Bargaining Solutions and Stationary Sets in n-Person Games

Abstract

The formal proceedings of an n-person cooperative game can be modelled as a multi-stage negotiation process. At each stage, coalitions may object to the proposal at hand. If a particular objection is given recognition, then the non-objecting players respond to that objection in such a manner that a new proposal results from the objection and response. An equilibrium collection of strategies in this negotiation game may be viewed as a 'standard of behavior' to which no nonconformist pressures exist. This paper explores the relationship between the set of proposals to which no objections are made in such an equilibrium collection, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of the original game.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Jul 01, 1974
Accession Number
AD0787047

Entities

People

  • Robert James Weber

Organizations

  • Cornell University

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Abstracts
  • Agreements
  • Bargaining
  • Cooperative Games
  • Game Theory
  • Negotiations
  • New York
  • Observation
  • Operations Research
  • Probability
  • Probability Distributions
  • Random Variables
  • Real Numbers
  • Stationary
  • Symmetric Games
  • United States
  • Universities

Readers

  • Game Theory.
  • Theoretical Analysis.