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WHY THEY LEAVE: RESIGNATIONS FROM
THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
CLASS OF 1966

Robert Leider

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (Army)
Washington, D. C.

6 July 1970

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WHY THEY LEAVE:
RESIGNATIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES
MILITARY ACADEMY CLASS OF 1966

Final Report
by
LTC Robert Leider

6 July 1970

The findings of this report are not to be construed
as an official Department of the Army position.

Directorate of Plans, Programs, Budget and Studies
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310

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13. ABSTRACT This study explores the reasons for the resignation from the United States Army among graduates of the United States Military Class of 1966. It seeks to determine reasons for resignations, quality of resignees compared with non-resignees, and what can be done to reduce resignations of Academy graduates.			

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Robert A. Dwyer
LTC Col, US

10

PEROT NAMED CHAIRMAN OF ACADEMY

ANNAPOLIS, Jul 2 (AP). H. Ross Perot has been elected Chairman of the U.S. Naval Academy Board of Visitors.

Perot, Chairman of the Board of Electronic Data Systems of Dallas, is a member of the Academy Class of 1953.

(News Item)

That he which hath no stomach to this fight,
Let him depart; his passport shall be made,
And crowns for convoy put into his purse.
We would not die in that man's company
That fears his fellowship to die with us.

(William Shakespeare)

The habit commanders had of moving in close when the shooting started and moving out when the shooting stopped was a little like trying to judge a symphony by listening only to its crescendos....As a result, a true picture of the war was most often available from junior officers living in the field where the daily rhythm could be felt....So you had in Vietnam a gap of information that paralleled a gap in age. Lodged in the center of this gap, preventing it from being bridged, was a powerful institutional instrument, the efficiency report....In Vietnam junior officers saw the faults but they were blocked from communicating their insights by layer upon layer of efficiency reports.

Harvey Meyerson in "Vinh Long"
(Houghton Mifflin)

For he today that sheds his blood with me
Shall be my brother. Be he never so vile.
This day shall gentle his condition;
And gentlemen in England now abed
Shall think themselves accursed they were not here,
And hold their manhoods cheap whiles any speaks
That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.

(William Shakespeare)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Heading</u>	<u>Page</u>
PART I	
Chapter 1 - The Problem	1-1-1
Chapter 2 - Methodology and Organization of Report	1-2-1
Section I - Methodology	1-2-1
Section II - Organization of Report . .	1-2-3
Chapter 3 - Summary of Report	1-3-1
Chapter 4 - Conclusions	1-4-1
Section I - General	1-4-1
Section II - Quality of Resignees . .	1-4-3
Section III - Principal Reasons for Leaving	1-4-3
Section IV - Precommissioning Experience	1-4-5
Section V - Active Duty Experience . .	1-4-5
Section VI - Future Prospects	1-4-7
Section VII - Career Files	1-4-8
Section VIII - Letters of Resignation .	1-4-10
Section IX - Miscellaneous Survey Findings	1-4-10
Section X - The Interview	1-4-11
Chapter 5 - Recommendations	1-5-1

	Section I - Recommendations for Policy Makers	1-5-1
	Section II - Recommendations for the Operator	1-5-4
PART II	CHRONOLOGICAL PROFILE	2-1-1
	Chapter 1 - Summary of Part II	2-1-1
	Chapter 2 - Precommissioning Experience	2-2-1
	Chapter 3 - Active Duty Experience	2-3-1
	Chapter 4 - Future Plans	2-4-1
	Section I - In Army	2-4-1
	Section II - Civilian Expectations	2-4-2
PART III	WHY HE'S GETTING OUT	3-1-1
	Chapter 1 - Summary of Part III	3-1-1
	Chapter 2 - The Letter of Resignation	3-2-1
	Chapter 3 - Reasons for Resignation Collected from Individual's TAG Files	3-3-1
	Chapter 4 - Reasons for Resignation Collected from OPO Files	3-4-1
	Chapter 5 - The Survey	3-5-1
	Section I - General	3-5-1
	Section II - Over-all Findings	3-5-1
	Section III - Specific Areas	3-5-20
	Chapter 6 - The Interview	3-6-1
PART IV	CHANGING THE ARMY	4-1-1

Chapter 1 - General	4-1-1
Chapter 2 - Tabulation of Suggestions . .	4-2-1
Chapter 3 - Extracts from Letters	4-3-1
PART V PREVIOUS FINDINGS (FORMER RETENTION STUDIES) .	5-1

PART VI APPENDICES

CHAPTER 1

The Problem

1. As of 24 June 1970, 23.1% of the members of the USMA class of 1966 who were commissioned in the Army had tendered their resignations from the Service. In the preceding 12 classes with which comparison is possible (1950-1961), the average resignation rate at a point 4 years beyond graduation was 15.5%.
2. The resignation record compiled by the class of 1966 would give concern in any year. In 1970 it causes special concern as the Army is seeking ways and means for improving career attractiveness and retention so as to carry out the President's objective of reduced reliance on the draft.
3. This study addresses itself to the resignation problem by seeking the answers to three questions:
 - a. Why did the members of the USMA class of 1966 resign?
 - b. How does the quality of the resignees compare with that of the stayers?
 - c. What can be done to reduce resignations from the USMA classes becoming eligible to leave the Army next year and the years thereafter?

CHAPTER 2

Methodology & Organization of Report

Section I - Methodology

1. The study methodology, in broad terms, consisted of a chronological reconstruction of each resignee's personal background, his pre-commissioning experience at USMA, his military record, and an OPO estimate of his future military prospects where he to remain in Service. The resignee then fleshed out the chronology by telling "his side" of the record. He was asked, by means of a questionnaire, to interpret his career in terms of what satisfied him and what did not. He was asked about his civilian career expectations so that these could be compared with what the military had in store for him. Lastly, he was invited to suggest changes in the Army which, if implemented, might have persuaded him to remain in Service. For added depth, ten resignees with outstanding military records, were invited to USMA for 3 days of intensive individual and group interviews designed to probe their discontent. As an ancillary action, the study group compared the records of the resignees with the records of two equally-large groups of stayers--the first representing the USMA class of 1966 and the second the RA ROTC officers commissioned in 1966.

2. Specifically, data were collected from the following sources:

- a. USMA--Information on class standing, aptitude for service ratings, and so forth.

b. The Adjutant General--Efficiency reports, academic reports, letters of commendation, derogatory information such as records of non-judicial punishment, records of appeals and reclaims to such agencies as the Board for Correction of Military Records and the Efficiency Report Special Review Board.

c. OPO-OPD-- Information from Officer Qualification Records (Form 66), individual letters to the Career Branch, replies thereto, records of telephone calls and visits, preference statements, and the assignment actions based thereon, and an evaluation of the resignee by his branch assignment officer.

d. Resignee--The letter of resignation, personal data such as family history, father's occupation, geographic origin, date married, number of children, an objective and subjective evaluation of satisfiers and dissatisfiers, career expectations, and a suggested list of changes which the Army would have to make to retain his services.

3. All told, information was collected on 100 resignees. Of these, 81 responded to the questionnaire. Ten resignees were interviewed. For comparative purposes, the study group evaluated the 201 files of 100 stayers from the class of 1966 and 100 stayers commissioned into the Regular Army from ROTC in 1966. The stayers were selected by TAGO at random.

4. The data collected were analyzed first on an individual basis. Items of information learned about a resignee or provided by him were checked and cross-checked for compatibility. For example, a complaint

about low caliber of superiors would be compared with the efficiency ratings received. Or a statement about unsuitable assignments would be cross-checked against preference statements and the action made thereon. Next, the data were analyzed on a group basis. Here the study group sought to determine if there was variance between the reasons for resignation offered by superior performers and those provided by less efficient officers. To accomplish this, the resignees were divided into three groups. The "A" Group, consisting of 22 resignees, contained officers with outstanding records. Thirty-six resignees with average records were designated the "B" Group. And, 42 sub-standard performers were aggregated into a "C" Group.

Section II - Organization of the Report

1. The report has been organized in 6 parts:

a. Part I contains a description of the methodology used; a summary of the report; and a list of the conclusions and recommendations.

b. Part II is a chronological analysis of resignee experience at USMA and on active duty and an estimate of future expectations--either in service, if the resignee had remained, or in the chosen civilian career.

c. Part III is an analysis of why the officer elected to resign. A chapter is devoted to each source which sheds light on the reasons

d. Part IV is a discussion of what changes the Army would have to make, in the opinion of resignees, to cause a reversal in their decision. Part IV is based almost entirely on resignee comments.

e. Part V is a summary of reasons given for officer resignation extracted from studies conducted in the past 15 years. The purpose of this part was to help segregate temporary dissatisfiers, possibly associated with the Vietnam War, from those which are more chronic.

f. Part VI contains appendix-type material.

2. The Table of Contents on page iii provides more detailed information on the location of chapters and sections of the report.

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Chapter 3

Summary of Report

1. USMA officers present a unique problem in retention studies. West Point graduates are highly competitive, especially with regard to classmates. When USMA graduates perceive themselves to have a "black mark" on their record which might slow their career progression in relation to that of their contemporaries, they may very well resign so as to save face. It would be too painful to remain on active duty for the first major selection round and see all one's classmates' names on the list, but not one's own. In this regard, USMA officers are very different from officers commissioned through other sources.
2. In line with this finding, the losses from the Class of 1966 represent considerable self-selection out. There is quality in the group, but not in the same proportion as among stayers from the same Class or among RA ROTC officers commissioned in 1966. Conversely, the proportion of below-average performers among the resignees is much higher than among the stayers.
3. Given a chance to select from 70 reasons those which were instrumental in causing their resignation, above average performers evidenced a sharply different reply pattern from that given by average and below-average performers.
 - a. Above-average performers are highly ambitious men. They are concerned with the paucity of opportunities which they see in the Army. They want faster promotions, more authority, more opportunities for

independent action, less red tape to slow them, less supervision, and more money. They are fully aware of their own worth. They consider themselves under-utilized by the Army. They want to go where their abilities can be fully used and recognized. They feel that this place is in the civilian sector. ✓

b. Average performers accomplish all assigned duties in a satisfactory manner. But deep down they are not driven by ambition. They are ego-centered, middle-class and suburban. Work is a means to an end. The end is family life, a house and garden, and vacations. Thus, they object to family separations. They want more free time to pursue their private life. They prefer stability to turbulence. In line with their value-conscious, suburban orientation they show more concern than either of the other groups for the esteem in which their civilian neighbors hold the military profession.

c. Below-average performers are bitter. They are highly critical of Army activities which relate to performance. They do not care for personnel management or the efficiency report system. They do not consider their superiors competent or see them as being willing to accept responsibility for mistakes. They regard their poor performance less in terms of individual failure and more as resulting from not being properly utilized and assigned. Had they been allowed to use their "special skills" or to specialize, they would have done better. In short, they blame the system for their personal "failure."

4. These sharply divergent response patterns underscore the ineffectiveness of generalized retention studies and surveys which produce findings

that are usually too broad-based to hit the target. Retention studies need a taxonomy which will assure that corrective actions are programmed to target on the groups the Army is most desirous of retaining. To this end, sharp differentiations must be made between:

- a. Potential careerists and two-year obligors.
- b. USMA careerists and careerists from other sources.
- c. Stayers and potential resignees.
- d. Dissatisfiers representative of specific performance groups (above-average, average, and below-average) and dissatisfiers which are applicable to all.
- e. Dissatisfiers which are historic and dissatisfiers which are temporary in nature, caused by the peculiar conditions of the Vietnam war.

5. The principal dissatisfiers cited by the USMA Class of 1966 resignees, common to the three performance groups, are of the temporary rather than historic type. They relate to excessive family separations and the prospects of another tour in Vietnam.

6. Pay and fringe benefits rate relatively low in the list of dissatisfiers. There is more concern with future pay than present pay. Many resignees feel the Army will need to place a greater share of incentives along the career path, rather than at its beginning, so as to make continuance on the path worthwhile.

Chapter 4 - Conclusions

Section I - General

1. Junior officers are not a homogeneous group. Studies and surveys which fail to recognize the diversity of motivation and interests covered by the junior officer category are bound to scatter their recommendations over too large a piece of terrain to make effective contact. For example:

a. Two-year obligors and potential careerists may both respond favorably to certain aspects of service life. But the first category's favorable response will not necessarily lead to retention; in the latter category it will.

b. The retention behavior of potential careerists depends on their source of commission. USMA officers are fiercely competitive, especially with regard to their classmates. Many who perceive themselves to have received a black mark on their record will resign, so as not to lose face in the eyes of their classmates when the next service school or promotion list comes around and their names are not included. Careerists from OCS and ROTC have not developed this form of competition toward classmates. They are less likely to resign because of one bad efficiency report.

c. Officer duty performance is an important factor in retention studies. It must be considered if recommendations are to target on the people whom the Army wishes to retain. The reason for this is that

above-average performers react differently to dissatisfiers than below-average performers. The high performer, for instance, objects to promotions by seniority; the low performer, on the other hand, feels protected by this policy. Conversely, the high performer is challenged by efficiency reports; the low performer would just as soon do without this institutional instrument.

d. Because of this varied response, the Army should know which dissatisfiers "rub" all groups and which are found objectionable by only one of the groups.

e. Lastly, it is important to segregate dissatisfiers by those which are historical in nature and those which are temporary, associated with the Vietnam War. Removing the first often requires legislation and scarce funds; the impact of the second can usually be softened through improved communication between senior officers who have been through similar situations in the past and their juniors.

2. In this study, it was noted that 75% of the resignees had entries in their official records which they, themselves, could construe as black marks with a possible adverse effect on their careers. Examples of "black mark" items were poor efficiency reports, academic failures, relief from Ranger School for lack of leadership, reprimands, delays in promotion, and relief from command. As Academy graduates, many young officers with such entries may have chosen to resign rather than stay on active duty and fall behind their classmates.

3. In actuality, the resignees were of a higher quality than they may

have rated themselves. The Study Group considered 22% as falling in the above-average category, 36% as having average records, and 42% as having below-average records. OPO assignment officers, given a later opportunity to independently rate the resignees, categorized them about the same way as the Study Group.

4. If resignees had been allowed to drop just one efficiency report, 33% would have advanced from their present performance group to the next higher one, using the criteria of the Study Group.

Section II - Quality of Resignees

Did the Army lose quality? Some, but not at a representative rate; that is, representative of the quality among stayers. The Study Group made a categorization of two groups of stayers--one from the USMA Class of 1966 and one consisting of RA officers commissioned from the ROTC in 1966. The scoring of records showed the incidence of above-average officers to be twice as high among the staying groups, while the incidence of below-average officers was almost twice as high among the resignees.

Section III - Principal Reasons for Leaving

1. As a group, the resignees said they were leaving because of excessive family separations and the prospects of another tour in Vietnam.

2. When dissatisfiers were sorted by performance category of respondents (above average, average, and below average) three different patterns for leaving the Army emerged:

a. Above-average performers showed themselves to be ambitious, fully-aware of their worth, and convinced that a paucity of opportunities in the Army would result in their under-utilization. They wanted more fast promotions, more challenges, more money, less supervision, and less red tape.

b. Average performers evidenced a strong orientation toward other than job-related factors. Work, to them, appeared to be the means to gratify the need for a full private life. They wanted more time with their family, more time for personal activities, stability, and the security which comes from knowing that their neighbors and the nation hold the profession of arms in high esteem.

c. Below-average performers were most critical of aspects of Army life which related to performance. Thus, they challenged career management, efficiency reports, the competence of their superiors, their superiors' willingness to accept responsibility for mistakes, and so on. Most felt that their training should have been utilized, that they should have been allowed to specialize, and that they should have received more suitable assignments. They were, in fact, transferring responsibility for their "failures" from themselves to the Army.

Section IV - Pre-commissioning Experience

1. With one exception, there was little in the resignee pre-commissioning background which distinguished them from stayers. They were reared in all regions of the country. Where their parents' background was civilian, they represented all occupational and social classes. Their standing at the Academy, both academically and in aptitude for service, was representative of the population at large. There was some correlation between aptitude for service ratings and later duty performance.

2. The exception was in resignees with a military background. More than 400 Plebes entering the USMA Class of 1966 had a parent with a military connection. But only 10 resignees claimed a parent who was a military careerist. This would seem to indicate that youngsters with a military family background make a better adjustment to service than those coming from civilian families.

Section V - Active Duty Experience

1. Most of the resignees knew which branch they wanted at graduation and were successful in drawing the branch of their choice. Two years later, the average and above-average performers had no regret with their pick. But this was not the case for below-average performers. Here, the majority was unhappy with their chosen branch. And, frustrating for them, the system allowed them no alternative for removing their dissatisfaction. A branch transfer, which is one way out, was denied

to them. The gaining branches accept only officers with good records and that's what these men did not have.

2. At time of entry into service, most resignees were undecided about the military career.

3. The resignees' active duty pattern followed that of the stayer group. All resignees served in Vietnam. Resignees averaged about 40% of their tour overseas. And, at the 3½ years' mark of service, they had better than three PCS's apiece.

4. School attendance was limited for resignees. Only Finance and Air Defense officers received their branch basic or orientation courses. The remainder attended a variety of special courses, such as Ranger, airborne, CBR and Vietnamese language. Three resignees attended a branch career course. Undoubtedly, more would have gone had the course not involved a service obligation. Resignees had a high opinion of military schooling. Some Air Defense officers, however, pointed out that their school did not present a challenge. But this was only an irritant, and not a cause for getting out.

5. Resignees had some problems with Ranger School. As a group, they failed the course at twice the Army rate for 1966. Within Infantry and Signal the failure rate was almost three times the Army rate. High performers passed the course almost universally. The lower the performance group, the higher the failure rate. On the whole, resignees were not critical of the course. They thought it an excellent preparation for leadership assignments. What bothered them was demeaning harrassment and

the habit of one branch (now discontinued) of writing officers who failed that they had jeopardized their careers and fallen behind their contemporaries in the competition for promotions, assignments, and schooling.

6. Most resignees married earlier than contemporaries commissioned through other sources. By the time they were first lieutenants, the top performers had an incidence of marriage almost twice that of their contemporaries and more than twice that of the poorer performers. This propensity for wedlock meant that the better performers had exposed themselves to family separation, and the problems which go with this state, at an earlier time and at a greater rate than their contemporaries.

Section VI - Future Prospects

1. If resignees had stayed in the Army, their future would have looked like this:

- a. Within 18 months more than half would have returned to Vietnam.
- b. This year or next most would have gone to their branch career course.
- c. Most of the better performers would have been programed for advanced civil schooling.
- d. About 70%, by maintaining their records, would have had little problem in being selected for major and CGSC. ✓
- e. Of that group, about 20% had records which, if maintained, might have qualified them for an accelerated promotion. ✓

2. Resignee civilian prospects are not as cleanly defined as their potential military career outlook. Most plan to attend college. And a majority of those will take law degrees. In job goals, the resignees favor self-employment or work for small companies. Apparently, many have had their fill of large organizations. They expect to earn about \$240.00 more per month than their estimate for the value of their current military compensation.

3. It is expected that most resignees will be able to follow their civilian plans at least as far as college is concerned. As a group they have high graduate records exam scores, with the poorer performers outscoring the better performers. This is understandable. The combination of a high GRE with poor efficiency reports exerts a pull-push effect. On one side, the nation's most prestigious schools are willing to open their doors to admit the individual; on the other side, his career prospects are quite dim.

Section VII - Their Career File

1. Most resignees provided a clue to their intent to leave service at least 6 months to one year before wiring a formal letter of resignation. Normally, the clue came in the form of a request to not be programed for the career course. One branch decided to act on the clue by writing to better performers and their battalion commanders about intended career plans. This seems to be an excellent idea. Potential resignees, at this time, have yet to make firm civilian plans

and commitments. They can still be swayed.

2. From the timing of clues, it is apparent that after 3 years' service USMA graduates generally know whether they want to continue on active duty or not. This would make the present 5-year obligation altogether too long.

Amen!

3. Retention experience varied among the branches. It was noted that, as a group, Signal officer resignees had the lowest ER's. As expected, the Signal branch had the least success in retaining members of USMA 1966.

4. Better performers are more likely to influence career progress through writing their branches than poorer performers.

5. Only about one third of resignees had visited their branches. To some poorer performers the visit became a traumatic experience. It afforded them first look at their ER's and led to the decision to resign.

6. Preference statements were used by only a minority of resignees. This is understandable since the ten-year-old form is very difficult to match with today's Army jobs and assignment opportunities.

7. OPO informed only a minority of the better performers of their high standing among contemporaries. Later interviews with high performers showed that many of them did not know that they were so competitive.

8. A minority of the below-average performers received "jack-up" letters from their branches. Two problems were noted with these letters.

First, they were based on relatively old information (due to the slowness of getting ER's into branch files). Thus, the critique came long after the incident. Second, no follow-up letters were written. This meant the recipient knew of his low standing, but left in limbo with respect to whether his successive improvement actions have cleared the records.

9. OPO correspondence to young officers, in general, is depersonalized, circumlocutory, and vague. Much improvement is possible here.

10. Insensitive handling of individual requests may have caused several resignations.

Section VIII - Letters of Resignation

1. Letters of resignation seldom provide a true reason for resigning.

2. Letters from good performers are normally short and state that the individual has a different career goal. The implication is that he found a paucity of opportunities in the Army and is seeking pastures where his talents can be better utilized.

3. Letters from poorer performers are normally long and express criticism of career-related aspects of Army life (assignments, opportunities for displaying initiative or exercising responsibility, etc.). Writers, without saying so, seem to place the blame for their "failure" on the items which they single out for censure.

Section IX - Miscellaneous Survey Findings

1. Major survey findings, with regard to the sharply different resignation

patterns of the 3 performance groups (above-average, average, and below-average), were discussed in Section I of this chapter.

2. Concern with present pay and fringes is relatively low. Resignees were more concerned with future earnings prospects. They felt the Army was placing too great a share of compensation resources at the start of the career point. Since most resignees, had they stayed, could look forward to but two more promotions in the next 18 years (having attained two promotions in their first two years), they thought more incentives should be placed at later points along the career path so as to make following it worthwhile.

3. Most resignees underestimated the value of their compensation.

4. Social life and senior wives have a generally positive impact on retention.

5. Senior officers and their short-comings are the principal topic of conversation in gripe sessions at the club.

6. The Category IV Program has no significant impact per se on junior officer retention; but, officers assigned to branches in which Category IV soldiers are concentrated expressed their dissatisfaction with "low quality EM" at better than twice the rate as officers with lesser exposure.

Section X - The Interview

1. The interviews expressed intense dissatisfaction with certain aspects of the Army system.

2. Singled out were:

a. The "ticket punching" system which places battalion and brigade commanders at career crossroads. Succeed, and you go on; fail, and you drop off. Resignees felt that senior officers, placed in this situation, forgot about mission and men, and concentrated all efforts on "looking good" and getting a high ER.

b. Impersonal career management and stereotyped career patterns.

c. A promotion system which does not discriminate sufficiently among outstanding, average, and poor performers.

Chapter 5

Recommendations

The recommendations in this chapter are intended for the consideration of policy makers and operators in the area of junior officer retention.

SECTION I - Recommendations for the Policy Maker

1. Recommendation 1. Give recognition in retention management to three categories of junior officers: two-year obligors, potential careerists from sources other than USMA, and potential careerists from USMA.
2. Recommendation 2. Give recognition in retention management to the fact that performance groups (above average, average, and below average) react differently to dissatisfiers.
3. Recommendation 3. Give priority in removing dissatisfiers to those which irritate above average performers.
4. Recommendation 4. When analyzing dissatisfiers, categorize them into those which are historical and those which are temporary in nature.
5. Recommendation 5. Give priority to removing historical dissatisfiers.
6. Recommendation 6. Determine, on a periodic basis, whether the Army is losing quality through resignations. Use the ratio calculated in this report, showing the incidence of quality among stayers against the incidence of quality among resignees, as a starting point. If ratio drops in subsequent calculations, heed this management indicator and intensify corrective actions.
7. Recommendation 7. Loosen up efficiency reports. The rating system has lost its detachment from the situation it should evaluate, and become

part of it. There is some merit to the charge that officers at crucial career points direct the bulk of their efforts toward attaining a high report, rather than to their mission and the welfare of their men. Also, ^{should} _{be} _{concerned} the belief that one bad report will crucify the recipient has become too deep-seated in the Army to be dispelled by an official denial. As the result of this belief, officers with one poor report tend to leave service, while those with good reports come under increasing pressure to maintain the whiteness of their record as they advance through the grades. Suggested methods for loosening up the system are:

a. For younger officers. Not require efficiency reports on officers in their first two years of service. This will preclude some younger officers from developing a failure syndrome during a difficult transitional period in which many are still maturing. It also protects young officers from being rated by equally young officers. As an ancillary benefit, it should sharply cut the work volume of TAGO and OIG in handling ER's. More attention could then be given to the review of ER's of more senior officers, challenging those which are out of line, and keeping up with the appeal and review volume. (What about career decisions on younger officers in their non-rated period, like applications for RA? These decisions can be decentralized to local boards.)

b. For older officers. Drop an officer's lowest report before each major board which considers him for promotion. This step, if taken, should have three beneficial results: It should restore evaluation to its proper perspective by separating efficiency reports from the situation being evaluated; it should change rater behavior in that raters would no

longer feel like career executioners if they write anything but inflated reports; and it should alter the behavior of rated officers by restoring their individuality and independence and concern for what is best for their activity (rather than for what will make them look good).

8. Recommendation 8. Gradually change policies so as to shift emphasis from career management, which has come to mean the gathering of individual qualifications and tickets, to contribution management which rewards the individual for what he has done for his country and the Army, in any assignment, and not just career-weighted ones.

9. Recommendation 9. Phase out policies which exact a service obligation for attending the career course. Army schools are held in high esteem and attendance is often a rewarding experience. Officers who are wavering in their career intent may well decide on staying after observing the precision of a school like USAIS. At present, however, a wavering individual will normally steer away from the career course because of the service commitment involved, and thus deprive himself of the opportunity to observe the Army at its very best.

10. Recommendation 10. Conduct periodic audits of TAGO and OPO career files. In TAG, check files for inclusion of data which belongs in the records of another individual; in OPO review correspondence between individuals and their career branches, preference statements, actions taken thereon, and other career data.

11. Recommendation 11. Ease policies on branch transfer. Do not make branch transfer contingent on the possession of a "superior" record. An individual may need another chance in a different environment.

12. Recommendation 12. Consider lowering the service obligation for USMA graduates from 5 to 3 years. All evidence points to the fact that undecided officers arrive at a career decision at approximately the three-year mark. //

13. Recommendation 13. Constantly emphasize the responsibility of seniors toward juniors. The fact that only ten resignees had parents with military backgrounds (as opposed to more than 400 members of the class) would indicate that seniors have failed in their loco parentis role. In a situation, as today, they need to help juniors distinguish between temporary and more permanent dissatisfiers; they must also explain that leadership styles will vary with the situation -- and that in today's environment seniors may have to go further down the ranks and be more detailed in their directions, than they like to do, so as to compensate for inexperience and turbulence.

SECTION II - Recommendations for the Operator

1. Recommendation 14. Improve communications with managed officers by:
 - a. Personalizing correspondence.
 - b. Avoiding circumlocution and references to policy.
 - c. Informing officers who are doing well that they are doing well.
 - d. Following up on "jack up" letters by letting officers know whether they did or did not improve themselves.
2. Recommendation 15. Dispel present misunderstanding that early attendance at advanced civil schooling is the only opportunity available for getting a master's degree. Prepare a booklet "You and Advanced Education" and describe the many alternatives which an officer has for advancing his

education. Stress that back-to-back degress can prove a disadvantage in a rapidly changing society where knowledge doubles every ten years.

3. Recommendation 16. Take action to correct the constant underestimating of the value of military compensation. Prepare a booklet "The Value of Your Compensation" and show therein, on a comparative basis, how much a civilian must earn to keep the same take home pay as a junior officer.

(One member of the Study Group - a lieutenant colonel - has calculated that a civilian must earn \$31,000 per year to obtain his take home pay.)

4. Recommendation 17. Concentrate retention action at the time the officer tips the branch of his intent. This point is usually many months in advance of the receipt of the formal letter of resignation. At that time, the officer's plans are still fluid and he can be swayed. Action after the letter of resignation is received is usually too late. By now, the resignee has made firm plans and commitments. Concentrate retention action on better performers only.

5. Recommendation 18. Consider adoption of the survey form in Part IV in future agency retention studies.

PART II - Chronological Profile

Chapter 1

Summary of Part II

1. Precommissioning experience.

a. Resignees come from all regions of the United States. No region predominates or has a greater share of resignees.

b. Resignee fathers with a civilian occupation represent a wide range of skills and earning power. Blue collar occupations, government employment, professional skills, and self-employment are about equally represented in the resignees' parental background.

c. USMA graduates of the Class of 1966 were less likely to resign if their fathers had a military connection.

d. Neither academic standing nor aptitude for service ratings can be used to predict retention or resignation. However, there appears to be a connection between aptitude for service and later duty performance, as measured by efficiency reports.

e. Graduate Record Examination scores, also, do not predict resignation. However, possession of a high GRE coupled with low efficiency reports may exert a pull effect on young officers. The high GRE scores open all academic doors, even those leading to the most prestigious schools, while the low ER's give little reason for continuing on active duty.

2. Active duty experience.

a. Most resignees were certain of the branch which they wanted and had drawn their first choice.

b. Two years later, resignees who performed well were satisfied with their choice; resignees whose efficiency suffered, expressed substantial dissatisfaction with their chosen branch.

c. Poor performers who were not satisfied with their branch found it difficult to obtain a branch transfer. Low efficiency reports denied them acceptance by the branch of their choice.

d. Failure rate for resignees at Ranger School was about twice the Army average for 1966. Failure rates varied significantly from branch to branch, with Infantry and Signal having about three times the failure rate of the Army average. Men who later performed well had a minuscule failure rate. Conclusions which can be drawn from this are:

(1) Failure at Ranger School imparts an early "failure syndrome" which is hard to live down. One branch aided in developing this syndrome by writing extremely harsh letters to Ranger School failures.

(2) The qualities required to successfully complete Ranger School may correlate with later, successful duty performance in leadership-type assignments.

e. Resignee active duty experience corresponded to that of stayers:

(1) All served in Vietnam.

(2) Better than 40% of their service was spent overseas. Most had three or more PCS in their first 3½ years of service.

(3) In their first three years, resignees were usually assigned to company-size units or lower staffs. In the fourth year, many received assignments to their service schools or ROTC. About 14% served as aides and two officers served on the DA and DOD staffs.

(4) Only Finance and Air Defense officers attended branch schooling. The remainder attended only specialized courses like airborne, Ranger, Vietnamese language, or CBR. Three officers attended career courses. This number would have been higher, had not so many resignees waived the course so as not to pick up a service obligation.

(5) Resignees earned numerous decorations, but did not fare so well in motivating superiors to write letters of commendation or appreciation. While almost every resignee had earned a decoration, only about one in four had received a letter of commendation.

f. Adherence to normal career patterns should not be construed as being synonymous with career satisfaction.

g. Resignees married earlier and at a greater rate than contemporaries commissioned from other sources. The best performers married at better than twice the rate than the poorest performers in the group. As a result, the superior performers were exposed to family separation and the pressures attendant thereto at an earlier point in time than poorer USMA performers or contemporaries who were commissioned through other sources.

3. Military career outlook if resignees had stayed.

a. The majority of resignees would have been returned to Vietnam for a second tour within the next eighteen months.

b. Most resignees would have attended their branch career course this year or next.

c. Only a minority of resignees was being considered for civil schooling. The minority, however, included a majority of the best performers.

d. Almost 70% of resignees had accumulated records which, if maintained, supported their promotion to major. About 20% had records, if maintained; might have made them eligible for accelerated promotion.

e. Resignees themselves expected to reach the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel in the next five, ten and fifteen years.

4. Civilian career plans.

a. The majority of resignees plan to enroll in graduate school.

b. Most resignees plan to study law. The remainder will study a wide variety of fields.

c. Resignees plan to enter a wide-range of occupations. The occupations do not necessarily correlate with the fields in which resignees plan to obtain advanced degrees. Many hope to work for themselves or for small firms, as opposed to large organizations.

d. Resignees expect to earn \$1135.00 per month as a start in their civilian careers which is \$239.00 per month more than their estimate of the value of their military compensation.

Chapter 2

Precommissioning Experience

NOTE: The group indicators A, B and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group is composed of 22 resignees with outstanding service records; the B Group includes 36 resignees with average duty performance records; and the C Group consists of 42 resignees who accumulated below-average performance records.

1. Is geographical origin a predictor of resignations?

a. Answer: No.

b. It has been said that citizens of the South and West are more military in their orientation than Americans originating from other parts of the country. In confirmation, recent polls have noted that the President finds more support for his war policies in these regions than in others. The availability of these findings led the Study Group to hypothesize that geographical origin, derived from the resignees' statement on where they grew up, might provide a useful predictor of retention or resignation.

c. Analysis of origins showed, however, that the distribution of resignees by region in which they grew up parallels the overall distribution of the national population. Thus, 22% of the resignees said they grew up in the South; the 1960 Census lists 19% of the total population as residing in the states which comprise the South. 35% of the resignees said they were raised in the Northeast; the Census shows 30% of the population living in the Northeast. A similar parallelism between resignee and population distribution holds true for the remaining regions of the country.

2. Is there a relationship between father's occupation (civilian) and resignation?

a. Answer: No.

b. The occupations which resignees ascribed to their fathers are representative. They include blue and white collar, technical and professional skills, and self-employment. Representative occupations are listed below:

<u>Blue Collar</u>	<u>Govt Employee</u>	<u>Professional</u>	<u>Self-Employed</u>
Foreman	City Engineer	Manager	Farmer
Annealer	Postal Employee	Chemist	Dentist
Service Station Manager	School Teacher	Manufacturer's Representative	Trucking Firm Tavern Owner
Meatcutter	Officer	Engineer	Lawn Equipment Dealer
Carpenter	Principal	Real Estate Agent	Food Whole- sale
Machine Tender	Agricultural Researcher	Accountant	
Machinist	HS Coach	Corporation Executive	
Steel Worker	Policeman	Insurance Salesman	
Laborer	Road Super- intendent	Bank Officer	
Electrician	Superintendent of Schools	Salesman	
	Fireman	Pharmacist	
	State Director of Motor Vehicles	Architect	
		Purchasing Agent	

3. Is there a relationship between the father's military status and resignation?

a. Answer: Apparently yes.

b. According to the 1966 Class Profile, the fathers of 62.2% of the entering plebes had a military connection. 42.1% were Army. But only 10.4% of the resignees (or 2% of the Class) stated that their fathers were connected with the military. No significant variation was noted

among the three performance groups:

<u>Group</u>	<u>% Fathers With Military Connection</u>
A	8.0
B	10.0
C	13.0
All	10.4

c. The study methodology contained no follow-up questions which might shed more light on the sharp difference in behavior between the resignees with a military family background and resignees with a civilian background. It could be hypothesized that the counseling which so many resignees felt their seniors should but did not provide (see Part IV) was available to the sons of military personnel in their family environment. Additional study will be required to satisfactorily explain the behavior difference.

4. Is academic class standing a predictor of resignations?

a. Answer: No.

b. Except for the top fifth, the resignees distribute evenly through the class standing. However, comparison with the top fifth is not valid at this time. Many members of the class with high academic standing were allowed to enroll for graduate education. By accepting this schooling, they incurred a service obligation which makes them ineligible to resign before 1972.

c. The distribution of resignees by class standing is as follows:

<u>Class Standing</u>	<u>Theoretical Percentage</u>	<u>No. of Resignees</u>	<u>Resignee Percentage</u>
1 - 115	20	12	12
116 - 231	20	24	24
232 - 347	20	21	21
348 - 463	20	21	21
464 - 579	20	22	22

5. Is the Aptitude for Service Rating a predictor of resignation?

- a. Answer: No.
- b. Resignees distribute throughout the range of the Aptitude for Service Ratings, though not evenly.

<u>Fifth</u>	<u>Resignee Percentage</u>
Top	23
2d	14
3d	22
4th	18
Bottom	23

c. There appears to be a correlation between Aptitude for Service Ratings and later duty performance. Almost half the members of the A Group were in the top fifth of their class in Aptitude for Service Ratings, whereas almost 40% of the C Group scored in the bottom fifth. A comparison of the Aptitude for Service distribution by quality group is below:

<u>Fifth</u>	<u>Percentage</u>		
	<u>A Group</u>	<u>B Group</u>	<u>C Group</u>
Top	45	22	12
2d	10	17	10
3d	25	31	15
4th	12	11	25
Bottom	8	19	38

6. Is the Graduate Records Examination score an indicator of resignation?

a. Answer: A qualified no. A high GRE score coupled with sub-standard duty performance may exert a pull-push effect on the potential resignee. On one side, possession of the high score gains him admission to the country's best graduate schools; on the other side, his low efficiency ratings make him feel that his military future is dim.

b. Resignees, in general, have high scores on the GRE. Below is a comparison of resignees with all college seniors tested nationwide:

<u>National Fifths</u>	<u>Resignee Placement in</u>	
	<u>Verbal</u>	<u>Quantitative</u>
	(as a percentage)	
Top	34	85
2d	20	9
3d	24	5
4th	12	1
Bottom	10	0

c. The hypothesis that a high GRE exerts a "pull" effect on officers with below average duty performance is borne out by comparing their scores with those achieved by officers in the A and B Groups. See below:

<u>Composite GRE</u> (1600 is maximum)	<u>Percentage Distribution</u>		
	<u>A Group</u>	<u>B Group</u>	<u>C Group</u>
1300 +	40	48	58
1300 -	60	52	42

d. An interesting variance in GRE's exists among the branches of the resigning officers. Here it should be noted that members of the technological branches -- Air Defense and Signal -- sharply outscore the combat arms.

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Percent Having a Composite Score of</u>	
	<u>1200 +</u>	<u>1200 -</u>
Infantry	45	55
Artillery	38	62
Air Defense	74	26
Armor	50	50
Signal	61	39
Miscellaneous (CE, TC, QM, MI, Finance, TAG)	40	60

7. Is the SRA Survey of Interpersonal Values a useful predictor of Resignations?

a. Answer: Probably no.

b. The Science Research Associates Survey of Interpersonal Values was administered to the resignees while they were cadets at West Point. As a result of this survey, it could be predicted that 9 of the 100 resignees would not stay in the Army. The other 91 tested about the same as the current stayers of the Class of 1966.

Chapter 3

Active Duty Experience

NOTE: Group indicators A, B, and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group consists of 22 resignees with outstanding service records; the B Group comprises 36 resignees who compiled average records; and the C Group consists of 42 resignees who accumulated below-average records.

1. Were resignees certain of the branch which they wanted at the drawing?

a. Answer: Yes.

b. There is no variation in the replies provided by the three performance groups:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Certain of Branch</u>	<u>Percent Not Certain of Branch</u>
A	80	20
B	85	15
C	85	15

2. Did resignees draw their first choice?

a. Answer: A qualified yes.

b. Resignees who compiled records which classified them as A and B performers had been more likely, as cadets, to draw their first choice than resignees in the C category.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Drawing First Choice</u>
A	95
B	94
C	79

3. Were resignees satisfied with the branch chosen after two years active duty?

a. Answer: Yes for those who performed well; no for those who performed below average.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Satisfied</u>	<u>Percent Dissatisfied</u>
A	90	10
B	70	30
C	39	61

b. This is the first of a string of findings which show the C Group generally more dissatisfied than the A and B Groups with aspects of military service impacting on career performance (superiors, type of assignments, ability to use training, etc.). The implication is that some young officers tend to transfer responsibility for individual failure to a circumstance of military life, i.e., "Had I only been assigned to a branch more compatible with my individual interests and ambitions, I would have done better." A dilemma which faces poor performers who are genuinely dissatisfied with their branch (as opposed to blaming the branch for their poor performance) is that it is difficult for them to obtain a branch transfer. Their present branch would not be reluctant to let them go, but poor efficiency reports would make poor performers unacceptable to the branch of their choice.

4. Did many resignees attempt to branch transfer?

a. Answer: No.

b. Twelve resignees submitted requests for branch transfer during

their careers. One request was later withdrawn. Five requests were approved. Six requests (all from C performers) were rejected.

5. First Schooling - Was failure in Ranger School a predictor of resignations?

a. Answer: Probably yes.

b. Potential resignees failed Ranger School at approximately twice the rate as all officers attending the course in 1966.

c. Failure rates varied significantly by branch:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>No. from Branch Resigning</u>	<u>No. from Branch Failing Ranger School</u>	<u>Percent Failure</u>	<u>Overall Percent of Failure - All Officers 1966</u>
Infantry	24	11	45.8	16
Artillery	15	3	20.0	16
Air Defense	16	4	25.0	16
Armor	10	2	20.0	16
Signal	18	8	44.4	16
Engineer	2	0	00.0	16
Miscellaneous	15	3	20.0	16
Total	100	31	31.0	16

d. Failure rates also varied by performance category. Officers who ultimately compiled A records almost universally passed the course. However, B and C officers failed at twice the overall leadership attrition rate for 1966:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Failing</u>
A	4
B	30
C	38

e. Two conclusions can be drawn from these findings:

(1) The attitudinal and motivational characteristics required for successful completion of the Ranger Course may be comparable to the personal qualities which are rewarded by high performance ratings.

(2) Failure at Ranger School may impart an officer with the feeling that he has slipped behind his contemporaries at the very start of his career. The failure syndrome thus obtained may cast a shadow on later duty performance. It could even lead to eventual resignation as the "marked" officer attempts another and more successful career start in a civilian environment. One career branch helped build the failure syndrome by advising branch officers who did not make it through Ranger School that they had "jeopardized" their careers.

6. Did resignee active duty experience depart from the normal?

a. Answer: No.

b. Resignee career patterns correspond to those of stayers with an equal number of years of service.

c. Within the resignee group itself, the patterns are almost identical, with no more than two or three resignees having patterns departing from the normal. For example:

(1) Vietnam. All resignees served at least one tour in Vietnam.

(2) PCS Most resignees had experienced at least three Permanent Changes of Station (PCS) by 31 December 1969. There was no variance among branches in the number of PCS. Signal and Artillery officers had the fewest PCS with an average of 3.1 per officer. Infantry had the most with an average of 3.25 PCS per officer after 3½ years of service.

(3) Months Overseas. Resignees, on the average, served the same number of months overseas. Again, there was no major variance among branches. Air Defense officers averaged the least number of months overseas with 19.2. Artillery officers spent the most months overseas with 23.7. The other branches fell between these extremes.

(4) Assignments. Almost all resignees spent their first three years as company officers or members of lower staffs. In their fourth year, many officers started to receive assignments with their service school or as ROTC instructors. Of the group, 14 accumulated specialized experience as aides. Two officers were assigned to the DA or DOD staff.

(5) Schooling. Many officers received specialized military schooling. Examples of specialized schooling are courses in the Vietnamese language and in CBR. Career-type courses (basic and orientation) were offered only to Air Defense and Finance officers. Three officers attended their branch career courses. Undoubtedly, this number would have been higher had it not been for the additional service obligation involved.

(6) Decorations. A complete count of the decorations won by the resignees could not be made. Many officers were still in Vietnam when this study was initiated and had not received their end-of-tour awards. In other cases, Forms 66 were not up-to-date or behind in being posted. Using a December 1969 cut-off, the total number of recorded awards is still impressive. The resignees had won 9 Silver Stars, 93 Bronze Stars, 50 Army Commendation Medals, and 7 Purple Hearts.

(7) Letters of Commendation. Resignees experienced more difficulty in obtaining letters of commendation than in winning awards. Only 27

of the 100 files examined contained letters of commendation. Of the 27 recipients, 19 had received one letter, 6 had two letters; and 2 officers had three letters.

d. Adherence to normal career patterns should not be construed as being synonymous with career satisfaction. As Part IV will show later, many of the resigning officers question present career patterns and cite their existence as a reason for departing.

7. Was marriage a factor in resigning?

a. Answer: Yes.

b. USMA officers tend to marry sooner than contemporaries receiving their commissions from other sources. The highest marriage rate is experienced by the outstanding performers in the A Group.

	<u>A Group</u>	<u>B Group</u>	<u>C Group</u>	<u>All Officers (Army-Wide)</u>
Percent Married as 2LT	79.2	63.8	39.6	55.5
Percent Married as 1LT (Cumulative)	93.4	72.5	43.0	59.1
Percent Married as CPT (Cumulative)	93.4	91.3	70.5	80.1
Single in 1970	6.6	8.7	29.4	19.9

c. The early marriage rate becomes especially significant when considered in conjunction with normal assignment patterns under which most young officers, after some schooling and seasoning, are ordered to Vietnam as second lieutenants or junior first lieutenants. In this context, for better than four out of five A Group performers, the Vietnam tour becomes

a family separation. Army-wide, this holds true for only one junior officer out of two. Thus, it can be hypothesized that USMA officers, and especially the good performers, are exposed to family separations and the pressures attendant thereto, earlier in their careers than contemporaries who derived their commission from a different source.

Chapter 4

Future Plans

Section I - In Army

NOTE: Group indicators A, B, and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group consists of 22 resignees with outstanding service records; the B Group refers to 36 resignees with average duty performance; and the C Group consists of 42 resignees who accumulated below average records.

1. In this section, the study group attempted to reconstruct what might have happened to the resignees, had they stayed in the Army.
2. Would they have gone back to RVN for another tour?
 - a. Answer: Yes for the majority.
 - b. For 19 resignees a return tour to RVN was imminent (within the next six months).
 - c. For 35 additional resignees, a second tour in Vietnam was highly likely in the near future, a period 6 to 18 months from now.
3. What military schooling would they have attended?
 - a. Answer: The Career Course.
 - b. Most resignees were eligible for and would have been programmed into their branch career course either in the 1970/71 or 1971/72 school years.
4. How many were being considered for advanced civil schooling?
 - a. Answer: Only a minority of resignees were under consideration for advanced civil schooling in the near future.
 - b. The branches had discussed advanced civil schooling with 18

resignees. The branches were considering another 12 resignees for graduate degrees but had not discussed their plans with the individuals.

5. What were their chances for promotion?

a. Answer: Most officers had records which supported advancement.

b. According to the branches, at least 20 resignees had accumulated records which might support an accelerated promotion.

c. On the other hand, the branch assignment officers thought that from 25 to 30 resignees might have had difficulty in securing promotion to major.

6. What were the resignees own military career expectations?

a. Answer: Highly optimistic.

b. Resignees were asked to state what rank they would hold five, ten, and fifteen years from now. The expectations, given below, do not correlate to a marked degree with current performance standing. A Group performers, however, are more optimistic about their promotion chances than members of the C Group.

<u>5-10-15 Year Pattern</u>	<u>Percent Responses in</u>		
	<u>A Group</u>	<u>B Group</u>	<u>C Group</u>
Captain/Major/Lieutenant Colonel	5	21	27
Major/ Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel	90	69	64
Lieutenant Colonel/Colonel/ Brigadier General	5	10	9

Section II - Civilian Expectations

1. What are the resignees' immediate plans?

a. Answer: The majority plans to enroll in a university for a graduate

degree. The intensity of desire for advanced schooling is almost evenly distributed among all performance groups. The C Group stands slightly higher here than the others, possibly because C Group members, on the average, have higher Graduate Records Exam scores and may find it easier to secure admission.

b. Graduate education plans are portrayed below:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percentage Who Will</u>	
	<u>Go to Graduate School</u>	<u>Not Go to Graduate School</u>
A	75	25
B	74	26
C	83	17

2. Did the Army offer graduate schooling to those desiring an advanced education?

a. Answer: Only to a minority of the resignees.

b. Offers of a government-financed graduate education vary significantly among performance groups. A majority of the resignees from the A Group received offers; but only a few members of the B and C Groups.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Percent Offered an Advanced Civil Schooling</u>
A	64
B	19
C	13
All	26

c. The relatively few offers made for graduate schooling, coupled with the intense desire for this type of schooling, may point to a

communication problem: namely, the possibility that resignees are not aware of the many opportunities available in the Army for obtaining a graduate degree.

d. In the judgment of the Study Group, a booklet or pamphlet titled "You and the Graduate Degree" would be helpful in removing the communications problem. The pamphlet should outline (1) the advantages of not crowding degrees too closely together in a time of rapid change and (2) the opportunities an individual has in the Army for obtaining the degree (by being sent to graduate school; in conjunction with CGSC or the War College; or on his own using tuition assistance, etc.).

3. What will the resignee major in?

a. Answer: The majority will study law.

b. Other majors listed include:

Business	Economics
Metallurgical Engineering	Architecture
OR/SA	Structural Engineering
Education	Computer Science
Managerial Psychology	General Engineering
Russian Studies	Physics
Journalism	Medicine
Mathematics	Dentistry
	English

c. It is significant that the Army has graduate education requirements in all the fields which the resignees propose to study.

4. What occupations will the resignees join?

a. Answer: A variety of occupations. Interestingly enough, the occupations selected do not necessarily relate to the fields which the resignees plan to study.

b. What is also significant is that in subsequent interviews many resignees stated that they hope to become self-employed or work for small companies. Only a minority plan to become associated with large organizations.

c. Occupations listed include:

Engineering Management	Production Management
Attorney	General Journalism
Business Law	Scientific Journalism
Marketing	Banking
Advertising	Self-Employed
Research Engineer	Investment Counselor
HS Teacher	Insurance
HS Principal	Real Estate
Personnel Management	Government Service
Data Processing	International Firm
Politics	Architect
Judge	Consultant
Stockbroker	Doctor
Dentist	Sales
Social Work	

4. What are resignee expectations for earnings in their civilian employment?

Answer: \$1135.00 per month (average).

5. How do resignee civilian earnings expectations compare with military pay?

a. Answer: Significantly higher.

b. Resignees estimate their current monthly military pay to be \$896.00. Thus, they expect their civilian earnings, on the average, to be \$239.00 per month higher.

c. In actuality, resignees are underestimating the value of their military pay which, for captains with less than four years service, is much closer to \$1,000.00 per month. Since they probably overestimate

their expected civilian compensation, it is doubted that resignation will lead to an immediate advancement in the resignee standard of living.

PART III

Why He's Getting Out

Chapter 1 - Summary

1. The Letter of Resignation

a. Letters of resignation are of limited value as clues to reasons why the resignee is getting out.

b. Good performers tend to write polite, courteous letters; poor performers frequently use the letter to advise the Army of its shortcomings.

c. Implied in the letter is that the good performer is dissatisfied with the paucity of Army opportunities; the poor performer criticizes the Army for his own real or perceived failure.

d. Categorizing letters of resignation by counting the frequency of reasons for resigning given is of little value as a management tool. Taking action on the reasons given in these letters would not solve the resignation problem.

2. The TAG File

a. TAG files contain valuable data which can explain the "real" reasons for getting out.

b. In many cases, the real reason is a real or perceived failure which causes the resignee to consider himself as having become less competitive in a military career.

c. About 75% of resignees had entries in their record (Article 15,

academic reports, ER's, etc.) which could be interpreted by them as "black marks."

d. Using our own criteria, the Study Group classified the resignees as follows: A Group (above average) -- 22%; B Group (average) -- 36%; C Group (below average) -- 42%.

e. From an analysis of two groups of stayers, of equivalent length of service, it was noted that "above-average" officers are distributed among stayers at better than twice the frequency as among resignees. Conversely, the distribution of below-average performers among resignees, compared to their distribution among stayers, is about 1.7 : 1.0.

f. Resignees from the Signal Branch had the lowest ER's, as a group. The Signal Branch, itself, had the poorest retention experience, among all branches, for USMA 1966 officers. Conversely, Engineer resignees had the highest ER's, while the Engineer Branch had the best retention experience.

g. Many resignees had but one efficiency report sharply deviating from the general pattern of their reports. If that report were dropped, it would have been possible to reclassify 33 resignees into higher performance groups.

3. The OPO File

a. Retention experience among career branches varied. This should not result in the requirement of keeping comparative data. Such a move could lead to the hand-managing of USMA graduates, to the detriment of young officers commissioned from other sources.

b. Letters of resignation are not the first tip-off about career intentions which the branch receives. OPO files show that in 68% of the cases there was an earlier tip-off. The earlier tip-off normally came at the 3 years' service point. Better performers are more likely to tip their branches than poorer performers.

c. One branch was developing a program to respond to tip-off's picked up from better performers. The program appears to have high potential for success, because at the time of the tip-off the potential resignee has not yet made firm plans and commitments. He can still be swayed.

d. The clustering of tip-off's at the 3-year point would lead to the conclusion that a 5-year service commitment for USMA graduates is too long.

e. Only one-third of resignees had visited their branches to review records and receive career counseling. To some resignees, seeing their records was a "traumatic shock" and prompted their decision to resign.

f. Better performers are more likely than poorer performers to influence their careers by writing their branch.

g. The tone and content of OPO correspondence with careerists needs improving.

h. Preference statements were used by only a minority of resignees to request assignment choices. Poor use of preference statements is

undoubtedly due to the age of the form and the practical impossibility of relating it to today's Army.

i. OPO advised only a minority of resignees where they stood career-wise. Only 14% of outstanding performers had received letters of praise for their records and assurance that they were competitive. And, only one out of five below-average performer had received "jack-up" letters.

j. Information on which OPO can base a letter of praise or a "jack-up" letter is usually several months behind the times. As a result, OPO runs the risk that the individual's career situation may have changed greatly by the time he gets his letter.

k. OPO does not write follow-up letters to "jack-up" letters. Thus, an individual is told that he isn't competitive, but then remains in limbo with regard to whether his subsequent actions have cleaned the slate.

l. Insensitive handling of some cases by OPO assignment officers may have swayed a minority of resignees toward their decision.

4. The Survey

a. Members of the 3 performance groups used in this study gave about the same number of important and decisive reasons for getting out.

b. Collectively, the 10 most important reasons for getting out are family separations, another Vietnam tour, red tape, the personal missing in career management, frequent relocations, promotions based on seniority, lack of opportunity for independent action, uninspiring

leaders, lack of integrity on the part of superiors, and over-supervision.

c. Collectively, the ten least important reasons were fear of being passed over, the Army getting too technological, not getting opportunity for command experience, racial problems, not being able to get the military school of one's choice, being put in positions of little career value, the brutality of war, not having a chance to use Army training, not being able to gain access to senior officers, and the post exchanges.

d. The three performance groups vary sharply in the reasons selected for getting out.

(1) Above-average performers are concerned primarily with the paucity of opportunities in the Army. They want faster promotions, more authority, opportunities for more independent action, less supervision by superiors, less red tape to slow them down, and more money. They are ambitious, career-oriented, fully aware of their own worth, and want to get as far as they can get.

(2) Average performers do a good job at work, but their real interests are "middle-class" and "suburban." They object to family separations. They want more free time to pursue private activities and a private life. They prefer stability to turbulence and show more concern than any other group for the esteem in which their civilian neighbors hold the military profession.

(3) The below-average performers are most critical of Army activities which relate to performance. They do not care for personnel management and the ER system. They do not consider superiors competent nor believe that they were given an opportunity to prove themselves by being allowed to specialize in a "suitable" assignment. They did not think that superiors accepted responsibility for their mistakes or that they evidenced much integrity. In short, they blame the system for their personal "failure."

e. The differences between performance groups are so sharp that taking corrective action on the junior officer retention problem through means of generalized surveys would be a waste of time. Items which irritate one group are considered a plus by another and vice versa.

f. For maximum corrective action on dissatisfiers, the following classification needs to be undertaken:

(1) Dissatisfiers which apply to potential careerists but not to two-year obligors, and vice versa.

(2) Dissatisfiers which apply to USMA graduates, but not to careerists from other sources, and vice versa.

(3) Dissatisfiers which are perceived as a plus by stayers. Correcting these may cause the majority to get out.

(4) Dissatisfiers which are assigned a different value (positive or negative) by different performance groups.

(5) Dissatisfiers which have been present historically, as opposed to dissatisfiers which are temporary in nature, caused by the Vietnam war.

g. The poor performers were the least satisfied with career management.

h. Dissatisfaction with pay and fringes is not too widespread. These areas rank far behind others as dissatisfiers. However, many officers are concerned with future pay. Resignees have had two promotions. Over the next 16 years they can expect only two additional promotions. Many feel the Army should concentrate incentives at later milestones, rather than at the point of career entry, so as to make the prospects for continuing the career journey worthwhile.

i. Resignees underestimate the value of their military compensation.

j. The desire to specialize, to be allowed to use one's special training, or to be employed in suitable assignments, is most often voiced by poor performers.

k. Resignees generally think highly of military schools. Some branch dissatisfaction exists with the lack of challenges at the Air Defense School.

l. The requirement to attend Ranger School is not an especially important reason for getting out. In fact, most resignees enjoyed the course but would have preferred less demeaning harrassment.

m. Low quality troops are not a factor in resignations per se. However, the reason is more common in branches with a concentration of Cat IV soldiers. Care must be taken that low quality EM do not drive out good officers.

n. Army social life and senior wives are more often a plus than a minus.

o. Wife dislike for Army is important, but not as important as is generally thought.

p. Contemporaries are just as important in influencing a young officer to resign as his wife.

q. The principal gripes in officer clubs are superior officers, another tour in Vietnam, and poor job satisfaction. Resignees say these gripes are sufficiently serious to be considered as reasons for getting out.

r. Many resignees are concerned with "political interference" with the war.

s. Our presence in Vietnam is a factor, but a minor one. Racial problems, though highly-publicized, are not viewed as a reason. The recent adverse publicity which the Army received influenced one out of four poor performers in their resignation decision. The better performers were less affected by the publicity.

5. The Interviews.

a. Interviewees did not represent a statistical sample. Hence, their views must be considered as individual expressions.

b. Interviewees were deeply concerned with the "system" which they see as destroying leadership, integrity and honor as superiors climb ahead on an ascending statistical report curve.

c. Interviewees gave case histories of insensitive career management, involving a field commander and OPO.

d. Interviewees expressed concern about the promotion system which, they felt, did not discriminate or relate to outstanding performance.

e. Interviewees recounted problems with OER's and some of the poor uses to which this instrument can be put.

Chapter 2 - The Letter of Resignation

NOTE: Group Indicators A, B, and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group consists of 22 resignees with outstanding service records; the B Group is composed of 36 resignees who accumulated average records; and the C Group consists of 42 resignees with below-average performance records.

1. What Are the Principal Reasons for Resigning Given in Letters of Resignation?

- a. Answer: Different career goals, graduate school, and the desire to maintain a normal family life.
- b. The top ten reasons, with the frequency stated, are as follows:

<u>Reason</u>	<u>Frequency*</u>
Different Career Goals	48
Graduate School	33
Family Life	24
Doesn't Like Army	13
Lack of Challenge in Army	12
Wants More Money	7
Served His Obligation	6
Can't use Initiative	5
Work with Minorities	4
In Conflict with Personal Beliefs	4

* Many letters contain more than one reason. Consequently, the total will exceed 100.

2. Do High Performers and Low Performers Offer Substantially the Same Reasons for Resigning in Their Letters of Resignation?

a. Answer: No.

b. High performers generally write short, terse letters in which they advise the Army of their interest in a different career goal or their desire to attend a graduate school. Letters from A Group members are seldom critical of the Army as an institution.

c. Low performers, on the other hand, write long letters which cite shortcomings in the Army as their reason for resigning. The list lack of challenge, poor assignment choices, inability to use initiative, unfair promotion policies, red tape, declining prestige, "boot-licking" superiors as causes.

d. While neither high nor low performers provide in their letters the "true" reason for getting out, the different rationalizations advanced by the two groups is significant. The A Group writer seems to convey dissatisfaction with Army opportunities. As an able man, he is striking out for areas where he thinks his rewards will come faster. The C Group writer, on the other hand, appears to blame the Army and the Army's way of doing things for real or perceived failures in duty performance.

e. In paragraph 3, below, we will see how sharp the differences are between reasons advanced in letters of resignation and the reasons given in later interviews and surveys.

3. Do Letters of Resignation "Tell It as it is"?

a. Answer: No.

b. Below are extracts of letters of resignation juxtaposed with comments obtained from the writers during the interview session or in the course of the survey:

FROM LETTER

"I desire to tender my resignation because of personal and business reasons..."

"My personal interests and those of my family are not coincident with the demands of a military career..."

"There exists in America today a desperate need for responsible leadership within the minority groups. Nowhere is the need so great as among the American Indian. I am determined to provide that missing leadership, and to make a significant contribution to our society..."

"I desire to tender my resignation because I do not feel a military career is consistent with my personal goals and objectives in life. My ambition is to own and operate a private business of my own and this cannot be accomplished while I remain in the service..."

FROM INTERVIEW

"I have been repeatedly faced with incompetent superiors." (The officer then cited five examples of what he meant.)

"The job I had in Vietnam completely disgusted me. I observed the action of a division staff directed by an irrational Chief of Staff. The deceit, hypocrisy and self-seeking of the staff officers revolted me. I do not desire to become locked into such an organization and this is the best time to leave it..."

"I am fully capable of performing jobs calling for higher rank than captain. Yet, even if I do perform well, there is no flexibility in the promotion system to pay me for the job I do..." "...I asked OPO about the possibility of a certain assignment. The reply was: 'That is a good job for sure. One of the OPO assignment officers will get that. Sorry..."

"I have no real reason for resigning and can be talked into remaining. If I only knew that my contributions were sufficient to place me high among my contemporaries, and if someone would take the effort to counsel me, I'd be happy to stay..." (This officer, it should be noted, has 2 silver stars, 1 ACM (Valor), 5 near maximum efficiency reports and 1 which is well above average.)

4. Are Letters of Resignation of Value in Retention Studies?

a. Answer: A qualified no.

b. The letters do not assume meaning until they are analyzed in terms of the writers' duty performance and related to personal interviews and objective survey comments.

c. Unless these steps are taken, the letters would be meaningless. Little would be gained by categorizing reasons for resignation offered in these letters as a basis for corrective action. The Army would only fire on the wrong target. After the smoke cleared away, the problem of resignations would remain as before.

Chapter 3 - Reasons for Resignation Collected from Individual and AG Files

NOTE: Group indicators A, B, and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group consists of 22 resignees with outstanding service records; the B Group refers to 36 resignees with average records; and the C Group contains 42 resignees who accumulated substandard records

1. In this step, the resignees' official files were analyzed for clues which may explain their desire to leave service. Since none of the letters of resignation had hinted at personal career difficulties such as poor efficiency reports, failure to be promoted with contemporaries, or reprimands, the review of files was designed to unearth such incidents. In the process, the resignees were rated by quality and compared to two groups of stayers--members of their own USMA class and RA officers commissioned from the ROTC in 1966, using the same evaluation standards. The quality analysis was thought to be important for two reasons; first, the Study Group wanted to know if reasons for getting out varied among quality groups. Second, the Study Group wanted to determine if the Army is losing quality through resignations.

2. What Was the Quality Distribution of Resignees?

a. Answer: 22% had above-average records; 36% had average records; and 42% had below average records.

b. Quality was determined through use of uniform scoring of efficiency reports along with a consideration of academic efficiency reports and other discriminators, such as awards and decorations.

3. How Does the Quality of Resignees Compare with the Quality of Stayers?

a. Answer: Stayers are of a higher quality.

b. Using the same scoring criteria, resignees compared as follows with two groups of stayers (100 in each group selected at random by TAG personnel):

<u>Category</u>	<u>Percent Described as:</u>		
	<u>Above Average</u>	<u>Average</u>	<u>Below Average</u>
Resignees	22	36	42
100 RA Officers Commissioned from ROTC in 1966	40	40	20
100 Stayers, USMA Class of 1966	49	26	25

4. What is the Ratio of "Above Average Stayers" to "Above Average Resignees"?

Answer: 2.02 : 1.00.

5. What is the Ratio of "Below Average Resignees" to "Below Average Stayers"?

Answer: 1.68 : 1.00.

6. Should These Ratios be Calculated at Periodic Intervals ?

Answer: An emphatic yes.

b. At present, the Army needs not be alarmed about loss of quality. But, should the ratio of "above average stayers" to "above average resignees" decline, the Army will need to take action. For this purpose, the ratio is a valuable management indicator and trend predictor. It can trigger the signal for corrective action before the problem becomes too apparent.



c. In this connection, it is immaterial what standards are used in determining what is above average, average, and below average. The main thing is that the same individual make the determination for all records reviewed, using uniform standards. The ratios then calculated will be comparable from period to period, regardless of who performed the record review and what criteria he used.

7. Are Efficiency Reports Comparable for Resignees from Different Branches?

a. Answer: No.

b. Officers from the Signal Corps received the lowest ER's, on average.

c. Using the ER's of Signal Corps officers as a base of 1, the ER's of resignees from other branches compared as follows, in ascending order:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Ratio 'o Signal Corps ER's</u>
Miscellaneous (MI, QM, FC, TC, AG)	1.06
Infantry	1.07
Armor	1.08
Air Defense	1.10
Artillery	1.16
Engineers	1.35

8. Is there a Relationship between the ER's Resignees Received by Branch and Branch Resignation Experience?

a. Answer: Apparently yes.

b. Branches experienced varying degrees of success in retaining USMA 1966 officers. As in ER's, Signal and Engineers here, too, occupied the extremes of the scale. Signal, which had the lowest ER's, had the worst retention experience; whereas, the Engineers with the best ER's also enjoyed the best retention.

<u>1</u> <u>Branch</u>	<u>2</u> <u>Graduates</u> <u>Assigned to</u> <u>Branch</u>	<u>3</u> <u>% of the</u> <u>Graduating</u> <u>Class</u>	<u>4</u> <u>Branch Re-</u> <u>signees as</u> <u>% of Total</u> <u>Resignees</u>	<u>5</u> <u>Ratio</u> <u>Column</u> <u>4 over</u> <u>Column 3</u>	<u>6</u> <u>Branch</u> <u>Comparative</u> <u>Standing in</u> <u>Retention</u> <u>of USMA '66</u> <u>Officers</u>	<u>7</u> <u>Branch</u> <u>Comparative</u> <u>Standing</u> <u>on ER's</u>
Signal	47	8.5	16.0	2.12 : 1.00	Last	Last
Engineers	65	11.7	2.0	0.17 : 1.00	Best	Best

9. How Many Resignees May Perceive Themselves as Having Unfavorable Data in Their Files?

a. Answer: The majority. Exactly 75% of the resignees, or 3 out of 4, may perceive themselves to be "military failures" as the result of "career damaging" information in their files.

<u>Resignees</u> <u>Studied</u>	<u>Resignees with</u> <u>Unfavorable Info</u> <u>in Files</u>	<u>Type of Unfavorable Data*</u> (Number of Instances)			
		<u>Very Low ER's</u>	<u>Low ER's</u>	<u>Relief R/S</u>	<u>Other**</u>
100	75	45	64	31	16

* Instances of unfavorable data will add to more than 75 because some individuals have more than one type of unfavorable data in their files.

**Other includes relief from command, delayed promotion, reprimands, academic failure in schools other than Ranger School.

b. Individuals possessing "unfavorable" data in their files are found in all branches:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Number Resignees</u>	<u>Resignees with "Unfavorable Data"</u>
Infantry	24	19
Artillery	15	13
Air Defense	16	12
Armor	10	5
Signal	18	13
Other	17	13

c. What is significant about the extent of "unfavorable" data is that it may cause many young officers to consider their records worse than they really are. It should not be ruled out that one of their main reasons for leaving service is the unspoken feeling that they are no longer competitive. If this is so, the officers' self-estimate of their performance is considerably harsher than official opinion.

<u>Group Making Judgement</u>	<u>Number of Resignees Considered Below Average</u>
Study Group	42
OPO Assignment Officers	25-30
Resignees Themselves	75

10. How Many Resignees Have Just One ER Out of Line?

a. Answer: 33.

b. The following table illustrates how many resignees, had they

received a higher score on one ER, would have classified for categorization in a higher performance group:

<u>Movement</u>	<u>Number of Individuals</u>
From B to A	15
From C to B	18

Chapter 4 - Reasons for Resignation Collected
From OPO Files

NOTE: Group indicators A, B, and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group consists of 22 resignees with above-average records; the B Group contains 36 resignees with average records; and the C Group consists of 42 resignees who accumulated below-average performance records.

1. The Study Group visited the career branches of the resignees and examined there each resignee's file and discussed him with his assignment officer. Of particular interest to the Study Group was the interplay between career branch and individual officer, as detectable by correspondence, preference statements, and records of individual phone calls. The Study Group was interested to learn how responsive OPO had been to the individual career needs and desires of the resigning officer -- at least those which should be considered as reasonable -- and the tone and content of communications from branch to the individual. The Study Group was equally interested in obtaining an assignment officer's judgment on the resignee's past performance, in relation to contemporaries, and his potential.
2. The survey, described in the next chapter, was still outstanding during the visit to OPO. After receipt and tabulation it revealed considerable discontent with Army career management. Only 5% of resignees considered it a positive factor. 29% said it had no bearing on their decision to resign. But 23% said career management had some influence. And almost half, or 43%, stated that career management had "a lot" to do with their choice to leave service. It must be pointed out, however, that many of the factors which resignees include under career management are outside OPO's control. For this reason one must be careful not to confuse resignee criticism of

career management with resignee criticism of OPO. The majority of branches had been highly responsive to the officers' desires; they had gone to extremes to satisfy their whims; and two branches were actively engaged in getting at least some of the resignees (those with outstanding records) to change their minds.

3. Was Retention Experience for USMA Class of 1966 Equally Distributed Among the Branches?

Answer: No. Some branches had excellent retention experience. Others did not. Figures are given below:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Assigned to Branch</u>	<u>Resignations in (30 Apr 70)</u>	<u>Percent Retained (30 Apr 70)</u>
Infantry	130	24	81.5
Artillery	92	15	83.7
Air Defense	51	16	68.6
Armor	62	10	83.9
Signal	47	18	61.7
Engineer	65	2	96.9
Miscellaneous	107	15	86.0

4. Should Competitiveness Among Branches for USMA Retention Be Encouraged?

a. Answer: No.

b. Competition in this area would lead to the hand-managing of young USMA officers, to the detriment of those officers commissioned from other sources.

5. Is the Letter of Resignation the First Tip-Off of the Resignee's Intent Which the Branch Receives?

a. Answer: No.

b. In 68% of the cases, the resignee provided an earlier clue. The clue came in a variety of forms. It might be contained in a preference statement, in a remark which a superior includes in an efficiency report, or most often, in an inquiry about service commitments associated with attending the career course. The clues usually cluster around the third year of service. The better officers are more conscientious in planning their resignation by not accepting assignments which could lead to another service commitment. Members of the C Group are more impulsive about departing. One explanation for this is that the adverse performance rating which may have placed them into the C Group did not come until they were approaching eligibility for resignation. Groups provided tip-offs in these percentages.

Group	Percent Tipping Off Branch At Least 6 Months Before Letter
A	87
B	71
C	54
All	68

c. During the visit to OPO it was noted that branches made no special effort to persuade those tipping their hand about resigning to change their minds. In most cases, the branches merely complied with the individual's request not to attend the career course by planning a different assignment

for him. The Artillery Branch, however, had become alert to the possibilities of acting when the tip-off arrives. The branch was developing a policy by which young officers with above-average records, who tipped their intent, were to receive letters from the branch chief, advising them of their high standing among their contemporaries and prospective career development plans. The letter was to be reinforced by a communication to the battalion commander, telling him of the "vacillating" young officer and giving him special career development plans which he could discuss with the potential resignee. A letter at this time will catch the possible resignee at a time when his plans are not firmed up. He may not yet be committed to a job or to a school. Letters written at a later time, after the official resignation notice has been received, are less effective in that the resignee may have made very firm commitments from which he cannot extract himself. Thus, these later letters are less likely to get him to change his mind. Their prime advantage -- and a very important one at that -- is to leave the man with a good taste in his mouth.

d. The clustering of the tip-offs at the three-year-service mark has interesting implications for the current policy which demands five years service for a USMA education. In Part II, Chapter 3, it was noted that most graduates were unsure about their career intentions at the time of commissioning. The tip-offs at the three-year-point would indicate that it takes young officers about that long to make up their mind. If this is correct, then the five-year obligation is altogether too long. It exacts two years of totally involuntary service from the majority of resignees, thereby instilling bitterness and defeating any opportunity for getting

outstanding potential resignees to change their mind about leaving.

6. To What Extent Did Resignees Visit Their Branches?

a. Answer: About one third of the resignees had visited their career branches.

b. The incidence of branch visitation is equally distributed among all performance groups:

Group	Percent Visiting Branch
A	34
B	33
C	31

c. For some C Group members, the visit was traumatic. They expressed astonishment at some of their performance ratings which had not been shown to them by the rater. Undoubtedly, in these cases, the visit was a factor in causing resignation.

7. To What Extent Did Resignees Communicate With Their Branches?

a. Answer: About two third of resignees had communicated with their branches in writing. Another third (among which were numerous individuals who complained in the survey about career management) had never attempted to influence their career development.

b. As could be expected, good performers, who are career-oriented, could be expected to influence their careers to a greater degree than poorer performers. See the next two tables:

Group	Average No. of Letters Per Individual
A	2.8
C	1.3

Group	Percent With 3 or More Letters in File
A	46
C	23

8. What Kind of Replies Did Resignees Get to Their Communications?

a. Answer: Fairly poor ones.

b. Replies are not personalized. They are periphrastic and circumlocutory. By quoting policy in response to an individual request, they appear to give the writer the brush-off. But if the writer is persistent enough, and doesn't accept the first reply, he is more likely to get what he wants. The tone of letters, from branch to branch, is sufficiently alike to make one suspect that at one time a policy guide, containing sample replies to common inquiries, may have existed.

c. There is room for considerable improvement in the preparation of branch letters. If possible, first names should be used. The quoting of policy should be eliminated. Circumlocution should be avoided. If the branch doesn't have the reply to a question, it should say it doesn't know and not say that action will depend on something which, in turn, depends on something else, which in some instances, may depend on still a third circumstance. Before replying to queries, assignment officers should habitually review the writer's entire record. There may be a clue or incident in his past performance which prompted his request, even though his letter may not mention it. If that's the case, the assignment officer should insert a personalized comment in replies which may have nothing to do with the subject under discussion but may impart the much-needed feeling

that the branch knows and cares (Example: "We were proud of your getting the Silver Star," or "Incidentally, we were pleased to note that you performed so well in your last command.")

9. Did Resignees Make Use of Preference Statements?

a. Answer: Not extensively. Less than one-third of resignees had a current preference statement in their files.

b. The limited use of preference statements can be readily understood. The current form is dated 1960, predating the organization of OPO by two years. It does not reflect the organizational changes which have taken place in the Army in the past decade. For instance, major commands like AMC, CDC, STRATCOM, ASA and others are not reflected on the form. There is no room for expressing an interest in any of the special career programs. Assignments which the Army emphasizes, like advisory duties, are not on the form. Nor can the form be related to the present pamphlet on Career Development. Thus, the officer could learn from the pamphlet what he should be doing at a particular point in his career. But if he then wanted that assignment, he could not find it on the preference statement. It can be surmised that the existence of so old and unrealistic form seriously destroyed its credibility. This may account for the limited use which resignees made of it.

c. It is the Study Group's understanding that OPO has now revised the preference statement to include special career programs and the current Army commands. We further understand that the revised form will be compatible with career development guidance issued by the branches.

10. Did OPO Advise the Resignees Where They Stood Career-Wise?

a. Answer: Generally no.

b. When officers were informed, they were more likely to be "jacked-up" than praised.

Group	Percent Receiving Letters of Praise	Percent Receiving "Jack-Up" Letters	Percent Having No Indicator
A	14	0	86
B	8	3	89
C		19	81

c. In examining these letters it was noted that:

(1) Many more officers should have received the encouragement contained in letters of praise.

(2) Because of the slowness in getting ER's into an individual's career file, the typical "jack-up" letter may refer to an ER which is six months old or older when the letter is written. In the meantime, the recipient, unknown to OPO, might have won two Silver Stars and bitterly resent the letter. While there is no objection to "jack-up" letters, the opening paragraph should acknowledge that the incident is old and that, in the meantime, the individual might already have improved his performance.

(3) There is no follow-up to "jack-up" letters. This means that individuals have been placed in a situation where they know, without a doubt, that they are in trouble with their branch. But they are in limbo with regard to knowing whether through their subsequent actions they have redeemed themselves or not.

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11. As the Result of the Examination of Career Files, Can It Be Said that OPO Caused Some Resignations?

a. Answer: Possibly, in a few instances.

b. In ten of the 100 files studies there was indication that the handling of the individual by OPO may have contributed to his resignation. Below are three illustrations of what might be described as depersonalized personnel management:

(1) Case 1. An Infantry officer failed Ranger School. In subsequent assignments, including Vietnam, he performed well. However, his failure to secure the Ranger Tab seemed to bother him. In all, he wrote four times to his branch requesting to be rescheduled to school. In each case he received a noncommittal reply which stated that attendance in the course would depend on his availability, budgetary factors, the spaces allocated to the Infantry branch, etc. As a result, the officer never returned to the school to prove his machismo. In later correspondence, he indicated that the manner in which the branch handled his request was a major factor in deciding him to resign.

(2) Case 2. An officer in the B Group wrote the branch six letters in five months, asking in each for a different assignment. The branch responded to each letter as though it were unique. A more perceptive assignment officer might have decided that obviously there was something bothering the officer. He should have picked up the phone and called the officer's battalion commander to learn what troubled him.

(3) Case 3. An officer wrote his branch, inquiring about opportunities for advanced civil schooling. The branch reply invited him to submit an

application. The officer assembled transcripts, GRE scores, and filled out the necessary forms. On receipt, the branch informed him curtly that his present standing was not competitive enough to warrant attendance at advanced civil schooling. In this instance, the two letters to the officer -- the encouraging one and the turn-down -- were authored by different assignment officers.

c. The individuals which may have been lost through handling of the type described above came from all three performance categories:

Group	No. of Individuals
A	3
B	4
C	3

12. Can OPO Tak Action To Improve Its Handling of Young Officers?

a. Answer. Yes.

b. Some of the improvements required have been touched on earlier in the chapter. They are summarized below:

(1) To attempt to persuade above-average officers to change their mind about resigning at the time the branch receives the first tip-off that the young officer may intend to leave service.

(2) To personalize correspondence.

(3) To make greater use of letters of praise.

(4) To write follow-up letters to "jack-up" letters.

(5) To exhibit more sensitivity in handling individual requests.

c. Other improvements, like the revised preference statement and the preparation of letters to outstanding potential resignees, after their letter of resignation has been received, are now under way.

d. Remaining improvements, not covered earlier in the chapter, are:

(1) To get TAG to speed distribution of letters of resignation to career branches. In the case of outstanding officers, every day counts.

(2) To not use captains as assignment officers for captains. In more than one case, the Study Group could sense that captain assignment officers were not too deeply troubled by the departure of officers with strong records. Although never enunciated, there was the unspoken feeling, "One less guy to worry about in making that five percent promotion."

Chapter 5 - The Survey

NOTE: Group indicators A, B, and C used in this chapter aggregate resignees by quality of duty performance. The A Group consists of 22 resignees with outstanding records. The B Group consists of 36 resignees with average performance records. The C Group contains 42 resignees who accumulated below-average performance records.

Section I - General

1. A survey containing 34 subjective questions and 70 objective questions was administered to the 100 resignees by mail. Eighty-one resignees responded. The distribution of A, B, and C Group performers among the respondents was about the same as in the entire group.
2. The 34 subjective questions were designed to (1) provide information about the resignee's personal history and plans, (2) allow the resignee to comment on his military experience, and (3) gather his views on what changes the Army would have to make to get him to change his mind.
3. The 70 objective questions contained a variety of reasons for leaving the service. Each objective question allowed the resignee to state whether the reason applied to him at all, very little, a lot, or was decisive.
4. A copy of the survey questionnaire is attached to Part VI of this study.

Section II - Over-all Findings

1. Did any Performance Group Cite More Reasons for Getting out Than any Other?

a. Answer: No.

b. All groups cited about the same number of reasons. But, as will be shown later, while the number of reasons offered is comparable, there is wide variation among the groups in the reasons which they selected.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Number of Reasons in the "A Lot" Category</u>	<u>Number of Reasons in the "Decisive" Category</u>
A	9.10	10.05
B	9.60	10.00
C	11.00	12.10

2. What Are the Ten Most Common Reasons Given for Getting Out - All Groups?

a. Answer: See table below.

b. The intensity index of the table is based on the scale from 1 to 6 which the respondents used on the surveys. Checking 1 meant the reason was not applicable at all. A 2 or 3 meant the reason affected the respondent "very little." A 4 meant the reason affected him a lot. A 5 and 6 meant the reason was decisive. If all 81 respondents had checked off the "5" column, the over-all intensity index would appear as 5 in the table. If, however, 40 had checked the 5 and 41 the 1, the intensity index would be the sum of 40×5 and 41×1 , with the total divided by 81, or 2.97.

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Intensity Index</u>
1	Family separations	4.36
2	Prospect of another Vietnam tour	4.22
3	Red Tape	3.78
4	The "personal" missing in career management	3.77
5	Frequent relocations	3.76
6	Promotions based on seniority	3.63
7	Lack of opportunity for independent action and initiative	3.56
8	Leaders who do not inspire	3.47
9	Lack of integrity on the part of superiors	3.46
10	Oversupervision by superiors	3.45

3. What Were the Next Twenty Reasons Advanced?

Answer: See Table, below:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Intensity Index</u>
11	Lack of private life	3.38
12	Superiors were not competent	3.34
13	No free time to pursue private life	3.25
14	Army is too slow to change with the times	3.16
15	Officer efficiency reports	3.15
16	Lack of authority commensurate with responsibilities	3.15
17	Too much turbulence	3.12
18	Superiors who do not assume responsibility for their mistakes	3.11
19	Not enough "outstanding" promotions	3.08
20	"Political interference" in the conduct of the war in Vietnam	2.91
21	Little prestige accorded officer by Army	2.86
22	Lack of pride in commission	2.81
23	Insufficient pay	2.78
24	Little opportunity to use education	2.78
25	Not having one's suggestions listened to	2.74
26	Demeaning additional duties	2.74
27	Unsuitable types of duty assignments	2.74
28	On-post housing	2.74
29	Poor quality of NCO's	2.72
30	Low prestige of the military	2.70

4. What Are Twenty Less Important Reasons (Less Important to the Group, that is) Advanced?

Answer: See Table, below:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Intensity Index</u>
31	Inadequate medical care	2.63
32	Regimentation	2.62
33	Assignments carried insufficient responsibility to be satisfying	2.59
34	Wife's dislike for Army	2.56
35	Lack of national support for war	2.52
36	Lean times ahead for the Army	2.48
37	Individual contributions not appreciated	2.46
38	Poor quality of contemporaries	2.43
39	Inadequate dental care	2.43
40	Superiors lacked courage	2.43
41	No chance to specialize	2.42
42	Superiors did not understand individual's problem	2.42
43	Poor quality of enlisted men	2.40
44	Promotions come too slowly	2.39
45	Poor geographical location of duty assignments	2.36
46	Desire to help with domestic problems	2.35
47	Army is too tradition-bound	2.35
48	Our presence in Vietnam	2.33
49	Being criticized inappropriately or for invalid reasons	2.33
50	Off-post housing	2.28

5. What Are the Least Frequently Voiced Reasons for Getting out?

Answer: See Table, below:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Intensity Index</u>
51	Assignments not in accordance with Preference Statement	2.25
52	Officer clubs	2.24
53	Commissaries	2.16
54	Fringe Benefits	2.14
55	Superiors were not dedicated	2.13
56	No opportunity to take leave	2.05
57	Recent adverse publicity	2.05
58	Fear of getting wounded or killed	2.05
59	Requirement to go to Ranger School	2.05
60	Quality of Army schools	2.00
61	Post Exchanges	1.99
62	Lack of senior officer accessibility	1.94
63	Little opportunity to use Army training	1.80

<u>Number</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Intensity Index</u>
64	Brutality of war	1.76
65	Positions occupied were of little career value	1.62
66	Unable to get Army school of choice	1.61
67	Racial problems within Army	1.53
68	No opportunity for command experience	1.52
69	Army getting too technological	1.33
70	Fear of being passed over	1.30

6. Is There a Difference Among Performance Groups in the Reasons Most Often Given for Getting Out?

a. Answer: Yes.

b. The A Group performer is most heavily bothered by conditions which impede his progress and advancement. The B Group performer is less career and more family oriented. He is interested in stability, free time, a private life, his family. While he does a good job at work, his true interests are wife and kids, the house and garden, vacations and recreation. The C Group member is bitter. He has not done well. He does not perceive any shortcomings in himself, but lists conditions which contributed to his "failure".

c. The tables which follow will list: first -- the 15 most decisive reasons provided by each performance group; next - the 15 reasons most often checked "a lot" and "decisive" by each performance group; and last - the 15 reasons which least affect each performance group.

DECISIVE REASONS - A GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent of Group Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On C Group List Position</u>	<u>On B Group List Position</u>
1	Promotions based on seniority	51	--	X - 6
2	Family separations	50	X - 7	X - 1
3	Red tape	47	X - 6	X - 10
4	Not enough outstanding promotions	45	--	--
5	Prospect of another VN tour	45	X - 8	X - 2
6	Promotions come too slowly	40	--	--
7	Frequent relocations	33	--	X - 5
8	Army too slow to change	31	--	---
9	Personal missing in career management	30	X - 1	X - 3
10	Lack of opportunity for independent action	26	X - 2	X - 7
11	Supervisors over-supervised	26	X - 4	X - 13
12	Lack of authority commensurate with responsibility	25	X - 15	X - 11
13	Supervisors were not competent	25	X - 3	--
14	Leaders were not inspiring	25	--	--
15	Desire to help with domestic Problems	25	--	--

DECISIVE REASONS - B GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent of Group Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On A Group List Position</u>	<u>On C Group List Position</u>
1	Family separations	68	X - 2	X - 7
2	Prospect of another VN tour	50	X - 5	X - 8
3	Personal missing in career management	40	X - 9	X - 1
4	"Political interference" with war	40	--	--
5	Frequent relocations	39	X - 7	--
6	Promotions based on seniority	34	X - 1	--
7	Lack of opportunity for independent action	33	X - 10	X - 2
8	Lack of pride in being an Army officer	28	--	X - 9
9	Lack of integrity of superiors	27	--	X - 10
10	Red tape	27	X - 3	X - 6
11	Lack of authority commensurate with responsibility	27	X - 13	X - 15
12	Poor quality of NCO's	26	--	--
13	Supervisors over-supervised	25	X - 11	X - 4
14	Too much turbulence	25	--	X - 14
15	Low prestige of military	25	--	--

DECISIVE REASONS - C GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent of Group Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On A Group List Position</u>	<u>On B Group List Position</u>
1	Personal missing in career management	48	X - 9	X - 3
2	Lack of opportunity for independent action	39	X - 10	X - 7
3	Supervisors not competent	38	X - 14	--
4	Supervisors over-supervised	36	X - 11	X - 13
5	Unsuitable duty assignments	36	--	--
6	Red tape	35	X - 3	X - 10
7	Family separations	34	X - 2	X - 1
8	Prospect of another tour in Vietnam	34	X - 5	X - 2
9	Lack of pride in being an Army officer	32	--	X - 8
10	Lack of integrity of supervisors	31	--	X - 9
11	Supervisors did not assume responsibility for their mistakes	31	--	--
12	Little prestige accorded you by Army	31	--	--
13	Officer Efficiency Reports	30	--	--
14	Too much turbulence	28	--	X - 14
15	Lack of authority commensurate with responsibility	27	X - 13	X - 11

DECISIVE AND "A LOT" COMBINED -- A GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent of Group Which checked Reason</u>	<u>On C Group List Position</u>	<u>On B Group List Position</u>
1	Red tape	77	X - 3	X - 4
2	Family separations	75	X - 8	X - 2
3	Promotions based on seniority	70	--	X - 6
4	Not enough outstanding promotions	70	--	--
5	Army too slow to change with times	62	--	--
6	Lack of private life	53	--	X - 5
7	Lack of opportunity for independent action	52	X - 7	X - 12
8	Leaders are not inspiring	50	--	X - 15
9	Lack of integrity on part of superiors	50	X - 11	X - 9
10	On post housing	50	--	--
11	Superiors do not assume responsibility for mistakes	48	X - 15	--
12	Insufficient pay	48	--	--
13	Prospect of another tour in Vietnam	48	X - 4	X - 1
14	Promotions come too slowly	45	--	--
15	Superiors not competent	45	X - 6	--

DECISIVE AND "A LOT" COMBINED - B GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent of Group Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On A Group List Position</u>	<u>On C Group List Position</u>
1	Prospect of another tour in VN	90	X - 13	X - 4
2	Family separations	86	X - 2	X - 8
3	Frequent relocations	64	--	X - 14
4	Red tape	61	X - 1	X - 3
5	Lack of private life	55	X - 6	--
6	Promotions based on seniority	54	X - 3	--
7	No free time to have a private life	54	--	--
8	Personal missing from career management	53	--	X - 10
9	Lack of integrity of superiors	48	X - 9	X - 11
10	Superiors over-supervised	46	--	X - 5
11	Political interference with war	46	--	--
12	Lack of opportunity to exercise initiative	43	X - 7	X - 7
13	Too much turbulence	43	--	X - 9
14	Lack of pride in being an Army officer	43	--	--
15	Leaders are not inspiring	41	X - 8	--

3-5-10

DECISIVE AND "A LOT" COMBINED -- C GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent of Group Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On A Group List Position</u>	<u>On B Group List Position</u>
1	Officer efficiency reports	65	--	--
2	Leaders not inspiring	63	X - 8	X - 15
3	Red tape	63	X - 1	X - 4
4	Porspect of another tour in Vietnam	61	X - 13	X - 1
5	Supervisors over-supervised	60	--	X - 5
6	Superiors not competent	60	X - 15	--
7	Lack of opportunity for independent action	60	X - 7	X - 12
8	Family separations	58	X - 2	X - 2
9	Too much turbulence	56	--	X - 13
10	Personal missing from career management	56	--	X - 8
11	Lack of integrity of superiors	55	X - 9	X - 9
12	Little opportunity to use education	55	--	--
13	Assignments carried insufficient responsibility	53	--	--
14	Frequent relocation	52	--	X - 3
15	Superiors do not assume responsibility for mistakes	51	X - 11	--

3-5-11

7. Is There a Difference among Performance Groups in the Reasons Which Least Affect Their Decision?

a. Answer: Yes.

b. The differences among groups emerge in two ways:

(1) In different reasons; for example; only the C Group officer is least bothered by slow promotions.

(2) In the intensity of reply; for example; none of the 3 groups was affected by a "lack of opportunity for command." However, in the A Group, 85% showed their lack of concern; in the B Group, 82% and in the C Group 67%.

c. The C Group reflects its slower marriage rate by being the least concerned with fringe benefits such as post exchanges, commissaries, dental and medical care.

d. The difference among groups in reasons which most and least affect their decision to get out illustrates the fallacy of assessing junior officer satisfaction and dissatisfaction by means of large, non-discriminatory surveys. If action were taken on the basis of replies received, it is entirely possible that costly resources could be expended in correcting a deficiency which bothers only sub-standard officers.

e. To pin-point corrective action and channel it to the groups which the Army is most desirous of retaining, survey responses must be correlated with duty performance.

REASONS WHICH LEAST AFFECT "A" GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Percent Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On C Group List Position</u>	<u>On B Group List Position</u>
1	Fear of being passed over	95	X - 2	X - 1
2	Inability to attend school of choice	90	X - 4	X - 9
3	Assignments not in conformity with preference	88	--	X - 12
4	No opportunity for command	85	X - 3	X - 3
5	Brutality of war	85	X - 8	X - 10
6	Racial problems in Army	78	X - 6	X - 6
7	Army too technological	75	X - 1	X - 2
8	Little opportunity to use Army training	75	X - 15	X - 4
9	Positions occupied are of little career value	75	X - 12	X - 5
10	Lack of senior officer accessibility	70	--	X - 7
11	Unsuitable types of duty assignments	70	--	--
12	Requirement to go to Ranger school	69	--	X - 11
13	Superiors not understanding your problem	67	--	--
14	Poor geographical location of assignment	65	--	--
15	Our presence in Vietnam	65	--	--

REASONS WHICH LEAST AFFECT "B" GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>% Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On A Group List Position</u>	<u>On C Group List Position</u>
1	Fear of being passed over	90	X - 1	X - 2
2	Army too technological	85	X - 7	X - 1
3	No opportunity for command	82	X - 4	X - 3
4	Little opportunity to use Army training	67	X - 8	X - 15
5	Positions occupied were of little career value	66	X - 9	X - 12
6	Racial problems in Army	66	X - 6	X - 6
7	Lack of senior officer accessibility	61	X - 10	--
8	Quality of schools	61	--	--
9	Inability to attend school of choice	60	X - 2	X - 4
10	Brutality of war	60	X - 5	X - 8
11	Requirement to go to Ranger school	58	X - 12	--
12	Assignments not in conformity with preference	58	X - 3	--
13	Supervisors not dedicated	53	--	--
14	Desire to help with domestic problems	51	--	--
15	Off-post housing	49	--	--

REASONS WHICH LEAST AFFECT "C" GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>% Which Checked Reason</u>	<u>On A Group List Position</u>	<u>On B Group List Position</u>
1	Army too technological	72	X - 7	X - 2
2	Fear of being passed over	70	X - 1	X - 1
3	No opportunity for command	67	X - 3	X - 4
4	Inability to get school of choice	67	X - 2	X - 9
5	Post Exchanges	64	--	--
6	Racial problems in Army	64	X - 6	X - 6
7	Promotions too slow	62	--	--
8	Brutality of war	58	X - 5	X - 10
9	Commissaries	57	--	--
10	Wife's dislike of the Army	57	--	--
11	Dental care	55	--	--
12	Positions occupied were of little career value	54	X - 9	X - 5
13	Army too tradition-bound	51	--	--
14	Medical care	50	--	--
15	Opportunity to use Army training	50	X - 8	X - 4

8. How Intense Are the Differences between above-average and below-average Performers?

a. Answer: very intense.

b. Four areas were examined:

(1) Reasons which bother A Group performers but do not seriously affect members of the C Group.

(2) Conversely, reasons which bother C Group performers but do not seriously affect the A Group.

(3) Reasons which do not affect the A Group, but intensely bother the C Group.

(4) And, again, conversely, reasons which do not affect the C Group but bother the A Group.

c. The four areas were examined by means of ratios. Ratios were calculated as follows: If, say, 50% of the A Group considered a reason decisive, but only 10% of the C Group considered the same reason decisive, a 5: 1 ratio was assigned.

d. The Tables below, as the previous ones, illustrate the danger of generalized surveys. For channeling corrective action toward the preferred retention groups, survey responses must be related to the quality of duty performance of the respondents.

REASONS WHICH BOTHER THE A GROUP BUT NOT THE C GROUP:

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1	Fringe Benefits	3.25 : 1.00
2	Off-post housing	2.19 : 1.00
3	Pay	2.17 : 1.00
4	Not enough outstanding promotions	2.05 : 1.00
5	Promotions based on seniority	1.70 : 1.00

REASONS WHICH BOTHER THE C GROUP BUT NOT THE A GROUP:

1	Supervisors not dedicated	5.60 : 1.00
2	Assignments not in conformity with preference statements	4.86 : 1.00
3	Unsuitable duty assignments	4.80 : 1.00
4	Accessibility of senior officers	4.80 : 1.00
5	Criticized inappropriately or for invalid reasons	4.62 : 1.00
6	Poor location of assignments	4.60 : 1.00
7	No chance to specialize	4.30 : 1.00
8	Assignment carried insufficient responsibility	2.94 : 1.00
9	Superiors did not understand problem	2.90 : 1.00
10	Requirement to go to Ranger school	2.90 : 1.00
11	"Political interference" with war	2.63 : 1.00
12	Our presence in Vietnam	2.50 : 1.00
13	Efficiency reports	2.25 : 1.00
14	Supervisors over-supervised	2.07 : 1.00

Continued.

3-5-17

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
15	Army too tradition-bound	2.06 : 1.00
16	Little prestige accorded you by Army	1.96 : 1.00
17	Regimentation	1.90 : 1.00
18	Adverse publicity	1.67 : 1.00
19	Little opportunity to use education	1.62 : 1.00
20	No personal in career management	1.60 : 1.00

REASONS WHICH DID NOT AFFECT THE A GROUP BUT BOTHERED
THE C GROUP

1	Efficiency reports	6.85 : 1.00
2	Supervisors over-supervised	4.10 : 1.00
3	Superiors did not understand your problem	3.35 : 1.00
4	Criticized in appropriately or for invalid reason	2.70 : 1.00
5	Unsuitable types of assignments	2.50 : 1.00
6	Assignments not in conformity with preference statement	2.25 : 1.00
7	Assignment carried insufficient responsibility	2.22 : 1.00
8	Superiors did not assume responsibility for their mistakes	2.21 : 1.00
9	Your suggestions were not listened to	2.16 : 1.00
10	The personal missing in career management	2.14 : 1.00
11	Your individual contribution not appreciated	2.08 : 1.00
12	Low quality enlisted men	1.60 : 1.00

continued

3-5-18.

REASONS WHICH DO NOT AFFECT THE C GROUP BUT BOTHER THE
A GROUP

<u>#</u>	<u>Reason</u>	<u>Ratio</u>
1	Promotions based on seniority	3.60 : 1.00
2	Not enough outstanding promotions	3.00 : 1.00
3	Army too slow to change	2.74 : 1.00
4	Promotions come too slowly	2.06 : 1.00

9. Are there Areas in Which All Three Groups Respond about the Same?

a. Answer: Yes. By combining categories ("none" and "a little" and "a lot" and "decisive") members of the 3 performance groups can be shown to provide fairly identical responses in certain areas.

b. Improvements in these areas would have the largest pay-off in terms of benefitting and motivating all categories of resignees.

c. Below is a list of common areas:

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>GROUP</u>	<u>% Not Affected Or a Little</u>	<u>Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Quality of schools	A	80	20
	B	90	10
	C	80	20
Inadequate medical care	A	64	36
	B	73	27
	C	74	26
Inadequate dental care	A	70	30
	B	75	25
	C	80	20
Commissaries	A	84	16
	B	82	18
	C	91	9
No opportunity to take Leave	A	90	10
	B	87	13
	C	84	16

Continued

<u>Question</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>% Not Affected or a Little</u>	<u>Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Red Tape	A	23	77
	B	39	61
	C	35	65
Poor Quality of Contemporaries	A	75	25
	B	80	20
	C	77	23
Lack of integrity of Superiors	A	50	50
	B	52	48
	C	45	55
Lack of private life	A	47	53
	B	45	55
	C	52	48
Wife's dislike of Army	A	77	23
	B	75	25
	C	75	25
Army too technological	A	100	0
	B	100	0
	C	93	7
Lean times ahead for Army	A	73	27
	B	75	25
	C	75	25
Racial problems in Army	A	90	10
	B	91	9
	C	94	6

Section III - Specific Areas

1. Were Resignees Satisfied with Career Management?

a. Answer: No.

b. "A" Group performers were the least bothered by career management.

In the C Group the majority said it affected their decision to leave to a considerable degree.

<u>Group</u>	<u>Career Management As:</u>			
	<u>A Positive Factor</u>	<u>Not a Factor</u>	<u>Affected me Some</u>	<u>Affected me a Lot</u>
A	5	40	25	30
B	3	33	27	37
C	7	20	17	56

c. The question, as worded, was probably too broad. At least a definition for career management should have been provided. From subjective comments added by resignees it was apparent that many had their own definition of career management and included items thereunder which are not controllable by the Army (like the force levels which required repeat RVN tours).

d. In the more specific questions which came later in the survey, the areas of dissatisfaction emerge more clearly:

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>GROUP</u>	<u>% Not Affected or a Little</u>	<u>% Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Not getting military school of choice	A	95	5
	B	90	10
	C	80	20
Little opportunity to use civilian education	A	67	33
	B	73	27
	C	45	55
Poor geographical location of assignments	A	95	5
	B	64	36
	C	77	23

Continued

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
		<u>Not Affected or a Little</u>	<u>Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Unsuitable duty assignments	A	90	10
	B	74	26
	C	52	48
No chance to specialize	A	90	10
	B	70	30
	C	57	43
Assignment not in conformity with preference statement	A	90	10
	B	87	13
	C	63	37
Officer efficiency reports	A	72	28
	B	62	38
	C	37	63
Personal missing in career management	A	65	35
	B	47	53
	C	44	56
Positions occupied had little career value	A	100	0
	B	93	7
	C	78	22
Promotions based on seniority	A	25	75
	B	44	56
	C	59	41
Promotions are too slow	A	55	45
	B	82	18
	C	86	14

e. From the specific replies, the following conclusions emerge:

(1) There are no common irritants. The good performer is not bothered by the efficiency report system; the poorer performer is. The good performer

wants to see promotions speeded up; the poorer performer is happy with their present rate.

(2) The varying profiles of the A and C Groups emerge here, as in so many other areas. The A performer can take the Army as it is. Unlike the C performer, he doesn't need to be given a chance to "specialize" or a "suitable" assignment to sparkle. He can perform anywhere. The C Group member, on the other hand, lacks this flexibility. He was bruised by the common career pattern and now tells us that if his talents had been appreciated and he had been allowed to specialize in a carefully selected niche, he would have blossomed out.

(3) If there is agreement anywhere, it is that personnel management lacks the "personal touch."

2. How Intense is Dissatisfaction with Pay, Fringes?

a. Answer: There is general satisfaction.

b. As noted in Section II of this chapter, the general ranking of benefit dissatisfiers was low. Pay was ranked 23, on-post housing 28, medical care 31, dental care 39, off-post housing 50, clubs, commissaries and fringes, 52, 53 and 54, respectively, and post exchanges 61. There were 70 dissatisfier on the list.

c. The questions which follow summarize responses by performance group to selected benefit area dissatisfiers:

<u>Question</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>% Not Affected Or a Little</u>	<u>% Affected a Lot Or Decisive</u>
On-post housing	A	50	50
	B	72	28
	C	61	39
Medical care	A	64	36
	B	73	27
	C	74	26
Post Exchanges	A	84	16
	B	90	10
	C	97	7
Commissaries	A	84	16
	B	82	18
	C	91	9
Clubs	A	80	20
	B	92	8
	C	77	23
Pay	A	52	48
	B	72	28
	C	78	22

d. The responses reflect a general lack of dissatisfaction.
Specifically:

(1) Responses hint at the different marrying rate for the C Group. Not being married at the same high percentage as the A and B Groups, the C Group member appears to be happier with fringes but slightly more discontent with the club.

(2) The intensely reward-oriented A Group member, for whom promotions do not come quickly enough in the service, is also most dissatisfied with the pay. He knows he is good and can get more money for his talents.

(3) In neither group is the concern with pay decisive at this time. But as will be shown in Part IV, when the resignees speak about needed changes in the Army, there is considerable concern with future earnings. The resignees had had two promotions in two years. The outlook for the next 18 years, to the initial retirement point, is grim, with only two more promotions in the offing. What resignees propose in Part IV is for the Army to not toss more incentives at the beginning of the career but to concentrate them at the later milestones so as to make the prospects for continuing the journey worthwhile.

3. Do Resignees Know the Value of Their Compensation?

a. Answer: No.

b. As noted by Hubbell 5 years ago, most members of the military are unaware of the value of their compensation.

c. Captains, with less than 4 years' service, make approximately \$11,000 per year or approximately \$920.00 per month.

d. In the majority of cases, resignees under-estimated their compensation:

<u>Group</u>	<u>Resignee Estimate of Their Monthly Compensation:</u>				
	<u>700-775</u>	<u>775-850</u>	<u>850-900</u>	<u>True Value</u>	<u>Over-estimate</u>
A	5	15	50	15	15
B	5	32	30	11	22
C	11	28	39	12	10

e. It is surprising that with the regularity of this finding the Army has not developed a simple troop information medium which shows the soldier how to calculate his true compensation and compare it with civilian salary scales.

4. How Intense is the Desire to Specialize?

a. Answer: Most intense among those who performed in a below-average manner.

b. There is sharp difference among good and poor performers in their desire to specialize or to use their USMA training (engineering) in the Army.

<u>Question</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	
		<u>Not Affected or a Little</u>	<u>Affected A Lot or Decisive</u>
No chance to specialize	A	90	10
	B	70	30
	C	57	43
Little opportunity to use civilian education	A	67	33
	B	73	27
	C	45	55

c. As noted earlier, the Study Group believes that the desire of younger officers to specialize should not be taken seriously. It most likely represents a rationalization by C Group members who blame an individual leadership failure on improper usage of their talents by the Army.

5. How do Resignees View the Quality of Military Schools?

a. Answer: High.

b. Although most resignees did not attend their branch basic course, almost all had some time at service schools for specialized training.

c. The minor criticism voiced is concentrated in one branch-- Air Defense. Resignees from this branch did not consider the Air Defense orientation course as a major mental challenge.

6. Is the Requirement to Go to Ranger School a Factor in Resignations?

a. Answer: Not especially.

b. The Ranger School is often cited as a major irritant. The facts, however, show that most resignees considered Ranger training as excellent. They saw it as a personal leadership challenge. If there was criticism, it pertained to harrassment of a demeaning nature.

c. As could be expected, C Group performers who had a higher failure rate (See Chapter 3, Part II) than members of the A and B Groups were slightly more critical of the requirement to attend Ranger School.

<u>Question</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	
		<u>Not Affected or Little</u>	<u>Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Requirement to	A	88	12
go to Ranger	B	85	15
School	C	65	35

d. The main problem with Ranger School, it is suspected, was caused by the following type of letter which Artillery Branch sent to

Ranger course failures. Word of these letters spread like wildfire:

"The Artillery Branch has received your academic report from the US Army Infantry School indicating your relief from the Ranger Course for academic failure. Your failure to complete this important training reflects unfavorably on you as a Regular Army officer, and has the immediate effect of placing you behind your contemporaries in the competition for promotion, service schools, and subsequent assignments to positions of greater responsibility. In order that you do not further jeopardize your career, we advise you to start a immediate program of self-improvement. Without self-improvement, your chances for a successful career in the Army are limited.

"This letter is being sent by registered mail...".

7. Are Low Quality Troops a Factor in Resignations?

a. Answer: Possibly.

b. In general terms, resignees express little concern for the low quality of enlisted men.

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>GROUP</u>	<u>% Not Affected or a Little</u>	<u>% Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Poor quality of EM	A	85	15
	B	72	28
	C	82	18

c. However, when it is remembered that Category IV personnel are concentrated in certain MOS's and branches, the concern becomes more apparent:

<u>QUESTION</u>	<u>Branch of Resignee</u>	<u>% Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Low quality of EM	Signal	12
	Infantry.	28

d. The acceptance of too many Category IV enlisted men may bring about in the Army a personnel application of Gresham's law -- that poor quality people will drive out the good.

8. Did the Requirements of Army Social Life Drive Officers out of the Service?

a. Answer: Generally, No.

b. On the whole, Army social life is more of a positive factor than a negative one. See Table below:

Group	<u>% As a Positive Factor</u>	<u>% -- Effect of Social Life on Resigning</u>		
		<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Some Effect</u>	<u>A Lot</u>
A	16	62	22	0
B	11	48	37	4
C	14	39	30	17
ALL	13	49	31	7

9. Did "Bossy" Senior Wives Drive Officers Out of the Service?

a. Answer: Generally no.

b. While some young couples had bad experiences, on the whole the wives of senior officers exerted a positive influence on potential resignees which was stronger than the positive influence of social life per se.

Group	<u>% as a Positive Factor</u>	<u>% - Effect on Resigning of Senior Wives</u>		
		<u>No Effect</u>	<u>Some Effect</u>	<u>A Lot</u>
A	18	56	26	0
B	18	58	24	0
C	9	61	12	18
ALL	16	58	21	4

10. How Strong is Wifely Influence in Causing an Officer to Leave?

a. Answer: It is a factor.

b. The wife's "dislike for Army" ranked 34th among the 70 reasons given for resigning. No variation exists among performance groups.

<u>Question</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>% Not Affected Or a Little</u>	<u>% Affected a Lot or Decisive</u>
Wife's Dislike for Army	A	77	23
	B	75	25
	C	75	25

c. In another part of the questionnaire, the resignees were asked to list which category of person--wife, parent, relative, friend, classmate or contemporary--influenced them "some" and "strongly" in making the decision to resign. Here, the resignees indicated, especially in the "strongly" category, that classmates and contemporaries exerted more of an influence than the wife. This will become apparent in the next question in which resignees were asked to list what they griped about when meeting with contemporaries at the club bar, and whether they felt strong enough about the gripes to leave the service.

11. What Do Resignees Gripe about When they Meet with Contemporaries at the Club Bar?

a. Answer: Mostly their superiors, followed by Vietnam tours and factors which inhibit job satisfaction. The responses of all groups are fairly alike.

b. Respondents indicated that the gripes were sufficiently serious to be considered reasons for resignation.

c. The Study Group can visualize how one individual, when he voices a complaint and finds general response among his contemporaries, will consider the complaint valid and serious and universally descriptive

of conditions in the Army. In this respect, the club bar may operate not too differently from a particle accelerator. As gripes are bounced from individual to individual they gain weight, status, and volume. It probably wouldn't hurt senior officers to occasionally sit down with the group for spirited give-and-take on an informal (as opposed to officer call) basis.

d. Gripes are tabulated below. The weight assigned to each is a factor of frequency, based on a frequency of one for the least-voiced complaint:

<u>Gripe</u>	<u>Performance Group Weight</u>		
	<u>A</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>C</u>
Superior officers	8	16	11
Vietnam tours	3	9	2
Job satisfaction factors (responsibility, challenge, etc.)	1	8	8
Assignment policies in general	3	4	4
Impersonal medical care	3	2	1

12. Is it Important to Sort out Temporary Concerns From More Permanent Ones?

a. Answer: Yes.

b. Certain concerns are temporary in nature. Through sensitivity to existence of these concerns, it should be possible to not let them become a problem.

c. Others are more permanent in nature. In many instances, little can be done about them because, after all, not every one is suited for an Army career.

d. Below are examples of temporary concerns which leadership, especially at the battalion level, might have prevented from becoming a problem. (Here, apparently, young officers with military fathers have an advantage. From them they can learn that after wars, the Army tends to get kicked around in getting a share of national priorities; that strengths do not always decline, they also go up; that popular support for the Korean War was no greater than for Vietnam, etc.).

<u>Question</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Percentage</u>	
		<u>Not Affected Or a Little</u>	<u>A Lot or Decisive</u>
Recent adverse publicity	A	85	15
	B	85	15
	C	75	25
Racial problems in Army	A	90	10
	B	91	9
	C	94	6
"Political Interference" with War	A	86	14
	B	54	46
	C	75	25
Our presence in Vietnam	A	90	10
	B	76	24
	C	75	25

e. Examples of more permanent complaints are listed below. The list was extracted from a USMA study prepared in 1964, entitled: "Why Do Officers Resign from Army?". The Study was based on 714 questionnaires mailed to USMA graduates from the Class of 1950, who had later resigned their commission.

List of Reasons for Resigning from
USMA - 1961 Study

Reasons Still Present
in 1970--as based on
Resignee Responses

Opportunities for advancement better
in civilian life

Yes

Pay and allowances

Yes

Inadequate recognition as an officer
in the service

Yes

Lack of stability for family

Yes

Inadequate on-post housing

Yes

Dislike for military social structure
and interpersonal relationships

Some

f. Part V contains a summary of resignee complaints, assembled
over the years. The intent of this part is to help policy makers
distinguish "permanent" from "temporary" complaints.

Chapter 6 - Interviews

1. Ten resignees were invited to the United States Military Academy for a period of 3 days. There they were interviewed in depth as individuals and participated in group interviews.
2. The quality of the interviewees was generally high. They included 7 A Group performers, 2 B Group performers and 1 C Group performer.
3. Since the interviewees did not represent a valid statistical sample of the population studied, the information developed in the interviews must be considered as an "impression." To a large degree, however, the "impression" received reinforces the data gathered in the more objective parts of the study.
4. How Do Interviewees See Their Senior Officers?

a. Answer: They think very little of them. Many stated that they would not wish to fall into the mold of the battalion commander, brigade commander, and general officer. The accuracy of their image, though debatable, is unimportant. The determining factor is what interviewees believe to be true. They perceive these officers as follows:

(1) The battalion commander is a man running scared because of an impossible system. He is a slave of the tyrant "management." Although he has been successful in the Army for 20 years, he is now taking a crucial career test at the expense of the 800 men in his battalion. If he succeeds, he earns the right to have his "ticket punched" and advance to the next rank. If he fails, he remains in his present grade

in the hierarchy and considers himself a career failure. His big problem today is the need to attain a Utopian state of readiness. He must attain this state, in spite of the inexperience of junior officers and noncommissioned officers, or of the drastic turbulence which precludes ever having a fully-trained unit, or of the supply priorities which may cripple his readiness and maintenance efforts. If he can attain the Utopian condition within the endurance limits of the men assigned, he will drive them to long hours. If the condition cannot be attained through the men assigned, he must massage the reports to please those above him. They, too, are "punching a ticket" and require monotonic increases in progress indicators. Within this system, the battalion commander cannot allow members of his unit to make human mistakes. If his career progression is to end, he feels that it should end because of his own failings. Thus he cannot allow subordinates to learn through mistakes. This results in personal supervision of even the most minute details. Junior officers are not even allowed mistakes in judgement. Innovation is stifled; since innovation and learning among subordinates creates a climate in which mistakes can be made. The result of the pressure of the system on the battalion commander is a juxtaposition of the relative importances of people. In reality, the battalion commander exists to lead and serve the men under him. Without these men, the job is meaningless. In practice today, the only reason for the existence of the men in the battalion is to guarantee the statistical success of the battalion commander.

(2) The brigade commander is a slave to the same system which tyrannizes the battalion commander. He helps to perpetuate the system but his stake is higher; he has more years invested and is trying for a star. He cannot allow a battalion to fail a CMMI. If it does, either the battalion commander must be found negligent or the brigade commander's image will be smeared. Personal survival, then, dictates that the battalion commander must perish rather than the brigade commander, himself. Some brigade commanders, in order to guarantee battalion diligence, reserve unto themselves the right to issue leaves and passes to the officers of the brigade. They cannot afford to have some effort diminished by having personnel absent from duty. Other brigade commanders ride above in their helicopters and direct squads by radio. The brigade commander is subject to caustic correction by general officers either in private or in public. Enlisted men and junior officers sometimes witness such incidents. The brigade commander, following his leadership example, is neither careful nor hesitant about passing such abuse down to his battalion commanders in front of the troops. He must create a public name for himself as well as satisfying the requirements of the Army management system. As part of his personal image building program, he must be ready to bow and scrape to the wishes of the news media--sometimes represented by highly unsavory characters whom he would not voluntarily entertain.

(3) The general officer perpetuates the system. His goal is one more star. Although his rank indicates supreme success in his chosen

field he finds after attaining his level that he is still not in a decision-making position. He must have his leaves and passes approved by the next superior. He must report his presence to this office at all times. He is subject to verbal abuse and insult from his next superior. He works longer hours than anyone under him, because authority for minor decisions cannot be delegated. He is often screened from the truth by subordinates conforming to a system which prohibits the reporting of the truth. One former general's aide who is among the resignees reports working in a headquarters in which every general officer maintained a wardrobe locked in the office. As many as 6 uniform changes a day were required so that all general officers in the headquarters would always be in the same uniform as the lieutenant general.

(4) The concensus of resignees was to view the Army as a large organization in which success, prestige and personal satisfaction cannot be achieved. They see themselves as ambitious young men whose goals in life cannot be fulfilled by success in any rank or position in the Army. They were trained to admire leadership as a virtue, and they see no chance to be leaders above the company officer level. They have observed men whom they admired as leaders at a higher level become the victims of the system for trying to adhere to truth, honor and integrity. The resignees do not want to become a part of such a system.

5. What Did Interviewees Say about Career Management?

a. Answer: They were not happy with Army career management.

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5. What Did Interviewees Say about Career Management?

a. Answer: They were not happy with Army career management.

b. There is a distinct distrust of career management practices. The junior officer feels that he must take positive steps to influence the direction of his career progression if he is to remain in the mainstream of promotable officers. This creates frustration in the mind of the individual. He gets no positive assessment of his chances to go to graduate school. Neither does he have any idea of his relative standing among his contemporaries. He resents impersonal letters from OPO which are vague in their promises and in their predictions of future assignments. There were cases in which the resignation decision was made during a visit or a phone call to the career branch. At the lower level the officer feels that he is assigned to jobs for too short a time. A 6 months' assignment as battalion motor officer means 3 months of learning and 3 months of production. After that, the officer will be assigned to a different* job within the unit and go through another learning process. Job satisfaction is seldom attained, because the young officer is seldom kept on a job long enough to perform up to his own standards.

c. An individual case of one of the resignees is offered for consideration:

(1) Captain Z was personally interviewed for this study. He stated that he had no good reason for leaving the Army. If he could be counseled by someone as to his chances for early promotion, for attending the career course, and for attending graduate school in the field of education or physical education, he would stay in.

(2) Captain Z's record appeared to be outstanding. Further interview uncovered no deep-seated reasons for leaving the Army. The

simple fact of the matter was that Captain Z did not know where he stood in relation to his contemporaries and decided to resign to see if anyone would try to dissuade him. He was not surprised to find that the resignation was unopposed all the way. Compared with the seeming impossibility of getting a genuine personal assessment from the Department of the Army, the resignation paperwork was a breeze. He could only interpret that the Army was not at all concerned with retaining him.

(3) In an effort to demonstrate the deep personal feeling for the individual which really exists in the Department of the Army, the interviewer required Captain Z to telephone his career branch chief assignment officer on the spot. The branch chief stated that Captain Z is in the top 10% of his year group and may or may not be a contender for early promotion. He stated that Z could attend the career course during the next class. He could not offer to send Z to graduate school in education or physical education; since the branch had no quota for studies. If Z could find an organization such as the faculty at West Point which had a quota and would accept Z under that quota, the branch would approve the action.

(4) After the phone call, Z decided to withdraw his resignation.

6. What Were Interviewee Comments about OER's?

- a. Answer: Interviewees were concerned about the OER system.
- b. Two case histories are provided to illustrate interviewee sentiment:

(1) Captain X. Captain X's first assignment was as a platoon leader in Europe, in the first part of 1967. His company commander was a young lieutenant slightly senior. The company commander had two occasions to rate X. Both these reports were rendered fairly in the opinion of X. The reports were not inflated, but merely stated that X was a very fine young lieutenant. X's company commander moved on, and future raters used more superlative phrases and higher numbers in their ratings. X trained his platoon to the point that it became the finest tank platoon in Europe and was suitably acclaimed. His battalion broke the tank gunnery records at Grafenwoehr. His platoon became so outstanding in every respect that the entire platoon was given a paid vacation to Garmisch. X moved up to the job of General's aide. After his complete success in Europe and prior to going to Vietnam, X stopped off at OPO branch to see what his prospects were. The assignment officer had access only to the first two efficiency reports rendered by the first company commander. Rightfully, on the basis of the only evidence at hand, the assignment officer counseled with the attitude that X was average and had average career potential. X made his decision to leave the service during that interview. He reasoned that if he had reached the position of the most successful tank platoon leader in Europe and the system of evaluation could not reflect such success, he had no idea how to succeed in the future. From the European tour, X went to Vietnam and performed outstandingly in addition to receiving four awards for heroism. X is an outstanding officer whose efficiency reports have been

uniformly near maximum since the first two rendered by the lieutenant. (X is leaving the Army to follow a political career. He is sufficiently impressive and has such a magnetic personality that he has gained the political influence and the financial backing to have high assurance of being elected to the US House of Representatives in either the next election or the succeeding one, as he chooses.)

(2) Captain Y. Captain Y was first assigned as a company executive officer in a battalion in Europe. After a matter of months, Y assumed command of his company. Upon a change in battalion commanders, his new commander greeted him with: "You are a West Point Graduate. Don't expect any special consideration from me." To Y's knowledge, he did an acceptable job in every respect. He was never counseled otherwise. Unbeknown to Y and during the 10th month of his command, the battalion commander recommended that Y not be promoted along with his contemporaries. After 12 months, the battalion commander announced that Y was relieved of command of his company. Accompanying the relief was an efficiency report which can best be described as devastating. Y was not then aware and is not aware today of the reasons for his relief. He was not allowed to see his efficiency report at the time but was later afforded access to it by the division staff. In Y's opinion, the report contains at least 3 lies as to events which had never occurred. It was not until some time later that Y found he had been recommended for passover to captain two months before his relief from command. Y attempted to find the proper channel to rebut his efficiency report.

No one in his new organization had any idea to whom or by what means to seek redress. Finally, he found one warrant officer who had heard of a form which could be used. He hadn't seen such a form for years he said, but would find one. The form was finally located through numerous telephone calls to other warrant officers in the area. Then the problem was to discover the format for the text of the request for reconsideration. The combined efforts of the administrators available to support Y could not yield a recommended format. Therefore Y and the warrant officer wrote and rewrote until they had a document which looked official. The document was submitted but was disapproved before it reached a level which could adjudge the merits of the case. Y was ordered to Vietnam in the normal sequence of events and has never yet been able to have a hearing on his efficiency report. Y states that the reason he is leaving the service is not that he had a bad report on his record--rather that he could find no means to have an official judgement made upon the justice of the report. He states that it is too late to turn back from resignation now; but had he been able to receive a hearing from the Department of the Army regardless of the official decision, he would have stayed in. He sees the personnel system as highly inflexible which has little consideration for the feelings of the individual.

c. The summary of interviewee opinion on OER's was that the system is not sufficiently pure to serve as a basis for career-influencing decisions. In their judgement, the system is essentially one-sided. It allows seniors to use it in a vendetta without fear of recourse.

7. What Did Interviewees Say about Promotions?

a. Answer: They see Army promotions based on seniority; not as a reward for an outstanding job.

b. In the judgement of resignees, they have been promoted rapidly, perhaps, too rapidly and that from now on their promotions will come very slowly. The dissatisfying part is the frustration inherent in a system which bases promotion primarily upon tenure rather than upon quality of performance. They see seniors who are unproductive protected in their job positions and even being promoted. Many of these young officers have been assigned to duty positions requiring majors or lieutenant colonels. They know they were given these jobs because they could perform them. Paradoxically, they see no hope of advancement to these ranks based upon the ability to perform the job. The resignees have always been on the first team up to the time they were commissioned. They were the leaders in high school. They competed for appointments to West Point. They were taught for 4 years that competition in the classroom and on the athletic field yields success. Now they are caught up in a system in which only the top 5% are promoted early. There is no other discrimination in promotion reward from the 6th percentile on down. They do not like to be restricted to the pace of promotion of the officer who does nothing but keeps his nose clean.

c. In Summary, the majority of interviewees are seeking self-employment in small firms. They find that the Army, like large corporations, is particularly unattractive to the individual who, believing in his own ability, wants to be associated with an organization which pays off on ability.

PART IV - Changing the Army

Chapter 1

General

1. As part of the survey, the resignees were asked "if it were possible to change the Army to the point you would stay in for a career, what changes would have to be made? Tell it like it is."
2. The majority of resignees advanced a number of comments.
3. In Chapter 2, the comments are tabulated according to frequency.
4. In Chapter 3, the tabulation is fleshed out through use of representative comments in the more frequently-voiced areas.
5. The principal value of this part is to provide policy makers with a general "feel" for the reforms advocated by discontented junior officers. In this respect, Part IV is more valuable as an idea bank than as a specific program for corrective action.

Chapter 2

Tabulation

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

PERSONNEL

23	Eliminate incompetent superiors.
7	Recognize that many officers are not dedicated, but are self-seeking.
5	Restore the prestige of the officer within the Army.
4	Improve the quality of NCO's.
4	Be more selective in commissioning officers.
3	Eliminate Project 100,000.
2	Improve the character of both junior and senior officers.
2	Eliminate incompetent NCO's.
2	Keep the draft.
2	End personnel turbulence.
1	Improve the quality of enlisted men.
1	Eliminate "instant" NCO's.
1	Eliminate the draft.
1	Make the life of the enlisted man more enjoyable and something in which to take pride.
1	Humanize the officer-enlisted man relationship.

PROMOTIONS

25	Institute a merit promotion system vice longevity promotions.
1	Promotion for officers and NCO's should be slowed down.

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

- 1 Stop promotions to captain on a blanket basis.
- 1 Delegate promotion to the company level in RVN.

CAREER MANAGEMENT

- 14 OPO take more personal interest in the individual when making assignments.
- 12 Provide more stabilized tours.
- 10 Develop a realistic efficiency report system.
- 7 Limit the total number of unaccompanied tours within the span of a career.
- 5 Change career management system to allow career progression without stereotyped assignment patterns.
- 4 Assign appropriate jobs to the talents of the individual at the unit level.
- 4 Lengthen job assignments within the unit.
- 3 Provide more opportunities for advanced education.
- 3 Educate active duty officers in critically needed skills, i.e., law and medicine.
- 2 Provide some alternatives to the individual at each PCS.
- 2 Change assignment procedures so that "wheeler-dealers" do not grab up the good assignments consistently.
- 2 Institute annual personal interviews with OPO assignment officers.
- 1 Improve the career management handling of the RA officer.
- 1 Stop assigning commands to officers merely because command is a career stepping stone.

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

- 1 Require more experience for officers and NCO's before placing them in responsible positions.
- 1 Replacements should overlap at least one week prior to losses.
- 1 Use already-trained commanders in wartime. Eliminate the practice of training commanders for six months in combat so that they can forward their careers.
- 1 Provide insurance against career-damaging assignments caused by personality conflicts. Especially protect the LTC's against such assignments.
- 1 Decrease family separations.
- 1 Follow specialized training with an assignment in that field.
- 1 Assign competent and sincere people in the field of personnel management.
- 1 Allow qualified people to attend graduate school and study in the field of their interest.
- 1 Don't yank junior officers around like migratory workers.
- 1 Eliminate the career system and hire middle managers from civil life on a contract basis. This would infuse new life into a decaying system.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

- 5 Return leadership to unit commanders and eliminate the requirement for a good show to get a good rating and promotions.
- 4 Eliminate command performance social functions.
- 3 Make officer authority commensurate with responsibility.
- 3 Commanders must pay more attention to the welfare of their subordinates.

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

- 3 Senior officers should listen to their junior officers.
- 3 Cease command emphasis on blood donations, savings programs, fund drives, etc.
- 2 Strengthen the military justice authority of the commander.
- 1 Give the commander a freer hand to hire and fire.
- 1 Relate mission requirements accurately to the men and equipment available to do the job.
- 1 Reduce the extreme legal powers of the superior as an individual.
- 1 Department of the Army should defend its own from public degradation, e.g., Green Berets, My Lai.
- 1 Support lower echelons of command from above.
- 1 Eliminate politics from the Army.
- 1 Remove the I.G. from the chain of command so that he can accomplish something without fear of retribution.
- 1 Take TJAG out of military command influence.
- 1 Eliminate the requirement for fabricated reports which destroy the credibility of the senior in the eyes of the junior.

PAY AND BENEFITS

- 22 Modernize fringe benefits (includes medical and dental care as well as allowances and benefits in kind).
- 18 Revise the pay scale to be comparable with industry.
- 4 Credit two years of Academy - ROTC time for pay longevity.
- 3 Raise pay rates for LTC, COL, and General Officers.

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

- 3 Make officers' club membership optional.
- 1 Revamp the Army medical system. Establish an effective complaint system for mistreatment and maltreatment.
- 1 Get out of the vehicle registration, grocery store, department store, etc., business.
- 1 Deemphasize job security and retirement.

JOB SATISFACTION

- 9 Eliminate waste, inefficiency, and overstaffing.
- 6 Shorten working hours to those necessary to accomplish the job.
- 3 Eliminate non-mission work generated by the whims of superiors.
- 3 Provide more intellectual challenge in the jobs of junior officers.
- 2 Improve work facilities, e.g., demolish WWII barracks used as office buildings.
- 2 Eliminate non-essential troop details.
- 2 Shift the level of unit inspections to a lower level in order to take some of the formality and accompanying crisis away from this function.
- 1 Eliminate demeaning jobs which are not required of civilians doing a like job on the same staff.
- 1 Eliminate local Mickey Mouse rules, e.g., starched fatigues, hats on in private vehicles.
- 1 Put DA civilians on the same level as officers. Pay them according to work performed and educational background.
- 1 Civilianize the Army to a large extent, and don't mess with a man's private life.

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

- 1 Deemphasize procedures and concentrate on the substantive aspects of situations.
- 1 Reduce the frequency of parades, displays and ceremonies.
- 1 Reduce the ratio of support troops to combat troops.
- 1 Authorize CMMI teams in TOE's and don't pull them from units.
- 1 Authorize battalion reenlistment NCO's in TOE's.
- 1 Reduce the paperwork burden at the troop level.
- 1 Reduce the number of civilian personnel in key slots.
- 1 Make the Army equally as people-oriented as it is mission-oriented.
- 1 Eliminate many of the personal restrictions, both on duty and off.
- 1 Stop giving awards and decorations for normal performance.
- 1 Remove red tape.
- 1 Make leave time available for vacations instead of using it to move.
- 1 Eliminate traditions which have lost meaning.

ARMY SCHOOLS

- 2 Make Ranger School optional for RA officers.
- 2 Delete the harrassment at the Ranger School and make the training more realistic.
- 1 Increase the difficulty and the challenge of Army schools.
- 1 Shorten the obligation required after West Point, for we scare away many fine young men aged 17 who don't really care to sign away the next 9 years of their lives when they haven't yet decided on a career.

FREQUENCY OF
RESPONSES

ADVOCATED CHANGE

POLITICAL ISSUES

- 4 End the government's myopic preoccupation with nebulous foreign goals, using the Army as its power instrument.
- 3 Pursue the war earnestly.
- 1 End the growing polarization of the military toward the extreme right.
- 1 Don't use National Guard troops in civil disturbances. Leave it to the police.
- 1 End the underlying racism in the Army.

MISCELLANEOUS

- 3 It is impossible to change the Army to the point that a career would be satisfying.
- 1 Institute a psychological propaganda campaign within the Army to sell the officers and men on why the Army and what it does. Tell the truth.
- 1 Conduct a psychologically based advertising campaign to constantly remind the officers in the service of the appealing idealism of their profession.
- 1 Initiate a program of senior officers and their families encouraging junior officers and their families to feel part of the Army.
- 1 Eliminate branches and change to a regimental system.
- 1 Cut the Pentagon staff by 50%.
- 1 Make regulations available and readable.
- 1 Implement the recommendations of the Junior Officer Retention Study.

Chapter 3

Extracts from Letters

1. On their superiors.

a. "...I didn't attend the branch basic course, which resulted in a feeling of incompetence, confusion, fright and insecurity in job knowledge during my initial assignment. My reaction was to avoid things and I never did jump in with both feet. I felt duped and used by experienced NCO's whom I trusted. Everybody had a different story! In fact, I received very little guidance from superiors until this year. I don't believe this case is true for all junior officers, many of whom have had good, conscientious commanders who were willing to help and not ridicule them...." (C Group)

b. "He (the battalion commander) was a very ambitious man and he will do whatever he has to do to get ahead...." (B Group)

c. "...Another factor that enters into my lack of desire to become a lieutenant colonel or colonel is that to date I haven't worked for a colonel who commanded my respect to the point where I have any desire to follow in his footsteps...." (C Group)

d. "...The urgency in units doesn't stem from the war effort but is inherent in the unit and is self-perpetuating....Battalion Commanders are getting excited about delinquency reports, white-washing rocks, and 100% bond participation....much of the work, the 14 - 16 hours per day, is not to advance the unit mission but to make the Battalion Commander look good...." (C Group)

e. "...Too many officers are put in command because they need it to advance their careers...." (A Group)

f. "...I have seen the egocentric, selfish, power-hungry people who used their positions for no other purpose than to extract anything from which they could benefit themselves or flatter their egos....I left the Academy with a desire to serve but have since found that there exist within the Army people whose intentions are not honorable, people whom I could not trust, people who would prostitute their moral values when a promotion, an OER, or a decoration was to be had. Too often I have been party to the distortion and deceptions by which these people have advanced...." (C Group - General's Aide)

g. "...I think the major complaint I have is with the commander, not a specific commander, but the commander whoever he may be...." (A Group)

h. "...Particularly discouraging to me have been commanding officers and superior officers who, in a problem situation, adhere to a 'party line' rather than attempt an unconventional approach. This has given me the impression, whether or not it is true, that they are more concerned about satisfying their superiors and enhancing their own reputations than they are about solving the problem...." (B Group)

i. "...One additional factor...is the quality of senior officers under which I served. In the majority of cases I have found their quality to be poor. The range runs from officers who are unfriendly, stubborn and incompetent to those who are hypocritical liars, self-important, and, in some cases, plain stupid...." (A Group)

j. "...Several officers I have come in contact with have been so concerned with their own welfare that they would not hesitate to sacrifice their subordinates if they could advance their own cause by it...." (B Group).

k. "...Eliminate the large group of majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels who lack intelligence drive and ability to provide excellence of leadership....there is mediocrity in the middle...." (C Group)

l. "...My boss has lacked the guts to stand up and be counted.... His actions were held in check by the OER....and his devotion was not to duty but to what makes him look good in his boss' eyes...." (A Group)

m. "...The battalion commander lives with the constant fear that his present job is the cross-road....If he does poorly he will be forgotten....This fear becomes an obsession affecting all his decisions...." (A Group)

n. "...Not that my superiors were downright dishonest. But the system breeds commanders who operate in the grey area...." (C Group)

o. "...My primary reason for resigning has been the generally poor quality of the people existing in the Army as my superior commissioned officers...." (C Group)

2. On promotions.

a. "...Once a young officer reaches his peak in a certain grade he should be allowed to move to the next grade without having to withstand the boredom of waiting years for the next promotion...." (A Group)

b. "...I have heard general officers comment that the ideal age for a battalion commander is 27-30 years. If I thought I could get a battalion by age 27, I would stay...." (B Group)

c. "....One of the main reasons for the reactionary tendencies of the Army today is the inability of bright, young officers to rise rapidly in the chain of command...." (B Group)

d. "....Greater differentiation must be made in the rate of advancement of the outstanding, good, average, fair, and poor officers...." (A Group)

3. On efficiency reports.

a. "....OER's are a waste of time. They are so inflated that they reflect in no way how a man performed his job...." (A Group)

b. "....OER's should be continually reviewed....and worst ER's destroyed so that continued improvement is not hindered by one bad ER...." (C Group)

c. "....A subordinate is degenerated to a submissive sycophant whose servility is required to insure a beneficial efficiency report...." (C Group)

d. "....Too often I have seen outstanding officers crucified because of a personality conflict with their raters...." (C Group)

4. On their own efficiency reports.

a. "....My future in the Army looks bleak because at my first duty station I was relieved from an Infantry company....reclama? Sure, after 2 or 3 years of crawling to those involved....Now I liken my situation to that of an ex-convict trying to live down his past...." (C Group)

b. "....Reduce the number of reports kept in an officer's file. Currently, officers must live with their bad OER's throughout their career...." (C Group)

c. "....According to a letter from DA, my rating from my only command assignment was much below previous ratings....I felt that I did an excellent job and then....but I had never seen the report nor was I counseled....The report was executed on 1 April 1968, the day the new form came in. Possibly my superiors rated me well above average, not realizing the inflated form the report would assume....Now I'm in the lowest 5%....certainly an injustice....I thought of appealing but was told it was nearly impossible...." (C Group)

d. "....I happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time....I am as good or better an officer than many of those who made captain on time....By regulation I was prohibited from citing certain undesirable traits and lack of support on the part of my battalion commander...." (C Group)

e. "...We need a system with build-in insurance against encountering a superior with whom an inevitable personality clash develops....The whim of one commander during one assignment can affect an entire careerIt has happened to mine...." (B Group)

f. "...I have had the unfortunate experience of working for three highly incompetent officers in Vietnam....The OER of one....virtually ruined any aspirations of a highly successful career....His rating was strictly tinged by personality...." (C Group)

5. On career management.

a. "...I personally have no desire to have the next ten or fifteen years laid out for me...." (C Group)

b. "...Certain assignments are required to advance to positions of great responsibility yet the individual has no control over the assignments he receives...." (B Group)

c. "...I have heard so much about career patterns it makes me sick...." (C Group)

d. "...The only possible way I could have been chosen for my present assignment is to have my name picked out of a hat...." (C Group)

e. "...The very phrase of career management is repugnant to me.... As an Engineer I can predict my career....but many of these ticket assignments are unattractive at this time....I want to advance but I don't like ticket punching...." (A Group)

6. On their career branches.

a. "...After much thought I decided to resign my commission because of the obvious (to me) lack of interest by the Infantry Branch in me as an officer...." (B Group)

b. "...When I queried DA on the effect of one bad OER on my career and future promotions I could not even get a general yes or no, good or bad, out of them...." (C Group)

c. "...When I wrote DA and told them that I intended to resign they essentially said, 'That's fine with us.'....The fact is that I could have been talked out of resigning at that point, had they decided to stop me...." (B Group)

d. "...The way my branch responded to the request, I could draw but the only conclusion - they had no interest in retaining me in the service...." (C Group)

e. "....I asked OPO about Graduate School at Harvard. Without a moment's hesitation I was told I never could get into Harvard. So I did it on my own -- and boosted my own ego a bit to boot...." (B Group)

f. "....Why can't a Branch become actively and sincerely interested in a potential career officer? My branch evidently assumed that I was locked in because I was RA and West Point...." (A Group)

g. "....I inquired of Engineer OPO of being sent to a particular assignment. The reply was, that is a good assignment for sure. One of the OPO assignment officers will get that. Sorry...." (A Group)

h. "....I wrote DA eighteen months ago that I intended to leave the service. I never even got the courtesy of an acknowledgment of my letter...." (B Group)

7. On pay, allowances, and benefits.

a. "....Fringe benefits like medical and commissary are operated by personnel who do not really care if they provide satisfactory service...." (C Group)

b. "....My wife has been unable to obtain a complete physical since she became a dependent two years ago...." (B Group)

c. "....All of the benefits that are available are too inconvenient to take advantage of...." (A Group)

d. "....Military pay is good for the first four to six years service but ceases to be competitive after that...." (B Group)

e. "....On-post housing is poor in most areas....In areas of large military concentrations, off-post housing is equally poor and very expensive...." (B Group)

f. "....If I stayed in the Army eight more years, I could expect to increase my pay by only \$160.00 per month. Not a very exciting fact...." (B Group)

g. "....Completely investigate and revamp the Army medical system.... with an effective complaint system for maltreatment and mistreatment...." (C Group)

h. "....The pay system seems designed to induce young officers to stay in, with large pay increases in the first few years.... but it rapidly tops off, giving small increases and poor pay compared to civilian life when a man should be reaching his greatest productivity and worth...." (B Group)

i. "...Until now pay has not been a problem. I have been well paid. I doubt I could have done better in civilian life. But now the pay is beginning to level off. The future looks dim..." (A Group)

PART V - Previous Findings

1. The purpose of this part is to assist policy makers in separating historical dissatisfiers from temporary ones, such as those related to the Vietnam war.
2. The part summarizes the findings of previous retention studies and opinion surveys.
3. The material was prepared by the Personnel Management Development Office, OPO. The assistance of this agency is gratefully acknowledged.
4. Previous findings are grouped by the following sub-topics:

<u>Topic</u>	<u>Page</u>
a. Recognition and Communication	5-2
b. Promotion	5-3
c. Red Tape, Inefficiency and Waste	5-5
d. Prestige	5-6
e. Responsibility and Supervision	5-7
f. Individuality	5-9
g. Duties and Assignments	5-10
h. Leadership of Superiors	5-13
i. Attitude Toward Peers	5-14
j. Bachelor Officers	5-15

RECOGNITION AND COMMUNICATION

In the 28 February 1961 Sample Survey fifteen factors were rated as primary reasons for leaving the Army. "Lack of stability of personnel policies" ranked fourth with RA officers and ninth with OTRA officers.

From the 1961 report on the retention of junior officers, it was stated that:

Greater recognition must be accorded the truly outstanding young officer through more rapid award of RA commissions, faster promotions, assignment to duties which offer the challenge, job satisfaction and reward they deserve.

The 1963 staff study on the retention of junior officers showed that "regarding recognition for achievement, the Army approach is negative, 'Do well and you won't get hurt'". It also stated that:

It is incumbent on the Army and particularly on the Officer Personnel Directorate to investigate and implement every conceivable procedure which will improve the personalization of career management. The effect on junior officers of the knowledge that someone in Washington regards him as a man rather than a body to fill a requirement cannot but help retention.

In the 1968 Franklin Institute study it was noted that: "Other common complaints concern the senior officer's disinterest in the junior officer's problem" From this study it was recommended that: "sufficient travel funds be budgeted to permit at least an annual visit to each major installation by the Officer Personnel Directorate career counseling team." In addition, it recommended that "... commanders be encouraged to establish and make better use of channels of communication with subordinates through such means as periodic interviews, officer calls and junior officer councils."

In the 31 May 1969 Sample Survey, 39.5% of the captains, 48.4% of the first lieutenants, and 43.9% of the second lieutenants indicate that "personnel and administrative practices" are factors which would influence them to leave the Army.

PROMOTION

From the 31 March 1958 Sample Survey, 19.2% of the RA officers and 8.7% of the OTRA officers considered "faster promotions" to be the factor that would most contribute toward increasing the value of an Army career to them personally.

From the 28 February 1959 Sample Survey, "promotion based too much on seniority" and "not enough promotion opportunities" ranked 5th with RA officers and seventh with OTRA officers out of 15 reasons for not making the Army a career.

From the 30 June 1959 Sample Survey, 13.5% of the RA officers and 3.0% of the OTRA officers stated that the main reason for their not making the Army a career was the insufficient promotion opportunities.

In another 1959 survey, 15.3% of the RA commissioned officers who were leaving the Army cited "insufficient promotion" as the main factor in their leaving.

From a 1963 staff study on the Retention of Junior Officers, it was found that: "lack of opportunity to get ahead" was listed as a reason for the junior officers resignation.

In the 1965 study of junior officer comments on early Army experience, 9% of the officers commented that promotion was based too much on seniority.

From the 1966 Special Housing Survey, officers ranked promotion opportunities fifth among reasons for their leaving the Army.

In the 1966 study on motivation and retention in the US Army, it was learned that "there is much junior officer sentiment for promotions being based more on performance and less on seniority."

From the 31 May 1967 study, 2.0% of the commissioned officers surveyed indicated that the limited opportunity for promotion was the main reason for their not making the Army a career.

In the 1968 study of the Special Career Program, 20% of the participating officers surveyed listed "opportunity for advancement" as the most important factor in their military career.

From the 1968 Franklin Institute Study, it was stated that:

They (junior officers) state that promotions are granted too rapidly and that this is reflected in a general decrease in competency and the promotion of improperly trained and inexperienced men. Respondents maintain that promoted officers are frequently unequal to the tasks they are called upon to perform and that their effectiveness as officers suffers accordingly. Officers state that rapid predictable promotions have destroyed the meaning and traditional value of rank. They argue that an officer now knows that he will be promoted after a given period of time unless he is totally unfit. Respondents state that rank has to be earned to be appreciated; and that the reduction to time in grade for promotion detracts from the sense of accomplishment and achievement that should follow from promotions.

From the 31 May 1969 Sample Survey it was found that 86.3% of the captains, 86.0% of the First Lieutenants, and 88.2% of the Second Lieutenants indicated that promotion opportunities were an influence for them to stay in the Army.

RED TAPE, INEFFICIENCY AND WASTE

In a 1959 survey report, 7.2% of the RA and 3.7% of the OTRA commissioned officers leaving the Army cited "too much red tape, administrative detail and regimentation" as the primary reason for leaving.

From another 1959 Sample Survey, 10.8% of the RA officers and 4.8% of the OTRA officers felt that "red tape" was the main reason for their not making the Army a career.

In the 1968 Franklin Institute Study, 31 junior officers commented on the "general inefficiency" and resulting "waste" of the Army organization. An additional 71 officers state simply that there is "too much red tape" and "too much paperwork."

PRESTIGE

In a 1958 Sample Survey, commissioned and warrant officers were asked which one of 11 factors would contribute most toward increasing the value of an Army career to them personally. 14.3% of the RA and 5.3% of the OTRA officers selected "increased prestige" as the most important factor.

From a 1963 staff study of the retention of junior officers, it is noted that: "the officer corps of the Army does not enjoy the prestige that it once commanded in the American public eye . . . (the Junior Officers) uniform or ID card will not get his checks cashed, even on post his credit is questioned."

From the 1968 Franklin Institute study:

In both their written and verbal comments respondents indicate considerable dissillusionment with their status and prestige as Army officers in service and in civilian eyes. These factors apparently influence junior officer career motivation and retention directly . . . Junior officers note a general erosion of discipline which contributes to the erosion of prestige and status of the officer. They state that the poor quality of officers . . . adversely affects the prestige of all Army officers. They suggest that a once elite corps has become a conglomeration of ill-trained, poorly educated and generally inexperienced officers.

In the 31 May Sample Survey it is noted that 20.6% of the captains, 18.0% of the first lieutenants, and 19.2% of the second lieutenants considered the public's opinion of the Army as an influence on them to leave the Army.

RESPONSIBILITY AND SUPERVISION

In a 1957 survey concerning the morale of the Army, it is stated that:

Many (officers) do object to what might be termed "the docile conformists are the successful officers." To be an innovator or to challenge the old ways is to court a ruinous efficiency report--the dread disease of the officers...Officers feel that they have allowed their integrity to be questioned, that promises frequently are broken, that docile conformity of individuals pays off, that initiative is not rewarded, and that over-centralization and close supervision are in effect...One can sense a longing for the "good profession", the genuine officer corps with high ideals of duty, honor, country", of men with unimpeachable integrity, of men trained, ready, and ever capable. The complaints are numerous and are symptomatic of frustrations and disillusionment. The West Point graduate is seen as awaiting his third year of service to see if he will remain in the active service, even his standards are said to be lower than formerly. At all levels there is seen a restrictiveness on delegating authority and on overcentralization. There is the feeling that Congress and the Secretaries have let the Army down, that civilian influences have lessened the cohesion and attractiveness of the corps, that there has been too much "Doolittleism", that too many promises are broken for minor reasons, that there is an 8:00 to 5:00 complex, and that discourtesies and degrading actions are practiced and tolerated.

In the 28 February 1961 Sample Survey, "limited opportunity to exercise managerial ability" ranked 7th with RA and 12th with OTRA officers out of 15 main reasons for leaving the Army.

In a 1961 DAMPMT report on the program for the retention of young officers it was stated that:

A concerted effort must be made to eliminate over-supervision, over-control and "spoon feeding", to encourage initiative and aggressiveness, and to develop in the young officer the attributes of leadership and command.

In a 1965 study of junior officer comments on early Army experience eight percent of the officers surveys commented on too much supervision in their assignments.

In the 1963 staff study on the retention of junior officers, it was noted that:

For lieutenant colonels, the command of a unit will "make or break" his career. He feels compelled to excel in his short (usually 12 months) tenure. He feels that there is no room for error and that he must improve the performance of his unit during his command. This often results in the commander not allowing junior officers to perform without close and continuous supervision... The mistakes they (junior officers) make are held against them by commanders who must excel in their short tenure in battalion level command. The lieutenant is required to undertake responsibilities for which he is often ill-trained and to undergo tremendous pressures to perform in an error-less manner.

In the 1968 Franklin Institute Study, it is noted that:

Unit commanders seem unwilling to delegate authority and responsibility to junior officers. The junior officer feels that he should be allowed some freedom of action and permitted to do a job to the best of his ability--even allowed a few errors in judgement. He feels that his commanding officers lack confidence in him...He regards his senior officers as being more concerned with "looking good" than with developing command ability in their junior officers.

INDIVIDUALITY

In the 28 February 1961 Sample Survey, 15 factors are given as reasons for leaving the Army. "Personal Freedom too limited" ranked third for both RA and OTRA officers.

In the 1961 study on the retention of young officers, battalion commanders were interviewed to determine why junior officers were leaving the Army. The commanders indicated that the dislike of Army discipline was one of the 5 primary reasons for leaving given by junior officers.

From the 1968 Franklin Institute study it is noted that: "Thirty-nine officers stated that the Army stifles all expressions of nonconformity or individuality. From this study it was recommended that installation commanders should be encouraged to: "eliminate overly-restrictive regulations pertaining to guests, social activities, and cooking."

In the 31 May 1969 Sample Survey it is noted that 31.7% of the captains and 44.7% of the lieutenants felt that their personal life in the Army was a factor which would influence them to leave the Army.

DUTIES AND ASSIGNMENTS

In a 1958 Sample Survey, 6.6% of the OTRA officers indicated that better job assignments would most contribute toward increasing the value of the Army career to them, personally.

From the 28 February 1961 Sample Survey, "no chance to do the work I like" ranked second for both RA and OTRA officers out of fifteen reasons for leaving the Army.

From the 1961 report on the retention of junior officers, it was noted that: "...the over-all problem ... can be attributed to incomplete and inadequate career offerings as compared to civilian careers. It also stated that:

"Job satisfaction" was repeatedly identified as one of the most decisive factors which influence young officers to seek continued active duty - or exit early from the Army if it is not found. In the interest of promoting this significant element of retention, insuring high esprit and morale and pride in unit, young officers should not be initially assigned to a training unit or activity involving the often-boring, nonchallenging monotony of repetitive training duties.

In a 1963 Sample Survey, 32.3% of the junior officers indicated a change in the area of assignments would most influence them in changing their attitude toward an Army career. Twenty-two percent of the junior officer's wives indicated that this was a disadvantage to Army life.

From the 1963 staff study on the retention of junior officers, it is found that: "...an analysis of the reasons for resignation submitted by junior officers, Regular Army ... indicates that lack of job satisfaction is the overwhelming consideration for resignation."

In the 1965 survey of junior officer comments, 48% of all officers commented on the improper use of their abilities and training, a majority of these officers indicated their intention of leaving the Army. Doubt was expressed concerning the "worthwhileness" of the job by 17% of the officers. Twenty-three percent commented that the Army failed to place them in desired jobs and job functions. Seventeen percent commented that their career future was limited. Five percent complained of branch assignment discrepancy. Uncertainty regarding future assignments was cited as a negative factor in an Army career by 16% of the officers.

In the 1966 study of motivation and retention in the US Army, it is stated that:

The junior officer is more interested and more responsive to the demanding nature of his assignment and in the full utilization of his abilities; and the smaller the discrepancy between his expectations and his satisfactions with his work experience, the more likely he will be to continue in a military career. The more that opportunity is provided for the junior officer to exercise relatively greater or increasing independence of action and the greater the resulting job satisfaction, the greater the likelihood that he will accept a military career as a profession. ... the core of the problem of career commitment for all categories of personnel seems to be whether they believe they are currently being employed effectively by the US Army career opportunities and job satisfaction build career commitments and where these attitudes are not developed by actual experience there is not likely to be any professional commitment.

In the 1966 special family housing survey of married male personnel, lieutenants and W1's and W-2's were asked to select from a list of 20 factors their main reason for leaving the Army. "Use made of abilities" ranked second; "working hours" ranked fourth, and "challenge of the job" ranked sixth.

In the 31 May 1967 Sample Survey, 4.0% of the officers stated that the main reason they were not making the Army a career was the fact that their duty assignments were not challenging enough.

In the 1968 survey on officer's special career program, 48% of the officers considered "interesting and challenging duties" the most important factor in their military career.

From the 1968 Franklin Institute study it is noted that:

Duty assignment ... is a critical factor in the Army career decision. If he is assigned out of branch or if his job does not match his MOS, he is likely to be dissatisfied. Officers complained that they were given no choice in duty assignments and also indicated that this affects their career decisions. Junior officers maintain that while the Army encourages them to acquire advanced or specialized education and training, it fails to make proper use of these through

duty assignments. The most frequent complaint was that duty assignments were inconsistent with the officer's education, training, abilities, and interests. Respondents stated that the extra duties they are assigned are often meaningless and petty, that they infringe on free time, and more seriously that they make it difficult for an officer to perform effectively in his primary duty assignment.

From the 31 May 1969 Sample Survey, 21% of the captains, 23.8% of the first lieutenants and 21% of the second lieutenants considered duty assignments to be a factor influencing them to leave the service.

In another 1969 Sample Survey, 4.8% of the RA and 12.2% of the OTRs officers cited "duties" as the aspect of military life with which they are most dissatisfied. For lieutenants, the figure increased to 15.5% for married, and 16.9% of the single lieutenants. For captains 9.1% of the married and 11.6% of the single captains are most dissatisfied with their duties.

QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP IN SUPERIORS

From the 1956 Digest of Attitude and Opinion Studies a study was made of interviews by a general officer of RA officers who resigned their commission:

Family influence, civilian opportunities, and desire for further civilian education to attain specific civilian jobs accounted for six of every ten reasons for resignation given by Regular Army officers. About two of every ten reasons given by the resigning officers centered around lack of interest, difficulty in adjusting to the military way of life, or a general feeling of frustration. The remaining reasons involved criticisms of such facets of the military as leadership, efficiency reporting, and promotion policies. TAG, in submitting the summary of reasons for resignation pointed out that the conditions under which the interviews were conducted might have resulted in resignees giving socially acceptable answers rather than the true basis for their desiring to leave the military service.

In the 28 February 1961 Sample Survey: "...low quality of leadership and management by superiors" ranked third with RA and sixth with OTRA officers out of 15 reasons given for leaving the Army.

From the 1961 report on the retention of junior officers it was stated that: "...unethical practices by irresponsible commanders leave a lasting poor impression on the young officer and those commanders should be identified and corrective action taken."

In the 1963 staff study on the retention of junior officers it was stated that: "...reasons for resignation include disappointment in the quality of leadership in the Army."

In the 1965 research study on junior officer comments on early Army experience it was stated that 11 percent of the officers surveyed commented on the low quality of leadership.

In the 31 May 1969 sample survey, 25.8% of the captains, 30.1% of the first lieutenants, and 20.0% of the second lieutenants indicated that the leadership of officers and NCO's was a factor which would influence them to leave the Army.

MORALE AND ATTITUDE TOWARD PEERS

In a 1957 survey concerning the morale of the Army it was stated that:

Respondents portray a professional group who have wandered into a field of malpractices, irritations, harassments, and onerous obligations. They find mountains of paperwork, the certifications, distrust in cashing checks at post installations, and complacency in matters which damage the professional status of an Army officer.

From a 1963 staff study concerned with the retention of junior officers it is learned that reasons for resignation included the junior officer's dissatisfaction with the quality of their peers.

From a 1965 study of junior officers comments on early Army experience, five percent of the officers commented on the low quality of their peers in the Army.

From a 1966 research study on motivation and retention in the US Army it is noted that "...there is much evidence to support the statement that morale of the officer corps is low."

In the 1968 Franklin Institute study:

Forty four...officers...remarked on the "poor quality" of their fellow junior officers...the majority of those who commented on the problem maintain that low standards and too rapid promotions have resulted in a general decrease in status and prestige.

In the 31 May 1969 sample survey, 12.2% of the captains, 17.6% of the first lieutenants and 14.3% of the second lieutenants indicated that "unit morale" is a factor which would influence them to leave.

BACHELOR OFFICERS

In a 1961 report on the retention of young officers it is noted that:
"The frequently cold, careless, indifferent treatment of young bachelor officers is a major source of discontent and is the cause of many officer losses.

From a 1963 staff study on the retention of junior officers it is stated that: "The BOQ situation has been a constant source of frustration and irritation to the bachelor officer ... a cost-of-living allowance or an increase in the basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) should be made a matter of high priority legislation."

In the 1968 Franklin Institute Research Study, it is found that:

They (junior officers) regard BOQ comfort somewhat unfavorably... they consider the BOQ unfavorable as to the relative cost of equivalent civilian quarters, the requirement to occupy BOQ if available, restrictions and visitors and in-house recreation.

These bachelor officers regard themselves as a second class citizen in an Army that favors the married officers. They feel both economically and socially disadvantaged.

In the 31 May 1969 Sample Survey, 44.1% of the single officers feel that their personal life in the Army is a factor which influences them to leave the service.

PART VI - Appendices

Appendix 1 -- Study Directive

Appendix 2 -- Questionnaire

Appendix 3 -- Form used in extracting data from OPO
and TAGO career files



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DCSPER-PSRD

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

15 APR 1970

SUBJECT: Actions to Reduce Reliance on the Draft

1. The Administration has clarified its position on the recommendations of the Gates Commission on an all-volunteer force and the Enke study of draft reform. In support of this position, there is a need to enhance the DCSPER's capability to both initiate and support actions designed to reduce reliance on the draft.

2. Specific areas of study will include:

a. The development of additional manpower procurement sources, to include national youth organizations, the United States Employment Service, and junior college graduates.

b. An examination of the effectiveness of advertising techniques and appeals used to attract volunteers to the Army.

c. The development of an improved retention environment, focusing on areas not covered in other efforts.

d. The development of management techniques designed to measure progress in reducing reliance on the draft.

e. Retention problems in USMA Class of 1966.

3. DPSB is directed to address these areas in a series of short studies which promise high payoff possibilities and short implementation periods. The studies will be identified as addenda to Project PROVIDE and assigned an equal priority.

4. DPSB will provide bi-monthly progress briefings, starting on 15 June 1970. Following these briefings, I will act on recommendations, assign


6-1-a

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DCSPER-PSRD

SUBJECT: Actions to Reduce Reliance on the Draft

priorities, approve new problem areas for study, and set the level of effort which is to be devoted to this project.



WALTER T. KERWIN, JR.
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel

DISTRIBUTION:

DPS
DPSB
DPD
DIT
DMPP
DCP
DWAC
TSG
OPO
TAG
TPMG
CofCh

on tape # 11
Re: # 1



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DCSPER-PSRD

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has asked me to find out why so many fine officers are leaving the service and to provide him with recommendations for improving the retention of quality junior officers.

To this end, I have obtained your records at the Academy, your service record and your letter of resignation. These documents tell me where you have been, what jobs you have had and what your superiors thought about your job performance. To make the record complete, I need to know what your impressions and feelings were over the same period.

For this purpose, I have prepared the attached questionnaire. Please be frank in responding to it and add your comments freely. While the questionnaire is official in nature, it will be treated in confidence and will be destroyed after analysis.

I will need your reply as soon as possible, since I plan to invite several of you to meet with me at the Academy or another suitable place to obtain more ideas on how to improve the attractiveness of the Army as a career.

Thank you for your cooperation in responding. I hope that with your help we can isolate some of the areas in which it is possible to change the Army for the better.

Sincerely,

7-1
LOREN M. EBERHART
I/TC, GS
Personnel Studies and
Research Division

SECTION A - Please Fill In

1. On the day I was commissioned, I -

Definitely intended to leave active duty after fulfilling my obligated tour.

Was undecided - wanted to wait and see.

Definitely intended to remain on active duty beyond my first obligated tour.

2. Were you certain of the branch you wanted at branch drawing?

Yes No

3. Did you draw out your first choice of branch assignments during First Class year?

yes No

4. After two years, were you satisfied that you had chosen the correct branch?

Yes No

If you plan to go to graduate school, answer questions 5 through 10 and omit questions 11 through 14.

If you do not plan to go to graduate school, omit questions 5 through 10.

5. What will you major in _____?

6. Did the Army offer you an opportunity to major in this field _____?
Any other field _____? (State which) _____

7. What kind of job do you expect to move into after you obtain your advanced degree? _____

8. Will you be working for or with relatives? Yes No.

9. Did relatives serve to convince you to accept this job?

Yes No

10. How much money per month do you expect to earn in this job? \$ _____

11. What kind of a job do you expect to move into when you leave the Army? _____

7-1-a

12. Will you be working for or with relatives? _____ Yes _____ No.

13. Did relatives serve to convince you to accept this job?

_____ Yes _____ No.

14. How much money do you expect to earn per month? \$ _____

15. Which people influenced you strongly to leave the Army?
(Indicate extent: 1 - none; 2 - some; 3 - much)

_____ Wife _____ Parents _____ Relatives _____ Friends
_____ Classmates _____ Other Army contemporaries

16. If you were to add up all your pay and allowances (not the PX, commissaries and fringe benefits), how much would you estimate you earn in total salary per month in the Army? \$ _____

17. If you stayed in the Army, what rank would you expect to achieve in

5 years _____

10 years _____

15 years _____

18. Please estimate the monthly salary you would earn in the Army (don't include fringe benefits) for the grades you expect in 11 above.

5 years \$ _____

10 years \$ _____

15 years \$ _____

19. How many other colleges did you apply for when you applied for an appointment to West Point? _____

20. Would you have applied if it had not been for the draft?...

_____ Yes _____ No.

21. To what extent did the relationship of your wife with wives of senior officers influence your career decision?

22. To what extent does the career management system of the Army influence your decision to leave?

23. To what extent does the social life of the Army influence your decision to leave?
24. When you and your contemporaries get together at the club, what things do you complain about?
25. Are these gripes sufficiently serious to influence your decision to get out?
26. Was your father a career military man? _____ Yes _____ No.
27. Was your wife's father a career military man? _____ Yes _____ No.
28. When did you get married? _____
29. If you have dependent children, list their ages.
- | <u>Boys</u> | <u>Girls</u> |
|-------------|--------------|
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
| _____ | _____ |
30. When you were a teenager, what kind of a job did your father hold?

31. What state in the Union do you consider the place where you grew up?

32. What is your current military mailing address?
33. Should it become necessary, would an interview during the week of 18 May 1970 represent a major inconvenience to you? _____ What week would you prefer? _____

SECTION B - Please circle the number depicting the degree of negative impact on your Army career.

If, upon commissioning, you were undecided about a career or if you definitely planned to stay in, please pick the factors listed in this part which contributed to your decision to leave the service. If any factors are not listed, please enumerate them in section C of the questionnaire.

If you had planned to leave service as soon as your obligation was up, consider this section as a list of irritants. Please rate them as to their gravity.

SUBJECT:	Negative (Irritants)					
	None	Very Little	A Lot	Decisive		
<u>ARMY SCHOOLING</u>						
1. Requirement to go to Ranger School	1	2	3	4	5	6
2. Quality of Schools	1	2	3	4	5	6
3. Little opportunity to use Army training	1	2	3	4	5	6
4. Unable to attend the school of your choice	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>ARMY MATERIAL BENEFITS</u>						
5. On-post housing	1	2	3	4	5	6
6. Off-post housing	1	2	3	4	5	6
7. Inadequate medical care	1	2	3	4	5	6
8. Inadequate dental care	1	2	3	4	5	6
9. Post Exchange	1	2	3	4	5	6
10. Commissary	1	2	3	4	5	6
11. Officers' Clubs	1	2	3	4	5	6
12. Insufficient pay	1	2	3	4	5	6
13. Fringe benefits	1	2	3	4	5	6

<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>Negative (Irritants)</u>					
	<u>None</u>	<u>Very Little</u>			<u>A Lot</u>	<u>Decisive</u>
<u>ARMY JOBS</u>						
14. Little opportunity to use education	1	2	3	4	5	6
15. Poor geographical location of duty assignments	1	2	3	4	5	6
16. Unsuitable types of duty assignments	1	2	3	4	5	6
17. Demeaning additional duties	1	2	3	4	5	6
18. No chance to specialize	1	2	3	4	5	6
19. No free time for private life	1	2	3	4	5	6
20. No opportunity to take leave	1	2	3	4	5	6
21. No opportunity for command experience	1	2	3	4	5	6
22. Assignments not in conformity with preference statements	1	2	3	4	5	6
23. Assignments carried insufficient responsibility to be satisfying	1	2	3	4	5	6
24. Red tape	1	2	3	4	5	6
25. Lack of authority commensurate with your responsibilities	1	2	3	4	5	6
26. Your individual contributions not appreciated	1	2	3	4	5	6
27. Your suggestions not listened to	1	2	3	4	5	6
28. Lack of opportunity for independent action and initiative	1	2	3	4	5	6

<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>Negative (Irritants)</u>					
	<u>None</u>	<u>Very Little</u>	<u>A Lot</u>	<u>Decisive</u>		
<u>CAREER MANAGEMENT AND PROMOTION POLICY</u>						
29. Officer efficiency reports	1	2	3	4	5	6
30. Family separations	1	2	3	4	5	6
31. Prospect of another tour in Vietnam	1	2	3	4	5	6
32. Frequent relocations	1	2	3	4	5	6
33. The "personal" missing in career management	1	2	3	4	5	6
34. Positions you occupied were of little career value	1	2	3	4	5	6
35. Promotions based upon seniority	1	2	3	4	5	6
36. Not enough "outstanding" promotions	1	2	3	4	5	6
37. Promotions come too slowly	1	2	3	4	5	6
38. Fear of being passed over	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>						
39. Poor quality of enlisted men	1	2	3	4	5	6
40. Poor quality of NCO's	1	2	3	4	5	6
41. Too much turbulence	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>CONTEMPORARIES</u>						
42. Poor quality of contemporaries among whom you served	1	2	3	4	5	6

<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>Negative (Irritants)</u>					
	<u>None</u>	<u>Very Little</u>	<u>A Lot</u>	<u>Decisive</u>		
<u>SUPERIORS</u>						
43. Your leaders were not inspiring	1	2	3	4	5	6
44. Lack of integrity of superiors	1	2	3	4	5	6
45. Superiors over-supervised	1	2	3	4	5	6
46. Superiors did not understand your problem	1	2	3	4	5	6
47. Superiors did not assume responsibility for their mistakes	1	2	3	4	5	6
48. Superiors were not competent	1	2	3	4	5	6
49. Superiors were not dedicated	1	2	3	4	5	6
50. Superiors were not courageous	1	2	3	4	5	6
51. Lack of accessibility of senior officers for advice and counseling	1	2	3	4	5	6
52. Criticized inappropriately or for invalid reasons	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>PRESTIGE</u>						
53. Lack of pride for what you are and what you represent as an Army officer	1	2	3	4	5	6
54. Recent adverse publicity	1	2	3	4	5	6
55. Low prestige of the military	1	2	3	4	5	6
56. Little prestige and respect accorded you by the Army	1	2	3	4	5	6

<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>Negative (Irritants)</u>					
	<u>None</u>	<u>Very Little</u>		<u>A Lot</u>	<u>Decisive</u>	
<u>SUPERIORS</u>						
43. Your leaders were not inspiring	1	2	3	4	5	6
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47. Superiors did not assume responsibility for their mistakes	1	2	3	4	5	6
48. Superiors were not competent	1	2	3	4	5	6
49. Superiors were not dedicated	1	2	3	4	5	6
50. Superiors were not courageous	1	2	3	4	5	6
51. Lack of accessibility of senior officers for advice and counseling	1	2	3	4	5	6
52. Criticized inappropriately or for invalid reasons	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>PRESTIGE</u>						
53. Lack of pride for what you are and what you represent as an Army officer	1	2	3	4	5	6
54. Recent adverse publicity	1	2	3	4	5	6
55. Low prestige of the military	1	2	3	4	5	6
56. Little prestige and respect accorded you by the Army	1	2	3	4	5	6

Negative (Irritants)

<u>SUBJECT:</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Very Little</u>	<u>A Lot</u>	<u>Decisive</u>		
<u>ARMY AS A WHOLE</u>						
57. Regimentation	1	2	3	4	5	6
58. Lack of private life	1	2	3	4	5	6
59. Fear of getting killed or injured	1	2	3	4	5	6
60. Wife's dislike for Army life	1	2	3	4	5	6
61. Army is too tradition-bound	1	2	3	4	5	6
62. Army is slow to change with the times	1	2	3	4	5	6
63. Army is too technologically oriented	1	2	3	4	5	6
64. Lean times ahead for the Army	1	2	3	4	5	6
<u>LARGER ISSUES</u>						
65. Desire to help with domestic problems such as civil rights or pollution	1	2	3	4	5	6
66. Racial problems within the Army	1	2	3	4	5	6
67. Political interference with the war	1	2	3	4	5	6
68. Lack of National support for the war	1	2	3	4	5	6
69. Brutality of war	1	2	3	4	5	6
70. Our presence in Vietnam	1	2	3	4	5	6

SECTION C

If it were possible to change the Army to the point that you would stay in it for a career, what changes would have to be made?

TELL IT LIKE IT IS

Name _____

Principal Reasons for Resigning:

Source of Appointment _____

Personal Data:

Age in June 1966: _____ Marital Status: _____

Yr Married: _____ Married ⁶⁶ Before _____ After Unaccompanied

Tour. Nr of Children _____.

Educational Data:

Grad Schooling _____ yes _____ no. Major _____ School _____

Military Education _____

Academic ER: Above avg _____ Avg _____ Below _____ Failed _____

Special Schooling: _____

Academic ER: Above avg _____ Avg _____ Below _____ Failed _____

Military Data:

Branch _____

Decorations _____

Nr. Letters of Commendation _____ Highest Rank on

Letters of commendation _____.

Nr. of ER's _____.

ER's Above avg _____ avg _____ below avg _____ very low _____

Nr. of PCS _____

Months CONUS _____ Months O/S _____

Months w/troops _____ Months on staff _____ Highest Level

staff _____ Months on personal staff _____.

Sequence of Assignments. See Attachment.

Derogatory Info in file? (Indebtedness, etc.)

 yes no. If yes, what

Record supports reason for resignation cited yes no

What's the evidence:

(no answers are clue to personal follow-up
interview)

Current address:

Name and address of parent

 T

Record of Assgmt

				RVN
				Unaccompanied O/S (not RVN)
				Accompanied O/S
				CONUS
				Civ. School
				School

0 12 24 26 48

Prospects & Evaluation

Preference Sheet on File _____ yes _____ no. Visited Branch _____

Geographical preference _____

Assignment preference _____

Other preference _____

Evidence of hardship _____

Planned assignment _____

Was it communicated? _____ yes _____ no

Relation of planned assignment to preference _____

Letters from officer in file _____ number

Summarize letters _____

Action on letters _____

(If warranted, burn copies of correspondence
as attachment)

Assignment officer's comments: _____