Credible Deterrence in a Salt Environment.
Abstract
Two questions arise from the SALT agreements: How do they affect the 'sufficiency' theory, and what would be a credible deterrence under these agreements. The flaws of the SALT agreements have been examined in light of U.S. deterrent strength. The U.S. 'Nuclear Sufficiency' theory is examined under the current SALT agreements. The author's recommendations are in two parts. The first is on a credible deterrence under the SALT agreements, and is basically continued development and deployment of those weapon systems allowed under the agreements. The second recommendation concerns the current SALT II talks. Here, consideration should be given for U.S. allies, no give-in to the Soviets for the sake of arms control headlines, and the U.S. must have a credible deterrence and an indication of the will to use it if the need arises. (Modified author abstract)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Sep 07, 1973
- Accession Number
- AD0780003
Entities
People
- William M. Williams Jr
Organizations
- United States Army War College