Task Order 73-1 were shifted to Task Order 73-3.

The Integrated Global Force Posture Analysis consists of two elements of research effort: a Summary, and a series of input substudies. Five of the latter have been published separately, namely:

- Edward N. Luttwak, "The Emergent International System and U.S. Foreign Policy," SSC-TN-2240-10 (June 1973).
- Y. L. Wu, "The National Security Implications of International Economic Policies," SSC-TN-2240-9 (June 1973).
- Edward N. Luttwak and Mark B. Schneider, "The Dynamics of Evolving from a Strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction to Mutual Assured Survival and Security: Two Views," SSC-TN-2240-12 (August 1973).
- N. R. Danielian, "European Economic Integration--The Next Phase," SSC-TN-2240-18 (October 1973).
- Robert C. Richardson, III, "The Role of Military Force in the New International Milieu," SSC-TN-2240-13 (October 1973).

As a part of the ongoing program of the Strategic Studies Center of SRI in national strategy research for the Army and other clients,

this study drew upon the prior and concurrent work in this overall program, including the national strategy papers presented at several symposia sponsored by the Strategic Studies Center and other U.S. and foreign research organizations.

This study was prepared under the supervision of Mr. Richard B. Foster, Director of the Strategic Studies Center, and Dr. Wynfred Joshua and Mr. M. Mark Earle, Jr., Assistant Directors. The Project Leader was Mr. William M. Carpenter. Members of the Project Team were Dr. Stephen P. Gibert, Mr. Edmund L. DuBois, Mr. Gordon Boe and Mr. Mark B. Schneider. Consultants included: Mr. Edward N. Luttwak, Dr. Y. L. Wu, Dr. N. R. Danielian, Mr. Robert C. Richardson, III, Dr. Robert M. Lawrence, and Mr. Raymond G. Leddy.

Richard B. Foster
Director
Strategic Studies Center

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I INTRODUCTION

A. Research Objective

The overall objective of this study is to examine the central issues which confront the United States in devising a global force posture to support American security interests in the decade ahead. Two principal historical factors have coalesced to make such an examination necessary. First, the international environment is undergoing a period of fundamental change. The relatively simple bipolar structure of international relations, which characterized the first generation after World War II, is giving way to a more complex mixture of military bipolarity and political-economic multipolarity. The effect has been to create a milieu of uncertainty. Alliances which were formed to accomplish goals commonly agreed upon a generation ago are now strained by changing attitudes and capabilities. States which continue to be ideological adversaries have in some situations found it necessary to negotiate with each other. This, in turn, further increases intra-alliance tensions.

Second, uncertainty on the international scene is paralleled in the changing attitudes on the part of the American public. The basic tenets which have guided U.S. foreign policy since World War II are now being questioned; there is a new concern about domestic problems and the requirements which they place on national resources. Concomitantly, the roles and utility of military force in this new environment are undergoing reevaluation.

The fundamental nature of these changes makes it appropriate to examine the impact on the factors which affect the guidelines for a future U.S. global force posture.

B. Approach and Scope

This study utilized the methodologies and the research base developed by the Strategic Studies Center in its broad program of analysis of national security policy. The Center's program has focused on three major areas:

Soviet studies; studies of U.S. relationships with allies, especially Western Europe; and U.S. foreign and defense policy analysis. Strategic interactions, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union, and among the other major world powers, have been the subject of particular attention. This study seeks to identify and evaluate the impact of the factors of change in the international environment as they affect the strategic framework for force posture planning. In addition to drawing upon the Center's national security policy research program, a number of substudies were undertaken by consultants to SSC to provide inputs on specific issues. This study was prepared in coordination with the research effort on Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis, to which it is a complementary study.

C. Organization of the Report

Chapter II of this study delineates the major changes taking place in the international system, and an evolving U.S. foreign policy designed to meet the challenges posed by these changes.

The third chapter reexamines U.S. national interests and U.S. national defense policy.

The fourth chapter analyzes the changing roles of military forces in the emerging international system. Emphasis is placed on conflict interference, warfighting capability, the political use of force and the effect of technology on military force.

The fifth chapter analyzes the various relationships of forces, both among U.S. national forces and between U.S. and allied forces, as these forces confront adversaries.

The final chapter summarizes the factors affecting guidelines for a U.S. global force posture in the next decade. Included are the military implications of the changing international system, the changing nature of U.S. relations with other countries, the military aspects of international economic interdependence, the relevance of military force in national policy, prospects for arms control measures, and the evolving strategic nuclear balance. The impact which all these elements have on U.S. force planning requirements is assessed.

II THE UNITED STATES IN AN EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A. A World in Transition

The international system of the 1970s is experiencing rapid change. New military, political, and economic relationships are modifying situations which conditioned American foreign policy throughout the first generation of postwar history, and a world is emerging which poses new challenges for the United States. The most important changes in the international milieu are the following:

- The evolving strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union
- The growth of international economic interdependence
- The emergence of a politically multipolar world
- The lessening of American domestic support for an activist U.S. involvement in international affairs and the growth of public uncertainty as to the proper role of the United States in a changing world.

1. The Strategic Balance

By the early 1970s, it was clear that the strategic nuclear balance had shifted from one of American superiority a decade before to a state of approximate U.S.-Soviet parity. This shift was not the result of happenstance, but rather followed from conscious policy decisions made by the two powers. Acting in accordance with its doctrinal decisions of the 1950s, the Soviet Union not only increased its defense budget (especially since Brezhnev and Kosygin have come to power), but also substantially enlarged the portion allocated to strategic weapons,¹ in order to develop and deploy

¹ R. E. Osgood, "The Military Issues," in R. E. Osgood, et al., *America and the World*, p. 197 (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

a force of third-generation ICBMs which would equal or surpass that of the United States by 1969-70.¹ Meanwhile, from the vantage point of strategic superiority, American defense officials reached several conclusions in the mid-1960s: (1) The buildup of U.S. forces had resulted in a situation in which further additions to its strategic arsenal would provide diminishing returns to the capacity for assured destruction; (2) moreover, attempts to preserve the U.S. superiority would only serve to fuel the "action-reaction phenomenon" of the arms race by spurring the USSR to make greater efforts to catch up to the United States; (3) Soviet military planners and American planners shared similar views about deterrence and the uses of military power (a "mirror-image" view of policy formulation). U.S. defense planners therefore concluded that the arms race would stabilize on the basis of mutual assured destruction once the USSR had attained approximate strategic equality.² These conclusions led American policymakers to miscalculate Soviet intentions and to underestimate the rapidity and extent of the buildup of the USSR's strategic arsenal.

Thus, although numerical parity was achieved by the late 1960s, the strategic balance has not stabilized on the basis of equality. As Table II-1 illustrates, the United States is now numerically inferior in ICBMs, and if the limits (for the United States, 710 SLBMs on 44 submarines and for the USSR, 950 SLBMs on 62 submarines) of the SALT ONE Interim Agreement and Protocol are reached, as the USSR has shown every sign of doing, the United States will soon be inferior in SLBMs deployed on

¹ For a discussion of the development of Soviet strategic doctrine and its effects on the deployment of Soviet forces, see W. T. Lee, "The Rationale Underlying Soviet Strategic Forces," in W. R. Kintner, ed., *Safeguard: Why the ABM Makes Sense*, pp. 142-178 (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1969).

² In 1965, Secretary of Defense McNamara even went so far as to declare that "The Soviets have decided that they have lost the quantitative race, and they are not seeking to engage us in that contest ... there is no indication that the Soviets are seeking to develop a strategic force as large as ours," cited in L. W. Martin, "Strategic Parity and Its Implications," R. E. Osgood, ed., *Retreat from Empire?*, p. 140 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1973).

Table II-1

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE, 1963-1973

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
ICBM	424	834	854	904	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054	1054
USA: SLBM	224	416	496	592	656	656	656	656	656	656	656
Long-range bombers	630	630	630	630	600	545	570	550	505	455	442
ICBM	100	200	270	300	460	800	1050	1300	1510	1527	1527
USSR: SLBM	100	120	120	125	130	130	160	280	440	560	628
Long-range bombers	190	190	190	200	210	150	150	150	140	140	140

Source: The International Institute of Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1972-73*, p. 67 (London, 1973).

submarines. Also, the SALT ONE agreements do not restrict qualitative improvements in strategic forces. Taking advantage of this, the Soviet Union is developing at least three or four new ICBMs and is progressing toward a MIRV capability. These developments could jeopardize the survivability of U.S. forces.

The shifting strategic balance has repercussions other than purely military since nuclear arsenals also serve as symbols of prestige and power. In the last several years, the world at large has received the general impression of Soviet advances in this arena of national power relative to the United States. An immediate consequence of parity has been a further decrease in the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee in the eyes of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia. The United States is therefore confronted with the problem of finding ways to increase allied cohesion at a time when its willingness to come to the defense of its allies is perceived to be diminishing.¹

Finally, the new strategic equation has joined the United States and the Soviet Union in a limited adversary situation different from that which interfaces with any other actors in the international system. The vulnerability of the United States to the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal has raised the issue of whether continued reliance on deterrence through mutual assured destruction is adequate to guarantee the long-term survival of the United States.² Accordingly, new concepts to enhance the mutual survival and security of both superpowers, which can be developed through unilateral measures and negotiations, need to be considered.

¹ For a discussion of the political utilities of nuclear parity and whether nuclear superiority can be translated into political gains, see W. Slocombe, *The Political Implications of Strategic Parity* (London: Adelphi Paper No. 77, May 1971).

² See F. C. Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 267-285 (January 1973).

2. The Growth of Economic Interdependence

As indicated in Table II-2, total world trade (excluding communist nations) increased by over 250 percent in the ten years between 1963 and 1972. This rapid expansion of international trade was led by Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In the 1970s, trade is expected to continue to increase, resulting in an even more interdependent economic system. To date, however, the USSR and China have not participated extensively in these developments. Both of these communist states have historically pursued autarkical policies, and neither has ever engaged in international trade to any great extent.¹

The phenomenon of an increasing economic interdependence among the nations of the world raises new and important implications for U.S. security policy. A primary problem is that, for the first time since World War II, trade and monetary issues have become major exacerbating factors in the political relations among the United States, Western Europe and Japan. The procedures established among these nations after the war provided for the separate treatment of economic and foreign policy issues. This essentially two-track system meant that trade and monetary problems were handled on their own merits by technical experts and ordinarily did not intrude into the high-level arena of foreign policy.² Now, however, in the face of the instability of the American dollar, the declining U.S. trade position vis-a-vis Western Europe and Japan,³ and continued political

¹ The agreements signed in October 1972 between the United States and the USSR were intended to increase trade and undoubtedly will do so. However, even if such trade tripled, it would still be less than two percent of total American trade. Soviet trade with Japan is also small, with the USSR buying only two percent of Japan's exports. See W. Laqueur, "The Cool War," *The New York Times Magazine*, p. 15 (17 September 1972).

² See R. N. Cooper, "Trade Policy is Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy*, pp. 18-36 (Winter 1972-73).

³ In 1971, the United States had a positive balance of trade of \$405 million with the six EEC members and Britain; in 1972, the balance was negative--\$588 million--representing a loss of almost \$1 billion in one year. During that same period, the U.S. trade balance with Japan slipped from minus \$3.2 billion to minus \$4.1 billion, another loss of almost \$1 billion. U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business* (March 1973). An encouraging reversal of this trend occurred in September 1973 when the overall trade balance showed the first sizeable monthly surplus (\$527 million) in over two years. However, future needs to import energy may well restore and increase the trade deficit problem.

Table II-2

SELECTED FACTS CONCERNING WORLD TRADE, 1963 AND 1972
(Millions of Dollars)

Area/Country	1963		1972	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
World total*	\$135,800	\$143,700	\$372,200	\$386,000
Industrial countries	95,290	98,620	275,400	281,540
Industrial Europe	47,440	52,670	151,650	150,650
United States	23,387	18,616	49,768	58,944
United Kingdom	12,219	13,956	24,361	27,859
Federal Republic of Germany	14,565	12,995	46,701	40,190
France	8,088	8,730	26,423	27,002
Japan	5,457	6,741	28,620	23,494
Less developed countries	30,900	32,100	72,000	72,000
USSR	7,272	7,059	14,149	16,047

* Excluding the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (USSR and East European Communist) countries and also the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba.

Sources: International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, Vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 36-39 (May 1972); International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics*, Vol. 26, No. 7 (July 1973).

barriers to trade (such as the EEC's Common Agricultural Policy which discriminates against American agricultural products, trade preferences extended by the Community to third countries but not to the United States, discriminatory measures imposed by Japan on U.S. products, and American pressures for "voluntary" export restraints by Japan and Western Europe), this two-track system is rapidly eroding. This has two serious deleterious effects on overall allied relations: (1) the conflicts caused by economic tensions exacerbate the divisive tendencies already present; (2) economic concessions are increasingly being linked in allied discussions to political and military concessions. The American attempt to link monetary reform to a continued U.S. troop presence in Europe is a case in point, as is the tacit linking of the reversion of Okinawa with a Japanese agreement to curtail its textile exports to the United States.¹ The danger involved in a continued application of linkage for short-term economic concessions, however, is that it may create even greater political and military tensions with which the allies cannot cope.

World economic interdependence is also increasing as the industrial nations become more dependent upon the less developed areas of the world for a continuous flow of petroleum products, minerals and raw materials. Japan currently imports about 99 percent of its petroleum and Western Europe approximately 96 percent.² Although the United States imports only an estimated 17 percent at present, by 1980 it could be importing about 50 percent of its petroleum supplies from foreign sources.³ Moreover, the bulk of the world's proven oil reserves is concentrated in the Persian Gulf. This situation has created a producer's

¹ R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence," *Survival*, pp. 159-161 (July-August 1973).

² L. A. Brown, *The Interdependence Among Nations*, p. 41 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, October 1972).

³ J. E. Akins, "The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is Here," *Foreign Affairs*, p. 463 (April 1973).

market in oil, and has conveyed tremendous economic and political power to the countries and ministates of the Gulf. These nations have succeeded in greatly increasing the price of oil to the consuming countries in the last three years. In addition, the oil suppliers are engaging in linkage themselves, by using their economic power to force political concessions from the importers. The Arab embargo of oil to the United States because of its support for Israel, accompanied by reduced oil production, is a particularly vivid illustration of a worldwide propensity to link economic with political policies.

Table II-3 shows the dependence of the United States on external sources for its supplies of other minerals and raw materials and illustrates the increasing vulnerability of the U.S. economy to external forces beyond its control. Most of the world's exportable copper is supplied by four underdeveloped nations--Chile, Peru, Zambia, and the Congo. Malaysia, Bolivia, and Thailand mine 70 percent of all tin entering international trade; and Australia, Mexico, and Peru account for 60 percent of the world's exportable supply of lead.¹ This limited number of suppliers creates the kind of oligopolistic situation potentially exploitable by the producing countries.

In terms of agricultural commodities, however, the underdeveloped areas of the world are dependent upon the developed countries for adequate supplies. At present, agricultural production in the developing countries is increasing at a rate of only one to two percent annually, which does not even keep pace with the growth rate (about 2.5 percent) of their population.² This overall shortfall of food production is currently being seriously aggravated by drought conditions and other natural disasters in the Third World, which have contributed to a global shortage of wheat and a multimillion-ton

¹

Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

²

A. H. Boerma, Director-General of FAO, *The World Food Situation and Its Implications* (Washington: Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, 24 October 1972).

Table II-3

U.S. DEPENDENCE ON EXTERNAL SUPPLIES OF PRINCIPAL
INDUSTRIAL MINERALS AND RAW MATERIALS
(Percent Imported)

<u>Raw Material</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>2000</u>
Chromium	n.a.	100	100	100
Copper	31	0	34	56
Iron	8	30	55	67
Lead	39	31	62	67
Manganese	88	95	100	100
Nickel	94	90	88	89
Phosphate	8	0	0	2
Potassium	14	42	47	61
Sulfur	2	0	28	52
Tin	77	n.a.	100	100
Tungsten	n.a.	50	87	97
Zinc	38	59	72	84

Source: Adapted from Brown, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

rice shortage in Asia. Estimates of current grain shortages in the worst-hit areas are: India (4.5 million tons), Pakistan (1.5 million tons), Bangladesh (1 million tons), the Philippines (500,000 tons), and the African drought belt (over 1 billion tons).¹ This kind of situation necessitates emergency aid by the United States and others to these countries; but it also presents America with a longer range opportunity to translate its capacity to export soybeans, wheat, corn, and other foodstuffs into an asset to be utilized to foster both domestic prosperity and American diplomatic influence.

3. An Emerging Multipolarity

Although the nuclear strategic balance will continue to be dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the 1970s, the relatively simple bipolar pattern of international relations which characterized the earlier postwar period is giving way to a more complex set of interstate relationships; a multipolar world is evolving in the political-economic arena. In this arena, the nuclear superpowers have been joined by at least three major power centers--the Peoples Republic of China, Western Europe, and Japan--each of which possesses at least some of the credentials necessary to be a power entity.

By virtue of its geographic size and location, its large population, its growing nuclear capability, and its ideology, China has emerged as one of the world's major powers. The growth in Chinese power, however, has been accompanied by a deterioration in its relations with the USSR. The current Sino-Soviet relationship is characterized by ideological rivalry for the allegiance of other members of the communist camp and by rivalry for influence throughout Asia. Sino-Soviet hostility has doubtless been an important factor in persuading both China and the USSR to seek better relations with the United States. American-Chinese relations have also improved as the United States has withdrawn

¹ *Washington Star-News*, p. C-3 (23 September 1973).

troops from Asia. Sino-Soviet rivalry, the Sino-American rapprochement and the Soviet-American detente now form triangular balance-of-power relationships. Each protagonist seeks to prevent the development of a rapprochement between the other two powers.

Western Europe and Japan represent the geopolitical anchors of the Eurasian balance on opposite sides of the globe. Moreover, both have attained sufficient strength through the projection of their economic power to play major global roles. However, their ability to achieve fully independent status in the international system is hampered by the fact that neither Western Europe nor Japan possesses the requisite military strength to provide for its own defense; consequently they must continue to rely on the U.S. nuclear guarantee to deter attack.¹ For constitutional, political, and economic reasons, Japan feels unable to mount a rearmament program sufficient to protect its strategic interests and will thus remain vulnerable to both the Soviet and the Chinese nuclear arsenals. Japan is also vulnerable to possible future threats to the sealanes which are vital to its trading position. Western Europe's difficulties stem from a different source. Although it has succeeded in forming a viable union in economic affairs, it has not been able to unite politically. Thus Western Europe is not a single unit, but is rather composed of individual sovereign nation-states, each pursuing its own concept of its national interests and security. Lack of political unity has prevented, and will continue to preclude, Western Europe from developing into a truly independent world power.

The emergence of China, Western Europe, and Japan as major power centers, even though the United States and the Soviet Union retain their nuclear preponderance, has resulted in what can be called an asymmetrical multipolar

¹ For a discussion of military power as a prerequisite for superpower status, see E. N. Luttwak, "The Emergent International System and U.S. Foreign Policy," SSC-TN-2240-10, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, pp. 2-15 (June 1973).

international system. In such a system, the five protagonists cannot interact equally on all levels in the power spectrum, but they do interact in a series of intertwined bipolar, tripolar, and quadripolar relationships based upon varying strengths and weaknesses. Consequently, the diplomatic process will be much more complicated in the 1970s than was the case during the Soviet-American bipolar cold war period. But this imperfect multipolarity should also result in an amelioration of the former atmosphere of intensive and extensive competition between two opposed power blocs, with continuous crises and tests of will. In a multipolar world, political-economic gains and losses can be more easily accommodated among the five major powers because lesser shifts in power relationships need not be of decisive importance to the central balance. Another effect of asymmetrical multipolarity is that an individual state cannot devise its policies solely in opposition to another power, but must rather consider the effects of its policies on its relationships with the other actors in the system. Illustrative of this is the triangular relationship among the United States, China, and the Soviet Union; each of the two communist rivals has attempted to improve relations with the United States in order to strengthen its position vis-a-vis the other. This fluid multipolar system is expected to endure for the foreseeable future, and U.S. national security policies will need to be formulated within this context.

4. A Changed American Outlook

The domestic support which sustained an activist American foreign policy between World War II and Vietnam has diminished considerably. This "flagging of the psychological drive," as Secretary of State Kissinger has phrased it,¹ is attributable to a number of factors, but principally to these three: the frustration experienced in Vietnam; the increasing economic and political friction between the United States and its allies; and the

¹ Quoted in W. F. Hahn, "The Nixon Doctrine: Design and Dilemmas," *Orbis*, p. 363 (Summer 1972).

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general relaxation of tensions resulting from the waning of the cold war. The change in public attitudes from staunch support of internationalism to uncertainty concerning America's proper role in the world is reflected in the results of public opinion polls. For example, below are the results of a poll taken in June 1972 by the Gallup Organization:¹

- a. While the percentage of those Americans who think of themselves as isolationists has not changed since 1964, the enthusiastic internationalism of the population has been moderated; also, 87 percent thought that the United States should continue to play a major international role but should cut down or some of its responsibilities abroad.

	<u>1964*</u>	<u>1968*</u>	<u>1972</u>
Completely internationalist	30	25	18
Predominantly internationalist	35	34	38
Mixed	27	32	35
Predominantly isolationist	5	6	5
Completely isolationist	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
	100	100	100

*1964 and 1968 percentages from the Institute for International Social Research.

- b. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement that the United States should come to the aid of its major European allies and Japan with military force if they are attacked by the Soviet Union or China, only slightly more than half agreed in the case of Europe and only four in ten agreed in the case of Japan.

	<u>Europe</u>	<u>Japan</u>
Agree	52%	43%
Disagree	32	40
Don't know	<u>16</u>	<u>17</u>
	100	100

¹ For complete results of the interviews, see W. Watts and L. A. Free, *State of the Nation*, pp. 192-204, 215-217, 277-283 (New York: Universe Books, 1973).

- c. When asked if they thought America's contribution of ground troops now serving in Europe should be increased, kept at the present level, reduced, or ended altogether, those polled answered:

Increased	6%
Kept at present level	44
Reduced	30
Ended altogether	15
Don't know	5
	<u>100</u>

- d. Finally, when asked to agree or disagree with the statement that the United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even going to the brink of war if necessary, 50 percent disagreed in 1972 as opposed to only 31 percent in 1964.

	<u>1964*</u>	<u>1968*</u>	<u>1972</u>
Agree	56%	50%	39%
Disagree	31	40	50
Don't know	<u>13</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>11</u>
	100	100	100

*1964 and 1968 percentages from the Institute for International Social Research.

Congressional support for an activist American foreign policy has also declined, especially in the Senate and its Foreign Relations Committee. This is partly the result of the continuing political struggle between the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch, with Congress the weaker of the two after abdicating much of its power over the years to a strong Executive. But this diminution of support also reflects the desire to avoid future Vietnams; consequently U.S. commitments overseas are being examined with more scrutiny by Congress. Also, many Congressmen and Senators believe that priorities should be reordered in the federal budget to give more funds to domestic concerns and less to defense.

Under pressure from these and other forces, Congressional support in foreign policy has deteriorated to the point where Congress is at loggerheads with the Executive Branch on many issues. Especially among Senate Democrats, support for internationalism has declined considerably. With regard to the defense budget, pressures for reduction, however, come

not only from "doves" but also from conservative "economizers". Even the armed services' committees have recently become more critical of defense spending levels.

Congressional pressure to reduce foreign commitments has met with but partial success thus far. Nearly every attempt to pass legislation favoring withdrawal of troops from Vietnam on terms which were opposed by the White House was defeated, with the exception of the Mansfield Amendment to the defense procurement authorization bill of 1971, which urged the President to establish a final date for the withdrawal of troops from Indochina with the stipulation of the return of American POWs and an accounting of MIAs. But when President Nixon signed the bill, he went on record as stating that the provision was without binding force and it would not change his policies.¹

However, Congress was able to set limits on the numbers of Americans stationed in Laos and Cambodia, and it did succeed in its efforts to establish a cutoff date of 15 August 1973 for the U.S. bombing of Cambodia. There is also growing Congressional support for another Mansfield Amendment to reduce the numbers of American troops stationed in Europe, although the Administration has been able to defeat this amendment so far.

Another indication of growing Congressional restiveness is the passage in 1973 of a War Powers Bill, requiring the President to report to Congress within 48 hours after committing U.S. forces to hostilities or substantially enlarging U.S. combat forces in a foreign nation; the President is further required to stop the operation after 60 days unless he receives Congressional approval (the President can continue for an additional 30 days if it is necessary to protect American forces). Under the bill, Congress can end the operation within this period by passing a concurrent resolution which would not be submitted to the President for a possible veto. Not only did Congress vote to pass the War Powers Bill, but when President Nixon vetoed it Congress overrode that veto; this was the first override of a veto in nine attempts in 1973.

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F. E. Rourke, "The President Ascendant," in Osgood, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

B. The Nixon Doctrine

Recognizing that nuclear parity, political multipolarity and changing domestic public opinion pose new challenges for the United States in the 1970s, the Nixon Administration has developed an innovative foreign policy approach designed to reconcile these divergent trends with the continuing necessity for a vigorous U.S. involvement in the world. The Nixon Doctrine purports to make a skillful use of the principles of strength, partnership and negotiations to orchestrate a dynamic diplomacy intended to bring about a global structure of peace in a multipolar world.

The Nixon Doctrine is based on a perception that the United States and the Soviet Union, by virtue of their nuclear status, will remain the preponderant military powers for some time to come. The adversary nature of their military relationship will continue, as will their political rivalry. This relationship requires that the United States retain its nuclear strength at a level of "strategic sufficiency," which is defined as the "maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced" and "enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking."¹ Strategic sufficiency is designedly a flexible and dynamic concept, and, when viewed in the larger context of the continually increasing strategic and conventional military power of both the USSR and China--and the shrinking American military strength--it implies the necessity for continuous assessment of its validity. The most difficult judgment, and probably in the future the most important, is the political adequacy--"to prevent ... being coerced." As one analyst puts it, "the conclusion is inescapable that the Russians are pursuing a deployment strategy that calls for more weapons than are required for retaliatory purposes alone, because they

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R. M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Building for Peace*, Report to the Congress, 25 February 1971, p. 170 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971). [Short title: Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1971*]

see the extra margin of strategic power as politically useful."¹ This problem, complicated by the ongoing arms limitation negotiations and the unknown degree of trust that can be placed in a detente environment, will be a critical challenge to the Nixon Doctrine and successor foreign policies of the United States.

The Administration views U.S. relations with its allies, particularly Western Europe and Japan, in terms of an increasing partnership. The United States will continue to provide the nuclear guarantee to its allies, but the emergence of Western Europe and Japan as major economic powers makes it possible for them to assume more of the burden of their own defense. It also promotes a greater degree of independence from the United States and a new pattern of allied relations, from American predominance to a more equal and balanced coalition.

The combination of continued strength and increased partnership makes possible the third pillar of the Nixon Doctrine--negotiations with adversaries. By engaging in bilateral arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union (such as SALT) and multilateral talks (such as Mutual Force Reductions in Europe), the United States promotes the formulation of new ground rules for cooperation and increased security for all. The Nixon Doctrine has broadened the negotiating process to bring the Peoples Republic of China into the international arena.

¹ E. Luttwak, *The Strategic Balance 1972*, p. 88 (New York: The Library Press, 1972).

While encouraging negotiations with the Soviets, the Administration recognizes that the USSR will not readily give up its aim to dominate Western Europe and other areas adjacent to the USSR. Accordingly, it is still U.S. policy to contain the communist threat through the maintenance of countervailing American and allied power. But as the era of negotiations progresses, and as a network of agreements and understandings evolves, it is hoped that the resulting mutual accommodations will form the basis of a *modus vivendi* in which competition is moderated.

The Nixon Doctrine has devalued the importance of the Third World as the decisive arena of superpower competition. This devaluation results partly from the breakdown in the unity of the communist threat and the discovery by the United States and other major powers that the underdeveloped nations are more difficult to manipulate than had been supposed. Furthermore, much of the Third World is now viewed as intrinsically less important than was the case previously. The Administration hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union will exercise mutual restraint and limit their competition in order to avoid becoming involved in a direct confrontation during local crises. America's allies in the Third World are expected to become more self-reliant and to provide for their own defense against indigenous threats and subversion. As the major powers concentrate on fashioning new relationships among themselves, the smaller nations will be faced with the task of accommodating to change in their own independent ways. They will need to formulate and make their own decisions on defense and development. The United States will play a supportive but not a central role in these endeavors.

The United States and the Soviet Union confront each other as two opposed social systems with fundamentally different world views and objectives. As the interests of the two superpowers clash in various parts of the world, a situation is created in which there is ample opportunity for conflict. However, the conflictual nature of their relationships is moderated by the fact that the destructiveness of their nuclear arsenals is so pervasive that their employment in a general war cannot be a feasible instrument of national policy. Thus the United States and the Soviet Union are faced with a common goal which overlays their entire relationship--the necessity to prevent a nuclear war. This necessity provides the basis for cooperation through negotiations.

The contradiction between opportunities for conflict and cooperation permeates all levels of the superpower relationship. Strategic interactions are therefore much more complex than in the earlier cold war period. One of the major contributions of the Nixon Doctrine has been the recognition of this fact--U.S. policy has moved away from an over-emphasis on the quantitative aspects of nuclear strategy and greater importance has been accorded to the political, diplomatic, psychological and economic factors. This also involves a deeper appreciation and understanding than heretofore of the Soviet Union's global strategy and the tactics used to implement that strategy. The challenges posed by the USSR are thus viewed less in terms of quantitative comparisons of two weapons systems and more in terms of the Soviet use of military power in effecting its political goals. A primary task facing the United States is therefore to ameliorate the superpower nuclear confrontation while generating a dynamic diplomacy designed to nullify the political utility of the adversary's forces.

The Nixon Doctrine attempts to accomplish this task through a policy based on strength, partnership and negotiations. However, the implementation of such a policy is hampered by the contradictions found in these elements. For example:

- The joint necessity to prevent nuclear war makes arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union possible. Yet these negotiations have a deleterious effect on U.S. relations with its allies by heightening their fears concerning the willingness of the United States to come to their defense.
- On the other hand, efforts to retain the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee in order to guard against Soviet attempts at nuclear coercion in Europe are in conflict with U.S.-Soviet negotiations to cooperate in avoiding nuclear confrontations.
- Increased partnership between the United States, Western Europe and Japan in military and political affairs is undermined by the intra-alliance conflicts in trade and other economic matters.
- Greater solidarity between Western Europe and the United States is made more difficult by the lack of agreement between the United States and Western Europe regarding financial support of their military forces and the sharing of the defense burden more equitably with the United States. This in turn has led to a rising resentment in the American Congress and in the public over what is seen as a disproportionate U.S. contribution to the defense of its complacent allies.
- The maintenance of a sufficient U.S. military posture is constrained by domestic pressures for a decreased defense budget in an age of detente and negotiations on arms control and mutual force reductions.

These contradictions illustrate the difficulties involved in attempting to reconcile the fundamental and divergent trends in a rapidly changing international system with the imperatives of planning an adequate global force posture.

III U.S. INTERESTS AND U.S. DEFENSE POLICY IN THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL MILIEU

In his earliest full statement on the Nixon Doctrine the President pointed out that "our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."¹ Every major power has interests beyond its shores, which it must support and protect. As a part of the consideration of factors entering into military force posture requirements, it is appropriate to examine U.S. interests, especially those which affect U.S. national security policy. This chapter briefly reviews U.S. interests and U.S. defense policy, as they evolve to meet the needs of the future.

A. U.S. National Interests Reappraised

1. Isolationism, Universalism, and Selective Globalism

U.S. foreign policy for the decade ahead faces challenges which cannot be met by adopting either an isolationist outlook or a universalist approach. Rather, what is needed is a more discerning policy, which can be called selective globalism, in which the United States does not involve itself indiscriminately wherever threats occur but rather determines its actions in accordance with its own vital interests, the threats to those interests, and its commitments to defend against such threats.

The isolationism followed by the United States during the period between the two world wars was a political rather than an economic phenomenon. The United States expanded its economic ties through trade and investment but refused to maintain alliances or political commitments to uphold the existing international system. Forays into the international political arena took the form of sporadic attempts to reduce the dangers

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R. M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace*, Report to the Congress, 18 February 1970, p. 7 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970). [Short title: Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1970*]

of the outbreak of general war through such measures as sponsoring disarmament conferences and participating in multilateral pacts designed to "outlaw" war. But the United States opposed a universalist peace-keeping obligation such as that envisioned by the League of Nations. Continuing its belief in George Washington's "great rule of conduct," the United States did not allow its expanding economic relations to lead to political arrangements. As Washington had advised, the "detached and distant situation" of America allowed it "to steer clear of permanent alliances."¹

Following the failure of this approach to keep the United States from becoming involved in a second great war within two decades, American decisionmakers became convinced that isolationism had to be abandoned. Peace was seen as being indivisible--a threat to one nation was a threat to all. The advent of the cold war and the threat of communist aggression gave impetus to a universalist approach to foreign policy. This led directly to the containment doctrine, advanced by the Truman Administration in 1947. Containment was intended to frustrate Soviet attempts at aggression and eventually "mellow" the expansionist tendencies of the USSR. It became U.S. policy to intervene wherever and whenever threats to peace occurred outside of Eastern Europe. This view of America's role in the world--generally referred to as universalism--led quite naturally to extensive American commitments to come to the defense of threatened nations everywhere. This policy was followed throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and by the beginning of this decade, the United States had formal treaty commitments with 43 other nations in addition to numerous commitments embodied in executive agreements, congressional resolutions, United Nations resolutions and Presidential declarations. Some pacts, such as NATO, represent as automatic a commitment to use U.S. force in defense of American allies

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For a discussion of the meaning of isolationism, see R. Tucker, *Isolationism: Threat or Promise?*, Chapter 2 (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

as is permissible under the U.S. Constitution; others, such as SEATO, do not involve quite as strong a commitment to respond with force and are primarily expressions of American intent.

By the time the Nixon Administration took office, U.S. policy was still based upon a universal commitment to preserve the peace in all regions of the globe. But both international conditions and the mood of the American people had changed. It was necessary to develop a new rationale for American foreign policy, one which would synthesize the two previous policies of isolationism and universalism and which would continue to meet U.S. responsibilities abroad but limit the involvement of the United States to those areas where its vital interests were at stake. Hence the Nixon Administration adopted a policy of selective globalism.

A policy of selective globalism requires a redefinition of U.S. interests and a more discriminating examination of the commitments undertaken to defend those interests. As President Nixon has observed:

Well, I think as far as commitments are concerned, the United States has a full plate. I first do not believe that we should make a new commitment around the world unless our national interests are very vitally involved. Second, I do not believe we should become involved in the quarrels of nations in other parts of the world unless we are asked to become involved and unless also we are vitally involved.¹

However, the Nixon Administration did not begin its foreign policy on a *tabula rasa*. The practical problem of implementing a policy of selective globalism based on self-interest is to find the means to make the transition from universal commitments to a more restrained and selective posture of choosing which commitments are vital and should be retained and which are not.

¹ Presidential Press Conference, 4 March 1969.

2. U.S. Security Interests and Regional Priorities

Although the general American strategy continues to revolve around denying the communist powers opportunities for aggrandizement, U.S. security interests vary in each region of the globe, and possible threats to these interests are becoming increasingly diverse in the more flexible international milieu of this decade.

Western Europe has traditionally been regarded as the cornerstone of American foreign policy because of its strategic location, its economic dynamism, and the cultural, social, and political ties which have formed between Europe and the United States. Western Europe is also the area in which the Soviet Union poses the most direct military and political threat to the West. Consequently, NATO remains the most important alliance of which the United States is a member. In terms of countering the immediate military threat and deterring a war in Europe, NATO has been eminently successful. But, paradoxically, this may have contributed to a lessening of the sense of urgency and to a diminished perception of the USSR as a military threat. As fear of the Soviet Union has waned so has support for NATO, both in the United States and in Europe.

The United States is confronted with the problem of reconciling a continued need for a large contribution of U.S. forces to Western Europe with increasing domestic pressure to reduce the contingent. This issue is linked to a whole gamut of trans-Atlantic problems, ranging from balance-of-payments deficits, trade, and currency reform to the seeming inability to devise a NATO strategy for deterrence and defense which is both militarily feasible and politically acceptable to all allies.

Even within Western Europe, divisive issues threaten to fractionate the alliance. One of the most significant problems is that the political unity necessary to formulate a common policy toward the United States and the Soviet Union does not exist. France is a "team player" only on individualistic rules of its own; West Germany's *Ostpolitik* creates uneasiness in other European capitals; British-Icelandic relations are poor in the aftermath of the "Cod War"; the Greek government has been viewed with distaste by many persons in the more liberal and socially conscious European societies; and none of the European allies seem to be willing to undertake significant steps to upgrade its defenses. These intra-European problems also affect the United States, in some cases directly. For example, the dispute between Britain and Iceland has provided the Icelandic government with still another reason to close U.S. bases in its country. Thus, at a time when the conventional military capability of the Warsaw Pact continues to grow and the Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal equals that of the United States, NATO is becoming increasingly disunited.

In Asia there is likely to be intensive and extensive great-power involvement for some time to come. Although the United States is less directly affected by Asian developments than the Soviet Union, China, and Japan, the long-term balance of power in Asia will certainly impinge upon U.S. global interests. A major diplomatic task for the United States will be to maintain a close partnership with Japan, in order to prevent Japan from being drawn into either the Soviet or Chinese orbit. Japan is vulnerable to nuclear weapons of both communist powers, but it is also a major potential source of economic capital and technology for the USSR and the PRC. Hence, Japan finds itself being courted by both competitors. Without American partnership, Japan would be forced to fend for itself without the military power necessary to preserve its independence.

The Nixon Administration has downgraded the perception of the Chinese military threat to American allies in Southeast Asia. This has facilitated the development of a Sino-American rapprochement and the reduction of U.S. ground forces in the region. Nevertheless, the United States has bound itself to defend five mainland nations--Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand--and has given security guarantees to five island nations--Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. These commitments must be reconciled with the U.S. desire

to avoid "future Vietnams," which acts to constrain the deployment of ground forces. The Nixon Doctrine's solution to this dilemma has been to place greater reliance on indigenous defense forces, backed by American military aid and advice, to counter subversion and internal threats. However, some forward-based American presence is maintained, primarily in Korea and Thailand, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to the security of both East and Southeast Asia.

In the Middle East, the United States has three basic interests--to deny the Soviet Union the ability to increase its influence in this strategically important region; to aid Israel in its search for security; and to insure an adequate and steady supply of oil to itself and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. Unfortunately, as the latest Arab-Israeli war has demonstrated, these interests can be in fundamental conflict with each other. American support of Israel and Soviet support of the Arabs brought on a confrontation between the superpowers and endangered the fragile framework of detente which had been so painstakingly negotiated. Arab oil producers have been able to institute a boycott against the United States and have reduced exports to Japan and Western Europe. Aside from the immediate situation, the ability of the Arab oil producers to use oil as a political and economic weapon poses serious long-term security problems for the West.

In Latin America, the United States has traditional interests based on concepts of hemispheric security. The United States obviously wishes to retain control of the Panama Canal. Also, Latin America supplies oil, tin, copper, and other raw materials to the United States. However, these interests are not presently threatened by superpower competition, due to the remoteness of the region from the USSR and China and the power of the proximity of the United States.

The United States has moderated its interventionist tendencies in Latin America, and has even learned to live with the Cuban communist presence in the Caribbean. A basic problem of the region continues to be political instability and lack of economic growth, although the performance of Brazil and Mexico has been exceptionally favorable. An issue which the

United States must increasingly be concerned with, however, is the action of some Latin American countries in claiming large areas of the ocean for national exploitation. International negotiations on territorial waters and uses of the seabed will probably not be able to resolve all these controversial claims in the near future.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the potential exists for chronic internal conflicts due to the difficulties African states are experiencing as they attempt to evolve from tribal societies into modern nations. But because the major powers have few strategic interests in this region, there seems to be little likelihood of superpower involvement and competition.

B. U.S. Defense Policy in Transition

In making the transition from a universalist to a more selective foreign policy, a main task of the Nixon Administration has been to design a defense policy which will be fully supportive of a changing American role in the world. The cold war era was dominated by the advent of nuclear weapons and the threat of world communism. America's response to these two factors was a fundamental shift from the nation's traditional isolationism to acceptance of the role of free world leadership. Through a massive program of foreign economic and military aid, the building of an elaborate set of security alliances, and the acquisition of a powerful nuclear arsenal, the United States succeeded, in the main, in a policy of containment. There was a heavy reliance on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation in the early years. In the 1960s, it was perceived that America's conventional military capabilities needed to be strengthened, and a policy of flexible response was adopted in order to correct what was judged to be too narrow a defense posture.

By the end of the 1960s, however, U.S. defense policy was again in need of reconsideration. When the Nixon Administration took office it found that the existing strategy did not meet the needs of the new global milieu. This was so for several reasons: (1) by over-emphasizing the quantitative aspects of the deterrent equation at

the expense of political, economic, and psychological factors, the result was an inadequate correlation of national security policy with the nation's overall foreign policy; (2) the reliance on the strategy of assured destruction did not provide the President with options other than the destruction of the enemy's civilian population and industry should deterrence fail; (3) although U.S. strategic forces had been structured to lower the probability of nuclear war through deterrence of aggressors, the stress had been placed on structuring U.S. conventional forces to increase their capability to intervene in, rather than deter, other types of conflict; (4) the trend of the 1960s was toward a greater and more direct American involvement in providing security for allies in nonnuclear conflicts; (5) the 2-1/2 war strategy, whereby it was planned that the United States would possess a capability for simultaneously fighting major Asian and European conflicts plus a minor conflict elsewhere, was not realistic and had never been attained; and (6) the concept of a continuum of force which could deter conflict at all levels had not been adequately formulated.

Underlying all the foregoing reasons for the necessity to restructure American defense policy was the need for a basic reconsideration of how the United States should allocate its national resources. There was an evident shift in the public consensus concerning priorities accorded to external versus internal demands. A growing number of Americans had come to believe that a greater proportion of money, manpower and attention should be applied to domestic problems. After a quarter century of bearing a heavy burden in preserving the freedoms which the United States and its allies cherish, Americans thought that their allies had progressed to the point where they should do more to defend themselves. Thus the new defense policy had to be consistent with new strategic and international realities, but also formulated within severe fiscal and manpower constraints.

1. The Four Realities

Approaching the problem of defining a new defense policy, the Nixon Administration recognized that it was faced with four realities, or major problem areas, which place both imperatives and constraints on

national security planning. These realities concern strategy, politics, money and manpower.¹

a. The strategic reality is concerned with the threat posed by the Soviet Union to the United States and its allies. This threat includes the entire range of Soviet military and para-military efforts, from Soviet assistance to the Third World to the Soviet strategic nuclear challenge to U.S. deterrent forces.

b. The political reality is concerned with both international and internal political factors which affect national security policy. International factors include: (1) the political and psychological effects of increasing Soviet military capabilities and presence throughout the world; (2) concerns of U.S. allies that the United States maintain substantial forward deployed forces; and (3) the possible impact of SALT agreements on U.S. military forces. Internal factors include: (1) the difficulty of maintaining broad domestic public support for national security efforts; and (2) Congressional opposition to policies, specifically Congressional desires to withdraw forward deployed forces.

c. The fiscal reality concerns the urgent need to commit greater resources to domestic problems at a time of rising military costs. While defense costs have been declining in real terms, the defense budget reflects increases resulting from inflation, force modernization and manpower costs.

d. The manpower reality is concerned with the pressures for smaller active armed forces and the recruitment problems of an all-volunteer service.

2. The Strategy of Realistic Deterrence

After reviewing the existing defense policy in light of the problem areas and the requirements of the goals envisioned by the Nixon Doctrine, the Administration set forth a new national security policy in 1971--the strategy

¹ Secretary of Defense M. R. Laird, *National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, Statement on the Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1973, pp. 29-34. [Short title: DOD Report FY 1973].

of realistic deterrence.¹ This new policy is based on the premise that the security of the United States and its allies will be enhanced through the deterrence of aggressors at all levels of potential conflict; to accomplish that goal, a renewed emphasis is placed on allied partnership through shared strength. The United States does not intend to be the "policeman of the world," but it will continue to provide leadership and protection as its partners assume more of the burden of their own defense. "Our goal is to prevent wars, to maintain a realistic and ready force aimed at deterring aggression--adequate to handle aggression should deterrence fail."²

As a basis for designing a defense policy appropriate for a changing international environment, the following criteria were established for U.S. national security planning:³

- The maintenance of a sufficient American strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the allied nuclear deterrent.⁴
- The development and maintenance of effective allied forces which will minimize the probability of employing strategic nuclear weapons should deterrence fail.
- The development of an international security assistance program to enhance the effectiveness of the self-defense capabilities of America's allies.

These defense planning criteria are to be implemented according to four guidelines:⁵

¹ Secretary of Defense M. R. Laird, *Toward a National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence*, Statement on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget, p. 17. [Short title: DOD Report FY 1972].

² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁴ Secretary Laird delineated the principal objectives of sufficiency as: "Maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces; providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis; preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war; defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches," *ibid.*, p. 62.

⁵ DOD Report FY 73, p. 23.

- In deterring strategic nuclear war, primary reliance will be placed on U.S. strategic forces.
- In deterring theater nuclear war, the United States also has primary responsibility, but those allies who have nuclear capabilities share in this responsibility.
- In deterring theater conventional war, U.S. and allied forces share responsibility.
- In deterring subtheater or localized war, the country which is threatened has primary responsibility particularly for providing manpower, but when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake the United States will provide help as appropriate.

3. The Total Force Concept

The concept of Total Force planning is founded upon the necessity to make maximum use of all available allied military and related resources for the attainment of an optimum level of security. These resources include "...both active and reserve components of the United States, those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs."¹ The Total Force approach involves both a division of responsibilities between the United States and allied countries, and a more efficient integration of U.S. and allied resources to achieve greater security at lower cost. The most appropriate application of the Total Force Concept is in planning for theater and sub-theater conventional conflict. In this area, four general categories of force planning exist:²

- Combined force planning assumes the integration of U.S. and allied forces (e.g., NATO and Korea) and involves close consultation with allies.
- Complementary force planning assumes U.S. military obligations to help in the defense of an ally, but does not involve prepositioned U.S. ground forces during peacetime (e.g., Japan); it also involves close allied consultation.

¹ DOD Report FY 72, p. 21.

² DOD Report FY 73, pp. 62-64.

- Supplementary force planning assumes an American role in aiding allied defense capabilities, basically through appropriate security assistance (e.g., Indonesia, Israel).
- Unilateral force planning involves contingencies in areas where U.S. interests are at stake; only U.S. forces would be involved and allied help would not be expected.

The Total Force Concept has several potential advantages for the United States. From the fiscal standpoint, it is clear that a dollar spent on international security assistance can buy much more defense against the threat to an ally than a dollar spent directly on U.S. forces.¹ Total Force planning permits America's allies (especially those in Asia) to "do what they can do best," namely, providing ground forces for defense, while the United States "does what it does best" by providing higher technology forces and logistic and training support. A significant factor is that the Total Force Concept allows the United States to shift from the previous 2-1/2 war strategy to maintaining sufficient general purpose forces consistent with a 1-1/2 war strategy. This is especially important in view of the constraints imposed by the fiscal and manpower realities, and the low degree of probability that concentrated military action will be simultaneously taken by the communist powers in both Europe and Asia.

4. Net Assessment

Net assessment is the comparative analysis of the capabilities and weaknesses of potential adversaries with the capabilities and weaknesses of the United States and its allies. These assessments play a critical role in the implementation of Total Force planning.²

Net assessment takes into account the imperatives and constraints of the strategic, political, fiscal and manpower realities. However, it is most concerned with the military threat posed by adversaries at all levels

¹ Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1971*, p. 184.

² DOD Report FY 73, p. 29.

--strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, theater conventional, and subtheater. Also analyzed are the impacts of communist military assistance and the challenges involved in the effort to maintain U.S. technological superiority.¹

This comprehensive and on-going assessment makes possible a new order of realism for effective Total Force planning by the United States and its allies.

5. Continuing Problems

The present national security strategy seeks to make deterrence indivisible by maintaining America's nuclear strength while enhancing the ability of U.S. allies to provide for their own defense. However, there are and will be problems in attempting to implement this policy:

a. Although the concept of sufficiency provides overall guidance as to the maintenance of U.S. strength, it is difficult to structure the specifics of a force posture based upon the necessarily broad objectives of such a concept. In regard to general defense policy, the President has stated that, "...there is an absolute point below which our security forces must never be allowed to go. That is the level of sufficiency. Above or at that level, our defense forces protect national security adequately. Below that level is one vast undifferentiated area of no security at all."² The problem lies in translating this definition into an agreed and sustainable level and mix of armed forces. Concerning America's nuclear arsenal, the four objectives of sufficiency which have been delineated by the Administration raise further questions: (1) What is the level of strategic forces required to maintain an "adequate" second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack?; (2) how can the United States provide "no incentive" for the USSR to strike first in a crisis?; (3) what is the definition of the ability of the Soviet Union to inflict a greater level of urban/industrial damage than the United States could inflict on the USSR?; and (4) how

¹ DOD Report FY 73, pp. 30-58.

² Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1970*, p. 167.

can the United States, within the constraints of SALT ONE, develop the capability to limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches? Such issues illustrate the difficulty in operationalizing the concept of sufficiency.

b. A principal goal of Total Force planning is to increase the ability of America's allies to defend themselves through the provision of security assistance as a substitution for the stationing of U.S. troops on allied soil. This particularly pertains to the Asian theater and is founded on the principle of comparative advantage and on the idea of cost-effectiveness--"as long as Washington can support eight to ten foreign soldiers for the cost of one U.S. soldier, American taxpayers are getting a bargain..."¹ This concept, however, suffers from two flaws: (1) it is by no means certain that an increase in security assistance will in all cases adequately improve the military capabilities of the recipient nations; and (2) it tends to ignore the fact that a principal purpose for the presence of American troops is to demonstrate concretely the U.S. commitment and to deter attack by making the threat of U.S. intervention credible. In this respect, military assistance is not a simple substitute for U.S. troops.

c. The new defense policy has rejected the former concept of a 2-1/2 war capability for a new goal of a 1-1/2 war capability, which entails the ability to fight a major war in either Europe or Asia, and concurrently deal with a minor contingency elsewhere. In reality, however, the U.S. posture is more constrained than the 1-1/2 war concept would imply. The commitment to Europe, where the major portion of deployed U.S. forces remains, is the priority commitment. This means that the United States is first prepared to fight in Europe, and elsewhere as the forces not deployed to Europe permit--in Asia, or perhaps in the Middle East. This is a politically realistic posture, but it is not, strictly speaking, a "1-1/2 war" posture. The forces available for a non-European conflict would be those deployed in the Pacific and in the CONUS, including, if necessary, forces

¹ R. J. Wood, "Military Assistance and the Nixon Doctrine," *Orbis*, p. 273 (Spring 1971).

earmarked for NATO. The NATO Central Front forces cannot realistically be expected to be deployable, although flank forces should have more flexibility.

d. The ultimate success of the U.S. experiment with an all-volunteer force is not assured. Problems in recruitment, adequate numbers of reenlistments, manpower costs, and social and racial composition of the armed services must be solved if the program is to provide effective general purpose forces.¹

e. U.S. strategic policy as it evolved in the 1960s was based upon assuring the destruction of an aggressor nation in retaliation for an attack which would attempt to destroy the United States. The doctrine postulates that the adversary is thus restrained from attacking by the knowledge that the resulting damage would be so great that the gamble would not be worth the risk. American policymakers extended this concept of assured destruction into mutual assured destruction (MAD) by making the assumption that Soviet strategists accept a similar premise and that the shared vulnerability of each to the strategic forces of the other is seen as a deterrent to both.

It is a matter of record that, during the tenancy of the mutual assured destruction doctrine, U.S. expenditures imputable to strategic-nuclear forces have been stabilized; significant arms control measures have been negotiated with the Soviet Union; and no nuclear war has taken place. However, it has also become evident that this doctrine and the force postures derived from it have serious limitations; MAD provides no strategic

¹ Recruitment is especially a problem for the Army, which has failed to meet its goals in each of the first nine months of the all-volunteer program. William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, estimates that by June 1974, the Army will fall 15,000 to 20,000 men short of its 792,000-man goal, *New York Times* (16 November 1973). For an overall analysis of problems resulting from eliminating the draft, see M. Janowitz, *The U.S. Forces and the Zero Draft* (London: ISS, Adelphi Paper No. 94, 1972).

alternatives which counter other types of threats or which could conceivably limit a nuclear exchange--it postulates either deterrence or all-out war.¹

Because the overriding goal of the superpowers should be to prevent nuclear war, it is essential that these shortcomings of MAD be rectified. A concept which has been advanced to accomplish this can be described as a strategy of Mutual Assured Survival and Security, or MASS.² This concept converts the negative aim of assured destruction into the positive goal of assured survival. It is founded upon the idea that a nation cannot assure its own long-term survival in the nuclear age without assuring the adversary of its survival as well. Concrete progress on moving from MAD towards MASS can be accomplished through a variety of both negotiated and unilateral measures. In arms control negotiations such as SALT and MFR, the mutual self-interest of increasing the security of all can be used to agree upon measures to limit damage in case of attack. For example, although SALT ONE had the effect of preserving a situation of mutual vulnerability by limiting ABM sites, SALT TWO can be used to negotiate an agreement to freeze or reduce offensive forces and perhaps even reconsider further ABM deployment; a City Avoidance Treaty could be negotiated to give legal

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For extended discussions of these limitations, see F. C. Ikle, "Can Nuclear Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 267-284 (January 1973); and E. N. Luttwak and M. B. Schneider, "The Dynamics of Evolving from a Strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction to Mutual Assured Survival and Security: Two Views," SSC-TN-2240-12, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, pp. 13-24 (August 1973). Ikle argues that MAD is untenable in the long run because it can be undermined too easily--by an irrational leader who is not deterred by the prospect of the destruction of his homeland, or by an accidental launching through technical error or human failure. He also contends that the targeting of retaliatory forces against the enemy's population is immoral--assured destruction is in fact "assured genocide" (p. 281). Luttwak states: "This doctrine is therefore based on exclusive deterrence in its most extreme mode: the value to be threatened is survival itself, and no defense is permissible since it would only attenuate the reciprocal terror that is considered essential to ensure stability" (p. 18). Furthermore, MAD is inflexible, since it leaves the national leader with only one course of action, ordering the destruction of enemy civilians or capitulation.

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See R. B. Foster, "The Nixon Doctrine: An Emerging U.S. Policy," in W. R. Kintner and R. B. Foster, eds., *National Strategy in a Decade of Change*, pp. 11-13 (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1973).

standing to the mutual retargeting of retaliatory forces away from population centers.¹ Unilateral actions which can be taken include: (1) an American declaration that its forces are no longer targeted against Soviet cities but are rather concentrated against military installations; and (2) the construction of point defense systems that can absorb attacks against strategic offensive forces but not attacks against other targets.²

Proposals for effecting a transition from MiD to MASS will not be adopted without controversy and the overcoming of difficulties, especially given the diversity of strategic views within the United States and the hazards of the negotiating process with the Soviet Union. However, the nuclear superpowers continue to be faced with the problem of increasing mutual security in an era of global uncertainty. The MASS concept is a means to increase that security.

¹ Schneider, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-53.

² Luttwak, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-31.

IV THE ROLES OF MILITARY FORCE IN THE EMERGING SYSTEM

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the impact of change on the role of military force as an instrument of national policy. The President has declared as a key foreign policy objective the moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. The military corollary to this objective is to deter conflict at all levels.

These objectives are clear, but what is less easily discernible is the specific role of military force itself, in the attainment of the objectives. There are a number of factors which are affecting and will probably continue to affect the roles of military force, including these principal ones:

- Revulsion against the carnage and destruction of two world wars in the first half of the 20th century.
- The fear of nuclear war.
- The likelihood of great power involvement in even minor clashes between states.
- Global instant communications, giving high "visibility" to acts of aggression.
- The existence of the United Nations, which even with its limitations, constitutes a forum for condemning acts of violence.
- The high costs of maintenance and use of military force.
- An inward turning of the industrial societies, reflecting greater concern over internal than external problems.
- The difficulty of bringing a conflict to a successful conclusion, especially against peoples who are willing to prolong resistance, even with considerable suffering, by employing unconventional or guerrilla tactics.
- Greater influence of the younger generation--the one which fights the wars--in both industrial and underdeveloped societies, acting as a constraint on the decisions of leaders.
- The concept that deterrence is the primary goal of military strength.
- The belief by many that the threat of war is decreasing.

In the following sections these and other factors are considered, as a step in deriving guidelines for force posture planning.

A. Military Force in the New Environment

1. Changing Threat Patterns

Armed force has two fundamental purposes in international politics: (1) to be employed offensively or to threaten directly or indirectly such employment, as an instrument of coercion to change the existing political order; and (2) to be employed defensively or to threaten directly or indirectly such employment, by a state determined to deter or to resist forcible changes or political pressures affecting the *status quo*. It follows that if no states intended to use coercive instruments to alter the international political structure, there would be no need for any nation to maintain armed forces except as adjuncts to other means of preserving internal order. Leaders of *status quo* states legitimize the existence of their military forces by perceiving and assessing threats to the international order which can be judged of sufficient salience to jeopardize their own nation-state, if not directly at least indirectly, and if not in the present at least in the foreseeable future. A threat to the nation, in short, means that leaders of one state perceive that leaders of another state intend to use their armed forces to effect political change to the detriment of the first state. To prevent this, the *status quo* state must maintain armed forces and the existence of these forces is justified by pointing to the threat environment.

These truisms would not need to be explicated were it not for the proposition frequently advanced that nations should be concerned only with the capabilities of other states, not their intentions. On the contrary, the very existence of armed forces is justified by threats (intentions) of other states. But it is not enough, of course, to "maintain" armed forces--their size, quality, deployment, etc., must be determined. These decisions cannot be made *in vacuo* but have meaning only in relative forms, that is, when compared with the armed forces of the

threatening state. Hence the need also to focus on the capabilities of other states; intentions analysis (threat perception) and capabilities analysis are inextricably intertwined. The term "threat assessment" (as distinct from "threat perception") has thus come to mean (1) identifying the enemy (2) appraising his intentions and (3) measuring his capabilities. Failure to undertake correctly any one of these three steps spells waste of resources at the minimum and risks destruction of the nation-state at the maximum.

a. Enemy Identification

Prior to 1946 the United States did not engage in war planning against a specific potential enemy in peacetime. Such war plans as did exist were not necessarily congruent with the real world. For example, at the time of Pearl Harbor--over two years after the onset of war in Europe--the War Department had three current war plans, designated Orange, Red, and Yellow. One was for a war with Great Britain, one for a war with Mexico, and the third for an unidentified "Asian power." Not surprisingly, the U.S. force posture was not adequate when the United States was suddenly drawn into World War II by the attack on Pearl Harbor.

After World War II, when it became evident that only the USSR could possibly pose a threat to the United States, U.S. force planning reflected the identification of the Soviet Union as the dominant power. This has conditioned force posture throughout the past 25 years; it also has resulted in numerous political and economic actions such as the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Marshall Plan, and currently the SALT negotiations. Identification of the Soviet Union as the dominant threat also affected drastically U.S. defense strategy and the types of conflict roles it was anticipated would have to be assumed by American military forces. Illustrative of this, for example, is the Assured Destruction strategy. This posture quantified U.S. strategic forces in terms of the degree of destruction necessary to deter the Soviet Union from attacking the United States. A second example of how the Soviet threat affected U.S. defense decisions was the emphasis placed on acquiring conventional and counterinsurgency capabilities by the Kennedy Administration

when it first took office in January 1961. This decision was in response to the perceived threat of a Soviet emphasis on so-called wars of national liberation in the less developed areas of the world.

After the Korean War, U.S. military postures were also affected by the fear of Communist Chinese expansion, especially in South-east Asia. This threat, however, affected conventional forces more than strategic forces; while, for example, justifications for the "thin" ABM were made in terms of the Chinese threat, it was the USSR which continued to affect most strongly U.S. military requirements.

It is now becoming clear that, while the Soviet Union remains the strongest possible American adversary and hence force requirements must continue to be affected by Soviet military power, a number of developments have occurred which no longer permit U.S. force postures to be determined solely on the basis of a single, dominant, and recognized threat. Among these new developments are the detente with the Soviet Union, the emergence of China as a nuclear power, the Sino-Soviet quarrel which now exceeds in intensity the conflict between the United States and the USSR, the economic recovery of Western Europe and the establishment of independent European nuclear forces, and the emergence of Japan as a great (albeit nonnuclear) power potentially capable of "balancing" China in the Far East. While the United States and the USSR still remain overwhelmingly the strongest powers in terms of strategic forces, in other regards there has emerged a multipolar world, sometimes referred to as pentapolar or pentagonal to allude to the five great centers of power. This means that within a decade it will no longer be possible to make U.S. defense decisions with the comfortable knowledge that both the enemy and the friends are fixed; it is conceivable that the United States could find itself in alliance with the USSR against China or with China against the Soviet Union or find itself an uneasy neutral in a Sino-Soviet conflict. It may be increasingly difficult in the future to design U.S. forces even to be complementary to those of the NATO allies, for in a multipolar world it is to be expected that alliances

may become less reliable. In short, unlike the past 28 years, there is considerable uncertainty as to who will be allies and who will be adversaries and where the war will occur. These factors enormously complicate defense planning.

b. Appraising Enemy Intentions

During the cold war period, it was widely (and correctly) assumed that the United States must pay close attention to Soviet and secondarily to Chinese intentions. It was also assumed (correctly until about 1960) that increases in Soviet and Chinese power and influence were losses for the United States and *vice versa*. Emerging multipolarity, on the contrary, means that increased Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, for example, might be an asset to the United States rather than a liability, for it might lessen the Soviet world position more than that of the United States. In sum, just as identifying the enemy is more complex, understanding the intentions and motivations of the other great states, especially the two communist rivals, is more difficult; gains for the United States are not necessarily losses for the USSR and *vice versa*.

c. Measuring Capabilities

For some years to come, the yardstick for sufficiency of U.S. strategic forces will still be their relativity to Soviet capabilities. But quantity, quality, and deployment of U.S. general purpose forces must now reflect the uncertainty of where they will be employed, against which nation or nations, and in alignment with which national forces.

Finally, it is necessary to emphasize that whoever the enemy may be, whatever his intentions are, and whatever his military capabilities, there has been an overall relative decline in U.S. power since 1945. Although in absolute terms, U.S. military power, especially that of the strategic forces, remains high, nevertheless, proportionate

to the most likely adversaries--the USSR and China--the United States has steadily lost and, if present trends continue, will continue to lose ground. This is true not only of military power but even more of economic power and its concomitant political influence. In 1945, the United States could be viewed as the hegemonial power of the world, certainly of the non-communist sphere. Now the United States remains the strongest non-communist power but has lost its hegemonial position and in many respects may now be second to the USSR. This fact suggests that the need to adopt optimizing force postures is considerably greater than it was in the past; this is likely to be even more the case in the future.

Among the factors relevant to assessment of military capabilities, a salient one is the impact of technology; this factor is worthy of separate treatment, in the section which follows.

2. Impact of Technology

a. Evolution of Technology as a Military Factor

One must look back to the last quarter of the 19th century for the genesis of the technological revolution that has had such a dramatic effect on 20th century military capabilities. Advances in metallurgy, electricity, hydraulics, and chemistry began to be put together to effect a radical change first in naval science--bigger and stronger hulls, protective armorplating, longer range guns using new gunpowder, more efficient steam boilers and engines, and self-propelled torpedoes. The British "Dreadnaught" battleship of 1906 became a symbol of the power of the new technology. About this same time warfare became possible in three dimensions, with the invention of the submarine and the airplane. The high-velocity rifle, the machine gun, more accurate artillery, and soon the tank made possible new tactics in land warfare. The range of lethality of weapons began to expand, affecting not only the forces in combat but for the first time endangering civilian populations distant from the scene of battle. With the application of technology to warfare, with its complexities and higher costs, began the correlation between military power and the degree of industrialization of a society.

The invention of radio (and the later radar and television) not only profoundly affected military strategy and tactics but, perhaps even more importantly as regards the role of military force as an instrument of policy, eventually made possible instant and worldwide communications. In an earlier time wars could be begun and ended before much of the world learned of them; now even the smallest crisis or armed clash is news within hours or minutes even in the remotest villages of a backward country. When national leaders speak on policy or strategy, the globe is their audience.

Technology will continue to be a critical determinant of military effectiveness. Although it is in the realm of strategic weaponry that the power of technology is most dramatically apparent, the potential extends downward throughout the spectrum of warfare.

The pace of technological change has been accelerating with time. In a 1969 appearance before the Congress, Herman Kahn displayed a series of charts which he said "argue that every five years since World War II we have experienced a revolution in military technology comparable in magnitude to the developments that took place, say, between the Civil War and the first World War or between the first and second World Wars."¹ Weapons technology has moved so rapidly that weapons can become obsolete within five years after deployment, or be superseded by more advanced

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"Strategy and Science: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970s," Hearings Before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session, p. 96, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1969.

concepts even before they have entered service.¹ It may be that this ever-increasing rate of technological change is leveling off, that there has been a "maturing" of scientific development, but even so the pace is rapid, the costs high, and the potential for future breakthroughs still high. The United States therefore faces a technological threat; it is imperative to stay ahead in the technological race.

b. The Technological Threat

Military research and development on an organized and large scale is a post-World War II phenomenon. In the early years of this period defense-related R&D was greater than all other U.S. R&D combined, and there is a popular myth that this preponderance continues today--to the alleged detriment of the civilian sector of the U.S. economy. The facts are otherwise, however; nondefense research experienced rapid growth in the mid-1950s, so that by about 1960 the defense and nondefense sectors were about equal. By 1972, nondefense R&D was greater than defense R&D by a ratio of 3 to 2, or--if space research is excluded--by a factor of 2 to 1.² A trend that should be of more concern, however, is that in the 1968-72 period, both sectors of R&D suffered a decline in growth. In this period, in real purchasing power, adjusted for inflation, nondefense R&D declined 7 percent and defense R&D declined by 21 percent.³

These facts are significant because of the technological threat to U.S. security. The critical R&D race has been between the United States and the Soviet Union, focused most dramatically on the strategic

¹ A classic illustration of this point is the cruise missiles developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s which became operational (or were canceled) at about the same time that ballistic missiles began to be deployed.

² *The Economics of Defense Spending: A Look at the Realities*, pp. 40-45 (Department of Defense, Comptroller, Washington, D.C., July 1972).

³ *Ibid.*

weapons and space programs but of course covering a much broader range of important areas. The United States has so far led in this race, but the gap is closing. Recent statements by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, and Dr. Stephen J. Lukasik, Director, Advanced Research Projects Agency, are pertinent:

The adequacy of our R&D efforts must be measured against the efforts of our leading rival, for our comparative R&D efforts today will determine our comparative standing in weapons quality through the rest of this century. During the past year we have continued to study the technological efforts of the Soviet Union and other nations, as well as ours. A number of parallel studies have been refined, and some independent new approaches have been added. There is much uncertainty in each of these avenues of estimating and forecasting, but I find it very disturbing that no projection shows that we are holding our superiority if current trends in the United States and the Soviet Union continue. Each projection independently shows that, to avoid technological inferiority within the next decade, we will have to increase our Defense RDT&E efforts; some of these projections show that substantial increases would be necessary.¹

I think that if one looks back to, say, 1960, one finds that we certainly felt fairly secure technologically... Looking now 10 or 15 years later we see the inevitable result of an emphasis on science and technology in the Soviet Union. I think it is not so much that we have lost as the fact that the Soviets have gained... What that amounts to is they now have weapons systems which are comparable to where we were before, and the ones in which they are ahead are roughly balanced by the ones in which we are ahead; the same is true in the unclassified world of science and technology. I think we have a situation rather like technological parity, so to that extent, I think there has been a relative loss in our lead over the last 10 to 15 years.²

¹ Dr. J. S. Foster, Jr., Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Washington, D.C., GPO, 1973, pp. 758-759, 17 April 1973.

² Dr. S. J. Lukasik, *ibid.*, p. 3954, 29 May 1973.

The term "technological threat" is of fairly recent usage in posture statements by Defense Secretaries, although the concept was implicit in most of the earlier statements. It is also only in recent years that comprehensive and sustained research has been done on the Soviet military R&D expenditures; the Strategic Studies Center of Stanford Research Institute has been a principal pioneer in this field.¹ Studies by SRI and others show that the Soviet expenditure for RDT&E (military and civilian) has been increasing at a greater rate than in the United States. Although precise ratios of USSR/U.S. RDT&E expenditures in the aggregate and in the military portions are made difficult by the problem of obtaining true Soviet figures and by the problem of the dollar/ruble conversion ratio, it is apparent that (1) the USSR, with a GNP approximately half that of the United States, is spending about the same or slightly more than the United States on military RDT&E; and (2) the curve on the Soviet expenditures is still rising, while the U.S. curve is approximately flat.

This situation poses a difficult dilemma for the United States, which is in a time of transition to a reduced national defense establishment, geared to the expectation of detente among the great powers. About one-tenth of the U.S. defense budget is allocated to RDT&E; this cuts into the expenditures for current forces, already at a minimum. It is in such a situation--of reduced forces in being--that research becomes increasingly important. A prudent strategy for a power with the lesser force is to keep well ahead of the research curve, to anticipate and prevent technological surprise. Even in a period of apparent detente, the technological threat remains real. The technological threat is not as readily separable into these two factors--the enemy's intention is from all indications to maximize his future capabilities. A basic problem in technology and R&D is that the Soviets and the Americans do not operate under a comparable set of constraints.

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See M. M. Earle, Jr., R. B. Foster, F. W. Dresch, "A Comparison of U.S./USSR Gross National Product, National Security Expenditures, and Expenditures for RDT&E," SSC-TN-2010-1, Menlo Park, California, Stanford Research Institute (February 1973), and other related studies.

c. Types of Constraints on Technology

For the purpose of analysis the broad term "technological constraints" may be divided into five types, representing a combination of technical, economic, and political factors, as follows:

- Detente constraints operative within the Executive branch of government.
- Detente constraints operative within the Congress and country at large.
- Credibility constraints operating against the Executive branch.
- Cost-effectiveness constraints.
- Political constraints.

(1) Detente Constraints Operative Within the Executive Branch of Government

There have been significant weapons improvements which the United States did not add to its arsenal, although they were technically feasible and cost effective, because of political decisions within the Executive Branch. The rationale was that by keeping certain weapons systems out of the inventory the United States could be kept from appearing to be moving towards a credible first strike posture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. This appearance was and is held to be important on the grounds that if the Soviets thought the United States was obtaining a first strike capability Moscow would be forced to respond by adopting some countermeasure, thus generating another round in the arms competition. Conversely, it was argued that should the United States show restraint and avoid giving the appearance of moving toward a first strike posture the Soviets would feel less threatened, and the climate between Washington and Moscow would be more conducive to arms control initiatives.

There does not seem to be any clear indication that the Soviet decisionmakers have acted to retard moving weapons into the inventory because of a desire to avoid an "action-reaction syndrome." Thus an asymmetry exists between the exploitation of technology in the Soviet Union and in the United States, which, if operated over a space of considerable time, would place the United States at a weapons disadvantage compared with the Soviet Union. Moscow, having been generally far

behind during most of the cold war era in strategic weapons systems, may have placed the goal of catching up with the United States ahead of all other considerations.

(2) Detente Constraints Operative Within the Congress and the Country

Another politically imposed constraint upon technology is found in considerable abundance in the Congress, and among interest groups about the land whose influence is often felt in the Congress. For example, there are some members of Congress who, because of either sincere belief, political expediency, or a combination of both, support reductions in defense spending, including RDT&E.¹ Further, there is some evidence that such advocates are forming a coalition with fiscal conservatives in the Congress to cut overall defense spending, including that for RDT&E.²

Outside the Congress are many interest groups which for a variety of reasons are pressing Capitol Hill for significant reductions in the defense budget, including RDT&E. A recent example is the work of thirteen men formerly employed in high positions in the defense establishment calling for reductions of \$1.3 billion in the defense budget by dropping the development of the Trident II missile and its relative submarine.³ It is quite clear that no analog exists in the Soviet Union, either to the members of the Congress who vote for defense budget reductions or to the interest groups which press the Congress for budget cuts.

¹ This is not to say there were not defense budget-cutters operating in the Congress before; obviously there have been. But there seem to be more of them now.

² R. Evans and R. Novak, "The Anti-Defense Coalition," *Washington Post* (23 August 1973).

³ "Military Policy and Budget Priorities: A Report to Congress," Project on Budget Priorities, Washington, D.C. (20 June 1973).

(3) Credibility Constraints Operative Against the Executive Branch

Currently the Executive Branch is experiencing difficulty in making its case before the Congress and the country at large concerning the Soviet threat and resultant defense appropriation requirements. This situation arises from a combination of factors. These include (a) loss of credibility due to the Watergate affair and associated scandals; (b) suspicion of Executive Branch deception during the Vietnam War; and (c) belief that the Pentagon has "cried wolf" before in regard to the Soviet threat in order to obtain appropriations for new weapons. The first two of these factors should pass with time, but the third is a continuing problem. There are fewer constraints upon the military use to which technology is put in the Soviet Union.

(4) Cost-Effectiveness Constraints

A number of technological applications in the United States have been stopped because of the application of what in retrospect may have been an undue emphasis on the cost portion of cost-effectiveness criteria. One of the earlier instances of this phenomenon was cancellation of the mobile ICBM in 1962.¹ The mobile missile system was more expensive than the fixed sites, but it would have had the desirable attribute of survivability. One of the most recent instances was the cancellation of SCAD, another standoff missile meant to prolong the useful life of U.S. bombers in their attempts to operate against an increasingly hostile and well-defended Soviet airspace.

There does not appear to be an exact Soviet counterpart to the American cost-effectiveness means of making decisions regarding research upon particular new weapons systems. In fact, recent remarks by the Secretary of Defense suggest that the Soviets operate in a different

¹ See Hearings on Military Posture, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3175 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962).

fashion.¹ When he announced the flight-testing of MIRVs, Dr. Schlesinger noted that the Soviets had built four new ICBMs and one new SLBM! In response to questions by reporters Schlesinger stated his belief that the Soviets probably would not deploy all of them, but would make some choices and only deploy some. One cannot imagine the United States bringing four ICBMs to the flight-testing point before making a decision on which to deploy.

(5) Political Constraints and Conclusions

Comparison of the current constraints upon technology in the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union indicates that the former is far more constrained by domestic political considerations than the latter. Real technological constraints are still considerably less in the United States than in the Soviet Union as a result of the overall superiority in science and technology enjoyed by America. On balance it would seem that over a sustained period this asymmetry would tilt to the side of effort expended, resulting in the Soviet Union's deriving greater military advantages than the United States, should Moscow persevere in a high RDT&E program, as trends indicate.

The periods in the past when the United States has been freest of political constraints upon technology have been characterized by relatively high levels of fear--on the part of the government and the general population--concerning the threat from the Soviet Union in particular and Communism in general. In such times so-called bipartisan foreign policy served to support substantially greater technology activity than is true today, although even then the cost-effectiveness approach and "action-reaction syndrome" exercised some constraints during times of high general concern over the Soviet threat.² Thus it appears that until the Congress

¹ *Washington Post*, p. 1 (18 August 1973).

² It should be pointed out that in all situations, except possibly wartime, a checks-and-balances democracy such as the United States will always have a somewhat greater degree of political constraint upon technology used for military purposes than will a totalitarian society. This is simply a fact of life with which the U.S. society must live as long as it retains its present political form and the value system which supports it.

and the country are substantially more convinced than at present of the Soviet threat, and therefore again form a bipartisan base of support for foreign and defense policy, it is not likely that the political constraints upon weapons technology in the United States will be significantly decreased. Of course there is always the possibility that the Soviets will "tip their hand" by some combination of greed and lack of patience, thus providing the Executive Branch with the raw material to persuade the Congress to remove the political constraints on technology.

While U.S. national security policy should take advantage of Soviet mistakes, such as Moscow's pushing too hard somewhere and alerting the American people and the Congress to the danger, U.S. policy should not rely too heavily upon this possibility. One approach, which depends as so much does now upon the rebuilding of bipartisan support for the foreign and defense policy of the President, would be to focus attention upon the comparison of the two nations' technological efforts relating to the SALT Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons. The problem here is that unfettered Soviet technology may be used by Moscow to gain a qualitative superiority in strategic weapons should the United States continue to be constrained in its application of technology by political constraints. Put another way the problem is that the U.S. application of technology may be constrained (e.g., stop MIRVing the remaining Minuteman component a la the proposal of Gilpatric, Kistiakowsky, et al.) while that of the Soviets is not so constrained. The efforts of a bipartisan group in the Senate might be declared in open support of the Executive's negotiation with the Soviets, recognizing that not only SALT, but also these unilateral political constraints impose limits upon U.S. strategic forces and technology application; the rough parity of the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement cannot be achieved if the Soviets combine quantitative superiority in launcher numbers with the quantitative and qualitative superiority in MIRVs made possible by the absence of political constraints on technology. Therefore the Soviets would be pressed to demonstrate (by on-site inspection, possibly) that their unconstrained technology is not making a mockery

of treaty constraints. Without some balance in the constraints to the treaty, especially regarding MIRVs, the United States might take the position that it really is not interested in pursuing a follow-on to the Interim Agreement on Offensive Weapons.

3. Certain Basic and Continuing Roles

It is now often said in free world societies that the usefulness of military power as an instrument of foreign policy is declining. Whether correct or not, signs that this belief is being acted upon by governments, institutions, and individuals abound: conscription armies are being replaced with volunteer forces; at least one nation has a labor union in its armed forces; budget restrictions act as increasingly severe restraints on both the quantity and the quality of military forces; pressures exist for withdrawing American troops from bases abroad; some colleges have closed their R.O.T.C. units; and young persons experience some pressure from their peers to restrain from volunteering for military service. All of these seemingly unrelated phenomena have one thing in common: they reflect a disenchantment with the military and a diminished acceptability of the utility of force in international politics. This diminished acceptability, in turn, results from the increased costs to society of solutions by armed force as the destructiveness of weapons has increased. Some even question whether the costs are so high as to make recourse to war prohibitive to rational decisionmakers. Especially in the case of strategic nuclear weapons, it has become difficult to imagine the political gains that would warrant their employment.

While undoubtedly the costs of recourse to force are high in both human and material terms and certainly suicidal in the case of unrestrained strategic nuclear war, the idea that force has no role in international politics is most assuredly false. Beliefs and actions alluded to above reflect a simplistic concept of the interrelationships between power and policy; furthermore, they posit a separation of war and peace into watertight compartments that is entirely unwarranted.

a. Likelihood of Resort to Force

War between the United States and the Soviet Union seems unlikely to most observers. Both superpowers have now recognized that unrestrained strategic nuclear war would result in death and destruction of an inconceivable magnitude and is an eventuality to be avoided at all costs. Accordingly, the superpowers are searching for ways to make certain that competition for global influence stops short of nuclear confrontation. The present SALT negotiations are intended to help ensure that resort to strategic nuclear war does not occur.

Evolving political multipolarity may result in a diminished risk of war between the superpowers. While a bipolar distribution of power is characterized by both extensive and intensive competition between two cohesive power blocs, with frequent confrontations and crises of varying degrees of war-risk, a multipolar world generally results in more restrained behavior. As was discussed earlier, power struggles lose some of their zero-sum game characteristics; a loss of influence by the United States is not necessarily a gain for the Soviet Union and *vice versa*.

Even if strategic nuclear war between major states becomes less likely in a multipolar as compared with a bipolar world, there will be a greater likelihood of wars below the strategic nuclear level between lesser states. A principal reason for the greater incidence of armed conflict is that the hegemonial authority formerly exercised by the superpowers declines in a multipolar system. Alliance bonds tend to be loosened; ancient rivalries which the bipolar system had submerged come once more to the fore and intra-alliance conflicts between lesser powers become possible and, in some cases, likely. The superpowers, no longer viewing each shift in international political alignments in zero-sum terms, will tend to be less concerned about and less influential over lesser power conflicts. In such an environment,

crisis management becomes dominant over crisis prevention--this takes the form primarily of preventing the escalation of conflicts to the point where they lead to great power confrontations and hence threaten the central balance. At the same time, the superpowers, especially in critical areas of the world, are likely to attempt to influence outcomes of conflict, both incipient and ongoing, through cultivating client-state relationships. Military assistance is likely to be an especially potent instrument in the continued competitive coexistence struggle, particularly in areas such as the Middle East, where geographical location and vast oil resources combine to make the region a magnet for great power rivalry. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the efficacy of armed force may actually rise, rather than diminish; lesser states may be more likely rather than less likely to engage in military clashes despite the increasing costs associated with contemporary warfare.

b. Strategic Weapons: Utility in Nonuse

The fact that the devastation of strategic nuclear war makes resort to it totally incommensurate with political or economic goals does not mean, as often alleged, that strategic nuclear forces are useless as well as dangerous. Negative goals may be as important as positive ones; it cannot be proved that the absence of war between the United States and the Soviet Union resulted from the existence of nuclear weapons but, to date, no substitute for strategic forces has been found to provide the necessary stability in the international system. The paradox enunciated by Churchill a generation ago that security and peace rested upon a "balance of terror" has proved to be prophetic. Additionally, while again it cannot be proved, it seems likely that the independence of Western Europe from Soviet domination owes much to the existence of nuclear weapons --strategic as well as tactical--and the concomitant stalemate in superpower relations. Finally, the risks of escalation are such that even conventional warfare between the superpowers has been strongly inhibited.

In view of these achievements, it is indeed extraordinary to conclude that force--its possession and ever-present threatened employment--is perceived to be of little use in the contemporary world. Ideally, of course, it would be better to undergird the superpower stalemate and to preserve the freedom of the non-communist world by means less dangerous than nuclear weapons. The negative utilities of nuclear weapons, accordingly, should not be permitted to impede efforts to find alternative ways to keep the military balance. Until such methods are found, the negative utilities of strategic nuclear weapons refute the concept that maintaining strong military forces is a wasteful and sterile endeavor, advanced solely for self-serving purposes by a "military-industrial complex."

c. General Purpose Forces and Minimum Military Roles

The quantity, quality, and deployment of general purpose forces may vary considerably within broad limits and yet they may still be able to act as protector of the nation-state. However, there are certain minimum roles or tasks which the military are now and will continue to be charged with performing. These are:

- To contribute to deterring potential aggressors
- To defend if deterrence fails, in order to achieve war termination on terms favorable to the United States
- To help defend vital national interests.

There can be little quarrel with the objectives of deterrence and warfighting although there are differing conceptions of the force postures required to accomplish these tasks successfully and economically. The third task, however, of determining the strategies and force postures required

to defend vital interests, is subject to differing conceptions of threats and constraints in the emerging international milieu. Two broad possible alternative roles can be postulated. One can be described as a "forward defense" posture and involves a force structure and deployment capable of intervening successfully abroad, not only in Western Europe but anywhere in the world. Such a force posture would emphasize that there are many areas in addition to Western Europe which are "vital" to the United States and which must be protected by force if necessary. It would assume that the United States must have access on a worldwide basis to raw materials and other important resources and that "lines of communication" need to be safeguarded through military forces. Since there have been no overt threats to U.S. national independence or territorial integrity--except by Soviet strategic nuclear forces--the justification for large general purpose forces rests on a broader, more long-range view of what constitutes national security. This broader view is based on the concept of communist containment; central to this is the idea that any increase in the number of communist governments or communist satellites threatens the "balance of power" and hence is to be resisted. Thus the United States, according to this view, must not only influence events abroad through such actions as providing economic and military aid or engaging in covert conflict, but also be both willing and able to carry out overt military intervention abroad--that is, to introduce U.S. combat forces into other countries for coercive purposes.

The fact that the United States has used overt military force on at least four occasions since the Second World War--in Korea in 1950, in Lebanon in 1958, in Vietnam in the 1960s, and in the Dominican Republic in 1965--suggests that the "forward defense" posture has been the "norm" for the United States in recent history. If this is to remain the norm, a force posture emphasizing worldwide interventionist capabilities will be required.

The consensus which has supported the forward defense concept has recently begun to sharply deteriorate. As a result, many persons see the military as operating under such powerful political, moral, and

budgetary constraints as to preclude a forward defense, interventionist military force. Rather, they view the future force posture in terms of what is sometimes called the "constabulary" concept. A force posture modeled on this concept would be smaller than a forward defense force, the number of American troops in Europe would be reduced, and U.S. defense forces would be pledged to defend only very "vital" areas; in essence this would mean, in addition to the United States itself, the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. In essence, such constabulary force posture would be similar to that pursued by the United States from its founding until the Second World War except for the maintenance of a strategic force to deter attacks on the United States and a commitment to Western Europe.

The constabulary model would be fundamentally opposed to the policy of containment and "Free World leadership" which has characterized American policy since the Truman Doctrine in 1947. It would reject all but the most minimal role for U.S. forces in international politics.

It is probably safe to say that at present, at least, the majority of American decisionmakers and the public still hold to the forward defense rather than the constabulary concept. Accordingly, the future is likely to see continued important tasks for military forces. Three analytically distinct but closely interrelated roles can be anticipated: conflict deterrence, warfighting, and political. These three are considered in detail in the remainder of this chapter.

B. Conflict Deterrence

1. Policy Considerations

"The primary purpose of modern weapons is deterrence. But deterrence is as much a psychological as a military problem. It depends on the aggressor's assessment of risks, not the defender's."¹

¹ H. A. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, p. 19 (New York, McGraw-Hill 1965).

It has come to be generally agreed that at the strategic nuclear level of warfare, the most successful weapons are ones that are never used --i.e., their existence inhibits any aggressor's taking action which might precipitate their being employed against him. This concept has been evolutionary. The first atomic weapons were created for their effect in actual use; the race for success in releasing the power of the atom was undertaken in the belief that Germany would create and use such a weapon against the World War II allies if the race were lost. The all-out concept of employment of weaponry in World War II made it straightforward logic to use the new superweapon against the principal remaining adversary, Japan. No doubt it would have been used against Germany had it been available before that country's surrender. The nuclear era concept of deterrence had not yet evolved.

After the Soviet Union broke America's monopoly of atomic weapons, and with the acquisition by both sides of the even more awesome thermonuclear weapon (and means of delivery) in the 1950s, the concept of the threat of use of nuclear weapons began to take on political meaning. The operative word initially was retaliation rather than deterrence, but the latter term has a broader and more useful connotation, and has since the early 1960s been the accepted descriptive word, at least in the West. In Soviet phraseology retaliation seems to continue to be preferred over deterrence, but this is partly a problem of translation, and the concept of the Western term deterrence is apparently both understood and, in effect, used by the Soviets.

If the primary purpose of modern weapons is deterrence, the relevant policy question is what is the objective of deterrence. The objective is both old and new: old in that it is consistent with America's recognized role of leadership in the preservation of peace and freedom in the world, and new in the manner in which the objective will be pursued in the context of a changing international environment. The objective of deterrence is to prevent or discourage the threat of or use of force by a nation or group of nations to impose unwanted change on one or a group of other nations. It is not only at the strategic level that deterrence is to be made credible; the use of force is to be made unrewarding to an aggressor at all potential levels of conflict. This necessitates a will to fight if deterrence fails, and it requires the capability to fight to give credibility to deterrence.

Heretofore the United States has carried a preponderant share in the burden of containing aggression. The new strategy of deterrence--referred to by former Secretary of Defense Laird as Realistic Deterrence--is based upon a new approach to security; it seeks to build a new relationship between the United States and those nations which share a common desire to preserve peace and to secure the benefits of freedom and independence--and are willing to act to prevent loss of those benefits. It is to be a relationship in which the United States remains militarily strong, but in which America's partners will have a greater relative strength, through their own efforts and with assistance when appropriate by the United States. A more nearly balanced and revitalized partnership is to be based upon a renewal --and perhaps a redefinition--of shared goals. These renewed partnerships probably will not--and need not--be the same as before. Alliance ties may be somewhat more flexible and America's voice in the dialogue among members more that of a peer than of the predominant actor. But the objective of the redefined and realistic partnerships will continue to be to constitute an aggregate of political and military strength that will be a credible deterrent to aggression against any or all of the members; the use of force by either side should not appear to be a profitable option, making it obvious that differences with adversaries should therefore be resolved through negotiation rather than conflict.

The foregoing is a delineation of the broad objectives of deterrence in a prospective or policy goal sense; in the application of deterrence there are many and more complicated policy considerations necessitated by the realities of a changing international environment.

A central policy consideration concerning U.S. deterrence of strategic nuclear war is the alteration which is occurring between American and Soviet strategic forces; the Soviets have gained superiority in numbers of strategic launchers, superiority in throw-weight, and now, as they proceed with MIRVing tests, could be moving towards superiority in numbers of warheads. The basic policy considerations which arise from this circumstance are: (1) the extent to which the Soviet Union will perceive that the United States is becoming decoupled from NATO Europe, and how Moscow will capitalize

on that perception; (2) to what extent the United States should overtly or covertly decouple itself from Europe, and in either event what should the surrogate be; (3) the same questions in regard to Japan; and (4) the way in which the declining relative strategic strength of the United States will modify the deterrent effect of the U.S. forces in regard to the wide spectrum of possible attacks which the Soviet Union could, in terms of its capabilities, launch against the American homeland. An associated policy consideration is the degree to which worldwide perception of the United States in terms of prestige and power will be degraded due to the change in the strategic arms balance between Washington and Moscow.

Another kind of policy consideration arises from a combination of the post-Vietnam reactions and the public's perception of serious domestic problems demanding immediate attention. The interaction of these two forces produces a mood of "no more Vietnams," on the basis that both the necessity to fight the war and the objectives of the war were ambiguous. Many Americans seem now to prefer to invest tax dollars and intellectual talent in solving the immediate domestic problems, thus raising serious policy considerations regarding the willingness and ability of the United States to maintain the standing forces necessary for deterrence and defense.

A further policy consideration is generated by the need to evaluate a central theme of the Nixon Doctrine described above: the sharing of defense burdens with allies—in particular, with those that are economically strong. Taken to its extreme conclusions the Nixon Doctrine could imply that nations such as Japan and West Germany would develop their own nuclear deterrent systems; that possibly a NATO joint strategic force comprised of England, France, and West Germany would be formed; and that the NATO nations and Japan should provide their own theater defense including the possibility of tactical nuclear weapons.

A corollary policy consideration raised by the Nixon Doctrine concerns those nations unable to defend themselves, and not thought to be necessary to American national interests; the implication is that they may not be defended by the United States. The problem is to devise a set of

principles which will assist the United States in making the determination as to which nations are and which are not necessary to American vital interests, and to determine the effects of such decisions upon the Soviet perceptions of American resolve.

Deterrence as a factor in the interactions of major powers raises such policy considerations as: the developing Sino-American relations when viewed in the context of the declining U.S. strategic forces vis-a-vis those of the Soviet Union; the possible degradation of NATO; and the fears professed by Peking regarding Soviet intentions. The implication here for policy is the need to evaluate the possibility of new power balances being formed in Asia along the shores of the North Pacific to compensate for the possible decline in the traditional U.S.-West European alignment--if that is necessary.

2. Deterring Strategic Nuclear War

The principal objective of U.S. strategic nuclear forces is deterrence; this goal has remained unchanged, but there are new conditions and new criteria that affect strategic doctrine. As stated by the President in 1970, "the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive,"¹ which was a goal not different from that of earlier years, but a new look was being taken at how this goal is to be pursued. The new administration regarded the former doctrine of Assured Destruction (or Mutual Assured Destruction, "MAD") as militarily and politically inadequate, and inconsistent with basic American values.² The MAD threat of all-out destruction is not sufficient to cope with the threat of an enemy who possesses large and flexible forces, and who might make selective use of such forces to achieve limited objectives. However, the attempt to move away from MAD--towards an alternative strategy of Mutual

¹ Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1970*, p. 122.

² R.M. Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Shaping a Durable Peace*, Report to the Congress, 3 May 1973, p. 184 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973). [Short title: *Nixon, Foreign Policy 1973*]

Assured Survival and Security, "MASS"--is constrained by the treaty and interim agreement of SALT ONE. Of the two 100-missile ABM sites allowable for each side, the United States is building only the one at Grand Forks for protection of MINUTEMAN launchers; construction of the national capital area site is deferred. The Soviets already had a 64-missile system around Moscow, and are believed to be enlarging and improving this system within the treaty limits. Presumably they will also take advantage of the right to defend one missile area, although "to our knowledge, construction of an ABM defense for an ICBM area has not been started."¹ But even if both sides were to build to the ABM treaty limits, defensive capabilities would be severely limited, leaving the assured destruction capability for both sides quite high, i.e., having the effect of preserving and even legitimizing the assured destruction doctrine.

As far as the deterrence of strategic nuclear war (all-out nuclear war) is concerned, the SALT ONE state of the equation does provide such deterrence. Even though the American strength in launchers and megatonnage is less than the Soviet strength, it is sufficient to convince the Soviets that they could be destroyed in an all-out nuclear exchange. The broad political aspect of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear equation is another matter (and a vital issue in SALT TWO) but the necessity apparently perceived by both sides to prevent nuclear war acts as a dominant policy determinant in U.S.-Soviet interactions. It is probably true that if nuclear weapons did not exist, there might well have been a U.S.-Soviet war arising out of any one of a number of post-World War II incidents, e.g., the U-2 shootdown in 1960, the several Berlin crises, the sinking of the USS Pueblo, perhaps the Middle East wars.

¹

Testimony of Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, JCS, Before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 29 March 1973, *Hearings on S.1263, Part 1*, p. 208 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973).

Although it has serious shortcomings, MAD has at least not failed to deter strategic nuclear war. But a better strategy would be one that is founded on the principle of survival rather than destruction--MASS. Without the flexibility of such a policy, the United States may not be able to deter nuclear attacks that are of limited scope for limited goals. SALT ONE has almost cut off one avenue of approach to a survival policy by allowing only a token ABM. The principal technological alternatives available for moving from MAD towards MASS would seem to be: (1) improvement of missile accuracy, to enhance counterforce capabilities; and (2) provision for maximum flexibility and speed in the employment of U.S. strategic weapons so that "single to multiple shots across the bow" could be made in response to Soviet attacks below the all-out level. But beyond technology, and in the end more importantly, an enlightened political-diplomatic effort will be necessary to build "a global order based on a new international politics derived from the strategic necessity of preventing nuclear war--equally applicable to the United States and to the Soviet Union because deterrence is mutual in the era of strategic parity."¹

3. Deterring Theater War

In deterring theater war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both nuclear and conventional forces are involved. In addition to the theater and tactical nuclear weapons which are an essential part of making deterrence credible, strategic weapons also have a role--the enemy should be kept in doubt as to whether an attack on NATO might precipitate U.S.-NATO use of strategic weapons in response. But nuclear forces are not an adequate deterrent; there must be a full range of sea, air, and land conventional

¹ R. B. Foster, "The Nixon Doctrine: An Emerging U.S. Policy," *op.cit.*, p. 4.

forces, and it is the NATO requirement that has the primary effect on U.S. general purpose theater force requirements. Although it is generally conceded that Warsaw Pact conventional forces have an overall edge over NATO conventional forces, the latter, along with their dependents, constitute a major link in the chain of deterrence. For this deterrent to continue, there must first of all be an agreed strategy within NATO. To facilitate the implementation of the deterrent aspects of the strategy, such factors as the following must be successfully managed by cooperative efforts among NATO allies: (1) force modernization, in U.S. and allied forces; (2) firm and patient negotiations regarding mutual force reductions, to ensure that the balance does not shift against NATO; and (3) a continued effort on the part of the European allies in NATO to improve force effectiveness, gradually shifting the ratio of the fiscal and manpower burden towards the European side--the latter requirement is logical both from the point of view of European capabilities and the propriety of their carrying the main burden of their own security, and from the practical imperative of Europe's recognizing that domestic pressures within the United States will force some reduction of U.S. funds and manpower allocated to NATO.

The foregoing discussion of theater deterrence centers on NATO, as the theater of primary concern. As stated in the FY 1972 Defense Department report to the Congress: "Our general purpose theater force requirements are largely determined by planning for U.S. and allied conventional forces, which, after a period of warning and of mobilization will be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack."¹ The President, in his 1973 foreign policy message, said, "the strength of the defense of Western Europe remains the cornerstone of our security posture."² The other important theater where U.S. forces have a deterrent mission is Asia. In the same message, the President stated that although "Asian force

¹ DOD Report FY 72, p. 77.

² Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1973*, p. 187.

levels are now substantially below those maintained prior to the Vietnam War ... it would be unwise to make further unilateral cuts in deployments or significant reductions in overall force levels in the foreseeable future."¹ As to the other areas, the President noted that "planning based on the threats in these two areas alone [Europe and Asia] is not sufficient. We also need lesser forces to deal with lesser contingencies that pose a threat to our interests--a capability not necessarily provided by units positioned for a major conflict overseas."² This reaffirms the necessity for rapidly deployable forces to theaters other than Europe and Asia.

The concepts of "theater forces for deterrence" and "subtheater forces for deterrence," especially in Asia and other non-European areas, are somewhat arbitrary--in practice they overlap. The concept of using quick response forces to react to a local situation within a theater, for example, in the Philippines, is based on the objective that it could be kept at the subtheater level in intensity and duration; further, the United States would expect to rely as greatly as possible upon strengthened indigenous forces to cope with the threat. Thus security assistance is an important ingredient of theater deterrence. The need for a U.S. presence and warfighting capability in Europe is clear. In Asia (and in other areas as the need requires) a credible U.S. military presence--and a deployable reinforcement capability--is particularly important during the time that it takes to bring local forces to the level where they can constitute their own deterrent, and some degree of U.S. presence will be essential after that time. However, even beyond the point where local forces are adequate for their own defense, some U.S. military deterrent presence probably will be necessary for political purposes. This continuing requirement is most concrete in the European theater; in Asia, the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean the situations are more complex and changing, but vital U.S. interests are still involved, and an American deterrent presence is accordingly required to support those interests.

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

² *Ibid.*, p. 187.

4. Deterring Subtheater War

The Nixon Doctrine provides that this type of conflict will only involve the United States directly when it is clear that U.S. interests are directly threatened and that U.S. intervention will prove useful. Thus whatever deterrence the United States exercised in this area before, it must be less in the future. Since such U.S. conflict participation has been made much less likely by the new policy, it may be expected that this type of conflict may come to increase in the future. U.S. deterrence of such conflicts will not likely be restored until and unless the United States actually intervenes and defeats the aggressors in a subtheater war.

Nevertheless, U.S. forces, especially the Army, should maintain a readiness for one of the more likely types of subtheater war--a quick-reaction, small-unit operation, for example, in the Middle East to (1) protect vital oil installations, (2) assist in evacuating American civilians, and (3) shore up Middle East governments under external and internal attack.

C. Warfighting Capability

1. Policy Considerations: A Defensive Posture

The U.S. global security posture is basically defensive. The United States seeks no territorial expansion or political domination over any other state. Because of the insular position of the United States and its dominant position on the American continent the only important national security threats can come from Europe or Asia. To become a significant threat to the United States a single nation (or alliance of nations) would have to dominate much of either of these areas. In World War II the United States defeated attempts by Germany and Japan to achieve such strategic domination, but the result was that instead of Germany's dominating all of Europe it came to be the Soviet Union dominating half of it and threatening the rest. By defeating Japan, China was liberated, but within a few years mainland China was taken over by a regime actively hostile to the United States.

The United States never seriously considered the use of force to effect a drastic change in this new strategic situation, which put the Red Army within easy striking distance of the heart of Western Europe and opened up the possibility of the domination of all the resources of Europe and part of Asia by one nation. Since the 1940s U.S. national security policy has been primarily aimed at containing the threat of such a development.

The basic U.S. national security objectives might be defined as the following:

- The preservation of the United States as a national entity
- The survival of U.S. institutions and way of life
- The preservation of the industrial base of the United States
- The survival of a nonhostile Western Europe
- The preservation of a nontotalitarian world.

The United States is faced with a series of military threats to its security and interests around the world. Among the most serious are:

- The strategic nuclear threat to the United States as a national entity (from USSR, PRC, and potentially Nth countries) and to continental-based U.S. military forces.
- The theater nuclear threat (from the USSR and PRC) to forward military bases and allies.
- The tactical nuclear threat (Soviet and potentially PRC) to U.S. forward-based military forces and the military forces of our allies.
- The conventional threat to U.S. and allied military forces and territory.
- The unconventional warfare threat to U.S. allies and sources of basic raw materials.

There are additional military threats that might be considered --unconventional nuclear delivery, strategic and tactical use of chemical and biological warfare, clandestine biological attack, a war of naval attrition, destruction of commerce by submarine blockade, and terrorism --

but the five basic threats listed above are the most important and probably the most likely contingencies faced by the United States.¹

While the U.S. basic world posture is defensive, this does not preclude the use of offensive tactics in response to provocation. The response could be totally different from the aggression or even escalatory. Unpredictability of response is an important part of deterrence. The enemy should never be assured of a certain course of action if a war breaks out.

2. Warfighting as an Element of Deterrence

Deterrence cannot be fully credible without warfighting capabilities. The concept of deterrence purely through punishment was first proposed by advocates of strategic airpower in the 1940s and largely adopted as the strategy of Massive Retaliation in the 1950s. Critics of Massive Retaliation, however, pointed out the incredibility and danger of such a strategy.² Would the United States launch a strategic attack on the Soviet Union in response to a nonstrategic provocation? What if the Soviets had a major retaliatory capability? Would the United States risk Washington to protect Bonn?

Herman Kahn became the best known advocate of strategic counterforce. He argued for a credible U.S. first strike capability to deter limited provocations.³ The case for a tactical nuclear local defense was made most forcefully by Henry Kissinger in 1957. Kissinger argued that the vast manpower advantage of the Soviet Union could only be countered

¹ Many of these additional threats could be subordinate elements of the five basic national security threats listed above.

² For examples of such critiques see: B. Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), passim; and M. Hoag, *On Local War Doctrine*, P-2433 (Santa Monica: RAND, 1961), passim; P. Nitze, "Atoms Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 187-198, Vol. XXXIV (January 1956); R. E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), passim.

³ H. Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), passim.

by U.S. reliance on tactical nuclear weapons, and that casualties in a tactical nuclear campaign would not necessarily be any larger than in a conventional war.¹

Some current advocates of a tactical nuclear defense endorse the arguments made by Kissinger. They especially emphasize the improvement of the Soviet conventional and tactical nuclear forces and the vulnerability of NATO to Soviet blitzkrieg tactics. They argue that a balanced defense of tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces would be required to hold a massive Soviet thrust.

Advocates of a conventional defense posture base their position on the standard critique of massive retaliation combined with the argument that the detonation of even a very small nuclear weapon will inevitably lead to strategic nuclear war. Tactical nuclear combat will, moreover, devastate the areas fought over and hence such weapons are unsuitable for purposes of defense. Collateral damage in a tactical nuclear war fought in Europe could involve anywhere from 2 to 22 million deaths, according to Alain Enthoven; hence an American President would seek any alternative short of the nuclear option. The claim is made that resort to tactical atomic weapons is really not necessary because the conventional balance in Europe is not nearly as bad as it is often made out to be.²

The existence of tactical nuclear weapons, conventional defense advocates admit, does have a deterrent effect, but they believe that the United States cannot rely on them for warfighting. Following this rationale, if U.S. utilization of tactical nuclear weapons is unfeasible in Europe, the use of such weapons, in their view, would be even less feasible for defense of other areas that are less important to U.S. security. There

¹ H.A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, pp. 147-164 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957, 1969).

² R. E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, pp. 135-145 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); and M. H. Halperin, "The Good, The Bad and the Wasteful," *Foreign Policy*, p. 77 (Spring 1972); J. Newhouse, *U.S. Troops in Europe--Issues, Cost and Choices*, pp. 46-47 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1971).

is also the problem of the Asian "nuclear allergy": a second use of nuclear weapons against Asians could brand the United States as a racist country and hurt the American position throughout the world.¹

Some conventional defense advocates propose territorial defense concepts, blitz tactics, or heavy investment in advanced conventional munitions such as "smart bombs." Proponents of the latter claim that they would give many of the advantages of tactical atomic arms with none of the onus or danger of escalation and collateral damage.²

On the level of strategic capabilities, the advocacy of counterforce capabilities or damage limiting capabilities through active or passive defense has been branded as heretical by proponents of assured destruction. Warfighting is identified with advocacy of a first strike capability.³ Indeed, even the protection of the U.S. retaliatory capabilities has been opposed on this ground.⁴ Strong opposition has arisen towards any kind of tactical nuclear modernization.

The defense strategy apparently advocated by those opposing strategic warfighting deterrent capabilities is almost a caricature of the old massive retaliation concept. Strategic nuclear retaliation against Soviet urban centers is supposed to deter Soviet aggression against the United States. Even a reliable retaliatory capability is not needed. The United States can resort to a launch-on-radar-warning policy if our land-based missile force becomes vulnerable.⁵

¹ Osgood, *op. cit.*; Halperin, *op. cit.*; and Newhouse, *op. cit.*

² Col. W. W. Yale, Gen. I. D. White and Gen. H. E. Von Manteuffel, *Alternative to Armageddon--The Peace-Potential of Lightning War* (New York: Curtis Books, 1970), *passim*.

³ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic and Strategic Impact of Multiple Warhead Missiles*, pp. 2-14, 31-46, 71-73, 85-87, 91st Congress, First Session, 8 July-15 August 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969).

⁴ A. Chayes and J. B. Wiesner, ed., *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Antiballistic Missile System*, pp. 52, 100 (New York: Signet Books, 1969).

⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Strategic and Foreign Policy Implications of ABM Systems*, p. 205, 91st Congress, First Session, 6-28 March 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969).

The popular credence given to this narrow view of strategy is unfortunate because it erodes confidence in the basic premise that the United States needs credible warfighting options. Warfighting options are important from the standpoint of both deterrence and prevention of a disastrous outcome if deterrence fails. Warfighting capabilities can contain enemy attacks, limit damage to the United States and its allies, and--if the situation requires it and if the U.S. capacity is adequate--counterattack. Without warfighting capabilities the only alternatives are local surrender or suicide in any confrontation with the Soviet Union. In confrontations with lesser nations the United States would increasingly have the alternative of mass murder or impotence. The acquisition of even a minimal nuclear deterrent capability by any nation could allow it to defy the United States with impunity. If the United States denies itself credible warfighting capabilities, it risks the prospect of the deterioration of the international order on a scale that could rival that of the 1930s.

D. Political Uses of Force

The use of military power as a political instrument is becoming more fully recognized by the United States. This use of military force seems likely to increase in the next decade. This section of the report briefly describes the likely future political uses of military force with special reference to particular U.S. foreign policies.

1. Diplomatic Bargaining with the USSR and China

a. In Crisis

Situations which involve pure conflict, in which the participants have no common interests but are diametrically opposed to each other, are not conducive to bargaining. In such cases, diplomacy, whatever the instruments involved, has little scope to affect outcomes. In contrast, limited adversary situations--such as those presently characteristic of U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-Chinese relations--involve a certain mutuality of interests as well as opposed interests. Accordingly, the use of military force frequently will not be an alternative to diplomacy but a part of diplomacy; coercion and threats of coercion will be one among several modes of the bargaining process.

The period since World War II provides numerous examples to illustrate the role of force as a mode of bargaining between the United States and the USSR. An early instance was the Berlin blockade of 1948. The Soviet Union initiated the blockade to compel the West out of the city, to delay or possibly cause the abandoning of the plan to establish a West German state, and to damage American prestige.¹

The coercive aspects of the blockade took the form of preventing road and rail traffic through the Russian sector of Germany. This aspect was accompanied by actions intended to frighten the West into thinking war was imminent unless Berlin was abandoned. First the Russians began examining passenger and freight documents and engaging in various harassing tactics. Then the Soviet representatives on the Allied Control Council became calculatinsly rude. Even General Clay became so alarmed that, prior to the institution of the blockade, he informed Washington that war "may come with dramatic suddenness."² The reasons for the actual blockade,

¹

A. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, p. 452 (New York: Praeger, 1968).

²

W. P. Davison, *The Berlin Blockade*, p. 73 (Princeton: 1958) as cited in *Ibid.*

which began in June, were sufficiently vague and diffuse to permit a Soviet retreat if the United States took drastic counteraction.

The U.S. response was the Berlin airlift. This was accompanied by the dispatch to Britain of a number of long-range bombers armed with nuclear weapons. The objectives of the dispatch of the bombers were political: (1) to persuade the USSR not to escalate the crisis by shooting down American transport craft flying supplies into the city; (2) to demonstrate to the Soviet Union American intentions to fight if necessary to prevent the West from being forced out of Berlin; and (3) to demonstrate American resolve to the allies, especially to the Germans. These political aims of the threatened use of force were achieved when in May 1949 the USSR lifted the blockade, thereby weakening materially the Soviet position in Germany.

The most famous political use of force during the cold war was, of course, the Cuban missile crisis. The events of that crisis are well known; the main points are that the United States enjoyed both local military superiority and strategic nuclear superiority and that it used these assets to compel the Soviet government to withdraw the offensive missiles from Cuba. Apparently U.S. threats to employ force to compel political actions by the Soviet government were made credible by Soviet recognition of the intensity with which Washington viewed the problem, the manner in which the situation was approached, and the actions taken to convey unambiguously U.S. determination to have the missiles removed.

A third threatened use of strategic forces during crisis occurred in October 1973 when the Administration came to believe the Soviets were preparing to send troops to the Middle East. The worldwide alert of U.S. strategic forces was intended to convey unmistakably to the

USSR American determination to resist unilateral Soviet intervention in the Arab-Israeli conflict. While it cannot be proved, it seems likely, had the Soviet government intervened with force, that U.S. counteraction would have been in the theater of operations and would not have involved strategic nuclear forces. If so, the alerting of the strategic nuclear forces was, in addition to being precautionary, intended primarily as a political act--to convince the USSR of the seriousness with which Washington viewed Soviet actions and contemplated further moves.

The cold war is replete with other primarily political uses of force. Among the cases that could be cited are the following: (1) the Iranian crisis of 1946; (2) the Formosa Strait problem in 1950; (3) the Quemoy situation in 1958; and (4) the Berlin Wall in 1961. Also, after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet government specifically threatened the use of force again in the future against East European countries. The Brezhnev Doctrine, as it later came to be called, represents another major example of the political use of force in that its objective is to accomplish political aims without actually employing physical violence.

A key current target for political use of force by the USSR is Western Europe. Through maintaining overwhelming military capabilities in Europe, the Soviet government hopes to attain "Finlandization" or neutralization of Europe without having actually to engage its military forces in combat. It is also in Europe that the use of force for diplomatic bargaining between the United States and the USSR is most likely to occur.

b. For Arms Control

The utility of armed forces (size, employment, weapons, location) for arms control bargaining with the USSR is likely to be important in the next few years. One important (albeit not the most crucial) reason for maintaining the present level of forces in Europe is their utility as bargaining chips with the USSR for mutual balanced force reductions and other issues with which the present SALT negotiations are concerned. For this

reason any unilateral reductions in U.S. forces in Europe must be accompanied by offsetting measures or the American arms control negotiating position will be weakened.

Presence of U.S. forces in Asia is not likely, in contrast to Europe, to contribute to arms control negotiations. However, should arms control negotiations become part of the North Korea-South Korea unification dialogue, then U.S. troop presence in Korea might be useful as a bargaining asset for the Republic of Korea. Additionally, should the present SALT negotiations be broadened to include China, then U.S. military presence in Asia would be useful for bargaining purposes.

c. During Conflict

Armed forces also may have political utilities even during warfare. For example, the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe might give the United States an opportunity to bargain with the USSR should it launch a conventional attack in Europe. In such a situation, bargaining between NATO and the Warsaw Pact might occur in which either side, if the other demanded unacceptable peace conditions, would have the option of escalating to the tactical nuclear level. Thus the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal might confer on the United States certain political or diplomatic advantages that would not exist without such weapons. A strategic nuclear capability, of course, also provides negotiating benefits.

Existence of a range of military capabilities also may provide a wider range of options for war termination purposes. Unless the objective is not only unconditional surrender but also the utter destruction of the enemy and his country, military capabilities provide bargaining advantages in the sense of determining the degree to which war termination conditions are favorable to the United States.

2. Relationships with Allies

a. NATO

A panoply of U.S. military power, and especially the stationing of American forces in Europe, confers certain political advantages on the United States which it would not otherwise have in terms of American relations with NATO allies. The United States is the leader, formulator, and implementor of strategic planning for the alliance as a whole. Because the United States has the strongest military forces, NATO allies ordinarily have been willing to accept (albeit sometimes reluctantly, especially in the case of flexible response) American strategic planning. If U.S. forces were inferior to those of Europe, Washington would have to accept European strategic planning. Also, U.S. military power, and especially a strong U.S. military presence in Europe, gives to the United States a position of leadership in the alliance which makes NATO more acceptable to the American people than would otherwise be the case.

Presence of U.S. forces in Europe and the fact that the United States is the strongest alliance member also result in a more cohesive NATO than would be possible otherwise. It is much easier for the Germans, the British, and even the French to accept American leadership of the alliance than for any of them to accept a European leader. For example, it would be unacceptable to the French or the British to have Germans occupy the position as alliance leader. Related to this role of the United States is the fact that American presence in Europe reassures other alliance members about a rearmed Germany.

Finally, and most important, strong U.S. military forces, and especially a strong U.S. presence in Europe, serve the political purpose of coupling U.S. and West European security. This political role of American armed forces has assumed even greater importance since the Soviet Union has attained strategic parity with the United States.

b. Other Allies

U.S. military forces also serve a variety of political roles in American relations with other allied nations. Particularly important is the continued presence of U.S. troops in the Republic of Korea to signify U.S. determination to assist South Korea in the event of attack from the north; this serves to enhance the deterrent effect of the U.S.-ROK alliance. U.S. presence in Korea also serves to symbolize a continuing commitment to other Asian allies, especially Japan. In view of extensive U.S. troop withdrawals from Asia and the prevalent attitude that U.S. policy is entirely European oriented, continued U.S. military presence in Asia is of great importance.

On the continent of Southeast Asia, U.S. forces remain only in Thailand. These serve to remind the North Vietnamese that the United States can intervene again with air power should North Vietnam undertake a full-scale renewal of the Vietnamese war.

3. In the Third World

a. Presence and Shows of Force

A critical area of the world where U.S. forces are present to show continued interest in the security and stability of the region is in the Middle East. In the Mediterranean Sea, the U.S. Sixth Fleet performs essentially three tasks: (1) to guard the southern flank of NATO, thus deterring Soviet attack in that area; (2) to counter Soviet naval presence and to prevent the USSR from achieving a hegemonial position in the Middle East; and (3) to provide visible evidence of American support for Israel against possible Soviet intervention on the side of the Arab nations.

On the Arabian Sea-Persian Gulf side of the Middle East, the United States maintains a small task force of three ships, homeported in Bahrain. The original purpose of these ships was to continue a Western presence in this vital oil-producing area after the British withdrew their forces east of Suez. Now the existence of this task force is especially

important in view of the fact that the United States has no Indian Ocean fleet, as has the Soviet Union. Doubtless this factor contributed to the October 1973 decision to send a U.S. carrier force into the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area.¹ The objective of this show of force was apparently to demonstrate U.S. ability to operate in this distant area and possibly to impress Arab oil-producing governments with this capability.

b. Access and Communications

Important roles of U.S. forces in peacetime are to ensure access to overseas areas and to maintain lines of communication. These are primarily naval missions and involve making certain that the United States is not denied supplies of vital raw materials and mineral resources. The most important of these missions now is to safeguard access to Middle Eastern oil, especially in the Persian Gulf area, and to see that oil supplies are not interdicted by hostile elements. It would seem likely that U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean are insufficient for these roles, given the fact that Japan, which imports almost all of its oil and gas across the Indian Ocean, has no naval capability.

c. Political Liabilities

While the presence of U.S. air forces in Thailand and naval forces in Bahrain undoubtedly has political utilities, a discussion of the political roles of armed forces needs also to mention the liabilities of such activities. In Thailand, for example, the presence of U.S. air forces provided a rallying cry for students who demanded the ouster of the government. This raises the question of whether the political assets of U.S. presence in Thailand will outweigh the extra burden this will put on the present Thai government in its attempts to restore political tranquility.

¹ *New York Times* (30 October 1973).

In Bahrain, the U.S. naval task force has been ordered to leave within one year. Its continued presence, even for one year, may provide excuses for radical Arab elements to undertake anti-U.S. actions. Possibly the three-ship task force should be somewhat enlarged but based instead in the Indian Ocean. Periodic visits could be made by such an Indian Ocean force into the Persian Gulf to symbolize U.S. concern with the area.

E. Force Roles and Force Posture

In the new order of international relationships the utility of military force is changing but not disappearing. The threats to national survival are more complex but still formidable. So long as there exist great political and social systems fundamentally antithetical in nature, the need will exist for means of deterring and resisting the imposition of the power of one upon another. Considerable progress has been made by the United States and other nations in ameliorating the tensions and animosities among traditional adversaries, but the "generation of peace" is still a goal of the future.

The power of nuclear weapons overshadows all international interactions. Apparently the possessors of nuclear weapons have come to accept the political inutility of all-out strategic war. There have always been limited wars for limited ends, but now the concept of limited war--if armed conflict does occur--has a new imperative. The use of force has always been ultimately political, but the now overriding necessity that war be limited has reinforced the political aspects of force.

The non-use of force--deterrence--is the most desirable political goal. Deterrence cannot be effective, however, without the capability and the will to use force if the adversary is not deterred by the mere existence of force, or if he believes that he has an option to use force at a level for which deterrence is not credible. This aspect of the deterrent equation necessitates the possession of forces and their integration into a force relationship which is able to deter at all levels of potential conflict. Only then will there be full utility in the political role of force. In the following chapter the concept of the continuum of force is examined in detail.

continuum, and to outline some of the considerations which should guide a determination of force posture on a global basis.¹ The objective is to establish a foundation for a balanced, interlinked, total force posture that will meet the needs for deterrence and defense. It should be observed at the outset that the specifics of relationships among forces are continually shifting as new weapons appear and relative force balances change. Optimal relationships will always be elusive and subject to getting lost in a maze of complexity.

2. Vertical, Lateral, and Horizontal Force Continuums

The continuum of military force will be discussed here in terms of what can be thought of as a "vertical" continuum in which the force elements are arranged in the hierarchy of an escalation ladder, with paramilitary and conventional general purpose forces at one end, strategic nuclear forces at the other end, and theater nuclear and tactical nuclear forces in between, as shown in Figure V-1. At the lower end, the continuum extends beyond military and paramilitary forces into nonmilitary instruments of national power, but these will not be discussed here.

The particular categorization of force elements shown in Figure 1 is somewhat arbitrary. There is no fully agreed categorization of force elements within the defense community, nor firm bounds on the use of different categories of force for various levels of warfare.² There is in fact overlap, rather than distinct separation, between force categories. This will be illustrated more specifically below.

¹ It is not intended to analyze specific characteristics and improvements needed for forces. Insofar as General Purpose Forces are concerned, this subject is presented in R. B. Foster, et al., "Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis," (U), SSC-TN-2240-15, -16, and -17 SRI/Strategic Studies Center (in preparation) SECRET RESTRICTED DATA.

² For an annotated glossary of terms pertaining to categories of nuclear weapons and forces, see W. Joshua and J. Scharfen, "Framework of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Policy," (U), SSC-TN-1908-1, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (Revised October 1973) SECRET RESTRICTED DATA.

Military force can also be considered in the context of a "horizontal" continuum and a "lateral" continuum. The horizontal continuum refers to the well-recognized precept of continuity among the traditional service categories--army, navy, air, and marine forces. The lateral continuum refers to continuity between geographically adjacent friendly military forces, such as Allied Command Atlantic and Allied Command Europe, or the forces of Greece and Turkey. In a broader sense the lateral continuum, as depicted in Figure V-I, refers to continuity between allies, such as between the United States and the Republic of Korea. By virtue of alliance and national defense structures, linkages exist within all these planes and between the planes throughout the entire military force "space continuum."

The view that forces are continuously related in a continuum is sometimes obscured by the semantics of the way we package military forces: into separate budget categories (strategic forces, general purpose forces, mobility forces, etc.); into operational mission categories (European Command, Pacific Command, Strategic Air Command, etc.); and by the environment in which their vehicles predominantly move (army on land, navy on the sea, air forces in the air, marine forces at the sea/land interface). We are led similarly into other semantic obscurations: general nuclear war is strategic nuclear war, which is equated to strategic nuclear forces primarily, to long-range theater-based nuclear forces secondarily, but hardly at all to nonnuclear and tactical nuclear forces. Similarly there is semantic obscuration at the other end of the conflict spectrum. The waging of a conventional defense against a nonnuclear aggression is normally examined as a matter for nonnuclear general purpose forces to execute on their own. Other force elements, notably nuclear force elements, are not usually analyzed as to their contribution and impact.

3. The Need to Interrelate Forces

Yet in current history we have the example of a strategic nuclear delivery means, the B-52, being utilized in an important way for tactical nonnuclear purposes in Southeast Asia. And it is commonly, though not universally, acknowledged that nuclear forces are probably still the major

(but not sole) deterrent to large-scale nonnuclear or nuclear attack against NATO. Increasing concern about the continued forcefulness of the "ultimate" strategic nuclear deterrent against the lesser magnitudes of aggression in Europe and historical examples elsewhere (Korea and Vietnam), and about the failure of nuclear deterrence against large-scale escalating nonnuclear warfare, point to the need to study the interrelationship of forces more carefully. Concerns about decoupling of U.S. strategic nuclear forces from their role in deterring attacks against NATO, and thus drastically weakening the forcefulness of NATO's deterrent, can be allayed if NATO posture perceptibly retains the chain of linkage to the highest force levels, including U.S. strategic nuclear forces. For the same end purpose but against a quite different background, the relationships among U.S. and allied force elements for deterrence and defense in the Pacific Basin and other areas of the world need to be brought to a clearer focus before there can be effective integration of force posture on a global basis.

As discussed in earlier chapters, military force posture must be designed to fulfill national and alliance objectives during both peace and war. During peacetime, military forces are instruments of government policy for carrying out the following kinds of roles:

- Deterrence of armed aggression by an opponent (the foremost security objective of forces of the United States and its allies).
- Coercion of and resistance to coercion from other nations and alliances by direct or implied threat of force.
- External stability, security, peacekeeping, civil action, and military advice and assistance.
- Internal stability, security, and civil action.

During wartime, some or all of the peacetime roles remain valid. In addition, military forces take on the following roles:

- Execution of offensive and defensive military operations, as directed by national authority, ranging from direct aggression for the purpose of defeating or subjugating an enemy, to strictly defensive and damage-limiting measures.

- Deterrence of escalation by the enemy to undesirable higher levels of warfare (intra-war deterrence).
- Coercing or forcing conflict termination on the most favorable terms obtainable.

Of these many roles it is in the working of deterrent and coercive influences both in peacetime and during war that the play of force interactions is most pronounced. It is certainly in furthering these more subtle political-military objectives that orchestration of the total force structure is crucially important. The security aims of both the United States and NATO rest on the foundation principle that each abjures armed conflict as an instrument of policy other than in defense.¹ For this principle to make practical sense, it must be accompanied by means to influence our adversaries likewise to reject aggressive conflict as an instrument of policy.

4. Relation between Punitive and Warfighting Components of Deterrence

For U.S. and allied forces to maximize their effectiveness in deterring conflict, each force element must be postured and utilized to contribute optimally to deterrence, and all force elements must act to reinforce one another in this objective. This does not mean that tactical nuclear or theater nuclear forces should be designed to function as smaller, less powerful versions of strategic nuclear forces, for deterrence must be worked differently against conflicts where a powerful opponent would be limiting his objectives and forces to less than all-out war, or where a lesser opponent does not have the capability to inflict serious military damage against the United States or its major allies.

Against general nuclear war, deterrence at present rests predominantly upon the punitive basis of assured retaliatory countervalue destruction of the opponent. The principal deterring agent is strategic nuclear force, though theater forces, both nuclear and conventional, also have a subordinate contributing role.

¹ Articles I and II of the 22 June 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev accord on avoiding atomic war constitutes at face value an abjuration of the threat of use of force as well as of actual use of force.

Against more limited attacks, deterrence rests upon a more complicated set of risks to the adversary: punishment by destruction of his engaged military forces, counterattack elsewhere, failure in battle which could bring on undesirable political repercussions, catastrophic escalating failure which might leave him defeated, and the danger of provoking an escalation which would lead to nuclear attack against his homeland. Deterrence will be strongest when the aggressor perceives a near certainty that the defender can and will inflict unacceptable damage or outcome, but deterrence will also be strong where the aggressor faces ambiguity as to the defender's response and uncertainty as to an acceptable outcome. Uncertainty here applies to how much force would be used by the defender, not how much force could be used, since bluff is too dangerous a ploy in a deterrent strategy.

Obviously, there comes a point below which the defender's values endangered in a limited aggression do not credibly warrant the risk of general nuclear or theater nuclear response, and realistic deterrence must then depend more upon the threat of countermilitary warfighting capability at the tactical level and less upon countervalue punishment. This is the point where there begins to be a decoupling of strategic nuclear war as a suitable response, though not necessarily a decoupling of all strategic nuclear forces. Where this point may be is, of course, highly subjective and variable. The United States, its allies, and its adversaries will all define a different point related to their own value systems. It is not necessary (and is doubtless impossible) to eliminate ambiguity on this matter, though it is essential that those countries which depend upon the nuclear umbrella of the United States have confidence that their vital interests fall within the protection of U.S. nuclear deterrence. Ambiguity--or more precisely, uncertainty--on the part of our adversaries as to the exact nature and level of U.S. and allied response (but not as to our capability and will) is an important ingredient in the calculus of risk and deterrence. Through this uncertainty a would-be aggressor is faced with fear of nuclear escalation and doubt as to success.

The relationship between deterrence by punitive countervalue threat and deterrence by countermilitary or warfighting threat is depicted symbolically in Figure V-2. For conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum, it is the incredibility of resorting to mutual destruction that reduces the force of punitive countervalue deterrence against limited aggression and increases the importance of warfighting deterrence. The values that would be at risk in limited intensity warfare do not credibly warrant a pre-determination that the national existence of the United States (or the USSR) should also be exposed to risk.

B. Force Relationships in the NATO Context

1. Flexible Response and Deterrent Linkages in NATO

The relationship of forces in the working of deterrence, coercive influence, and active defense can best be exemplified in the European context, where U.S. and NATO force relationships in the face of the USSR and Warsaw Pact threat have over the years become to a degree institutionalized under the NATO Alliance. The discussion below illustrates U.S. and NATO force relationships in deterring and defending against a spectrum of threat possibilities ranging from small-scale nonnuclear attacks to general nuclear war. Subsequently the discussion will be extended to illustrate the relationship of forces in the less structured military environments applicable to other theaters than Europe.

NATO strategy acknowledges the necessity for interrelated forces as a keystone of its concept of deterrence and defense. The NATO strategy of MC 14/3,¹ in calling for the flexibility to respond to lower levels of aggression without invoking a general nuclear response, makes clear that any lesser response is always backed by the intention to deliberately

¹ NATO Military Committee, "A Report by the Military Committee for the Defense Planning Committee on Overall Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Area. Enclosure to North Atlantic Military Committee: Decision on MC 14/3," (U) (22 September 1967) NATO SECRET.




FIGURE V-2 SYMBOLIC REPRESENTATION OF DETERRENT RELATIONSHIPS

escalate, if need be, and that the escalation could be to the highest level of general nuclear response. The NATO strategic concept recognizes that:

... credible deterrence of military actions of all kinds is necessary, and this can be secured only through a wide range of forces equipped with a well-balanced mixture of conventional and tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. The purpose of this balance of forces is to permit a flexible range of responses combining two main principles. The first principle is to meet any aggression with direct defense at approximately the same level and the second is to deter through the possibility of escalation.¹

Thus NATO intends a coupling of all its forces in an unbroken chain of increasingly powerful responses. There is, in effect, a single interlinked deterrent, the action agents of which stretch from counter-military defensive capability by forces at the nonnuclear end of the spectrum to punitive countervalue capability by forces at the strategic nuclear level. The NATO concept in principle rejects a discontinuous firebreak concept in favor of a graduated continuity of force capability.

This does not mean that NATO must necessarily match the Warsaw Pact with equal or superior military capability at all levels from top to bottom in its deterrent coat of mail. In practice NATO forces are less powerful than would be desired in deterrence against Warsaw Pact theater nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities, but this is compensated by reinforcing linkages with national strategic nuclear and tactical nuclear capabilities, respectively. The USSR and Warsaw Pact, for their part, can draw upon their powerful MRBM and IRBM forces and upon chemical warfare and conventional forces in compensating for advantages which NATO may have in tactical nuclear capabilities.

2. Force Balance and Reinforcement in the Vertical Continuum

This kind of asymmetry and compensating reinforcement within the vertical continuum of forces is illustrated for Europe by the simplified

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North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Aspects of NATO Defense Policy," NATO Information Service, Brussels (1969).

nonquantitative depiction of Figure V-3. The imbalances indicated do not necessarily reflect a complete assessment of relative capability between the two sides, but rather the manner in which each side can apply its available assets, if necessary, to adjust for asymmetries.¹ There are, of course, escalatory risks involved in reinforcing across the "thresholds" indicated in the figure, notably in the use of nuclear weapons to reinforce conventional forces and in the use of strategic nuclear weapons to reinforce theater nuclear forces.


There are other important asymmetries not depicted in Figure V-3, such as the fact that Soviet Union MRBM and IRBM forces are based within the USSR homeland but have the range only to attack targets within what the United States defines as the "European Theater;" while NATO strike aircraft, based in Europe as "theater" forces, can reach targets in the USSR homeland. As noted earlier, there can be no firm dividing lines between arbitrary classifications of what are theater nuclear forces, tactical nuclear forces, and so on. The fact that there cannot be firm bounds on force categories is reflected in the cross-utility of force elements for various levels of warfare intensity. There is extensive overlap in all categories, as pointed out below.

3. NATO and Warsaw Pact Force Hierarchies

The linkages between the forces available to NATO and, for comparison, those available to the USSR and Warsaw Pact are shown more clearly in the hierarchy of Figure V-4. As can be seen, NATO and national supporting forces constitute today a continuum with marked overlapping of force categories and of force utility. Figure V-4 shows not only the overlap in the arbitrarily defined categories of forces (strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, etc.) but an even greater overlap in utility of NATO force elements to engage in conflicts ranging from nonnuclear to general nuclear warfare. All force elements listed have some utility in general nuclear war, most have utility for theater-level or tactical nuclear warfare, and about half are useful in nonnuclear warfare. Subject to technological and doctrinal changes, Figure V-4 also indicates there is potential for even greater cross-utility of NATO force elements to engage in various levels of warfare.

¹

Not all of the reinforcing possibilities are shown in Figure V-3. For example, the USSR can reinforce its theater nuclear forces by using SLBMs and SLCMs, although it may have less need to do so than NATO.



Note: Relative capabilities are not to scale.

Figure V-3

DEPICTION OF BALANCE AND REINFORCEMENT BY FORCE CATEGORY, NATO VS WARSAW PACT

Thus there is inherent in current NATO and supporting national forces a considerable degree of force linkage and cross-utility which fosters deterrent coupling and defense flexibility. The forces in the vertical continuum are not conducive to easy "firebreak" segregation into distinct categories equatable to levels of warfare. Nor is such a firm separation intended, as the MC 14/3 strategy makes clear.¹

The Warsaw Pact and supporting national forces exhibit similar (though not identical) overlap among force categories and cross-utility for various levels of warfare. There also appears to be considerable similarity in the particular force elements included in the hierarchies for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The parallelism may be somewhat deceptive, however. It is questionable that the USSR has yet espoused a strategic concept which accepts the multiple levels of warfare envisioned under NATO's flexible response concept. Although USSR and Warsaw Pact forces can accommodate to various warfare levels as depicted in Figure V-4, it is uncertain that the Soviet Union intends to do so in the same way that NATO may wish.

¹

It would be erroneous to conclude, however, that NATO forces were specifically planned to have extensive overlap and cross-utility as a means to facilitate flexible response. NATO posture has evolved in this direction, but the basic structure of the force hierarchy was set before NATO agreement on the MC 14/3 strategy of flexible response.

Moreover, there remain key asymmetries between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in specific capabilities of corresponding force elements. For example, the land-based ballistic missiles of the French are no match in numbers and total effectiveness for the MRBMs and IRBMs of the USSR. On the other hand, NATO has large numbers of nuclear-capable cannon artillery for use in the engaged battle zone, while the USSR is not known to have any. The Soviet Union can in turn compensate for this latter deficiency by drawing upon its tactical nuclear missile capability, which outnumbers NATO in numbers of launchers.

4. Extending Deterrence Downward and Credibility Upward

Given the military imbalances and asymmetries which exist in the vertical force continuum as it stands today, NATO must compensate by drawing upon the reinforcing linkages among its forces. Having already provided first and foremost for deterrent capability against general nuclear attack by coupling to U.S. strategic nuclear forces, NATO must build deterrence downward by providing deterrence against limited strategic nuclear and theater-level nuclear forms of warfare, then the tactical nuclear level and finally, nonnuclear levels of attack. To leave gaps in this downward-building process is to move in a direction contrary to credibility and flexibility and toward more brittle tripwire versions of deterrence.

Serious discontinuity in force capability leads to dangerous discontinuity in deterrence. Continuity of force capability allows for mutual economic reinforcement between categories of forces and couples the punitive deterrent strength of strategic forces to the countermilitary deterrent strength of tactical forces. Combined deterrence based upon reinforcing, coupled force capabilities is more forceful than level-by-level deterrence based on segregated force capabilities. At the same time, the warfighting capability of tactical conventional and nuclear forces adds the essential ingredient of credible intent to defend which strategic and theater nuclear forces lack by themselves. The result of strengthening these interactions up and down the force continuum is a posture which tends to maximize credible, realistic deterrence against all levels of warfare under existing and foreseeable conditions.

C. Working of Deterrence, Defense, and War Termination

1. Situations Considered

The manner in which NATO force linkages come into play can be illustrated by examining the working of deterrence, defense and war termination coercion for various levels of warfare. The discussion below considers force relationships in situations of small and large scale conventional warfare, tactical nuclear and theater nuclear warfare, and general nuclear warfare.

2. Working of Deterrence and Defense Against Threats of Small-Scale Nonnuclear Attack

NATO could well be faced with a very small-scale nonnuclear attack, incursion, lodgement, terrorist assault, or the like in which only a small fraction of enemy forces would be involved and in which the enemy has not premeditated an escalation to major attack to guarantee success of the initial very limited objective. Both flanks of NATO are particularly susceptible to such a possibility.¹ Against such threats, NATO conventional

¹

For a discussion of the threats against NATO flanks and of NATO capabilities, see R. B. Foster, et al., "Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis," (U), *op. cit.*, Volume 2, Chapter XI.

forces, if properly postured, can be assembled in sufficient strength eventually to prevail and restore territory initially lost.

Against such limited, nonescalating forms of aggression, nuclear forces have little utility as credible deterrents.¹ The principal deterrent against this form of aggression is the conventional defensive ability of active forces in place plus that of nonnuclear air, sea, and land forces that can reinforce laterally and from the rear. The physical presence of national military forces in the path of an aggressor, even in small numbers, is a strong deterrent by virtue of reinforcing linkage with other national and allied forces. The air and land components of the Allied Command Europe Mobile Force are particularly effective instruments to cement the commitment of multinational involvement, demonstrably linking local NATO forces to others outside the area of aggression. This exemplifies linkage in the lateral continuum of force across NATO. Rapidity and forcefulness of reinforcing action (for which remotely based air and naval power is especially useful) are important, as well as careful control of force (for which ground forces are especially useful). On both sides, demonstration of will and symbolic action may be more critical than the territory fought over. Coercion, bargaining, and conflict termination are likely to involve other issues than the proximate cause of aggression.

3. Working of Deterrence and Defense Against Large-Scale Nonnuclear Attack

In deterring large-scale nonnuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact against a major segment of NATO, including escalation from an initially very limited conflict, the full range of nuclear and nonnuclear forces comes powerfully into play. Any such major attack would be *prima facie* evidence that the highest value systems of one or more NATO nations are in immediate jeopardy, and hence the viability of the Alliance itself.

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Against threats where the enemy plans to escalate the limited aggression to a much larger attack, the deterrent power of nuclear forces would come very much into play, as indicated in paragraph 3.

In weighing a decision to launch a large-scale nonnuclear attack, the Warsaw Pact must recognize that the NATO nations--especially those most directly threatened--will be under great pressure to respond with forceful measures appropriate to national survival. The Warsaw Pact cannot be assured that a strong nuclear response will not be NATO's answer. The greater the aggressive provocation, the higher the risk of nuclear response involving, possibly, a theater nuclear exchange or a strategic nuclear confrontation. The Warsaw Pact cannot isolate its calculations to the odds in conventional operations alone, but must consider the odds of loss vs. gain in nuclear warfare of unpredictable intensity.

There is linkage in an even more direct way between the conventional war threat and the force of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons deter the enemy from bringing his full mass of conventional forces to bear in an attack. For the enemy to mass while NATO has nuclear weapons at the ready is to incur excessive risk of wholesale losses and to invite the NATO nuclear escalation which the USSR fears. By virtue of their quick responsiveness to the immediate threat, tactical nuclear weapons are especially valuable in inducing a limit to enemy nonnuclear concentration. In addition, nuclear strike aircraft, theater nuclear missiles, and even strategic nuclear forces (under limited operational conditions) can inflict major damage to concentrated nonnuclear forces.

Thus nuclear forces at all levels contribute to setting upper bounds on the level of conventional force that can prudently be brought to bear, and in consequence, upper limits on the scope of objectives that the Warsaw Pact could plan for a conventional attack without expecting to trigger NATO nuclear escalation. Conventional forces by themselves cannot force these limits upon the enemy. Only a close and credible relationship with supporting nuclear forces can deter on this plane. The effect is to press any thoughts of nonnuclear attack toward lower intensities where NATO conventional forces can be militarily more effective and hence more useful in themselves deterring.

But the deterrent task is not complete merely with inducing upper limits on conventional force massing and restraining warfare within lower levels of conflict. There are many limited attack objectives which the

Warsaw Pact or USSR might risk if they could be quickly carried out or kept to lower levels of provocation where NATO might not invoke a nuclear response. Conceivable instances include a geographically limited attack against Northern Norway, an occupation of Iceland, or a limited action against Greece or Turkey. Even in Central Europe the Warsaw Pact might seek to force a salient into West Germany, then, at the point where NATO uses or threatens to use nuclear weapons, seek to terminate hostilities while retaining the territory gained. A political objective of fractionating or destroying the Atlantic Alliance could well be the motivating purpose, overshadowing any immediate military and territorial gains. Soviet operational concepts and doctrine for warfare in Europe emphasize offensive tactics well suited to rapid, decisive accomplishment before the full range of NATO forces can be concerted to halt an attack or put NATO in a favorable position to terminate hostilities.

Therefore, to extend deterrence to cover such large scale but limited objective aggressions, principal dependence must be placed on credible warfighting capabilities and on flexible, selective, controllable war options. If NATO deterrence is to be complete and credible, conventional forces must be able to be militarily effective against major non-nuclear aggressions; and nuclear forces--particularly tactical nuclear forces as the in-place first-line backup to conventional forces--must credibly be able to carry out military missions such as halting and repelling invading forces without excessive collateral civil damage and without endangering NATO options for higher nuclear escalation or response.

Should a major nonnuclear conflict break out, the same deterrent influences continue in play to constrain the conflict from escalating to undesired levels and to induce termination on favorable terms. At this point it is the potential use of NATO's as yet withheld forces which influences the enemy to restrain or desist.

Among critical measures to be carried out by the as yet uncommitted tactical nuclear and theater nuclear forces would be assumption of high states of alert, deployment of weapon systems and munitions to dispersed, more survivable field positions, and preparation of nuclear and

chemical warfare passive defense measures. Equally significant are measures to ensure the capability to initiate or respond to nuclear warfare while the nonnuclear battle is in progress. Mobilization and movement of reserve forces and civil defense preparations can be undertaken. Strategic nuclear forces, alerted for the possibility of general war, can also be postured so that they can readily undertake limited strategic attacks against the USSR or direct support to NATO nuclear forces. Coordination of operational planning for use of U.S., UK, and French national nuclear forces can be undertaken. Strategic and tactical intelligence activities can be brought to full pitch. All these and many other measures are signals of capability and intent that if the attack is pushed too far, NATO will escalate to nuclear warfare.¹

But once the Warsaw Pact has set the level and magnitude of non-nuclear conflict, NATO is faced with the difficult choice of how far to commit nonnuclear capability in the battle and how much force to retain in reserve for influencing the future course of the conflict. The danger of too little commitment is obvious, but there is also a danger of being drawn into a concentrated defense where NATO is excessively vulnerable to nuclear preemption by the enemy and no longer has the reserves to compensate for sudden losses. This danger exists even if NATO is first to use nuclear weapons, for NATO cannot count on a nuclear disarming first strike capability.

The problem is especially acute because of the need to utilize NATO's dual-capable tactical nuclear systems in conventional defense. NATO tactical air forces, for example, will be essential to nonnuclear counterair, interdiction and close air support operations, yet they cannot at the same time stand guard as nuclear quick reaction alert forces.

1

Military maneuvers which exercise such measures during peacetime, combined with national and NATO policy declarations, are means to display such intentions before the fact. They also are means to solidify allied intentions by establishing precedents and reaction habits before the fact. Even more important is commitment of alliance resources during peacetime to the necessary force modernization and readiness measures.

Once committed to conventional operations, reversion of aircraft to nuclear capability at a critical point in the war could cause difficulties. Furthermore, tactical nuclear capability will be affected (and thus deterrent effectiveness reduced) by conventional war losses in control and communications, intelligence and target acquisition, maneuver elements, and many other aspects which serve both tactical nuclear and nonnuclear operations. Tactical nuclear forces (and to a lesser extent, theater nuclear forces) are in fact imbedded within, dependent upon, and integral to conventional general purpose forces; they are not so much a distinctly separate set of forces as they are the nuclear firepower element of land battle and war-at-sea forces. Because of the close interdependence of dual-capable tactical nuclear and nonnuclear forces, it is crucially important to recognize that there are upper limits to the losses which can be accepted in conventional combat before the option to escalate to tactical nuclear warfare becomes infeasible due to loss of force integrity.

The difficulty of waging conventional war with dual-capable forces without excessive attrition to nuclear capability is sometimes termed the "dual capability dilemma." The solution lies in designing forces to be less vulnerable and in following tactical concepts which preserve at all times the capability to make the transition to nuclear warfare without loss of defense integrity.¹ Against a full-scale nonnuclear assault, NATO must presume the possibility that it will be forced to nuclear escalation or that the Warsaw Pact will preemptively escalate. Thus NATO must at all cost preserve its tactical nuclear (and theater nuclear) capabilities by ensuring survivability not only of nuclear systems but also of the nonnuclear systems--communications, firepower, mobility, logistics--which are essential adjuncts of nuclear firepower. To endanger these capabilities is to risk loss of an important--and perhaps essential--deterrent against enemy nuclear initiation and of means

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The potential of precision delivery of improved munitions--both non-nuclear and tactical nuclear--for resolving the dual capability dilemma is a key point of discussion in R. B. Foster, et al., "Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis," *op. cit.*, particularly Vol. 2, Chapters IX, XII, and XIII.

to induce war termination. A firebreak strategy which seeks to isolate nonnuclear capability from nuclear capability and then prosecutes a large-scale nonnuclear defense to the point of near exhaustion will probably not be able to salvage a losing campaign by nuclear escalation, nor be in a good position to continue intrawar deterrence and to influence the enemy's choice of options toward restraint and war termination.

4. Working of Deterrence and Defense Against Tactical Nuclear and Theater Nuclear Attack

There is no single definition which demarcates tactical nuclear weapons from theater nuclear weapons. As noted earlier, there is overlap in any arbitrarily defined categories of forces. Nor is there a clear distinction between tactical nuclear warfare and theater nuclear warfare.¹ For present purposes the distinction between tactical nuclear and theater nuclear warfare is described simply as one of limitation: tactical nuclear warfare is that which is intentionally restricted in terms of geography, yield, delivery system, target type, or other means to objectives below the full capability of nuclear forces available, while theater nuclear warfare generally is wider in scope and less restricted as to objectives. Tactical nuclear warfare is often considered to involve only military targets immediately confronting engaged forces--that is, those in the engaged battle zone. Tactical nuclear warfare is also normally considered to exclude attacks into the homelands of the United States and the USSR.

In view of this ambiguous distinction, the working of deterrence against tactical nuclear and theater nuclear attack tends to blend together, the differences being more in scope than in kind, with particular actions highly dependent on scenarios. Three deterrent requirements can be foreseen: (1) peacetime deterrence against Warsaw Pact initiation of nuclear warfare against NATO, (2) intrawar deterrence against enemy escalation from conventional to nuclear warfare, and (3) intrawar deterrence against an excessive enemy nuclear response to a NATO escalation from conventional to tactical nuclear warfare.

¹

See glossary in Joshua and Scharfen, *op. cit.*

NATO tactical nuclear weapons alone are certainly not the principal deterrent to enemy initiation of nuclear warfare in Europe. Both the forces and the operational doctrine of the Soviet Union are disposed more toward widespread decisive use of nuclear weapons with little regard for the discriminate, controlled, and limited employment envisioned for NATO tactical nuclear options. Deterrence rests predominantly upon the combination of NATO theater nuclear and supporting external strategic nuclear forces. Nuclear artillery and short-range missiles have an important additive, but not dominant, contribution in deterring enemy nuclear initiation.

Should tactical nuclear warfare¹ break out in Europe, the immediate task of engaged nuclear forces is to assume the principal firepower function initially. As a minimum, the explicit task of engaged nuclear forces is to quickly inflict sufficient damage to halt further enemy ingress into NATO. As a maximum, engaged nuclear and nonnuclear forces would be called upon to restore territory initially lost.

The implicit objective of engaged tactical nuclear forces would be to induce the enemy to terminate his aggression under conditions which after final negotiations, would restore the approximate *status quo ante*, or in any case not be to NATO disadvantage. This implicit objective is not attainable, however, except insofar as it is clearly backed by the threat of deliberate escalation, using as yet uncommitted nuclear forces and sufficient remaining nonnuclear forces to execute a sustainable defense and counterattack to restore the situation. To the extent that NATO has the opportunity of initiative, the lower the level of nuclear operations which can halt the aggression, the more forceful is the withheld residual capability in coercing a favorable termination. Moreover, as pointed out above,

¹ Nuclear warfare limited, that is, in not employing the full array of theater nuclear weapons available on both sides and in excluding attack of the U.S. and USSR homelands. To the European nations on whose territory the war is being fought, it may have the aspects of a general war of national survival.

tactical nuclear effectiveness depends directly upon the nonnuclear force elements with which the tactical nuclear systems must operate. There is a close and direct relationship between tactical nuclear forces and the other theater force elements, both higher and lower in the continuum of force.

Thus the retention of reserve force capability acts to deter enemy nuclear initiation or escalation just as it does to deter major conventional attack. Because of the virtual inseparability of tactical nuclear and non-nuclear capability it is essential that both nuclear and nonnuclear forces be withheld as reserves. If all NATO forces are deployed in forward readiness so as to maximize initial defensive capability, the Warsaw Pact, having the initiative of the aggressor, can design its attack accordingly and possibly bring to bear enough force against weak points to defeat NATO in short order. Moreover, a concentrated forward commitment of most of NATO's forces would tend to incite, rather than deter, enemy nuclear preemption. On the other hand, retention of survivable reserve capability poses the enemy with uncertainty as to how and when those reserve forces may be used. He is deterred not only by this uncertainty, but also by the more difficult military task of defeating NATO in depth.

In light of the stronger conventional reserves which the Warsaw Pact has at its disposal, NATO faces a tough dilemma in balancing allocations between initial defense capability and reserve capability. The lack of NATO M-Day conventional reserve strength forces NATO into a greater reliance upon nuclear forces for structuring its reserve capability. Reserve capability must be postured in depth both in the tactical sense and in the strategic sense, with the reserve strength of survivable dual capable tactical nuclear forces backing up nonnuclear war capability, linked theater nuclear forces backing up tactical nuclear capability, and the full range of external strategic nuclear and general purpose forces available for timely backup of NATO from outside Europe.

The conduct of limited nuclear operations is obviously fraught with restraining uncertainties for both sides. Once tactical nuclear warfare has been initiated, it is the combined effect from forceful employment of the nuclear weapons used and from uncertainty as to the prospect

for even greater nuclear damage which deters enemy counterescalation and coerces him to terminate. In the test of national will to outlast in a limited tactical nuclear war, the values at risk to NATO nations are higher than the values to be gained by the Warsaw Pact in aggression. By the act of initiating nuclear warfare, or responding to enemy nuclear initiative, the NATO countries involved have declared their willingness to risk severe damage to preserve their values. Unless the aggressor prices his potential gain at a value equal to the risk of further nuclear damage, circumstances favor his curtailment or termination of the conflict.

In the working of deterrence against theater-level nuclear attack, the principles discussed earlier continue to apply. Differences lie more in the tactics of working deterrence and coercion than in the principles. Theater forces depend for reinforcing support upon U.S., UK, and French national strategic forces and in turn provide to other NATO forces reinforcement both in the vertical force continuum and laterally to adjacent NATO forces. Theater forces must be designed for compatibility with both strategic and tactical nuclear forces, and must have credible, responsive, flexible capability to execute warfighting military objectives. And particularly, theater nuclear forces must avoid a posture which might invite preemptive nuclear attack either by a provocative stance emphasizing offensive strike capability or by the appearance of vulnerability.

As with tactical nuclear and conventional forces, force survivability for theater nuclear forces is a paramount requirement. That NATO forces exhibit a degree of vulnerability to sudden nuclear attack is recognized. It is also known that current Soviet Union doctrine emphasizes massive, decisive employment of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it is a most difficult task for the USSR to conduct a successful nuclear disarming attack against all of NATO nuclear retaliatory elements throughout the depth and breadth of the Alliance. The interlinked capability of NATO and supporting national forces adds to total survivability and thus deterrent credibility. Looked at from a total force point of view, the lack of firebreak segregation of NATO nuclear force elements denies to the USSR an easy, clear-cut nuclear disarming option against a portion of NATO nuclear forces without risk of dangerous retaliation from other elements. Thus,

for example, a successful nuclear disarming attack against vulnerable NATO nuclear strike aircraft bases would have low value unless there could also be successful attacks against PERSHING missiles, carrier based aircraft, SLBMs, and nuclear missiles and aircraft under national control, each of which can substitute in part for strike aircraft. While improvements in the survivability of each of NATO's force elements are needed, it is the reinforcing interlinkage of force capabilities that provides the cement for combined force survivability.

In the same way, lateral reinforcement capabilities within NATO act to deter nuclear attack against any one sector of the Alliance by compensating for the deficiencies and vulnerabilities in that sector. Nuclear attack against the Southern Region could not, for example, be planned by the USSR without considering nuclear response by the U.S. Sixth Fleet and reinforcement by nuclear strike aircraft deployable from the United States and Central Europe. Similarly, although the Warsaw Pact could easily mount a tactical nuclear force superior in numbers to that which NATO has in the Northern Army Group sector of the Central Region, NATO can compensate by lateral reinforcement with strike aircraft and PERSHING missiles based outside the Northern Army Group and by lateral movement of nuclear artillery.

5. Contribution of External Forces to Support of NATO Theater Forces

The theater nuclear forces assigned to NATO command are not an adequate match for the theater forces available to the Warsaw Pact, the governing differential being the MRBM, IRBM, and VRBM¹ weapons based in the Western part of the USSR. NATO is thus dependent upon the allocation of external strategic forces for use in reinforcement to NATO forces. These include not only U.S. forces, principally SLBMs and strategic bombers, but the national nuclear forces of the UK and France.

¹ Variable range ballistic missile.

The long-range nuclear forces of the UK and France have a special and important role in deterrence against enemy nuclear initiation, more by virtue of their independence from the U.S. nuclear decisionmaking process than because of their effectiveness. These weapons are at present more suitable for urban-industrial targeting than counterforce targeting, but by being in European hands, the credibility of their coupling to the defense of Europe is high. Questions can be raised about the deterrent value of British and French national nuclear forces in the case of nuclear attacks not involving the homelands of those countries. Yet against all but very limited nuclear attacks the uncertainty created by long-range nuclear forces in the hands of Europeans is a significant contribution to deterrence. Should the British and French nuclear systems be improved for greater effectiveness against counterforce targets, their warfighting utility for supporting NATO in a theater nuclear war would be enhanced and their deterrent credibility thereby increased.

A strategy which seeks to isolate strategic nuclear forces from theater nuclear warfare, or nuclear forces under national command from theater forces under NATO command, would vitiate the deterrent to enemy nuclear initiation and escalation. Under the present balance of forces, this would put NATO in the particularly disadvantageous position of inferiority at the highest level of theater warfare, thus ceding to the Soviet Union the dominant position for deterrence and coercion at the theater level. Strategic nuclear forces of the United States, United Kingdom, and France must, to the contrary, be perceived as linked with theater forces in theater nuclear warfare.

For general nuclear war, U.S. theater nuclear forces are at present closely coupled and integrated in SIOP planning with U.S. strategic forces. This coupling and integration can be extended to draw upon the utility of U.S., British, and French national strategic nuclear forces for support to NATO-assigned theater forces. With current operational capabilities these forces could be employed in three theater supporting roles:

- As a counterforce balance to Soviet MRBM, IRBM, VRBM, and bomber forces aimed at Europe. In this role allied national nuclear forces supplement comparable NATO-assigned forces in filling what otherwise could be a "hole" in the NATO deterrent.
- As an emergency nuclear backstop to theater nuclear and tactical nuclear forces in defending against invasion. Current strategic systems have restricted military utility in this role and could cause excessive collateral civil damage. Nevertheless, current strategic nuclear forces could be used as a hedge against failure of theater nuclear forces in NATO defense.
- In limited strategic countervalue options to induce war termination when actions at lower levels of the scale of conflict have not brought results.

With improvements in system accuracy and responsiveness, strategic forces could have greater effectiveness in the first two roles listed above. Technological and doctrinal improvements could extend utility beyond emergency backup to a more controllable, flexible supplement.

To give full credibility to strategic force options in support of theater warfare, it is necessary not only to make hardware changes to weapon systems but also to implement doctrinal changes. Among these are changes in command relationships and related communications, integration of target planning among the U.S., UK, France, and NATO, coordination with SIOP general war planning, and possibly changes in forces assigned to or earmarked for NATO commanders. With these several steps in hand, the current marginal support capability could become a more flexible instrument for realistically extending the deterrent power of strategic forces to the protection of NATO. In the face of growing concern about coupling of strategic nuclear forces to a war in Europe, options for limited strategic attack and for direct strategic force support in a theater war provide continuity of deterrent linkage at the highest level, yet within sensible bounds of credibility. Such options draw on the potency of the ultimate deterrent while reducing the insecurity of a tripwire trigger to general nuclear war.

6. Contribution of Theater Forces to Deterrence of General Nuclear War

Against the threat of general nuclear war the principal and essential deterrent is, of course, U.S. strategic nuclear capability. The overriding importance of strategic nuclear forces, and to a lesser extent theater nuclear forces, tends to overshadow the important contribution which general purpose forces make to deterrence of general nuclear war.

Under the earlier NATO strategy of massive nuclear retaliation to any attack (except limited incursions, border incidents and local hostile actions), the role of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe was recognized to encompass that of holding the land forces of the USSR and its East European allies at bay while the strategic nuclear exchange proceeded. In this way theater forces contributed an additive element of deterrence to general nuclear war.

This role remains under the current NATO strategy. In effect, general purpose theater forces contribute to deterrence of general nuclear war by presenting an obstacle to the capture of Western Europe intact as a base for USSR recuperation after a strategic exchange. Two changes in the international scene would seem to increase the future importance of this role: (1) the existing condition of strategic nuclear parity and the possibility that the USSR could achieve some measure of limited strategic nuclear superiority; and (2) the rise of the PRC as a formidable nuclear power. The former condition could lead the Soviet Union to risk a strategic nuclear exchange if the prospect for successful capture of Europe were high enough. The second condition creates additional strong incentive for the USSR, should general nuclear war occur, to capture Europe (and possibly also Japan)--and for the United States and NATO to deny its capture--lest the PRC come to dominate both the USSR and the United States in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange.

D. Force Relationships in Theaters Other than Europe¹

1. Multipolarity of National Interests and Nuclear Capability

The preceding discussion of force relationships in the NATO environment illustrates the principles which must be considered in developing integrated force postures. It becomes more difficult, however, to project these principles from the relatively well structured political military environment of Europe to the less definitive environments of other potential theaters of operation. Two aspects, in particular, affect the relationships among forces outside Europe: (1) a more amorphous multipolarity of national interests than characterizes the European scene; and (2) the prospect that additional nuclear powers will appear within the next decade or so, the most notable possibilities being Japan, India, and Israel.²

The rise of Japan as a major international power (but one with only limited defensive military strength), the rapprochement between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, and the receding U.S. military profile in the Far East represent changes of far-reaching significance which add complexity to force posture equations in the Pacific. Japan depends upon the umbrella of U.S. nuclear and nonnuclear military force for protection against attack or coercion by the USSR and the PRC, and upon the projection of U.S. naval and other military power for protection of its vital sea lines of commerce. But Japan has doubts about the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear shield, doubts which may be reinforced by the recent U.S. policy shift vis-a-vis the PRC. Facing serious long-term threats from both the USSR and the PRC and in doubt about the United

¹ For additional discussion of general purpose force requirements for the Far East, Middle East and Latin America, see R. B. Foster, et al., "Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis," *op. cit.*, Vol. 2.

² None of these countries has ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and each has the technical capability to develop a nuclear capability. For additional discussion of this subject, see R. M. Lawrence, et al., "Summary Report: Implications of Indian and/or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for U.S. Defense Policy Planning," SSC-TN-1933-1, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (October 1973) UNCLASSIFIED; and R. B. Foster, et al., *ibid.*, Vol. 3, Chapter II.

States, Japan well may decide to become a nuclear power. While this eventually might be advantageous to the U.S. position in the Far East, the ramifications are not clear, nor is it clear how a Japanese nuclear capability would be related with U.S. forces.

The development of nuclear capabilities by India or Israel similarly raises major uncertainties which complicate U.S. force planning. The possession of nuclear weapons by Israel in particular could be a destabilizing factor in the Middle East if it led to the explicit injection or threat of injection of Soviet nuclear capabilities on behalf of Arab countries in compensation for Israel's nuclear weapons.

2. The Nixon Doctrine and Total Force Concept

The Nixon Doctrine and the Administration view of the Total Force Concept establish broad policy guidelines for relationships between U.S. forces and those of our allies and neutrals. In describing the Nixon Doctrine the President has stated:

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.¹

In explaining the Total Force Concept and its relationship to the strategy of "Realistic Deterrence," former Secretary of Defense Laird has said that:

The Total Force Concept means nothing less than maximum and integrated use of all available resources--including those of allies and friends.²

Through the Total Force Concept, realistic deterrence against armed conflict at all levels is to be achieved with a continuum of force that links U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities with U.S. theater nuclear

¹ Nixon, *Foreign Policy 1970*, p. 55.

² *DOD Report FY 73*, p. 13.

forces and the general purpose forces of the United States and its allies. Under the extended kind of partnership implied, there would be a considerable degree of burden sharing for deterrence and defense, with the United States providing nuclear forces, other advanced technology elements, non-combat support, and military assistance; while other countries provide ground forces and less advanced air and naval forces, as well as in some cases, base rights, facilities, and logistic support for U.S. forces. That nuclear deterrence is a part of the Total Force Concept was made clear by former Secretary of Defense Richardson in the Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1974. He stated that U.S. nuclear forces maintained in a theater were for the purpose of enhancing deterrence, and if employed, were to deny any major military advantage to an aggressor initiating a nuclear attack in the theater. He also pointed out that these forces contribute to the deterrence of conventional war in the theater.

Except for Europe there is as yet a long way between the concept of Total Force and its implementation. The U.S. military profile in the Pacific theater has been substantially reduced in the past several years, but the restructuring to achieve a Total Force posture combining U.S. and indigenous capabilities has not yet progressed far other than in Korea and South Vietnam. The process of readjusting force relationships and reestablishing the visible symbols and credible arrangements for combined deterrence will take time.

3. Peripheral Conflicts

In the case of "peripheral conflicts," in which the vital interests of the United States and the USSR (and probably of the PRC, Japan, and NATO Europe) are not involved, the possibility of using nuclear weapons is remote and hence the influence of strategic and theater forces is less likely to have a dominant effect.¹ On the other hand, peripheral conflicts

¹ For additional discussion of peripheral conflicts, see K. H. Jacobson and R. M. Lawrence, "The Utility of Nuclear Weapons Employment in Peripheral Conflicts: Two Views," SSC-TN-2240-3, SRI/Strategic Studies Center (April 1973) UNCLASSIFIED.

are more likely to occur than conflicts involving confrontation between the nuclear superpowers, and the actions of the United States in regard to such conflicts will be closely watched by our allies for implications pertinent to them. Thus, for example, either use or nonuse of nuclear weapons by the United States in a conflict will establish important precedents that enhance or detract from the credibility of the U.S. nuclear shield, Total Force Concept, and Realistic Deterrence. It is conceivable that circumstances could arise in which the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a highly controlled and limited manner may, in a peripheral conflict, serve to demonstrate and exemplify U.S. resolve in a way not practical in a conflict involving more critical national interests. The question of precedent for future action could be more important than the immediate military reason for nuclear employment. The possibility that a nuclear precedent may one day have to be set, and its importance if it is, will be increased if additional powers outside Europe acquire nuclear weapons.

4. Force Relationships with Japan

The key position of Japan as a minimally defended world power immediately adjacent to two nuclear powers (the USSR and the PRC) and within the sphere of influence of a third (the United States) presents special problems for U.S. force posture planning. In some respects these problems are unique to the Japanese situation, but in many respects they are parallel with the principles which guide the relationship of U.S. forces to other forces in NATO.

As with NATO, it is crucially essential to relate U.S. forces to Japanese interests in such a way as to maximize credibility of U.S. deterrence and protection on behalf of Japan. The diminished but still considerable presence of U.S. forces stationed or home-ported in Japan continues to provide visible evidence of U.S. protection despite growing unpopularity of the U.S. military presence. Equally important, and perhaps in some respects more so, is the U.S. land and air forward deployment in South Korea. The inclusion of nuclear capable delivery systems in Korea is especially important in symbolizing implied nuclear defense of Japan

as well as Korea. To Japan, trying to maintain viability in the center of a triangular relationship with the United States, USSR and PRC, the U.S. nuclear-capable forward commitment in South Korea represents an important buffer between it and the PRC.¹ So long as this deployment is maintained, one important link to the U.S. nuclear shield is provided. Defense of South Korea is at the same time defense of Japan.

Other direct military threats include land and sea attack by the Soviet Union from the north and nuclear missile and air attack by either the Soviet Union or the PRC. While it may be possible for the United States to provide direct support to Japan against an overt invasion, the missile and bomber threat would have to be dealt with by countering with U.S. missiles and bombers against targets within the USSR and PRC. Deterrence of any of these kinds of threats thus depends, in the absence of a Japanese nuclear capability, upon U.S. tactical nuclear and theater nuclear systems, principally land and carrier based aircraft and SLBMs. ICBMs are also available, but their use could be highly escalatory and their military utility questionable. The operational problems in carrying out any of these kinds of operations in coordination with Japanese defense forces can present great difficulties.

The current Middle East embargoes on production and distribution of oil highlight Japan's vulnerability to an additional kind of military threat: naval blockade, terrorist activity, local insurgency or other actions of forces remote from Japan which interfere with Japan's critical dependence on imports and exports. Here again, Japan must rely on the United States and it will be generally within U.S. interests to provide assistance to the extent feasible.

The possibility that Japan may decide to acquire its own nuclear capability has been mentioned earlier. Should this occur, the need to coordinate U.S. and Japanese planning probably would become more urgent

¹ To a lesser degree the U.S. presence in South Korea may be viewed as a degree of protection against Soviet encroachment from that direction.

if Japan's nuclear forces are to be made effective and yet not become a Japanese trigger for U.S. nuclear involvement. Depending upon U.S. attitudes, cooperation could include not only military planning, but exchange of nuclear information and technology (such as nuclear surety devices and methods) as permitted by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and assistance in related military technologies (such as target acquisition and communications).

Whether Japan acquires its own nuclear capability or not, the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence and defense on behalf of Japan needs to be made more explicit. U.S. forces in and commitments toward Korea and U.S. forces located in Japan now provide visible symbols of U.S. commitment for the defense of Japan. In the face of Japanese doubts regarding the solidarity of U.S. nuclear support, however, it may be desirable to indicate more positively the extent to which other U.S. tactical, theater and strategic nuclear forces, particularly SLBMs and strategic aircraft, could be utilized as part of the deterrent umbrella protecting Japan against both the Soviet Union and the PRC. This could entail understandings negotiated at the political level, joint military (including nuclear) planning, assistance in training for nuclear warfare and civil defense, and joint command arrangements. If Japan does acquire its own nuclear weapon capability, the coordination of planning and training should become more detailed.

Lacking a formalized political-military structure comparable to NATO, such measures, even on an ad hoc basis, would give evidence of the link to U.S. nuclear capability. If so, the tactical application of nuclear weapons against invading forces (including possible use of strategic bombers) would be a principal deterrent to nonnuclear aggression, and the use of theater nuclear forces (primarily SLBMs) would be a principal deterrent to nuclear attack.

In view of Japan's sensitivity to pressures from its neighboring nuclear powers, it appears desirable to visibly and credibly link U.S. nuclear and nonnuclear forces closely to Japan's interests in deterrence, protection against coercion, protection of merchant shipping and homeland defense.

5. Considerations Affecting Force Relationships

In seeking to improve force relationships for theaters other than Europe, the principles discussed earlier for NATO must be viewed in light of the additional complexities of multipolarity and nuclear proliferation briefly discussed above. Nevertheless, the structuring of force relationships should be guided by the same basic rules. The combined U.S.-NATO force structure exemplifies the Total Force Concept in a much higher order of development than exists elsewhere. The pattern for Europe serves as a point of departure for other theaters.

The following guidelines in particular highlight considerations which need to be taken into account in relating theater forces other than NATO within a global force posture.¹

a. Deterrent Emphasis

As with NATO the principal role of theater forces is conflict deterrence and coercion resistance. The possibility of peripheral conflicts (in which major power vital interests are not directly at stake) is greater outside Europe; for these conflicts nuclear deterrence has little or no credibility, and reliance must be placed on indigenous forces and the credibility of links to U.S. conventional support. Similarly for conflicts in which vital interests are in jeopardy and hence where a nuclear confrontation could arise, the full force of combined strategic and theater force deterrence undoubtedly has a lower credibility elsewhere than in Europe. where deterrence is more institutionalized through long historical precedence, firm national declarations, and a well structured force hierarchy.

Credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the eyes of our non-NATO allies and adversaries will rest more upon the warfighting component of deterrence than upon punitive deterrence. Military means to this end are forward deployments and bases, arrangements for joint planning

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For a discussion of force posture and force characteristics which would pertain to implementation of these guidelines, see R. B. Foster, et al., "Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis," *op. cit.*, especially Chapters XII and XIII of Volume 2, and Chapters II and X of Volume 3.

and mutual assistance, force structures which visibly draw upon higher level theater reinforcement in the vertical continuum, and the capability for rapid projection of air, sea and land combat power to areas remote from continental U.S. The role of nuclear forces is not fundamentally different in other theaters, but the dependence that can be placed on the deterrent coupling between theater forces and strategic nuclear forces would appear to be less than for Europe.

b. Economy of Total Force

Economy of total force, where total force is both U.S. and non-U.S. elements, is a precept of the Nixon Total Force Concept. As with NATO, this must be accomplished by increasing the efficiency of combat power and the cross-utility and flexibility of forces for mutual reinforcement in the vertical and lateral force continuums. Force flexibility is necessary to cope with the wide variety of contingencies, the nature of which cannot easily be anticipated. Credibility of warfighting capability, including tactical nuclear capability, is essential. For theaters other than Europe, however, the great disparity between modern U.S. forces and more rudimentary indigenous forces presents special problems.

In planning for burden sharing under the Total Force Concept, it is clearly intended that U.S. combat power be projected from bases and with weapon systems remote from the zone of combat to the fullest extent possible. Deterrent effectiveness rests largely on the credibility of theater forces, or if needed, strategic forces, to project conventional or nuclear power from outside the battle area. However, experience in Korea and Vietnam indicates there are limits to the military effectiveness of U.S. air and naval power in supporting conventionally equipped indigenous ground forces. Options for the use of Army and Marine forces in non-combat support role or to provide advanced technology support in direct combat must therefore be developed. The discontinuity between indigenous ground forces and high technology U.S. air and missile firepower must be bridged with other more direct support.

c. Forward Deployment

The forward deployments and forward bases which the United States now maintains in the Pacific area provide visibility and credibility of deterrence in the same manner as do deployments in Europe. In particular, the forward deployment of nuclear capable forces provides strong cement for the U.S. nuclear commitment, most notably for the protection of Japan. Although the extent of U.S. forward basing and deployment is receding, the evidence of commitment must be preserved through continued force presence, military assistance, joint planning and other actions. Improved ability to rapidly deploy tailored forces and to project firepower from remote locations will have to compensate for reduced forward peacetime deployments. These capabilities will in turn be dependent upon strategic and theater surveillance, warning and intelligence capabilities.

d. Relationships in the Lateral Force Continuum

Reinforcing relationships in the lateral force continuum, that is, between allied and U.S. forces at various points in contact with adversaries, are likely to be critical. The multiplicity of national interests and the capability of the Soviet Union and the PRC to project military power at a variety of locations increases the possibility that conflict, or threat of conflict, will occur simultaneously at widely separated points. Lateral reinforcement, and hence deterrence in the lateral continuum, both peacetime and intrawar, must fall largely to U.S. forces. Nuclear weapons in the hands of Japan and India could well be a stabilizing factor against the lateral spread of conflict, provided U.S. force capabilities are related to these possibilities, and in the case of Japan, coordinated or integrated.

e. Force Survivability

Force survivability is essential for credibility of deterrence. This includes the necessity to retain reserve forces to be withheld for influencing the conduct of operations and termination of conflict. It also includes the necessity, where vital U.S. interests are at stake, to operate as dual capable forces able to transition from conventional to

nuclear operations. In this regard a particularly difficult aspect is survivability and utility in nuclear warfare of non-U.S. ground forces which may not have been trained to operate in a nuclear war. This highlights once again the importance of relating U.S. and allied forces and of reducing discontinuities in U.S. and non-U.S. capabilities.

f. Command and Control

Command and control of U.S. forces must be coordinated or integrated with that of allied forces if Total Force is to be effective. This aspect of alliance deterrence and warfare has historically presented critical shortcomings. Highly centralized political control on a bilateral or multilateral partnership basis is likely to be required. Control and coordination at the tactical level similarly present special problems. Should tactical nuclear warfare become necessary, control and coordination may present especially difficult problems. On a unilateral basis, the United States can make prior preparations regarding the procedural and mechanical means for selective nuclear releases, but option diversity for tactical nuclear warfare could well be more restrictive than for NATO.

g. Civil Damage

Both in Europe and other theaters, reduction of collateral civil damage is a matter of prime importance in both conventional and nuclear warfare. U.S. operations in Southeast Asia and the employment of nuclear weapons against Japan in World War II serve to magnify the issue within the United States and in Asian countries. Weapons and theater force options will have to be designed with minimization of civil damage acutely in mind. The utility of theater level nuclear and nonnuclear weapons delivered from a distance will be limited unless accuracy and control can be improved over current capabilities. The limitation in military effectiveness of air and sea power for support of local non-U.S. forces, mentioned above, is paralleled by a limitation in their capability for discriminate delivery of firepower.

6. Force Relationship Differences Between Europe and Other Theaters

While the principles which should govern force relationships in other theaters are in the broad sense roughly equivalent to those that apply to Europe, there are significant differences in the working of deterrence and defense. To summarize, the following aspects of theaters other than Europe differ from the NATO case in regard to specifics of global force posture integration:

- The multi-dimensional nature of the nuclear and conventional threat, friendly and allied interests, and U.S. interests.
- The greater geographical discontinuity between potential points of conflict and diversity of the potential forms of warfare, including the possibility of sub-theater peripheral conflicts.
- The greater differential between the military capabilities of U.S. and allied forces.
- The less structured, less institutionalized hierarchy of forces.
- The less formal, visible, credible and precedent-based commitment to nuclear deterrence and defense.
- The lower credibility and lower dependence upon the punitive deterrence of strategic nuclear forces and greater dependence upon counter-military deterrence of theater forces.
- The greater reliance upon the deployment and projection of U.S. military power from continental U.S. and other locations remote from the scene of conflict.

VI STRATEGY GUIDELINES

A. The Changing International System

1. Characteristics of the New Milieu

The concept of a rigid bipolar world, with most of the elements of power concentrated in two rival centers, was always an oversimplification of reality in that many nations existed independently of the two superpowers. However, in a military sense bipolarity was an accurate description of the first twenty or so years of the postwar period. Most of the power of the world, whether measured in nuclear weapons, gross national product, trained military manpower or technological development, was concentrated in the United States and the USSR. Each dominated rival alliance systems; the European allies of each contributed less to the strength of the superpowers than to legitimizing their roles as the politically dominant powers in Europe.¹ Outside of Europe, the client states of the superpowers were, on the whole, much weaker; they accepted aid and, in some cases, joined in alliance with one or the other of the two great powers. Their contributions to the alliance, however, with but several exceptions, were primarily territorial in nature and consisted of such things as landing rights, bases, and ports and other facilities. They had neither the material wealth, the trained manpower nor the technology to contribute to the rival superpowers; they were consumers rather than producers of power and looked to their respective alliances for protection, occasionally against the rival superpower but more frequently against hostile neighbors.

While the nuclear strategic balance is now and will continue to be dominated by Moscow and Washington for the remainder of the decade and beyond, this bipolar pattern of international relations has been supplanted by a more complex set of interstate relations. It is usual to describe this new situation as multipolarity, to distinguish it from the previous concept of a bipolar world.

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This, of course, was much more true of Eastern than Western Europe. Many West European countries had developed strong economies by the middle 1950s.

A multipolar world, as the name implies, is one with several rather than just two centers of power. In the present case, five centers can be identified: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan and West Europe. Each of these five centers contains much of the potential necessary for participating on a global basis in military, political and economic relationships. However, because this potential has not been actualized in all five cases, the system still contains elements of bipolarity and is only imperfectly multipolar. From the nuclear strategic sense, for example, despite China's nuclear development and the nuclear forces of Britain and France, the strategic equation is and will remain for some time to come dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. In terms of political power, Western Europe is not and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future able to act in a concerted and unified fashion toward the outside world. Properly speaking, while collectively Western Europe possesses all the assets to be a superpower, the lack of European unity precludes a truly independent role in world politics for Europe. Japan, on the other hand, does not have military power even remotely proportionate to its other elements of power; Japan, therefore, like Europe, cannot be a completely independent actor in the system.

From an economic point of view, China is much less of a center of power than are the other four. This is not likely to change within a decade, although it is to be expected that China will continue to develop its resources and will eventually participate more fully in world trade and economic relationships.

While there are no other nations likely to become the sixth world power center, there are emerging at the present time several candidates for regional great power status. Prominent among these are Brazil in Latin America, Iran in the Persian Gulf, and India and Indonesia in Asia. Increasingly, the global powers will need to take into account the postures of these regional powers in determining their world-wide military, political and economic policies.

Other nations will be unable within the time frame of this study to greatly affect world political and military events. A few other states, however, will be of increasing economic importance as suppliers

of vitally needed minerals, raw materials and other resources. Oil-producing states in particular, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya, will be increasingly important to the major industrial nations and will have political influence very greatly disproportionate to the other attributes of power which they possess. Accordingly, the political postures of these nations will become critical and they will be the targets for influence and possible subversion by the major world states.

Less fortunately endowed Third World nations are likely to become still poorer relative to the rest of the world--the gap between the have and have-not nations will continue to widen in the decade ahead.

2. Implications for Global Force Posture

a. U.S. Relations with Other Great Powers

Throughout most of the post World War II period, the principal threat to the United States was the Soviet Union. This is still the case but the emergence of the other three power centers has affected and will continue to impinge upon the central Soviet-American relationship. While previously U.S. defense decisions could be based primarily on countering the Soviet threat, in the future defense planning will have to recognize the possibility that various combinations of great powers could occur. For example, theoretically at least four different threat situations involving the United States can be assumed possible, although, to be sure, not equally likely. The first is from the Soviet Union alone, the second from a USSR-China combination, the third is that of a U.S.-Chinese combination against the Soviet Union and the fourth is a U.S.-Soviet combination against China. If to these combinations is added a neutral or participatory Japan and Europe, the possible various groupings become quite large.

In the real world, U.S. defense planning must make certain basic assumptions. Among these are the following: (1) the United States and the USSR will remain the two principal protagonists and will not become allies against any of the other global powers; (2) China is not likely to become a military ally of either the United States or the Soviet Union; and (3) Western Europe and Japan are likely to remain American allies.

If these assumptions are true, they will have certain implications for the U.S. force posture in the decade ahead. These are as follows: (1) U.S. forces have to be structured primarily in terms of the Soviet threat and secondarily with the Chinese threat in mind; (2) U.S. forces need not be sufficient to cope simultaneously with wars with both the USSR and China; (3) the United States will continue to participate in joint defense with Western Europe and Japan and these two power centers will continue to rely on U.S. strategic forces for protection against nuclear blackmail; and (4) the United States will need to continue to have the kind of military posture which makes credible U.S. determination to defend Europe and Japan. Additionally, the United States, probably within the next decade, will need to reassess its position on supporting independent nuclear forces for Europe and Japan. Such a reassessment will need to include consideration of the relationships which should appertain between U.S. strategic nuclear forces and nuclear forces of Western Europe and Japan.¹

In terms of war between the pentagonal powers, it is generally thought that this is increasingly unlikely. As between the United States and the USSR, most observers expect that the present "limited adversary" relationship will continue throughout the decade. As the name connotes, this relationship contains a mixture of competition and cooperation. On the one hand, the superpowers will continue to be rivals for prestige and influence and continue to confront each other in rival alliance systems. On the other hand, however, some cooperation in terms of arms limitations, trade and investment, and conflict management to prevent local crises from escalating out of control are expected to continue. Soviet pressures on Western Europe, intended to secure its neutralization, will certainly continue and perhaps be intensified as Moscow attempts to exploit its emerging strategic superiority over the United States. The U.S. position will continue to be defensive; while the aim of the USSR will be to fragment the American-European-Japanese alliance, the goal of the United States will continue to be its strengthening and integration.

U.S. force postures, accordingly, must be structured to strengthen and enhance U.S.-European and U.S.-Japanese defensive arrangements. In Europe this means retention of at least some U.S. ground forces.

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Should this occur, it will require revision of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to which the United States is a signatory.

As discussed in Chapter V above, linkages between U.S. forces must be maintained to strengthen credibility and extend deterrence. In the Far East, maintenance of at least some U.S. troops in South Korea is necessary to symbolize the American commitment to the defense of Japan. The present widespread notion that the United States does not intend to remain a Pacific power must be refuted; it is useful to repeat this (as President Nixon and others have done), but beyond verbal assurances, visible troop presence is required. Tactical nuclear capability in South Korea should be maintained.

Outside of Europe, the principal area of superpower competition is likely to be the Middle East. As is the case in Europe, the United States will be on the defensive, attempting to prevent an aggressive Soviet government from making still further inroads in the Arab world and establishing itself as the great power arbiter of Middle Eastern developments. The Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area is likely to be an arena where the USSR will attempt to become the dominant power and to exclude Western influence. Soviet motives are not only to influence Arab use of oil and oil revenues as weapons against the West and Japan but also to counter possible Chinese inroads in the region. American defensive measures may require the establishment of an Indian Ocean fleet (possibly building from the nucleus of the present three-ship force stationed in Bahrain), continued military aid to Iran, and possibly some measures to ensure the viability and independence of Pakistan.

b. U.S. Relations with Regional Powers

As the decade nears an end, certain other states should emerge as regional great powers, capable of conducting military operations on a significant scale in their immediate areas. Among the obvious candidates for regional great power status are Brazil in Latin America, India and Indonesia in Asia, and Iran in the Persian Gulf. Two of these states (Brazil and Iran) are American allies, one (India) is allied (albeit possibly less closely) to the Soviet Union, and one (Indonesia) is neutral. All of these states, except India, can be expected to resist communist influence and are not likely to provide the USSR

with bases and other facilities. Accordingly, it may be feasible, in an era of increasing constraints on U.S. forces, to encourage these emerging power centers (again except for India) to assume a larger peace-keeping role in their areas of the world. The American role could be limited in many cases to providing military assistance, including training, to the armed forces of these regional powers. As appropriate, other types of military interactions might include joint armed forces exercises, research and development cooperation, and technological assistance.

c. U.S. Relations with Other Countries

As a result of the policies of containment and forward defense which the United States has pursued for many years, the United States is now committed, in some degree or another, to the defense of forty-two countries around the globe. The Nixon Administration assumed office with the intention of making certain that no new commitments, unless strongly justified, would be entered into. Existing commitments would be honored; however, it was expected that allied nations would assume a greater share of the defense burden. Philosophically, the U.S. posture was intended to move gradually from defense of any non-communist nations threatened with communist takeover to a more selective policy based upon an appraisal of U.S. vital interests. It was to be expected, in implementing a more selective policy, that certain commitments, not necessarily fully consistent with a more realistic appraisal of U.S. interests, would remain. In the next decade these will gradually fade away and a policy which limits American commitments to countries of vital U.S. interest will become fully operative.

It is difficult but necessary to define U.S. vital interests in order to determine U.S. commitments and to provide guidance for defense planning. Just as it was necessary to develop "sufficiency" criteria for strategic force planning, so it is now necessary to develop "commitments" criteria to determine the future U.S. forward defense posture. As noted earlier, it would be logical to develop close relations, where feasible, with those middle-range or regional great powers, such as Iran, so that they will be able to undertake the major role of peace-keeping in their

respective areas. Beyond these regional powers, there would appear to be only several countries outside of the NATO structure where the United States, in a world of increasing constraints, ought to be committed to defend if necessary. Prominent candidates, in addition to countries in the western hemisphere, are South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines in Asia. In the Persian Gulf area, Iran and (because of its oil and on the assumption that good relations will be reestablished) Saudi Arabia are countries whose independence is of vital interest to the United States. In the Middle East, Israel's independence will remain an American obligation. In Africa, no active defense policy is required. However, it is expected that the present close relationship with Ethiopia will be maintained.

d. Security Assistance and Total Force Planning

Defense planners should review international security assistance to bring it into line with a more selective defense posture. In the past, ten countries (all of which, except Israel and Jordan, are located on the communist periphery), have received nearly all of the security assistance funds. Some of these countries, such as South Korea, will continue to be important to the United States and hence will in the future receive substantial military aid. Some others, however, will not be vital once a more selective policy is fully implemented and their security assistance allocations should reflect their decreased role in U.S. defense planning.

Closely related to security assistance is the problem of Total Force planning. The Total Force Concept is intended to integrate and make the optimum use of all available resources of both the United States and its allies in developing the kinds of forces required to deter communist aggression. The United States will provide these allies with security assistance; they, in turn, will assume increased responsibilities for their own defense. This concept should provide a framework for a broad range of matters relating to joint security interests and should not be limited to indigenous force contributions. Consideration should be given, where appropriate, to the capabilities of allies to provide base rights

and other facilities, transit, overflight and staging rights, and, possibly, logistic support for U.S. and indigenous forces. The United States, in turn, would provide a nuclear shield against superpower aggression and a commitment to furnish appropriate support by U.S. general purpose forces in the event of aggression.

While the Total Force Concept is potentially of great benefit, it has not as yet been fully implemented. It should be a priority task of defense planning to proceed further in these directions. In doing so, it must be kept in mind that the concept to be viable must be selective and based upon sound defense criteria. There is little point in providing large amounts of security assistance and in engaging in Total Force planning with those Third World countries whose security will not be considered vital to the United States in the future. Defense planning in all its aspects must be oriented to a much more selective policy than that which has characterized the past.

B. The Strategic Nuclear Balance

1. Implications of Parity

Strategic nuclear parity with the Soviets is seldom discussed without the qualification of being approximate. Indeed, in terms of numbers, Soviet strategic strength is increasingly being described as superior to that of the United States. Under the May 1972 Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms, the Soviets were permitted to have higher levels than the United States in ICBMs and SLBMs. SALT ONE accorded the USSR a quantitative superiority of some 60% in fixed ICBMs and about 1/3 more operational SLBM launchers. It also recognized the overwhelming Soviet superiority in throwweight. Moreover, in the areas in which the United States had an advantage--in deployed SLBMs, MIRVs, better warheads and guidance, and other qualitative elements--the Soviets continued to have the opportunity to catch up. As a result, the Soviets were able to test recently a whole new generation of ICBMs and SLBMs with much bigger yields. Furthermore, in spite of the strong American unilateral declaration linked to the SALT ONE accord that the United States would regard the development of

mobile land-based ICBMs as inconsistent with the SALT goals, the Soviets may be developing a mobile ICBM. Moreover, the Soviet testing of MIRVs in the summer of 1973 indicates that, in light of their greater number of delivery vehicles and payload, they could in a few years achieve a significant margin of overall strategic superiority, including an advantage in counterforce capability, over the United States unless the United States makes similar advances. All this calls into question whether the American strategic offensive forces continue to meet the sufficiency criteria.

In order to find an acceptable basis for a SALT TWO agreement, the existing imbalances need to be corrected. It is not certain whether this is possible. Still, the United States is not without some leverage. As a minimum, the United States could conduct the SALT TWO round without the notion that it has to arrive at an agreement. No agreement may be better than any agreement. Paradoxically, with such an attitude the United States may have a better chance to arrive at an acceptable SALT TWO formula.

Secondly, the United States could link economic issues to the SALT negotiations. The USSR needs to trade with the United States; it wants U.S. agricultural products; it needs American technology; and it seeks credits from the United States. As long as the Soviet Union continues its strategic and other military expansion, the United States would, particularly if it would extend economic credits to the USSR, be indirectly subsidizing the Soviet arms buildup. If the Soviets want the United States to support them with their economic development, the United States should make this contingent upon Soviet willingness to limit their strategic buildup. The Soviets know how to link economic policies to their strategic goals. They have repeatedly encouraged the Arabs to use oil as an instrument of foreign policy; the Soviets have told the Arabs that they had the power to turn the arms of the NATO powers into a heap of "rusting metal." There is no reason why the United States should not apply a similar linkage of economic policies to strategic policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in SALT.

Thirdly, the United States at this stage still has the edge over the USSR in technology, even though its lead is vanishing. If the United States wishes to prevent the strategic balance from tilting further against the United States, it needs to pursue a vigorous military R&D program.

If the Soviet Union, in addition to having a quantitative advantage in strategic arms, should also succeed in overcoming the U.S. qualitative lead, it would truly become the world's number one military power. This would have profound implications for U.S. commitments abroad, particularly for the U.S. commitment to the defense and security of Western Europe. Perhaps the most important aspect of the SALT ONE accords was their impact on U.S. relations with the NATO allies. In the eyes of the U.S. allies parity and its ratification in SALT tended to neutralize the American strategic forces for anything but a direct attack on the United States. Allied concerns were exacerbated by the June 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Under the June 1973 accord the superpowers agreed to consult with each other if they got into a confrontation which risked nuclear war. Unfortunately, the U.S. allies in Europe perhaps perceived this as an agreement not to use nuclear weapons without consultation with the Soviets first and, therefore, as another step toward the decoupling of the U.S. nuclear forces--strategic and tactical--from the defense of Western Europe. At the same time, the agreement was regarded in West European capitals as an effort to establish a superpower world condominium.

To avoid any further strains in the Alliance, the United States needs not only to consult more closely with its allies, but to formulate a joint U.S.-West European strategy which could serve as a yardstick against which the strategic arms negotiations with the Soviets could be conducted. The U.S. objectives in SALT TWO need to reflect such a common strategy. If this strategy takes time to develop, the United States may wish to seek a delay in the strategic arms discussions, and as a minimum, may try to play for time and not seek any agreement. To restore the credibility of the U.S. strategic forces in their extended deterrence role, it is vital that these forces clearly have some counterforce capability. The United States should avoid any agreement in SALT TWO that would prevent it

from having such a capability. In U.S. R&D programs it is important to concentrate on providing the U.S. strategic forces with a counterforce capability, including accurate MIRVs. Furthermore, because coupling is in essence a political perception, the United States needs to make abundantly clear in public and private meetings that it remains committed to the defense of Western Europe and other allies.

The U.S. nuclear guarantee will be nevertheless increasingly in doubt if a linkage is not preserved by forces deployed in the theaters where allies are threatened. The case for the presence of general purpose, dual-capable, U.S. land, sea and air forces in NATO (including the presence of theater nuclear forces, and with external strategic forces available) is clearly established by the vital U.S. interests in Europe and the U.S. commitment to the Alliance. In the Far East, the key ally is Japan. Deployment requirements center on making credible the U.S. nuclear guarantee to Japan. As discussed in Chapter V, land, sea and air forces, with strategic, theater nuclear and tactical nuclear, as well as conventional forces in and near Japan and South Korea would help to extend deterrence through all levels of potential conflict involving Japan (and other allies as well). Beyond having some counterforce capability, credible extended deterrence depends, at a minimum, upon maintaining deployed forces in Europe and Asia.

2. Nuclear Proliferation

One of the potential consequences of a reduced credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee is that nations which have counted on it may feel the need to develop their own nuclear forces. Japan, for example, faced with the possibility of nuclear or other forms of attack from neighboring Russia and China, is already considering the advantages and disadvantages of acquiring some nuclear capability.¹ There are considerations other than the

¹ See "Implications of Indian and/or Japanese Nuclear Proliferation for U.S. Defense Policy Planning," *op. cit.*

credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee--such as the desire to be consulted in major power deliberations on international problems, a status that probably would be attained if Japan were a nuclear power--which will enter into Japan's decision on nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear relationship, however, will continue to be a very important factor. Significantly, Japan has apparently "turned the corner" on the constitutional issue regarding possession of nuclear weapons. A 1970 White Paper declared that defensive nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional. Apparently the decision about nuclear weapons will be made on a pragmatic political-military basis, despite the emotional overtones acquisition of nuclear weapons has for the Japanese. There are many unknowns in the implications of this contingency beyond the scope of this discussion, but two generalizations regarding U.S. policy can be made: (1) Japan's dilemma is made more difficult by uncertainty, which suggests the need for the United States to make more explicit the U.S. nuclear guarantee--by word and deed; and (2) the U.S. attitude toward a Japanese decision to acquire nuclear weapons should remain flexible. This is to suggest that there are arguments for as well as against nuclear proliferation.

Whether enlargement of the number of nuclear powers would increase or decrease international stability, and lead to more or fewer conflicts below the nuclear level, cannot be known in advance. The nuclear superpowers, however, cannot fully control proliferation. For the United States, a concrete step to avoid the uncertainties that would flow from proliferation is to enhance the credibility of its own extended deterrent.

3. Strategic Arms Limitation

A key factor in preserving U.S. nuclear deterrence is the outcome of strategic arms limitation talks. As noted above, SALT ONE seems to have given the Soviets political, military and psychological advantages. Furthermore, Soviet behavior since the signing of the SALT ONE documents does not seem compatible with at least the spirit of the June 1973 Nixon-Brezhnev declaration that "both sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the

C. Economic Interdependence and Global Force Posture

Monetary interdependence, a rapidly growing level of world trade and an ever greater competition for scarce resources are causing the world to become increasingly integrated. The role of economic factors, therefore, in U.S. foreign policy is assuming greater importance than heretofore. This rising influence of economic aspects of foreign policy places new opportunities and demands on U.S. national security postures toward the Soviet Union, Western Europe and Japan, and the developing countries of the Third World.

1. The Soviet Union

One of the major reasons for the Soviet pursuit of detente with the United States, Western Europe and Japan is the USSR's desire to obtain capital credits, to acquire technology, and to import food and agricultural products from these advanced countries for its internal development. Russia's need for capital, agricultural products and technology provides other nations with a potentially advantageous negotiating position. A possible course of action is to negotiate further trade agreements with the USSR on their own economic merits, with the expectation that the resulting economic interdependence might lead to increased cooperation in other fields. This cooperation could result in an overall reduction of tensions and lead to the creation of an atmosphere more conducive to arms control agreements. The Soviets, however, have thus far succeeded in negotiating advantageous economic agreements while continuing to increase and consolidate their strong political-military position. They show little willingness to allow economic detente to spill over into other areas.

A better policy which the advanced countries (particularly the United States) can adopt is to link economic agreements to Soviet political and military concessions. By using its economic power to induce the USSR to cooperate in arms negotiations in order to obtain American capital, technology and food, the United States might then be able to redress the military balance without sharply increasing the defense budget. If the Soviets chose not to cooperate in this manner, the United States would

have a clear indication of Soviet intentions and could cease providing its adversary with unilateral advantages. The USSR is not an underdeveloped country; the United States in any event has no moral obligation to provide credits to the Soviet Union without concessions in return. Equally important is the consideration that the United States, by providing credits to the Soviet Union, would in effect be helping to finance the Soviet arms buildup.

2. Western Europe and Japan

The economic relationships between the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan continue to be beset by severe problems. These include recurring monetary instability, balance of payments deficits and trade problems. The rising trend in economic nationalism throughout the alliance has exacerbated and intensified the pressure on the entire fabric of the alliance system by decreasing cooperation in other areas. On the one hand, the United States is increasingly insistent that Western Europe make economic concessions in exchange for the continued American financial and troop contributions to the allies; on the other, the Europeans adamantly maintain that the political-military issues be treated separately from the economic issues. Moreover, the divergent interests of NATO-Europe and the United States concerning oil supplies and policy toward the Middle East conflict have further strained the alliance. Western Europe's dependence on oil has been a major factor in the refusal of the allies to support the United States in its Middle Eastern policy. Secretary of State Kissinger has attempted to dampen the acrimony of the immediate situation and restore some unity by proposing that the allies begin a cooperative effort in research and development of alternative energy resources.

It is vital that satisfactory solutions to these economic problems be developed before they irreparably damage the Western alliances. A comprehensive "code of conduct" for allied economic relations (and for the world in general) needs to be developed in order to prevent these problems from degenerating into economic warfare. The formulation of such a code poses the same type of difficult problems which have been encountered in developing codes of conduct for international politics and military relations, but the effort needs to be made.

3. The Third World

For most of the countries of the Third World, the outlook is not bright. The economic gap between them and the developed nations will probably continue to grow throughout this decade. At the same time, the attention paid to their problems by the developed countries will decrease. However, for those Third World states which control critical supplies of oil and minerals, the future promises increasing economic and political power. The Persian Gulf oil producers provide the most vivid current example--their control of much of the world's oil reserves is being used to obtain political and economic concessions from some of the world's most powerful nations. Before the decade is out, other organizations of developing countries which export vital minerals, such as copper, tin, and lead, may be able to exert influence over the industrial world.

This situation creates two main problems for U.S. national security. First, although some of the oil-producing states are improving their military capabilities (such as Iran and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia), many are experiencing a rapid increase in their political and economic power without a commensurate increase in their ability to defend themselves. Kuwait and Abu Dhabi are particularly striking illustrations of this problem. Military weakness, along with internal instability and their importance as oil producers, makes these nations likely candidates for subversion and political coercion. The conservative Arab regimes are under increasing pressure from the radical governments and political organizations; the Chinese support for dissident elements, while not large, is growing; and along with an increasing diplomatic influence in the Middle East, the Soviet Union continues to augment its Mediterranean and Indian Ocean fleets. The combination of these factors makes some form of American military presence in the area desirable to aid in providing stability.

A second problem arises from the likelihood of future threats by the oil-producing countries to embargo shipments or to restrict production in order to obtain various political concessions. If the current use of this tactic to force the United States to change its policy toward Israel succeeds, the Arabs would likely be tempted to use their oil as a weapon

on a variety of other issues. Although the days of "gunboat diplomacy" by the great powers may be over, the United States cannot allow economic "blackmail" by militarily weak nations to take place with impunity. Accordingly, the use of force in crisis contingencies where U.S. vital interests are at stake must not be renounced, even though there are many practical constraints. The United States, therefore, must have the visible capability to intervene, if necessary, anywhere in the world. Such a posture will contribute materially to protecting America's vital interests.

4. Force Posture Implications

In the long run, economic interdependence may result in the realization that peaceful cooperation and competition is the only way all nations can benefit from the system. In the interim, however, interdependence reinforces the need for a credible U.S. military posture. Such a posture is inextricably intertwined with the ability to obtain desirable solutions to the variegated economic problems in American relations with the Soviet Union, allied countries and developing nations.

D. Future Role of Military Force

1. The Continued Relevance of Military Force

The fact that the maintenance of strong military forces will continue to be absolutely essential to undergird U.S. national security for the foreseeable future would be a truism not worth mentioning were it not for the increasingly frequent assertions to the contrary.¹

The principal arguments by adherents to this point of view that general war will not occur are: (1) no conceivable political or economic end would be sufficiently attractive to the nuclear powers to warrant the

¹ For example, in a recent article in the most prestigious journal dealing with U.S. foreign policy the author declares that "the day of general wars ... may ... be past..." See L. J. Halle, "Does War Have a Future?" *Foreign Affairs*, p. 33 (October 1973).

costs and risks associated with even conventional general war, to say nothing of strategic nuclear conflict; (2) the destructiveness of modern weapons beyond the point where they have political feasibility in active use has deprived war of its "legitimacy" as an instrument of state policy; (3) the spread of political democracy has and will continue to inhibit resort to wars by democratic governments because of the increasing difficulty in mobilizing the requisite public support; (4) international economic interdependence on an unprecedented and increasing scale makes wars less feasible than in the past; (5) the acceptance of the concept of national sovereignty with the implication that strong states do not have the "right" to coerce weaker nations; and (6) the existence of a global communications network which "brings war into the living rooms of the world" and hence turns the spotlight on "aggression" and reduces the viability of "gunboat diplomacy."

These are compelling and cogent reasons why general strategic war is very improbable and why even conventional war between the great powers is less likely to occur than in the past. Paradoxically, however, it cannot be concluded that, because great-power war is less likely, military forces can be dispensed with. On the contrary, many of the reasons why war is less likely depend for their validity (for example, the argument that war is not politically feasible because of the destructiveness of modern weapons) on the existence of strong military forces. In fact, this is the principal tenet of the concept of deterrence.

There are other reasons why it will continue to be vital to retain strong armed forces. Authoritarian governments, like those of the Soviet Union and the PRC, are much less likely to be constrained by public opinion than democratic societies like the United States. Nor do concepts such as the immorality of the resort to force by strong states against weak nations act to inhibit the behavior of the USSR to the same extent as they do in democratic societies.¹

¹

The Brezhnev doctrine, for example, explicitly puts forward the "right" of the Soviet Union to use force in Eastern Europe. See C. T. Baroch, *The Soviet Doctrine of Sovereignty* (Chicago: American Bar Association, 1970).

Below the strategic nuclear level, there is no evidence to indicate that wars are becoming less frequent. While statistics vary according to different definitions of war, there is general agreement that war of some magnitude has existed somewhere in the world almost continuously since 1945. The United States, in fact, has conducted large-scale military operations in thirteen of the past twenty-eight years.¹ While it is possible that the next decade may see less occasion for the United States to employ armed force, this is by no means a certainty.

It should be emphasized also that the United States cannot make its national security policy on the basis of probabilities: to justify sharp reductions in military capabilities it must be argued that it is nearly certain that the United States will not require them, not that it is merely less likely.

The direct application of military force is but one (albeit the ultimate) type of policy instrument which a nation-state may employ to support its foreign policy objectives. Such policy instruments can be conveniently classified into three main categories--coercive, persuasive, and attractive.

Coercive instruments of national power include the actual or threatened use of military force to obtain the desired concessions from other nations. Military actions can take the form of strategic alerts, mobilization and even so-called demonstration or exemplary attacks.² Included on the lower end of the violence spectrum are such actions as shows of force (or "gunboat diplomacy"), subversion and terrorism. On the non-violent level, a state can use a variety of economic policies, such as boycotting vital supplies of strategic minerals (e.g., oil) to others, dumping commodities on the world market, and currency manipulation, as coercive instruments of diplomacy.

¹ In Korea from 1950 to 1953 and in Indochina from 1964 to 1973.

² H. Kahn conceptualized a 44-rung ladder which logically distinguished various modes of utilizing military power. The first rung was called "Ostensible Crisis" and the forty-fourth "Spasm or Insensate War." See *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, p. 39 (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965).

Persuasive instruments include conventional diplomacy and other activities such as propaganda and cultural exchange. The objective of conventional diplomacy is to persuade leaders of other countries to undertake (or refrain from) certain actions or to adopt (or not to adopt) particular policies. Propaganda and cultural exchange, in contrast to diplomacy, are aimed at the people rather than the leaders of foreign states. The objective is to create favorable images of one's country and culture in the minds of people; it is hoped that the people, in turn, will influence their leaders to be favorably disposed.

Attractive instruments of foreign policy include economic foreign aid, technical assistance, trade, development loans, and other economic measures which assist the recipient country. In addition to strengthening the aided nation, donor objectives may be to curry both favor and influence with the recipient.

Military foreign aid is a special kind of instrument of foreign policy that has been used extensively by both the USSR and the United States for many years. It is used as an attractive instrument of policy in terms of donor-recipient relationships. It can also be used as a coercive instrument to threaten countries which are rivals to the military aid recipient unless they pursue policies desired by the military aid donor state. The donor state can also use military aid to support dissident groups within a state and foster civil war.

Oil can also be employed as either an attractive or a coercive instrument of foreign policy. Currently (late 1973) the Arabs are using the oil weapon in an attempt to coerce the United States into adopting pro-Arab policies in the Middle East. The Arabs are also using their oil as an attractive instrument of policy, to persuade other nations to adopt pro-Arab stances.

Should the USSR gain dominant influence in the Persian Gulf and obtain control of substantial amounts of Middle East oil, Moscow could use oil as both an attractive and a coercive instrument. By offering oil to Western Europe, for example, the Soviets could provide still another reason for European neutralization. Against China, on the other hand, the USSR could continue its refusal to sell oil and attempt, in fact, to deny China access to Arabian oil. Japan could also be presented with both oil inducements and oil threats to pursue pro-Soviet policies.

It seems likely that Soviet actions in aiding and perhaps encouraging the Arab attack on Israel in October 1973 were motivated at least partially by a desire to test the efficacy of the oil weapon and to drive a further wedge in the deteriorating relations between Europe and the United States.

Thus, in addition to deterrence and warfighting, U.S. military forces will be required for the political purpose of undergirding diplomacy and other instruments of national policy. The United States is now, and will remain, the principal obstacle to Soviet political domination of Europe and other adjacent areas such as the Middle East. Because of this, a "Japanese-type" approach to foreign policy is not feasible for the United States. The United States is a superpower and will have to behave like one, including retaining the requisite military forces, if world dominance is not to shift to the USSR. In addition to the political role of countering the USSR, American armed forces will be required to perform a variety of other political tasks. Among these will be to preserve U.S. access to vitally needed minerals and raw materials, to safeguard lines of communication, to support friendly governments, to protect American lives and property abroad in times of danger, and to encourage stability where required to advance American interests. Most of these tasks will be in the less developed world and are likely to become more important in the future as the world becomes increasingly interdependent economically.

2. Constraints on Military Forces

Three basic requirements for military forces are to deter, defend, and exert influence. If U.S. and allied forces could be made fully sufficient and credible, in theory they ought to deter aggression by any rational adversary. But because deterrence cannot be guaranteed in the face of the many unknowns in the real world, forces must be capable--and leaders must have the will--of defending against aggression if deterrence fails. Further, in the ongoing execution of national policy and support of national objectives, since the United States has vital interests in distant places, military forces have a role in the projection of U.S. and allied power and influence.

For any nation, and especially a democratic one, there are a number of constraints which limit what would otherwise be the optimum capabilities for meeting the requirements for military force. These include: (1) perception of the threat; (2) resource limitations; (3) technological constraints; (4) geographical factors; and (5) political constraints.

a. Threat Perception

The threat problem can be compared to the concept of insurance. Against a high risk to property or interests, one is prepared to buy insurance, even at considerable cost, to prevent a disastrous loss. If the risk is judged to be low, it would be uneconomical to over-insure. How seriously the United States and its allies regard the present and future threats to their survival and to their interests will determine how heavily they are willing to invest in protection against those threats. This is the "strategic reality" described by former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird in his FY 1973 posture statement.¹ The reality is that, although the Soviets and the Chinese continue to build up their military capabilities in all categories of arms, the people of the United States and its allies perceive that the risk of war is receding. The drawing of an appropriate line somewhere between the objective fact of expanding Soviet and Chinese military capabilities and the belief that these capabilities will not be used to attack the non-communist world is a matter of dealing with the constraint of threat perception. Put otherwise, those who want increased defense spending point to increased Soviet and Chinese capabilities while those who want to decrease defense spending allege that the threat has diminished or was exaggerated in the first place.

¹ DOD Report FY 73, p. 30.

b. Resource Limitations

Money and manpower are the ingredients of this constraint. As noted above, the United States has been reasonably consistent regarding the appropriate level of defense expenditure supportable in the current and foreseen domestic and international environment. This is a defense budget of about 30 percent of the total federal budget, representing some 6 percent of GNP, and an active-duty military manpower level on the order of two million. These figures are to some degree arbitrary; nations vary widely in the allocation of resources to defense. Israel, for example, spends more than 20 percent of its GNP on defense while Japan's defense burden is just over 1 percent of GNP.¹ The military manpower level in the United States is constrained by both the budget and the numbers available from a no-draft system. Additionally, it remains to be seen whether this system will provide an adequate quality level--leadership, morale, skills, motivation--in the military. The challenge posed by resource limitations for defense planners is to devise strategies and capabilities within this constraint that will meet national security requirements. If they cannot, then political decisions to ease the resource constraints will need to be made.

c. Technological Constraints

This factor has two aspects: (1) the limitations imposed by the state-of-the-art weaponry and the scope of military application of future technological developments; and (2) self-imposed limitations, as for example in the limits put on the amounts and kinds of research and development in the United States. In an earlier chapter it was noted that there is a potentially dangerous situation in the disparity of effort devoted to R&D by the United States and the Soviet Union.

d. Geography

Americans have taken some comfort in the fact that, as unwanted as its conflict involvement has been, it has all taken place far from the homeland. The 1962 Cuban missile crisis was a great shock to

¹ *The Military Balance 1973-74*, pp. 33, 52 (London: IISS, 1973).

many Americans, with its threat of actual damage within this country--some even hastily built backyard bomb shelters. Geography is thus both an advantage and a constraint. The constraint operates as a requirement to devote a significant portion of military resources to mobility assets, thus reducing what could otherwise be combat capabilities at the scene of battle. An important mission for U.S. forces is to protect both military lines of communication and America's extensive routes of commerce and trade. Even though the U.S. overseas base complex is shrinking, many bases will remain, and their remoteness increases the effort required to protect them. These distant obligations necessitated by the geography of U.S. interests induce an emotional reaction that bears upon national policy; a significant factor in the pressures being exerted today to reduce American overseas deployments is the simple desire "to bring the boys home" and a refusal to believe that events in faraway areas of the world can impact significantly on U.S. security.

e. Political Constraints

Political considerations are involved to some degree in all the foregoing constraints, but there are domestic and foreign political issues worthy of separate mention. The fulfillment of U.S. military commitments involves a trade-off between the domestic political cost of sustaining obligations and the international political repercussions that would ensue if the credibility of U.S. commitments falters. Bilateral negotiations between the United States and its traditional adversaries--e.g., SALT negotiations with the Soviets, normalization of relations with China--bring their own political gains, but tend to strain political relations with allies. Any shift in U.S. strategy, no matter how logical from a military point of view, cannot--or should not--be made without giving careful attention to the political constraints involved, as the United States learned when the Kennedy Administration introduced the NATO flexible response strategy.¹

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For the repercussions of this decision, see Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 98ff.

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E. Force Characteristics

The United States faces the difficult task of maintaining a credible global force posture with an overall U.S. military strength that has sharply declined over the past several years, at a time when the capabilities of the principal adversary, the USSR, have been steadily increasing. In such a situation, force characteristics take on particularly critical importance. Even with a more selective foreign policy, the United States has interests, responsibilities and commitments that are global in scope. This requires that the characteristics of its forces be such that there can be an effective relationship of forces (1) throughout all levels of potential conflict; (2) across the types of forces; and (3) from one theater to another. Further, there needs to be a rationalized set of relationships between U.S. and allied forces. This is a formidable set of requirements, difficult to achieve in the face of many constraints, but nevertheless necessary as a goal for force posture planning. One facet of this goal deserves special mention: the great variety of nuclear weapons available now and from future technological advances provides a highly flexible array of options for deterrence and warfighting. But in taking advantage of these options, discontinuity between nuclear and non-nuclear forces should be avoided. In the discussion below, although strategic forces and general purpose forces (which includes nuclear forces) are considered separately, it should not be implied that these two force categories are not inseparably linked.

1. Strategic Forces

a. Retaliatory Force Characteristics

In addition to the overall size of the strategic offensive force, to meet both targeting requirements and the political aspects of the strategic balance, such forces should fulfill as nearly as possible all elements of the criteria of survivability and military effectiveness.

Survivability is enhanced by concealment, mobility and protection. The latter may consist of site hardening or strategic defenses (ABM). The current TRIAD is a trade-off among these three aspects of survivability. Since no one weapon system can satisfy all criteria, it

will be necessary to continue to have such a weapons mix. However, because the most vulnerable of the three weapon systems is the fixed land-based ICBM, any future shift in the mix allowable by treaty should be away from the present preponderance of this system. The mobile ICBM, now being seriously reconsidered after its earlier rejection as not being cost-effective, is a good candidate to replace at least part of the fixed variety. But technology may provide other and more survivable strategic weapons in the future.

Weapon effectiveness depends upon accuracy, penetration ability, and optimization of payload. Continued R&D to improve performance in these areas is especially important in view of the inferior numerical missile ratio existing between the United States and the Soviet Union.

b. Characteristics for Other Roles for Strategic Forces

Strategic forces should not be limited in use to an all-out destruction role. The President has repeatedly stated the need for other options. Although existing strategic weapons (including land and sea-based missiles and aircraft-delivered weapons) can be used selectively, it may be possible to design a limited number of strategic weapons with unique characteristics for selective use, such as a particular counterforce role. It may also be possible to design a weapon that, because of its limited numbers or special characteristics, would not be viewed as a first strike weapon. Consideration of characteristics for a selective-use strategic weapon should emphasize the necessary special command and control arrangements.¹

¹

Selective use of nuclear weapons in war termination was the subject of a recent study by SRI. See B. McLennan, et al., "War Termination Concepts and Strategic Nuclear Response Options," SSC-TN-8974-78, SRI/Strategic Studies Center, pp. 8-9 (Revised August 1973).

c. Strategic Forces of Other Nations

The strategic weapons of the UK and France have a presently important deterrent role, and probably an increasingly significant role in the future. These weapons serve as a complement to and, to some extent, as an alternative to U.S. strategic forces. As the Atlantic Alliance evolves to a new set of understandings and sharing of the overall deterrent and defense role of NATO, the United States should pursue a flexible and constructive attitude towards the possibility of creation of a uniquely European strategic force.

2. General Purpose Forces

This category of forces embraces theater nuclear, tactical nuclear, and conventional forces.¹ As it is for strategic forces, the primary mission of general purpose forces is deterrence. To be credible, they must be capable of warfighting, if deterrence should fail. To accomplish both these missions, general purpose forces must be capable and visible, in-place (and reinforceable), in the areas where U.S. interests are clearly at stake. According to U.S. policy, this is at a minimum in Western Europe, in certain parts of Asia, and to the extent that deployment is feasible, in and near the Middle East. There is and probably will increasingly be a definite linkage between Europe and the Middle East. U.S. force posture, accordingly, needs to be designed to optimize this linkage.

In Asia, where U.S. forces have been drawn down, and are in danger of being reduced too far, the key force posture consideration is the North-east Asia focal point, the Japan-Korea region. So long as U.S. general purpose forces remain in Korea, and in and near Japan, the U.S. strategic deterrent can be credibly extended over these two allies. If unification of Korea causes these U.S. nuclear-capable forces to depart from that forward defense point, an alternate posture would have to be devised. Dual-capable naval and air forces should be considered, augmented by mobile ground forces from a rear area.

An always possible contingency in Asia is war between Russia and China. U.S. neutrality probably would be desirable but may not be feasible; prior events might have drawn the United States into a closer relationship

¹ A detailed analysis of theater and general purpose force posture requirements is contained in the study which is a complementary research task to this study. See R. B. Foster, et al., "Theater and General Purpose Force Posture Analysis," *op. cit.*, *passim*.

to one than the other of the antagonists. Even were the United States able to avoid taking sides, the commitment to Japan and Korea would make for a tense situation. It seems highly improbable that the United States would commit ground forces to Asia, against either Russia or China, or even with one against the other. Other forms of military involvement are at least possible, however, such as naval or air action. War involving one or both of these major powers very likely would involve the use of theater and/or tactical nuclear weapons, and strategic weapons as well. The latter would probably be first used in a war termination mode.

Besides the distant conflict contingencies, U.S. general purpose forces must be ready to defend the United States--Hawaii and Alaska, for geographical reasons, pose special problems.

There are some basic characteristics desirable for U.S. general purpose forces applicable to all the foregoing roles. Some have been indicated in the discussion above, but are included again here. These characteristics are based on attaining the general objectives of high force effectiveness--military and political--and force survivability. Forces should be:

a. Mobile, locally and intertheater. For the latter, effective air and sea lift are required. Operating within fiscal constraints, it will not be possible to have as much lift as that mission alone would suggest because of the necessity to make a budgetary trade-off between rapid and massive movement of forces and the size of the combat forces themselves.

b. Strategically defensive, to accord with the defensive nature of U.S. policy, but capable of tactical offensive operations as conflict situations may require.

c. Flexible, as to mission capability and organizational structure--i.e., force units capable of being integrated into task forces designed for a variety of contingencies.

d. Dual-capable, to provide for rapid implementation of a decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons, and to enhance survivability of forces--this is a special case of the flexible force concept above.

e. Flexible in Command and Control, not only for varying the mode of controlling U.S. forces but for coordinating operations of U.S. and allied forces. The command and control function in employment of theater and tactical nuclear weapons is an especially critical problem.

f. High-Technology Forces. This implies continuous modernization. The technological race between the United States and its adversaries makes it imperative that the benefits of research and development be applied to U.S. forces on a continuing but necessarily selective basis to prevent their being rendered obsolete and vulnerable by enemy technological breakthroughs. There is, however, a necessity for a trade-off between sophistication and numbers in designing forces to cope with a wide span of contingencies. Some balance in a "high-low" mix will be necessary to make the optimum utilization of limited resources for the support of a credible force posture, as for example in the Navy's decision to increase its overall deployment capability by opting for part of the fleet to be composed of more numerous but less expensive and limited-mission ships and aircraft. A significant contribution of technology is the advance in precision-guidance of weapons (and the related high sophistication in surveillance and target-acquisition) which could bring about modifications of force posture and tactics, with possible overall conservation of forces and resources.

g. A Regular-Reserve Mix. The United States and most of its allies are constrained by their political systems to rely upon regular and reserve forces to defend the nation, and in most of these nations, conscription has been abolished as a means of securing the necessary manpower. The reserve force concept is related to the citizen army concept, a method of meeting defense needs at minimum cost; although appropriate for and being implemented by some of the European allies, it does not seem to have a place in U.S. force planning in the foreseeable future. However, U.S. forces in NATO may operate very closely with certain local citizen army units.

h. Logistically Austere. Keeping the "tooth-to-tail" ratio as high as possible is a never-ending problem, but one that demands attention, particularly in this era of tight defense budgets. The civilianization of a greater proportion of the support function reduces military manpower requirements, but does not always reduce costs; a trade-off of these two factors must be weighed against the priority accorded to each.

i. Area-specialized, to a limited degree. Where extended deployments are involved, as in NATO, some compromise can be made with the general objective of having forces capable of fighting in any place where they may be needed. In the NATO Central Front area, for example, some special capabilities for urban warfare would be appropriate.

3. Offense and Defense: A Trend

A defense policy based on a lowered military profile and an overall reduction in strength certainly entails risks, even though it is bolstered in its ultimate effectiveness by being integrated with an overall U.S. foreign policy that is showing a new awareness to all the factors --political, economic, technical, social, as well as military--involved in interactions among nations. It may, however, have one fortuitous trend working in its favor: the changing balance between offense and defense.

The 1960s was a decade in which offensive weaponry reached a peak of advantage over defenses. The ballistic missile, the supersonic airplane (especially when flying low), the nuclear powered submarine, and the sophisticated heavy arms of the ground forces all seemed to have run far ahead of any existing or prospective defenses. The 1970s seem to be witnessing the turning around of this equation. The ABM, while not yet proven in effectiveness (and arbitrarily largely set aside by treaty) embodies hints of a future breakthrough that may seriously challenge the ballistic missile threat. Aircraft are now seriously threatened at both high and low levels by the newer sophisticated SAMs. Anti-tank weapons of high accuracy and lethality are making effective defense against tanks a credible ground warfare tactic. Large ships are highly vulnerable to very small craft armed with SSMs. Even the increasing urbanization of

such potential battle zones as the Central Front in Europe may give a potential bonus to the defender. The aggressor may have to fight part of his battles in cities, a milieu in which determined defenders armed with rather simple weapons can put up resistance far out of proportion to what they could do in open country.

If, as seems likely, defensive weaponry is coming back into its own after a long period of eclipse by the offensive products of technology, this will confer advantages on the United States and its allies, since they have opted for a defensive military posture. The objective of creating balanced forces is made more attainable if offense and defense are more nearly equal. This trend should also help to attain the goal of incorporating the entire spectrum of forces into a flexible instrument of foreign and defense policy.