Saddlepoint Optimality in Differential Games.
Abstract
A family of two-person zero-sum differential games in which the admissible strategies are Borel measurable is defined, and two types of saddlepoint conditions are introduced as optimality criteria. In one, saddlepoint candidates are compared at each point of the state space with all playable pairs at that point; in the other, they are compared only with strategy pairs playable on the entire state space. As a theorem, these two types of optimality are shown to be equivalent for the defined family of games. Also, it is shown that a certain closure property is sufficient for this equivalence. A game having admissible strategies everywhere constant in which the two types of saddlepoint candidates are not equivalent is discussed. (Author)
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jul 22, 1974
- Accession Number
- AD0784407
Entities
People
- G. Leitmann
- H. L. Stalford
Organizations
- United States Naval Research Laboratory