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**NATIONAL STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WAR.
IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT EXPERIENCE
VOLUME III**

July 1966

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**IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT EXPERIENCE
VOLUME II**

**NATIONAL STRATEGIC CONCEPTS
AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WAR
31 JULY 1966**

HISTORICAL EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

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NATIONAL STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND THE
CHANGING NATURE OF MODERN WAR

Implications of Recent Experience
(Volume III)

A Report prepared for the Air Force Office of
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Historical Evaluation and Research Organization

31 July 1966

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IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT EXPERIENCE
(Volume III)

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PART ONE

CASE STUDIES OF CONFLICT EXPERIENCE SINCE WORLD WAR II

Berlin (1948-1949, 1960-1961)

by

Jean Edward Smith

INTRODUCTION

Allied victory in World War II left Berlin jointly occupied by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. Joint occupation symbolized Allied unity. Berlin was to be the seat of the Allied Control Council for Germany, and from there Allied policy for Germany was to be coordinated. The occupation was to be short. Cooperation among the victors was to insure that Germany never again menaced the peace of Europe.

This dream faded quickly. In the euphoria of wartime partnership, little attention had been devoted to likely causes of discord. Friction with the Soviet Union was inadequately anticipated. Allied leaders, for example, located Berlin 100 miles within the Soviet zone of occupation. Explicit access provisions were considered unnecessary. To the world of 1965, these omissions appear culpable. But in 1945, the arrangements seemed eminently appropriate.

As East and West drew apart in the postwar years, Berlin became a flashpoint of cold war tension. Stresses elsewhere were reflected in Berlin. And Berlin, as a result of its anomalous position, proved a ready testing ground for cold war confrontation.

The methods of conflict employed in Berlin--show of force, bluff, intimidation, blockade, economic pressure, gradual encroachment, and the extensive use of proxies--were not new. What was new was the changed technological and political environment in which they were employed. This paper treats two major Berlin confrontations: the blockade of 1948-1949, and the closing of the East Berlin sector boundary of 1961. Each of these crises reflects the changing nature of international conflict. Each illustrates the impact of profound technological, political, and psychological

change. And each exhibits the intimate relationship between political objectives and military force.

Thus, the paper divides into two symmetrical portions. Part I treats the blockade and its antecedents. Part II deals with the wall. The analysis of each crisis is preceded by a brief chronology. For ease of exposition, political, diplomatic, psychological, and technological influences are considered separately, although each is clearly inextricable. Strategic and tactical force relations are dealt with to the extent permitted by available information. The paper concludes with a selected bibliography.

PART I--THE BERLIN BLOCKADE: 1948-1949

Chronology

Introduction

In the immediate postwar years, deteriorating East-West relations were reflected by increased Soviet pressure in Berlin. This pressure took two forms: increased harassment of Western military garrisons and accelerated efforts to capture control of the city's political organs. The first effort was spearheaded by the Soviet army; the second by the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), later the Socialist Unity Party (SED). Both, it seems fair to say, were directed by the Soviet Occupation Authority. Soviet goals appear varied and flexible. Maximum success involved driving the Western powers from Berlin and incorporating the entire city in the Soviet occupation zone. Failing this, the division of the city into Communist and democratic sectors offered an attractive alternative. It was for this latter alternative that the Berlin blockade was finally lifted.

Local Politics, 1946-1947

Beginning in early 1946, Soviet occupation authorities accelerated their efforts to capture political control in Berlin. Preparatory to the first postwar elections, Soviet officials sought to merge Berlin's large Communist Party with the even larger Social Democratic Party (SPD). On March 31, 1946, the SPD rejected merger in a city-wide referendum. In the three Western sectors, the vote went 19-2 against the proposal. In the Soviet sector, voting was interrupted under various pretexts and no

count was taken. Three weeks later (April 21, 1946) Soviet authorities went forward with the merger in their sector and in the Soviet zone of Germany.*

The first postwar elections in Berlin (October 20, 1946) gave the Social Democrats 63 seats in the City Assembly, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) 29 seats, the new and Communist-dominated Socialist Unity Party (SED) 26 seats, and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 12. Dr. Otto Ostrowski (SPD) was elected Oberbürgermeister by the City Assembly on December 5, 1946. Ostrowski proved unable to withstand the combination of blandishments and pressure directed at him by the Soviets. His complicity with Soviet occupation authorities forced his repudiation by the City Assembly (85-20) on April 11, 1947. Dr. Ernst Reuter (SPD), who was elected to replace Ostrowski (June 24, 1947), was prevented from taking office by Soviet veto (June 27, 1947). Throughout this period, Communist pressure to capture public opinion in Berlin was intense. Failure to do so led to the adoption of other means.

Initial Traffic Restrictions,
March 10-June 16, 1948

On February 25, 1948, the coalition government of Czechoslovakia yielded to a Communist coup. In Berlin, Soviet pressure intensified. On March 10, 1948, USSR occupation authorities imposed pass requirements on all German nationals traveling through the Soviet zone to Berlin. Following signature in Brussels of the European Mutual Defense Treaty (March 20, 1948), Marshal V.I. Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Governor for Germany, walked out of the Allied Control Council. On March 30, Soviet authorities imposed extensive documentation demands on Western military traffic to Berlin. Rather than submit, US occupation authorities organized the "Little Airlift," which ferried goods and personnel between West Germany and the Allied garrison in Berlin.

In April 1948, the Soviet grip tightened. On April 3, the Soviet Military Administration severed all rail links between

*In referring to "zones" and "sectors," normal postwar usage has restricted "zone" to mean the divisions of the prewar state of Germany. The term "sector" is reserved for the division within the city of Berlin itself. Hence, the Soviet zone and the Soviet sector are two separate entities.

Berlin and the Western zones, except via Helmstedt. Beginning April 9, individual clearances were demanded of all trains traveling the Helmstedt route. Eleven days later (April 20, 1948) similar requirements were imposed on all barge traffic to Berlin. Additional restrictions were imposed on May 20. On June 9, 1948, individual permits were required for each passenger on the Berlin-Helmstedt route. The following day, East Berlin railroad workers attempted to remove all rolling stock from yards in West Berlin. On June 11, rail service between Berlin and Helmstedt was interrupted for 48 hours. The autobahn bridge across the Elbe was closed for repairs June 12. Four days later, June 16, 1948, the Soviet sector commandant in Berlin left the Allied Kommandatura.

Currency Reform and Blockade,
June 18-29, 1948

June 18, 1948, saw the introduction by the Western powers of a new currency in their respective zones of Germany. Berlin was not affected. The following day (June 19, 1948) Soviet authorities responded by suspending all passenger traffic (highway and rail) between Berlin and the West. On June 23, the Soviets introduced a currency reform of their own, including the entire city of Berlin under its provisions. That evening, Western military governors extended the new West German currency to their sectors of Berlin. The Soviets countered by suspending all remaining traffic between Berlin and the Western zones (June 24, 1948). The blockade had begun. On June 25, General Lucius D. Clay and his British counterpart, General Sir Brian Robertson, commenced the Berlin airlift. The first cargo planes landed on June 26. That same day a formal Western protest was delivered to Marshal Sokolovsky by General Robertson. Sokolovsky replied on June 29 that the interruption was due to "technical difficulties," and pledged a prompt resumption of service.

Splitting the City, June 23-
November 30, 1948

Unable to capture public opinion in Berlin, the Soviets augmented their pressure on the Western garrisons with a series of moves designed to intimidate the city government. On June 23, a throng of 5,000 Communist demonstrators besieged the city hall (located in the Soviet sector) and disrupted a meeting of the City Assembly. Throughout July and August, the City Assembly was subjected to similar harassment. Pleas for Soviet assistance in controlling the demonstrations went unanswered. Unable to conduct its business, the Assembly withdrew to the British sector on September 6.

In October and November, perceiving that the Western powers might not depart, the Soviets severed governmental ties between their sector and the rest of the city. Non-Communist borough officials were dismissed in the Soviet sector; city offices and departments were removed to the West, and separate organs were established by the Soviets. On November 30, 1948, an "extraordinary session" of the City Assembly was convened in the Soviet sector. Attended exclusively by Communist delegates and functionaries, the meeting elected Fritz Ebert, Jr., "Oberbürgermeister of Greater Berlin" and proclaimed a new city government. On December 3, Soviet occupation authorities recognized the new creation as "the only legal organ of city government" in Berlin.

Negotiations, July 1948-May 1949

Negotiations to lift the blockade began unproductively. On July 6, 1948, the United States, Britain, and France protested the blockade to Moscow as "a clear violation of existing agreements." Moscow replied that the blockade was a result of Western violations of agreements on Germany, including the currency reform and "the dismemberment of Germany." Meetings between the Western ambassadors and Stalin and Molotov in Moscow (August 2-27, 1948) resulted in an agreement for lifting the blockade in return for introduction of Soviet zone currency in Berlin. Discussions by the four military governors as to how this was to be done (August 31-September 7, 1948) resulted in deadlock. On September 29, the Western powers referred the Berlin question to the UN Security Council. A Security Council resolution providing for settlement was vetoed by the Soviet Union on October 25. A compromise proposal by Security Council "neutrals" was rejected by the United States shortly afterward.

On January 30, 1949, Marshal Stalin granted an interview to Kingsbury Smith of INS. Among the issues discussed was Berlin. Smith's question and Stalin's answer were as follows:

Question: If the governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France agreed to postpone the establishment of a separate West German state, pending a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the German problem as a whole, would the Government of the U.S.S.R. be prepared to remove the restrictions which the Soviet authorities have imposed on communications between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany?

Answer: Provided the United States of America, Great Britain, and France observe the conditions set forth /above/, the Soviet Government sees no obstacles to lifting transport restrictions, on the understanding, however, that transport and trade restrictions introduced by three powers should be lifted simultaneously.

Following consultations in Washington, Dr. Philip C. Jessup, US Representative to the UN Security Council, queried his Soviet counterpart, Mr. Jacob Malik, as to whether Stalin's omission of the currency issue in his reply to Kingsbury Smith was accidental (February 15, 1949). Malik replied on March 15 that Stalin's omission of the currency problem "was not accidental." Discussions between Jessup and Malik continued throughout March and April. On May 4, 1949, a four-power declaration was issued in New York announcing the lifting of the blockade in return for the convening of a conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris on May 23. On May 12, the blockade was lifted without incident.

Creation of the Federal Republic, September 1, 1948-May 12, 1949

Currency reforms in the Western zones paved the way for formation of a West German government. On September 1, 1948, a special "Parliamentary Council" composed of delegates from the various Lander of the US, British, and French zones of occupation convened in Bonn to draft a Constitution. A draft was submitted to the Western military governors on March 2, 1949. At that time, the military governors took exception to provisions incorporating Berlin into the new government. Merger of the three zones was approved in protocols issued in Washington on April 8, 1949. On May 8, the final draft of the Basic Law was approved by the Parliamentary Council. Approval of the Western military governors was added on May 12, 1949, with certain exceptions concerning the status of Berlin.

Political and Diplomatic Considerations

Berlin's peculiar location gives rise to the assumption that all aspects of the Berlin problem are unique. The assumption is understandable. An isolated bastion 110 miles within unfriendly territory is without precedent. Yet once that is said, the familiar becomes dominant. Goals and methods on both sides (again complicated by alliance considerations) resemble nothing so much as

the traditional techniques of great powers hovering at the brink of war, yet each intent on avoiding the precipice.

The Berlin blockade of 1948-1949 is a prime example. Clearly, the Soviet Union sought to extend its hegemony in Central Europe.* Clearly, Berlin was cardinal to that purpose. And just as clearly, the methods to be employed were necessarily restricted. An outbreak of hostilities--in view of the US nuclear monopoly and the depleted state of Soviet resources in 1948--would deny Russia's immediate goal, and probably much more besides. Thus, limits were imposed on what the Soviets might do in Berlin. To achieve control of the city they were precluded from using the means most direct, namely, to invoke their preponderant land power and forcibly dictate a solution.

Hindsight makes this appear lucid. But, in 1948, perception of this reality came hard. Indeed, the problems faced by the West just to stay in Berlin seemed insurmountable. Focusing on the West's own difficulties caused the hazards faced by the opponent very nearly to go unnoticed. This is scarcely a new phenomenon in political and military confrontations. But because this confrontation was taking place in a setting so unique, the peculiar difficulties of our own predicament were stressed out of proportion.

The Soviets, it seems fair to say, enjoyed a more exact appreciation of the possible. The alternative of open hostilities was rejected from the very beginning; all lesser means were carefully orchestrated to drive the West from the city. If in the end the Soviets failed, their ability to keep the crisis carefully modulated--indeed, to dictate the level of conflict--elicits admiration. For at no time did the Soviet Union lose control of the situation. Escalation through various phases of local political action to military blockade was purposefully controlled. And when the Soviets reached the end of the scale--in this case, blockade--without achieving their goal, they quickly liquidated the encounter.

The dynamic nature of conflict reveals itself in the political and military limits imposed in this case. In view of the Soviet goal of driving the West from Berlin, the pressure exerted was limited. Throughout the duration of the confrontation, each step was carefully prepared in advance. At no time did Soviet actions exceed the bounds of necessity. Nor were those selected likely to trigger a violent Western response.

*The question of larger Soviet goals is beyond the scope of this paper.

The methods by which pressure was exerted are also revealing. Consider early Soviet activities. As the chronology makes clear, first intimation of Russian desires was the attempt of the local Communist Party (KDP) to capture the dominant Social Democratic Party machinery. Western officials in Berlin made no move to oppose the take-over. Rebuffed by the Socialists, the Communists endeavored nonetheless to win the 1946 election. Their comparative defeat (26 of 130 seats) taught that the road to power lay elsewhere than through free elections. But, it was not until this became clear that more extreme measures were taken.

The same holds true for the military pressure which replaced local political efforts. Introduction of the blockade was halting and gradual. The ground was carefully tested before each step. At no time would it have been impossible for the Soviets to pull back. The lesson for a study of the changing nature of war is that the application of force becomes more discriminate; that increasing risks demand increased control of all instruments of national policy, and that the overt use of force is severely restricted. The struggle also reflects reciprocal relations between degrees of resolve. By throwing initiative back to the Soviets the West placed upon them the burden of assessing the risks attendant upon moving to violent measures.

When the Soviets lifted the blockade, it was for much less than their original goal. Instead of driving the West from Berlin, they achieved absolute control over only a portion of the city. This the West was in no position to deny. But the lesson is explicit: political goals in the context of great power confrontation tend to be limited and varied; what cannot be achieved immediately may yield to gradual encroachment; and all positions tend to be temporary--tend to provide takeoff points for further action when the climate has improved

Diplomatically, the Berlin crisis of 1948-1949 revealed the inherent difficulty of coalition operations. Achieving a united Western front was long and arduous. Not only were there differences between London, Paris, and Washington (the Moscow discussions did not get underway until August), but there were serious differences between Western officials in Berlin and their respective capitals. The Moscow accords (August 27, 1948), which explicitly provided for the use of Soviet currency throughout Berlin, were torpedoed by General Clay when the problem of implementation arose. Indeed, throughout the confrontation, officials in Berlin exhibited greater confidence than their superiors at home that the position could be held.

The role of the United Nations also deserves comment. Given the nature of the dispute--a quarrel involving the permanent members of the Security Council--the formal UN apparatus proved ineffective. Original reference of the dispute by the Western powers, it seems safe to say, was intended primarily as an appeal to public opinion. Mediation by "neutral" members of the Security Council was rejected by the West when the solution suggested went beyond that considered necessary. Nonetheless, the United Nations did play a major role in lifting the blockade. By providing a recognized channel of contact, US and Soviet delegates to the Security Council were able to negotiate informally and privately, and eventually arrive at a mutually agreeable formula. To be sure, both sides sought agreement at that time. But the opportunity for informal contact offered by the United Nations proved highly effective.

Psychological Influences

Psychological factors play a major role in the Berlin blockade. When the occupation began, Soviet efforts were directed toward capturing public opinion in Berlin. Control of the traditionally dominant Social Democratic Party (SDP) was a means to that end. Capitalizing on the widespread hardship prevalent in postwar Berlin, the Soviets exploited their economic resources to the hilt. Before the election of 1946, food, fuel, and long-neglected luxury items were virtually pressed on residents of the Soviet sector. Notebooks were distributed free to schoolchildren--compliments of the SED (Socialist Unity Party).

The trend recurred throughout the early days of Soviet occupation. Clearly, the Russians left no stone unturned to win the support of the average Berliner. The slogan of occupation, posted prominently throughout Berlin by the victorious Red army, would have been unthinkable in an earlier era--and probably to the Western allies as well. That slogan reappeared consistently in Soviet propaganda of the period: "Hitlers come and go, but the German people endure forever."

Unfortunately for the Soviets, the earlier actions of the Red army during the Battle of Berlin created such animosity among the Berliners that all subsequent protestations of Communist good faith seemed ingenuous. The rape of the city by the forces of Marshal Zhukov permanently estranged the workers of Berlin. The German Communist Party bore the stigma of a Soviet appendage. This effectively prevented the USSR from winning control in Berlin through parliamentary means.

In spite of their lack of success, Soviet attention to public opinion in Berlin focused on a well-recognized adjunct to modern conflict: the vital role of popular support. Indeed, the Soviets pursued this goal relentlessly. After the 1946 election convinced most Soviet officials that they could not win a free election in Berlin, they at least sought to deny popular support to the West. This involved extensive efforts to intimidate Western supporters, to capitalize on fears that the West would not remain, and to induce such hardships among the population that capitulation might appear preferable to further resistance.

Fortunately for the West, the military governors (Clay, Koenig, and Robertson) were alert to these dangers. Never one to have much truck with Socialist politicians, Clay assiduously sought out Ernst Reuter at the time of the blockade to verify the state of Berliner morale. Repeated efforts by Washington to evacuate US dependents in Berlin were steadfastly resisted by Clay for the possible adverse effect on the local population. And by meeting each Soviet encroachment vigorously, the military governors convinced the Berliners of Western resolve--and doubtless also the Soviets.

The airlift offers the best example. Continuously the Berliner saw (or heard) the visible proof of Western determination. Indeed, the plight of the pilots evoked great sympathy among the Berliners. A feeling of comradeship developed. And for the Berliners, enduring their hardships resolutely was their part of the compact. Thus, the airlift galvanized German resistance. Until then, most Europeans had stood on the sidelines, anxious not to offend a seemingly unstoppable Communist expansion. But with Western forces holding fast, a rallying post was provided for those longing to resist. Decisive action in this case provided the margin of victory.

In the United States, public opinion supported the decision to stand firm. Poll samplings in March and April of 1948 indicated an 80% favorable response to administration policy. Even after the imposition of the total blockade in June, only 12% of those queried advocated withdrawal. By October 1948, only 10% favored leaving. The lesson for a study of the changing nature of war is that by 1948 American public opinion was more than ready to shoulder the burdens incumbent upon a nation claiming great power status.

The Berlin blockade and the Allied airlift were psychologically important elsewhere. One by one the countries of Eastern and Central Europe had yielded to Communist regimes. Were the West to relinquish Berlin, all Germany might follow. Indeed, the

very difficulty posed by Berlin proved a singular advantage for the West. A show of determination in a place apparently untenable heightened the psychological effect of Western resolve--and Soviet appreciation of that resolve. Berlin's isolated position captured public imagination. Previous identification of the city with Hitler's capital gave place to symbolic resistance to Communist aggression. Public sympathy was overwhelming.

On the other hand, Soviet imposition of the blockade represented the ultimate in attempts to coerce popular submission. Fear of want is a compelling weapon. Hunger, cold, and an uncertain future militate against extended resistance. That the Berliners did resist is a credit both to them and to the Western powers who made resistance possible.

Technological Factors

The West was able to mount the Berlin airlift because of overwhelming technological superiority. That the Soviet Union chose not to interfere with the airlift can be attributed to the same factor. For the nuclear monopoly which the United States enjoyed at that time made the risks of interfering unacceptable. As General Clay advised Washington, the Soviets could disrupt the airlift only by shooting planes down. They would not take this risk unless they were bent on war. And in that case, war would come regardless.

Thus, modern technology made it possible for the United States to remain in Berlin. The airlift was possible only because of America's tremendous air strength. To supply a city of 2,000,000 by air for a period of almost one year staggers the imagination. Mayor Reuter, we are told, was clearly skeptical of the operation when first advised by General Clay. But Generals Clay and Robertson and their Air Force commanders were determined that Berlin could be supplied by air. And in the air, their determination carried the day.

Besides the effect of airpower itself, technological change was central to other aspects of the Berlin problem. Without all-weather navigation aids, the airlift would certainly have bogged down during the fog-shrouded months of December, January, and February. Advanced packaging techniques also contributed to the success of the airlift. With water removed from most food substances, for example, available space went many times further. The introduction of large cargo aircraft became of crucial importance as the winter began and fuel was added to the items carried.

When a city is isolated to the extent of Berlin, communications are often as important as transportation. Had the Western garrisons been entirely dependent upon land-line telephone extending through the Soviet zone, it is certain that long-term resistance would have been impossible. As it was, Western headquarters in Berlin were linked instantaneously with their respective capitals. Clay in Berlin could seek instructions or offer advice on a moment's notice, and the same was true of his British and French counterparts.

But to a certain extent, technology cuts both ways. Berlin in 1948 was a city subsisting at a minimal level of luxury. Recovery had scarcely begun. Life was rigorous; requirements were limited. Industrial and consumer demands were satisfied with a minimal tonnage. Today, technological progress and industrial recovery impose demands many times greater. Higher standards of living enjoyed by the Berliners further complicate the picture. Stated differently, technological development makes man more dependent. And at Berlin's present level of development, it is highly unlikely that a new airlift would prove adequate.

Strategic and Tactical Force Relations

The Berlin blockade offers important evidence concerning the close relation between strategic and tactical forces. Almost by definition, the Western garrisons in Berlin are capable of nothing save the most limited holding action (and the control of civil disturbances). Yet, because of US strategic dominance--the ability to strike the Soviet homeland with virtual immunity from nuclear retaliation--these forces were sufficient to deter overt Soviet aggression. Indeed, the threat of armed action was never offered.

Also, the relation between strategic and tactical forces tends to be reciprocal. Had the Western garrisons not been adequate to contain potential Communist-inspired riots and demonstrations, the Soviets could have captured control of the city by never presenting sufficient provocation to trigger US strategic forces. To launch overwhelming retaliatory action against overt military aggression has the ring of credibility. To employ strategic bombers in response to civil disorder is patently ludicrous.

PART II--THE BERLIN WALL: 1960-1961

Chronology

General

From the end of the blockade until the late fifties, Soviet pressure was noticeably absent in Berlin. Sporadic incidents merely emphasized the underlying calm. But in 1958 the atmosphere changed. After the successful launching of Sputnik in 1957, and with growing confidence in Soviet nuclear capacity, Moscow launched a second major effort against Berlin. Whether the aim was to drive the West completely from the city, or whether it was simply to complete the incorporation of the Eastern sector into the German Democratic Republic, is a moot point. In the end, the Soviets once more settled for the limited achievement.

Ultimatum, Geneva, and Camp David

For convenience, the second Soviet campaign in Berlin can be traced from November 27, 1958--the date of Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum to the Western powers. According to Khrushchev, the West had six months to terminate the occupation and declare West Berlin (but not the Eastern sector) a "free city." During the winter of 1958-1959, Khrushchev gradually moderated his demands. A visit by Anastas Mikoyan to the United States in January 1959 paved the way for a conference of Foreign Ministers on the Berlin question, which convened in Geneva on May 11, 1959. The Geneva Conference was unproductive--upstaged by the impending visit of Chairman Khrushchev to the United States. Khrushchev arrived in New York on September 15, 1959, and conferred for three days with President Eisenhower at Camp David, September 24-27, 1959. The Camp David discussions elicited Khrushchev's formal withdrawal of his earlier ultimatum in return for a full dress Summit Conference to be convened in Paris the following spring.

Proxy Harassment

Between Camp David and the Paris Summit, the Soviet Union scrupulously refrained from exerting pressure on Berlin. Instead, they encouraged (or at least did not restrain) their East German satellite from moving against the Western position. Beginning in October, the German Democratic Republic nibbled repeatedly and effectively at Western rights in Berlin. On October 6, 1959, East

German flags were hoisted over all S-Bahn (elevated) stations in Berlin. A similar attempt on November 1 was prevented only by threat of Western military intervention. On February 3, 1960, the German Democratic Republic instituted its own pass procedures for the three Western military missions (to the Soviet commander in chief) in Potsdam. These "procedures" were relaxed only when similar curbs were imposed on the Soviet military missions in the West (March 15, 1960). On February 4, 1960, the Warsaw Pact nations meeting in Moscow announced their intention to conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany. This was followed on March 1, 1960, by Soviet protests of high altitude US flights into Berlin. In the face of the upcoming Paris Summit, the United States relaxed its position. At his press conference on March 9, President Eisenhower announced the temporary suspension of all flights into Berlin over 10,000 feet.

U-2, the Paris Summit, and Vienna

On the eve of the Paris Summit Conference (May 1, 1960), an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over the Soviet Union. The Conference adjourned without issue two weeks later (May 17, 1960). Following the Paris Conference, East German tactics of gradual encroachment intensified. The autobahn was denied participants in a "German Homeland Day" rally in Berlin (August 30-September 4, 1960), and on September 5, all barge traffic to Berlin was halted for 48 hours. On September 8, 1960, restrictions were imposed on West German entry to East Berlin. On September 18, the Apostolic Nuncio to Germany was barred from entering East Berlin. Three days later (September 21, 1960) the ban was extended to all diplomats accredited in Bonn. On September 26 the intensification continued; East Berlin officials sealed the sector boundary completely for 24 hours protesting incendiary rallies (Billy Graham) in West Berlin. Only the threat of West German economic sanctions (October 1, 1960) caused the GDR to desist.

The new administration in the United States found the Berlin issue seemingly defused. But the meeting of President John F. Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna (June 3-4, 1961) rekindled the crisis. Khrushchev presented an aide-memoire reviving Soviet demands for a free city and, in effect, giving the West a new ultimatum.

From Vienna to the Wall

Following the Vienna Conference, events in Berlin moved quickly. A scheduled Bundesrat meeting in West Berlin was

cancelled on June 8. On June 10, Moscow made public the aide-mémoire presented by Khrushchev. In a Senate speech on June 14, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield advocated compromise on Berlin with the Soviets. Throughout the remainder of June and July, the number of refugees fleeing the GDR grew to record proportions, adding further to the unrest which Washington feared in East Germany. On July 30, 1961, Senator William Fulbright, in a television interview, questioned why the GDR had not moved to close the East Berlin sector boundary. Between August 2 and 11, the GDR moved to do just that. Border crossing restrictions were tightened, and all East Berliners working in the West were forced to register. Leaders of the Warsaw Pact nations met in Moscow to discuss the situation August 3-4, 1961. A parallel meeting of Western Foreign Ministers convened in Paris August 5-7. And all the while, the number of refugees increased. Shortly after midnight on Sunday, August 13, 1961, East German zonal authorities sealed the sector boundary completely.

Panic and Recovery

When the GDR closed the sector boundary, Western authorities in Berlin did not contest it. Even a formal protest proved tardy. As a result, West Berlin morale all but collapsed. Near-panic gripped the city. Departures for West Germany rose alarmingly. To counter the threat, President Kennedy dispatched Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson and General Clay to the city on August 18. At the same time, reinforcement of the US garrison was announced by the White House. Two weeks later, in the face of continued erosion of morale, President Kennedy announced that General Clay was returning to Berlin as his personal representative. The purpose of sending General Clay to Berlin was largely symbolic: to reassure the Berliners of Western resolve, and likewise to convince the Soviets. Clay arrived in Berlin September 19, 1961. Two days later he visited the isolated enclave of Steinstuecken by helicopter--visibly demonstrating US presence. One month later (October 27-28, 1961), a confrontation of US and Soviet armor at Checkpoint Charlie convinced the Berliners that the West would stand firm. With West Berlin morale restored, General Clay departed Berlin May 8, 1962.

Political and Diplomatic Considerations

The second Berlin crisis bears strong resemblance to the first. The principal antagonists were the same. Communist goals

once more were varied. Pressure was discriminate. Tactics were carefully moderated to avoid a final confrontation--until it was certain what that confrontation would yield.

But there were differences as well. At certain points, US and Soviet interests appeared to coincide.* The most important of these was in dousing the fire which both perceived to be raging in East Germany. When it became clear that that could be done only by closing the Berlin sector boundary, then border closure became inevitable. The larger consideration of US-Soviet relations provided the backdrop before which the whole drama was enacted. During the crucial stages of the crisis (August 10-16, 1961), both the United States and the Soviet Union were noticeably absent from affairs in Berlin. The Soviets left arrangements completely in the hands of the GDR. The United States did the equivalent, keeping its garrison tightly restricted to its caserns. Both avoided the dangerous confrontation which political leaders feared might escalate.

Use of the Ulbricht regime by the Soviets was a prominent feature of the border closure. Doubtless one consideration was to add stature to the hitherto undistinguished East German government. Another, perhaps, was to provide the Soviets with a loophole to back out if the West forcibly resisted the building of the wall. A third consideration was further to delineate the separation between East and West--to define clearly the sphere of control of each. Agreeing in principle with the need for this delineation, the United States (and Britain and France) were stopped from contesting the border closure. The result was that Ulbricht moved virtually at will during the month of August. Indeed, a halt was called only in October when General Clay deployed US tanks at Checkpoint Charlie. The Soviets responded by stationing their own tanks opposite, thus ending Ulbricht's seeming autonomy.

The eventual US-Soviet confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie reveals a fundamental point of proxy warfare. Namely, that barring total victory, the principals must ultimately resume contact, for a military demonstration by one great power compels a comparable demonstration by the other. In this case the contact

*One member of the Review Panel takes strong exception to this interpretation of events. He says, "I regard it as a most questionable interpretation of an event designed to put a détente face on what was essentially a weakness or an unwillingness to press an advantage against an enemy then in disarray, discomfiture, and near to defeat in one section of the global battle."

posed great dangers of intensifying the conflict, but considerably less so than an extended confrontation between US and East German (proxy) forces. (According to most accounts, East German military units had been without ammunition on August 13.)

The fear of instability was perhaps the central factor of the second Berlin crisis. It was that fear that compelled the East to close the border--for by doing so they were tacitly settling for the more limited goal of separation. And it was that fear which triggered Western response--in this case, acceptance of the closure. When the closure was complete, it was the fear of escalation which forced the Soviets to return to the city--thus blowing the whistle on further encroachments by the Ulbricht regime.

Diplomatically, the crisis of 1960-1961 involved the same problems of coalition diplomacy as the blockade. Presenting a united Western front at all levels of Communist harassment proved exceedingly difficult. This was true not only at the governmental level, but in Berlin as well. The existence of vigorous governments in West Berlin and Bonn complicated the picture further. Preparation of contingency plans involved dozens of separate headquarters and departments. That Western response was as unified as it was (Chancellor Adenauer was later to pay dearly for this), remains a tribute to US leadership.

The United Nations played little role in the 1961 encounter. The occupying powers--the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union--resolved to tamp down what all considered an impending conflagration in East Germany. The only way to accomplish this was by closing the border. Once this fact was mutually recognized, the rest of the drama was determined. To be sure, formal consultation between East and West was at a minimum. But the signals exchanged were clear and unmistakable. Similarly, the means employed were carefully limited. Moderation was the keynote.

The border closure was clearly to the best interest of all concerned. A dangerous situation in Central Europe was contained, and once that was accomplished, the stage was set for improved US-Soviet relations. Hindsight makes this obvious. What was not obvious at the time was that this improved relation might be possible.

Psychological Influences

The one element ignored (or underrated) by Western governments in 1961 was the deleterious effect of the border closure on

West Berlin morale. Attention centered on the explosive situation in East Germany. The dangers of increased tensions posed by the continuing refugee exodus required that the East Berlin sector boundary be sealed. Pre-August 13 warnings by Mayor Willy Brandt and other West Berlin officials were either ignored or attributed to election campaign propaganda. Not even the West German government took Brandt's alarm seriously. On August 11, Foreign Minister Brentano dismissed out of hand the idea of possible panic in West Berlin. Washington and London, eager for the improved international climate which border closure might bring, saw Brandt's forebodings as deliberate obstacles placed in the path of East-West accord.

This largely explains the tardy Western response on August 13 and the days immediately following. To Western capitals, what was happening in Berlin was simply in line with an overall desire to improve the international climate. The West Berliners were being obstinate. Reports of the seriousness of the situation from Western officials in Berlin were dismissed as coming from those too much involved to have a proper perspective. Indeed, it was the fortuitous presence of Edward R. Murrow in Berlin which finally caused Washington to appreciate the seriousness of crisis. Clearly not a "local official," Murrow's warnings of impending panic could not be ignored. The result was the hasty dispatch of Vice President Johnson and General Clay to Berlin on August 18. Reinforcement of the US garrison was also directed at soothing Berliner morale, for the added combat effectiveness of a single battle group was scarcely significant.

Choice of General Clay to accompany Vice President Johnson was fortunate. No one could better convince the Berliners of US resolve than the former military governor who had launched the airlift.

The principal question posed by the second Berlin confrontation is how had West Berlin response been so poorly anticipated? For it now seems clear that the "crisis" was largely a crisis of local morale. Had the West Berliners not thought they were being forsaken, they would not have bolted as they did. Firm US action on August 13--not to open the border, but just to demonstrate Western presence and concern--probably would have sufficed. Mere presence of US troops at the sector boundary would have served a salutary effect. Deterioration of West Berlin morale would have been avoided, and the propaganda victory subsequently claimed by the West would have been unblemished. As it was, Ulbricht was able to enhance his own standing considerably by seeming to intimidate the Allies. Absence of Western troops on August 13 and the days immediately following was widely attributed in both halves of Germany to Allied timidity.

In retrospect, it seems fair to say that Western capitals were oblivious to Berliner morale because they chose to be so. Concern with the larger purpose of the exercise--the removal of a dangerous source of tension--led officials in Washington to ignore all evidence which might detract from that purpose. The warnings in this case had been loud and clear. Because they did not jibe with the desired result, they were not acted upon until too late. In this respect, the crisis over the wall was largely of our own making.

Technological Factors

Technological change played little role in the second Berlin crisis. If anything, the wall separating East and West Berlin traces its origin to those of the Romans or the Chinese 2,000 years previous. That the GDR was able to move as swiftly as it did on August 13 is no more than is to be expected of a modern military force. The same is true of the rapid move of US reinforcements August 19. In line with Western desires, the question of surprise remains moot. Rapid communications and transportation were taken for granted on both sides.

To be sure, it was concern with nuclear escalation which triggered Western response to the deteriorating situation in East Germany. Ulbricht's weakness in this case became his principal strength. For given the fact of mutual nuclear vulnerability, neither side could afford to see the GDR tinderbox ignited. This differs considerably from what might have been the case a decade previous (although Western reaction to the June 17, 1953, uprising argues to the contrary). A nuclear standoff between superpowers places a premium on stability. This necessarily redounds to the advantage of the weaker party. In this case, Ulbricht was saved because of his very weakness. All possible alternatives enhanced the likelihood of hostilities. With the danger of escalation appearing so imminent, shoring-up the GDR seemed the path least likely to provoke it. Once this was clear to all sides, the outcome was never in doubt.

This suggests that the interest of nuclear powers in stability is an overriding one. The dangers of mutual destruction are sufficiently great to introduce a major element of restraint in what otherwise might be an unlimited struggle for supremacy. The Berlin confrontation of 1961 makes this clear.

Strategic and Tactical Force Relations

The relation between strategic and tactical forces in 1961 differs from the confrontation in 1948 in two important respects. The first and most obvious is the fact of mutual nuclear potential which prevailed in 1961. Indeed, this fact dominated the entire confrontation. Less obvious is the increased employment of proxy adversaries. By keeping the GDR continually in the foreground, while at the same time retaining real control over GDR actions, the Soviet Union effectively minimized its risks. Dissociation from Ulbricht's tactics was possible at any time. This could prove particularly desirable (for both sides, really) should an intended probe miscarry. In such a case, only Ulbricht would be the worse for it.

But except for these two factors, what was true in 1948 was true in 1961. Forces in Berlin represent tactical pledges for strategic forces elsewhere. And as long as Berlin remains isolated, this is likely to remain so.

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Korea (1950-1953)*

GENERAL BACKGROUND

The conflict in Korea (1950-1953) is a phenomenon unique in the history of US military operations, diplomacy, and politico-military relations. It is indeed the pivotal point in understanding the post-World War II complex of international accord and discord.

The uniqueness of the Korean conflict lies not primarily in its character, because this conflict was a reproduction on a major scale of what had become normal relations between the Western and Eastern power blocs since 1945. Its special significance lies in the fact that it brought sharply into focus the existing pattern of diplomacy and the new and difficult relationship of war to international politics.

In September 1949 the Soviet Union had eliminated the nuclear monopoly under cover of which US diplomacy had functioned for four years. Although the US stockpile was miniscule by current standards and the delivery means was at best questionable, it nevertheless had constituted a one-sided and unanswerable threat to military aggression. Soviet development of a nuclear device did not, of course, simultaneously create a Soviet stockpile and delivery system comparable in magnitude and presumed effectiveness to those of the United States. But it did demand the assumption that there existed--and might be employed--a Soviet nuclear capability of some order of magnitude, susceptible of improvement at an unknown rate.

Since 1945 the pressures of Communist aggression had been felt and resisted by the United States. This resistance had been applied with success in Iran, Austria, Greece, the Philippines, Turkey, and Berlin. US resistance to this aggression, diplomatic and persuasive only, had been applied in the cases of Poland and

*This paper, prepared by the HERO staff, is in large part based upon a paper prepared for this study by Marshall Andrews.

the Slavic Balkans, and had failed. Similar failure had rewarded our diplomatic, economic, and military resistance in China, for reasons which are at best controversial, but not germane to this paper.

The real threat from the Soviet Union was lost on many of the American people in the postwar years, not only by virtue of a mistaken obsession with domestic communism but also from an unquestioning reliance by many on nuclear power as the military catholicon. This latter preoccupation derived naturally from the conviction, instilled by two world wars within a generation, that total war was the foregone resort in international disputes not amenable to diplomatic settlement.

The history of the ancient country of Korea has been a turbulent story of alternating conquest and domination by the more warlike and more powerful Chinese to the north and west, and Japanese to the south and east. In 1910, as a result of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905, Korea was annexed by Japan. Occupation of the country jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union after the defeat of Japan in 1945 was agreed at the time of Japan's surrender--an afterthought to the problems of reoccupation of Japan and liberation of other areas of Japan's empire. As a temporary expedient and purely for convenience for accepting the surrender of Japanese forces in the peninsula, the 38th parallel of latitude was agreed upon as the US-USSR demarcation line in an exchange of personal messages between President Truman and Marshal Stalin at the time of Allied adoption of the terms of the Instrument of Surrender. From the outset, however, the Soviets assumed the 38th parallel as a permanent division, organizing the area north of the parallel under a puppet government.

In the south US forces entered Korea September 8, 1945. Little thought had been given to the problem of the civil administration of this area of 36,760 square miles and some 21,000,000 inhabitants. Government of the liberated country under these circumstances caused considerable criticism at home, and was further complicated by the aggressive activities of the Communist minority in the US-occupied zone. The US occupation forces found themselves caught between the anvil of Korean aspirations and the hammer of Soviet ambition. They went into Korea utterly unprepared for their essentially political mission; it was not until the end of December that military government units were distributed to the provinces.

The directives sent to General John R. Hodge, the US commander, recognized that Korea was to be treated as a "liberated" country in distinction to Japan's status as an "occupied" country,

but Hodge was also directed to utilize to the maximum extent possible suitable agencies of the existing government.* The government of Korea for 35 years had been Japanese, and the Koreans were violently opposed to continuing any Japanese in office, or to following Japanese practices. Yet the Koreans themselves were altogether unprepared to assume the responsibilities of government. Those with any experience had served under the Japanese and were often regarded as collaborators. The rest were untrained in even the most minor capacities.

American efforts to straighten out the problems of government in South Korea were further frustrated by total lack of cooperation from the Soviet military and political officials in the north. When it proved completely impossible to obtain any sort of understanding, Secretary of State James Byrnes raised the problem of Korea at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December 1945. This resulted in the so-called Moscow Agreement on Korea, to which the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union were parties, with Nationalist China later adhering. It provided for a US-Soviet Joint Commission which was to make recommendations for establishment of a provisional Korean democratic government.

Although the Joint Commission held several meetings, the Soviet representatives remained uncooperative and the net result was further complication of the problems with the Koreans themselves. Unfortunately the Moscow Agreement used the term "trusteeship" in relation to Korea, and, accidentally or by design, the word was translated into the Korean term used to express the Japanese "protectorate" from 1905 to 1910. In 1947 General Hodge reported:

The furor over this subject makes it almost impossible to get any coalition, any middle-of-the-road group that we can use. The term was established early in the minds of the Koreans as being deadly to their sovereignty. Later it became synonymous with the Russians having a hand in managing the country. Then it became so that trusteeship, Russian control, and communism were all synonymous. They didn't mention that word without rolling all those connotations into one.

*A member of the HERO staff participated in the drafting of the official "Post-Surrender Policy for Korea" by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee; a copy of the draft was sent to Hodge in the hands of a State Department official before he left Okinawa for Korea.

US attempts to bring political and economic order to South Korea were complicated still more by, among other things, an influx of Korean repatriates and refugees from north of the 38th parallel. In addition the Russians themselves shoved thousands of old, destitute, and politically undesirable North Koreans over the border until more than 1.5 million refugees were on the hands of the US authorities. Among these, as was later to be demonstrated, were a number of Communist agents.

By 1947 it was obvious that the Soviet Union had no intention of carrying out the Moscow Agreement. Soviet members on the Joint Commission were employing obstructionist tactics designed to confuse the already difficult political situation in South Korea, while the Russian authorities were busily engaged in sovietizing the Korean people north of the 38th parallel. Since neither efforts by the US military authorities in Korea, nor diplomatic moves by the Department of State, affected these Soviet activities, it became necessary for the United States to reassess the Korean situation and to decide what could and should be done to carry out our repeatedly announced obligation to bring about the freedom and independence of Korea.

After a careful evaluation of political, economic, and military considerations, the US Government decided to refer the problem of Korean unification to the United Nations. This resulted, despite Soviet protests, in the establishment in 1947 of a UN Commission on Korea, with the purpose of preparing a draft democratic constitution and establishing a Korean national government.

Since the Soviets would not cooperate, and would not allow the UN Commission to enter North Korea, that body could carry out its responsibilities only in South Korea. Under the Commission's supervision, free elections were held there on May 10, 1948, and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was founded, under the aegis of the United Nations, on August 15, 1948. Declaring that this action was illegal and that it violated the Moscow Agreement, the Russians in September formally established a puppet Communist state in North Korea, which they called the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The 38th parallel, "a fortuitous line resulting from the exigencies of the war," was now a political frontier in name as well as in fact. Later that year all Soviet occupation forces were nominally withdrawn from the newly established Communist satellite.

By June 29, 1949, all US troops, except a training contingent, the Korea Military Advisory Group (KMAG), had also left the country, and its affairs had passed within the cognizance of the US State Department. The Republic's defense was entrusted to a

constabulary and an embryonic army, both to be equipped with US weapons deliberately limited in offensive capabilities to minimize the possibility of a ROK attack on North Korea. But by June of 1950 the organization, training, and equipping of these two forces were far from complete.

In Japan, meanwhile, US occupation forces had been reduced to four divisions, primarily engaged in routine administrative occupation tasks. All units were understrength; infantry regiments lacked one rifle battalion, artillery battalions were similarly reduced to two firing batteries and these batteries had only four pieces instead of the authorized six. Armor was nonexistent except for M-24 light tanks, designed for reconnaissance and not for combat, in the infantry division reconnaissance companies.* Most important of all, these troops were not only not organized or trained for combat; they were psychologically unprepared for battle.

Neither the US military forces on the Korean periphery nor the people of the nation were ready for the responsibility about to be thrust upon them.

THE KOREAN WAR

The North Korean People's Army (NKPA), much superior to that of South Korea in size, equipment, and training, struck across the 38th parallel before daybreak June 25, 1950, Korean time. Since the North Korean government was entirely subservient to the Soviet Union, this was actually a Soviet attack, with Koreans doing all the dying. The resultant conflict will be considered from three aspects: events precedent to the attack, conduct of operations, and events subsequent to operations.

Events Precedent to the Attack

In view of the apparent abandonment of the military defense of South Korea by the United States and the obvious military weakness of that young republic, the venture must have seemed to the Soviets to be almost without risk. Not only had US attention been successfully diverted to Europe by the Berlin blockade of

*This was in part because Japanese bridges were not sufficiently sturdy to support heavier tanks.

1948-1949, but US and Western European fears of a Soviet attack in Europe had been nurtured by well-timed saber-rattling. Furthermore, US interest in Korea apparently had been dismissed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in a speech at the National Press Club in Washington January 12, 1950. This speech, delineating the strategic defense perimeter vital to the United States in the Pacific, eliminated Korea. Acheson's reference to a system of military outposts was widely taken by the US press and public, and apparently by the Soviet leaders, to indicate no interest in the security of Korea. This had not been the intent; Acheson and the State Department did not think of Korea as a defensive base area; the omission had not been intended to imply that Korea had been abandoned as unimportant to US policy.

Warnings of Communist ambitions and intentions in Korea had been many and frequent over the five years between the end of World War II and the North Korean attack. Ever since its establishment the North Korean government had continued and intensified the earlier Soviet efforts to stir up trouble in South Korea. Frequent raids across the border had been combined with activities of Communist agents--propaganda, sabotage, guerrilla action, and terrorism. But Communist success had been limited.

When the invasion came, contrary to general belief, US military intelligence was not surprised. For some three months an Air Force warrant officer in Seoul with evidently exceptional sources had been calling attention to an impending invasion and even, near the event, fixing the date. In Washington the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, had compiled a thorough summary of indications which he concluded clearly pointed to North Korean action against South Korea. These warnings were, for some reason, ignored in high administration circles.

"I saw the CIA messages," Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified later, "but about every Sunday morning--this is an oversimplification--the North Koreans came across the 38th parallel, then excused it as maneuvers and they went back. . . . There was no advice to the military in any of the reports--'wolf' being, and having been, cried so often on the Sunday morning excursions--that put us on notice that anything was going to happen in Korea." General MacArthur, who had opposed the withdrawal of US forces from Korea, apparently washed his hands of the situation. He later said: "It was not in my command; I didn't have anything to do with it." Later both the Defense Department and the Far East Command (FECOM) disclaimed responsibility for intelligence of developments in Korea, since that area had come under State Department cognizance upon withdrawal of occupation forces in 1949.

Nonetheless, MacArthur's intelligence officer had sent back considerable information to Washington regarding the likelihood of a North Korean invasion.

To the Soviet Union, aware of the unreadiness of South Korean forces, and of the apparent lack of US political or military interest in, or responsibility for, South Korea, there appeared to be two prizes, ripe for the plucking. The richest would be a demonstration to all the weak and wavering nations of the world that Soviet power was invincible and that it could be exercised at will and with impunity. The second (though hardly paltry) prize would be Korea itself united under Soviet rule.

Conduct of Operations

President Truman was in Independence, Missouri, when news of the NKPA attack reached Washington late on June 24.* The next day he returned to the White House and during the three-hour flight made up his mind about what had to be done. As Mr. Truman described it later:

If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the free world, no small nation would have the courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors. If this was allowed to go unchallenged it would mean a third world war, just as similar incidents had brought on the second world war. It was also clear to me that the foundation and the principles of the United Nations were at stake unless this unprovoked attack on Korea could be stopped.**

Next day the UN Security Council, by a 9-0 vote (the Soviet delegate had withdrawn from the Council in a huff over another matter in January 1950), declared the North Korean action an aggression and ordered its cessation and removal of the NKPA from South Korea. On June 27 the Security Council called on UN member nations to give assistance to South Korea in repelling invasion, and restoring international peace and security in the area. Earlier that same day Mr. Truman had directed General MacArthur to

*June 25 in Korea.

**H.S. Truman, Memoirs, New York, 1956 Vol. Two, p. 333.

use US air and naval forces south of the 38th parallel and ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa.

Supported by armor (Soviet T-34 medium tanks), the NKPA advanced rapidly southward in a main column down the western side of the peninsula and two subsidiary columns eastward. Their advance proved irresistible, smashing the untrained and weakly armed ROK opposition with relative ease. US air support was of little help to the beaten ROK forces.

General MacArthur on June 29 flew to South Korea to estimate the situation for himself and that same day advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the NKPA thrust could be halted only by the interposition of US land forces. He was authorized next day to take this step, and two rifle companies of the US 24th Infantry Division, with some supporting heavy weapons were immediately airlifted to Pusan. Later that same day other elements of the 24th Division began to move to Pusan by sea from Japan. The first clash of US and North Korean troops took place near Osan, 40 miles south of Seoul, on July 5. The two rifle companies and a supporting artillery battery were overrun by a North Korean division.

The numbers and quality of these first US troops, their training and equipment, were inadequate to halt the NKPA advance. Although the US force in Korea was increased daily, it was pushed back along with the ROK army (ROKA) until in late July--now organized as the US Eighth Army, under Lt. Gen. W.H. Walker--it took strong defensive positions behind the Naktong River covering Pusan. There it remained for about two months, fighting off incessant attacks, building and learning as it fought, while a remarkable event was brewing in Tokyo.

At the Japanese capital General MacArthur had decided on a seaborne envelopment on the west coast of South Korea at Inchon. Part of the force would have to come from the hard-pressed Pusan perimeter, part from Japan, and part from outposts as far away as the Mediterranean. Under the drive of his personality, and despite skepticism of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, the normally accepted planning period of 120 days for an amphibious operation was cut to 30, part of the landing force was assembled at sea, and the landing was made on September 15, 1950. In almost every respect it was an unorthodox operation; aside from the extremely brief time between inception and execution, it was carried out in the heart of a port city and in almost impossible conditions of a 29-foot tidal variation. Nevertheless it succeeded; the 1st Marine Division made the landing, followed up by the 7th Infantry Division; the two divisions forming the X Corps, under Lt. Gen. E.L. Almond.

By September 27 the South Korean capital of Seoul had been retaken, and the UN forces in the Pusan perimeter had broken out and were advancing rapidly westward and northward. North Korean aggression had been spectacularly halted, and the NKPA, to all intents and purposes, had ceased to exist as a viable military force. In addition to unknown NKPA casualties killed and wounded, UN prisoner-of-war cages held more than 110,000 North Korean soldiers of the estimated 150,000 that had attacked in the first place.

It might have seemed that the objective of the campaign had been achieved; South Korea was freed of the invader and clear notice had been served to the Soviet Union and all the world that aggressions, directly or by proxy, against weak nations would not be tolerated. However, no clear-cut objectives had been established either by the United States or by the United Nations. Thus it was not clear whether the objective was to eject the aggressors, or to punish them, or to reunite Korea in accordance with the 1947 UN declaration.

Having been ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to destroy the North Korean armed forces," with authority direct from President Truman, and with UN approval, early in October MacArthur proceeded in pursuit of the aggressors. He withdrew the amphibious-experienced X Corps from the Seoul area in order to employ them in a landing farther north on the east coast, while the Eighth Army moved across the 38th parallel on the western side of the mountains which form a spine down the middle of the Korean Peninsula. ROK units meanwhile rushed up the east coast and arrived at the port of Wonsan, objective of the X Corps, eight days before the corps--delayed by Communist mining of Wonsan harbor--could get there. In the west, Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, was taken on October 20. Within a week ROK units had reached the Manchurian border at the Yalu River, and Eighth Army elements had begun to encounter Chinese Communist forces.

In response to a MacArthur surrender appeal to the NKPA, Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had announced that his country would not "supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invaded by imperialists." On October 26, General Almond interviewed 16 Chinese soldiers captured by South Koreans and identified them as members of the regular Chinese Communist Army (CCA) with from 2½ to more than 3 years' service. They told him they were part of a large force that had crossed the Yalu River into Korea on

October 16.* Almond radioed details of his findings directly to MacArthur on October 30.

Despite this and subsequent warnings the advance of Eighth Army and X Corps toward the Chinese border continued. It was abruptly interrupted in late November by large-scale Chinese attacks against scattered UN detachments deep in North Korea. These detachments were thrown back on their parent units, which, in turn, retreated southward under unrelenting Chinese pressure. The withdrawal assumed almost the precipitancy of a rout.

Why General MacArthur chose to ignore clear and increasing evidence of Chinese intervention has been a subject of speculation and debate ever since, with no acceptable answer. MacArthur himself has asserted that he had carried out a reconnaissance in force to clarify the situation, and thus provoked the Chinese into prematurely attacking. But while this "reconnaissance" was under way he publicly announced that the war would be over by Christmas. He had informed President Truman at their Wake Island conference October 15 that there was no danger of a Chinese attack, that he could release divisions for Europe in January 1951 and hold general elections throughout Korea the same month. In the unlikely event of a CCA attack, he assured Mr. Truman, "there would be the greatest slaughter."

General Almond, who was very close to MacArthur, has given his own explanation** of his chief's attitude, and it may well be close to the true one. In his opinion, MacArthur's great underlying fear before and during the Inchon operations was that it would induce immediate Chinese intervention. When this did not occur, he became convinced that the Chinese were bluffing and would not intervene at all, whatever they might threaten. (This also seems to have been the CIA assessment.) Additionally, MacArthur seems not to have anticipated that, if the Chinese did actually attack, he would not be permitted by Washington to use his airpower to strike Chinese base areas and vulnerable lines of communications north of the Yalu River.

So ominous were the results of the initial massive CCA attack that something close to despair took hold in the United States;

*Other evidence places the CCA crossing of the Yalu as early as October 14 or even October 12. The important point here is that MacArthur knew by October 30 that these forces had already been in Korea for at least two weeks.

**In an interview with Marshall Andrews at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, April 2, 1952.

even military leaders were considering the possibility of evacuation of Korea or retiring to perimeters covering the major ports and hanging on pending a recuperation of strength. What these pessimistic forebodings ignored was the increasing logistical problem faced by the advancing Chinese. Each mile forward was a mile farther from their bases, along a limited road net under constant and severe UN air interdiction. The country in which they operated had been fought over twice and was drained of all means of local support. Their casualties were high, as were their expenditures of ammunition. Sooner or later logistical pressures were bound to deprive the attack of its momentum. This first occurred north of the 38th parallel in December. Then, after a massive Chinese invasion of South Korea in January, it occurred again at Wonju in February. Soon from west to east the Chinese advance was halted.

Meanwhile General MacArthur had been increasingly at odds with the administration in Washington not only over military matters but over those of policy. He made clear his bitter disappointment when he was not permitted to bomb the Chinese bases and lines of communications north of the Yalu River in Manchuria. He pressed for employment of Nationalist Chinese forces from Formosa against the mainland after offers of such employment had been rejected by the United Nations. He forestalled an official UN offer of an armistice with one of his own. He criticized policy decisions and ultimately publicly urged that bases on the Chinese mainland be bombed.

MacArthur received major public support in the United States for his demand that Chinese bases be bombed, despite the chill that this demand sent through US European allies, who feared Soviet retaliation in Europe. One of his supporters, General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, published an autobiography in 1965 in which he reiterated his support of MacArthur's bombing doctrine. In the same book, p. 462, LeMay, however, raises serious doubts as to the validity of MacArthur's and his own argument:

If I had been working for the other side, and had all those Migs in Manchuria that the Chinese had, I would have run General MacArthur right out of Korea.

Maybe they were afraid that if they did commit the Migs to any extent, we would go across and bomb them up there. But we weren't bombing in Manchuria; weren't allowed to.

With that Mig force, any energetic commander could have cleaned out all the airfields we had in Korea, and mighty soon. And I think he could have done it on the first mission; then they could have started working on the troops. Why they didn't do it I'll never know.

On the other hand, the actual combat capability of the Communist MIG force is perhaps put into perspective by noting that, when these planes were later committed to air battle over Korea, in air to air combat 1,108 Communist aircraft were reported destroyed, while 114 UN planes were lost. A total of 838 MIG-15s were shot down, the loss rate compared to F-86s being 13 to 1.*

Nevertheless, the threat and the capability to cause the other side damage was clear to both sides. This was why MacArthur was not permitted to bomb Chinese bases. A new concept of limitation and restraint had been generated by the sort of war being conducted in Korea: the concept of "sanctuary." There was tacit agreement that if the United States did not bomb bases outside of Korea proper, neither would the Soviets or the Chinese, and vice versa. As it was, US airpower had a free hand over Korea. Although the Communists were defeated in their cautious and tentative efforts to dispute air superiority over Korea, both sides were aware that Chinese--and particularly Soviet--bombers were available which could have played havoc not only with South Korean bases but with those in Japan and Okinawa as well.

This concept of sanctuary took other forms. Although regular CCA troop units were hotly engaged against UN forces in Korea, China preserved the fiction that these were "volunteers." The UN General Assembly on February 1, 1951, declared Communist China an aggressor, but the resolution merely served notice that Chinese participation was officially recognized; the war remained confined within the limits of Korea. The Soviet Union itself, a member not only of the United Nations but of the Security Council (the Soviet representative having returned to his seat after the events of June 1950), was actively and overtly aiding both Chinese and North Koreans, against whom the United Nations was conducting a bitter war. It was all most unorthodox, but indicative of the new and complex relationship of war to diplomacy.

MacArthur's public differences with his superiors over policy led to his relief by President Truman on April 11, 1951, and his supersession as UN commander by General Matthew B. Ridgway, then commanding the Eighth Army in Korea. On his return to the United States for the first time since before World War II, MacArthur was received by the public as a hero.

After the CCA attack had been halted in Korea, the Eighth Army had resumed the offensive in March 1951 and had progressed

*Reports of enemy aircraft destroyed in battle are notoriously unreliable; however the evidence is clear that the Americans had a lopsided superiority over the Communists in the air.

well into North Korea when the CCA launched a major counterattack late in April. This was met by a resilience in defense possible only to veteran troops, trading ground for time and chewing up Chinese formations with tremendous coordinated firepower. When the Communist counterattack finally ground to a halt early in May, the UN forces immediately resumed their methodical offensive. By the end of May they were north of the 38th parallel, breaking into the so-called "Iron Triangle," with the towns of Chorwon and Kumhwa at its base and Pyongyang its apex.

Reduction of the Iron Triangle would have meant capture of the most important Chinese rail and road center in North Korea and disruption of Chinese communications both rearward and laterally. In addition, losses in the previous five months had wrecked the organized armies Communist China was capable of committing to the Korean conflict. The result was a Chinese peace proposal on June 23, 1951, through Jacob Malik, Soviet representative to the UN Security Council.

Meanwhile, on May 16 the US National Security Council, rounding out a long series of discussions on Korea, had concluded that while political objectives there included reuniting the divided country, military objectives would be satisfied by expulsion of invading forces from south of the 38th parallel. Then, on June 1, Trygve Lie, UN Secretary General, intimated publicly that a settlement along the 38th parallel would satisfy UN aims, a viewpoint seconded by US Secretary of State Dean Acheson on June 7.

Contributing to this decision was a condition of frustration and war weariness in the United States that was manifested by widespread opposition to the effort in Korea and was to contribute to election of a Republican administration in 1952. The genesis of this attitude was lack of understanding, not only of the nebulous and wavering US aims and objectives in Korea but of the failure to achieve victory in the conventional sense. Its result was domestic political pressure that led to decisions in external affairs not warranted by the conditions of those affairs themselves.

Thus, following Malik's proposal, the United States promptly agreed to a "cease-fire" pending the outcome of negotiations leading to an armistice. The Communists protracted these negotiations for two years, during which they so strengthened their positions in Korea that they became impregnable to any but the most costly frontal attacks. (It was the interminable and unproductive negotiations which contributed most directly to popular American frustrations.) It seems clear in retrospect that recognition of the altered relation between war and diplomacy would have

recommended continuance of the UN offensive northward until an armistice had been signed.*

Events Subsequent to Operations

During the two years of negotiations at Panmunjom, military action was employed repeatedly by the Communists to affect its trends and decisions. Hundreds of lives were lost in this apparently pointless war of stalemate which, in actuality, were the price of a further refinement of the interim application of war in diplomacy. When the armistice finally was signed on July 27, 1953, two fortified lines faced each other across the Korean Peninsula, which not only epitomized but appeared to confirm perpetuation of the unnatural division of that land. US troops have been required to man part of this line since 1953, some 50,000 now being stationed there.

The Soviet Union had gambled and lost, but it had lost nothing already its own. North Korean and Chinese troops did its fighting (with Soviet weapons) and the Soviet Union did not even appear as a belligerent. The Soviet Union remained the principal enemy, however, despite China's assignment of "volunteers" to the battle. So confused did international relations become that Chinese representatives led the Communist negotiating delegation at Panmunjom, although China had stoutly denied official connection with the conflict.

In the light of the probability of instigation of wars of the Korean type by expansionist powers for a long time to come, and in the light of many factors relevant to the current struggle in Vietnam, the lessons of the Korean conflict seem more than merely incidental to the development of future strategic concepts.

CONCLUSIONS

In Korea, for the first time the United States participated in a war in which the actual opponent, although not the one who was doing the fighting, was in possession of nuclear weapons. This fact was of great importance, for it made both parties

*President Truman endorsed the correctness of this view, with some reservations as to hindsight, in an interview with Marshall Andrews, August 5, 1959, at Independence, Missouri.

hesitant to risk an open confrontation. As long as the Soviets remained unproclaimed supporters of the North Koreans and then of the Communist Chinese, they ran no risk of nuclear attack on Soviet territory. But at the same time, US leaders were worried about Soviet reaction to possible extension of the war into Communist China, and American fears were far less than those of their European allies whose countries lay within close range of the Soviet Union. Thus the fiction of Chinese "volunteers" was maintained and UN forces were denied the clear-cut military victory that might have been achieved by continuing ground action in the summer of 1951, and which would perhaps have been hastened by demolishing bases north of the Yalu in Manchuria. However, the basic objective of driving out the invaders of South Korea was achieved, and the deep concern of the US Government (and in all probability of the Soviet as well) to avoid expansion of the limited conflict into a nuclear war was satisfied.

The Korean War was the first, and may well be the last, conflict of major dimensions in which the United Nations took immediate, effective military action to halt an aggression. That it would not have been possible had the Soviet representative been present in the Security Council or had the United States not been ready and willing to carry the brunt of the burden is obvious. The significance of the UN action lies in its effective use as a forum for disclosing and discussing the developments in Korea, in its giving official sanction for what were necessarily primarily US views and decisions, and in the fact that so many of the member nations contributed forces and medical units to the UN effort. The fact that the Soviet Union, while supporting and sponsoring the forces which the United Nations was fighting, remained a member of that organization and that the organization consequently continued to function is a significant test of its basic viability.

The firm stand taken by the United States in support of the Republic of South Korea was not lost on either the Communist or the free or unaligned nations of the world. The Soviets almost certainly had not anticipated it, but this example of US reaction in behalf of its allies must not have gone unheeded in subsequent Soviet planning for expansion.

The Korean experience raises the question of the desirability of determining and clearly stating both political and military objectives. In Korea the objective remained general, as stated by the United Nations in the beginning, hence it could have been interpreted to include the total military defeat of the NKPA, and subsequently its Chinese supporters, as well as the longstanding UN political objective of unifying Korea. When military defeats in North Korea made it essential to define objectives, limitation

of the military objective to the ejection of the aggressors from South Korea of course relegated the political objective of pursuit of a unified Korea to other times and other methods, and in effect abandoned all possibility of its foreseeable achievement. Establishment of a clear military objective made it possible to end the fighting, a goal demanded by popular opinion in the United States. Establishment of a clear military objective in support of a firm political objective at an earlier stage in the war might have made it easier to maintain public support. It certainly would have affected the course of the military operations. But it might well have put the United Nations at a disadvantage by showing its hand too clearly from the beginning and defining for the Communists the limits the conflict might be expected to follow.

The extent to which American public support for the war in Korea faltered points up the necessity--a necessity which still exists in respect to the war in Vietnam--for US policymakers to define clearly for themselves the political objectives in a conflict where public support is essential and to translate those objectives into acceptable terms, widely publicized and reiterated, in order to maintain morale and backing for the military measures and costs deemed necessary in pursuit of those objectives.

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Great Power Response to the Hungarian Revolution
(October-November 1956)

by

Andrew C. Janos

INTRODUCTION

The present study addresses itself to the impact and repercussions of an internal rebellion on the policies and behavior of great powers in the contemporary world. Its subject is the "crisis" created by the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the responses of the Soviet Union and the United States to an emergency created by forces outside their immediate control.

Such a study necessarily involves the exploration of decision-making processes and motivations behind decisions, which in the present case must largely rest on conjecture and circumstantial evidence. Even American motivations are hard to ascertain in the light of available material on the subject. As to Soviet motivations and decision-making we have practically no direct evidence. The propositions developed in the essay, therefore, must be accepted as tentative until more is known about the exact circumstances under which decisions were made during the crisis.

The purpose of the analysis is to explore the development of modern strategic concepts: the impact of contemporary technology and international environment on national policy objectives and the means of their achievement. The assumption underlying the inquiry is that some of the motivations and aspects of national decision-making are relatively static--in some ways great powers behave today as they have throughout history--while others are dynamic and responsive to social, economic, technological, and other environmental changes. In essence, the task ahead is to draw a line between the two.

The thesis of the essay is that the responses of the great powers to the Hungarian crisis were basically motivated by a classic concept of international politics: the recognition of primary interests and zones of influence. In terms of the traditional principles of international politics these will be violated only if and when one of the powers is ready for a maximal response involving all-out war against the other. Since this readiness was absent and since Hungary was perceived to be in the well-defined Soviet zone of influence (and recognized as vital to Soviet security), the US reaction was limited. The choice of a low-efficiency, low-cost strategy was further motivated by the fact that Hungary and Eastern Europe were considered of marginal significance from the point of view of American national security and interest.

The question that remains to be answered after testing this initial proposition is, how the behavior of the great powers differed from that of great powers involved in the resolution of such a crisis, say, 50 or 100 years ago. What particular aspects of technology and environmental change influenced national objectives? What ecological and political variables conditioned the choice of means? To what extent were these traditionally relevant or unique in their modernity?

SOVIET POLICY AND STRATEGY

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Sphere of Influence

Soviet and Russian interest in Eastern Europe is traditional and goes back to at least the 18th Century. Prior to World War I the Russians had competed with Germany and Austria-Hungary for influence over the Balkans and Baltic. Excluded from the area in 1918 they reasserted their influence pursuant to the German-Soviet Pact of 1939. A question of domination over Hungary and Rumania led to the deterioration of German-Soviet relations in November 1940. Initial German successes in the war temporarily established the Third Reich as the dominant power of Eastern Europe. In 1945, German defeat, Soviet military advance, Western weakness (particularly the inability of France to reestablish her prewar ties with the countries of the former Little Entente), and American indifference made Stalin the sole master of the area between the German-speaking countries and the traditional boundaries of Russia.

The extension of Soviet power and direct domination over the area were motivated by three considerations. First, there was the

traditional concern with the security of the Soviet Union. Twice in a generation attacks were mounted against Russia from Poland and the Carpathian Basin. The traditional boundaries of Russia had placed the enemy right in the middle of a vast and indefensible plain. Therefore, during and after World War II Soviet policy-makers were determined not to let the same thing happen again and fight the next ground war in areas other than their own. In addition, after 1945 certain areas of Eastern Europe (particularly Poland) became indispensable because they gave access to Germany, a country that the Soviets had been determined to keep divided and under their control.

The second motivation was economic. During the Second World War at least 40% of Soviet industries were dislocated and destroyed. The transportation system had been smashed. The cities of the Ukraine and White Russia were left in ruins. Even agriculture took a heavy toll. The retreating Germans devastated and removed everything that they could lay their hands on. At the same time Stalin expected industrialization to continue after the war and reconstruction to proceed rapidly in view of the need to increase his country's defense potential. This, Stalin knew, could not be accomplished by utilizing Soviet manpower and resources only, while for political reasons he was reluctant to rely on Western economic aid. Thus, the military and political conquest of Eastern Europe became the prelude to one of the most ruthless and thorough processes of economic exploitation known in history. Contributions to the rebuilding of the Soviet economy were extorted from the defeated countries in the form of reparations (East Germany, \$1.5 billion; Hungary, \$300 million; Rumania, \$400 million) and in the form of unequal economic agreements and joint stock companies. Altogether, between 1945 and 1956 an estimated yearly \$1 billion of goods and services were extracted from an area the gross annual product of which in 1939 did not exceed \$10 billion.¹

The third motivation to conquer and dominate Eastern Europe had its source in the revolutionary ideology of the Soviet leadership. In part, this ideology was a rationale and a functional requisite for the continued existence of an oppressive dictatorship, but beyond the function of legitimation the idea of world revolution had a momentum of its own. It was a social force that imposed the moral duty on the regime to expand and disseminate the creed. The success of any such attempt would then increase the cohesion and morale of the vanguard in the Soviet Union.

Hungary Under Soviet Rule

The Sovietization of Hungary took place step by step between 1945 and 1948. The details of this process need not be recalled here. It should be pointed out, however, that revulsion from the Soviet Union and Communist rule was probably more widespread in Hungary than in any other country of the area. The main reasons for this were traditional anti-Russian sentiment and the behavior of the Soviet army in the spring of 1945. Consequently, in the elections of November 1945 the Communists received only 13% of the popular vote and 17% of parliamentary seats despite the fact that the Communist Party had all the financial and material support of the Soviet Union. Two years later the Communists polled 22% of the vote in an election which was later admitted to have been rigged. Without rigging and preventing hundreds of thousands of non-Communists from voting they could have hardly hoped to win more than 5% of the popular vote.

After 1948 economic exploitation was aggravated by Soviet insistence on accelerated economic growth with an emphasis on heavy industries. The first Five Year Plan envisaged an annual growth rate of 18.2%. In 1952 the plan was amended and envisaged an industrial growth rate of 25.4%.² The compounded effect of the two processes created immense deprivations and popular frustration. Worse still, the obvious and overt character of Soviet exploitation undermined the morale of the local party. Doubts about the legitimacy of Soviet exploitation and the wisdom of enforced industrialization persisted and were countered by systematic terror directed not against the population but against the party itself. This terror destroyed the moral fabric of the Communist elite. The coincidence of these two factors (popular dissatisfaction and elite demoralization) then led to the outbreak and rapid success of the revolution of 1956.

The Soviet Decision-Making Process

The revolution (or, initially, the demonstrations of October 23) were triggered by the Polish events of October 18-21. This circumstance (and the fear of a further chain reaction in the other satellites) is particularly important in analyzing responses and motivations.

The Soviets were not entirely taken by surprise. There is clear evidence that they had been preparing for a crisis in the satellites since the first days of October. Troop concentrations

on the Polish-Rumanian-Hungarian borders took place between October 7 and 14. On October 20-21 floating bridges were assembled at Záhony on the Soviet-Hungarian border. On the same day Soviet officers on leave and reserve officers speaking Hungarian were recalled. On October 22 Soviet forces in Transdanubia were observed moving toward Budapest.³ Nevertheless, it is fair to conjecture that they were unprepared for the dimensions assumed by the uprising during the days October 23-November 4.

The decisions concerning adequate response to the rebellion were reached in two phases. The initial decision to intervene during the night of October 23-24 appears to have been made by the local commanders acting on prior authorization and responding to the call of Hungarian government officials. On October 24, however, the scope of decisions shifted from the police-military to the political plain, and the center of the decision-making process was transferred from Budapest to Moscow. In order to fill the considerable gap in information, the Soviet leaders dispatched Anastas Mikoyan to Budapest on October 24. He was back in Moscow the next day, but returned to Hungary once more with Mikhail Suslov on October 31. In the first days of November Khrushchev himself appeared in the Soviet border-town of Uzhgorod to consult with Janos Kádár.⁴ The operations of November 4-11 were conducted under the personal supervision of General Ivan Serov, head of the Soviet Security Police.⁵

At first, the Soviet decision was to "play it soft" and permit events to take a "Polish course." This alternative implied a limited reliance on the Soviet army, and the acceptance of Imre Nagy's "national Communist" government. However, by October 28-30 this strategy had obviously failed. Nagy had been unable to resist the tide of the popular movement and was forced to make concessions far beyond the broadest definition of national communism: a multiparty system, free elections, complete decollectivization and finally, on November 1, the abrogation of the Warsaw Treaty.⁶

Khrushchev's personal admissions⁷ and other circumstantial evidence clearly point to the fact that the Soviet leadership was divided on the appropriate response. This division became clear to close observers of the Soviet scene on October 28-29 when Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov showed himself in a most conciliatory mood at a conference with Western correspondents, while Marshal Grigory Zhukov brusquely rejected the idea of withdrawal from Hungary at a reception at the Turkish embassy. Both statements were printed in Pravda on October 29.

The final decision to crush the rebellion by the full force of Soviet arms appears to have been made in the evening hours of October 31 (Moscow time), shortly after Mikoyan returned from his second tour of duty in Budapest. That the decision had not been made earlier is suggested (beyond the already quoted Shepilov press conference) by the fact that the Pravda of October 29 struck a tone that most obviously was meant to prepare the Soviet public for an ideological retreat. On the next day, the well-known declaration of the Soviet government was published on the "Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States" (printed in Pravda, October 31).⁸ In this document, Moscow admitted "past errors" and declared its willingness to re-examine military and economic relations and to withdraw military units from Eastern Europe including Hungary. Although leaving a number of subterfuges for the Soviets, this document was undoubtedly dictated by those who at the given moment favored conciliation over intervention. Finally, Mikoyan and Suslov on October 31 exuded friendliness and approved of Nagy's and Kádár's decision to give an equal status to non-Communist political parties.⁹ That the decision was reached on the night of October 31 and not later is suggested by the fact that Soviet troops occupied the municipal airport of Budapest at the break of the next day. Simultaneously, Soviet infantry sealed off several of the main checkpoints on the Austrian-Hungarian border. From the morning of November 1 reinforcements began to pour into Hungary. On the same day Pravda changed its tone. While referring still to a "democratic coalition" (in Hungary) the leading article of the issue painted a bleak picture of the Hungarian situation. On the next day, the denunciations of October 24-27 were back on its front page.

Motivations for Intervention

The dilemma posited by the rapid deterioration of the Hungarian situation initially divided the Kremlin somewhat along "Stalinist" and "revisionist" lines, with some of the military men arguing strongly for intervention. By October 31, however, most of the soft-liners were probably convinced that the "national Communist" solution had failed and that there was no alternative but intervention or surrender to the emerging local revolutionary forces.

The factor maximizing the pressure for all-out intervention was that Hungary's case could not be isolated from the rest of Eastern Europe. For one, the Polish situation had not yet been

under control. Then, there were reports of massive unrest from the Hungarian-inhabited regions of Transylvania. There was general nervousness in East Germany and Bulgaria. The New York Times, perhaps too suggestively, echoed this sentiment when it wrote on October 25:

The revolutionary mood is an infectious one. Budapest is the spiritual child of what happened in Poznan and Warsaw. Can Prague, East Berlin, Bucharest, Sophia or Tirana be immune from that mood?¹⁰

While Soviet security would not have been irreparably damaged by the loss of Hungary, an area-wide uprising would have threatened the very existence of the Soviet regime. Not only was a loss of face and territory involved, but the rebellion of the satellites and their defection from the Communist camp would have raised serious ideological questions. The reversal of the "Socialist revolution" and the possibility of a victory of the counterrevolution would have undermined the legitimacy of the Soviet government itself.

These were the military and ideological considerations (the economic was no longer a serious one in 1956) that the Soviet leaders had to weigh against the negative impact of their action: the loss of faith and trust in the post-Stalin government that Khrushchev had laboriously built over ten years - personal diplomacy and demonstrative de-Stalinization; the adverse effect on the morale and electoral support of the Communist countries in the Western world, and the negative impact on uncommitted world opinion. On the other hand, the moment was not an unfavorable one. Soviet action would command the support of the Communist parties themselves (China and Yugoslavia had already declared themselves against the Hungarians).¹¹ By October 27-28 it had become evident that the United States would not be involved in the East European conflict. On October 28-29 the Suez drama began to unfold, conveniently smokescreening preparations for Soviet intervention. As to military capabilities, they were practically unlimited, given the objective and the relatively small and ill-organized forces that the Hungarians could muster for the showdown.

In sum, the Soviet Union had almost everything to win and little to lose by sending its armies to Hungary. The step was to save the bloc (until more subtle and less dramatic forces of dissension were to arise), raise its prestige with the Communist parties, and demonstrate to all and sundry that the Soviet Union was master in Eastern Europe. In the other scale one would have to place only the loss of a few thousand fellow-travelers and the

hope of "popular fronts" against bourgeois governments for a few years to come. In view of the balance of these losses and gains and the relatively low risks involved it is hard to see how the Soviets could have decided to stay aloof or withdraw.

THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

Background: The United States and Eastern Europe

In contrast to the Soviet Union, Germany, and France, the United States had never developed strong ties with or interest in East European countries. True, a substantial number of American citizens are of East European extraction, but of all these only the Poles have a voice of their own. Hungarians, Rumanians, Slovaks, Serbians do not have a "vote" in the sense that Italians, Jews, and the Irish do. Unlike the latter, the former live in relatively scattered areas, and the interests of the respective communities do not extend beyond the level of local politics.

American disinterest in Eastern Europe became obvious as World War II was drawing to its close. Washington consistently refused to listen to the proddings and suggestions of its British ally to attempt to fill the vacuum in the Balkan and Danubian regions once Germany collapsed. American policy toward Eastern Europe evolved gradually, and the elements of this policy are hard to reconstruct in every detail. It seems, however, that the principal elements were traditional disinterest, a bad public image of these countries as pro-German and reactionary, and the feeling that the countries would represent a liability rather than an asset for the United States and her Western allies. Throughout the interwar period the area had been known for its economic problems and for the notorious instability of its inter- and intra-state politics. To these not very appealing considerations some American officials were inclined to add the disadvantages of alienating the Soviet Union by showing interest in an area close to its borders. An aggressive assertion of Western rights in these countries, it was believed, would irretrievably force the Soviets to assume an aggressive stance against the West in the postwar world. Conversely there was a strong conviction that recognition of Soviet interest would lead to genuine East-West cooperation.

The status of East European countries was determined at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences. The gist of the agreements was that it would fall to the Soviet Union to liberate and "police" the area. Finland was covered by special provisions,

and Greece was to be policed by the British. Free elections were to be held everywhere and a democratic form of government was to be established. The meaning of these terms was not defined. In Potsdam Stalin further specified that no governments hostile to the Soviet Union would be tolerated in the area, leaving "hostility" again to his own interpretation. In the next few years the Soviets consolidated their hold over the countries over the weak protests of Western military missions and diplomatic representatives.

Before 1948 the United States had no particular policy toward Eastern Europe. After that year, however, the Soviet menace called for a global strategy of defense and deterrence, and it was within this broader framework that an American strategy was evolved. The essence of this strategy was harassment with the aim of preventing the stabilization of Communist regimes. The techniques used were mainly propaganda and economic blockade. "Decisive action" was often demanded and promised (as in the election campaign of 1952) but never initiated. Some years later the theory evolved that the East Europeans would have to "liberate themselves," meaning that they would be expected to give a clear demonstration of their intention to reject Soviet rule before they could expect external help.

American Decision-Making: October 23-November 4

Due to growing interest in Eastern Europe during the early fall of 1956 and the Polish events of October 18-21, the outbreak of the revolution was not a complete surprise in Washington. On October 22 (the day preceding the mass demonstrations) President Eisenhower, according to the testimony of his memoirs, "held conference after conference . . . from 8:36 in the morning until 6:17 at night . . . practically all of which had to do with subjects directly or indirectly related to the developing Hungarian crisis."¹²

Nevertheless decision concerning a response was hampered by lack of information for almost 72 hours. During this time Washington was cut off from its legation in Budapest, and the State Department as well as the President had to rely on "news ticker reports based on radio broadcasts."¹³ The first intelligence reports apparently reached the President only in the morning of October 26, and these still dealt with the events of the night of October 23-24.¹⁴

At no time between October 23 and 27, the four crucial days of the revolution, was there a crisis atmosphere in Washington.

As it appears in Mr. Eisenhower's memoirs he was preoccupied with the campaign and the approaching elections. His briefings and the meetings of the National Security Council were routine. On the fourth day of the "crisis" the President calmly withdrew to Walter Reed Hospital for a physical checkup. During the same period the prestige press took a calm and detached view of developments. Obviously poorly informed, the New York Times denounced Imre Nagy as an "inglorious quisling,"¹⁵ expressed fears that "the rebels may act too fast," and cautioned that Poland and Hungary would remain attached to the Warsaw Pact.¹⁶ Day after day, the Times stated with a measure of surprise that the revolution had not yet been suppressed.

Under the circumstances created by the campaign and the near-complete blackout of information the American response was slow and hesitant. On October 25 the President issued a press release "deploring the intervention of Soviet forces which under the Treaty of Peace should have been withdrawn."¹⁷ On the next day recourse to UN action was considered. At the same time the President and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles decided to extend an offer of economic aid (made to the Poles on October 24) to all the satellite countries. This offer was incorporated in Secretary Dulles' October 27 speech which may be regarded as the major policy declaration of the administration in connection with the East European crisis. In Dulles' words the nations of Eastern Europe "could draw upon our abundance" if they decided to do so. They were assured that the United States would not demand that they renounce communism,¹⁸ apparently to make the course of events more palatable to the Soviet Union.

During the same days (October 25-27) a strong undercurrent of anxiety developed in Washington lest the Soviet Union in desperation over the satellite crisis should attack the West. This fear was voiced by the President at the regular meeting of the National Security Council on October 26. "I doubt that the Russian leaders genuinely fear an invasion from the West," he told members of the Council. "But with the deterioration of the Soviet hold over its satellites might not the Soviet Union be tempted to resort to extreme measures, even to start a world war? This possibility we must watch with the utmost care."¹⁹ Eisenhower reiterated this position after the second Soviet invasion of Hungary. "The Soviets," he addressed his assistants on November 5, "seeing their failure in the satellites, might be ready to undertake any wild venture. . . . There is nothing more dangerous than a dictatorship in this frame of mind."²⁰

Consequently, on and after October 26 a second line of response developed to reassure the Soviet Union that the United

States did not want to extend its influence over the area. In response to a presidential directive a position paper was developed on Eastern Europe, "reaffirming our reassurances to the Soviet Union that we had no intention of making these countries our allies; and declaring that if the U.S.S.R. used force to suppress the Gomulka regime, the United States would be prepared to support a U.N. action--including the use of force--to prevent the U.S.S.R. from reinforcing control."²¹ As will be noticed Hungary was not covered by the document, and even in the case of Poland the guarantee was an extremely weak one. The impressive words, "including the use of force," were rendered meaningless by the preceding statement that the United States would not act upon its own and was only "prepared to support U.N. action," the effectiveness of which as all knew depended on the compliance of the Soviet Union. How valid this statement is was demonstrated by the role of the United Nations after the second Soviet intervention in Hungary on November 4.

The major instrument for signaling these reassurances to the Soviets was Dulles' Texas speech on October 27. In this speech he included the following statement:

The U.S. has no ulterior purpose in desiring the independence of the satellite countries. Our unadulterated wish is that these peoples should have sovereignty restored to them. . . . We do not look upon these nations as potential military allies. We see them as friends and as part of a new and friendly and no longer divided Europe.²²

Lest the Soviets misunderstand American intentions Mr. Dulles' speech was, in the words of the New York Times, "careful not even to hint at U.S. military support for the rebels."²³ Further, and most likely not by coincidence, the Secretary used this occasion to retreat publicly from his earlier position of "massive retaliation" and call for "conventional forces to counter local aggression." At the end of the speech he expressed hope that the day was close "when the people of the U.S. can have with the people of Russia the relations of fellowship which they would like, and when the governments of our countries can deal with each other as friends."²⁴ To make sure that the message was not lost on the Soviets, on October 29 Ambassador Charles Bohlen in Moscow was instructed to convey to Khrushchev and his associates, including Zhukov, certain sections of the Secretary's speech, stressing to the Kremlin that every word in the cable had presidential approval.²⁵

The issue of the cable and some of the previously quoted sections were commented on extensively by the American press, "as an invitation to the Soviet Union to regard Hungary not as a crisis but as an opportunity for an all-European Security Pact discussed between President Eisenhower and Premier N.A. Bulganin in Geneva."²⁶ On the critical October 31 this theme was reiterated by the President in a television address to the nation. The President in his speech "sought to remove any false fears . . . with respect to the Soviet Union . . . that we would look upon the new governments in Eastern Europe as potential military allies."²⁷

The cautious and reassuring attitude of the administration underscores the initial proposition of this essay. American response to the East European crisis (between October 20 and November 4) was guided by a strong, if only intuitive, sensitivity for spheres of influence. As a conservative and defensive (rather than crusading and aggressive) power, the United States was bound to accept this principle. For how can international security be maintained and potential aggressors be persuaded to respect the status quo if their conservative-minded opponents are ready to change it when the opportunity presents itself?

American acceptance of the legitimacy of spheres of influence transpired from early reports that there was "little effort in Washington to deny that U.S. forces abroad could be used in the same way [as Soviet forces in Hungary] if there was a Communist led revolution in, say, Italy."²⁸ The same Washington spokesman allegedly emphasized that intervention in Hungary would be very difficult, because US allies (notably France) were at the time of his speaking about to protect their interests by force in Morocco and Tunisia. Both of these statements refer to the clear acknowledgement of Western as well as Soviet interest. It is also worthwhile to note that while American policy-makers were reluctant to threaten force to make the Soviets desist from action in Eastern Europe they moved fast to guarantee the territorial integrity of Austria against possible Soviet violations.²⁹

America's allies, the French and the British (already preparing for the Suez showdown) were even more assertive on the principle that Soviet interests should be respected in exchange for respect of Western interests. Paris and London publicly warned against "exploiting" the quandary of the Soviet Union created by the Polish and Hungarian uprising.³⁰ In addition to the Prime Minister's statements, the British government leaked the following information to the press on October 28, summing up the position of the government on the day when Israeli-British-French cooperation just began to unfold:

The warning that the Soviet Union would fight to maintain its control over Eastern Europe has affected the attitude of the British government and possibly other Western governments toward intervention in Hungary. . . .

This warning was delivered in London last April by Soviet Premier N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev. The occasion was a discussion of Britain's vital interest in the oil of the Middle East in which Prime Minister Eden emphasized his government's readiness to take arms to defend this interest.

Mr. Khrushchev was somewhat taken aback. But his rejoinder included an assertion that the Soviet Union too had areas of vital interest and that it would fight to retain the glacis of Central Europe.

In military terminology a glacis is an artificial slope covering the approach to an open country. Russia which has been invaded twice in a third of a century from Western Europe, through what are now satellite states, evidently considered their retention as militarily indispensable.

It is understood that Mr. Khrushchev's comment was reported to other interested governments at that time. In any case, the Soviet Union's strategic interest in the satellite states has been one of the realities of European politics since 1945.³¹

American Decision-Making: November 4-11

After November 4 the United States was embarrassed into action by the brutality of the Soviet intervention and by the realization that failure to react would mean an irretrievable loss of face in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world. But response was still in terms of a low-efficiency and low-cost strategy: reliance on the United Nations to call on the Soviets to stop intervention.

Military intervention was ruled out as an alternative response from the very beginning.³² This was understandable in terms of basic national objectives that emphasized the conservation of possessions (and hence low risks) and the defense rather than the augmentation of influence. As President Eisenhower explained nine years after the revolution, military intervention was regarded as impracticable, "even if the United Nations, overriding a certain Soviet veto, decided that all the military and other resources of member nations should be used to drive the Soviets from Hungary."³³

His explanation: such an expedition would have inevitably led to general war, and general war over Eastern Europe had never entered American calculations.

In the absence of such determination it is obvious that a second possible operational alternative, the threat of intervention, would not have been workable either. The Soviets were too well aware of the limited nature of American commitment in the area to back down in the face of a bare threat. Then, this strategy was ruled out not only on grounds of impracticality, but also for domestic political reasons. How could a President campaigning on a platform of peace issue a threat of all-out war over Eastern Europe only two days before the general election?

A third possible strategy, covert intervention (the sending of "volunteers," and/or military supplies to the insurgents) had to be ruled out because of Franco-British noncooperation and because of Hungary's geographical position. "I still wonder," writes the former President, "what would have been my recommendation to Congress and the American people had Hungary been accessible by sea or through territory of allies who might have agreed to react positively. . . . An expedition moving across neutral Austria, Titoist Yugoslavia or Communist Czechoslovakia was out of question."³⁴ Passage through the territory of these countries would have again meant general war.

Suez and Hungary: Contrasts in American Response

It is not the purpose of this essay to describe the response of the great powers to the Suez crisis in detail. However, a brief discussion of Suez seems to be appropriate because the contrast in the ways in which the great powers, in particular the United States, responded to the crisis in the Middle East underscores the initial thesis concerning the recognition of zones of interest and influence.

In contrast to Eastern Europe, Western interest in the Middle East had been traditional. Since the end of the 19th Century Suez had been justly regarded as the gateway to Europe and as a cardinal point of British defense at times of war. The discovery of oil resources in the area added to this interest.

After World War II Franco-British interest in the Middle East continued, but the influence of the two powers gradually declined. The United States appeared as a major interested power in the area. Meanwhile, as a result of the rise of independent

states and aggressive Arab nationalism the status of the area in world politics gradually changed. Instead of being protected by or closely associated with Western powers it became one of the "grey" areas on the map of the world, lying between the two power blocs. Western objectives in the area became limited to safeguarding primary interests (free passage through the Canal and access to oil resources) and to denying the area to the Communist bloc. These objectives were pursued by safeguarding the balance of power within the area and in respect to the area in world politics. Any change in the internal balance of power or any Soviet advance in the area that would threaten Western objectives would therefore draw an immediate response. These principles of policy were incorporated into a declaration of 1950 by the United States, Britain, and France, pledging to maintain the local balance of power by protecting any victim of aggression within the area.

The greater and more immediate interest of the United States was also reflected in the press coverage of the two crises occurring almost simultaneously (see Table I). While the press coverage of the Hungarian revolution somewhat exceeded the coverage given to Suez in the days prior to the outbreak of the hostilities, attention immediately shifted to Suez once Israeli mobilization was announced on October 28. From this day on the Suez coverage not only exceeded the coverage of the Hungarian revolution, but exceeded the maximum coverage given to the latter (on October 26 and November 3) by almost three times. Suez received more than double coverage even on November 4 and 5, the days when the second Soviet intervention occurred in Budapest. On November 7 the coverage of both crises was down to minimum due to the presidential elections of the previous day. On November 8 Hungary, for the first time since October 24, was banished from the front page even though the battle was still raging in Budapest. On that day (the announcement of the armistice in the Middle East) the coverage of Suez exceeded that of Hungary by 6.5 times, on November 9 by 21 times. As far as the American prestige press and the public were concerned the Hungarian crisis had come to an end long before Soviet military victory and pacification were accomplished facts.

TABLE I

New York Times Coverage of Two Crises
(24" columns)

	<u>October</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>31</u>
Suez		6	6	6	9	10	16	28	44	50
Hungary		3	14	16	22	18	14	12	11	10
	<u>November</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
Suez		62	49	38	30	34	39	5	33	32
Hungary		8	6	22	16	14	17	3	5	1.5

Similar conclusions can be drawn from the responses of the New York Stock Exchange, the pulse of American economic life (see Table II). Between October 16 and 23 no significant fluctuations occurred. On October 21 industrials were down 1.19 points, on October 24 (the day after the news of the uprising broke) down 2.38 points. As the Wall Street Journal observed "there was some timid selling on the thought that a breakup of the Russian and satellite bloc might in the future produce an easing in defense spending."³⁵ However, "Wall Street regarded the eastern European situation as a case of Communists against Communists,"³⁶ and the market rapidly recovered. On October 26 industrials jumped 4.98 points.

Not so in the case of the Suez crisis. On Monday, October 29, there was heavy trading in the morning (at 2 P.M. stocks were up 6.02).³⁷ When, shortly after midday, the news of the Israeli invasion became known, there was a rush of sales, and at 5 P.M. the market closed +0.88. There was some nervousness next day and a slump on October 31 (-6.62) when the reports of British and French bombings reached New York. The stability of the market was restored by the President's statement in the evening of October 31 that the United States would not be directly involved.

The crushing of the Hungarian insurrection went unnoticed on Wall Street. After the big gains of November 1 and 2 the trend continued on Monday, November 5. On the day following the Soviet intervention, industrials gained 4.90 points testifying to the absence of fears concerning American intervention or the danger of a European conflagration.

TABLE II

Dow Jones Averages

	OCTOBER					
	21	22	23	24	25	26
Industrials	486.12 -1.19	485.27 -0.85	485.05 -0.22	482.67 -2.38	481.08 -1.59	486.06 +4.98
Railroads	162.38 +0.77	162.06 -0.32	161.44 -0.62	160.44 -1.00	159.63 -0.81	160.19 +0.56
Utilities	65.83 -0.12	65.81 -0.02	65.65 -0.16	65.58 -0.07	65.70 +0.12	66.11 +0.41

	OCTOBER			NOVEMBER		
	29	30	31	1	2	5
	486.94 +0.88	486.47 -0.47	479.85 -6.62	487.62 +7.77	490.47 +2.85	495.37 +4.90
	159.50 -0.69	158.78 -0.72	155.93 -2.85	158.78 +2.85	159.54 +0.76	161.46 +1.92
	66.37 +0.26	66.44 +0.07	66.20 -0.24	66.84 +0.64	67.08 +0.24	67.24 +0.16

The response pattern of the government was also appropriately different. Above all, there was no doubt in Washington that this was a genuine crisis situation. The campaign appearances of the President were cancelled. On the morning following the outbreak of hostilities (October 29) an emergency meeting of the National Security Council was called with Secretary Dulles, CIA head Allen Dulles, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, JCS Chairman Admiral Arthur Radford, Sherman Adams, and Herbert Hoover, Jr., present. The personalities and the great hurry in which this meeting was convoked sharply contrasted with the almost relaxed atmosphere of the White House during the Polish and Hungarian crisis. Before the meeting the President conferred with Senators William Fulbright and William Langer, and after the meeting Press Secretary James Hagerty announced that "the question whether and when the President will call a special session of Congress will be decided in the light of the unfolding situation."³⁸ In New York, a meeting of the Security Council was set for 11 A.M.

There will be no attempt made here to tell about any of the moves and exchanges between the United States on the one hand and the Franco-British alliance on the other. This story is well known and will be told in this study elsewhere. What remains to be told, however, are the exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union and the vastly different tone and content of these communications from those issued in conjunction with the Hungarian uprising. In response to Bulganin's announcement that Soviet volunteers would be sent to the Middle East, the White House responded immediately by issuing a statement to the effect of its opposition to Soviet intervention. To underline the seriousness of the statement, officers of the Air Defense Command were called from their homes and SAC was put in a state of alert. In response to Bulganin's threat to England and France the President warned that such "would oblige all members of the United Nations including the United States /italics in the original/ to take effective countermeasures."³⁹ To make the counterthreat even more impressive, General Gruenther, Commander of the NATO forces, upon presidential instructions, issued the same warning without diplomatic varnish: "If the Communists attacked the West, the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc would be destroyed as sure as day follows night."⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

So far we have concentrated on the conventional aspects of conflict resolution. What emerged from the analysis of the Hungarian crisis (and a slipshod comparison with Suez) is that in the

modern world traditional principles of international politics are still valid. Despite ideology, moral commitment, and the complexities of setting and technology, the great powers reacted in terms of mutually perceived primary and secondary interests and zones of influence.

Yet, at the same time, the study also permits us to develop a number of generalizations about the impact of "modernity" on great power behavior. While "interest" and "influence" strike one as the concepts most relevant to motivations there are a number of respects in which the resolution of the conflict was different from what it would have been a generation ago. In the following, these differences and the conditions for the differences will be briefly summarized.

The Nuclear Age

There is no doubt that the single most important postwar technological development effecting international politics has been the invention and spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the first few years after World War II the United States enjoyed a monopoly over these weapons. But by the time of the Hungarian revolution something like a "balance of deterrence" had developed between the two superpowers. Although means of delivery had not attained their present level of efficiency, the Soviet Union could be easily reached from European bases. Conversely, the Soviets had the capability of annihilating American allies on the Continent and had some chance of reaching targets even within the United States.

One of the effects of the "balance of deterrence" was to change the arena of conflict. We initially hypothesized that primary interests of great powers will be encroached upon by their rivals only if they are ready to face the consequences of war. Since nuclear weapons increased the costs of war, the effect of the "balance of deterrence" was to shift the conflict from clearly defined zones of influence to areas where interests are less clearly defined.

The second consequence of the balance of deterrence situation has been to change the style of conflict from overt to more and more covert patterns. This form of the international power struggle is best known as the Cold War. Its most significant method is the support of internal rebellions, subversion, and guerrilla warfare. What the Hungarian case suggests, however, is that such methods of changing the balance of power are

legitimate, or accepted as such, only in the "grey areas," the ones in which great power influence is not clearly defined. Within the core areas of the two blocs internal war will not be an effective method of changing the balance of power, at any rate not as long as the leading powers of a given bloc have the military capability to end them. This is valid not only for the Soviet, or Communist orbit, but also for the Western alliance (see the alleged State Department references to putting down a Communist uprising in Italy,⁴¹ or American actions in Guatemala), although the Western alliance has been less effective in handling these crises within its own sphere of influence (Cuba) than the Communists. The reason for this is, in part, that Western spheres of influence are somewhat less obvious and less clearly defined than the Soviet controlled areas. At least this was the case nine years ago at the time of the Hungarian revolution.

The rise of nuclear weapons and the balance of deterrence had an impact not only on strategy but also on national objectives. There is no doubt that operational (real) objectives have tended to become less aggressive and more conservative. Long-range, ideological objectives appear to have been relegated to the level of political myths. The world revolution is still proclaimed by the Soviets as an objective, but operationally it is less relevant than 25 or 30 years ago.

Bipolarization

The second major aspect of the postwar setting was the rapid polarization of opposing forces and the formation of two "camps" or "blocs." In the last few years this process appears to have been reversed with a tendency toward a multipolar balance of power system. But at the time of the revolution the bipolar pattern prevailed.

What is the impact of a bipolar system on the behavior of participants? Ideally (and the world of the 1950s came close to this model), under a bipolar system the loss by one party is the gain of the other. The behavior and rules of the bipolar system are analogous to the behavior of a two-party system in domestic politics. It tends to distort and magnify shifts in the balance of power. The consequence of this will be an even keener sensitivity for the delimitation of spheres of influence and a tendency to shift conflict from blocs to the contestible "grey" areas. Thus bipolarization reinforces a trend that we have already observed as the result and byproduct of the nuclear balance. American nonintervention in Hungary, we may thus say, was a decision

following the logic of the nuclear age and of the polarization of power politics.

A corollary of the bipolar system prevalent in the fifties was the global character of the commitments of leading powers. The existence of such commitments increases the complexity of the decision-making process; it enters variables that do not enter the calculations of a power with regional commitments.

Global commitments operate in two ways. First, they increase penalties for noninvolvement. The fact that the United States refrained from active response not only tarnished its image in the crisis area (East Europe) but increased its image of weakness even in regions close to the home base, as, for instance, in Latin America. Conversely, had the Soviets not responded to the crises in Hungary and Suez, they would have had the Chinese and other bloc countries up in arms against them (as indeed they had them after the Cuban missile retreat). On the other hand, global commitments may increase the political costs of involvement. The Soviets paid for their military victory over Hungary, among other ways, in terms of lost votes and supporters in the West.

International Organization

The third significant conclusion that emerges from the study of the Hungarian (and Suez) crisis concerns the role of international organization in conflict resolution. This statement certainly does not imply that international organizations (notably the United Nations) have eliminated traditional ways of settling disputes (i.e., by force or the threat of force). Indeed, whenever the powers perceive a threat to their vital interests they will act on their own rather than entrust their fate to the organization.

The number of instances when the United Nations has failed to settle disputes (and will fail in the future) is considerable. We may list examples like Berlin, Hungary, and Vietnam. It has been most notoriously ineffective when dealing with great power disputes. This, of course, is not surprising and was recognized by its founders when the right of veto was established. The principle was lamely opposed in the first years following its foundation (notably by the first Secretary General), but under Dag Hammarskjold's tenure of office great power interests became recognized and the concept of the spheres of influence became a ground rule of its operations. There is good reason to believe that Secretary General Hammarskjold's passive role during the

Hungarian crisis resulted from his deep conviction that the United Nations should not take an active role where primary interests of great powers are involved.

What then is the role of the United Nations in modern international strategy? What are the effective uses of the organization? There are three answers.

First, the United Nations is useful as a permanent forum for negotiations precluding the embarrassment factor that is involved in calling a conference by one of the parties involved in a dispute or conflagration. Further the United Nations is significant, or may become so, as a façade for effective great power action as in Korea and, less obviously, in the Congo. Finally, and this was its role in the Hungarian crisis, it may act as an important face-saving device. Inaction may be camouflaged by resolutions and ineffective condemnations. If the great power elects to remain passive, it can do so by saying, "I did my best, but my scrupulous adherence to the charter (including the veto of my adversary) prevents me from taking effective, military action."

Footnotes

1. Victor Winston, "The Soviet Satellites--An Economic Liability," Problems of Communism, Vol. VII (1958), p. 19.
2. Nicholas Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe (New York, 1957), p. 297.
3. United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary (New York, 1957), p. 5.
4. This he admitted in a speech three years after the suppression of the revolution. Published in Népszabadság, April 7, 1959.
5. UN Report, p. 45.
6. One may argue, of course, that the abrogation of the Warsaw Treaty was a consequence rather than a cause of Soviet intervention.
7. The division of the Soviet Presidium was again referred to by Khrushchev. Published in Népszabadság, December 3, 1959.
8. For the English translation, see Paul Zinner (ed), National Communism (New York, 1957), pp. 485-489.
9. Paul Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York, 1962), pp. 320-324.
10. New York Times, October 25, 1956, p. 32.
11. After an initially favorable response (apparently due to communications blackout) Hsinhua denounced the Hungarians on October 26. Joza Brillej, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations, denounced US attempts to bring the Hungarian issue before the United Nations on October 29.
12. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York, 1965), p. 63.
13. Ibid., p. 64.
14. Ibid., p. 67.

15. New York Times, October 25, p. 32.
16. Ibid., pp. 1 and 18.
17. Eisenhower, p. 65.
18. New York Times, October 28, 1956, p. 34.
19. Eisenhower, p. 67.
20. Ibid., p. 90.
21. Ibid., p. 68.
22. New York Times, October 28, p. 34.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Eisenhower, p. 71.
26. New York Times, November 1, 1956, p. 10.
27. Ibid., p. 14.
28. New York Times, October 26, 1956, p. 1.
29. On November 6 the State Department declared that "any violation of the territorial integrity or internal sovereignty /of Austria/ would be a grave threat to world peace." New York Times, November 7, 1956, p. 1.
30. Speeches by Foreign Minister Pineau and Prime Minister Eden. New York Times, October 26, p. 1.
31. New York Times, October 29, 1956, p. 8.
32. Eisenhower, p. 89.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp. 88-89.
35. Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1956, p. 19.
36. Ibid.

37. Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1956, p. 23.
38. New York Times, October 30, 1956, p. 1.
39. Eisenhower, p. 92; New York Times, November 7, p. 35.
40. Eisenhower, p. 97.
41. See n. 29, above.

Suez (1956)

by

D.C. Watt

INTRODUCTION

The Suez crisis provides one of the most complex and one of the most important examples of the use of force in support of political aims in the nuclear age. The actual military operations, however, formed only a small part of the totality of the crisis, and the events of October 29-November 6, 1956, from the Israeli invasion of the Egyptian-held Sinai Peninsula to the cease-fire between the Anglo-French expeditionary force occupying Port Said and the forces of Egypt are misleading unless set in the larger political context of the five- or six-way struggle for mastery in the Middle East of this period.

In military terms, moreover, the Suez war seemingly belongs more to the period of World War II than to anticipated patterns of conventional conflict in the nuclear age. The Israeli action presents virtually no novelties in the use of new technological devices, or of land, sea, and air forces, in the reactions between strategic and tactical forces, or in their command and control systems, save perhaps in their speed of mobilization and in their use of the French antitank missile. The Egyptians provide no military novelties whatsoever. There are certain innovations on the British and French side, in the British use of helicopters and the French use of an airborne command post. There are aspects of the nuclear balance between Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union that seem at first sight relevant to this study. But their relevance is in the political, not the military field. The importance of the Suez crisis to this study lies mainly in its illustration of the political and psychological changes in the nature of warfare. And most of the lessons of the Suez crisis are negative.

The Suez crisis involved primarily six states: Britain, France, Israel, Egypt, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Each of these states saw the crisis quite differently, pursued totally different aims, and was guided by different principles. For each the events of the crisis marked a crucial stage in their policy in the Middle East. In each case that policy was a completely different one. For Britain, the conflict with Egypt fits into a set of developments which began with Napoleon. For France the dominating issue was that of the civil war in Algeria. For Israel, the central issue was that of her encirclement by an Arab union. For Egypt, the issue was the assertion of her nationalist personality against the great powers, the United States and Britain. For the United States there were two prime issues: that of solidarity within the Western alliance and that of the global balance with the Soviet Union.* For the Soviets the primary question was one of entry into the Middle East.

BACKGROUND

Britain's concern with and presence in the Middle East dates back to the Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1797. Her concern then was with the role of the area as a stepping stone to the land and sea routes to India. These routes could lie across the Isthmus of Suez and down the Red Sea, or across the Syrian landmass and down the Tigris and Euphrates to the Persian Gulf. Her dominant interest was to deny control of these routes to a hostile great power. The opening of the Suez Canal to traffic in 1869 enhanced this interest, as the Canal came very soon to play a major part in British intercontinental trade. In the 1880s, 80% of all ships using the Canal flew the British flag. Britain's concern for the control of the area led her to contemplate joint intervention with France in Egypt in 1879 when the bankruptcy of the Egyptian state seemed about to provoke French intervention. But in 1882 France's European anxieties caused her to flinch at the last moment. Britain occupied Egypt alone. The occupation gave Britain direct control of the southeastern exit to the Mediterranean and was to that extent characteristic of traditional British maritime strategy. But it became atypical when Britain was unable to find a weak power to act as her surrogate in ruling Egypt and was forced to take on the job herself, until Egypt could be built up as a modern state capable of playing that role

*The Review Panel for the study felt that the moral issue of respect for international law and the UN Charter was a prime issue for the United States; the author, however, did not agree.

herself. In military terms the occupation committed Britain to a land-force rather than a maritime role in the Middle East. She fought major campaigns there in 1914-1918 and 1940-1943. In 1940 her vital and scanty resources in armor were even committed to defend Suez rather than her own shores. During this period she faced two other major confrontations over Egypt, one with France in 1897 at Fashoda on the Upper Nile, and another in 1906 with Turkey in the Sinai Desert.

The granting of independence to India in 1947 removed much of the old strategic justification for British anxieties over the control of the Middle East as a whole and the Isthmus of Suez in particular. The very considerable volume of trade between Britain and the Asian and Australasian continents continued, however; some 25% of Britain's total volume of imports and exports still ran through Suez. To these was added a new element of immense peacetime importance not only to Britain but to the whole of Western Europe. Europe's industrial pre-eminence in the 19th and early 20th Centuries had been based on the presence of large and cheap energy resources in coal. Europe's coal production had begun to decline, and the only way to maintain the growth in European industrial production necessary to maintain her current rate of growth was to draw ever more heavily on oil. In 1955 estimates produced by the British Ministry of Fuel and Power showed that by 1985 Britain could expect to be using some 430 million tons of coal equivalent, of which 90 million would have to be met by the use of oil. Similar estimates produced for all Western Europe gave a gap of 315 million tons of coal equivalent between Europe's estimated needs and her own power supplies, which could be met only by the use of oil. The vast bulk of this oil would have to come from the Middle East, where oil was both cheap and abundant. Kuwait alone was estimated to contain 40% of the proven oil resources in the world.

This oil in 1955 was nearly all being produced from four big fields. First in scale was the Kuwait oilfield, exploited by a joint Anglo-American combine. Second was the great oilfield in Saudi Arabia, exploited by the wholly American-owned Aramco. Third were the oilfields of western Iran, exploited since 1954 by a joint Anglo-French-Dutch-American consortium. And fourth were the oilfields of Mosul and Kirkuk in northern Iraq, exploited by the Iraqi Petroleum Company, a consortium in which British interests were predominant, but French, American, and Dutch were also represented. (There were quite large sources of supply in Bahrain and Qatar, the "Neutral Zone" between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and some even in Egypt, but they were relatively insignificant by comparison with the big four.) The oil from Iraq and Saudi Arabia went by pipeline across Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon to ports in the

Levant. That from Kuwait and Iran went by tanker through Suez. By 1975 it was estimated that some 300-350 million tons of crude oil would annually be transported on the south-north route through the Suez Canal. Even the use of the new 45,000-ton-plus tankers which from 1955 began to come off the slipways of Europe and Japan could not make the alternative route round the Cape competitive with that through Suez. If power is the most essential element in the economic growth of Europe, then the control of the Suez bottleneck would give the nation controlling it the ability at any time to throttle Europe slowly; or so the argument ran in Britain at the time.

Since 1900 British policy in Egypt had been directed to the modernization of Egypt as a preparation for that country eventually to act as Britain's agent in the control of the Canal and the key Suez position. But the making over of Egypt was one of the major failures of British colonial policy, explicable in part by Britain's uneasy series of switches between the use of force to protect Britain's strategic interests and the attempt to persuade Egypt's nationalists to cooperate with Britain, in part by the resistance of Islam to the process of Anglicization. In 1922 Britain proclaimed Egypt's nominal independence. But she was unable to get an agreement which would legitimize the presence of British troops on the Suez Canal until Italy's conquest of Ethiopia convinced the Egyptians they faced more aggressive and less sympathetic colonial powers than Britain, and they signed the Anglo-Egyptian alliance of 1936. The end of World War II made Britain the only remaining colonial power in the Middle East, occupying a Suez base which had grown fantastically as supplies had been stockpiled for the North African and Middle Eastern campaigns. Between 1945 and 1952 Anglo-Egyptian relations deteriorated to the level of continuous quasi-guerrilla harassment of the British forces occupying the Suez base.

The overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy by the Nasser-Naguib officer group in 1952 seemed to offer the chance of a new development in Anglo-Egyptian relations. At the same time, the Churchill government, under the intellectual impact of first the American and then the Soviet development of thermonuclear weapons with rocket delivery systems, came to believe that to regard the Suez installations as the possible base for a Middle Eastern campaign on World War II lines was completely unrealistic. In the hope of restoring Anglo-Egyptian relations to some form of amity, an agreement was signed in 1954 providing for the evacuation of the Suez base by all British troops, and the handing over of its vast military stores to British and local civilian contractors, with British right to reoccupy the base only in the event of external aggression against a Middle Eastern country. The last

British troops in fact evacuated the base a week before the Canal was nationalized in 1956.

The Anglo-Egyptian agreement, however, was not followed by the amelioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations that had been hoped for. The reasons for this failure were threefold. First, in pursuance of the joint Anglo-American aim of containing the Soviet Union, Britain had taken up the American idea of a pact linking the states of the "Northern Tier," Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, and had brought them together in late 1954 into the so-called Baghdad Pact, to which Britain had herself acceded. In so doing she had by implication chosen to strengthen the Iraqi regime, which President Nasser regarded as his major opponent for the leadership of the Arab world. Second, after the Israeli attack on the Gaza strip in the spring of 1955, Britain and the United States, in pursuance of their policy of attempting to maintain a balance of armaments between Israel and the Arab States, agreed upon in 1950, had refused President Nasser the modern weapons he had demanded to give the Egyptian armed forces superiority over Israel. He had therefore turned to the Soviet Union and concluded a major arms agreement in the fall of 1955, ostensibly with Czechoslovakia, which gave him MIGs, Ilyushin jet bombers, Soviet heavy armor, and submarines. Third, although Britain had agreed in principle to support a major Anglo-American World Bank loan to enable Egypt to construct the projected High Dam at Aswan, the project was under continuous criticism in the British press for being excessively expensive and hydrologically not the best answer to Egypt's water problems. Finally, Cairo Radio continued to pump out the most obnoxious stream of anti-British propaganda throughout the Middle East. Events such as the dismissal of General Glubb and the other British expatriate officers in the Jordanian Arab Legion and the stoning of the British Foreign Secretary's jeep on his visit to Bahrein were all laid at Nasser's door. A powerful minority group in the British Conservative party had seized upon the Suez issue as the means to attack Prime Minister Eden's position as Conservative leader. By the summer of 1956 President Nasser had few defenders in Britain.

THE CRISIS

This, then, was the position when the US Government, piqued by Nasser's recognition of Communist China and by his efforts to play their aid off against the Soviet Union, and aware that only a long and, in an election year, highly hazardous battle with Congress was likely to secure Congressional approval of American financial participation in the Aswan Dam project, abruptly

informed President Nasser's regime that America was no longer prepared to support it. On July 26, 1956, in a lightning riposte, President Nasser seized the Suez Canal Company's offices and installations and declared the Canal to be nationalized.

The crisis that followed can be divided into two parts, the political and the military. As an exercise in political warfare, the course of the crisis is immensely instructive. It shows the extreme difficulties of conducting a campaign in political warfare in a polycentric situation. The main themes are the failure of the three Western powers to agree on a common objective, let alone on common methods; the breakdown of Anglo-American cooperation at the highest level through the inability or unwillingness of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles either to accept the British objectives or to make clear or acceptable to the British the nature of his own; the failure of the United States actively to prevent Soviet intervention and exploitation of Western divisions and the Egyptian role in disrupting Middle Eastern security; the Anglo-French rapprochement with Israel which led to coordinated military action against Egypt in the period October 29-November 6, 1956; the collapse of that action under UN pressure led by the United States and backed by financial pressure on London; the device of the UN Emergency Force to secure the separation of the belligerents during the withdrawal of the aggressors' forces; and the triumphant exploitation of the outcome of the crisis by the Egyptians. In political terms the outcome of the Suez crisis was a major defeat for Britain and France, a qualified victory for Israel, a major setback for the United States, and a qualified triumph for the Soviet Union and Egypt.

The military aspects of the crisis can be classified under three heads. First, there is the relevance of the available strategic and tactical forces to the political objectives. In this both British and French performance showed great weakness at all but the purely tactical levels, where each introduced what were, at the time, some minor but interesting innovations. The Israeli forces on the other hand demonstrated some significant weaknesses at the tactical level both in organization and materiel, but proved themselves excellently organized at the strategic level, though with some marked weaknesses in materiel here too. The Egyptian performance is difficult to assess, partly for lack of unbiased evidence, partly because the attack on their forces caught them at a period when they were in the process of being rearmed and re-equipped with weapons in whose handling and tactical employment they had not yet been properly exercised or trained. Second, there is the actual conduct of the military operations, in which there is little to be learned. The Israeli campaign in the Sinai Desert was a straightforward

exercise in World War II desert warfare techniques, including a parachute drop to seize the critical Mitla Pass. The Anglo-French attack on Port Said was a ponderous exercise in World War II amphibious warfare, backed by carrier-borne aircraft and naval gunfire and preceded by an equally textbook-style destruction of the Egyptian air force on the ground by long-range bombing from bases in Cyprus and Malta by the RAF, and carrier-based strike attacks by both British and French naval aircraft. Third, there are the lessons drawn by the British and French from the course of the crisis as to the need to proceed with plans to develop their own thermonuclear deterrents and to go over to small, professional, long-term, highly mobile armies and abandon their previous reserve-based, conscript-manned, mass armies designed primarily for conventional warfare against a major military opponent on the European mainland.

The only technological change of major importance to make its influence felt at Suez was that involved in the possession of nuclear weapons. In 1956 only the United States and the Soviet Union had active nuclear forces. Both Britain and France had embarked on nuclear programs. The British tested their atomic bomb in 1952 and their 1955 defense program had begun the transition to an all-nuclear strategy. But the British nuclear delivery system at this stage was still in the form of subsonic manned bombers, the Canberra with a range of 2,750 miles at a mere 540 mph, and the Valiant with a range of 4,500 miles at a mere 567 mph. Contracts for the first standoff bomb, Blue Steel, were given in 1955, for Blue Streak, the British missile, only in 1956. The British hydrogen bomb was not tested until 1957. The French program was only in its initial phase. The 1955 budget had contained certain secret appropriations for the development of nuclear weapons. But the crucial decision to enter the thermonuclear race was taken in November 1956 at the time of the Suez operation. In November 1956 both Britain and France depended on the American nuclear umbrella, a situation which gave the United States a very considerable weapon against them inside the alliance.

Under these circumstances, the British and French decision to regard the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal Company as an unfriendly act demanded some kind of rapid and decisive action against Egypt. Forces for such an action simply were not available. There was only one British carrier in the Mediterranean. The two French carriers were armed with piston-engined aircraft much inferior to Egypt's new MIG-15s, MIG-17s, and Ilyushin-28 bombers in speed and firepower. There were no supersonic British fighters in the Middle East. There were only two squadrons of Canberras in the Middle East, both on Arab air bases. The strategic base at Akrotivi on Cyprus was not yet completed. British

elite units were tied up in national security duties on Cyprus. The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade on Cyprus had not even done a practice drop for a year. The Royal Marine Commando saw helicopters for the first time in October 1956, those of the Joint Services Experimental Unit which was still evolving helicopter assault tactics in Britain. Of British strength of 38 landing ships (tank) only two were in service, the remainder in mothballs. The main British armored strength in the Middle East, the 10th Armoured Division, was in Libya, where permission of the Libyan government was necessary for its employment in the Middle East. The size and organization of the Egyptian army with its modern Soviet armor, and its 200 field and antitank guns, presented the Anglo-French Command with only two alternatives: very rapid action to take Egyptian forces off balance or a full-scale military operation to defeat them in detail.

It is not proposed here to set forth a full narrative of the course of the Suez crisis in either its political or its military aspects. Separate political and military chronologies are attached as Appendices A and B. Detailed study should be directed to the works of Azeau, Bar-Zohar, and Robertson on the political side, and Barker, Brown, Marshall, O'Ballance, and Flintham on the military side, listed in the Bibliography, Appendix C.

POLITICAL FACTORS AND CHANGES AFFECTING THE CRISIS

The evacuation of the Suez base under the 1954 agreement had represented a calculated British risk. The base was not particularly useful for general or limited war against the Soviet Union and was very vulnerable to guerrilla warfare techniques in any extended operation in the Middle East. Furthermore, British policymakers had come to accept the arguments of the new school of British pro-Arabs that Arab nationalism was essentially pro-British and pro-Western and that only the remnants of old-style colonialism, affronts to their national dignity, such as the Suez base, prevented a revival of Anglo-Arab friendship. Nasser's policy after the signature of the 1954 agreement revealed these arguments to be sentimental nonsense. British policy under the impact of this revelation was for a time to swing to the opposite and equally nonsensical pole, that Nasser was a captive of Soviet policy. The Suez operation followed naturally from the failure of the 1954 agreement to accomplish its aim of securing a friendly power in control of the Canal.

The Suez operation thus represents a continuation, in political terms, of traditional British foreign policy. The situation

had changed very radically, however, since 1945. Before 1902 British policy in Egypt had been conducted with German support against the opposition of France and Russia. In 1902 Britain bought France off and Russian opposition collapsed. (It had been given only because France was Russia's ally.) In 1914-1918 Britain stood off German-Turkish attack and annexed Egypt. From 1914 Britain's only rivals in the Middle East were France and Italy, who were themselves also rivals. Britain's strength was adequate to cope with them, although Britain did not feel strong enough to close the Suez Canal against Italy in 1935, because of the other challenges she faced in Europe and the Far East from Germany and Japan. In 1940-1944 Britain stood off German and Italian attack, with the aid of war material and money drawn from the United States under lend-lease.

After 1945 the political situation changed drastically in several ways. First, Russian pressure in the Middle East revived. In its first phase, 1945-1954, it took the traditional forms of pressure on its neighbors, Turkey and Iran. This was stymied by the Truman Doctrine of 1947, as far as Turkey was concerned, and by Iran's entry into the Baghdad Pact in 1954, as far as Iran was concerned. In 1955, therefore, Soviet policy leapfrogged the Baghdad Pact countries, the "Northern Tier" of the Middle East, by the Czechoslovak-Egyptian Arms Treaty of September. Soviet technicians arrived in numbers to service the Soviet arms deliveries and to train Egyptian military personnel in their use. The arms deliveries were on a scale sufficient to disturb the whole balance of power in the Middle East both between Egypt and Israel and, because of the technological sophistication of the weapons delivered, between Egypt and the West. The Soviets, adopting Britain's policy of denying territory to potential enemies by the encouragement and development of states surrogate to their aim, picked on Egypt to deny the Middle East to the West.

A second change was the fact that Britain and France had become bound to the United States in a series of permanent alliances, military, economic, and financial. At the same time, the terms of the alliances did not cover the Middle East. American policy in the Middle East supported British policy of denying the area to the Soviet Union, but fell into the same trap of believing that local nationalism, save for reaction to some surviving institutions of colonialism, was inherently amiably disposed toward the West. Thus America aided Britain in preventing a return of French power to Syria and Lebanon in 1945-1946; hampered and thwarted Britain in the Palestine dispute; took up with Britain the support of Greece and Turkey against the Soviets in 1947 by the Truman Doctrine; acted as a limiting factor on British action at the time of the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute until there seemed

danger of Prime Minister Mossadegh finally succumbing to the pro-Soviet Tudeh party, when the CIA intervened to organize the coup d'etat which overthrew Mossadegh and restored the Shah; encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact but refused to join it; and allowed the Saudi family to believe that their ambitions in the Persian Gulf enjoyed American support. Similarly the United States refused to support French aims in Algeria and North Africa. Decolonization was encouraged, urged, and emphasized, without, so America's allies held, any respect for either their interests or the speed and manner in which it was achieved.

Another change was the new relative weakness of Britain and France themselves. Both were faced with a permanent challenge in Europe from Soviet ground forces which dominated their strategic thinking and their weapons development programs. Both were only beginning in the mid-1950s to emerge from the financial and economic weakness of the war and its aftermath. Britain's role as holder of one of the two major currencies of world trade, sterling, was terribly vulnerable to pressure on the pound, threatened as it already was by internal inflation of demand. France had not yet solved her own internal inflationary pressures. Both had faced a series of colonial wars and operations since 1945 in Indochina and Malaya, Palestine, Kenya, Madagascar, Algeria, and Cyprus. These, while giving their forces a superb technical training, had prevented an adequate adjustment at the strategic level to the demands of contemporary warfare.

In the so-called Third World, meanwhile, nationalism had emerged, after 30 years gestation, as an effective political force at three levels: at the intergovernmental, as in the Pan-Arab movement and its organ, the Arab League, and on the broader level, in the anticolonial movement embodied in the Bandung Conference; at the level of the officer corps of the new nations, angry and dissatisfied with the traditional political leaders (the bimbashis had replaced the pashas, as it was put); and at the level of the urban masses, living in new-style shantytowns around the slums of the big cities which they had also crowded to saturation point, unemployed, detritalized, stripped of respect for traditional authority, and easy material for the new charismatic leaders who could give them something to which to belong and someone to hate. Old-style political nationalists among the small nations could be cowed, courted, or corrupted. A Nasser, or a Sukarno, was not to be dealt with by any of these three methods.

Finally, these forces had all come to express themselves in the United Nations. Since 1950 this had ceased to be a concert of the great powers, if it ever had been that. The Uniting for

Peace resolution of 1950, introduced at American initiative, had instead made it an assembly where great powers competed for the votes of the minor powers. The change had given far more weight to the anticolonial sentiments of the Third World, and had stimulated the emergence of countries such as India and Canada as intermediaries between the big voting blocs of Latin America, the Arab States, the Soviet bloc, the African states, and those of Western Europe.

POLITICAL-MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED

Both French and British forces learned from their lack of mobility at Suez. Inability to act quickly involved them in a long military buildup, during which time morale and unity of purpose deteriorated in Britain. The United States, the Soviet Union, and India were enabled to intervene politically, and the whole center of conflict shifted to the political field. This shift necessitated the evolution of an occasion to legitimize in public eyes the shift of British and French action back to the military sphere. For a time it was thought this would be provided by Egyptian action in barring the Canal to shipping or by a breakdown of the Egyptian administration of the Canal. Finally the Israeli attack on Egypt was adopted as a justification for an ultimatum designed to "separate" the opponents.

Here again, however, political necessity and military necessity failed to coincide. The length of time necessary for the major section of the amphibious forces based on Bone in Algeria and Malta to reach Egyptian waters meant either a gap of six days after the political intervention, the ultimatum demanding withdrawal of both belligerents from the Canal Zone, or the embarkation of the amphibious forces before the issue of the ultimatum. The second made nonsense of the political necessity, the first gave time for political means to be mobilized against Britain and France, at the United Nations and in the general propaganda battle. Attempts by French Command elements to speed up the operation ran into the military objections of the British commanders against leaving paratroops without adequate antitank weapons against SU 100s with only air support to protect them. Only British political intervention could secure agreement by British military commanders to advance the parachute landing one day ahead of that of the seaborne forces.

Behind these problems lay a deeper deviation between Britain and France. The French were interested only in crushing Nasser's aid to the Algerian rebels. The British wanted a friendly Egypt.

The French did not mind collaboration with the Israelis, provided that Nasser was humiliated, defeated, overthrown. The British were very chary of charges of collusion. The French had little objection to causing severe casualties among the Egyptian population. British air bombing and sea bombardment of Port Said was meant to limit casualties on the Egyptian side as much as possible. The British ultimately could not find a satisfactory definition of military victory that did not involve them in a repetition of the dilemma from which they had sought to escape by evacuating the Canal. The real defeat of Britain came with the failure of the schemes for internationalizing the Canal advanced at the first and second London Conferences. The subsidiary defeat came with the failure of the plans for an Iraqi entry into Jordan or a coup d'etat in Syria. (See political chronology, Appendix A.) The decision to collaborate with Israel was a lapse into unrealism.

France and Israel both found themselves bound by military necessity to Britain, and their hopes of attaining their objectives perished with Britain's defeat. For France bases in the Middle East were essential. Such bases could be provided only by Britain or Israel. The French carrier force was too small and too ill-supplied with modern aircraft to support an amphibious operation on its own. British support seemed the most obvious. But British support entailed accepting a command structure which made British commanders supreme at every level. French forces were unable to stage an alternative operation or to continue the action on the Canal when the British chose to adopt a cease-fire. Fear of just such British vacillation had led to the French examination in late September 1956 of a joint operation with Israel. But the Israelis insisted not only on French air protection against Egyptian air attack on Israel, but also on the destruction of the Egyptian air force by ground attack. Only the British had the bomber range to execute this. The French were forced back onto the British bases in Cyprus and to reliance on the British.

The actual course of the operation revealed the combat superiority of British and French forces once the attack was launched. But the British proved unable to break Egyptian morale or to win the propaganda battle--at least with the effort exerted in the short period of hostilities. Cairo Radio was bombed but not jammed; when it went off the air Damascus Radio picked up on the same wavelength. British forces took over what had hitherto been a very successfully operated "grey" radio, Sarq al-Adna, operating from Cyprus. But the style of radio offensive chosen, supported by leaflets dropped from the air, was better adapted for use against primitive tribes, being full of threats of destruction from the air, which bore little relation to the strict avoidance of attack on civilian targets practiced by the

Anglo-French bombing attack. Moreover, being audible all over the Middle East it did immense damage to the British position elsewhere in the Levant. Its only real effect was to secure the resignation of the bulk of the Arab staff, and of the skilled British directorate, and the end of Sarq al-Adna as an effective "grey" operation. Paradoxically the BBC Arabic and General Overseas Services, which continued their normal news coverage including reportage on the division of opinion in Britain, suffered very little loss in their listening audience in the Middle East, though they were severely criticized in Britain itself. Several "black" operations were carried out by both Britain and France, but their collaboration with Israel rendered these meaningless as exercises.

The course of the operation set up very great strains within the alliance. Secretary Dulles and President Eisenhower seemed dominated by the idea that it had been launched contrary to their warnings and seemed to disregard the extreme weakening of the British and French positions and, by implication, of that of the United States, that would be caused by an Egyptian success in carrying off the nationalization of the Canal with impunity. Mr. Dulles' preference for diplomacy by press conference, the main effect of which was to give the maximum publicity to any differences within the alliance, drove the British and French governments to a state where they were simply not prepared in any way to listen to American advice, and preferred to count on the traditional paralysis of American political action during the weeks prior to a Presidential election. It seemed very easy for Mr. Dulles to forget that the Canal's nationalization had been triggered by an American attempt "to cut President Nasser down to size." His attitude to British policy was that Britain had been trying to maintain a position of hegemony by bluff. He seems to have viewed with equanimity the question of who would replace Britain if her position collapsed, although the Suez episode was to open a period much more effectively exploited by the Soviets than by America, with both Syria in 1957 and Iraq in 1959-1961 trembling on the verge of becoming Soviet satellites by internal coups d'etat.

For the Soviet Union, the Suez operation can be counted only as a substantial--and largely undeserved--dividend to their abandonment of support of local Communist parties in favor of a policy of supporting those local forces best able to deny the area to the West. Egypt's losses in the Suez operation had virtually to be replaced from Soviet sources; and the later Soviet-Egyptian arms agreements were much less wastefully organized than that of 1955 (which gave the Egyptians considerable supplies, among more useful items, of arctic warfare equipment!). The use of threats of

thermonuclear missile attack was excellently timed to secure the maximum propaganda effect in the Middle East. To this day, the belief that this was the major factor in securing the Anglo-French cease-fire is widespread, if not dominant, in the area.

For Israel the action was a tactical success, a strategic draw. Nasser was not overthrown, nor the Canal opened to Israeli shipping. The fedayeen bases in the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza strip were not destroyed. Large quantities of Egyptian war supplies were captured and the Gulf of Aqaba opened to Israeli shipping. The rapid mobilization of the Israeli forces showed that there were no defects on that side. But the Israeli record in Sinai itself was not too good.* Tactically the Israeli forces were unimaginatively handled with too much reliance on frontal attacks; and the main damage to the Egyptian armor was inflicted by the French air forces. Israeli fears of the Egyptian strategic air force seemed overrated. No Egyptian attempt was made to bomb Israeli territory even before the Anglo-French ultimatum. In the air battles that took place, on the other hand, losses were about equal on each side, and there was quite an effective attack by Egyptian Vampires on the Israeli column at Mitla Pass on October 30.

The main revelation of the Suez operation was the speed with which the UN General Assembly and Secretariat moved in the organization of the UN Emergency Force, and the advantages conferred by international air mobility on such an operation. The first units of UNEF arrived in the Canal Zone 10 days after the initial UN resolution. Prime Minister Eden seems to have accepted the idea of a UN Force, in the confident expectation that no one but Britain would be able or willing to provide troops for such a force. The UN refusal to use direct sanctions against Britain and France or to vote the kind of condemnation that the extreme Soviet-led anticolonialists wished made the ending of the crisis and evacuation of the Zone easy and simple. UNEF is still the most successful example of the use of a UN military presence.

For the British and French military the main lesson was the need to redesign their conventional forces. Both felt the need for nuclear forces; but both also had demonstrated to them very early in their nuclear effort the need for strategically mobile conventional forces on a ready-to-go basis. The British abolition of conscription, adaptation of two carriers for commandos with helicopters, development of tactical air transport squadrons,

*There are sharp differences of opinion on this score. For example, see S.L.A. Marshall, Sinai Victory, New York, 1958 (ed.).

building of a strategic reserve in Britain, all stem from the Suez experience. French adaptation was delayed by the Algerian campaign, but their present organization follows largely from the same experience.

Both Britain and France also drew from their Suez experience a determination to proceed with development of a national nuclear deterrent. The British hydrogen bomb was tested the following year. The French nuclear program for the second five-year period was signed in November 1956, a couple of weeks after Suez.

There was one further lesson drawn from the Suez operation and the Egyptian blockage of the Canal. In July 1956 Britain and West Europe held oil reserves equivalent to only one month's demands. In July 1956 they held six months' reserves; and the oil companies remain ready at any time to reroute the world's tanker fleets to resist any new threat to their oil supplies. Since the US Government chose to use the need to agree on rerouting as yet another form of pressure on Britain to secure the evacuation of Port Said, the gain is not entirely that of the United States. The French development of Algerian oil reserves and their determined exclusion of all foreign oil companies except Shell is also traceable to the Suez experience. Western Europe is not today as open to pressure or the fear of pressure on her energy supplies from the Middle East as at the time of Suez.

CONCLUSIONS

Changes in Technology

Despite the advent of the nuclear age, technological developments since 1945 had only a limited effect on the course of the Suez crisis. The following three instances are of the most importance.

1. The Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt were of such technologically advanced weapons as to make a deliberate and thoroughly prepared attack by the British and French forces seem necessary. At the opening of the crisis in July 1956, the Egyptian air force's possession of MIG fighters and IL-28s ruled out an immediate attack until British and French jet aircraft could be concentrated in the area. This factor continued in French and Israeli eyes to enforce reliance on British jet bombers to destroy the Egyptian air force and to make it impossible for them to act against Egypt without British participation. The Egyptian army's

possession of Soviet tanks of an advanced design was a similar factor in preventing the French High Command from accepting the advice of their paratroop commanders and launching a purely French assault on the Canal Zone in the period after the issue of the Anglo-French ultimatum to Egypt. It should be made clear, however, that what is at issue here is the development of a new technique or ploy by the Soviets rather than a technological revolution itself. At any period in time it has been open to an advanced nation to strengthen one less advanced against its adversary by arms deliveries of a type so advanced as to eliminate the technological arms gap between the two. It is difficult, however, to discover a case in the past where this was done on quite this scale.

2. The absence of nuclear weapons in the hands of Britain and France meant that they had to rely on American nuclear support against Soviet threats to use nuclear weapons. Even though such threats were largely regarded as bluff in London, they tended to force the British back onto the United States as the only power which could call that bluff (which, in fact, the United States did very explicitly).

3. The British use of helicopters for assault purposes and the French use of an airborne command post added greatly to the effectiveness of the triphibious assault on Port Said.

Changes in Political-Social Ideology

The Establishment of a Nationalist Republic with a Charismatic Leader in Egypt

Popular nationalism was nothing new in Egypt. Indeed there had been a virtual deadlock between nationalism from below and British pressure in Egypt since before World War I. What was new was an Egyptian government which made itself the embodiment of this nationalism instead of attempting to manipulate it. The Nasser regime proved itself to be something which was beyond traditional great power methods of control.

Decolonization and Changes in World Opinion

The movement for decolonization and the turn of world opinion against traditional forms of colonialism and against paracolonial

forms of great power control meant that psychologically the British and French governments were on the defensive throughout the whole crisis from July to November 1956. There was little or no support in the world for their contention that the circumstances in which the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company's properties in Egypt rendered it akin to theft. Their attempt to mobilize international support for an international Suez Canal authority failed in the face of Egyptian intransigence, being dubbed "collective colonialism" by President Nasser. Their implied argument that great powers have the right to control areas external to their own territory which they regard as vital to their security was not acceptable internationally.* And the British government was very greatly weakened by the divisions in British opinion and the sympathy which the more radical Labor Party elements in the country felt for the anticolonial cause.

The Change in the Ideology of Collective Action

One of the accompaniments to the enlarged membership of the United Nations was a change in the general concept of a universal international organization from a guarantor of the legal status quo, especially of the rights of the great powers and of the collectivity of powers, to that of a guarantor of the unfettered exercise of national sovereignty by the small powers. The United Nations changed from a basically conservative to a radical institution. To supporters of the older conception of an international organization, especially to those whose attitudes had been formed by the League of Nations, President Nasser's action in nationalizing the Canal was not a legitimate exercise of national sovereignty but a unilateral assault on the legitimate status of collective agreements, and ominously reminiscent of similar unilateral actions by Adolf Hitler. Illegitimacy was inherent in the method chosen to revise the status of the Suez Canal. Such "conservatives" also argued that the Anglo-French action was a legitimate action by the great powers who alone were in a position to act to punish Egypt's behavior and to remit the matter to a genuinely international body. This view had some degree of support in Britain, much more in France. Against this was the alternative

*It is worth pointing out that Britain's experience in this regard has made it much more difficult for the similar American case on the Monroe Doctrine and the Caribbean to win acceptance in Britain.

view which regarded the Egyptian action as legitimate in substance, if exceptionable in execution, and regarded the Anglo-French action against Port Said as totally contrary to Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, of the UN Charter. The upholding of the principles enshrined in this section of the Charter, which calls for settlement of international disputes "by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered," and abstention from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State," was, in this view, of pre-eminent and overriding importance. This appears to have been President Eisenhower's view. This was also the view of the official Labor opposition in Britain which, while in office in 1950, had considered and rejected the use of force against Iran after the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, on precisely these grounds. This was the view of the majority of Britain's co-members of NATO and of the Commonwealth, as of the majority of the non-Communist states in the Commonwealth.

Changes in the Patterns of Political Behavior

Failure of the Commonwealth to Function as a Quasi-Alliance

There are parallels with this in the refusal of the Dominions to support Britain in the Chanak crisis with Turkey in 1922 and their reluctance to support Britain at Munich in 1938. But the outbursts of anti-British feeling in India and Pakistan, and the independent role of India in thwarting British pressure on Egypt from July onward was something quite new.

Abandonment by British and French Governments of the American Connection

Anglo-French collusion with Israel and concealment of the action from the US Government marked an abandonment of traditional British national strategy which, since 1900 or so, has been oriented toward avoidance of conflict with the United States and cooperation with European powers only on the European continent itself. Much the same could be said for France. In the development of British national strategy the Suez action has proved to be an aberration. For France the Suez action points the development of a new European-chauvinist policy with strong anti-American overtones.

Willingness of the UN Secretariat to Take Positive Action

The action of the UN Secretary General in conjunction with the Canadian and other interested governments in setting up the UN Emergency Force marked the opening of a new period in the evolution of international conflict. The United Nations under Dag Hammarskjold came to play the role of umpire and industrial arbitrator when international conflicts between members of the Third World and the Western bloc threatened to get out of hand. This period came to an end with the death of Hammarskjold and the overloading of the Secretary General's field of responsibility during the Congo crisis of 1960-1962.

Soviet Use of Arms Deals and Foreign Aid Promises as a Means of Entry into the Middle East

The Soviet initiative in making available to Egypt arms of a sufficient quantity and degree of technological advance to upset completely the balance of power in the Middle East has already been commented on. On a par with this was Russia's use of offers of aid to build the Aswan Dam to encourage President Nasser to evade Western attempts at using Egypt's need for external finance for construction of the High Dam in order to "control" Egyptian action in the Middle East. The Soviet aim in this was, first, to damage Western unity and economic strength by exacerbating tensions in the area; second, to ensure Russian inclusion in any settlement in the area; third, by encouraging Egypt, to deny the area to the West. It should be noted that the Soviets have been very sparing in their use of the arms deal technique. They were forced to maintain deliveries to Egypt after 1956, it is true. Their deliveries to Indonesia have not had the same effect in Southeast Asia, owing to Indonesia's technological backwardness and internal divisions. The delivery of advanced arms to Cuba, and the stationing of nuclear weapons there in September 1962 can possibly be seen as an attempt in far more hazardous circumstances to adapt the technique to the area of direct US-USSR confrontation. The recent delivery of heavy Chinese armor to Pakistan resembles in some aspects the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal of 1955. As a technique it is of limited effectiveness unless a Western attempt to maintain an arms balance in an area of local conflict already exists. Cases where such action might possibly be conceivable in the future are the Ethiopia-Somalia-Kenya dispute and Zambia-Rhodesia in Africa.

Israel's Use of the Punitive Attack

The Israeli attack on the Egyptian positions in Sinai has been variously presented as a pre-emptive move provoked by the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal or by the setting up of the joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian High Command or as a punitive action designed, like previous actions since the spring of 1955, to put an end to fedayeen attacks on Israel.* In any case the technique of the punitive attack played a large part in the development of events prior to the invasion of Sinai. As such it presents a curious adaptation to the contemporary scene of the colonial power's classic technique of control across an unsettled frontier as practiced by Britain on the northwest frontier in India and by the United States against both Indians and Mexicans. In Israel's case it proved of mixed advantage; it proved impossible to administer without progressive intensification of action, which finally involved Israel in a great power conflict. It did eventually succeed, however, in quashing the use of fedayeen against Israeli territory. Against this must be put the role it played in making Egypt turn to the Soviets for arms of the kind which now threaten Israel.

The Role of Economic Factors

The first economic lesson of the Suez crisis is the comparative imperviousness of nationalist undeveloped countries to economic and financial pressure, either as a means of control or as a weapon in economic warfare. Egypt's undoubted need of grants-in-aid and a World Bank loan for the Aswan Dam did not prevent President Nasser from withstanding attempts to use that need as an instrument of political control. The British action in freezing Egypt's considerable sterling balances and in closing the facilities of the City of London was progressively weakened by the reluctance of other financial powers to support it over a long period. No international agreement could be reached on the denial of Canal transit dues to the Egyptian authorities.

Contrariwise, the second lesson was the extreme vulnerability of Britain, a developed country, and sterling, a world currency, to economic and financial pressure. More than anything else it was the need for international backing to counter the run on the pound sterling which forced the British government first

*General Moshe Dayan's diary, published since most of this paper was written, makes the second presentation seem more plausible than the first.

to order the cease-fire at Port Said and then to evacuate the British troops unconditionally. Such pressure could have been resisted only at the cost of abandoning sterling convertibility and destroying confidence in sterling as a world trading currency entirely, with all the decline in the City of London's role in world trade and finance which would have gone with such action. This the Conservative government, faced with a divided country and the subdued skepticism of much of the City, felt unable to accept. This vulnerability has impeded any further initiative on the Suez scale except where American acquiescence can be guaranteed.

Britain's fears for the security of her oil supplies and for those of Western Europe played a considerable part in the justification advanced by the British government spokesmen for their unwillingness to allow Egypt to remain in full control of the Canal. It is difficult, however, to assess the importance of these fears in determining the British government action, especially as Arab threats to use their power to close the Canal to Western oil supplies played a considerable part in Arab propaganda both before and after nationalization. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the prestige issue (which of course involved, among other factors, the public knowledge of vulnerability to Arab pressure on the Canal) was the most important element in determining the British government to redress by any means available the Egyptian action in nationalizing the Canal.

The Suez Crisis and the United States: Crisis Management

Whatever may be one's personal feelings toward John Foster Dulles (and his name rarely fails to arouse strong feelings in Britain even now), it has to be admitted that he had little success in managing the Suez crisis.

The initial crisis was provoked by the failure of the offer of an Anglo-American grant-in-aid and backing for a World Bank loan to "control" Egyptian behavior in the field of foreign affairs. It was occasioned by Mr. Dulles' preference for a dramatic public gesture, the withdrawal of the American offer, in terms calculated to humiliate ("cut down to size") the Egyptian leader, action taken without prior consultation or concert with Britain. No Egyptian counteraction was apparently anticipated, nor any countermeasures to such action discussed or prepared.

The strong British and French reaction to the nationalization of the Canal faced the American government with a serious dilemma. Apart from considerations of domestic US politics, the American Government faced one of three choices: to take the lead in chastising the Egyptian government, which would risk a head-on clash with the Soviet Union and a loss of initiative within the United Nations to the Soviet Union; to leave the initiative to Britain and France, a course which would put the United States in jeopardy without any control over British and French action; or to restrain British and French action, running the risk of a collapse of the North Atlantic alliance as a consequence. Where Mr. Dulles' judgment was proved wrong was in his belief that the first and the third courses could be combined. He failed to measure the degree to which Egypt would evade attempts to control her by diplomatic means; and he failed entirely to anticipate the degree to which Britain and France could evade American control and the length to which they would proceed in the use of force against Egypt. American control of British actions could be re-established only after the breakdown of British policy became apparent and after Mr. Dulles himself had been hospitalized. The major elements in restoring American control of Britain's actions were the Soviet rocket threats and the vulnerability of the pound to pressure, once doubts about British strength had been implanted.

The cost of Mr. Dulles' failure to the United States were (1) the need to undertake the Eisenhower Doctrine and the subsidy of Jordan; (2) the encouragement of uncertainty in NATO as to the willingness of the United States to protect the vital interests of her allies, leading to European chauvinist anti-Americanism, soon to be exploited by President de Gaulle; (3) a very considerable weakening in the position of Great Britain, shorn of both friends and assets in the Middle East; (4) an equal weakening of the French government, leaving it open for the basically antidemocratic elements which combined to return President de Gaulle to power; (5) a long period of strained relations with Egypt with whom acceptable relations have still to be established, (6) the establishment of a pattern of fidelity to UN precepts which was to leave the United States itself extremely vulnerable in the United Nations in 1961 during the Bay of Pigs episode.

The Suez Crisis and Great Britain: Crisis Management

If the record of Mr. Dulles' attempts to control the crisis is patchy, that of the Eden government is inept in the extreme. Britain's ability to mobilize its military and naval strength

against Egypt proved insufficient to match the demands of Eden's foreign policy. Britain was unable to protect herself against Soviet threats, and, apparently, based her reliance on US nuclear support against such threats on assurances which were only imagined and whose cost had apparently not been assessed. In the event, reliance on US backing in diplomatic pressure on Egypt proved mistaken; and reliance on US nuclear and financial support could be purchased only at the cost of an ignominious and publicly humiliating abandonment of the Suez operation.

Britain's ability to control Egypt proved equally lacking. Economic and financial pressure required a degree of international support Britain proved unable to mobilize. Military pressure proved so cumbersome as to allow a development of world sentiment against Britain which made British action abortive.

The British government proved unable to convince large sections of its own public opinion of the correctness of its action. Internal division played a very large part in the weakening of Britain's external position. British pressure on Egypt fitted only too easily into the stereotypes of anti-imperialist sentiments, offended pride in Britain's own role in the decolonization process, and was a departure from previous British support of the principles of the UN Charter.

Finally, there was no real way in which the British government could define victory, except on the assumption that any regime in Egypt would be preferable to that of President Nasser.

The Suez Crisis and the Soviet Union

The Soviet management of the crisis was hardly more successful than that of the United States. First of all, the Soviet regime had no countermove to the cancellation of the American loan, but was forced to hesitate and disown talk of a Soviet loan, a humiliation which was ended by President Nasser's action in nationalizing the Canal. During the Anglo-French action, the Soviets were forced to withdraw aircraft and technicians to the Sudan to avoid involvement, an action which was observed and bitterly resented by the Egyptian government.

In diplomatic terms, the Soviets' only answer to the Anglo-French action was to incite India and Indonesia into a political offensive against Britain and France, until Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's initiative of November 4 in the United Nations in securing the condemnation of the Anglo-French action and the setting up of

UNEF resolved Soviet doubts as to where America stood. This was then followed by the overt Soviet rocket threats against Britain and France and the suggestions of joint Soviet-American intervention against the "aggressors." Soviet disillusion with Egyptian military abilities was reflected in Shepilov's support in December 1956 of a renewed Middle Eastern arms embargo, which was later disowned by Khrushchev. In their attempt to deny the area to Britain, the Soviets only succeeded in securing American entry into the Middle East--not on balance a Soviet gain.

Appendix A

POLITICAL CHRONOLOGY

1956

- Jul. 19 Secretary Dulles informs the Egyptian ambassador in the United States of US withdrawal from the proposed international loan to finance the first stage of the High Dam at Aswan. Britain follows suit.
- Jul. 26 President Nasser declares the Suez Canal Company nationalized.
- Jul. 27 British countermeasures:
(1) Approach to France since main Suez Canal Company assets are French.
(2) Approach to the United States. Prime Minister Eden informs President Eisenhower: (a) Force is needed "to bring Nasser to his senses"; (b) Britain cannot endure threat to her oil supplies; (c) There is need to restore shaken British prestige; (d) US support is asked to block Soviet intervention on Nasser's side if force is used against Egypt.
- Jul. 28 (3) Anglo-French implementation of financial measures against Egypt. Seizure of control of Egyptian sterling reserves; seizure of control of Suez Canal Company assets in London.
- Jul. 30/31-
Aug. 2 At tripartite Anglo-Franco-US talks in London a conflict of objectives and interpretations arises. Dulles' view, "a business dispute over a major utility," conflicts with Eden's view, "an act of theft" which, if unpunished, would reduce British status in world affairs to that of "just another Netherlands."
- Soviets support Egyptian view of legality of nationalization.

US Treasury freezes assets of the Egyptian government and Suez Canal Company but not private Egyptian funds. Later authorized use of "new" money was not concerned with frozen assets. British and French governments authorize continued payment of Canal dues by British and French shipping to the Suez Canal Company. US Treasury authorizes payment of dues to the new Egyptian Canal authority.

Jul. 31 United States takes action to forestall use of force by Britain. Eisenhower letter to Eden asks for peaceful negotiation but says if peaceful means failed public opinion would understand allies could not accept the situation. This position is backed by Dulles in tripartite conversations.

Aug. 2 Tripartite talks lead to two decisions: (1) to aim at setting up an international authority to run the Suez Canal; (2) to summon a conference of principal maritime powers to establish this authority. In addition there is agreement on the need to take emergency measures against closure of the Suez Canal to Europe-bound oil traffic.

Aug. 6 British attempt to enlist US support continues. Eden sends a letter to Eisenhower, pointing out that no agreement at the London Conference would necessitate use of force against Egypt. The alternative would be the progressive expulsion of Western influence from the Middle East with a series of Nasser-organized and -inspired revolutions in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia.

Joint Anglo-American encouragement is given to Syrian political exiles and a right-wing plan for a coup d'etat in Syria with Iraqi support. Anglo-American-Iraqi committee in Beirut had been set up in June 1956, aiming to forestall a Syrian move to the Soviet side seemingly foreshadowed in Soviet-Syrian arms deal, and the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shepilov to Damascus, June 22, 1956. Some American arms are supplied in mid-August to political exiles in Beirut. Differences between British and Americans are at the operational level on the issue of which exile factions to support.

Aug. 9 US Government invokes antitrust legislation to allow 13 international oil companies to set up in New York a Middle East Emergency Committee to plan pooling of world

petroleum resources and tanker movements to meet oil needs of the United States and Western Europe in the event of interruption of maritime traffic through Suez.

Suez Canal Company plans preliminary measures toward withdrawal of pilots.

- Aug. 14 Breakdown of planned financial boycott of Egyptian Canal authority is revealed. 40% of dues paid to Canal authority, only 60% to Suez Canal Company.
- Aug. 16- First London Conference. Dulles proposes an international Suez Canal authority with Egyptian participation under UN auspices, with effective sanctions against any violations of the new convention, or interference with operation of the Canal as a threat to peace. Proposal is opposed by India, Ceylon, Indonesia, and the Soviet Union, but adopted by the majority. Mission led by Australian Premier Menzies is sent to Cairo to explain the plan and obtain Egyptian agreement. Dulles warns Shepilov, and similar warnings are given by the US ambassador in Moscow, that Egyptian rebuff of the scheme would lead to a serious situation. These warnings do not correspond with the British request that Soviet intervention on Egypt's side should be banned.

French hold the view that Egypt and the Soviet Union are working together. Egyptian support of Algerian nationalists is designed to force the French out of Algeria, disillusion the French with NATO failure to support the French position in Algeria, bring about defeat of the pro-NATO, pro-European government in favor of a neutralist regime. French continue in the determination to overthrow the Nasser regime in Egypt.

- Sep. 3- Menzies mission in Cairo meets with rejection of the London proposals by Nasser, with Soviet and Indian encouragement. With failure of economic and diplomatic pressure as recommended by America to secure objective of international authority from Egyptians, the alternative now seems to be the use of force.
- Sep. 8 United States turns more against use of force. Eisenhower letter to Eden warns that use of force would cause a serious misunderstanding between Britain and the United States, would enable the Soviet Union to go to the United Nations and brand Britain and France as aggressors. A plea for UN influence to be explored has

already been made. In the US view use of force would increase the area of jeopardy, strain the economy of Western Europe, and consolidate peoples of the Middle East, North Africa, Asia, and Africa into an anticolonial bloc, the leadership of which would naturally fall to the Soviets.

- Sep. 10 Anglo-French political and military conversations are held in London. Nasser's refusal to accept the London proposals is said to have created a "very grave situation." Directives are given to staffs to plan for attack on Port Said. French and British hope for an anti-Nasser coup in Cairo. British intelligence contacts with General Naguib, and French contacts with old-style political leaders of the Wafd party, foster belief, contrary to reporting of the British Embassy in Cairo, in the availability of an alternative regime in Egypt to that of Nasser.
- Sep. 11 Bulganin warns Eden that the Soviet Union, well aware of the purpose of the Anglo-French military concentration in Cyprus, could not be expected to stand aside if Egypt were attacked.
- Suez Canal Company announces that all its employees, including pilots, will be authorized to withdraw services from the Egyptian Canal authority on September 14.
- Sep. 12 Severe political crisis in Britain at the meeting of the House of Commons. There is bitter Labor opposition to a military buildup, and a sizable revolt in the Conservative party which is averted by Eden's acceptance of the American plan for a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) to charter pilots and take convoys through the Canal, at which time if Egypt resisted, the 1888 Convention would have been breached. British Cabinet is anxious about the Eisenhower letter and the increasing signs of Anglo-American divergence. Eden believes that the Egyptian breach of the Convention would lead to the occasion for military action against the Canal, and that the American plan implies this.
- Sep. 13 At a press conference, Dulles says that the Egyptian breach of the Convention would not be used by the United States as occasion to "shoot its way through the Canal." Dulles presumably has abandoned, if he had ever entertained them, intentions and desires to see Nasser overthrown. The dominant aim of his policy is now the

avoidance of a casus belli between Anglo-French forces and Egypt.

The effect of the Dulles press conference on Eden's position in Britain is disastrous.

- Sep. 18-21 There are tripartite Anglo-French-US talks in London. The Second London Conference meets to set up the SCUA. In the United States there is a new attempt to provide a de facto organization with which Egypt might cooperate. The payment of dues to the new association, however, is made voluntary so that the association is without any lever against an Egyptian rejection of the proposal.
- Sep. 20 French temporarily abandon the idea of cooperation with Britain in view of the alleged hesitancy displayed by and the division of British opinion, and substitute inciting an Israeli attack on Egypt with French aid. Israel supplies evidence of increasing Soviet penetration of Syria and Egypt.
- Sep. 23 French Foreign Minister Pineau visits London with Israeli evidence of increased Soviet penetration in Egypt and Syria. Pineau and Eden refer the dispute to the UN Security Council. There is division in the British Cabinet on whether to continue to work for the international front against Nasser or whether simply to show that American electoral considerations and Soviet resistance make this impossible.
- Sep. 26 There is a procedural Security Council debate. Eden visits Paris. French Premier Mollet proposes joint action with Israel. Eden proposes Iraqi military entry into Jordan to forestall a Nasserite victory in the forthcoming Jordanian elections, possibly to coincide with a pro-Iraqi coup in Syria. Eden aims to administer a rebuff to Nasser. Iraqi troops in brigade strength are concentrated on the Syrian/Jordanian border. British abandon plan in face of bitter Israeli resistance, but warn Israel to leave Jordan alone.
- Sep. 28 International Monetary Fund (IMF) releases \$15 million to Egypt, thus largely negating the effect of continued British financial pressure.
- Sep. 29 Israelis reveal to the French a plan to invade Sinai at the end of October.

- Oct. 1 Eden forwards Bulganin letter of September 11 to Eisenhower with the comment that "Nasser . . . is now effectively in Russian hands." A request is made again by Eden for the United States to forestall Soviet intervention.
- Oct. 2 A Dulles press conference disassociates the United States from Britain and France in the Middle East. Dulles speaks of "differences of approach" and says, "The United States cannot be expected to identify itself 100 per cent with the colonial powers."
- Oct. 1-4 Third London Conference meets. SCUA is formally set up.
- Oct. 5-13 Security Council meets in New York. The Anglo-French draft resolution is rejected by Egypt and the Soviet Union. Secret Anglo-French talks with Egyptians under chairmanship of the Secretary General lead to agreement in the Security Council on six principles. A further resolution calling on Egyptians to cooperate with the SCUA in light of the six principles is vetoed by Russia.
- Oct. 10-11 A major Israeli punitive attack is made on the frontier village of Qalqilya in Jordan. The British warning to Israel is reiterated formally.
- Oct. 16 Eden visits Paris and agrees to use the Israeli attack on Egypt as occasion for intervention, making it virtually impossible to proceed further with planned coups in Syria or hope of an alternative regime in Egypt. The decision also causes great weakening of the Hashemite pro-Baghdad Pact regime in Iraq. Possible reasoning was to use Zionist influence in an effort to win support in the United States at the time of the Presidential election. Anglo-US contacts come to a virtual end as a result of Dulles' role. Some reliance is placed on Eisenhower, viewed as a friend of Britain, who appeared from remarks to Macmillan to have a difference in emphasis from Dulles, and was believed to be not so firmly against use of force. British fear of seeming to cooperate with Israel leads to delaying obvious preparatory moves of troops for amphibious invasion of Egypt until after an Israeli attack should be launched. Israel insists on British participation in view of need for destruction of Egyptian Soviet aircraft on the ground.

- Oct. 18 French capture the motor yacht Athos running Egyptian arms to Algerian nationalists and break off relations with Egypt.
- Oct. 21 Jordanian elections are held. Nasserite forces are victorious and a pro-Nasser government is set up.
- Oct. 22-24 Tripartite Anglo-French-Israeli conversations are held in Paris. Secret Anglo-French-Israeli treaty on cooperation is signed.
- Oct. 23 A tripartite Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian military pact with a common military command, directed against Israel, is signed.
- Oct. 28 A US appeal to Israel is ignored. The Israelis mobilize.
- Oct. 29 Israelis attack Sinai positions. United States announces it will take the crisis to the Security Council on October 30. Arms smuggled from Lebanon to the disaffected Druze tribal elements in Syria go astray. Coup leaders in Syria refuse to follow the Iraqi request for rising at the end of October.
- Oct. 30 Anglo-French conference is held in London. US and Soviet resolution is vetoed by Britain and France in the Security Council. A joint ultimatum is sent to Egypt and Israel demanding withdrawal of troops to a 16 kilometer distance from the Canal banks, and agreement to the Anglo-French military occupation of Port Said, Ismailia, and Port Suez in order to guarantee freedom of transit through the Canal. Egypt rejects the ultimatum. Israeli acceptance is made conditional on that of Egypt. Syrian President flies to Moscow.
- Oct. 31 Yugoslavia proposes to refer the crisis to an emergency meeting of the General Assembly.
- Nov. 1-2 Emergency session of the UN General Assembly is held. The United States works hard to forestall a hard-line resolution sponsored by India and the Soviet Union condemnatory of British-French-Israeli action, and to secure a cease-fire. Canada proposes a UN force to keep peace on the Arab-Israeli borders.
- Nov. 3 Eden and Pineau accept the Canadian proposal and the General Assembly resolution, on the condition that the UN force be organized to remain until the Arab-Israeli

settlement and a satisfactory arrangement on the Suez Canal can be guaranteed by the United Nations; in the meantime, Anglo-French military detachments are to be stationed between Egypt and Israel. Dulles is suddenly ill.

Nov. 4 The Canadian resolution, calling on the UN Secretary General to produce within 48 hours of 2 A.M. a plan to set up a UN Emergency Force, is passed by the UN General Assembly and accepted by the Egyptians.

Nov. 5 UN General Assembly accepts a resolution establishing a UN Command for a UN Emergency Force with a Canadian commander. Soviet note to Britain and France threatens the use of rockets. It expresses determination to crush aggression and establish peace in the Middle East.

A Soviet note to the United States proposes joint US-Soviet use of naval and air forces to stop the war in Egypt.

A US statement opposes the effort of Soviet forces to enter the Middle East and states that the United States will "respect obligations under NATO." The Soviets summon the Security Council to endorse a joint US-Soviet military force in the Middle East unless aggression is halted within 12 hours. The Security Council, by 4-3 vote with 4 abstentions, refuses to debate the proposal.

French ambassador in Washington is told that US support of France against Soviet nuclear threats is intimately related to the unconditional acceptance of the UN resolutions.

Very strong pressure on sterling causes loss to Bank of England of \$300 million on November 5. Estimating the need of \$1 billion to avoid devaluation, the British approach the IMF and encounter American delaying tactics linked with British acceptance of the cease-fire.

Nov. 6 Ankara reports, 1420 hours, that Soviet bombers are overflying Turkish territory. The Soviets apply to pass one cruiser and four destroyers through the Dardanelles. British accept a cease-fire at midnight.

Anglo-French acceptance of cease-fire under American and UN pressure makes British efforts to continue occupation under pretext of clearing Canal of Egyptian obstructions

impossible. US agreement to IMF extension of financial assistance to Britain is not given until Britain agrees to withdraw troops from Port Said. The collapse of the Anglo-French attack means the collapse of SCUA and the general recognition of effectiveness of the Egyptian Canal authority. In Syria the parties of the pro-Iraqi right are removed from the governing coalition at the end of December 1956. In Jordan the British subsidy is rejected for one jointly subscribed to by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria (agreement of January 18, 1957). In Egypt all Anglo-French assets are sequestered and "Egyptianized." The Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1954 is denounced, and petrol rationing is introduced in Western Europe.

Appendix B

MILITARY CHRONOLOGY

1956

- Jul. 26 Nationalization of the Canal is announced.
- Jul. 28 British and French General Staffs order draft plans for military attack on Egypt. There is gross inadequacy of available forces and dependence on the US Sixth Fleet.
- Aug. 1 Plans for an immediate attack on Egypt after the discovery of US refusal to participate are abandoned. The British Chief of Staff advises: "No invasion unaided by United States can succeed without long and detailed preparation."
- Aug. 2 A limited number of British reservists are recalled (20,000 in all).
- Aug. 7 At an Anglo-French staff conference joint planning of an invasion, to be prepared by September 15, is begun. The plan evolves for a joint landing near Alexandria, and an advance on Cairo, using the code-word "Hamilcar," to coincide with withdrawal of the Suez Canal pilots.
- Aug. 11 General Keightly is appointed Supreme Allied Commander; Admiral Barjot, France, is appointed deputy. The build-up of forces in Malta and Cyprus begins. The inadequacy of Cyprus ports requires seaborne forces to be based on Malta and Algeria. Contact is made between French and Israeli General Staffs. The French agree to supply Israel with Mysteres jet fighters and antitank missiles.
- Sep. 10 Anglo-French staffs are directed to plan for an attack on the Canal.
- Sep. 20 French and Israeli staffs make contact in Tel Aviv. French propose to aid an Israeli attack on Egypt.

- Sep. 26 Anglo-French staff plan for attack on Port Said is completed. French proposal for paratroop attack on the Canal in place of a seaborne invasion is rejected by the British. French propose alternatively to coordinate Israeli attack on Egypt with Anglo-French attack. Plan "Omelette" for military intervention is also prepared in event of an anti-Nasser coup d'etat in Cairo.
- Oct. 3 The French and British agree to use an Israeli attack on Egypt as the occasion to launch an invasion.
- Oct. 15 The French proposal that an invasion fleet leave Malta three days before an Israeli attack is turned down by the British.
- Oct. 17 RAF Canberra, Valiant, and Hunter-5 squadrons are flown to Malta and Cyprus air bases.
- Oct. 23 Anglo-Franco-Israeli talks are held in France. French air force agrees to protect Israeli cities against Egyptian bombing raids; the French navy is to protect the coast and support Israeli army operations; French air transport is to be stationed in Israel to supply paratroopers. One Mysteres squadron, one F-84-F squadron, and one Noratlas squadron of the French air force are transferred to Israeli bases at Lydda and Haifa. Israelis insist on Canberra bombing to destroy the Egyptian air force on the ground.
- An attempt is made by the French military command in Algeria to precipitate attack. French seaborne units put to sea from Bone; they are recalled when at sea.
- Oct. 24 The Israeli attack is set for October 29, and Anglo-French landings for November 6.
- Oct. 26 Valetta and Hastings RAF transport squadrons and one Canberra squadron are flown to Tymbu airfield from Britain. French seaborne units embark at Bone and Marseilles.
- Oct. 27 Senior British officers in Malta are warned of the imminence of the operation.
- Oct. 28 The Israelis mobilize.
- Oct. 29 Israelis attack Egyptian positions with a paratroop drop on Mitla Pass. British Canberra high-flying

reconnaissance of the Canal is intercepted by Russian-flown MIG-15s and fired on. One aircraft is damaged. British troops embark in Malta on "exercise."

- Oct. 30 Anglo-French ultimatum is given to Egypt. The French warship Kersaint and the Egyptian destroyer Ibrahim al Bural engage off the coast of Israel.
- Oct. 31 The RAF bomb Egyptian airfields at night. The Egyptians send 20 MIG-15s and 20 IL-28s to haven in Syria and Saudi Arabia under Russian or Czech piloting. Another 20 IL-28s are flown to Luxor. The absence of Egyptian opposition in the air encourages the use of carrier-borne aircraft and daylight bombing of Egyptian air bases on November 1, 2, and 3, when the Egyptian air force is deemed obliterated. 260 Egyptian aircraft, including most of the MIGs and IL-28s, are destroyed on the ground. Air attacks are then switched to tank parks, military depots, barracks, and antiaircraft installations.

French air attacks from Israeli bases disrupt Egyptian armored columns advancing to support the main body of the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Desert.

- Nov. 1 Nasser withdraws the bulk of Sinai forces behind the Canal. The 8th Division is abandoned in the Gaza strip. French cruiser Georges Leygues supports the Israeli attack on Rafa. An Israeli column, having relieved paratroopers at Mitla, moves along the coast of the Gulf of Suez toward Sharm al Sheikh on the Gulf of Aqaba. A second column moves down the Gulf of Aqaba toward the same goal. British units sink the Egyptian training frigate Domiat in the Gulf of Suez.

The Anglo-French Command consider advancing the date of the airborne attack on Port Said to November 3 or 4. The British reject the plan in light of evidence of the concentration of Egyptian armor in the Canal Zone west of Ismailia.

- Nov. 2 Israeli forces reach 16 kilometers from the Canal all along its length. Two Egyptian divisions are allowed to escape; one, the weakest, is destroyed. Israelis capture \$80 million worth of Soviet supplies for the Egyptian army, stockpiled in Sinai.

Anglo-French debate on the possibility of advancing the date of the airborne attack is renewed. French paratroopers put on alert. British resist French proposals on the ground of presence of Egyptian armor. French debate independent action, but the French army commander is dubious in view of the vulnerability of French paratroopers to armored attack if they are expected to hold out two days until arrival of seaborne armor.

- Nov. 3 Anglo-French staffs consider advancing the date of the parachute attack (Operation "Telescope") to November 5. At midnight British Minister of Defence overrides the military objections.

Operation "Telescope" is adopted. Instructions are given to avoid losses to civilians, and to concentrate on the occupation of the Canal Zone. The Egyptian 8th Division in the Gaza strip ceases resistance.

- Nov. 4 Israeli forces occupy Ras Narani. The Egyptian garrison is largely evacuated by sea. Israeli-chartered cargo ships sail from Massawa in Ethiopia, and land forces on Jiran Isles at mouth of Gulf of Aqaba.

Israel announces acceptance of a cease-fire. Sharm al Sheikh falls to Israeli forces on November 5. British and French forces sail from Cyprus. US Sixth Fleet, withdrawing from Alexandria, crosses the convoy's path.

- Nov. 5 The 16th Independent Parachute Brigade, 3rd Battalion, and French parachutists are dropped from bases in Cyprus at Gamil airfield and at bridges connecting Port Said with the mainland causeway, supported by taxi rank of naval strike aircraft from British and French carriers. Egyptian local commander sues for local truce, but is overridden by Cairo. By evening paratroopers are in control of Port Fouad except for the coastal strip and the Gamil airfield and its surroundings.

- Nov. 6 Anglo-French forces land, supported by fire from destroyers at Port Said and Port Fouad. Egyptians abandon overt resistance for sniping and ambush.

A telegram, sent at 1400 hours GMT to General Keightly from London, saying that the cease-fire is likely to be ordered by 1720, fails to reach his deputy, General Stockwell. A cease-fire telegram actually is sent at 1640 GMT, but the French do not regard it as binding on

them. A French telegram follows at 1800 GMT, but fails to reach General Beaufre, who is separated from his command ship until two hours later. French paratroop forces consider various subterfuges to cover a continuance of operations, but are thwarted in each by the control exercised by local British commanders, especially over the means of mobility. A cease-fire is in effect at midnight.

Appendix C

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Incidents in the Middle East (1958-1961)

by

D.C. Watt

LEBANON AND JORDAN, July 1958

Introduction

The American intervention in Lebanon and that of Britain in Jordan in July 1958 have been categorized as cases of limited confrontation, that is, as examples of the use of force short of war. This would appear to be a misuse of the word "confrontation," since it is far from clear exactly who was confronted, the forces of Arab nationalism backed by the United Arab Republic, or the Soviet Union. The Anglo-American operation, whatever its motives (and the course of events showed that, at least in the American case, these were muddled and largely irrelevant to the course of events that prompted them), was an exercise in stabilization. It had a great many side effects, most of which were beneficial to Western interests; but, after a good many attempts to unravel Anglo-American motives with the benefit of hindsight, it must be concluded that these side effects were not intended. The military operation was planned for an emergency other than that which occurred. And only remarkably gifted improvisation by the US political and military commanders on the spot avoided a major disaster from which only the Soviets could have benefited.

Narrative

The virtual collapse of the British position in the Middle East as a result of the Suez operation was followed by 18 months of crisis in the Middle East, as Egyptian President Nasser, the Syrian mercantile-military clique, the Syrian Arab Renaissance

party, and the Saudi ruling house fought for leadership. Britain's position in the area came under attack from Saudi and Egyptian subversion and support of dissident tribes in Oman and on the undemarcated Aden-Yemeni border. In Iraq and Jordan the pro-Western regimes came under severe attack from Egyptian-financed nationalists and from the powerful propaganda of Cairo Radio. King Hussein of Jordan saved himself from overthrow first by negotiating the withdrawal of the British air base at Mafraq, and later by the loyalty of his Bedouin regiments when the young officers he had promoted in the place of the British attempted a coup. In Iraq, General Nuri es-Said was forced to tighten up Iraq's internal security arrangements and to contemplate vainly some last throw for Arab hegemony for his monarch in an Iraqi invasion of Syria. Fear of such an eventuality, which the Syrians professed to believe would be concerted with Turkey, Iraq's ally in the Baghdad Pact, facilitated the efforts of a faction in Syrian politics to turn Syria even more strongly toward the Soviet Union.

The need to find some counterbalance to the decline of British power in the Middle East after Suez led inevitably to American intervention. It took the form of the so-called "Eisenhower Doctrine" embodied in President Eisenhower's message to Congress of January 5, 1957. In this message the President sought Congressional authority to use US forces to protect any country in the Middle East requesting assistance "against overt aggression from any nation controlled by international communism" and to offer aid to a total of \$200 million to strengthen internal security and promote orderly government. In March 1957 President Eisenhower sent James P. Richards on a mission to the Middle East to explain the doctrine and solicit local support. This was, in fact, not forthcoming except from Lebanon. But Iraq received certain American support when at the end of March 1957 the United States joined the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. And when in April 1957 King Hussein of Jordan defied and defeated a Nasserite coup led by his Chief of Army Staff and overthrew the Nasserite Parliament elected in October 1956, it was American financial aid which replaced the former Arab subsidy (which had replaced that given by Britain in November 1956). King Saud of Saudi Arabia also swung over to an anti-Nasser line.

There followed a period of acute crisis in Syria. In August 1957 the Syrian government purported to have uncovered an American-financed plot against the regime. The Syrian Chief of Staff was replaced by a man widely, and erroneously, regarded as a "ranking

Communist."* Mr. Loy Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, visited the Middle East, including Ankara, and held talks with Turkish, Iraqi, and Jordanian leaders. This was followed by ostentatious Turkish maneuvers on Syria's northern borders, which scared the Syrians into assuming invasion to be imminent and led to Soviet threats against Turkey. Two Soviet warships visited Latakia harbor. The US State Department, relying heavily on intelligence from the Christian and minority elements in Syria opposed to the Syrian government, purported to believe that Syria had virtually become a Soviet satellite. Arms were airlifted to Jordan very ostentatiously. But Arab opinion turned against America, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia found it expedient to warn the United States that intervention might force Syria into the Soviet camp. Not to be outdone Egypt sent troops to support the Syrian army on Syria's northern frontier. Thereafter the crisis fizzled out. But it had still further strengthened the Egyptian and Soviet positions in the Middle East and produced a serious setback to American policy, demonstrating it to be both ineffective and ill-informed.

The crisis of the summer of 1957 produced virtually the same effects in Syria as the fears which had brought it about. An alliance between a loose group of independents led by a Damascus millionaire, Khaled al Azm, then Premier of Syria, and the Communists seemed to presage an attempt at a Communist coup. In an attempt to forestall this the leaders of the Ba'th Arab Socialist party and a dominant section of the army leadership stampeded the country into outright union with Egypt, on February 1, 1958, in the United Arab Republic.

With the union of Syria and Egypt, attention in the Arab world turned to Lebanon. Politics there were based on a precarious compromise between the various Christian and Moslem minority groups. There were no real parties, only personal followings and connections in the cities, and tribal and family groupings on the land, hiding behind party labels. The compromise involved the allocation of jobs; the president had to be a member of the largest Christian community, the Maronites; the premier had to be a Moslem. No president could serve more than one six-year term. In foreign affairs the Christians pulled toward France, Britain, and America, the Moslems toward Syria and Egypt. Again a compromise agreement as a policy of balance between these twin pulls was the agreed convention of Lebanese politics. President Camille Chamoun, intent on a second term, had violated all these conventions. He had so

*New York Times, August 17, 1957.

rigged the elections of 1956 as entirely to exclude a great many Lebanese political figures from Parliament. And he was known to be working for a revision of the Lebanese constitution so as to give himself a second term in office. Furthermore, alone of all Arab states, he had brought Lebanon formally to adopt the Eisenhower Doctrine. This Christian swing toward the West was answered by a corresponding Moslem reaction toward Syria and Egypt. And the leaders Chamoun had excluded from parliamentary activity, especially the Moslems of Northern Lebanon and the Druzes of the south with fellow Druzes in Syria, turned to organizing a rebellion and to seeking aid from Syria. On May 8, 1958, the rebellion broke out. The rebels soon controlled the city of Tripoli in the north and the Druze-dominated area of Mount Lebanon in the south. In Beirut they fortified the Basta area and held it against all comers.

The ensuing civil war in Lebanon quickly developed into stalemate. The Lebanese army under its Maronite commander, the universally respected General Chehab, refused to intervene. General Chehab was apparently afraid, with reason, that his army, being drawn from all sections of Lebanese religious society, would fall to pieces if it were ordered to fire on the Moslem or Druze rebels. Chamoun therefore armed his supporters. The rebels began to draw arms and money from Syria. Some 600 Druze tribesmen from Syria joined the Lebanese Druze leader. And a small but significant cadre of Syrian army officers and NCOs infiltrated across the border to join the rebels in Beirut and Tripoli.

After President Chamoun had mentioned the possibility of requesting American military assistance, he was advised by Mr. Robert McClintock, the US Ambassador in Beirut, not to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine by inviting the dispatch of American troops unless the integrity of Lebanon was genuinely threatened and Lebanese forces were inadequate to protect it. The United States expected that in such a case Lebanon would file a complaint with the UN Security Council against external aggression and obtain the public backing of at least one other Arab government. If President Chamoun requested American aid it would be sent to protect American life and property and to assist the Lebanese government to protect Lebanon's integrity and independence. On May 17 the US State Department announced that armor and other military aid, including tear gas and small arms ammunition, were being airlifted to Beirut to be put at the disposal of the Lebanese army.

In the meantime it was felt advisable to do some contingency planning. An Anglo-American Specified Command Middle East was set up under the command of Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., USN, Commander in Chief Naval Forces Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

The British deployed the carrier Ark Royal with five destroyers and two frigates off Beirut to evacuate British civilians on May 19; and on May 24, the 24th Independent Brigade Group was airlifted to Kenya to form a British strategic reserve on the far side of Suez. The US Sixth Fleet maintained a couple of destroyers permanently just over the horizon from Beirut and an amphibious task force with a reinforced Marine battalion within five hours' steaming distance.

In the meantime the Iraqi government was getting increasingly worried by the general advance of Nasserism in the Middle East. The union of Egypt and Syria had been followed by a major upsurge in Nasserite sentiment everywhere. The two royalist states of Jordan and Iraq had felt constrained to conclude a loose federation, so as not to seem outdone in the race for Arab unity. But the followers of the Hashemite dynasty, which had provided the kings of the two countries, now belonged largely to the older generation of Arab nationalists of which Nuri es-Said was the most prominent; they had been decisively defeated in the struggle for Syria, and their power elsewhere was insignificant. On May 21 Nuri es-Said warned the US Ambassador in Baghdad that the civil war in Lebanon seemed to presage armed intervention from Syria. If Chamoun would appeal to the Security Council he could count on Iraqi support. If the Western powers were to intervene in Lebanon, Iraq would also support them, providing there were no French participation in the operation.

As the civil war was continued in Lebanon, Nuri began to press ever more strongly for intervention by the Western powers, until at the end of June and in early July he began to talk of Iraqi intervention in Syria or in Jordan. Only Iraqi weakness in the air--with respect to the modern Soviet aircraft of the United Arab Republic--restrained him, he told the US Ambassador on July 12. But his appeals for Western support went unanswered.

The Chamoun regime in Lebanon was equally alarmed at its inability to secure positive Western action. On June 6, the Lebanese government appealed to the Security Council. The Council responded on June 11 by setting up a UN Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to investigate Lebanese charges against armed intervention from Syria. UNOGIL proved too small in numbers, inadequately mobile, and less than genuinely neutral in the tenor of its reports.

Information reaching Washington indicated very significant Syrian financial support for the rebels, significant support in arms shipments, and limited support by Syrian military advisers. On June 16 the Lebanese cabinet voted President Chamoun full

authority to call for foreign military assistance if he believed the integrity of the Lebanese state could not be saved in any other way. He secured the support of Jordan and Iraq. But he was again persuaded by the American Ambassador not to issue a formal call for intervention, lest it be construed as intervention in the internal affairs of the state.

On July 14, revolution broke out in Iraq, led by units of the Iraqi army en route for the Jordanian border. The royal family and Nuri es-Said were murdered, the royal palace sacked, and several American citizens were also murdered. The new Iraqi government seemed openly Nasserite and declared the union with Jordan at an end. The same morning President Chamoun called for aid from the United States within 48 hours (in the erroneous belief that the US Sixth Fleet was deployed in the western Mediterranean) and from Britain and France within 24 hours. Consultation between British, French, and American representatives produced the decision that the United States alone should intervene in Lebanon with token French participation, France having no troops to spare, and that Britain should intervene in Jordan if requested. A Jordanian request for intervention came July 16, two days later, as a result of reports of Syrian troop movements to the Jordanian border with heavy infiltration of arms and saboteurs across the border.

At the time of the Lebanese request for aid, US dispositions were as follows: The US Sixth Fleet had two destroyers over the horizon from Beirut, and one Battalion Landing Team (BLT) of US Marines at sea about 12 hours' sailing time from Beirut. Of the two other BLTs, one was at sea north of Crete, the other west of Malta. Of the fleet's two carriers, the Essex was at Athens with the cruiser Boston; the USS Saratoga and the cruiser Des Moines, the fleet flagship, were off Cannes in the western Mediterranean. Admiral Holloway was airborne on his way back from the United States to London.

Deciding to intervene took five hours in Washington, and orders for action were given to the Sixth Fleet at 1800 hours July 14, Washington time, 0200 hours on July 15 local Lebanese time. The operation which the contingency planners had decided on involved an initial seaborne landing by the Marines of the Sixth Fleet. This was to be followed by the airlift of two Army airborne battle groups from US forces in Germany to Adana air base in southern Turkey, en route for Beirut. At the same time, Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) Bravo, stationed in the southern United States, was to fly direct to Adana with refuelings in the air at Nova Scotia, Bermuda, and the Azores.

The initial Marine landing was set for 1500 hours local Lebanese time, 0900 hours Washington time, on July 15, to coincide with a Presidential announcement of the intervention. The belief that secrecy was essential led to a delay in orders to the CASF and Army airborne battle groups until President Eisenhower had made his statement. Thus, although the 1st Airborne Battle Group was mustered at dawn local German time and kept on alert throughout July 15, it did not take off until 0800 hours local time the following day, July 16, and did not arrive in Adana in any strength until July 17. The orders caught CASF Bravo with its fighter airfields partially closed by construction activity. Two other squadrons had to be substituted despite their inadequate preparation. Of the first flight of 12 planes only 4 reached Adana, very late on July 16. They became operational at 0225 hours, July 17. The second flight of 12 did not reach Adana until late on July 17, by which time the airfield was totally congested by the airlift of the 1st Airborne Battle Group.

The Marine battalion (BLT 2/2) went ashore on the beach as scheduled at 1500 hours local time, and within one hour advance units had secured Beirut airfield. Air cover did not arrive, however, until H-20 minutes, when seven propeller-driven AD-6 attack planes and four FJ-3 jets from the Essex arrived, having staged through a British airfield in Cyprus. The amphibious task force consisted of two LSTs, the AGC-17, Taconic, the APA-31, Monrovia, the AKA-57, Capricornus, and the LSD-29, Plymouth Rock. The second BLT began landing at 0400 hours on July 16. It relieved BLT 2/2 at the airport, enabling that unit to move to secure the Beirut docks. At the same time Admiral Holloway and Brigadier General Sidney S. Wade, USMC, arrived at Beirut airport from London.

The presence of the American officers was very welcome, as liaison between the US Ambassador and his staff, on the one hand, and the commander of the landing forces, on the other, had broken down entirely. The radiophone connection between the Embassy and the Sixth Fleet units had been broken on security grounds by Sixth Fleet personnel just before the landing. With Admiral Holloway not yet present, the landing force commander refused to depart from the letter of his instructions, either to restage the landing through the port of Beirut as General Chehab had requested to spare Lebanese amour-propre, or to send troops to protect President Chamoun's palace. The final disagreement came when the advance force of BLT 2/2, moving toward the Beirut docks, encountered Lebanese army units with armor and artillery, under orders to resist their passage by force, orders issued by Nasserite officers in the hope of provoking a warlike incident which would turn Lebanese opinion against the intervention. The US Ambassador, however, was able to persuade General Wade to delay action until he could get General

Chehab and Admiral Holloway together to arrange a compromise that would preserve Lebanese dignity.

Thereafter the buildup of American forces went without incident, until at their greatest force by July 25 there were 6,600 US Marines organized in four BLTs, and 4,000 Army men of the 1st Airborne Battle Group, tanks and artillery, all landed in and around Beirut, while Adana airfield held 63 combat aircraft of CASF Bravo, including nine all-weather USAF F86D fighter interceptors from Germany.

The comparable British operations in Jordan were designed to guard against four possibilities. First was the opening of an Iraqi attack on Jordan or a revolt in Jordan. Second was a revolt with or without Egyptian support in Libya. Third was an Iraqi move and/or a revolt in Kuwait or Bahrein. Fourth was an Iraqi attack on the British air base at Habbaniya in Iraq. The Iraqi revolution found the British order of battle as follows: In Cyprus were 15 infantry battalions, the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade, 1 cavalry regiment with armored cars and light tanks, and the 40th Royal Marine Commando. The 45th Royal Marine Commando lay at Malta. In Libya there was one infantry battalion with some armor. At Malta lay the carrier Eagle, with the cruiser Bermuda. A second cruiser, Sheffield, lay at Cyprus. On the other side of Suez there were three infantry battalions in Aden, one at Bahrein, and one in reserve at Kenya. In Britain two independent infantry brigades were put on short notice to move to the Middle East on July 14. The RAF had squadrons of Hunter supersonic fighters in Cyprus with Canberra bombers. In Aden was a mixed force of Hunters, Venoms, and Meteors, fighters and ground attack aircraft, and a mixed force of transport aircraft.

Paratroopers of the 16th Paratroop Brigade from Cyprus began landing at 0700 hours on Amman airfield on July 17 in response to King Hussein's appeal. In the first 24 hours, two battalions of 16th Paratroop Brigade were landed, together with one field regiment of Royal Artillery. Air cover was provided first by aircraft from the U.S.S. Saratoga and Essex lying off Beirut, then by Hunter aircraft operating at their extreme range from Cyprus, and finally by aircraft from H.M.S. Eagle, which left Malta for Lebanese waters on July 15.

On July 18 H.M.S. Bermuda with the 45th Royal Marine Commando was diverted to Tobruk, Libya. The Royal Sussex Regiment was moved from Gibraltar to Malta to replace them. The same day the 19th Independent Brigade was airlifted from bases in the United Kingdom to Cyprus. On July 19 Headquarters, 3rd Infantry Division, was moved to Cyprus to act as operational headquarters in the event of any

warlike actions proving necessary. On July 20, the 1st Battalion Kings Own Rifles was flown from Kenya to Aden to complete 24th Infantry Brigade concentration. 24th Infantry Brigade Headquarters was airlifted to Bahrein, presumably to act as operational headquarters for action in Bahrein or Kuwait, or to relieve the British base in Iraq. H.M.S. Albion, a commando carrier, sailed from Portsmouth, England, with the 42nd Royal Marine Commando, for Malta. On July 23, in a comprehensive regrouping, the 40th and 42nd Royal Marine Commandos were concentrated at Malta and the 45th Royal Marine Commando at Cyprus, the Royal Sussex Regiment replacing the 45th Royal Marine Commando at Benghazi.

In the meantime there was the problem of supplying the parachute brigade in Amman. On July 30, a route was opened between Amman and the Jordanian port of Aqaba. On August 2, the remaining parachute battalion of the 16th Brigade was airlanded at Aqaba, and on August 7 the commando carrier Bulwark with the cruiser Gambia moved the Cameronians from Aden to Aqaba, from where they were flown to Amman to guard the long line of communication Aqaba-Amman. They were replaced at Aden by the Lincoln regiment from Malaya. On August 20 the naval units in the Gulf were reinforced and the Life Guards (armored cavalry) left Britain by troopship via Suez for Aden. Thereafter the crisis gradually ebbed away, and deconcentration began on September 18 with the airlift of 19th Infantry Brigade from Cyprus to the United Kingdom. British troops began withdrawal from Jordan on October 20.

Analysis

The first point to note in analyzing the Lebanon episode is that although American intervention in Lebanon was justified on the basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which referred specifically to aggression from nations "controlled by international Communism," it is extremely dubious in retrospect whether Syria ever came near this category. The UAR of July 1958 certainly did not. Nor is it clear that there was any significant degree of Syrian aggression against Lebanon, although there was certainly subversion. The intervention was actually designed as a stabilizing and limiting operation, to contain the Iraqi revolution within Iraq's borders, and should be considered together with the British military moves in Aden, Libya, Bahrein, and Jordan. It was not intended to be an intervention in the Lebanese civil war, although the intent of the Lebanese invitation clearly included this role. The American emissaries who followed the intervention of the American troops did negotiate a settlement of the civil war, which resulted in the removal of Chamoun, his Moslem premier, Sami es-Sulh, and his Maronite

Foreign Minister, Charles Malik, from office and their replacement by General Chehab as President and the leader of the Moslem rebels in Tripoli, Rashid es-Kerami, as Premier.

The false assumptions on which the operation was based had a good deal to do with the two elements which nearly brought the US intervention to disaster, the breakdown of civil-military command and control at the moment of landing, and the excessively large scale of the US operation, which so jammed the airfield at Adana that any hostile Soviet or Syrian action against that base would have caught the US forces like sitting ducks.

To take the first point first, the American intervention came at the request of a friendly government, and Admiral Holloway's instructions laid down specifically that, "in case of a difference between the military commander and the local US diplomatic representatives in regard to political matters relating exclusively to Lebanon, the views of the latter shall be controlling." Yet the local commander broke communication with the local US diplomatic representative before the operation commenced; the landing was carried out as though against a hostile country; and political requests, designed to avoid conflict with Lebanese forces, were ignored, although an overt clash with Lebanese forces would have aborted the whole purpose of the intervention. Only Admiral Holloway's prompt arrival on July 16 averted a major disaster.

To take the second point, it must be asked just what the immense US forces were designed to avert. Over 10,000 troops with armor and artillery suggest fear of a major Soviet intervention which would in some way leapfrog the Baghdad Pact countries while thoughtfully omitting to attack the indispensable US base at Adana. Why was it necessary to bring in US Army and Air Force units at all? Or alternatively, once they had been brought in, would it not have been possible to re-embark the four Marine battalion landing teams so that the Sixth Fleet could resume its role as a perambulatory seaborne deterrent? A contrast with the British action shows just such a replacement and regrouping of the British Royal Marine Commandos, the US BLT's equivalents. And the effectiveness with which the British deployed their forces (about 8,000 strong excluding those on Cyprus) to intervene at three points--Libya, Jordan, and in the Gulf--suggests that the American intervention would have been just as effective if half the number of troops had been employed, with the heavy units kept in reserve.

This point is reinforced if the possibility of resistance by Lebanese rebel elements is considered. Such resistance might have involved Lebanese army units as at the confrontation on July 16,

which took place before the main army buildup had begun. Its alternative forms could have involved guerrilla operations by Druze tribesmen (their leader threatened resistance), isolated sniping, rioting, or possible strike action in the Beirut docks. It is difficult to see why any of this could not have been dealt with by normal military security or crowd control methods--and easy to see that if any incident had resulted in serious casualties among the Lebanese the result would have been disastrous for the American position over the whole Middle East.

In fact, after the first day the relations between the American forces and the Lebanese were most admirably handled and reflect the greatest credit on the training and discipline of the rank and file of the American forces. The size of the American intervention did supply an indication to Arab opinion of the potential might America could mount in the Middle East; and it is possible, although opinions differ on this, that it restricted an equivalent Soviet intervention. It would seem more probable, however, that the limited nature of the Anglo-American operation and the abstention from any attempt to restore the regime overthrown in Iraq left the Soviets without much of a handhold. And the last thing the Arab states wished to see was their countries becoming the main battlefield of the Cold War.

It was the anxiety of the Arab states which in fact enabled the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, to secure from the Arab League a declaration of solidarity and nonintervention which provided the Anglo-American forces with an excuse and an occasion for evacuation. It is one of the characteristics of such limited interventions that it is much easier to intensify a situation toward the moment when intervention becomes necessary to control it than to graduate it downward toward the moment when evacuation without incident becomes possible. In the Lebanese case, as in that of Suez, the role of the UN Secretary General proved an invaluable instrument for this purpose.

The aims of the Lebanese-Jordan operation were excellently fulfilled. The independence of the two countries was preserved, and both were able to end the internal subversion which had opened the way to foreign intervention. The willingness of the American authorities and the revived capability of the British to intervene effectively to honor their commitments were convincingly demonstrated. The joint operation was an excellent demonstration of the degree to which British and American policy in the Middle East, after the disastrous divisions of Suez, had come together. The Arab states received a salutary lesson in the dangers of over-involvement in cold war tensions. Soviet hopes of exploiting Middle Eastern tensions were so thwarted that in November 1956

the main field of Soviet endeavor was shifted back to Europe with the opening of the Berlin crisis.

At the military strategic level the operation enabled both Britain and the United States to try out their new doctrines of air mobile strategic reserves. Both found their needs as regards transport aircraft required more and better designed, longer range models than those in service. The main lesson for the American forces was the need greatly to improve the coordination of forces and the flow of information to the rear echelons as to what kind of situation was being encountered. Needed too was an interservice command capable of handling and altering according to the demands of the situation the rate of arrival at the strike bases of the different types of unit--airborne assault, ground attack, airborne support, etc. Needed too were a common doctrine and common procedures for coordinating Navy air and Air Force CASF operations with each other and with the needs of ground forces on the lines of the ground-air "taxi-rank" procedures used by British units at Suez, or the perambulating airborne command post used by the French units in the same operation.

The CASF forces at Adana were in fact very inadequately trained and equipped for conventional combat capacity, although fully qualified in the nuclear role. There is also a good deal of doubt as to how long they could have sustained conventional operations from Adana before being forced to suspend operations for lack of bombs and ammunition. The arrangements by which they flew from bases in the United States to Adana were also calculated to produce the maximum disorganization for the minimum effect. For three days Adana lay virtually defenseless because of congestion on the ground. Reconnaissance aircraft, without which there could have been little effective employment of the single flight of tactical bombers installed by July 18, did not arrive until late on July 18. The main force arrived the following day. Adana could not be described as fully operational again until July 20. The whole operation threw the original centralized CASF concept into a good deal of doubt, and began to arouse interest into a wider deployment of CASF forces with stockpiling of conventional weapons.

On the tactical level the helicopter again demonstrated its superb adaptability to any situation in which the opponent does not have adequate anti-aircraft capacity. It enabled US troops simply to bypass or overleap urban areas or road centers held by politically hostile elements, and to isolate selected points by setting up roadblocks around them. Even where the enemy controls anti-aircraft capacity, the helicopter conveys great advantages out of the enemy line of sight of fire. This seems to be one of

the few areas where the modern professionally armed force of war still has the technological advantage over the modern guerrilla, whatever the nature of the terrain.

The Lebanese situation demonstrated too the advantage sea-borne intervention forces enjoy over airborne or air mobile forces up to the very moment of intervention. The sea is neutral and offers permanent over-the-horizon concealment. Airborne or land-borne intervention forces can be kept in a similar position only if adequate land bases are close to hand. Movements of land-based forces are difficult to conceal. They give advance warning of purpose to potential enemies and assume with this a political and diplomatic significance which may be of advantage or not to those employing them but which is difficult if not impossible to conceal. Carriers are also versatile, being capable of employment as fast troop transports as well as in an assault role with helicopter-borne assault forces or to provide conventional air cover. In short-of-war situations it is arguable that maritime strike forces are perhaps more effective than other forces in the initial stages, although they are ill-designed to maintain a military presence over any length of time, and they are no substitute for air mobile army forces.

OMAN, 1959

The British intervention in central Oman on the Jebel Akhdar in January-February 1959 is a small example of the advantage conferred by air mobility on modern troops over even the most difficult terrain.

The Sultan of Muscat and Oman had been harassed since 1956 by the self-styled Imam of Oman, rallying the tribes of central Oman with money and arms provided by Egypt and Saudi Arabia against the Sultan's rule. The Sultan is an independent ruler with whom Britain was in only a rather vague treaty relationship. But it was believed that his overthrow would reflect badly on the whole British position in the Persian Gulf, including the all-important oilfields of Kuwait, Bahrein, and Qatar.

In 1957, therefore, British troops intervened to "see off" the Omani rebels who had begun operations into Oman's coastal areas. The rebels took refuge in the Jebel Akhdar region of central Oman, a high plateau of 7,000-9,000 feet, about 20 miles by 10 miles with an oasis on the plateau and sides dropping almost vertically to the plains below. From here they raided into the plains, laying light and heavy mines, supplied by the United States to the Saudi armed

forces, on the main tracks and trade routes inside Oman. The rebel force consisted at this date of some 180 hard-core rebels with perhaps 500 armed tribesmen in support, armed with mortars and heavy and light machineguns.

In November 1958 the British flew in one Special Air Service squadron, followed by a second in January 1959, both en route from Malaya to the United Kingdom. In February they were lifted by helicopter to positions surrounding the Jebel. Air cover over the Jebel kept the rebels' heads down, and feint attacks diverted their attention while the main attack scaled cliffs in their rear. The attack broke up the rebel concentration completely, for a total casualty list of 14 dead and wounded, with British forces greatly outnumbered by the rebels, and, save for air portability, being approximately equal in firepower. The rebel base was captured and the so-called Imam took refuge in Saudi Arabia. Rebel operations ceased entirely for six months and when resumed were on a scale sufficiently small to be contained by the locally recruited, British-officered (on detachment) Omani Scouts.

The operation is of interest in demonstrating the abilities of elite air-portable troops in antiguerrilla operations in very difficult terrain, and the ease with which such units can be moved from one battle area (Malaya) to another quite different one.

KUWAIT, 1961

The British operation in Kuwait in June-July 1961 falls more nearly in the category of limited confrontation than that of the Anglo-American operations in Lebanon and Jordan which it otherwise resembles very closely. The state confronted was Iraq, which chose the occasion of the abandonment by Britain of the protected status Kuwait had hitherto enjoyed to claim that Kuwait was part of Iraq, and to make troop movements toward the Kuwaiti frontier which, whatever their real purpose, seemed sufficiently preparatory to a possible coup de main against Kuwait to cause its sheikhly ruler to appeal for British assistance.

The Kuwaiti case resembled the Lebanese case mainly in that no shots were exchanged and, once the British move was made, there were no countermoves from the potential opponent other than those for purely propaganda purposes. The usual appeals were made to the Security Council with Soviet backing, but the British were able to secure the support of Saudi Arabia, and Iraq was already so isolated from the main Arab nationalist movement by its conflict

with Egypt that the British action, which might otherwise have been expected to earn the full denunciations of the Arab anti-colonialist movement, passed largely, though not entirely, uncriticized. Indeed it was to an Arab League force with Egyptian participation that Britain handed over the job of protecting Kuwait.

The Kuwaiti case is also interesting in that from the military point of view probably even the full British force would have been extremely vulnerable to a determined attack from Iraq, and it took seven days to achieve this full buildup. The Iraqi army at the time consisted of five full divisions with over 250 tanks (100-150 Soviet T-54s) and 8-inch howitzers; the Iraqi air force armed with MIG-17 and MIG-19 jets and IL-28 bombers probably had a slight technological edge on the British Hunter fighters and Canberra bombers. And although probably only two of Iraq's divisions could have been committed against Kuwait (one would be needed for internal security duties in Baghdad, and two were involved in action against Kurdish insurgents in northern Iraq), this was still a much larger force than the British force of three infantry battalions, two Royal Marine Commandos, one parachute battalion, and a single squadron each of tanks and armored cars, even when augmented by the well-trained and officered Kuwaiti Defence Force with its tank squadron, field battery, and highly mobile jeep and armored-car-mounted infantry companies.

The timetable of the British reaction was as follows:

1961

- June 30 The ruler of Kuwait appealed for help. H.M.S. Bulwark, commando carrier with 42nd Royal Marine Commando (RMC), at sea on exercise, was ordered to sail at full speed for Kuwait.
- July 1 Bulwark disembarked 42nd RMC at Kuwait. British amphibious warfare squadron permanently on station in the Gulf disembarked one tank squadron at Kuwait. One squadron of Hunter jet fighters moved to Kuwait from Bahrein, and based themselves on the Kuwait airfield. One flight of Canberras left bases in Germany en route for Bahrein. Saudi paratroopers arrived in Kuwait by vehicle across the desert.
- July 2 Airlift into Kuwait began. Two infantry battalions from the Middle East Strategic Reserve in Kenya (four battalions in all), and 40th Royal Marine Commando from Aden were airlifted to Kuwait. The amphibious warfare

squadron put ashore an armored car squadron from the base in Trucial States at Kuwait. Naval forces off Kuwait included Bulwark and one frigate, with the headquarters ship of Amphibious Warfare Squadron capable of radio communication both with Aden and United Kingdom. En route to Kuwait from Hong Kong were the fleet carrier Victorious, one destroyer, and three frigates, including sea to air missiles.

- July 3 One parachute battalion was airlifted across the Levant land barrier from Cyprus; one artillery battery was airlifted from United Kingdom.
- July 4 One further infantry battalion was taken from Kenya to Kuwait by airlift. Two battalions of infantry from 19th Independent Infantry Brigade, in Central Strategic Reserve in United Kingdom, was airlifted to Kenya, from Kenya to Aden, together with one battery Royal Artillery (guns to be drawn from Aden stockpile).
- July 5 Fleet carrier Centaur, three destroyers, one LST (landing ship, tank) passed through Suez en route for Aden.
- July 7 Victorious with escort arrived off Kuwait and assumed responsibility for air defense. British troops in Kuwait totaled 5,700 men, 20 tanks, one field battery Royal Artillery, and one armored car squadron, with two squadrons of Hunter fighters.

The main snag in the British operation, it developed, was the extremely limited capacity of Kuwait international airfield, which could take only five transport planes an hour. The effect of air freightage on this slow scale was that for some days grave deficiencies in equipment and stores were felt among British troops in Kuwait.

A second snag was provided by climatic conditions in Kuwait. There were over 100 serious cases of heat exhaustion among British troops in the first week; electrical equipment became overheated; and recurrent sandstorms would have gravely impeded the use of aerial strikes against invading armor.

Two remarkable strokes of luck greatly assisted the British in this operation. First, Bulwark with 42nd RMC just happened to be in the vicinity at the crucial moment. Second, some LSTs happened to be doing some tests with tanks embarked in the Persian

Gulf. A week later neither of these important elements would have been at hand.

From the British point of view the operation was an unqualified success. The political object of the operation was to show that Britain was in general capable of honoring its obligations to an Arab state without reimposing its colonial presence, that Britain was still prepared and capable of acting to maintain stability in the Persian Gulf and in particular that it was prepared to act to maintain the integrity of Kuwait. That Britain felt this had been sufficiently demonstrated was well illustrated by the much more limited British reaction in December 1961 when there were revived reports of an Iraqi armored buildup at Basra and a renewed outpouring of Iraqi claims on Kuwait. Kuwait's defense was then in the hands of an Arab League combined force and Kuwait had been admitted to membership in the Arab League itself.

On the military level the operation, apart from the doubts it cast on the limits set by the necessity of acclimatization on the employment of UK-based Strategic Reserve troops in tropical climates, was equally rated a success. The snags encountered in the use of Kuwait airport were taken to emphasize the advantage enjoyed by seaborne amphibious forces; there was clearly room to modernize beach landing techniques, possibly by the development of hovercraft, which can travel direct from a large LST to the shore without having to run the hazardous path between ship and shore traced by more conventional landing craft. The advantage of carrier air cover in circumstances when local airfields are clearly not adequate both for air transport and for air defense squadrons was also demonstrated. Those who pointed out that an outright Iraqi attack could well have caused the force considerable difficulty were answered by a reference to the normal factor of threefold superiority required by offensive forces against defending forces in modern conventional warfare. This, it was argued, makes it possible in holding and confrontation operations on a limited scale like that in Kuwait to employ forces numerically inferior to those available to a possible aggressor as long as their firepower is adequate, they have good air cover, and they do not fall much below 50% of the strength available to a potential aggressor. The importance of this to a country like Britain, which counts its strategic reserves in independent infantry brigades, and whose characteristic unit of intervention is a Royal Marine Commando of 700 men, is obvious.

LEBANON AND JORDAN, OMAN, KUWAIT: CONCLUSIONS

1. The main element these three cases have in common is that they all represent exercises in the "damping down" of a political conflict before it could get out of hand. The keys to a successful damping down operation are a local invitation, good intelligence, air and sea mobile forces on a ready-to-go basis, a good central command with the military and political elements well integrated, and speed in operation, once the initial invitation for action has been issued.

2. The scale of such an operation depends on the scale of local political opposition. A rough rule on the experience of these operations would seem to be that whereas in a conventional assault against conventional opposition an overall superiority of three to one is necessary, and in conventional antiguerrilla operations a superiority of eight or more to one may be necessary, in "damping down" actions, numerical equality with anticipated local opposition is the most that is required. Too marked a numerical inferiority might tempt local hotheads to "have a go." Equality is more than enough since the speed of the intervention acts as a warning to local potential hostiles that the arrival of larger reinforcements is only a matter of time.

3. On this basis it can be argued that the American intervention forces in Lebanon were numerically far too large. Their effect, however, was felt well beyond the limits of Lebanon; still their armament was probably excessive by any standards. The British forces landed in Kuwait in 1961 were probably as small a contingent in relation to the available Iraqi forces as Britain could have got away with. Their effectiveness was directly dependent on the speed with which they were deployed.

4. A typical intervention force may need to consist of two waves. The first is the immediate "fire brigade" force of air or sea mobile forces, paratroopers, airborne forces, commandos, and marine landing teams. The second should be the ordinary infantry, armor, and air support necessary to hold the bridgehead established by the "fire brigade" forces and to release them to return to their original role of immediate availability. In view of the frequent unsuitability of local airfields for modern air force operations, carrier-borne air support has a considerable role to play in such operations in the maintenance of air cover over the bridgehead.

5. The most important technological innovations for this kind of operation are the commando helicopter carrier, the long-distance troop and equipment transport plane, and, potentially,

the hovercraft. Aircraft must be of the fighter interceptor or ground attack kinds, since it is their presence in the air over the bridgehead which is of the most immediate political effect.

6. The near breakdown of political-military liaison and the failure adequately to brief the landing forces in the Lebanon case brought American intervention in Lebanon within a hair's breadth of disaster. Since "damping down" is a military operation in the field of politics, the primacy of political considerations in such operations should need no emphasizing.

7. The most difficult part of a "damping down" action is the extrication of one's forces after the immediate emergency has passed. In such cases, UN intervention, a regional organization force or agreement, or the substitution of token forces from admittedly neutral states have all proved useful. In the Lebanon-Jordan case an Arab League agreement obtained by the intervention of the UN Secretary General provided the local inciters with a way off the hook. For Oman the operation was so small scale and well concealed at the time that no intermediary was necessary. In Kuwait the organization of an Arab League force provided the substitute for Britain's military forces.

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The Quemoy Crisis (1958)

by

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WHY QUEMOY?

At 1800 hours, August 23, 1958, Chinese Communist shore batteries began a bombardment of the Quemoy and Matsu Island groups, initiating what has been known as the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis.¹ Within two hours, 57,000 shells fell on the islands; during the 44-day bombardment the Communists fired an average of 10,000 rounds daily.

Why Quemoy? The affair has to be regarded as an experiment in the laboratory of the new style in war. It is to be noted from the beginning that the Republic of China and the Chinese People's Republic each thinks itself the sole legitimate government of all of China. Before abandoning the mainland in 1949, the departing hierarchy took certain legalistic steps to assert its continuing legitimacy. The Chinese Civil War continues and the Kuomintang forces think of themselves as a government temporarily beleaguered by insurgents in one of its provinces. To the Communists, on the other hand, the issue is resolved and the final answer has been received. The revolution has succeeded and the "bandits" of the KMT are the illegal force. To both sides the issue is clear. Taiwan and the Pescadores and Quemoy and Matsu are parts of China. Each side intends to hold as much as it can. It is doubtful that any real strategic value adheres to the offshore islands. The use of "strategic value" as a solid reason for US intervention served only to obscure the real issues and give opponents of the US policy a base for their arguments. The idea that Quemoy could control Amoy in an all-out war is most doubtful. The use of the offshore islands as invasion bases for either side--Chiang against the mainland or Mao against Taiwan--makes no tactical sense whatever.

The often-raised question of prestige or "face" must be viewed in the larger context of the claims of the contestants. Both know the islands to be part of China. It is for China that both are contending. It must be concluded then that the CPR decided to assert its claim, but if an analogy is permissible, the Communists entered a "table stakes" poker game and did not risk anything approaching their total resources. The resource costs of an all-out invasion in the face of significant American support of the Nationalists were obviously beyond the upper limit as determined by the CPR. This does not mean that the CPR had changed its views of the whole Taiwan question. Chou En-lai has stated that the Communist regime can wait as long as necessary. Reunification will come about. The 1958 crisis attended an attempt to hasten the process of history. Its abandonment for the time being testifies to the pragmatism of the Communist leadership. This quality, rather than any devotion to the idea of "face," should be looked to when searching for an explanation of Chinese Communist actions.

Why did the Communists assert their claim at this particular time? There was in 1958 a kind of euphoria on the mainland. The Communist bloc, as personified by the USSR, had launched Sputnik, achieved an ICBM vehicle, and moved into the multimegaton range of weapons. In China the communes were launched, the "Great Leap Forward" was underway, and real progress in modernizing the nation seemed apparent. What better time to press a claim and to show the world--most of all Asia--that the United States was indeed a paper tiger? There were, of course, some offsetting conditions. Although the Russians had not yet formally reneged on their nuclear hardware commitment, later CPR statements suggest that the actual deed had been done early in 1958. The "blooming and contending" period was a recent unhappy memory.

Nevertheless, on balance it must have seemed a good time to test both the United States and the Soviet Union. The CPR was indeed in complete control. The choice of times to start and stop, the selection of means, and the intensity of the exchange at any given point in time were options of the Chinese Communists. To them, US options must have seemed much more limited. An invasion of the mainland was out of the question. The use of nuclear weapons seemed most unlikely in the circumstances. The level and type of support the United States would give to the Nationalist forces was open to doubt, since the position of Quemoy and Matsu was ambiguous in the declared American policy. Earlier, the United States had responded to the threat to Tachens by giving strong support to their evacuation. The odds looked right.

THE CRISIS

This crisis came after three years of relative calm in the Straits, interrupted only occasionally by some minor air and sea engagements between Nationalist and Communist forces. The first crisis in 1954-1955 subsided not because of any permanent settlement but because of Peking's démarche after the Bandung Conference and, more importantly, US determination to defend Formosa, as expressed in the Mutual Defense Treaty signed with the Nationalist government in December 1954. During this period the United States and Peking carried on negotiations on the ambassadorial level in Geneva in search of a formula to reduce tension in the Western Pacific. By the autumn of 1958, 73 sessions had been held but no progress had been made. The United States vainly tried to secure a mutual renunciation of the use of force in the Formosa Straits, and Peking continued to insist upon American withdrawal from the area as a precondition for a negotiated settlement.

In the meantime, the Chinese Communists completed, as part of their first Five-Year Plan, the Amoy-Yingtai railway linking the port of Amoy with the east-west trunk line in Kiangsi Province, thereby facilitating the subsequent buildup of Amoy and surrounding areas. By July 1958 the Communists had constructed 47 modern jet air bases in Chekiang, Fukien, and Kwangtung Provinces opposite Formosa, and had deployed about 300,000 troops in areas facing the island groups, with 700,000 others stationed nearby.² At the time of the crisis, the Communist air force was estimated to have 2,500 planes, more than half of which were jets, and it could, if the Communists wished, achieve tactical superiority. The Nationalist air force possessed no more than 400 jets based on Formosa. However, during the crisis Communist use of airpower was restrained. According to Nationalist figures, only 14 air battles were fought, and in all 32 Mig-17s were reported destroyed.³ With its 90 ships of various classifications, the Nationalist navy was able to control the Straits right up to the islands, subject, of course, to daytime dangers from CPR shore batteries. In the only two direct sea engagements, probably accidental, some small Communist craft were sunk.

The major force, however, was the US Seventh Fleet with its 125 vessels, including six carriers equipped with the Regulus guided missile and one with an antisubmarine hunter-killer team. On their decks, with instructions to shoot if shot at, were F4Ds, F9F-8s, and A3Ds with nuclear capability. In addition, 200 Air Force Super-Sabres and a Marine air wing were combat ready in

Formosa, not to mention 2,500 other planes in the Western Pacific area. The Seventh Fleet was "the largest in peace-time," and could swing into action within 20 minutes.⁴

From the very beginning of the bombardment, the Seventh Fleet was alerted for possible emergencies, a move that was similar to US action during the Middle East crisis of the same year. US naval ships began escorting Nationalist supply vessels to within three miles of the mainland coast, despite a unilateral Communist declaration of a 12-mile limit on September 4. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles warned that any attempt to seize the islands "would not remain a limited operation."⁵ There was some evidence that the Chinese Communists deliberately avoided the American ships, and on some occasions they held back their fire until the Nationalist ships were alone. It is generally agreed that the Communists never planned a direct assault on the islands. Among other things, the bombardment was undertaken without any signs of the concentration of ships necessary for an invasion. After the third day of shelling, action in the air ceased, and shelling was punctuated with barrages of propaganda leaflets asking the garrison to surrender. The Chinese army radio also broadcast appeals to the island garrison to give up the fight because an invasion "was imminent," and said that the garrison had no chance because "the islands had been completely cut off from the outside."⁶ That the Communists themselves--both Russian and Chinese--seemed to discount the seriousness of the crisis was evidenced by the routine nature of their press reports. The characteristics of the operation strongly suggested that it was well-managed "brinkmanship."

The crisis might have deepened after the Communists claimed a 12-mile limit for their territorial waters. American ships, ignoring the claim, continued to escort Nationalist convoys to within three miles. Should the Communists have decided to enforce their claim and fire on US vessels, retaliatory strikes against mainland bases conceivably could have resulted. However, the Communists refrained from taking such action. Possibly they realized that Secretary Dulles was serious in his series of warnings, particularly his statement made in Newport on September 4, to the effect that the United States would not fail to take "timely and effective action." If we accept the hypothesis that the CPR was conducting a controlled experiment, this would represent a step which their scenario did not contemplate. Such hints and warnings were made doubly realistic when, shortly afterward, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles were turned over to the Nationalist air force, US buildup in the area was accelerated, missile sites on Formosa were being rushed to completion, and war games were held jointly by US and Nationalist forces.

On September 6, the Chinese Communists through Chou En-lai offered to renew the ambassadorial talks with the United States. President Eisenhower accepted the offer. This sudden development instantly reduced the threat of war. It is significant that only after this did the Soviet Union openly and unequivocally support Peking. In two letters to Eisenhower, on September 7 and 19, Khrushchev warned that an attack on the Chinese People's Republic would be regarded as an attack on the Soviet Union, adding that a nuclear attack would elicit a response in kind. It was carefully specified that the Russian response was directed to a US attack on the mainland and that the Soviets would not become involved in the purely "civil war" conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists. Despite the bellicose language used by both the Russians and the Chinese, Peking unilaterally proclaimed a cease-fire for a week as of October 6. The United States withdrew her ships from escort duty two days later. The cease-fire was extended for two more weeks on October 13, but on October 25 shelling was resumed on odd-numbered days, presumably to demonstrate that the Communists still had complete control of the situation. The shelling continues, but as a general rule it now consists of a small number of propaganda shells, fired into areas which contain neither people nor installations. The pattern is occasionally varied to reflect current feelings such as the Communist distaste for the Eisenhower visit to Taiwan, which was welcomed with a very heavy bombardment over a period of several days.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE AREA

The Quemoy group consists of Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, and 12 other small islets. Their total area is 68 square miles and they support a civilian population of about 45,000. The area was never thought of as a particularly prosperous or desirable one, but since the crisis of 1958, the Nationalist government has made a considerable investment in improvements to the standard of living and general conditions of the natives. Visitors to Quemoy are shown a populace that is obviously well-fed and housed, prosperous, and loyal. The area apparently has a monopoly on the manufacture of the fiery Chinese liquor called Kao-liang and does well with it economically. The Matsu group, while well-garrisoned and defended, occupies a lesser place in the symbology of the Communist-Kuomintang conflict. Guarding the channel to Foochow, the five islets of the group have a total area of only ten square miles and a civilian population of 13,000. Both groups, and a considerable sea area to the eastward, lie within range of medium artillery shore batteries on the mainland. The two groups of

islands are almost 200 miles apart and there is no tactical interdependence or relationship between them. For the purposes of this examination, it can be assumed that Quemoy stands as the more important element in the Nationalist-CPR quarrel over the governance of Taiwan and hence of all China.

In 1949, the Communists made a surface assault on Quemoy. The Nationalists repulsed the attempt and the losses to the CPR are claimed to have been in the neighborhood of 19,000 men. From that day onward, Chiang Kai-shek has done what he could to increase the garrison and improve the island's defenses. After 1955 these efforts were accelerated, despite the disapproval of the United States. Today approximately one-third of the KMT ground forces are in offshore island garrisons, with the greatest number by far located in strong, well-stocked underground positions on Big Quemoy. In showing visitors over the island, the Nationalists use the word "impregnable" uncomfortably often. The defenses are strong, nevertheless, and a Communist assault, using the means available to them, would produce a frightful toll of casualties for the attackers, although the number of 300,000 sometimes given as an estimate is undoubtedly far too high. The Communists' decision, as they see it, relates to the immediate, as compared to the future, advantage of gaining control of the islands. The Communist confidence that Taiwan will eventually come under their control militates against a costly venture whose reward, except in terms of prestige, has no urgent appeal. While Quemoy as a "springboard" for further operations against Taiwan has little real military value, there would be some advantage in an action that would destroy one-third--and the best one-third--of Nationalist ground strength. On balance the violent reduction of Quemoy would be militarily useful only as part or preliminary of an attack on Taiwan. As a prestige item, the price seems too high. In the current overall Asian situation the idea of further involving the United States in protracted and inconclusive fighting probably has some attraction, but the nature of the American reply cannot be predicted with real assurance if US resources are tested too much.

At the Cairo Conference in 1943, the United States, Great Britain, and China agreed that "Taiwan and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China." In accordance with this and the Potsdam Declaration, Chiang Kai-shek was directed by General MacArthur to accept the Japanese surrender in Formosa. From then on the island has been ruled by Chiang's government. Until 1950, this was accepted by all major governments and the island was regarded as part of China. However, when the Korean War broke out, President Truman sent the Seventh Fleet to Formosan

waters to protect the island from Communist attack, and at the same time declared that "the determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."⁷ This was a major change in US policy, and formed the basis for Peking's charge that the United States was the aggressor in Taiwan since the CPR has never foregone its claim to Taiwan as a province of China.

As Peking has grown more truculent in subsequent years, the United States has been drawn closer to the Nationalist regime. During the first offshore island crisis in 1954, and perhaps to mollify the Nationalists for loss of the Tachen Islands, the United States and Taiwan concluded a Mutual Defense Treaty in December 1954. By this treaty the United States is obligated to come to the help of Formosa if it is attacked by the Communists. The offshore islands are not mentioned, although it has been reported that Chiang Kai-shek was privately assured by Eisenhower of American help in their defense.⁸

As a response to the immediate threat during that first crisis, Eisenhower and Dulles persuaded Congress to pass a Joint Resolution in late January 1955, authorizing the President to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores. This authority was "to include the securing and protection of such related positions and territories . . . as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores." This left to the President's discretion to judge whether an attack on the islands was a prelude to the invasion of Formosa and to decide whether American troops would be used. The President's exercise of his authority was tested in the crisis of 1958. In his report to the nation on September 11, 1958, Eisenhower argued that since the Communists had been clamoring for the liberation of Taiwan, the shelling of the offshore islands must be regarded as preliminary to an invasion of Taiwan, and therefore the Joint Congressional Resolution and its reference to "related positions" was applicable.⁹

American policy in the Far East between 1950 and 1958 was largely determined by external events which Washington could not control. Formosa itself seemed to have been written off in January 1950 by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, but the outbreak of the Korean War turned it into an important link in the expanding network of anti-Communist alliances in the Western Pacific. The Nationalist regime asserts itself to be the legal government of China. The question then arises of the right to attack the mainland, which by definition, is under rebel control in a continuing

civil war. The 1954 treaty between the United States and Taiwan evades a direct answer. It prevents "a legitimate government from being overthrown by its internal enemies but tacitly assures the latter that it will not be subjugated by this legitimate government,"¹⁰ at least not with direct US assistance.

The way out of this dilemma, according to many observers, was to seek a Two-China solution. During the first two weeks of September 1958, it appeared that the United States was moving closer to that idea. The Nationalist government became alarmed. Both Chiang and his ambassador to Washington protested vigorously and publicly reaffirmed their determination to recover the mainland. For a time it appeared that the Communists had succeeded in driving a wedge between the United States and the Nationalists. What transpired in private communication cannot be known, but late in October, Dulles himself thought it necessary to fly to Taipei to consult with Chiang. From their conversation came, on October 23, a joint communiqué in which the United States conceded that the offshore islands were "closely related" to the defense of Taiwan, but avoided any explicit commitment. Chiang, on his part, agreed that "the use of force" would not be the "principal" means to recover freedom for the people on the mainland. Just as the US position remained ambiguous, Chiang's was far from being the total renunciation of force which was obviously sought by Dulles. In late October, the United States was more deeply committed to the Nationalist government. During the first month of the crisis, \$90 million in military supplies had been given to Chiang Kai-shek, and in the next few years military aid was to assume even larger proportions.

COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS

There can be little doubt that the ultimate objective of the Chinese Communists was, and is, the winning of Formosa by means short of general war. Just prior to the bombardment on August 23, 1958, an anti-American campaign raged on the mainland, and "liberate Taiwan" slogans reverberated throughout the country. If the capture of Taiwan was the objective, the offshore islands themselves were only the means to an end, pawns in a much larger political-psychological game. By subjecting the islands to continuous bombardment, Peking hoped that the United States would force the Nationalists to agree to the evacuation of the islands. This was not a totally unrealistic expectation in view of what had happened in 1955 and of the increasing body of opinion in the United States and abroad in favor of abandoning the "strategically indefensible" islands. Such an eventuality could undermine the

relations between the United States and the Nationalists on the one hand and demoralize the island garrison, particularly the officer corps, on the other, thus paving the way for a deal between the Formosa government and the mainland.

The United States may have been apprised of a "deal" in the making when Dulles flew to Taipei in October. Earlier, when Peng Te-huai, Peking's defense minister, ordered a cease-fire on October 6, he also offered to negotiate with the Nationalists for a settlement. In fact, reports of dealings and contacts between Peking and Taipei had been circulating after Chou En-lai's widely acclaimed speech at the Bandung Conference in 1955. In July of that year, Chou declared, "Provided that the US does not interfere with China's internal affairs, the possibility of the peaceful liberation of Formosa will continue to increase."¹¹ He went on to say that the Chinese Communists were willing to enter into negotiations with the responsible local authorities of Formosa toward that end. Consequently, Communist peace terms were transmitted to intermediaries in Hong Kong by former high Kuomintang officials now in the service of the Communists. By those terms, Formosa would be left as it was, or it could be turned into an autonomous region like Tibet or Sinkiang on the one condition that the Nationalist government renounce all its ties to the United States.¹² Perhaps the military pressure was applied in 1958 to drive home to those in Formosa that they should accept the inevitable by peaceful means because the Communists could accomplish it by force. If the crisis of 1958 had succeeded in shaking the confidence of even a few Nationalist officials, it would have been a gain for the Communists.¹³ As it turned out, the crisis ebbed after October and the Chinese Communists have discernibly reverted to their "peaceful liberation" theme.

Another explanation of the crisis is that the Communists precipitated it in order to frustrate what they called "the Two-China Plot," which was gaining adherents in 1958. According to this view, the Chinese Communists actually wanted the offshore islands, which are unquestionably part of the mainland, to remain "attached" to Formosa, whose legal status is unsettled. While Formosa could become a separate entity, the islands could not. As long as the islands remain in Nationalist hands the civil war technically continues. Anna Louise Strong, long sympathetic to the Chinese Communists, wrote in November 1958:¹⁴

To take Tsinmentao (Quemoy) at present without taking Taiwan would isolate Taiwan and thus assist Dulles in his policy of building "two Chinas." It would deprive the Chinese of Taiwan of their hope of "return to the mainland."

In the future, Miss Strong said:

Peking intends to achieve its aim by political and moral pressure, mixed with occasional "shooting and not shooting" . . . without permitting the pressure to develop into war.

Such statements could be a Communist rationale for their inability to take the islands by direct military means. But the pattern of later bombardment--odd-numbered day shelling, for example--seems to lend credence to the Two-China theory. There was enough pressure to make it difficult for the Nationalists to evacuate the islands because to do so under fire would be embarrassing, but not enough pressure to escalate the war. The low-key shellings of recent years, mostly pro forma, support the idea that the Communists deliberately maintain an ambiguous situation. Sometime after the crisis, a Communist was reported to have confided to a Hong Kong journalist that "even if Chiang Kai-shek would agree to withdraw his army from Quemoy and Matsu under American pressure, our shore guns would not allow him to do so."¹⁵

Opposed to the Two-China theory is the theory that the crisis was a calculated probe of US intentions in the Straits. Until the Dulles statement of September 4, the Communists were probably uncertain of the American position. In that statement made at Newport, Dulles asserted that the islands were becoming increasingly related to the defense of Formosa and that the United States might strike at the mainland if Quemoy were attacked. The officer who briefed reporters on the statement added that the United States probably would not wait until the situation was in extremis before acting.¹⁶ It may not have been an accident that on the day after this statement the Communists offered to renew ambassadorial talks, thus moving the crisis to the less dangerous political plane, despite the continuance of massive demonstrations and belligerent public statements in Peking. If the Chinese Communists had any intention of "liberating" Taiwan, the firmness--or obduracy, as some said--of Dulles was probably the most decisive element forcing them to retreat. While frightening his own people at home and US allies abroad, Mr. Dulles seems also to have done pretty well at frightening the Communist camp.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTRA-BLOC RELATIONS

The relations between the Chinese Communist Party and other parties within the bloc underwent drastic changes after 1956. In the Polish and Hungarian revolts of that year, both Moscow and

the satellites looked to Peking as arbiter of their differences. The end of the year saw Chou En-lai actively intervening in Polish and Hungarian affairs. A year later, Peking became a partner with Moscow in leading the world Communist movement.¹⁷ In its new role Peking, reversing its previous stand, adopted a hard line, forcing the Russians to take up the fight against what Peking called Yugoslav revisionists. During the Polish revolt, the Chinese had supported Polish Communist demands for more independence from Moscow, but by 1957 they had made a complete volte-face and insisted on monolithic unity of the bloc. It is possible that the radical policy changes anticipated by the Peking leaders dictated a more aggressive posture of the Communist world vis-a-vis the Free World.

Among the many issues on which Peking began to deviate from the Soviet Union, the one that had a direct relationship to the Quemoy crisis was global strategy. Mao and his associates had come to believe that Soviet technological advances had ended American superiority and had made the Communist bloc stronger than the West. In Mao's estimation, the Communist states should not be afraid to resist Western "imperialism" and, furthermore, should adopt a forward strategy in areas where there were just grievances.¹⁸

The Soviet position, on the other hand, was that while the Communist bloc was now stronger than before, it was not yet superior. Though the Soviet Union was ahead in rocketry, its industrial capacity was still far behind that of the United States. The Russians, having acquired nuclear weapons, had also come to realize that war with these weapons would be a war of mutual destruction. According to Soviet calculation, Soviet achievements in rockets would serve as a deterrent which would bring about a stalemate, since the West was equally aware of the consequences of nuclear war. The opposing view of the Chinese naturally led them to believe that the Communist bloc's superiority would forestall total war, but that precisely because of the West's fear of total war the Communist bloc should step up the assault against the exposed positions of imperialism, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The two divergent views were first tested in the Middle East crisis of July 1958. American and British troops landed in Lebanon and Jordan respectively following the coup in Iraq on July 13. Although neither Western nation had the intention of going into Iraq to overthrow the new government, the Soviet Union feared that that was the objective of the landings. If that had been planned, the Soviet Union would have been confronted with a difficult choice: to oppose the American and British move by force or to lose face by failing to act. This, according to many observers,

explains why Khrushchev was determined to use political--and therefore dilatory--means to prevent the Western powers from carrying out their supposed intention and thus, for a while at least, avoid making any explicit commitment. As in the later Quemoy crisis, Khrushchev became much more ebullient, and even threatened to send volunteers, after the tension had eased. While Khrushchev was hesitating, Mao and the Chinese Communists strongly favored a military response to "American and British aggression." Chinese newspaper commentaries obliquely but defiantly chided Soviet policy as appeasement.

Related to the differences on global strategy was the issue of Soviet military aid to Communist China, particularly nuclear weapons. Peking had, since 1957, been trying to secure Soviet nuclear arms aid. Although the Soviet Union may have given Peking research nuclear reactors and promised more, this aid came too slowly to suit Peking's purposes. After the first Sputnik, there were indications that the United States might share atomic information with her allies. Peking was asking that the Soviet Union do so too.

It was apparent that the lack of nuclear capability caused serious concern to the Chinese leadership. If both sides had had nuclear weapons in the Straits confrontation they probably would not have been used. Peking would have been able to go much farther toward the brink because knowledge of its nuclear capability would introduce into the conflict an element of uncertainty and the United States in that case might not have gone as far as she did to risk nuclear war over something that was not truly worth the hazard. The Chinese desire to obtain nuclear arms was illustrated by reports--planted by the Chinese themselves, according to Alice Hsieh--that Khrushchev had agreed to give atomic weapons to Communist China.¹⁹ The same writer thinks that this was most unlikely, since throughout the crisis, and indeed afterward, the Chinese Communists continued to disparage atomic weapons by reviving Mao's older views that although atomic bombs are important the decisive factor in war is man himself. This latter course may equally well represent the Chinese Communist thesis, enunciated also by Mao, that "we fight with what we have."

From post-crisis Communist literature, it appears that Peking's strategic thinking was revised as a result of the Quemoy confrontation. Writings that touched upon war no longer harped upon the theme that "the east wind was prevailing over the west wind"; they exhibited a much more cautious attitude and showed the West much more respect by saying that the West was still a "paper tiger" in the strategic sense but that in tactical

situations it must not be regarded too lightly. Here again the "thought of commander Mao" rationalized a new situation.

THE MEANING OF THE INCIDENT--SOME CONCLUSIONS

In the opening section, this paper offered some thoughts on the timing of the Communist action and the selection of Quemoy as the scene for a test of strength. The alternatives of the antagonists and possible motivations have been examined. It remains to examine the results in terms of relevance to the strategic thinking of both sides.

In addition to a controlled assertion of continuing involvement in the whole question of Taiwan, the Chinese Communists may have been testing a theory which has recently been given explicit substance in the Twentieth Anniversary of V-J Day article by Marshal Lin Piao--the idea that there are situations in which the United States will not dare use nuclear weapons, either because they are not appropriate or because the Americans fear the reaction of the rest of the world. It is safe, he said, to wage wars of national liberation at levels of intensity controlled by the dissidents. The current version of this doctrine of course calls for each revolutionary group to fight its own war regardless of the absence of physical support from outside, even though in happier times the Communists in China were themselves eager to receive all the assistance available, as long as it did not involve sacrifice of sovereignty. The Straits affair may then have constituted an early test of the US position, under shelter for a time of the Russian nuclear capability (however insubstantial that shelter may have turned out to be). It is reasonable to think that the straightforward threat in Mr. Dulles' Newport speech may very well have assisted the CPR in setting the upper limit of Communist provocation.

What then did the CPR get in return for its journey to the brink, a serious depletion of its ammunition stocks, and significant wear in something like 500 artillery tubes? First, there was some addition to the growing Chinese doubts over the resoluteness of the USSR in support of another regime. The Russian Bear revealed a disappointingly high paper content. Second, the CPR learned that the United States would honor a commitment at considerable risk of enlarging the conflict in the process. As a corollary, however, the Communists may have learned also that the United States can be drawn into conflicts at times and places of the Communists' choice and, within certain limits, under controls of their choice. It is also apparent that the Nationalist garrison

(at least with US support) was capable and resolute, showing no significant weakness under physical or psychological pressure. The Nationalist navy and air force also demonstrated courage and competence. The price of any all-out attempt on Quemoy or Taiwan was, for the time being, set beyond anything the Communist regime would be willing to pay.

For the Nationalist government the Straits crisis produced a curiously mixed set of results. Initially it was made clear beyond doubt that the United States was going to honor its commitment, including the extension of its support to the offshore islands. As a bonus, the Nationalist forces received a torrent of weapons and equipment, in types and numbers far exceeding the programmed military assistance. The maintenance and continuing modernization of the force levels thus established has been a continuing charge on the US treasury and attempts to reduce it have been vigorously resisted. For Chiang Kai-shek the blessings thus received have a bitter element. Instead of being "unleashed" as Mr. Dulles had it during the Korean War, Chiang now finds himself quietly and firmly leashed and well aware that any attempt to go it alone in an assault on the mainland is out of the question without massive US support. The quiet assurances given the Communists when the 1958 crisis was subsiding have been reaffirmed in connection with a series of events in the early summer of 1962 when Nationalist actions suggested the possibility of an imminent invasion. The government and people on Taiwan enjoy a very high and increasing level of material well-being. They have an army, navy, air force, and marine corps, which, by Asian standards, are of superior quality. All this, however, relates only to the island of Taiwan, and the prospects of a return to the mainland by force of arms grow steadily dimmer. The United States underwrites what, to the mainlanders, is a distasteful status quo. To the Chinese Communist gains there must therefore be added the comfort afforded by some knowledge (however conditioned by reflex fear of the West) that the Kuomintang forces are, for the time being, under effective restraint.

The impact of the affair should have been heaviest on the United States. Whether it has been can be determined only by pondering the lessons. First, there is the somewhat frightening thought that many of our commitments may be open-ended to a degree not understood in the beginning. It has been alleged by some--but never proven--that the 1958 crisis was triggered in the first instance by Nationalist fire on shipping entering Amoy Harbor. Regardless of how it started, it is clear that a situation requiring American response can grow and change in random and unanticipated fashion, and a graceful way out of a difficult situation created by friend or foe will sometimes be hard to find. In

this particular situation, there was a massive movement forward of US forces and the involvement, in one way or another, of a good part of the Seventh Fleet. It is likely that American resolution, physical and moral, set the ceiling on the Communist effort in the Taiwan Straits. The important element, however, is the fact that the initial provocation, the course of events, and the final decision as to when to stop were controlled by the other side. It is easy to say in retrospect that the firmness of the Secretary of State produced deescalation, but there is still unanswered the question of what would have happened next had the Communists chosen not to be persuaded.

The second idea needing examination is the manner in which criteria for alliances and commitments are established. The United States, as a result of its actions from 1949 onward, has acquired a protectorate in the Republic of China on Taiwan. The degree of American involvement, political, economic, and military, has been great. Without going into the moral aspects of the matter, it is fair to ask whether at any point there has been an objective examination of the political and military implications of our position and the degree to which we can be manipulated by Taipei or Peking. In the event that the United States might some day be able to restructure its alliance pattern, the lessons of open-ended commitments to those whose aims do not always coincide with ours should be pondered.

Assuming that any extensive restructuring is not possible, it remains to assess the Taiwan Straits crisis as it presents new material for consideration in developing strategic concepts for the future. If the United States is truly committed to the support of friendly regimes (of whatever political coloration) in the face of the Communist or revolutionary threat, then the nation must continue to maintain a sophisticated mix of forces at high levels of cost in manpower and resources. In the Straits and later we have learned that these forces must be used. Their existence purely as a threat no longer seems to suffice.

Newer technology played a useful, but not critical, role in the crisis. US aircraft were able to operate over friendly forces at night, substantially contributing to the vital resupply operation. Sidewinder air-to-air missiles gave the Nationalist air force an overwhelming advantage over its opposition. With these exceptions, the chief contribution of superior technology rested in the general increase in operating efficiency that forces so armed and equipped have over less-favored opposition. It remains then for the United States to contemplate the continuing need for superior equipment, while recognizing that the sort of conflict

exemplified by the Straits crisis can be resolved only by resolute use of the means available and appropriate.

The Communist aims in the 1958 crisis were ambiguous. Their methods were so carefully controlled and directed that it must be concluded that capitulation of the offshore islands was thought of only as a possible bonus effect of loss of will to fight in Nationalist troops. If the Russians were truly tested and found wanting, it served only to spur the already apparent determination of the Chinese to go their own way, relying on their own resources. The Chinese People's Republic may then be said to have cleared away some of the underbrush in its confrontation with the United States. The United States, on the other hand, may be considered to have weathered a test, in the course of which she solidified and intensified a not completely satisfactory alliance, while simultaneously permitting a cunning enemy to learn that she may become seriously involved in combat situations on the enemy's terms.

Footnotes

1. Actually the first Communist assault on the islands took place in October 1949, when 17,000 Communist troops attempted a landing on a well-defended concave beach of great width. Almost the entire force was destroyed or captured. The second crisis occurred in 1954-1955.
2. The Communist buildup continued during the crisis. At least one artillery division was reported in the Amoy area. Guns were emplaced not only on the mainland but also on Tateng Island, only one mile from Quemoy.
3. China Yearbook, 1959-1960 (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1960), p. 211.
4. See U.S. News and World Report, September 19, 1958.
5. New York Times, August 24, 1958.
6. The air strip on Quemoy was rendered inoperational for several days. But American ships succeeded in escorting Nationalist supply vessels to the island.
7. State Department Bulletin, Volume 23 (July 3, 1950).
8. Alexander DeConde, "The Entangling Mr. Chiang," Nation, October 25, 1958, p. 289.
9. State Department Bulletin, Vol. XXXIX, No. 1005, September 29, 1958, pp. 481-483.
10. Akira Iriye, "Dilemmas of American Policy Toward Formosa," in Mark Mancall, ed., Formosa Today (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 108.
11. Lewis Gilbert, "Peking and Taipei," in Mancall, p. 116.
12. Ibid., pp. 117, 118.
13. The New China News Agency on December 6, 1958, released a commentary dwelling on the growing rift between Formosa and the United States. Survey of China Mainland Press (Hong Kong: US

Consulate-General), No. 1911, December 10, 1958, pp. 21-22. This may be one example of the expectations of the Chinese Communists.

14. Quoted by Alice Langley Hsieh, Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Age (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 128.

15. Gilbert, p. 116.

16. Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1964), p. 208.

17. See William J. Jordan, "China Gives Moscow Much-Needed Support," New York Times, January 6, 1957; Harry Schwartz, "Peiping Takes Place as Moscow's Policy-Making Partner," New York Times, January 20, 1957; and Schwartz, "Is Peiping Calling the Signals for Moscow?" New York Times, August 10, 1958.

18. Zagoria, ch. 5.

19. Hsieh, p. 123.

Malaya (1948-1960)

by

Riley Sunderland

SUMMARY OF EVENTS

- Dec. 1941 The Japanese invade Malaya, a great tin producing country with a population composed of about 40% Chinese and the bulk of the remainder, Malay.
- 1942-1945 The Japanese occupy Malaya. Some 500,000 Chinese flee to the jungle fringe to become squatters, outside civil administration. The small, elite Malayan Civil Service of British subjects becomes refugees or prisoners. The police are killed, imprisoned, or become collaborators. There is widespread hunger. Many thousands of professedly Communist Chinese guerrillas organize in the Malayan jungles where they are armed and trained by the Southeast Asia Command.
- Aug. 1945 Between the end of hostilities and the British return there is a brief interregnum during which Communist guerrillas dominate many parts of Malaya.
- 1946-1947 A period of slow, painful, and partial recovery, in which civil administration and police are undermanned, Chinese squatters remain outside civil administration, and there is widespread malnutrition and underemployment. Crime is 12 times its prewar rate. There are many Communist-led strikes, and a powerful Communist guerrilla cadre becomes a jungle force-in-being.
- Feb. 1948 A Communist Party conference is held in Calcutta, attended by the USSR delegation, plus representatives from all over Southeast Asia. Evidence suggests a strong impulse from Moscow toward large-scale violence was relayed outward at this conference, and was

- followed a few months later by widespread outbreaks in Southeast Asia, including Malaya.
- Jul. 1948 A series of Communist terrorist murders in the Malayan countryside disturb public opinion and force the government to declare a State of Emergency.
- Aug.-Sep. 1948 The succeeding months show that Commonwealth soldiers relying on air supply and the Malayan police are able to operate effectively in the jungle. The Communists mobilize 12,000 uniformed, full-time guerrillas with several times that number of supporters and agents, about 95% Chinese.
- 1948-1950 A period of stalemate exists. Periodic jungle sweeps keep the Communists from organizing conventional units for large-scale hostilities, but do not end terrorism.
- Jan. 1950 Great Britain recognizes the People's Republic of China. The guerrilla surrender rate drops; the incident rate soars.
- Mar. 1950 Lt. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs is made first Director of Operations. The Briggs Plan of (1) resettling Chinese squatters and (2) tightly integrating civil and military authority controlling the counterinsurgent effort is introduced. Slow improvement begins.
- Oct. 1951 The High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Henry Gurney, is assassinated by terrorists.
- Feb. 1952 General Sir Gerald W.R. Templer becomes both High Commissioner and Director of Operations. His wide powers and driving energy put a new, and in the event decisive, impetus behind the Briggs Plan. Templer proclaims that one of his missions is to make Malaya a self-governing nation with citizenship for both Malays and Chinese. Guerrilla attacks lessen as their casualties rise.
- May 1952 Elected village councils are instituted.
- 1952-1954 No significant developments.
- Apr. 1954 An announcement is made that a Legislative Council will be elected.

- Aug. 1954 A Viet cease-fire ends the guerrillas' hopes of Chinese or Viet intervention.
- Nov. 1955 A decision is made that, at its current level, the guerrilla warfare in Malaya is no bar to independence. More and more areas are declared "white," or free of guerrillas.
- Jan.-Feb. 1956 A London conference is held on the transfer of power from Great Britain to Malaya.
- Aug. 1957 Malaya becomes independent.
- 1958-1959 There is mass surrender of guerrillas, leaving but a few hundred at large.
- Jul. 1960 The Federation government proclaims the end of the State of Emergency. The guerrillas have been reduced to the level of a nuisance on the Thai border with which the local authorities can deal.

INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES

ON THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY

Neither the initial discovery and monopoly of nuclear energy by the United States nor its later acquisition by the Soviet Union or Great Britain had any discernible effect on the course of events in Malaya. Nor did the developments in space technology and rocket-powered delivery systems. Mass air transport, however, in the form of air supply, was of fundamental and controlling importance in the course of events in Malaya.

When the Malayan Communists planned the conduct of a guerrilla war against the government of the Federation of Malaya, they appreciated the fact that the terrain of Malaya was then 80% jungle, with no key point more than a few hours away from it. They further observed that some 500,000 Chinese squatters--and it should be noted again that the Communist Party was about 95% Chinese--had established themselves in the jungle fringe and were farming there. These squatters were simply outside the structure of civil administration. Indeed, in some areas the Communists supplied the administration. Therefore, the squatters could supply food, information, and recruits to the guerrillas, who if pressed by soldiers or police could retreat into the jungle.

The Malayan Communists before the outbreak of the insurrection, or Emergency as it was known locally and will be called here, explicitly believed that the soldiers and police could not conduct combat effectively in the jungle. They had seen the Japanese defeat the British six years before, in 1942, in large part because the Japanese had both a doctrine and techniques for jungle operations. They were not aware of any change in British capabilities and believed that the jungle would give them the base areas so important in Maoist doctrine of guerrilla warfare.

However, in fighting the Japanese in Burma only a few years before, the British forces had learned that by the routine delivery of supplies by air in the combat zone they could free themselves of dependence on road transport. This in turn meant that they could go anywhere in the jungle without the need to safeguard a ground line of communications. The number of motor convoys was therefore reduced to those necessary for the air bases and for strategic troop movements, well away from the area most suited to guerrilla ambushes.

The guerrillas had logistical problems of their own to solve. The collection, stockpiling, and distribution of rice almost entirely by porter is slow and tedious yet had to be done if the guerrillas wished to mass a force for any length of time. Strategic movement through the jungle on foot is also a slow, tedious process. Consequently, in the first few months of the Emergency the guerrillas found that the army and police were far more mobile than they, and equally able to operate in the jungle. The superior mobility of the army and police and their ability to call for tactical air support were assets that could not be matched on the one occasion the guerrillas did try to hold ground. Consequently, although the numerical odds (12,000 guerrillas versus at first 10 infantry battalions, about 6,000 men joined in a few months by a brigade, and what police could be spared from a force of about 10,000 in a nation of 4,000,000) would seem to favor the guerrillas, by December 1948 they had to admit that they could not set up base areas, for the army and police could go anywhere they could go and be more combat effective on arrival.

Both sides recognized that air supply made this possible.

A second use of air transport--the numbers involved make it hard to describe it as mass--was the use of helicopters for casualty evacuation and overland transport. Casualty evacuation was a most important morale factor. Since the practice of jungle war in Malaya involved movement off road and off trail, since encounters with the guerrillas might come at any moment on any sort of terrain, the physical problems in evacuating wounded by

stretcher bearer to the nearest road and then arranging for them to be picked up by medical convoy were very serious and involved just that sort of vehicular movement the army and police were most anxious to avoid. Helicopter ambulances solved the problem and were a tremendous morale factor.

The use of helicopters for troop transport was a third and least important use. Because guerrillas lose greatly in effectiveness if they are not physically near the people they want to dominate, the Communists in Malaya tended to be within marching distance of the jungle's edge. However, as an organized force they had training camps, headquarters, and supply depots which for security might be at some distance inside the jungle. The helicopter made it possible to put troops within striking distance of such targets without need for long, slow, and tiring marches. Surprise was sought by exploiting terrain features. Assault landings were limited to a few experimental attempts to exploit good intelligence about the location of high-ranking Communists. Results did not encourage repetition, for the guerrilla would be alerted by the noise, take refuge in the jungle, and could be found only by days of patient tracking, if then. It was finally judged better simply to move troops and trackers into the area, as quietly and expeditiously as the situation might permit, which might or might not call for helicopters, and then to hunt the target of the operation by methods basically similar to those used in hunting wild game, and following any intelligence leads that might be given. Such operations would be supported by air supply.

INFLUENCE OF ADVANCES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL

Portable, reliable radio communications permitted troop deployments and operations well-suited to guerrilla war as practiced in Malaya in 1948-1960. Initially, applying the principle of mass in what then seemed an obvious manner, the army showed a strong tendency to stage large-scale jungle sweeps of from one to three battalions of infantry. Personnel turnover, resulting in a steady flow of senior officers fresh from the United Kingdom and the British Army of the Rhine, also probably contributed, since these newcomers were prone to apply the principles of war in what they regarded as the normal manner.

Gradually, however, the failure of such sweeps to yield results in terms of guerrilla casualties, however much they contributed toward preventing the guerrillas' massing, led to a changed appreciation. By about 1951 the army and police concluded

that instead of sweeping an area with up to a brigade and then withdrawing, it was better to turn over a suitable area to a battalion, keep it there, and let it come to dominate the area. Emphasis was put on killing individual guerrillas, and the battalion deployed into as many patrols and ambushes as the interaction of personnel strengths and intelligence suggested.

This necessarily meant a deployment in detail. Had it not been for radio such tactics would open the possibility of defeat in detail. Thanks to radio, each detachment was linked with the battalion, and the battalion with the brigade, and so on. Contacts with guerrillas were promptly reported. If an estimate of the situation showed that the reporting patrol could not deal with what it saw, this would be expeditiously reported and the process of reaction would begin.

New arrivals almost invariably thought this deployment a violation of the principles of war, and the attention of senior officers was required to guard against a constant tendency to relapse into the practice of large-scale sweeps.

Radio communications, strategic use of motor transport, and air supply made possible the rapid assembly and commitment of a task force able to disperse any guerrilla concentration. The most usual episode of this sort would be the patrol's seeing and quietly reporting a guerrilla camp, too large for the patrol to overrun. Then by radio, the patrol would call up a force able to stalk and overrun the camp with a fair prospect of killing most of its occupants. Air drops, casualties from patrol encounters, would also be handled by radio.

On the higher level, telecommunications gave the army and police a reaction time significantly less than the guerrillas, which the security forces learned to exploit. That is, since the guerrillas relied upon couriers and had a number of headquarters all of which had to be consulted for an operation of any size, the army could withdraw troops from an area, saturate another with patrols and ambushes, and return the reinforcements to their home station before the guerrillas could react to their absence.

Radio permitted a troop deployment in Malaya that appeared on the surface in violation of one of the principles of war, concerning concentration of mass. However, the large jungle sweeps employed or advocated by inexperienced commanders, once the guerrillas were scattered, were far in excess of what was needed to do the job and so violated the principle of economy of force. The small detachments of the period 1951-1960 were perfectly able to handle the existing guerrilla deployment, and by their very

dispersion had a far better probability of bringing the guerrillas to battle.

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

Changes in the Soviet system had no discernible effect on events in Malaya. Nor did the Sino-Soviet split seem to affect the Communist guerrillas in Malaya at any level. They were Chinese Communists and as will be described below may have been ideologically in advance of Peking. In any event, when the split became acute, after 1957, the issue in Malaya was largely decided and the mass surrenders were beginning.

Relations between the Communist bloc, as it was in 1953-1954, and the West did affect events in Malaya. The French defeat in Vietnam followed by the cease-fire and the Geneva Conference had a profoundly disheartening effect on the guerrillas, for they could no longer hope that the war in Vietnam could move south into Malaya. They had long hoped for Chinese intervention, and now this hope was gone. Thus, paradoxically, a Communist victory in Vietnam contributed to a Communist setback in Malaya.

The only US contribution to the Emergency in Malaya was a few US-made helicopters. Why it was so small and what the US attitude toward the situation and Great Britain's corresponding reaction were cannot be ascertained from published sources. It is highly likely that neither tangible nor moral support was really needed. The episode was indeed handled as a purely local matter within the Commonwealth and neither the United Nations nor the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization nor their members outside the Commonwealth became involved.

Nationalism and racial consciousness affected events in Malaya. The Communist movement there was emphatically a Chinese movement. It was so physically, and it was so seen by other elements in Malaya. Some of the Communist slogans were racist, e.g., "Throw out the Red-haired Devils!" and of the sort later stigmatized by the Russian Communists as deviationist. Because the Communist movement was Chinese it enjoyed wide support from within the Chinese community, and one of the tasks of the government was to cut off this support. Pride in China's new strength, anger at the restrictions placed on the Chinese community in Malaya (e.g., bars to land title and reserved civil service posts), and traditional Chinese fondness for secret societies, all served as inducements to join the Malayan Communist Party.

There were also powerful nationalist and racial factors on the other side. It should be noted that Islam and China meet in Southeast Asia. The commercially minded Chinese, who eats pork, hangs pictures of his leaders on his walls, and does not acknowledge the One God, violates three Moslem taboos on almost any given day. The Moslem Malay did not want to become a stranger in his own land and spontaneously took up arms in his own defense in the Kampong guards. He also gave intelligence to the army and the police, whose ranks he joined in increasing numbers. There were two battalions of the Malay Regiment in 1948, seven plus supporting services in 1960. In addition to this narrow Malay nationalism, a wider Malayan nationalism that would embrace both Malay and Chinese seems to have had a powerful appeal to the young educated elite of both communities.

There remains another political and psychological force, perhaps of purely local significance in Malaya: the break in the psychological continuity of the Chinese community caused by migration from South China to Malaya. The old ways, the authority of the old, were at a serious discount, and the clever, energetic, young Chinese were powerfully attracted to what was presented to them as something new. One observer, Lucian Pye, suggested that the Chinese youth would in many cases try communism the way he would have tried any other new idea of his new environment. In this breakdown of old ideas, old values, and old controls may be found the principal psychological motivating force behind the Emergency in Malaya.

ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AND WEAPONS

Chinese communism taught the merits and the use of organized violence in a way that was unknown earlier in the 20th Century. Had it not been for these teachings and the leadership of the Communist Party it seems likely that there would have been no outbreak in Malaya. These teachings argued that the peasants and workers of a community could obtain their due only by taking up arms against the middle classes. They further taught that arms were, in the initial phase at least, to be used in methods of clandestine terror. The basic doctrine may be summed up in Mao's phrase, "All power grows out of the barrel of a gun." This is an attitude toward politics and the political process that represents a great change from earlier years and that led directly to the uprising and the manner in which the guerrillas conducted it.

MILITARY FACTORS AND STRATEGIC THINKING

Mobilization stocks at Singapore Command were ample to fit out and later to support the two reinforced divisions that were the peak Commonwealth strength in Malaya. The effort was no strain on the British treasury nor on British industry. Ammunition expenditures were easily met from Singapore and were indeed encouraged to use up stocks before they deteriorated. Since use of motor vehicles was consciously avoided, strain on them and consumption of POL were both low. The entire 12-year episode cost the Federation and the British treasury only some \$850,000,000 beyond what it would have cost to maintain the troops involved at home stations. In the light of the foregoing, the question of a changed mobilization base seems hardly to arise.

The new approaches to strategic thinking by the governmental authorities have been indicated but may be conveniently restated. The basic one was the application of the lesson learned in Burma during World War II that, in jungle or close country, units in contact with or possibly about to contact the enemy should be supplied by air, not by motor transport. This in turn conferred a degree of operational and tactical mobility unexpected by the guerrillas and was a principal factor in their defeat. The second new approach was the acceptance of a previously unheard-of degree of dispersion. Its aim was to kill guerrillas, not to hold territory, and it relied upon patrols and ambushes. It was principally made effective by radio.

Resettlement and food control, though of critical importance, were not new techniques.

On the guerrilla side, the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung were a new approach to strategic thinking and may indeed represent a whole new system of war as important in the 20th Century as the Roman legion or the ideas of Napoleon were in their periods. In so brief a paper as this, one can only suggest the general outlines of Mao's teachings and urge a reading of some adequate explanation and commentary such as Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith's Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare. It is the historic importance of Mao's teachings that is of interest here rather than their very brief summary.

Mao Tse-tung teaches that in the underdeveloped areas, which may be considered as Asia sans Japan, Africa, and Latin America, the guerrilla effort should be made in the countryside. The conflict should be made to pass through three stages. In the first,

the guerrillas, by ambush and terror, seek to drive governmental authority from a section which in their parlance then becomes a liberated area and functions as a base. In these liberated areas the guerrillas form organized forces which, in the second stage, sally out to link up liberated areas. In the third stage, large conventionally organized forces operating from these bases fight regular large-scale battles with the government's forces and overthrow it. With these broad principles Mao offers a number of observations based upon his experiences in China, the whole forming a comprehensive body of doctrine. It is noteworthy that the initial liberated area should be carefully chosen, that is, be one in which the army and police forces will not be at full combat effectiveness. Because of contemporary military emphasis on motor vehicles, mountainous or jungled terrain has again and again been chosen for such use. Noteworthy, too, is the candid emphasis on terror and force, the statement that all power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

As regards the question of the relation of tactical and strategic forces in Malaya, on several occasions heavy bombers were guided by radar to the sites of camps in which high-ranking Communists were thought to be present. In one instance, this technique resulted in killing a member of the Central Committee, but the event came late in the Emergency and was not decisive. On a number of other occasions between 1948 and 1960 elements of Bomber Command were committed, either on speculation or on what was thought to be good intelligence. These operations had no discernible effect on the course of the Emergency, and interrogation of surrendered or defecting guerrillas did not suggest they were effective.

When on one occasion early in the Emergency the guerrillas did try to hold a village, fighter-bomber support was most helpful, in view of the difficulty of taking along artillery with a force that made a practice of operating off trails and roads. However, since the guerrillas emphatically did not seek to hold ground, airpower could have precise targets only when intelligence could report camps or headquarters. In such cases, the technical problems of directing airpower to the target and the tremendous intelligence value of prisoners and documents that could be seized tended to encourage infantry attack.

The Commonwealth forces present in Malaya were themselves a strategic reserve. It was a fortunate accident for the Commonwealth that the 17th Gurkha Division was forming in Malaya when the Emergency began, and that so many of its key personnel had had recent successful experience in Burma. Its battalions were at varying states of readiness and training, but within a few

months all were committed. One may surmise that a division whose permanent station is to be Malaya is intended to fight jungle war so that its commitment was not unforeseen by higher authority. Its doctrine, training, and equipment were well adapted to the area and to the problem; it was combat effective from the first.

Training facilities were hastily created in Malaya so that battalions could be transferred there from any other spot in the Commonwealth and, after completing the course at the Jungle Training Center, Kota Tinggi, take their places in the field. This was then a conventional device which permitted battalions to pass in and out of reserve at home, be committed to the BAOR, be sent to the garrison at Hong Kong (which received a major buildup), and take their turn in Malaya.

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Save as otherwise noted, the material in this paper is taken from an unclassified RAND Corporation manuscript, Riley Sunderland, "The Communist Defeat in Malaya," D-9803-ARPA.

Of the sources consulted in writing this manuscript, the most useful were:

Annual Reports, Federation of Malaya, 1948-1956.

The series ended with Malayan independence. Although official publications, and contemporary, they are candid, and contain a great variety of useful information.

Henniker, Brigadier M.C.A. Red Star Over Malaya. Edinburgh and London, 1955.

Miers, Brigadier Richard. Shoot to Kill. London, 1959.

Robinson, J.B. Perry. Transformation in Malaya. London, 1956. This was written by the man who catalogued the files of the Federation of Malaya in preparation for the writing of an official history, and so had a singular opportunity to know of what happened behind the scenes.

Most of the books consulted were published in the middle or early 1950s. Little has been published in the later years. However, so far as is known, the techniques as described in this paper did not change appreciably in the latter years of the Emergency.

Recently published, and drawing upon official sources, is a most interesting study of resettlement:

Sandhu, Kernal Singh. "The Saga of the 'Squatter' in Malaya," Journal of Southeast Asia History. March 1964.

Cuba--The Bay of Pigs Operation (1961)

by

William Spencer

INTRODUCTION

The unsuccessful amphibious invasion of Cuba by a brigade of US-trained Cuban exiles in April 1961 had several serious consequences. It produced a chain reaction which triggered significant Soviet policy revisions potentially dangerous to the United States; it developed tensions within the Western allied powers; and it seriously damaged US international prestige. The significance of the operation rests not entirely on its lack of success, nor even on the weakening of the US position vis-a-vis the Communist powers. Its deeper importance lies in its implications for the new concepts under which responses in conflict between nations are likely to be made. Since these responses are governed by the internal relationship between political and military authorities of a state, the evolution of military strategy outside a political context in the case of the Bay of Pigs represents a dangerous precedent.

In its simplest terms, the Bay of Pigs operation was intended to overthrow the government of a neighboring sovereign state. It was the US response to what most policymakers regarded as a threat to US national security. Assignment of operational responsibility to an intelligence service, under maximum security arrangements, however, had the effect of removing an essentially political action from adequate political supervision. The assumption of the officials responsible for the Bay of Pigs operation appears to have been that the Central Intelligence Agency had the competence to carry out the operation successfully because the CIA-backed coup in Guatemala in 1948 had succeeded. The consequent distortion of views extended beyond the sponsoring agency, the CIA, and surrounded the entire body of US policymakers concerned.

Analysis of the Bay of Pigs operation necessarily must consider the limits of participation by intelligence agencies in

national strategy when the use of force is contemplated to achieve objectives. Normally intelligence participation shares the general subordination of military to civilian leadership in a democratic system. Because of its unique capabilities for judging the strength and intentions of an opponent, the intelligence community plays an important consultative role in national policy formulation. However, the boundaries of this role require careful definition. An unusual combination of political circumstances--a new administration, unclarified national policy guidelines, the instinct of old bureaucratic hands to strike quickly with a new policy before the administrative glue hardens, broad national uncertainty over what to do about an inferior power which suddenly sets an independent and apparently threatening course, and a consequent irresistible urge to do something--furnished the reasoning behind the assignment to the CIA of full responsibility for the operation. However, this precluded overt US support (primarily logistic and materiel) for the Cuban groups hostile to Fidel Castro. The CIA, which was locked into its own administrative structure by the basic requirements of intelligence, then developed an invasion plan which did not take into account the real political situation in Latin America. Its principles dictated an accommodation with one of the Cuban exile groups. Accordingly CIA officials chose the group which was most conservative, anti-Communist, and unfortunately least likely to wean support inside Cuba away from Castro and ensure the success of the invasion.

BACKGROUND OF EVENTS

When Cuba became independent of Spain in 1902, after the Spanish-American War, American commercial interests moved in to assist in its development. Within a decade they had come to control the sugar and rum trade, tourism, and almost every other major commercial interest. The US naval base at Guantanamo assured protection and a springboard for intervention as needed. But American commercial and strategic assistance to Cuba was never accompanied by political education.

General Fulgencio Batista, the last (1952-1958) of a long series of Cuban dictators, was probably no worse than his predecessors despite the brutalities inflicted on political prisoners and the denial of basic individual liberties. Cuba's sporadic flings at democratic government before Batista had been invariably followed by more dictatorships; democracy merely meant a shuffle among the conservative wealthy class that ran the island in conjunction with the military. The misfortune of Batista was that his regime coincided with the appearance of an educated

middle class, whose backbone consisted of lawyers, doctors, and other professional men and women. This group added to the traditional Iberian idealism of their ancestors a revolutionary goal of social reforms. Its most effective spokesman was Fidel Castro. Castro's charismatic gifts were first tested in 1953, when he led an unsuccessful attack on the Moncada army barracks to dramatize Cuba's need for reforms. In speeches during his trial, Castro declared, "History will absolve me!" (i.e., for leading a revolt against his own government). He urged Batista to hold popular elections under the 1940 constitution, which he said had been set aside by the dictator. Exiled, he founded in July of the same year his "26th of July Movement," perhaps inspired by the secret organization developed by Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt. He then set out to destroy Batista. In December 1956 Castro landed on the Cuban coast with 82 men and fought his way inland to the Sierra Maestra with the 12 others who survived. Three years later with about 1,000 guerrillas he marched in triumph across Cuba and entered Havana, having achieved the downfall of a dictator whose army numbered about 40,000 effectives.

Castro's incredible success was possible because the Cuban people themselves turned against Batista. The government's repressive measures produced such revulsion that whole companies of militiamen deserted to the guerrillas. By its unexpectedness, the triumph catapulted Castro into power without a party, program, or even an ideology. During the Castro revolution, the United States, pursuing its traditional policy of nonintervention and support for existing regimes however unrepresentative they were, equipped the Cuban army to fight the rebels. US ambassadors, first Arthur Gardner and then Earl T. Smith, even made public statements in Cuba favoring Batista. The dictator's sudden collapse, and the total misreading of the attitude of the Cuban people, was enormously embarrassing to the incumbent Eisenhower administration. Nevertheless it swallowed its pride and recognized Castro, but without any admission that his revolutionary aims, vague as these were, might represent a potential benefit to Cuba.

The anti-Americanism in Cuba during 1959 and 1960 had its root causes in economic imperialism. Castro's own feelings were heightened when he was impressed on his visit to the United States with the contrast between American and Cuban economic standards. The contrast apparently seemed to him to be the result of unfair economic arrangements, and increased his growing inclination to communism. Gradually an "enemy image" of the United States was projected across Cuba to cement the authority of Castro's government and to promote his revolution through a convenient scapegoat. One after another, US properties in Cuba

were nationalized. Castro's nationalizations, his posturing, swagger, threats, and arrant bad manners, did not sit well with the US public. By 1960 pressure on the administration to do something was very great. President Eisenhower responded by canceling the Cuban sugar quota and placing an embargo on all exports except medicines and basic foodstuffs. The Cuban response was to order a reduction in US Embassy personnel. Then on January 4, 1961, diplomatic relations were formally declared at an end.

Chronology of the Bay of Pigs

On May 17, 1960, the US National Security Council issued directives for specific anti-Castro action. The Central Intelligence Agency was assigned the task of organization, training, and support of Cuban exiles in the United States who had already formed various groups in opposition to Castro. Richard Bissell, then the CIA Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P), assumed direct charge of the task. In addition to regular CIA training specialists, Bissell's staff included a number of Regular military officers on detachment from the Department of Defense who were added because of their experience in guerrilla operations in Malaya, against the Philippine Hukbalahap, and elsewhere. The NSC directive specified that any invasion effort would be secret, i.e., covert or "black." There would be no involvement of US conventional forces, other than for close support, and of course no nuclear weapons. Within these limits the CIA set itself to mount an unconventional action using exclusively indigenous Cuban personnel.

Agency officials in Guatemala, with the tacit approval of President Ydigoras, arranged to lease training sites on the vast Helvetia coffee plantation owned by the Alejos family, on the Guatemalan Pacific coast. At these secret sites, CIA agents prepared an invasion force eventually numbering 1,500 men, supported by a fleet of B-26 bombers and ships leased from the Garcia Line, Cuba's largest merchant fleet in the Batista period. This infrastructure, like the equipment issued to the Cuban invaders, was selected because of free availability on the international arms market; the American role in the operation could not be proved on the basis of equipment alone.

Responding to increased public pressure, the incoming Kennedy administration published a White Paper on April 3, 1961. It accused Castro of betraying the Cuban revolution and said that the Castro government represented a "clear and present danger" and a "grave and urgent challenge" to the safety and security of the

Western Hemisphere. Since it had already committed itself in secret to destroy Castro, the White Paper was the administration's way of preparing the general public for the forthcoming invasion.

The invasion plan called for two air strikes over Cuba on successive days, followed on the third day by a single landing in force at the Bay of Pigs (Bahia de Cochinos) on the southern coast. The two strikes were supposed to knock out Castro's small air force on the ground, after which the invaders, known as Brigade 2506, could land unopposed on the beach and have full air cover provided by the B-26 fleet. The first air strike was carried out on April 15, and approximately 60% of the Cuban air force was indeed destroyed. Meanwhile the ships carrying the brigade left Porto Cabezas, the rendezvous point in Nicaragua, and steamed toward Cuba. While they were en route, the second air strike was cancelled by order of President Kennedy. The President, subject to pressures which did not affect, or concern, the CIA, and with only the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate of a 40% chance of success to reassure him, insisted that US participation be limited to standby support. Thus the invaders landed with air support inferior to the remaining 40% of Castro's air force. The spontaneous uprising predicted by the CIA did not materialize, and the Cuban army pinned Brigade 2506 to its beachhead, where it fought bravely until its ammunition was exhausted. The survivors then scattered in small groups, all of which were captured within a few weeks.

The disaster, as might have been expected, proved to be a propaganda as well as a military success for Fidel Castro. Following a mass public trial of the brigade's survivors, at which the Cuban leader made full capital of the violations of international law and national sovereignty by the United States, the captives were sentenced to long prison terms. Subsequently they were ransomed in return for medicines and drugs--perhaps the strangest element in the entire affair--and returned to their families in Florida. Castro's release of sworn enemies in this fashion appears inexplicable, unless recognized as an assumption that the brigade was compromised in Cuban eyes by identification with the "Yanqui" imperialists, and of no further danger.

AMERICAN DECISION-MAKING

The Bay of Pigs operation was generally considered at the time, and for months thereafter, to have been one of the greatest failures experienced by the United States. Retrospect, and particularly the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which stemmed directly from the Bay of Pigs, have softened this harsh judgment somewhat,

at least in political terms. Nevertheless the favorable results which ultimately accrued to the nation from Soviet misassessment of the Bay of Pigs should not obscure the evidence of uncoordinated planning, divided counsel, and absence of defined authority which handicapped the invasion almost from the beginning.

Division of responsibility for a strategic action which required consensus was a major element in the disastrous outcome. The series of National Security Council briefings during which the CIA invasion plan was approved, as they have come to light, reveal much concerning the interaction of bureaucratic interests which precedes policy actions in support of national objectives. Conservatism, traditional military staff attitudes, extremism and moderation, were all represented at these briefings as indeed they are in US national life. The shaky consensus ultimately established to permit the invasion planning to continue was in accordance with normal democratic behavior. However, the divisions within the administration and the nation which the events exposed encouraged the Soviet Union to undertake a revised strategy in Cuba, a miscalculation which brought on the missile crisis one year later.

Normally intelligence agencies influence strategy in support of national objectives through informational rather than operational activity. The intelligence contribution is especially valuable in cases where direct channels of communication are closed. Because diplomatic, commercial, even personal contact between Cuba and the United States had ceased after January 1961, the intelligence community's importance to projected action involving Cuba was drastically increased. At the same time the activist role played by the CIA in previous operational actions where massive and open US intervention had not been feasible, suggested that this aspect of the agency's mandate might be exploited with profit. Success in these previous actions, notably in the anti-Communist coup carried out in Guatemala in 1948, was considered to justify a somewhat similar operation against another Latin American country where it was judged that some parallel conditions existed. Since Communist penetration of Latin America in any form was regarded by US policymakers as a serious danger to US national interests, some sort of response to Castro was clearly necessary. Yet a positive military response would have an adverse effect on Latin public opinion, undercutting two decades of efforts at Good-Neighborism and US nonintervention in internal Latin affairs. Curtailment of Communist expansion in the hemisphere through the overthrow of Fidel Castro by his own people, with American participation concealed, was an attractive alternative.

CIA's previous successes, especially those in Guatemala and Iran, led CIA officials charged with responsibility for the Bay of Pigs force to overestimate their capabilities. It is certainly significant that they chose Guatemala as a site for the exile training base. Not only was it secure, and comparable in topography, climate, etc., to the conditions the brigade would face in Cuba; there was a psychological advantage to the trainers in a strike for freedom mounted from the scene of a previous triumph. Also they were far enough from Washington to be free from the taint of political compromise. It is worth noting that the CIA agents at the Helvetia base made commitments of US support to the exiles far in excess of anything shown to American decision-makers during the NSC briefings. The leaders of the brigade were assured that their friends would not let them down, that the entire armed power of the United States stood ready behind them. Political realities in Washington being what they are, it is doubtful that Richard Bissell and his co-conspirators contemplated such a broad commitment. Evidence strongly suggests that they were confident that in the unlikely event of a successful response by Castro, the President would change his mind or be forced by events to order US intervention. The assumption was that the brigade would be able to disembark safely, establish a beachhead, and declare the formation of a new democratic Cuban government which could then legitimately request American military aid.

In contrast with the CIA's expectation that President Kennedy would approve US intervention as a last resort was the President's expressed conviction that the United States would not intervene militarily under any circumstances. This position had the dual advantage of not exposing the nation's hand in a strategic action directed against another government, while it would bring the new administration a handsome political dividend if it succeeded. The majority of the President's military advisers regarded the invasion plan as feasible, although they had some misgivings about the CIA's ability to execute it. They would have preferred to have final authority rest with professional military men instead of the soldiers of fortune hired by the agency for the training phase. These and other, more serious, doubts were brought out during a full-dress briefing on April 4, 1961, the day after publication of the Government's White Paper on Cuba which exposed the Communist threat to US national security.

The April 4 briefing affords a useful illustration of the political factors involved in conflict strategy formulation. Bissell presented the CIA invasion plan to the NSC, and CIA Director Allen Dulles spoke in favor of it. Both argued persuasively that it would inevitably succeed. Senator J.W. Fulbright, the sole member of Congress present, opposed the invasion. He questioned

the effectiveness of any of the exile groups in governing Cuba and pointed out that direct US intervention could do incalculable damage to the US position in Latin America. Finally he questioned the clandestine nature of the operation as contrary to US national standards of morality and possibly to international law.

President Kennedy was faced with diametrically opposed opinions. In order to ascertain the majority opinion, he then is reported to have polled each official present. A majority did vote in favor of continuation, on the ground that a showdown with the Soviet Union was inevitable eventually in Latin America, that the operation's very secrecy assured it of success, that the spectacle of Castro's own compatriots attacking him would appease the American public, and that the pace of events within Cuba would within a few months reduce the chances for a successful move against Castro to zero.

The military realities played a distinctly secondary role in the Bay of Pigs operation. This was due not only to the overwhelming political realities, but also the very nature of the operation. The CIA agents charged with the training of the exile brigade were in the main undercover agents completely out of touch with political events, and military men whose experience was limited to irregular warfare. Furthermore, the brigade was not prepared for the hostile conditions which were in fact encountered immediately upon landing at the Bay of Pigs. The assumption that the Cuban people would rise en masse to support the invaders was an incredible (as well as fatal) miscalculation. Kennedy's final decision to proceed was based in large measure on CIA estimates that this would happen. This error illustrates the limits of CIA competence.

Manolo Ray's Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP) was the sole exile group with an effective underground network of agents and informers inside Cuba. Ray, who had been Castro's first Minister of Public Works, broke with Castro because he felt the latter had betrayed the revolution for a Communist-style dictatorship. He and his MRP were dedicated to the social and economic reforms pledged by the revolutionary movement, and he favored the restoration of democratic government after the overthrow of Castro. The CIA, however, distrusted Ray because of his past associations and social reformist ideas.

The CIA's choice for support fell on Captain Manuel Artime Buesa, a former Castro officer whose group was called the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR). It included a high percentage of landowners, professional men, and former members of

Batista's army. Militarily the MRR was more knowledgeable and efficient than the MRP, but it was less likely to obtain popular support from Cubans because of the identification of so many of its members with Batista. But such political factors as these apparently did not concern the CIA. When the agency formed a seven-member Cuban Council to coordinate all Cuban exile groups, on March 20, 1961, the MRP was unrepresented. After the Bay of Pigs, the MRP transferred its entire headquarters from Miami to Puerto Rico, and stated that it would continue to work for Cuban independence but would reject all US assistance out of hand.

In strategic terms a major failure of the CIA involvement in the Bay of Pigs was its lack of relevance to operational realities. The CIA officials who planned the invasion did so in complete freedom from the normal public pressures which surround most Federal policy actions in a free society. They became so absorbed in its development as to lose all perspective. The possibility of failure or error apparently did not occur to them. Yet the size and scope of the operation clearly called for objective evaluation from outside sources, as well as highly accurate intelligence.

The one concession to strategic flexibility was the preparation of two alternative plans of invasion. Both required complete concealment of US participation; otherwise they differed significantly. One plan envisaged multiple landings of small forces at various points along the Cuban coast, the landings timed to coincide with a massive campaign of sabotage by the anti-Castro underground. This plan was favored by the MRP. The second plan, ultimately adopted, called for a single landing by an invasion force of approximately 1,000 men, with strong air support and US fleet units on standby offshore. It was assumed that the landing would set off a series of uprisings; the invaders would pick up support as they fought inland, until Castro's army would collapse as had Batista's. In the final days of their training, the brigade was told that there would be a diversionary landing in Oriente Province and a pretended landing at Pinar del Rio, but neither the diversion nor the feint was carried out.

An air of unreality pervaded the entire plan, as there was no contact between the brigade members in training and their presumed supporters inside Cuba. This accounts for the almost complete failure in combat intelligence. Not only were the strategic intelligence estimates on which the plan was based incomplete and inaccurate, they were never checked with other intelligence estimates made by other agencies of the US Government. Apparently no total intelligence evaluation was made of the Cuban situation before the invasion. Evaluation was limited to separate and unrelated

military estimates; vital personal appraisals by trained agents were never solicited. Also, CIA estimates of Cuban ground strength conflicted with Defense Department estimates and these were never reconciled. Although the Department of State rejected the CIA view that Castro's army would prove unreliable in a show-down, apparently nothing was done to check these estimates. The conflict between bureaucratic elements was intense--and tragic.

Two elements in the military planning, equipment, and support for the operation are of particular significance. In order to conceal US participation only arms and equipment freely available on the international market were to be used. Thus, in the face of Castro's well-trained army, equipped with Communist-supplied weapons, the firepower of the invasion force was hopelessly inadequate. Also unfortunate was the failure of the first pre-invasion bombing raid to knock out Castro's Soviet-equipped air force completely, for the bombers flown by Cuban and American contract pilots were no match for the Cuban MIGs. Full coordination of strategy and tactics, with effective modern firepower, together with highly accurate intelligence and favorable political factors are essential to the success of limited military operations.

CONCLUSIONS

The Bay of Pigs was a failure in military, political, and psychological terms. It resulted in a serious loss of prestige for the United States in international affairs, exposing weaknesses and divided counsels as to US policy objectives and the use of small-scale military actions to attain those objectives. It encouraged divisions within the Western alliance because of the evidence of military unpreparedness, inefficiency, rivalry between components of the national bureaucracy, incomplete intelligence, and US readiness to compromise high moral standards on the assumption that national security was endangered. The failure, combined with evidence of US vacillation and indecision, also encouraged the Soviet Union to take positive steps toward creating a Communist base of power in the Western Hemisphere, and to raise the level of its national objectives in this area, and specifically to undertake installation of an operational missile base in Cuba. If the Bay of Pigs had any favorable result at all, it was the lack of understanding by the Soviet Union that conflicting views within the leadership of a democracy do not necessarily spell weakness; in the missile crisis of 1962 it was the Soviet Union that showed irresolution.

The Bay of Pigs was a military failure for a variety of reasons. But the military failure is less significant to the conduct of US foreign policy than the political failure. The CIA, despite its attempts to act in secret and its elaborate arrangements to use men and equipment that did not come from official sources, inevitably committed the US Government to a course which, as it turned out, the Government was not prepared to support. The directive by which the agency was charged with a secret operational responsibility was in itself a miscalculation of the nature of limited conflict. The scope, the logistics, and political implications went far beyond the capability of any intelligence agency, and particularly one which is essentially nonmilitary in nature.

The problems of reconciling differing views in the policy-making apparatus of a democratic government, where the personal views of the participants are subject to pressures of public opinion, are illustrated in the Bay of Pigs decision. The activists, or strongly anti-Communist elements, sought a quick military solution to the Castro problem. More moderate elements recognized the inseparability of political and military objectives and were inclined to oppose intervention as not in keeping with traditional American positions. Agreement on a mandate for action for the CIA did not eliminate the differences of opinion, but by assigning responsibility to that agency in effect reduced the contributions which other agencies might have made to the planning process.

In comparison with other examples of US intervention in the affairs of weaker states, the abortive invasion of Cuba suggests certain conclusions in regard to the effectiveness of politico-military actions in support of national policy decisions. It is likely to become the classic example of the failure of military force when unaccompanied by adequate political direction. The Bay of Pigs illustrates the importance of awareness by political leaders of foreign political attitudes, and particularly of changes in the established political order, without which the effective application of limited military force in a given country to achieve US objectives is difficult. Such awareness must be based not only on adequate information but on its proper interpretation, a factor which in the past may have suffered from distortion resulting from obsession with the Communist threat and an inclination possibly to view political conditions for US intervention more favorably than they are in reality. The tendency to move quickly must be tempered by a realistic appraisal of the political circumstances as well as the implications and consequences of success or failure. The virtual impossibility of escaping attribution of responsibility or at least implication in such action makes it highly unlikely that the United States could successfully perform such an operation covertly in the future. The effects of

open intervention on allies as well as on opponents must certainly be given weight in arriving at a decision to initiate politico-military action in support of national policy.

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Laos (1954-1962)*

by

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SUMMARY

During the years bounded by the two Geneva conferences on Southeast Asia (1954-1962), the United States attempted to halt the spread of communism in that area without becoming involved in a shooting war there. Through two administrations it tried to use various means--bilateral diplomacy, multilateral treaty, military assistance, economic aid, show of force--to achieve its purposes in Southeast Asia, and specifically in Laos. Its success was extremely limited. By 1962 the Communists held far more Laotian territory than they had in 1954. Many factors contributed to the failures, of which the most significant may have been a lack of unified and effective policy and direction from US leadership.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Throughout the period 1954-1962, the United States was groping for a diplomatic solution to the problem of containing communism in Southeast Asia. There was determination to avoid a "shooting war in Asia" in this post-Korea period. The United States failed to contain communism in Laos, and the effect of this failure on South Vietnam was critical.

2. US failure in Laos during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations should be ascribed largely to (1) lack of unified policy and unified operation of the various US agencies and

*This paper was prepared with the assistance of Joanne Siegmund.

individuals involved, (2) failure to recognize fully the threat posed by Communist-directed insurgency, and (3) failure to identify and consistently support those elements in Laos that are not Communist and are also able to win the loyalty of the countryside.

3. The US presidential election of 1960 had the unfortunate effect of suspending US decision-making and action at a crucial period for Laos.

4. Lack of unified policy was also apparent among the Western democratic powers involved. At Geneva in 1954 differences in purpose among the Western powers, based on their varying strategic positions and national objectives, seriously handicapped the Western position.

5. The French had a deleterious effect on the development of an independent Laos, failing to live up to their obligations to provide military training, hampering US efforts, and obstructing the work of the International Control Commission. This action was apparently related to French resentment at the replacement of France by the United States as the dominant outside power in what had been French Indochina.

6. The Geneva 1954 agreements left the Royal Lao government in a virtually untenable position, so far as defending its territory was concerned. The country was in fact, though not in words, partitioned, with the Communists in control of two of its twelve provinces. The government had no effective means to protect its share of the country.

7. The International Control Commission established in 1954 failed in its purpose of insuring that terms of the Geneva agreements on Laos were carried out. It is safe to say flatly that such a three-man group, with Communist representation and a rule of unanimity, can never enforce an agreement fairly and effectively.

8. Ethnic differences and grievances of ethnic minorities were significant factors in the spread of communism in Laos.

9. US aid was given to Laos after 1954 in a way that helped defeat US purposes. Although it made possible the Royal Lao army, a necessity for an independent Laos, it also brought about a serious rural inflation, encouraged corruption in government officials, and undermined Lao traditions of service. Perhaps most serious, emphasis on the necessary military and import programs, without a balancing emphasis on effective economic aid to the villagers, did much to alienate the latter and to help Communist propaganda and subversion.

10. Military coups, sometimes unrelated to ideology, played a significant role in undermining government stability in Laos and confusing US policy.

11. There were divergencies of aim within the Communist camp even before the Sino-Soviet debate, although the Communists were far more unified than the Western powers. The Viet Minh suffered somewhat from the fact that the Soviet Union and China were following a relatively "soft" line in 1954.

12. Changes in Soviet and Communist Chinese ideological and tactical policies were reflected in Laos. Chinese espousal of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" was in evidence in 1954; the "Spirit of Camp David" apparently temporarily softened the Laotian Communist offensive in 1959; and assurances by Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy at Vienna in June 1961 affected US actions at Geneva in 1962.

13. Recent technological changes played virtually no role in the political, military, and psychological warfare that took place in Laos during this period.

GENEVA, 1954

The Geneva Conference of 1954 was called to end armed conflict on the Indochinese Peninsula. The general intent of the Western powers was to halt further Communist expansion by creating a favorable atmosphere for the peaceful development of the newly independent states of Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. For Laos, the goal was the establishment of a politically unified and economically stable country which, by avoiding military alliances, would not become a pawn in the East-West power struggle.

In reaching these goals at Geneva, the Western powers were hampered by two serious obstacles. First, the Communists were winning militarily in that part of Southeast Asia. The negotiations, despite their lofty hopes, were in reality a last-ditch effort, from the West's point of view, to halt Communist expansion and salvage what could be salvaged. Second, the Western nations, beneath their general agreement, had widely divergent aims in the area.

Aims of the Western Nations

France was primarily concerned with extricating herself from an untenable situation, rather than with establishing a meaningful peace and the machinery to preserve it. After eight draining years of fighting in Indochina, the French had little interest in, or reserve effort for, containing Communist expansion in this part of the world. At the same time they were somewhat resentful of the Americans as their apparent successors, or supplanters, in Indochina.

French internal politics also played an important and deleterious role at Geneva, since the French needed a quick settlement for domestic reasons. When Mendes-France became Premier in June 1954, he vowed to achieve peace within 30 days or resign. This commitment further damaged the already-weak bargaining position of the West.

The British were equally anxious for a settlement, and wished to avoid military commitments in the area beyond their current involvement in the Malaya Emergency. The United States, on the other hand, was primarily interested in containing further Communist expansion in the area, rather than in a quick settlement. US strategy placed its faith, not in the Geneva Agreement, to which it eventually declined assent, but in a regional security system. Foreshadowed by Dean Rusk's efforts as Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East in November 1951, this security system developed into SEATO in 1954. Although Laos was not a member, a protocol to the treaty extended SEATO protection to her against Communist aggression.¹

There was lack of communication and coordination among the Western powers at Geneva. They seem to have had no prepared plan for concerted action. The initiative was given to the Communists.

The Communist Position; Communist Gains

The Communists at Geneva, bargaining from a position of military strength, sought to consolidate their gains and keep both the United Nations and the United States out of Indochina. Yet at the same time, the Soviets and Chinese, clearly sharing international objectives in 1954, were moving toward a "moderate" or "soft" foreign policy line, and probably sought to enhance their image among the new neutral nations by cooperating in an Indochina peace. It was in this period that Chou En-lai became the foremost

"salesman" for the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence," hawking them expertly to Premiers Nehru (India) and Nu (Burma) preparatory to his triumph at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. Because of this policy, the Chinese appear to have exerted pressure on the more intransigent Viet Minh to accept withdrawal of all foreign troops (except a small French training mission) from Laos. But the Viet Minh succeeded in two other military respects: they excluded reference to "irregular" forces, i.e., guerrillas; and they won the point of large-scale consolidation of their proteges, the Pathet Lao troops, in two northern Lao provinces, contiguous to both Communist China and North Vietnam. It was imperative for the Viet Minh that this section of Laos, that is the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, be in friendly hands, as this was its crucial route of access to South Vietnam.

The International Control Commission at Geneva and in Practice

There is significance beyond Laos in the Geneva provision for an international control commission to supervise the carrying out of the cease-fire and the terms of the agreements. From the beginning, the participants agreed to the need for international supervision in principle, and an international control commission was in line with the agreements reached at the earlier Korean conference. The Communists suggested a four-power commission made up of such "neutral" nations as India, Pakistan, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.² Western countries countered with proposals for UN supervision or a commission made up of five Asian nations.³

It was then necessary to delimit the functions and procedures of the commission. Voting procedure became the argument that was never quite settled and plagued the International Control Commission (ICC) all its life. The Communists expressed the view that, since the commission did not have power to enforce its recommendations, these would have to be unanimous to have any effect at all. This argument presupposed that the members of the commission would not be objective or neutral. If carried out, it would mean that any suggestion that was not unanimous would not be made, and that any that was unanimous would depend for its effect on the good will of the party to whom it was made. The West finally agreed to unanimity on "major issues"--which were left undefined--while insisting on majority voting for all other questions. Nothing was clearly specified in a binding way.

The lack of authority and controls for the ICC was to prevent it from achieving a lasting settlement. In practice it was

further handicapped by a number of factors, of which the following were especially significant: the unwillingness of the Indian chairman to attempt to force quick settlements on disputed issues; gross obstructionism by the French authorities responsible for ICC logistic support; and open hostility, including firing on ICC inspection teams and ICC aircraft, by the Pathet Lao.

THE ECONOMY OF LAOS

Laos has an inward-looking, subsistence economy, rather than a diversified commercial economy integrated into a national system and tied into the world economic order. Over 90% of the people follow agricultural pursuits. Land has always been plentiful, and in peacetime Laos can produce enough to feed herself. With a population estimated at below 3,000,000, Laos has a relatively low population density. There is no "land reform" problem. Systems of land tenure in rural areas are traditionally quite loose.

Laos has only light industry, very little of that, and almost all of it is concentrated in the administrative capital, Vientiane. The transportation net is primitive, and natural resources are largely unexplored. There are some mineral deposits, of which only tin and salt were mined during this period. The rich forests have varying commercial value. When the absence of local capital and the natural wariness of foreign investors--in view of the political situation--are added to this picture, it is clear that Laos has no great immediate possibilities of industrial or diversified development.

Laos grew almost totally dependent on foreign aid for the increased security responsibilities which her situation as a newly independent nation demanded. If the United States had not shouldered the burden of underwriting the Lao government in this period, Laos would almost certainly have succumbed to the planning and operations of the Hanoi-Peking axis.

The influx of US funds and the creation of the Royal Lao army did, however, exacerbate existing economic problems in a country that had little experience with a money economy. Each month the US Government made a multimillion dollar deposit to the Royal Lao government, which then provided Laotian currency to pay the soldiers, police, and civil servants (see Appendix B, Table 1). To prevent runaway inflation, an elaborate commodity import program was worked out to absorb the salary payments.

Introduction of an increasing amount of cash where little has been must lead to dislocations under the most favorable circumstances. In Laos these were magnified grossly in the implementation of the import program, which became marked by widespread corruption. While the import program operated on the official rate of 35 kip to the dollar, up to 110 to the dollar could be obtained in Bangkok and Hong Kong. This great disparity led to speculation in foreign exchange in which hard goods became merely the medium for defrauding the import program; Laos' trade imbalance increased dramatically. Despite American efforts to support the kip, its value on the free market declined steadily, resulting in serious rural inflation.

Other effects of the aid program were equally deleterious, if more subtle. The concentration of economic development, and the growth of a wealthy class of officials and merchants in Vientiane, aggravated rural-urban mutual distrust. Social and class differences were accentuated, and money became a prime goal among the young, undermining the Lao tradition of service. Officials caught up in their new lives lost contact with the countryside, and forfeited their authority there by growing involvement in corruption, and lack of concern for the hinterlands. The elite seemed to feel that the government should benefit the whole society, but them the most. No member of the government ever went to jail for corruption, although many took handsome profits from irregularities in obtaining and trading in import licenses, and other aspects of the program.⁴ And some Americans shared in this loose loot.

The new importance ascribed to making money was evidenced in the rapid increase in the number of applicants for the police and military, while applicants for the priesthood and teaching declined.

Ultimately the most crucial result of the economic aid program may have been the alienation of the rural population: it certainly failed to win their support. Emphasis on the military and the import program, both of which were necessary, without a concomitant emphasis for the villagers, resulted in gross neglect of the countryside.

Only a small per cent of the US funds was spent in agriculture for direct aid to over 90% of the population. The commodity imports benefited them indirectly, but no real village aid program was initiated until the fall of 1957. Even the highly touted road and dam projects were largely ineffective. Work was often poorly planned and executed; and the failure of the US technicians to give the local Lao a sense of personal involvement

and achievement, and most particularly their failure to train them in the use and repair of equipment and of the structures they had built, more often than not made the beneficial effects of these projects very temporary.⁵

Anticipating that the Communists would exploit this weakness in the rural program in campaigning for the May 1958 elections, the United States early in 1958 initiated the first meaningful village aid program, with 90 work projects. But the situation was already far gone. The Pathet Lao had been organizing cells all over the country. Corruption and dependence on the United States, plus rural discontent, provided fertile ground for the Communists. By giving the Lao government a military weapon to offset its essentially political weakness, without, however, providing domestic security and economic stability, the United States had created an issue for the opposition. This could be made to appear all the more real by the concomitant effect of US visibility and presumed responsibility for what was occurring.⁶ The Communists seemingly had an additional excuse for intervention.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

BETWEEN GENEVAS, 1954-1962

De Facto Partition

The most serious problem faced by the Royal Lao government after the Geneva conference was de facto partition, without the means to defend its side of the partition. Of its twelve provinces, two northern ones had been virtually given to the Pathet Lao at Geneva. Actually the Pathet Lao had been given regroupment areas in the provinces, but from the first they had claimed control of the entire provinces, and had effectively resisted all efforts of the Royal Lao government to exercise national sovereignty there. The International Control Commission was also effectively prevented from supervising and inspecting the execution of the cease-fire in Pathet Lao territory.

During the period 1954-1958, the government carried out intermittent negotiations with the Pathet Lao, urged on by the ICC and its Indian chairman, especially following a visit of Prime Minister Nehru in fall 1954. The ICC and Nehru encouraged acceptance of Pathet Lao rights in the northern provinces.

Growth of the Pathet Lao

While government negotiations with the Pathet Lao were proceeding intermittently, the Communists were using their Phong Saly and Sam Neua bases to increase their military and political influence where the government authority was weak.

By terror, the Pathet Lao entrenched itself in these two provinces and impeded the work of the ICC. It steadily built up its military force, with the covert assistance of North Vietnam. Pathet Lao cadre troops expanded from an estimated 1,000 in 1954 to over 6,000 in 1958.

In August 1954, a nucleus of well-indoctrinated propagandists and "irregulars" remained in the provinces that had been earlier invaded while the rest of the Pathet Lao regrouped in Phong Saly and Sam Neua. This subversive network was charged with preparing arms caches, receiving agents sent from Sam Neua, and similar missions. Groups of agents were sent throughout Laos as early as May 1955, to the regions of which they were native.

By mid-1956 the Pathet Lao and its Viet Minh supporters were concentrating in the two northern provinces and extending their influence in all of the remaining ten. They had recruited 3,000 new cadres in their northern base, and as a result the Pathet Lao "administration" could release several hundred hard-core Communists for clandestine missions throughout the country. The majority were sent to areas bordering Vietnam, and heavy concentrations were also sent to Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Savannakhet, Thakket, and the Bolovens Plateau in southern Laos.

Concentrating on isolated rural areas, the Communists played on the discontent of the ethnic minorities. They even encouraged the Meo minority to believe that they could have their own state under Communist rule.

The Communists operated on the family level, making the most of traditional kinship ties. They operated through women's, youth, and peasant organizations. They trained people to disobey and unseat their elected village chiefs, who represented the only link with the provincial and national governments.

The fruits of their efforts during the first four years were clear in the 1958 elections. Inhibited somewhat thereafter by the anti-Communist turn of the Phoui Sananikone government, they stepped up their campaign of armed rebellion, at the signal of the

escape of the 2nd Pathet Lao battalion. The misguided thrust of the American aid program, plus the political inefficiency of the Lao government, contributed immeasurably to their new position of strength.

The tragedy of the growth of Communist strength in the countryside was all the more heightened by the fact that many intimidated rural Lao chose to flee their native villages rather than subject themselves to Pathet Lao "liberation." From 1959 on, the Lao economy was further burdened by a growing refugee problem, and the need to support these dislocated people with emergency supplies until they could re-achieve self-sufficiency. The United States aided the Lao government in these efforts by providing supplies and a delivery system of unarmed relief flights.

The Pathet Lao took the position, with increasing hostility through 1961 and 1962, that these mercy missions violated their territory, and impeded them in every way possible, including shooting down the unarmed planes.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, generally neutralist in orientation, negotiated an agreement with his Pathet Lao half-brother, Prince Souvannouvong, calling for reunification and elections, and pledging allegiance to Nehru's "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" with Communist countries. Souvannouvong came into the government. In July 1958, the ICC withdrew at the request of the coalition government on the grounds that its work had been completed. Both the Hanoi regime and the Lao Communists willingly acquiesced in its leaving.

The elections called for in the agreement were held in May 1958, and the Communists did well, so well that the diverse anti-Communist elements in the country were spurred into action. Two new anti-Communist political parties were formed. The Progressive and Independent parties combined into a new party, the Rally of the Laotian People (RL²), which controlled some 38 seats out of the 59 in the National Assembly. Shortly thereafter, a group of army officers, civil servants, and leading families from the south established a new group, the Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI). Alarmed at the drift to the "left" and disgusted with the conduct of some of the older, conservative leaders who had been prominent in various governments since 1954, the CDNI espoused a strong pro-Western and anti-Communist stand. From the beginning, these "young Turks" had the endorsement of some US quarters and apparently of the heir-apparent to the throne, the present king. Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan were among their prominent leaders.

Souvanna Phouma was unable to form a government, because of opposition to his policy of coalition with the Pathet Lao. Phoui Sananikone became Prime Minister, and the Pathet Lao, excluded from the government, intensified the buildup of their military strength.

The Crisis of 1959

The year 1959 was crucial in the Laotian story. The escape of the 2nd Pathet Lao battalion in May--when the government attempted to integrate it into the Royal Lao army--led to a round of skirmishes in Phong Saly and Sam Neua provinces through June and July. In August Viet Minh troops and artillery aid joined the Pathet Lao forces, and in September Laos appealed to the United Nations for help. An investigating team was quickly dispatched, but hostilities, on a threat from SEATO, appeared to have suddenly ceased. The UN team found indication of hostile action but did not or could not name Viet Minh participation.

But all the moves in this contest were not left to the United Nations. On September 5, 1959, the United States issued a White Paper on The Situation in Laos. The State Department made clear the manner in which the Communists, directed and materially assisted from Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow, were working to obtain control over Laos through continuation of diplomatic maneuvers, political subversion, and guerrilla warfare. It agreed to respond "to specific requests from the Lao Government for improving its defense position." Not only did the United States indicate its willingness to "support the dispatch of a United Nations force to Laos if this becomes necessary to halt Communist aggression," it also moved elements of the Seventh Fleet closer to the zone of conflict.⁷ Thirty days later, Admiral Harry D. Felt, Commander in Chief, Pacific, spoke in Australia of US atom-powered submarine readiness in the Pacific. Perhaps these potent items lent credibility to the decision of SEATO, announced September 26:

In the event of its becoming necessary to defend the integrity of Laos against intervention, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization has made preparations so as to be able to act promptly within the framework of the Manila Treaty.⁸

The United States seemed then--in words, deeds, and the promise of more deeds, and without recourse to the Geneva Accords of 1954--determined to thwart the clear Communist objective of taking

over Laos. This posture, plus timing--it came at a time when Khrushchev was cultivating the "Spirit of Camp David," during and after his meetings with President Eisenhower at the Maryland retreat in September 1959--helped to still for a short while the Communists' Laotian offensive.

Breakup of the Anti-Communist Coalition

After these events in the early fall of 1959, Communist military activity temporarily subsided in Laos. Pathet Lao forces were still encamped in their eastern border areas. They obviously had a directing base and sanctuary at or near Dien Bien Phu, but they took the time, or were forced, to regroup and plan afresh.⁹

With this momentary lull in the battle against Communist insurgency and war-by-proxy, the Laotians in late 1959 turned to domestic politics and, unhappily, to discord. The government of Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone had promised, in January 1959, to hold new elections for the National Assembly at the end of one year, during which Phoui had a mandate to rule without parliamentary consent. The RLP and the CDNI, the anti-Communist groups which had formed the coalition controlling the Royal Lao government, had a falling out. The issue which divided them, when reduced to political rather than constitutional terms, related to which authority would be in control of the government at the time of the agreed-upon new general elections, scheduled for April 1960. This badly timed and essentially unproductive domestic quarrel was resolved by a bloodless army coup that overturned Phoui Sananikone's government as the 1959 year ended.

This Putsch was a consequence of the generals' disgust at the political situation. They feared with no discernible evidence that Phoui's threatened elimination of CDNI influence from the cabinet might lead to a reconciliation with the Pathet Lao. The frustration of the generals was enhanced by their conviction that they alone had the organizational strength to prepare the country to resist the Communist menace.

The CIA as it appears--unlike the State Department--decided to back the CDNI leader, General Phoumi Nongsavan, because the army was, in its opinion also, the only organization that could "put through a program of development in a country where there were no effective political parties, where basic education was still lacking, where malaria and malnutrition were rampant, and where the most lucrative, if unofficial export, was opium."¹⁰

In the final analysis, based on his interviews with leading US and Lao officials, the present author finds no basis for the military coup beyond a conflict between elites--which persists to this day. In the face of strong US criticism of this negation of the constitutional process, the generals retreated.

In early January 1960, civilian government was restored, with Khou Abhay as Prime Minister, to prepare Laos for the new elections. The elections were held April 24. The two anti-Communist groups won all the seats. Beyond question, the army involved itself in the election by arranging for voting only in districts where it could provide or maintain order. Whether this prevented the election of any Communists or their allies is an issue on which debate has raged. There is no way to ascertain the truth of what happened, although there is little doubt that the elections were not free and fair by Western standards. General Phoumi Nosavan, an avowed anti-Communist and head of the CDNI, was the key figure in the elections. His candidate, Tiao Somsanith, was designated Prime Minister in early May 1960.

Just prior to the elections, Prince Souvanna Phouma, twice former Prime Minister, returned from his ambassadorial post in France to stand for and win an uncontested seat from Luang Prabang. He became President, the presiding officer, in the newly elected National Assembly.

Near the end of the month, May 23-24, Souvannouvong and some 15 other Communist Pathet Lao leaders escaped or bribed their way out of their police camp jail, located on the outskirts of Vientiane. They made their way to the border areas and rejoined their Communist comrades. There does not appear to be any causal relationship between Souvannouvong's escape and the dramatic episode which precipitated the next phase of the Laotian crisis. But once it occurred, the Pathet Lao and all their allies made the most of it.

Kong Le's Coup

Among the officers of the Royal army, the abortive generals' Putsch of December 1959 set a dangerous precedent. Discontent with the value of the American military aid program, the lack of economic development resulting from concentration on military objectives, disgust with corruption in government, smouldering resentment at the treatment by the Lao elite of the non-Lao groups, fanned by well-placed Communist propaganda from the leading spokesman (Quinim Pholsena) in Vientiane of the Communist Neo Lao

Hak Sat party appear to have motivated the successful August 8-9, 1960, coup in Vientiane by a young paratroop battalion captain, Kong Le. His crack unit had borne the brunt of fighting against the guerrillas in 1959 and did not share the attitudes of the CDNI. When he and his supporters finally settled on their political leader, they insisted on someone who would, in effect, return to the former policy of collaboration with the Communists. Souvanna Phouma was their man, and he was selected on August 15 to head the government as Prime Minister. Phouma had left Luang Prabang, where he and other members of the legal government had gone, and arrived in Vientiane before August 15. By his presence there he gave support to the rebels, who then became the "legal" government.

With Souvanna Phouma's return to power, the struggle for Laos entered a decisive phase. During his previous tenure as Prime Minister, he had formed a coalition government with the Communists and had oriented its diplomacy toward friendship with the Communist bloc. This orientation had been reversed by the anti-Communist political groups who coalesced in 1958, after the stunning election showing by the Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat. The breakup of the anti-Communist coalition, followed by Kong Le's coup, opened the way for a return to the policies pursued by the previous Souvanna Phouma regime.

In this new Vientiane cabinet, Souvanna Phouma also retained the portfolios of Defense and Foreign Affairs. Quinim Pholsena, leader of the small Communist-front Santiphah party, who had earlier demonstrated his sympathies and had been a spokesman for the Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat, held the ministries of Interior (Police), Sports, and Youth. He used these effectively to bring out mass anti-American demonstrations in Vientiane, as needed. But the cabinet also included Prince Boun Oum, an anti-Communist, who in terms of royal family status was second only to the king in Luang Prabang. At this time, Souvanna Phouma claimed that he wanted to form a neutral government, including Phoumi Nosavan and the CDNI. It is not clear whether he told the American Embassy of any plans to include the Pathet Lao also, but it was most probable that Pholsena would insist on such a policy, which had been the basis of Souvanna Phouma's earlier efforts to head a government.

General Phoumi Nosavan and other members of the previous anti-Communist government refused to acknowledge the new government, established and maintained in Vientiane by Kong Le's paratroopers. Phoumi and the main units of the Royal Lao army withdrew to their main southern base at Savannakhet, about 180 miles south of Vientiane, on the Mekong River in the panhandle of Laos.

In this still fluid situation--in which Souvanna Phouma was seeking to establish a coalition government of some sort--negotiations with his Communist half-brother, Souvannouvong, may well have been channeled through Pholsena. For before Phoumi Nosavan's position had thoroughly hardened, the Pathet Lao were aware of detailed events in Vientiane. Souvannouvong broadcast threats, calling on Laotians to "rise up and kill" all "agents of the American imperialists," including Phoumi's "rebel groups."¹¹ At this time, the king in Luang Prabang made one of his two public and valiant efforts to end the political strife between Souvanna Phouma and Phoumi Nosavan. In the last days of August, he summoned the National Assembly to the royal capital and worked out, by August 30, a compromise cabinet inclusive of and accepted by these two leaders. This compromise cabinet, the nearest thing to a neutral one, was publicly denounced by Kong Le and Pholsena, whose respective troops and police still controlled Vientiane. Phoumi thereupon went back to Savannakhet. Souvanna Phouma, however, returned to Vientiane, made no visible effort to persuade Kong Le and Pholsena to accept the king's compromise, and again joined forces with the coup group, declaring Phoumi Nosavan a "rebel" if he did not return to that city. Prince Boun Oum, convinced that the coup group was Communist influenced and infiltrated, if not controlled, thereupon became the civilian leader of General Phoumi Nosavan's faction.

Whenever Souvanna Phouma had made a final choice of alliances it had always been with the Pathet Lao and his half-brother, Souvannouvong, and with such crypto-Communists as Pholsena. Yet just before the August 30 meeting with the king in Luang Prabang, the new US Ambassador, Winthrop G. Brown, reportedly gave assurances to Souvanna Phouma that the US Government considered the differences between his regime at Vientiane and General Phoumi Nosavan's at Savannakhet to be a question of internal affairs in which the United States would not interfere.¹² Immediately after Souvanna Phouma returned from this meeting, the United States was reported as "giving guarded support to the new neutralist Government of Laos."¹³ And five days later, two US diplomats, according to press reports, visited Savannakhet "with a sharply worded letter from the United States Ambassador Winthrop G. Brown, stating that the United States has no intention of supporting any revolutionary plans General Phoumi Nosavan might have."¹⁴

In less than two months the new US Ambassador to Laos had succeeded in completely reversing the policy followed by Washington during the two previous years! For the United States had rejected Souvanna Phouma on the basis of his Communist-coalition party in 1957, and had, in 1958-1959, given ardent support to the governments of the RLP and CDNI, which expressly excluded

crypto-Communist and Pathet Lao elements. US policy in the fall of 1960, however, seems to have accepted Souvanna Phouma at something approaching his own estimate of himself. His earlier and never concealed Communist-coalition policy was simply ignored.

Whatever the difficulties and criticisms of governments provided by the Rally of the Laotian People and the Committee for the Defense of National Interests between August 1958 and August 1960, these governments had been supported by Washington because it was clearly recognized that they were anti-Communist, pro-United Nations, and friendly to the West. That they--like all governments in Laos throughout the past millenium--have been dominated by the elite is true, as is the fact that their observance of parliamentary democracy in the elections of April 1960 left much to be desired. But that these governments and their leaders, unlike those headed by Souvanna Phouma, knew that they had to fight for survival against an international Communist conspiracy and insurgency is also true. In a hasty about-face, based on inadequate estimates, the United States had directed its "sharp words" not against the coup group in Vientiane, but against its friends in Savannakhet. And at this time, the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh military forces stepped up their campaign in the northern provinces of Sam Neua and Xieng Khouang and across the panhandle from the 17th parallel, aiming at Savannakhet, where they engaged troops loyal to General Phoumi Nosavan.

The Spread of Hostilities

Communist strategy in September 1960 sought to take further advantage of the political divisions within the country, while simultaneously giving indirect support to the Pathet Lao-endorsed Keng Le coup group, who now legally held the government. Radio Hanoi announced on September 19 that Souvannouvong was ready to negotiate with Souvanna Phouma. General Phoumi, however, realized that unless he retook the administrative capital of Vientiane, his movement would be doomed. Prince Boun Oum announced this intention September 19, some time after fighting between Vientiane and Savannakhet forces had erupted.

The diplomatic moves of the next two months are sometimes difficult to follow. Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi Nosavan once again accepted an invitation from the king to try to patch up their differences. It was agreed, at a meeting in Luang Prabang on September 28, that fighting was to be temporarily suspended. However, Keng Le and Pholsena refused to accept this new cease-fire and Souvanna Phouma once again abided by their views.

He announced at a major mass meeting held in Vientiane that negotiations with the Communist Pathet Lao would begin "within a week." He "absolutely" was not negotiating with the anti-Communist Phoumi and Boun Oum, he told this audience, and added that he had invited an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Soviet Union.

Approximately one week later, J. Graham Parsons, US Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and John N. Irwin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, alarmed by the turn of events, hastened to Vientiane. The United States had contributed at least \$300 million to Laos since 1955 in order to keep it out of the hands of the Communists. It had, after the Kong Le coup, backed Souvanna Phouma in the hope that, with the support of Kong Le's paratroopers, he would bring some peace to a non-Communist Laos. Now, once again, Souvanna Phouma was opening the door to the Pathet Lao and had, by mid-October 1960, initiated and exchanged diplomatic instruments with Moscow. Parsons, by all accounts, attempted to sway him from such a course, but failed, despite the use of a temporary punitive measure (suspending aid funds).¹⁵

At this point, it seemed unlikely that Washington policymakers could entertain any doubts about Souvanna Phouma's real intentions. Whatever may have been the expectation that he would not cooperate with the Communists, he was now once again, more than ever, committed to a policy of coalition with them. This should have been a decisive political moment, for in a country such as Laos, weak in political leadership and inexperienced in Communist machinations, such a coalition policy most probably precludes disaster. If Souvanna Phouma had been willing to head a non-Communist coalition government, the United States might conceivably have taken a chance. But his rejection of the Parsons mission and all that this implied should have turned US leaders emphatically to General Phoumi Nosavan, or to someone else, if he were not the proper choice. Instead, in one of the most anomalous moves in contemporary diplomacy, US policymakers for Laos during the fall of 1960 decided to continue military, financial, and material aid to Souvanna Phouma and Kong Le's troops, as well as to Phoumi Nosavan!¹⁶

Shortly after the arrival of the first Soviet Ambassador, A.N. Abramov, on October 13, 1960, the Pathet Lao received a Soviet airlift of petroleum products, weapons--including howitzers and mortars--and other military equipment.¹⁷ There is also some evidence of increased supplies from Hanoi.

The end of 1960 saw the overthrow of Souvanna Phouma's government and the restoration of the anti-Communists, led by General Phoumi Nosavan, who recaptured Vientiane December 13-15. After Kong Le and some of his troops retreated from Vientiane in mid-December, they joined Communist Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces in the border regions, setting up a command center in Xieng Khouang Province. There they regrouped their forces and began to receive a steady flow of supplies brought in by Soviet air drops and by road from North Vietnam. The Soviet involvement in Laos was soon to be felt.

Although the new year started with a pro-Western government in power, the situation in Laos was far from stable. Again, reliable intelligence on Communist maneuvers in north and east Laos was not available. The Royal Lao government charged that there were seven battalions of North Vietnamese troops fighting together with Kong Le and Pathet Lao elements--and that they were well-equipped with Soviet materiel. Whether or not the North Vietnamese actually invaded Laos, it became clear that the combined Kong Le-Pathet Lao forces were moving effectively not only in the northern provinces, but also down the Plaine des Jarres in Xieng Khouang Province. The Soviets announced that they did not recognize the new Boun Oum government. Souvanna Phouma, in exile, was their man. Quite promptly, Souvanna Phouma obliged by issuing a ringing denunciation of the United States for "betraying" and "double-crossing" him and his government,¹⁸ presumably because the victory of Phoumi Nosavan meant that the United States, belatedly alarmed by Soviet intervention, would no longer support both him and the general.

Assessment of the Eisenhower Administration's

Laos Policy

The Eisenhower administration had had a unique opportunity in Laos. No prior administration had dealt with this newly independent country, whose ethnically diverse peoples and geographical pieces had recently been merged after centuries of division and subordination to other powers. Obviously, the US Government was eager to help Laos to maintain its security after the 1954 Geneva Conference. Inexperience, ineptness, maladministration, and even some corruption hampered American economic aid in this effort. The French, with internationally recognized rights for training the Laotian army, not only failed in this function but did many things to thwart improvements recommended by Americans. One

deeply knowledgeable reporter, in a valuable article assessing both American and French roles, had this to say about the French:

The French, resentful of American intrusion into their one-time colony, often seemed more anti-American than anti-Communist; they failed to fulfill their treaty obligations to train the Laotian Army and assist the Laotians in fighting insurrection. They constantly influenced the Laotians against the Americans and kept up constant defeatist talk of neutralism and coalitions with the Communists.

Her assessment of the American role is equally and justifiably unflattering.¹⁹

In sum, the Eisenhower administration was deeply committed to preventing a Communist take-over in Laos. To this end, it expended about \$300 million, most of which went to pay for the armed forces "trained" by the French. The rest for the most part benefited the few, not the many. It improvised less than adequate military devices, such as the nonuniformed Program Evaluation Organization, to surmount the obstacles placed in our way by the French. Nor did it take advantage of the suspension of the ICC (and therefore perhaps of 1954 Geneva Accords), which might have made it possible to nudge the French out of their training function. Twice, in September 1959 and early January 1961, it publicly authorized a degree of military readiness in the area to back up the 1959 SEATO policy. But it failed to fulfill the brave words which SEATO had used. It could not locate that combination of Laotian political forces which would give internal stability to Laos; and, in this connection, its choices for support at the time of the Kong Le coup and afterward, as well as its policies, proved to be a disaster.

In short, the American policy of attempting to contain communist expansion in Laos by inadequate ground action (supporting the efforts of the Royal Laotian Army) and strategic deterrence (the threat to commit American troops) had failed, while there had been no invasion /sic/ by communist forces, seven years of subversion had achieved virtually the effect of an invasion.²⁰

It was unfortunate that these crucial events occurred during election time in the United States, when the outgoing administration was hardly inclined to any radical reassessment of policy.

The Kennedy Administration

While the leaders of the new administration--President Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and their advisers--were formulating policy, the Laotian situation steadily deteriorated. In the first three months of 1961 the Communists, including the Viet Minh, extended their control from Phong Saly and Sam Neua to Xieng Khouang, and launched new attacks in the eastern panhandle area, now called the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They were establishing and consolidating power over eastern Laos, contiguous with the western borders of Vietnam down to Cambodia. And during these months, US policymakers were sharply divided on what policy to pursue. The Congress, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA failed to agree on advice to the President. The President, therefore, did not elect to pursue a bold course, either through SEATO, unilaterally, or otherwise.

During these months, various proposals were aired for the solution of the crisis. The British, seconded by India, proposed revival of the International Control Commission, which the United States had always opposed. Laotian King Savang Vatthana proposed that a commission, composed of three of Laos' neighbors--Burma, Cambodia, and Malaya--be appointed to supervise the intended neutrality of Laos. The United States backed this suggestion and urged the Soviets to do likewise. The Chinese denounced the king's plan as a US ruse, and, like the Soviets, called for an "enlarged conference," along the lines of the 1954 Geneva meeting on Indochina; restoration of the ICC to Laos; and recognition of the Souvanna Phouma government as the only legitimate one. (Souvanna Phouma, having summarily departed from his post as premier in December 1960, had been living in Cambodia. In mid-February 1961, he again joined his Pathet Lao half-brother and Kong Le in Khan Khay, Xieng Khouang Province, and gave them his support against the Royal Lao government.) Cambodia's Chief of State, Norodom Sihanouk, also disagreed with King Savang Vatthana's proposal and put forth his own plan for an international conference more or less similar to the Geneva Conference of 1954. The Communist Pathet Lao and Souvanna Phouma endorsed the similar proposals of the Soviets, Chinese, and Cambodians. The Thai, usually quiet in such affairs, were annoyed that so much attention was being paid to their "rivals," the Cambodians and other neutrals. They looked forward to the forthcoming March 27 meeting of SEATO, which would determine whether SEATO would honor its obligations or become a "paper tiger."

Just prior to this SEATO meeting, President Kennedy, on March 23, made his famous televised "map" talk on "The Situation in Laos."²¹ The Presidential analysis confirmed that there was a "clear and one-sided threat" to Laotian neutrality, and that this threat came from the Soviet bloc. There had been "over 1000" air-lift sorties since "last December 13," plus "a whole supporting set of combat specialists, mainly from Communist North Viet Nam," the President revealed. It was this war which he hoped to stop by supporting the goal of "a neutral and independent Laos tied to no outside power or group of powers." He was prepared to enter into "constructive negotiations," he announced, along the lines of the British proposal (a new Geneva Conference), and he warned that if external aggression against Laos did not cease, "those who support a truly neutral Laos will have to consider their response." The SEATO meeting was specifically mentioned as one occasion for such consideration. The President added that "our support for the present duly constituted government is aimed entirely and exclusively at obtaining the above result." The "duly constituted government" meant at that time the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan government, not Souvanna Phouma.

The President had decided on an attempt to save Laos not by an act of intervention, but by diplomatic moves, which hopefully would get all "intervening" parties out of Laos--the Communists as well as ourselves.²² Laos, then, according to the President's "hope," would become independent and neutral, or neutralized by international agreement, that is, in a way corresponding to the Austrian solution. The pitfall of this approach stemmed from the incongruity of applying a "European" solution, capably policed by a well-articulated (Austrian) political public, to a Southeast Asian problem where such conditions did not exist.

At the SEATO meeting, despite objections from some of its Asian members, President Kennedy's call for a cease-fire and negotiations for a neutral Laos were, in effect, endorsed. The organization warned that if these "efforts fail," and if "there continues to be an active military attempt to obtain control of Laos," SEATO would take "whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances."²³ The SEATO meeting also revealed that France and Britain favored a new Laotian coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma; Thailand, and probably the Philippines, favored the existing Boun Oum regime; and the United States attempted to harmonize these differences. W. Averell Harriman, then Ambassador-at-large and later Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, reported to President Kennedy that "Souvanna Phouma believes that he is the man of the hour in Laos." Mr. Harriman agreed that this prince, who had never concealed his hopes of building a united

front government with the Communists, was "one of the personalities who will have to be dealt with if we are to get a neutral Laos."

The Soviets had no difficulty in agreeing to the idea of a new Geneva conference, since they, Communist China, the neutrals, and Britain had already recommended it. The President's "map" talk and the SEATO meeting merely confirmed US willingness to accept this "British proposal" (thus rejecting the advice of those American officials who had called for a strong policy), in view of the US failure to win support for King Savang Vatthana's idea of a three-nation commission. The precondition to another Geneva conference was a verified cease-fire in Laos. This required some six weeks to negotiate, during which the Communists proceeded to advance their lines in Laos with relative impunity. Simultaneously, they pressed forward in South Vietnam, where their forces were estimated by Secretary Rusk in May 1961 as four times their size in late 1959. In parallel fashion Viet Cong (Communist) activity in South Vietnam, increasingly supplied via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, had been considerably stepped up after 1959. At the time of the March 1961 SEATO Conference, it was estimated that the Viet Cong, who probably numbered about 12,000, were claiming 500 to 800 lives monthly.

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, 1961-1962

The 14-nation Geneva Conference finally opened May 16, 1961, this time with the United States as a full participant. Its membership included most of the states of mainland Southeast Asia: Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, the two Vietnams, and Laos; the three members of the original International Control Commission for Laos --India, Canada, and Poland; the USSR and the People's Republic of China; the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. From mid-May to mid-December 1961, these powers worked to draft a Declaration of Neutrality of Laos upon which they could agree. Simultaneously, the "three princes"--that is, the Royal government, headed by Prince Boun Oum; the Pathet Lao Communists, headed by Prince Souvannouvong; and the Geneva-named premier-designate, Prince Souvanna Phoum--negotiated on the distribution of power in a new coalition government for a neutral Laos. Boun Oum and especially General Phoumi Nosavan, throughout a year of intermittent negotiating sessions, remained unwilling to surrender both of the two crucial portfolios of Defense and Interior. In an effort to force the Royal government into a coalition regime, the United States, in the beginning of 1962, withdrew the \$3,000,000 monthly defense support program, which went toward defraying the

salaries of the Royal Lao armed forces. Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan refused to submit meekly to such financial punishment. They traveled to friendly Asian capitals in the vain hope of winning support for their point of view, and thereby persuading the United States to change its policy, but neither Thailand nor the Philippines could influence the US Government to alter its course.

Though President Kennedy in his "map" talk had declared our "support for the duly constituted government" in Laos, of which Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan were, respectively, premier and deputy premier, our negotiators at the Geneva Conference quickly succumbed to the views of our Western allies--views completely congenial to the Sino-Soviet bloc--with respect to the political role of Souvanna Phouma, the self-proclaimed "man of the hour." He became the premier-designate of the proposed neutral Laotian coalition government. Assistant Secretary Harriman and Ambassador Brown had apparently persuaded the Kennedy administration to support Souvanna Phouma, despite his demonstrated predilection for a coalition government which contained Communist ingredients for political disaster.

Perhaps the determining factor for US policy throughout the period of the Geneva Conference came as a result of the Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in Vienna in June 1961. For there President Kennedy seems to have become convinced of the possibility that the Soviets would adhere to an agreement for a neutral and independent Laos. Harriman indicated that the Soviets had confirmed this stand during the Geneva Conference negotiations; in May, the Assistant Secretary was reported "to believe that Russians will cooperate in the effort to make Laos neutral."²⁴

It was the acceptance of this belief in Washington which brought to the fore the Kennedy administration's "hope" for a future neutral, independent Laos, a hope to be achieved by "a diplomatic solution," without what the President called "the great hazard . . . of a shooting war . . . in the jungles of Asia."²⁵ To gain this objective, the West was willing, if necessary, to eliminate from power the leading pro-Western elements in Laotian politics, or at the least cause them to suffer a severe loss of "face."

Hostilities During Geneva

Our objective in Laos was thus the achievement of a neutral independent Laos, without a shooting war involving Americans. The

unlikelihood of accomplishing this aim was well demonstrated on May 7, 1962. At 3 A.M. the Communists in Laos began a heavy bombardment in a new sector of the tenuous cease-fire line. The target was Nam Tha, a key town south and west of Phong Saly Province and close to the Chinese border, possession of which permitted the sealing-off of Communist-held Phong Saly at its southwestern provincial line. Nam Tha's Royal Lao army garrison had recently been reinforced, for, since an earlier breach in the cease-fire and the fall of Muong Sing to the north and west, it had slowly been rimmed by Pathet Lao elements. It was obviously a military objective of the Communists. Prior to the conflict, the defending Laotian officers had rejected the advice of American military advisers, and during the battle, despite their numerical superiority to the Pathet Lao, the Royal Lao forces gave a miserable account of themselves. Forced to withdraw from Nam Tha, they fled across the Thai border.

Nam Tha represented only the most serious breach of the cease-fire agreement, which had been a prerequisite for the Geneva Conference. During the year after the Geneva Conference began, there had been repeated reports of such events. At first--that is, during the late spring of 1961--these violations could have been regarded as patrol incidents or the settling-down of the cease-fire line. (Between the May 3 cease-fire agreement and June 10, the Pathet Lao were said to have captured 19 Royal Lao army military posts and positions.) Even after such a settling-down period, however, violations continued to occur. Harriman complained of several at a November meeting in Geneva.²⁶ But the United States did nothing more than complain prior to the Nam Tha event, even though the Communists irregularly, but steadily, added to the territory they controlled. Forgotten or ignored was the SEATO warning of March 27-29, 1961, that if "an active military attempt to obtain control of Laos" continued, SEATO would take appropriate action.

When the Nam Tha incident occurred, the United States did three things. First, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman "severely rebuked" General Phoumi Nosavan for provoking the Pathet Lao by increasing the size of his defending garrison and for neglecting his duties, that is, for traveling in search of aid to replace that which the United States had withdrawn. Second, the United States protested to Moscow, whose officials, on or about May 15, presumably confirmed the continuation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev 1961 Vienna agreement on Laos.²⁷ Third, to the plaintive question raised by the Acting Foreign Minister of the Royal Lao government, Sisouk Na Champassak--"What can we say now of our friends who have confidence in the Communists? We are waiting for their reactions"²⁸--the United States gave at least

one positive answer. On May 18, the first contingent of Marines, acting under the March 1962 bilateral agreement between the United States and Thailand, landed in Bangkok. There they joined a smaller group of US armed forces, who had remained in Thailand after a recent SEATO military exercise. Eventually, some 5,000 to 6,000 US troops were stationed in northeast Thailand, on the invitation of the Thai government. They were joined by small air and ground forces from our British and Australian SEATO allies. After the Geneva Agreement of 1962 was signed, the United States substantially reduced the size of these forces.

There is no doubt that these military units were in Thailand as part of the US guarantee to that country, once it had been determined to seek neutrality for Laos. During the visit of Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Washington in the first week of March 1962, the United States gave assurances to Thailand that it would no longer permit the search for unanimity in SEATO to thwart the real security needs of Thailand. It was this assurance, given to Thailand, that made US policy in Laos tolerable for the Thai Prime Minister, Marshal Sarit.²⁹

The Communist take-over in Nam Tha provided the occasion for President Kennedy to honor this commitment to Thailand. It was designed to mean that at the time, with some 7,000 to 8,000 US forces in South Vietnam under the command of General Paul Harkins, the United States was in a state of area readiness to face external aggression against Laos and Thailand, once the Geneva Declaration became operative and of questionable effectiveness.

The Laotian "Solution"

The alarm occasioned by the Pathet Lao successes following the breach of the cease-fire in May, together with the rapid deployment of US forces in neighboring Thailand and intense pressure from the great powers, spurred the negotiations of the "three princes" on a coalition government. The three signed an accord on June 12, 1962, which established a regime providing roughly equal representation for the contending factions. The "neutralist" Prince Souvanna Phouma was designated Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. The Communist Pathet Lao leader, Prince Souvannouvong, became a Deputy Premier and Economics Minister. The staunchly anti-Communist General Phoumi Nosavan became another Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister. Other notable cabinet appointments were: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Quinim Pholsena, supposedly a "neutralist" but actually a Communist sympathizer,

earlier spokesman for the Neo Lao Hak Sat; and Minister of Information, Phoumi Vongvichit, the strident theoretician of the Neo Lao Hak Sat.³⁰

As indicated earlier, the portfolios of Defense and Interior were the big stumbling blocks in the protracted negotiations among the three princes throughout 1961. Their accord of June 12 required that "every decision" relating to the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs would have the unanimous approval of the leaders of the three factions, Souvanna Phouma, Souvannouvong, and Phoumi Nosavan. This provision meant, in effect, that all decisions on foreign and domestic policies would require unanimity. Here was implementation of the now-famous Soviet-sponsored "troika" principle.

Establishment, at last, of the coalition government removed the final obstacle to signing the Geneva Declaration of 1962. That declaration and the accompanying documents purported to insure the neutrality of Laos. The declaration stated openly that SEATO was not wanted in or by Laos; thus SEATO's protocol coverage and "umbrella" were to be withdrawn from Laos, although the declaration did not similarly exclude any Communist alliance or instrument. It did allow the new International Control Commission, composed of India (Chairman), Poland, and Canada, to "investigate violations" on its own initiative and by a majority vote (Article 15 of Protocol); but "conclusions," "recommendations," and "decisions" of the ICC still had to be adopted "unanimously." A small French training contingent, comparable to that allowed under the 1954 Geneva Accords, might by agreement remain for a limited time. All other forces and paramilitary units were to quit Laos. Of course, no one was to interfere in the "internal affairs" of the country. But this still left the Pathet Lao in a superior position, contiguous to its "sanctuary" in Viet Minh territory and contiguous to peoples who are racially, ethnically, and linguistically akin. It also precluded, probably, any attempt on the part of the United Nations to do more than merely "honor" the 1962 Geneva Declaration, in which the Sino-Soviet bloc had a considerable voice.

The signing of the Geneva Declaration of 1962 did not end the struggle for Laos. It represented a pause while Laos and the rest of mainland Southeast Asia entered a new and probably decisive phase.

SUMMARY OF US POLICY SINCE 1954

The Eisenhower administration had recognized the danger in mainland Southeast Asia. In part, it met the danger by large-scale materiel investment in Vietnam and Laos, and on two occasions (September 1959 and January 1961) by a transient show of military power. But essentially it did not counter the guerrilla warfare and warfare-by-proxy which the international Communist movement so skillfully exploited in these two beleaguered countries. Nor did it meet the demands for civic action and nation-building which would have won the population to the support of the respective regimes, thereby countering the propaganda, psychological warfare, infiltration, and subversion that the enemy has employed with great capability.

The Kennedy administration clearly accepted the positive elements in the Eisenhower record, and it added to these positive elements--although not in Laos. There was better understanding and increased action with respect to guerrilla warfare, warfare-by-proxy, and counterinsurgency as elements in the Cold War. Doctrine and practice for these kinds of conflict rapidly developed after an executive order issued in March 1962. The enormously complicated tasks of civic action and nation-building were now, at least, being re-examined at the highest levels.

In taking these positive steps, some kind of intervention--a dirty word in the lexicon of international diplomacy, but a deed not infrequently practiced--is inevitable. Intervention, to be politically successful--that is, to be more or other than merely a military occupation of a country--requires the identification of the political, social, and psychological forces within the "intervened" country that are capable of winning loyalty from the countryside, and the proper support for and from these forces. This we have not yet done in Laos, and therein still lies the danger to this pivotal country. We have hurt our friends. We have given comfort to those who never sought to be our friends. By these and other acts, or by failure to act, we have failed to stop the encroachment of the Communists in Laos since 1954. There can be no denying that, by Geneva 1962, the Communists held far more Laotian territory than the two provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua which they controlled after the first Geneva Conference.

The chief problem of Geneva 1961-1962 was not lack of courage but lack of direction. In 1962 the United States found itself divided over policy for Laos at all levels and between cabinet departments. Throughout the whole period under review, 1954-1962,

it would appear that the United States fearfully handicapped itself in handling the Laotian question because it could not decide upon any single or concerted set of policies to be pursued vigorously. It failed to understand the Communist doctrine of "wars of national liberation" by whatever name. It also failed until March 1962 to shape operations within the government so as to begin to cope with this problem. And not until President Johnson's historic decision in February 1965 did it determine to carry the battle to the enemy's terrain.

EPILOGUE

One can write a postscript to the events which in this paper terminate with Geneva 1962. As is frequently the case in warfare --declared or otherwise--the enemy opened a new salient through which he hoped to conquer. He moved more decisively and more vigorously into South Vietnam on the well-founded assumption that if he were to win there--win meant drive the United States out of Vietnam and thus capture it--he would have relatively easy "pickings" in Laos. This strategy, aided by the declining effectiveness of the Diem regime, almost succeeded. Only since the Presidential decision in February 1965 to carry the war to its place of origin, a decision which in the book on war is almost the first prescription--take the offensive when possible and feasible--has the balance been redressed. The enemy no longer has the exclusive option of attacking where and when he wills. He is now being hit and hurt; and his capacity to "handle" Laos has been diminished. In Laos, as a consequence of a long-overdue, unpredictable awakening, Souvanna Phouma declares that he no longer publicly believes that he can "win over" his half-brother. By this accident of biography, and by a related one in which Kong Le's closest military friend was murdered by the Communists, hang the threads of a redirected policy in Laos. This policy now accepts American military aid through such devices as Air America and other improvisations. Together with the main riposte in Vietnam, the enemy is losing, and the Asian-American and other allies are winning the first rung on the ladder. That is, they are beginning to provide the security for the countryside without which the minds and hearts of the citizens cannot be begun to be won by political, economic, technological, and other means so easily at our disposal if we are inclined to use them.

Footnotes

1. See Frank N. Trager, "American Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia," in Robert K. Sakai, editor, Studies on Asia, 1965, University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

2. Documents Relating to the discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, April 27-June 15, 1954, Misc. No. 16, 1954 (London: HMSO), Cmd. 9186, pp. 131, 145, Molotov speeches.

3. Ibid., pp. 126-127, Eden speech.

4. These paragraphs are based on the work of Dr. Joel Halpern of the Department of Anthropology, University of California at Los Angeles, who has written profusely and helpfully on Laos. Among his many papers especially pertinent to an understanding of "family" and the power structure in Laos are: The Laos Elite: A Study of Tradition and Innovation (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, 1960); Government, Politics and Social Structure of Laos: A Study in Tradition and Innovation, Laos Project, No. 21, UCLA; and Laos Profiles Paper No. 18, June 1, 1961, UCLA.

5. This problem is treated in depth by Joel M. Halpern, Economic Development and American Aid (1958).

6. An unclassified US AID paper, September 18, 1963 (in the author's possession), cautiously summed up the situation as follows:

Much of our economic aid through FY 196 was in the form of cash grants to the Lao Government. The deposit of U.S. cash grant dollars generated local currency required for the military and civil budgets and to support U.S. economic projects in Laos. The sale of these dollars through the Lao National Bank to local businessmen and others, under the system of free convertibility, permitted them to import goods or spend the dollars abroad in other ways. This system had some advantages in that it maintained financial stability and removed incentives for corruption and smuggling, but it also invited wasteful use of resources and flight of capital.

7. New York Times, August 28, 1959.
8. SEATO, Record of Progress 1959-60, p. 6.
9. Contrary to the allegedly docile, indolent, and unwarlike nature of Laotians, both the Royal Lao army and the Pathet Lao forces fought, skirmished, moved about, and were otherwise militarily active during the most difficult time of the year, the rainy monsoon season (June-October 1959). The Communists probably decided to expand hostilities at this time to take advantage of their superior ability to undertake guerrilla warfare, while the army was hampered by dependence upon motor or air transport, which was largely ineffective during the rainy season.
10. Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Policies of Neutralization (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 127.
11. See Thomas E. Ennis, "Operation Survival in Laos," Current History, March 1961, pp. 153-158.
12. Ibid.
13. New York Times, September 7, 1960.
14. Ibid., September 12, 1960.
15. Parsons had been Ambassador to Laos and had been in favor of supporting the Royal Laotian army. For his failure in an attempt to wean Phouma away from his course see New York Times, October 17, 1960, and Phouma's later attack on Parsons, ibid., January 20, 1961.
16. New York Times, October 4, 11, 20, 29, and November 17, 1960.
17. Text of US Note to Soviet Union, New York Times, December 18, 1960.
18. New York Times, January 11 and 20, 1961.
19. Peggy Durdin, "The Grim Lesson of Laos," New York Times (Sunday) Magazine, May 21, 1961.
20. Dommen, p. 172.
21. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, April 17, 1961, pp. 543-544. The New York Times, March 24, carried the text and

transcript of the Presidential News Conference, including additional material on Laos.

22. While the President had apparently decided upon diplomacy rather than military measures, he left himself an opening to opt for military intervention by ordering elements of the Seventh Fleet, with US Marine ground forces abroad, to the scene at the time of his "map" talk and the special SEATO meeting, ready for deployment if necessary in Laos. Perhaps another factor dissuading the President from military intervention, which he regarded as the very last resort, was a significant event that occurred in the middle of April 1961--the debacle at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba--with its attendant effects upon US prestige. In any event, by the end of April, the President had definitely ruled out military intervention in Laos. This decision, according to Joseph Alsop (Washington Post, February 19, 1962) had been endorsed by Congressional leaders of both parties.

23. From text of the SEATO resolution. See New York Times, March 29 and 30, 1961.

24. New York Times, May 12, 1962.

25. Transcript, Question 5, The President's News Conference, New York Times, May 18, 1962. See also Transcript, Question 7, The President's News Conference, ibid., May 10, 1962.

26. See, for example, his remarks, November 1, 1961, US Delegation to the International Conference on Laos, U.S. Del. 118 (US PR/21, November 1, 1961).

27. This was the guarantee that the Geneva Declaration, after it became operative, would be respected within Laos. That declaration requires the United States and all other foreign groups to withdraw from any kind of bilateral support for Laos. Of course, this guarantee does not affect the activity, legal and clandestine, of the Pathet Lao (and their easily disguised allies from across the border) who remain in Laos. They can continue to cheat with impunity.

28. Quoted in New York Times, May 8, 1962.

29. On March 7, Secretary of State Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman issued a joint statement, confirmed by exchanges between President Kennedy and Marshal Sarit, which (1) pledged US defense of Thailand on a bilateral basis; (2) broke the previously existing SEATO "rule of unanimity" which had blocked SEATO action in the Southeast Asian crisis and made it a

paper tiger; and (3) in effect sounded the death knell of SEATO as presently constituted. See also W. Averell Harriman, "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia," New York Times Magazine, May 27, 1962, for a useful summary explanation of US policy in Laos, and also a House bipartisan report to the Foreign Affairs Committee, which indicts SEATO as offering "no security" to Southeast Asians (New York Times, May 8, 1962).

30. The main provisions of the agreement signed by the three princes were these: (a) all decisions concerning defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs would be agreed upon unanimously by the leaders of the parties; (b) all decisions of the provisional government of national union would be made in accordance with the unanimity rule; (c) the coalition would include 19 members--seven from Souvanna Phouma's group, four from Phoumi's group, four from the Pathet Lao, and four Vientiane "moderates." The new coalition government, with Prince Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister, was installed by Royal decree on June 23. For a full listing of all members of the new cabinet, see Current Notes on International Affairs, June 1962, pp. 50-51.

Appendix A

CHRONOLOGY

1954

- May 8-
Jul. 21 Geneva Conference on Indochina.
- Nov. 25 Katay Don Sasorith becomes Prime Minister.
- Dec. 31 US Department of State announces direct aid to Laos under Mutual Security Act of 1950.

1955

- Feb. 19 SEATO, with protocol covering Laos, comes into effect.
- Dec. National Assembly general elections take place without Communist participation.

1956

- Aug. 5 Souvanna Phouma and Pathet Lao discuss agreement for coalition government. Neo Lao Hak Sat, a front of the Pathet Lao, is recognized as a legal political party.

1957

- Nov. 19 Conclusion of discussions mentioned above, resulting in agreement with Pathet Lao. Two of its leaders receive cabinet posts to form a government of national union.
- Dec. 12 Provinces under Pathet Lao control, Phong Saly and Sam Neua, are returned to national government.

1958

- Feb. 18 Pathet Lao soldiers formally integrated into national army.
- May General elections are held in which Communists and their allies win 13 of 21 seats. This success spurred the formation of two new political parties to replace the fragmented anti-Communist organizations: Rally of the Laotian People (RLP), the traditional elite; and Committee for the Defense of the National Interests (CDNI), composed of younger elements and military officers. At this time these political groups worked together in general support of the RLP.
- Jul. 17 ICC adjourned sine die at request of Royal Lao government (request made by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma with concurrence of Pathet Lao and Viet Minh).
- Aug. 18 Phoui Sananikone, anti-Communist, becomes Prime Minister.

1959

- Jan. In face of renewed threats from the Pathet Lao the National Assembly adjourns for a year and gives Phoui special powers.
- Feb. Lao government renounces Geneva terms, pledges to rely on the principles of the United Nations as the guiding force in its international relations.
- May 18 2nd Pathet Lao battalion decamps on the eve of its final integration into the Royal army and goes into rebellion.
- Jun. Pathet Lao resumes attack in northern provinces. Prince Souvannouvong and other Communist leaders are arrested.
- Jul. 31 Lao government announces renewed Pathet Lao attacks on government forces.
- Sep. 4 Laos appeals to the United Nations for assistance, charging the Viet Minh with aiding the Pathet Lao rebels.
- Sep. 26 SEATO declares its readiness to defend Laos.

- Nov. 5 UN investigating team issues its report, having found no concrete evidence of Viet involvement.
- Dec. 30 General Phoumi Nosavan takes control of the Lao government in a bloodless army coup as RLP and CDNI factions in the adjourned National Assembly dispute over procedure for the coming elections.

1960

- Jan. 6 Khou Abhay becomes Prime Minister, and civilian government returns to prepare new elections.
- Apr. 24 Elections are held, supervised by the army, in which anti-Communists are overwhelmingly, suspiciously, triumphant.
- May 23 Souvannouvong and 15 Pathet Lao leaders escape arrest.
- Jun. 3 Prince Somsanith becomes Prime Minister.
- Aug. 9 Obscure paratroop battalion captain, Kong Le, stages successful coup at Vientiane.
- Aug. 16 Souvanna Phouma, at invitation of Kong Le and king, again becomes Prime Minister.
- Sep. 29 Sihanouk urges East and West power blocs to turn Laos and Cambodia into guaranteed neutralized buffer zones in order to bring peace to Southeast Asia.
- Oct. 13 First Soviet ambassador arrives at Vientiane. Soviet airlift begins to the Pathet Lao.
- Dec. 15 Phoumi Nosavan retakes Vientiane.
- Dec. 16 Boun Oum becomes Prime Minister, receiving Western recognition. Souvanna Phouma continues to be recognized by the Communist bloc until June 11, 1962.

1961

- Mar. 6 Pathet Lao forces begin advance toward Luang Prabang and Vientiane.

- Apr. 22 Souvanna Phouma in Moscow signs joint communiqué calling for the neutrality of Laos.
- May 2 North Vietnam calls for a Laotian cease-fire.
- May 12 ICC reports de facto cease-fire in Laos.
- May 16 14-Nation Conference on Laos convened in Geneva.
- Jun. 21 Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and Souvannouvong meet at Zurich and agree to form a coalition government.
- Oct. 8 The three Laotian princes agree on Souvanna Phouma as head of the coalition government. The agreement subsequently breaks down in a dispute over the distribution of cabinet posts.

1962

- May 6- Communist forces gain control of large territories.
- May 27 About 2,000 Royal army troops with their commander flee across the Mekong to Thailand, as the Communists take Nam Tha.
- May 15 President Kennedy announces that at the request of the Thai government he has ordered US military forces to Thailand.
- Jun. 12 Three Laotian factions sign agreement for establishment of neutral regime under Souvanna Phouma, with the cabinet posts divided among them.
- Jul. 23 Declaration and protocol on neutrality of Laos is signed at Geneva.

Appendix B

HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND

OF CONTEMPORARY LAOS

Politics and History

The kingdom of Laos--more specifically, of Luang Prabang--has had a continuous history and royal leadership since its founding in the 14th Century. From time to time, however, the country has been divided: by contest among its leading families, each with major roots in different regions; by encroachment from the Vietnamese and from the ethno-linguistically related Thai kingdoms under Ayuthian and Chakri dynasties; by the eventual establishment of French hegemony over the several parts of Laos after the French had forced the Thai to relinquish their claims in 1893 (and several times after that); and by the post-World War II Communist thrust of the Pathet Lao and Viet Minh.

During World War II, the Lao gradually reacquired some rights of self-rule under the Vichy French, and then briefly under the Japanese, although the former retained the separate administrative French colonial structures: a protectorate over the kingdom of Luang Prabang in the north, and a colony, Bassac, in the south.

Among those opposing both the French and the Japanese was the patriotic Vientiane vice-regal family of the late Prince Phetsarath, who organized and for a time led the Lao Issara or Free Lao movement, assisted by his younger brothers, the Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souvannouvong. In the confusion of the immediate post-war period, between October 1945 and April 1946, the Lao Issara dethroned the king as allegedly pro-French and formed a provisional government. The Free French, upon returning to the Indochinese Peninsula, rejected this nationalist group, who then fled or were driven into exile in Bangkok, where Phetsarath, married to a Thai, remained until his death. France supported the royal house of Luang Prabang, then headed by King Sisavang Vong, father of the present King Savang Vatthana.

The French were successful in August 1946 in working out a modus vivendi that provided, inter alia, for a united Laos in which the regal house of Bassac, or Champassak, headed by Prince Boun Oum, acceded to the throne of Luang Prabang (the "royal capital"); the convening of a constituent assembly; and the drafting of a democratic constitution to be promulgated by the king. By July 1949 a Franco-Laotian Convention recognized the independence of the kingdom within the framework of the Associated States of French Indochina. On October 24, 1949, the exiled Lao Issara decided formally to dissolve because its goals were being achieved. Souvanna Phouma and some two dozen other notables were flown to Vientiane (the "administrative capital"), there to rejoin and serve the government, typically dominated by elite families. Souvanna Phouma became the third premier of the united country after the August 1951 elections (preceded by Prince Boun Oum and Phoui Sananikone). Laos signed a Treaty of Friendship and Association (in the French Union) with France on October 22, 1953, and as a fully independent nation was admitted on December 14, 1955, to the United Nations, after the Geneva Accords had been adopted.

However, Prince Souvannouvong, the third brother, rejected the foregoing steps to a peaceful solution of Laotian independence. Read out of the Lao Issara movement in late 1949, he and his followers, with the help of the Viet Minh, and after consultation with Ho Chi Minh, created the Pathet Lao-Viet Minh complex on territory within Laos but bordering on North Vietnam. From this territory, in about 1951 this group launched the "liberation" movement in the name of a Free Lao Resistance government and invaded Laos. Their forces, including Lao and Vietnamese military units, attacked northern and central Laos in 1953 and 1954. They sought to link up with the Free Cambodian or Khmer Issarak movement under the general Communist policy that "Peace in Indochina is indivisible"--provided of course it was a Communist peace. (This Free Khmer movement also formed a government-in-exile, but subsequently, about 1947, disbanded. Groups of the Khmer Issarak later cooperated or joined with the Viet Minh-sponsored Khmer People's Liberation Army. But little came of the movement in Cambodia.)

The three Communist powers (the Soviet Union, Chinese Communist regime, and North Vietnamese regime) at the Geneva Conference, April 27-July 21, 1954, made strenuous efforts to seat the Pathet Lao and Khmer "Resistance Forces" as participants in the conference. They failed because of opposition from the Royal delegations of Cambodia and Laos, supported by the Western powers. The Geneva Conference held eight plenary sessions on the Indochina question, beginning on May 8, but most of the negotiations were

conducted in secret sessions, chiefly between Premier Mendes-France and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. The proceedings of these "restricted" and "confidential" negotiations have not been published, though some of their content may be inferred from published speeches, from memoirs, and from the more than 130 articles that make up the Geneva Accords.

Before the 1954 conference began, the United States apparently urged the British and French to avoid any settlement that would exclude appeals to the United Nations or inhibit US efforts to build a Southeast Asia defense system. The Geneva Accords or Agreements did not meet American wishes. The United States therefore did not accept the Final Declaration. Geneva 1954 excluded UN supervision, discouraged military alliances, denied the United States the possibility of training Laotian or other "Indo-chinese" forces, and was sufficiently ambiguous on other matters to contain the seeds of the future difficulties.*

Land and People

Any Southeast Asian geography will define the contours of this landlocked kingdom. It abuts on six countries with which it shares difficult borders: Burma (146 miles), Communist China (263 miles), the Democratic Republic of Vietnam--DRVN (818 miles), Republic of Vietnam (301 miles), and Cambodia (277 miles). Its total area of approximately 91,000 square miles is about equal to that of Idaho or Great Britain. Its Himalayan spurs rise to over 9,000 feet. Its weather is a typical example of mainland Southeast Asian monsoonal climate, i.e., hot wet and hot dry, except in high altitudes. Heavy rainfall occurs between May and October.

A Marine military briefing based on first-hand experience on the terrain describes it as follows:

In spite of many rumors to the contrary, the Marine Corps, if committed in Laos, would not find any problems

*See Frank N. Trager, "Back to Geneva '54? An Act of Political Folly!" Viet Nam Perspectives, August 1965. It is imperative for any student to study the existing official documents. See Documents relating to the discussion of Korea and Indo-China at the Geneva Conference, Cmd. 9168 (London: HMSO, 1954); and Further Documents, Cmd. 9239 (London: HMSO, 1954).

it hasn't met before--someplace, sometime--and whipped. There are dense jungles in Laos; there were dense jungles in Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and New Britain. There are vast rice paddy areas and mountains--as in Korea. Laos combines the mountains of Korea with the jungles of the South Pacific, compounding the difficulties. However, I doubt that the mountains there are as bad as those in Korea were at 20° below. . . .

Laos is not one endless, mountainous jungle. The great central plain of Thailand extends across the Mekong into the Thakhek-Savannakhet-Pakse area. Many parts of the plain are perfectly flat. There are heavy forest, open forest, savannas, open grassy areas, and rolling hills. Parts look like central Florida, others like Virginia, and some like the open wooded areas of Alabama and South Carolina. You could deploy a division in most of this area, with amtracs, tanks, SP guns--and make maximum use of air support. In the monsoon season there would be extensively flooded areas, especially near the rivers. Mud would be as bad as the wet season in Okinawa or Korea. You'd need river crossing capability. Even then, much of this area could be negotiated.

The Plateau Bolovens is a sort of geographical freak. Its approaches pass through steep, mountainous, jungle-covered ravines. On top there are jungle forests; also, rolling hills with elephant grass towering over your head. And there are open cultivated areas, including coffee plantations. In other words, in the central part of Thailand--stretching into south and central Laos--we could fight a pretty good "school solution" type of warfare, particularly from west to east. A Thai general thought a corps could be deployed and maneuvered here.

The mountains in Laos vary from low, rolling, barren hills to precipitous, jagged peaks. Mostly they're covered with two types of jungle: either the classical 100-foot deep, closed-over type of WWII, or a thicker, brushy, secondary growth. The real closed-over jungle has less undergrowth and is easier to get through. You find it along stream beds, in flat verdant areas, and on many mountain-sides. The thicker bush jungle has trees from six to twenty feet high. It covers many steep hills and mountain slopes and some flat areas. It's almost impossible to negotiate. It would limit military operations to the extensive valleys and to jeep roads and mountain trails. This would be a light infantry war with maximum use of small arms, mortars,

recoilless rifles. You'd rely heavily on jeeps, mechanical mules, and helicopters--even, perhaps, pack horses and possibly elephants. An elephant can be handy to salvage vehicles from canyons or mud.

But no matter how wild the mountain or jungle area, nearly always within a few miles there was a potential helicopter landing site. These are often cultivated patches hacked out by the Meo tribesmen, who live in even the highest, wildest mountains. There's a visibility problem for air operations in the monsoon season. Altitude also hampers. But there are many small airfields for planes of the OE type. Such planes, from the DC-3 down in size, are now the primary means of travel in many parts of the country. Brush--even in many cleared areas--recommends being ready to load or unload hovering helicopters. Panels, brush hooks, machetes, and colored smoke grenades would be critical tools of the trade. Any mount-out should consider this.

The Plaine des Jarres--I want to place particular emphasis on this area. Strategy and tactics in northern Laos must orient on Vientiane, Luangprabang, and the Plaine des Jarres. Any spot that looks and is so much like East Texas placed smack in the middle of one of the world's most remote jungles just can't be ignored. It's just twice the size of Camp Fendleton. There are gently rolling, grassy hills, open woods (some pine), and dry grasslands--these so flat a GV-1 might land in emergency without an airfield. There's also a net of one- and two-way roads. This large bowl is surrounded by moderately-sized, heavily forested mountains. The elevation is a comfortable 3,000 feet (I slept under blankets while Vientiane sweltered.)

There seems to be plenty of water and, in 1953-54, some 12,000 French forces camped here. The approaches to this elevated plain cover some of the wildest, most rugged ground in Laos. There's just no easy way to get there by surface from Vientiane. Note that the eastern approaches favor North Vietnam. Six months before Dien Bien Phu, Ho Chi Minh converged two and a half divisions here. His light infantry found conventional French forces with supporting arms, including air. In open warfare the French could have mangled these jungle troops. Ho Chi Minh withdrew.

Some mountains northeast of the Plaine des Jarres are quite barren. They don't fully protect against China or North Vietnam. The Chinese and the DRV can move and support large forces any place they can walk

and carry an A-frame. To disregard this fact would be to ignore the bitter lessons of Korea--and the disaster of Dien Bien Phu.

Communications--It's too pessimistic to say there's simply no road net in Laos. The road north to Pakse is paved. From Pakse to Thakhek four-wheel vehicles can go in all weather, touring cars in good weather. From Thakhek to Vientiane roads may be fair, poor, or out--depending on floods and collapsed bridges. The road north to Thakhek and the ones leading inland from Savannakhet and Pakse could support a division as initial MSR. If the division engineers kept working they could keep it in.

In Northern Laos most roads are short, one-way jeep roads. That's the best you can say. They're usually cut from landslides and bridge washcuts. They used to be better. I think it would be possible to repair and re-establish some--at least as fast as we could advance on foot against light opposition. Note that the DRV approach roads and North-South communications parallel to the border are both kept up and in good condition.

The Mekong River has long been the life stream of communication and transport for Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Only certain stretches are navigable. Rapids require trans-shipment near Savannakhet, north of Luangprabang, and over Khone Island in South Laos. At Khone Island, the old marine railway can easily be put back into commission. This would let LCM come in at high water (mid-April to mid-October) and move to Vientiane. A group of experts believe in that season LCM with river pilots could navigate clear to the Burma border. Within the broken stretches, much cargo can be moved, then trans-shipped. Native diesel-power sampans haul 27-40 tons. Stopping at night, the trip from Luangprabang to Vientiane takes three days. The Mekong rises and falls 30 feet. The maximum current is six knots; it averages 3.3 knots. I've seen trees four feet across floating in the muddy water.

The density of the population, which is estimated below 3,000,000--there has been no census--is rather low, especially in relation to cultivable areas. There is no problem of "land reform" in Laos. Systems of land tenure are--except in the area of towns--traditionally "quite loose." The distribution of population generally follows the lines of altitude. The Lao are lowlanders, rice cultivators, and sedentary farmers. The Kha (or the La Thung) occupy the medium altitudes and are regarded by the Lao as "savages." The Meo are highlanders, more Sinicized than

the others. Both the latter practice a slash-and-burn type of seminomadic agriculture. They are the "mountain" people, familiar to us in Vietnam as the Montagnards.

The greatest concentration of population is in the Mekong River Valley; the Lao make up about 50% of the whole. These people of Thai stock, fleeing in part from the Mongol invasion and breakup of the ancient Thai kingdom of Nanchao (9th-13th Centuries), dominate the peoples of the country. The minorities are non-Thai speaking: proto-Malaysian groups, Vietnamese, Khmer, and the inevitable Chinese, Indian, and European "invaders."

This is the land, and these are the people, that became the subject of the so-called settlement at Geneva in 1954.

Table 1

US ASSISTANCE TO LAOS

Dollar Obligations and/or Commitments and Local Currency
Withdrawals by Type of Program FY 55-FY 62
(in millions of dollars or dollar equivalent)

I.	Total AID Assistance to Laos (\$ obligations)		290.4
A.	<u>Internal Security and Governmental Support</u>		
	Military Budget Support (L/C Withdrawals)		184.4
	Civil Budget Support (L/C Withdrawals)		18.2
	Police Support (\$ project obligations and L/C Withdrawals)		13.7
B.	<u>Economic Project Assistance</u>		
	Dollar Project Aid (\$ obligations--excluding Police)		49.8
	Support of Economic Projects (L/C Withdrawals--excluding Police)		24.3
	<u>Field of Activity</u>	<u>Dollar Obligations</u>	<u>Local Currency</u> (withdrawals)
	Agriculture	1.4	1.9
	Industry and Mining	1.8	0.6
	Transportation	20.5	7.9
	Education	2.4	1.9
	Health and Sanitation	2.5	1.8
	Public Administration	0.9	1.0
	(Civil Police)	(1.9)	(11.8)
	Community Development	7.0	5.4
	General Technical Support	13.3	3.8
	and Other		
		(51.7) <u>49.8</u>	(36.1) <u>24.3</u>
II.	<u>Total Military Assistance Program (MAP) Aid to Laos (DOD) Programmed Dollar Commitments</u>		150.6
III.	<u>Total Mutual Security Program (MSP) Aid to Laos</u>		441.0
IV.	<u>PL 480</u>		1.2
V.	<u>Grand Total US Assistance to Laos</u>		442.2

Cuba--The Missile Crisis and the Great Power

Response (October 1962)

by

William Spencer

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with a major international crisis which was brought about by expansion of one great power into an area traditionally reserved to another great power's sphere of maximum interest, and the second great power's response to this direct challenge to its national interest. The crisis was caused by the installation of Soviet missile sites and offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba. The US reaction, in October 1962, produced a direct confrontation between the two major powers. The situation developed because of some significant misconceptions on each side, regarding each other's intentions. The United States did not anticipate that the Soviet Union would take the risk of establishing missile sites in such an exposed forward base as Cuba. The Soviet Union did not even expect the United States to make a positive response, still less the reaction which actually occurred. The Russians did not consider US warnings against missiles in Cuba as either explicit or likely to be followed by positive military action. The United States did not believe that the Russians would bring in missiles in the face of what was considered to be an explicit warning of the consequences. Thus, the entire crisis hinged upon lack of communication between the two powers.

The missile crisis suggests a number of approaches to the use--or the threat of use--of force to achieve national objectives. The force actually used was limited to the boarding of ships, a possible violation of international law but deliberately calculated not to provoke nuclear holocaust. The threat of force was employed through an ascending scale of steps, with superiority of nuclear weapons and locally available conventional forces held by the United States. This became a distinct

advantage early in the game, establishing a situation the reverse of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, when Soviet conventional forces held superiority over any combination available to the United States, and when the Soviet Union regarded Hungary as essential to its own security.

In spite of the disparity between Soviet and US conventional forces, a point to note is that both great powers carefully controlled the escalation of responses. Reckless statements were made on both sides. Even before the crisis, Chairman Khrushchev drew attention to "bellicose reactionary elements" in the United States which would plunge the world into a universal thermonuclear war through attacks on Cuba.* But the greatest, and the most dangerous, element of recklessness was provided by the Cubans themselves. Under the current conditions of approximate nuclear stalemate, the missile crisis showed that a small power could seriously compromise international stability. It could undermine established great-power relationships, and it had the ability as a catalyst to invite wholesale nuclear conflict through suicidal retaliation. No such controls as have become more or less implicit for major power statesmen in their formation of strategy are imposed on the leaders of nonnuclear minor powers. Indeed it seems almost as if size is a reverse coefficient for aggressiveness!

The present paper considers briefly the background to the missile crisis, with particular relevance to the Bay of Pigs disaster of April 1961, which was its precursor and in certain respects led to it. An even briefer summary of events follows. The remainder, and the bulk of the paper, is concerned with an analysis of the crisis as it illustrates various aspects of the strategy of conflict utilized by modern states as they press toward particular national objectives. Since it is part of the broad spectrum of conflict which has occupied the United States and the Soviet Union for the past 20 years, the missile crisis cannot be treated as an example of the changing uses of force entirely without reference to other components of this spectrum. It is closely linked to the Berlin situation and the Soviet efforts to force a Berlin settlement on favorable terms, for example. Soviet missile bases on Cuba represented an effort to compensate for the US lead in missile production, after it had been disclosed that the much-advertised Soviet lead, the "missile gap," was partly psychological and in reality wholly nonexistent. Because the crisis involved both small and great powers, estimates need to be made of the change in their relationship posed by great-power alignment with a lesser power at the expense of another great power. Such

*Tass. September 12, 1962 (reported in the New York Times).

problems as these are likely to recur; the chief merit of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 as an example of conflict must be derived from the light which its conduct sheds on future and continuing conflict elsewhere.

BACKGROUND TO THE CRISIS

The missile crisis of October 22-28, 1962, was a direct confrontation of US and Soviet strength, a Soviet challenge to US national interests. The Soviet Union essayed a move in Cuba which was recognized in the United States as a challenge requiring a positive response. This response might have included use of nuclear weapons and at least use of conventional forces to terminate Soviet activity in Cuba. Only maximum efforts to achieve understanding and communication of motives between the two major powers prevented this. The United States accomplished its short-term objective of forcing the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba through a rare case of total coordination of political and military-strategic responses. Command decisions flowed from the top, through a consensus which recognized only differences in methodology and procedure, within a common objective. This illustrates the main contrast between the crisis and its predecessor, the Bay of Pigs operation. The public statements of responsible US leaders, and a massive use of propaganda in the United Nations and elsewhere, were significant in achieving a solution. The Western alliance was not fully agreed on the significance of the Soviet challenge, but some members (notably Britain) played a useful advisory role.

The rapidity of the establishment of Soviet missile sites in Cuba surprised American intelligence analysts. Evidence of the USSR scientific, technological, and logistic capacity greatly shortened available US reaction time. Once aerial reconnaissance had proved conclusively the existence of the sites, shaping a US Government policy and a specific set of responses required about a week of discussion (October 14-22).

The Soviet leaders did not take immediate action following the gross embarrassment to the United States caused by the Bay of Pigs disaster. But the assumption that the United States was divided, and the evidence of this apparent weakness, eventually prompted the Soviet Union to a more drastic move than usual. As 1961 passed without incident, Castro was enabled to consolidate his regime. In July he formed the United Party of the Socialist Revolution as Cuba's only legal political party. Cuba and the Soviet Union found "identity of positions" on more and more

international questions. The obvious rancor of the Kennedy administration encouraged Castro to seek Soviet military aid against another expected attempt to overthrow him, either through exile groups or by direct attack.

Castro's overt commitment to Marxism-Leninism increased his attractiveness to Soviet policymakers. Evidence of American uncertainty and willingness for accommodation--not only on Cuban-Soviet friendship but on other issues, notably Berlin--may have been interpreted as a policy shift and an opportunity to establish an advanced nuclear base on Cuba at little cost. Accordingly the Soviet Union began early in 1962 to ship military equipment and technicians to Cuba. The shipments were increased after Raul Castro's visit to Moscow in July, upon the invitation of the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. Apparently the two leaders agreed on the secret installation of medium and later long-range ballistic missiles in Cuba as a means of equalizing the true missile gap, at least psychologically. The installation was expected to have the additional advantage of enabling the Soviet Union to confront its major adversary with a fait accompli which could still be described as defensive in character. The installation was undertaken in stages. Soviet cargo reservations on Western ships were shifted to Soviet vessels. The first shipments contained conventional tactical weapons; these were followed by SA-2 or SAM (surface-to-air) missiles of the type used to shoot down Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over Smolensk in 1960. Finally in September intermediate-range surface-to-surface missiles began arriving at Cuban ports. Reports to US intelligence agencies from Cuban observers estimated that 20 cargo ships entered Cuba during July, and 59 cargo ships from Soviet bloc countries were counted in August. In addition the equivalent of about one division's strength of Soviet military personnel arrived in Cuba during the period. Several Cuban air bases were placed off-limits to the local population, and technical specialists began assembling MIG-21 fighters and IL-28 bombers.

Until September evidence available to the United States supported the belief of US policymakers that Soviet military aid to Cuba was defensive in nature. At the end of August, however, the Cuban Minister of Industry, Ernesto (Ché) Guevara, led a mission to Moscow. The Soviet government announced a new Cuban-Soviet agreement on military aid and technical assistance, with specialists to be provided to train Cuban forces to meet "threats from aggressive imperialist quarters." The reports coming into Washington from Cuban agents told of extensive underground construction.

The American response was at first moderate. Senator Kenneth Keating (R-NY) took the Senate floor on August 31 and in the first of ten speeches on the subject protested the Soviet military buildup on Cuba. The next day President Kennedy ordered full aerial reconnaissance and photography by U-2 airplanes. For the next few weeks U-2s made regular high-altitude flights over Cuba in an attempt to clarify the military nature of the buildup. On September 4 the President stated that there was no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country, of Soviet military bases, of offensive ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction. The statement warned of the "gravest consequences" if the case should be otherwise. In other statements the President continued to distinguish between "offensive" and "defensive" weapons and continued to warn that installation of an offensive base would force the United States to act in defense of its own interests and those of its allies.

The Soviet Union interpreted these statements to mean that the United States would not respond to the placement of Soviet missiles on Cuba in any positive manner. US leaders would temporize even in the face of a nuclear threat. (Khrushchev told poet Robert Frost in an interview that the Americans were "too liberal to fight.") The Russians speeded up the timetable for the installation of the bases. The first-strike capability of Cuban-based missiles would serve as bait (or blackmail) for further US concessions. The Soviets accused the United States of planned aggression against Cuba!

The American U-2 overflights of the period September 5-October 7 revealed only a growing conventional defensive military establishment, the most interesting feature of which was the SAM missiles. Then, on October 14, a U-2 plane clearly spotted and photographed MRBM and IRBM launching sites, both in an advanced stage of construction where they had not existed a month previously. A sequence of photographs taken on October 14 and 15 showed detailed tracings of the movement of missiles hidden under tarpaulins by truck convoy from Cuban ports to the launching sites.

Upon being informed of the photographic evidence of the Soviet missiles, President Kennedy called an emergency meeting of certain government officials and a few private individuals. This group was entrusted with the task of reviewing all possible US responses to the Soviet threat and recommending the action which the President should take. Eventually given the title of Executive Committee of the National Security Council, all or part of the group met as often as two or three times a day during the crisis period.

The committee accepted certain basic assumptions. Since the United States realized that Russia, and not Castro, was the real danger, Cuba per se did not figure in their discussions. Other basic assumptions were that any response had to be both swift and decisive, that military and politico-diplomatic action should be coordinated, and that nuclear attack was indeed possible. Two extremes of choice were: to do nothing, which would be in effect unconditional acceptance of a Communist power base in the hemisphere; or to attack Cuba in strength with air strikes on the identified launching sites. Between these extremes lay a range of decisions which could lead, through varying routes, to a negotiated settlement. A further complication was the recognition that the withdrawal or neutralization of the missiles would have to be accomplished without completely destroying Soviet freedom of maneuver, under some sort of face-saving gesture.

CHRONOLOGY

The Executive Committee deliberated a week before deciding on the following responses: (1) a US naval and air "quarantine" or blockade of Cuba in order to preclude the introduction of additional offensive weapons; (2) a coordinated forceful public exposé of Soviet deception, carried out in the United Nations and elsewhere; (3) acquisition of moral support (if not the loan of Latin American military units) from the Organization of American States; (4) total mobilization of conventional and nuclear strike forces to attack Cuba in case of Soviet refusal to withdraw its offensive weapons.

On October 22 Kennedy issued a statement implementing these decisions. He listed the key moves which comprised the main US response: continued close surveillance of Cuba, reinforcement of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay, and a strict quarantine on all ships carrying military weapons to the island. He declared that any nuclear missile launched against any nation in the Western Hemisphere would be regarded as a Soviet attack on the United States. The quarantine went into effect on October 24. As had been hoped, the OAS passed a resolution calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles, which gave the United States added moral support from a majority of the Latin American states. The OAS also urged collective action to ensure that Cuba should not receive Communist military equipment later on. The UN Security Council met in emergency session; during the debate, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted the Soviet delegate, Valerian A. Zorin, with the same photographic evidence which the President

had seen, but was unable to secure a flat admission that the Soviet Union had deceived the world.

In the end the crisis was settled not by collective international action but bilaterally by the actions of the two major powers. Only one ship, a Lebanese tanker, tested the blockade. American naval vessels halted her; American officers went on board and determined that she did indeed carry a cargo of fuel oil destined for Havana. The ship was allowed to proceed, with honor on both sides satisfied. Khrushchev's final note, announcing the settlement, noted that Kennedy had pledged the United States not to invade Cuba, and that in view of this, the motives which had prompted the Soviet Union to aid its ally were no longer applicable. Originally it had been agreed (perhaps to salvage something for Fidel Castro) that the removal of the missiles would be carried out under the supervision of UN inspection teams. But the two nations advised Secretary General U Thant that they had established their own inspection procedures and would not require any UN help. The missiles were withdrawn during November. In December, under Soviet pressure, Castro agreed to return the IL-28 bombers (which he had previously claimed were a "free gift" to the people of Cuba from the people of the Soviet Union and not affected by the withdrawal agreement).

POLITICAL FACTORS

The missile crisis was settled without military or nuclear conflict because of recognition by the United States and the Soviet Union that short-term national objectives and strategy and even basic national interests must be accommodated to the realities of thermonuclear power. Strategy must be developed within a framework which does not require absolute or unconditional responses, or place one power in an untenable position. Thus conflict escalation has distinct limits. After the crisis Kennedy noted that if the United States had invaded Cuba, the Soviet Union would probably have acted in spite of its local military inferiority, because of compulsions implicit in the role of powers in the modern state system.

The decision of the Soviet leaders to embark on an offensive strategy in Cuba rested on a number of factors that appeared to them favorable. One was the unlikelihood of an American nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. Second, in the Soviet view American hands were tied by the previous failure in Cuba, with its implications that the United States could not readily pounce on a weaker state even in the interests of its own national security.

Third, the Bay of Pigs episode had revealed conflicts and indecision in the US leadership. Fourth, the installation of the missiles was a shift of the balance of power which, in the Soviet view, would not necessarily demand a strong US response.

The Soviets evidently assumed that the United States would respond by diplomatic protests and pressure in the United Nations, if at all. A massive American mobilization and threats of force did not figure in their plans. The Western custom of consultation among allies would further impede decisions, the Soviets thought. US determination to shed the heavy-handed "Big Brother" role in Latin America meant that unilateral action could be discounted. In short, the Soviets leaders apparently became convinced by their analysis that the United States was not in a position to consider Cuban-based missiles a direct provocation which required a direct, or positive, response.

Soviet confidence that the political balance had shifted irretrievably in its favor after the Bay of Pigs was prominently displayed at the 22nd Party Congress, in October 1961. One of the pronouncements of the Congress noted the achievement of Communist military superiority over the West, which could permit the threat of force to accomplish political objectives. It can now be seen that Soviet leadership felt that a well-equipped advance missile base in Cuba would be an excellent means of accomplishing this.

In this context the preliminary aspects of the missile crisis were as significant as the crisis itself. Soviet confidence that the Bay of Pigs had sapped America's resolution (possibly supported by the US failure to intervene in Laos) encouraged the Soviet Union to a larger commitment in Cuba than prudent military appraisals of the situation should have advised. A Cuban buildup would give the impression that the Soviets had achieved the effective missile parity they had falsely been assumed to have and been demonstrated to lack. Also the Soviet capability for conflict appeared greater than the American, because of determination on the Russians' part to act in defense of their interests. The new policy would serve as a visible warning to all states, and reassurance to satellite or potential satellites, that even a small nation remote from the Communist power center could line up with the Communist powers without fear of reprisals.

The performance of the US decision-making apparatus during the crisis leaves little doubt that rapid and coordinated politico-military strategy can be achieved to attain desired national objectives in a democracy. The full weight of US power was marshalled against Cuba--a sovietized Cuba instead of the Castroite Cuba of 1961--with incredible speed. Short-term

political objectives were harnessed to overall political strategy, under full recognition of the risks and the need to restore the status quo ante.

The President's policy of quarantine, with intense diplomatic pressure, mobilization, and readiness to use nuclear weapons against Cuba or the Soviet Union, reflected the consensus that no other policy offered the necessary speed, strength, and freedom of action needed to deal with a major threat to national security. At the same time it left the doors open to a graceful Soviet withdrawal, or even to more negotiation. The President's subsequent commitment not to invade Cuba was a concession to one of the basic requirements of Soviet strategy. Whether or not it had missile bases on Cuba, Soviet interests would be served by a stabilized Castro government.

The suspicion remains nevertheless that the optimum conditions for peaceful settlement which existed in the missile crisis were crucially conditioned by the fact that the threat was in the geographic area of maximum US concern, and probably could not be duplicated elsewhere. The response from all sectors of American public (and private) opinion showed a willingness to invade Cuba. The threat to US security was clearly recognized. While the 22,000 Russian troops in Cuba were a Soviet liability which conceivably would not be written off, the Russian position in Cuba was even more vulnerable than the West's would have been in Hungary in 1956. The Cuban-Soviet challenge to political stability in Latin America finds no comparable echo in Vietnam for example.

The question of overseas bases played a considerable part in the missile crisis. Some authorities would conclude from the outcome that such bases are a liability. Developments in weaponry, it is contended, make them useless and not worth fighting for. Even those bases which serve a vital function in the speed with which major powers can react to conventional aggression may not be worth the problems involved in defending them.

The United States made it clear, however, that it would not readily abandon its own foreign bases. One of Khrushchev's letters to Kennedy offered to withdraw Cuban missiles in return for evacuation of American missile bases in Turkey. Although the Turkish bases were armed with short-range Thor and Jupiter missiles and did not represent a comparable threat to Soviet territory, Khrushchev seems to have pursued the exchange as a possible political gain at small cost, and abandoned it when it became obvious that the United States would not compromise. When the President did not respond, the suggestion was dropped.

The speed of events resulting from American seizure of the initiative seriously hampered the Soviet Union's ability to react to the sequence of American responses. Lack of coordination, for example, between Soviet leaders in Moscow and Soviet representatives abroad forced the latter to operate on an ad hoc basis. Soviet prestige suffered in the process and the Soviet Union appeared in a particularly bad light at the United Nations.

Nevertheless the United Nations played a secondary role in the missile crisis. It primarily served US purposes of exposing the evidence of Soviet duplicity. It was useful also as a forum for discussion and a source of mediation via the Secretary General (although the Soviet Union fared worse after Soviet Ambassador Zorin accused U Thant of pro-Western favoritism). Insofar as the two protagonists were concerned, the United Nations had little more than nuisance value and was certainly not trusted with any responsibility beyond its accepted moral right to seek ways of reducing international tension. The fact that neither Stevenson nor Zorin was fully briefed on the decisions being taken in their respective councils of state gives to their clashes in the Security Council a sideshow appearance. Regular consultation between Kennedy and U Thant seems to have been more pro forma than a practical search for UN support. The aftermath of the crisis temporarily widened UN participation, as the United Nations was called upon to police the withdrawal of Soviet materiel. But the major powers did not even adhere to this commitment. In a crisis of such far-reaching implications, the basic weaknesses of the United Nations seem destined to impede its role as a reducer of conflict, except where conflicts do not involve the vital interests of the major powers.

The Organization of American States played a minor role, but from the point of view of US relations with Latin America a significant one. Called into emergency session on October 23, the Council, in a vote made unanimous with approval from Uruguay the following day, authorized "the use of force" in carrying out the quarantine, approving a US-sponsored resolution. Six Latin American states on the following day offered military aid to assist in the quarantine. This demonstration of hemispheric solidarity had an important psychological effect within the hemisphere and was not unnoticed by the Soviet leaders, although militarily the combined forces of the OAS nations would probably not have deterred them from attacking the United States.

The NATO alliance as such did not participate in the crisis. President Kennedy sent special envoys to inform the British, French, Germans, and Canadians, all of whom supported the President's position. The British quietly brought their nuclear

bomber force to a state of alert. Russian attempts to play upon earlier evidence of divisions in NATO by demanding the removal of American missiles from Turkey were another misjudgment of the actual situation.

A final political consideration in the missile crisis was Berlin. Khrushchev clearly intended to use Cuba as leverage to obtain a settlement in Berlin on terms which would preserve Communist (or Soviet) influence in Germany. Khrushchev's promise to Kennedy not to create new tensions until after the 1962 Congressional elections (in November) specifically mentioned Berlin, but not Cuba. The Soviet Union later warned that a US attack on Cuba might bring about nuclear retaliation against Berlin. Having been unable to push the Western powers out of Berlin, Khrushchev presumably hoped to use the post-Bay of Pigs irresolution of the United States regarding Cuba as an indirect way of making Berlin untenable for the Western alliance.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

The placing of advanced technological weapons in Cuba was an extremely bold strategy for the Soviet Union. In the view of American military planners, the successful installation of IRBM missiles in close proximity to the United States could be a nuclear equalizer. In the withdrawal phase of the crisis, 42 ballistic missiles were removed from Cuba and 9 operational missile sites dismantled. According to subsequent testimony before the Congress, six of these sites had been constructed with launchers for medium-range missiles, and three were fixed sites for intermediate-range missiles. In December, after Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan had visited Cuba, 42 IL-28 bombers were also removed. Within the 2,500-mile range of the IRBMs, all the cities and air bases of the eastern United States would have been within range of possible missile attack.

US operational strategy was influenced by the need for rapid mobilization, for deployment of conventional forces, and for a state of combat readiness for nuclear forces. The entire American response was a calculated risk, although this risk was reduced by the coordination of military and political strategy and decisions, and the President exercised total responsibility as he had not during the Bay of Pigs. There was no question as to whose finger rested on the button. Five types of military resources were placed in active status: an at-sea naval force for the quarantine; another at-sea striking force poised for attack on specific Cuban targets; the defense forces of Guantanamo Bay; Florida-based

air forces and southeastern SAC units; and an amphibious striking force for assault on Cuba's land defenses. National Guard and other Army Reserve units completed the operational deployment. The threat represented in this mobilization of power, rather than its use, contributed to the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In addition to the direct challenge and response, and the "test of will" aspects of the missile crisis, there were important psychological factors. The Soviet Union engaged in a familiar but imaginative psychological strategy to secure operational advantages in Cuba at little cost. This seeming adventurism, contrary both to Soviet traditional doctrine and to Communist prudence, stemmed from the Soviet Union's erroneous assumption that US resolve had weakened.

On the US side the psychological view of the Soviet Union may account for a gross failure to anticipate Soviet missile strategy in Cuba. Intelligence officers, evaluating reports of the installations, tended to discredit them because this strategy was incompatible with traditional Soviet policy. They also downgraded the reports on the assumption that the Cuban agents responsible for them had greatly exaggerated the information in order to encourage another US attack on Cuba. US policymakers clearly misread Soviet strategic intentions.

An important aspect of the psychology involved in the missile crisis was the use of bargaining to gain local advantages. The broad strategy of the Soviet Union designed to achieve nuclear equality--if not superiority--through Cuban-based missiles has been mentioned previously. Inasmuch as the missiles could not have achieved total superiority for the Russians, their leaders were more interested in the psychological advantage to be gained by the US impression that practical equality or superiority had been achieved by positioning.

Cuba's role in the crisis was almost purely psychological. The presence of missiles on Cuba reinforced Castro's publicly expressed defiance of the United States, and his willingness to bring on a world thermonuclear catastrophe in the event of an American invasion. The Cuban Premier bluffed still further when he stated that the presence of Russian troops compromised the Soviet Union as fully as the United States was compromised in Berlin. Cuba, a small power with no nuclear weapons of its own, was a potential danger to both great powers. This three-cornered

aspect of the crisis suggests that lesser powers (especially nuclear powers) under comparable circumstances can provoke a serious threat to world peace by the extension of their own national objectives in a manner that involves major powers.

Finally, from a psychological standpoint the US reaction in the missile crisis significantly improved the US image in world opinion. Particularly in Latin America, but also among Western allies, the image of the United States had suffered considerably as a result of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The attempt to intervene in a Latin American nation, an action the US Government had for years been trying to convince its hemispheric neighbors it would not take, alienated still further the anti-US element, while the failure of the intervention, and its evidence of US indecision and apparent bungling, exasperated US friends. The missile crisis produced final evidence of Soviet intentions vis-a-vis Cuba and the Western Hemisphere and the strong stand successfully taken by the United States increased respect for its government in many areas of the world.

COMMENT

So many elements contributed to American success of the missile crisis, in contrast to the failure of the Bay of Pigs venture, that any attempt to compare the two is difficult and likely to be misleading. Despite the differing circumstances, however, it seems justifiable from these incidents, in which the same minor power was involved and the same administration in the United States was responsible, to conclude that it is easier to reconcile differences and to develop a strong, unified position when the security and integrity of the United States are clearly and obviously in jeopardy, than is the case when a threat is posed to other US interests whose relevance to the American people or the American homeland is either ambiguous, controversial, or indirect. The Castro regime in Cuba was considered potentially dangerous to US interests, but the missile crisis presented a direct threat to the continental security of the United States. It was a rallying point around which plans had to be made, and the unanimity of agreement on the basic objective greatly simplified the process of planning for its attainment.

In the Bay of Pigs incident, as also in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic later on, the government was in the position of having to lead public opinion, for there was no general public acceptance of the situation as posing sufficient threat to the security of the United States to warrant intervention. This lack

of wholehearted public support was reflected in the attitudes of those responsible for making decisions and planning US intervention. The missiles in Cuba, however, presented an issue in which there could be virtually no doubt of public support for doing something. Without the problem of deciding that something must be done, the decision became a choice between alternatives.

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Conflict in the Congo (1960-1965)

by

William Spencer

INTRODUCTION

Throughout its first five years as a sovereign state the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville, to distinguish it from its neighbor the Congo Republic of Brazzaville) engaged in a series of violent internal conflicts which compromised its sovereign existence. These were less exercises in rebellion against the duly constituted Congolese government than expressions of the tribal-nationalist rivalries which were historically part of African tribal life. Those provinces of the Belgian Congo in which there was a dominant tribal group set themselves up as rightful representatives of the new Congolese sovereignty and the appropriate governing body for the Congo. The savagery and brutality which characterized conflict in the Congo during much of this period may be attributed to the simplistic approach to national objectives characteristic of primitive peoples confronted unexpectedly with the complex requirements and relationships of a modern nation-state.

The unusual feature of the conflict in the Congo was the application of international force to resolve an internal crisis. The purpose of this paper is to assess the effect of this highly unstable situation and the resultant UN action on the national policies and objectives of the great powers in Africa. One of the many paradoxes of the Congo conflict was the use of an organized international force to secure and protect national sovereignty. As an issue which could be considered to threaten international (or regional) peace, the Congo conceivably merited international intervention or, at the very least, mediation between factions. Because it was a recognized sovereign state and a UN member, the use of international force within the Congo's borders represented an infringement of its sovereignty.

This analysis of Congolese conflict and UN action in suppressing or controlling it is carried out in three subsequent sections. The first section deals with the Congo's history; the second gives a brief summary of the chronological development of the several crises during the period since independence; the third comprises an analysis of the political, technological, psychological, and military-strategic factors which affected the evolution of the Congolese revolutionary cycle up to 1965.

The United Nations dominated events in the Congo, and its military forces in time became responsible for national administration, just as UN civilian experts rather than Congolese officials or foreign advisers per se worked to create a viable nation-state. However, the national objectives and strategies in Africa of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and lesser powers, notably Belgium, were also involved in the Congo, and must form part of the analysis if it is to yield meaningful conclusions about the future uses of conflict. In a world increasingly tending toward rejection of Wilsonian collective security, containing both stable nation-states and those in which authority may shift with bewildering speed from one faction to another, the preventive function which the international force exercised in the Congo bears careful scrutiny as an alternative to intervention by individual powers which could lead to nuclear confrontation, as in the Cuban missile crisis.

CONGOLESE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The vast territory in Central Africa which took its name from the mighty Congo River was divided among various tribes until the late 19th Century. Only one of these tribes, the Bakongo, appears to have held authority over a fairly broad area. Their kingdom, the Kongo, as it was called, made its first contact with Portuguese explorers led by Diego Cao in the 15th Century. From then on, it was all downhill for the Bakongo and the other African tribes of the Congo region, as European slavers, European adventurers, and Christian missionaries vied for the souls and bodies of the Africans. The one redeeming feature of this development was that it was concerned with individuals rather than with territory. The Europeans operated from a few coastal ports near the mouth of the Congo and from downriver trading posts.

As interest shifted from slaves to colonies and sources of raw materials for industry, various European powers became more involved in Central Africa. In the late 19th Century the explorations of Stanley and Livingstone, notably the former, opened

the door for penetration of all the Congo. Henry Morton Stanley became the personal representative in Africa of Leopold II, King of the Belgians, who harbored vast ambitions for his small country, ambitions which could be achieved only through African colonization. Leopold had entered Belgium in the race for African colonies by the back door; he formed the International Association of the Congo in 1882 with himself as president. Stanley, as his agent, negotiated treaties with 450 African chiefs along the Congo. At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, 14 European nations agreed to recognize the Congo Free State with Leopold as its personal monarch.

The Congo Free State existed in the anomalous position of being ruled as an absolute monarchy by the constitutional monarch of another state until 1908. It was then annexed to Belgium, Leopold being unable to finance it any longer from the Belgian treasury. Belgian rule during the Congo's colonial period (1908-1960) was paternal and supremely administrative. Natural tribal unities were broken up into artificial administrative groupings, with Belgian-trained chiefs whose loyalty was guaranteed assigned to run them. The major tribal units, including the Wauga, Lunda, and Bavaka, which were potential bases for a nascent sense of nationality, were broken up and linked closely to the central Belgian administration. It may be noted that the Belgian type of colonialism was less assimilative than the French, but it did not contemplate independence or even local autonomy for the Congolese. The Belgians preferred a loose form of association through which, they expected, the Congolese would take readily to Western standards once these were understood.

The legacy of Belgium included the tragic absence of any effort to prepare the huge colony for future sovereignty or the establishment of a viable modern state. The Belgian programs in most fields--education, public service, the economy, health, national and local administration--were geared to the mother country's interest in long-term colonization and gradual assimilation and were somewhat comparable to the French system in Algeria. There was no organized Belgian effort to qualify promising Congolese for future leadership. The maximum to which an educated and qualified Congolese could aspire was a subordinate post. Thus Patrice Lumumba represented the ultimate in "Congolization," a national political leader who was also a clerk in the Stanleyville post office!

In 1955 a Belgian law professor, A.J. van Bilsen, published Un Plan de Trente Ans Pour L'Emancipation de l'Afrique Belge. This book put the Belgian government on notice respecting the actual postwar situation in Africa. However, not until 1959 did

Belgium commit itself to eventual self-government for the Congo. A series of riots broke out among the Congolese population of Leopoldville, causing several hundred casualties. It was the first show of opposition to the colonial regime in the Congo's history and seems to have thrown the Belgian government into panic. Under the prodding of the United States and other disinterested nations, and agitated by increasing violence in the Congo, Belgium convened a Round Table Conference (January 20-February 3, 1960) to define the instruments of the transfer of power. Independence was fixed for June 30, 1960, when the Congo would become a constitutional republic. The Colonial Charter of 1908 would be replaced by a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Belgium.

CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT CONFLICT

The development of the Congo conflict took place in three stages: (1) the immediate postindependence period, ending with the arrival of the UN Expeditionary Force (ONUC, or Organisation des Nations Unies Pour le Congo); (2) ONUC intervention to suppress the rebellion of Katanga against the central Congolese government; (3) the bilateral Belgian-American military operation in Orientale Province in 1964 prompted by the Gbenye-Soumialot rebellion and the massacres of Europeans. Although three stages of conflict may be distinguished, crisis situations succeeded each other in a continuous flow. Because the lines between one outbreak and the next were so blurred, the ONUC commitment in the Congo became quasi-total in the course of events.

Independence was announced on June 30, 1960. On July 7 the new state was proposed for membership in the United Nations, and it was accepted on September 20 after a dispute between two delegations, each claiming to represent the legitimate government, was resolved in favor of the delegation from Joseph Kasavubu's Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), the second most important political grouping in terms of seats in the Congo Constituent Assembly. The central government thus represented had Kasavubu as President and Patrice Lumumba, leader of the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) based in Orientale Province, as Prime Minister.

On July 5, soldiers of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), Belgian trained and formerly called the Force Publique, mutinied against their Belgian officers, who were subsequently replaced by the government with Congolese. The disorder spread. In the following days some Europeans were injured, some were killed, and many fled in panic. The Belgians, who had two military bases in

the area, flew in some paratroop reinforcements, with Congolese opposition, and on July 10 Belgian troops stepped in to restore order and protect European lives and property.

On July 11, Moise Tshombe, governor of Katanga Province, announced its secession from the Congo and invited Belgian troops to serve under his authority and safeguard Katanga's extensive mining resources. That same day the Kasavubu government appealed orally to the United Nations for help in restoring order in the ANC. A formal cable the following day requested urgent "military assistance" because of Belgian "aggression" and Belgian support of the Katangan secession. In the absence of Lumumba the Congo Cabinet requested direct American assistance and was told to go through the United Nations. Upon Lumumba's return he and Kasavubu requested Chairman Nikita Khrushchev "to watch hourly over the situation." Ultimately the Soviets sent equipment, aircraft, and technicians.

A resolution taken by the Security Council on July 14, sponsored by Tunisia, authorized the Secretary General to provide military assistance until the national security forces of the Congolese central government should be able, in its own opinion, to fulfill their tasks. It called on Belgium to withdraw its troops and restricted military aid to that provided by African states. Subsequent resolutions (July 22 and August 9) called for speedy withdrawal of Belgian troops and reaffirmed that the UN Force (ONUC) would in no way "intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise." Initial troop contingents sent to the Congo numbered 3,500 men, from Ethiopia, Ghana, Morocco, and Tunisia. A month later there were over 14,000 troops from 24 countries.

Subsequent events effectively internationalized the Congo conflict. The overthrow of Lumumba--who was subsequently held under house arrest and on January 18, 1961, turned over to Tshombe--and his murder in February aroused world concern. In the face of increasing disorders Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold asked the Security Council for more authority. On February 21 the Council adopted a resolution authorizing the use by UN troops of "force, if necessary in the last resort," to prevent "civil war." In addition it urged reorganization of the ANC and withdrawal of "all Belgian and other foreign military and paramilitary personnel and political advisers not under the U.N. Command." The USSR accused the United Nations of blatant interference in the Congo's internal affairs. It withdrew recognition of Secretary General Hammarskjold from then until his death in an airplane crash while en route to the Congo in September. The majority of UN members, however, supported the Secretary General and ONUC.

In December 1961 ONUC, with a peak strength of 20,000 men, intervened directly in Katanga, occupied Elisabethville (its capital), and forced Tshombe to accept the authority of the central government. The complete defeat of Katangese secession required numerous conventional military actions, however, and not until December 1962 was the province effectively rejoined to the Congo. Beginning in January 1963 ONUC undertook a phased withdrawal, coordinated with the training of the ANC and transfer to it of responsibility for public security. The two major Belgian military bases, Kitona and Kamina, were returned by the United Nations to the Belgians, who had authority over them under the 1960 Treaty, in February 1964; Belgium then retroceded them to the Congolese government. Twice extended by the General Assembly, on June 27, 1963, and October 18, 1963, the mandate of ONUC expired finally on June 30, 1964, when the last 58 Canadians and 85 Nigerians left the Congo.

Instability and rebellion resumed after the departure of the UN troops. The most serious revolt was in Orientale Province, which had been the home base of Lumumba. Three "Lumumbists," Pierre Mulele, Gaston Soumialot, and "General" Nicolas Olenga, organized a guerrilla force from disaffected rural youths. The guerrillas expanded their activities in the eastern Congo, where government control was at best nominal. On June 26, Soumialot captured Stanleyville. Olenga organized his Armée Populaire de Libération (APL), a tightly cohesive force, all of whose officers came from his own ethnic group, the Batetela-Bakusu tribe. The APL seized control of Stanleyville from Soumialot's guerrillas; it metamorphosed itself into the Revolutionary Government of the Congo, and began recruiting young tribesmen into its ranks in preparation for a drive against Leopoldville. The recruits were called Simbas (lions, in Swahili) and were given drugs and manipulated by witch-doctors to commit unbelievable atrocities.

Stanleyville during the months of July through October 1964 was the scene of wholesale executions of civil servants and persons alleged to have committed counterrevolutionary acts; the total death toll was estimated at 10,000. Fears for the safety of the European population of the city prompted the United States and Belgium to intervene, and a joint Belgian-American paratroop drop was carried out on November 24. The majority of the European population, who had been held as hostages by the Simbas, was evacuated, but more than 300 were killed, including eight Americans, one of whom was a medical missionary named Dr. Paul Carlson who had spent his life in service in the Congo. This intervention restored order in Stanleyville, and subsequently the reinforced ANC broke up Olenga's forces into scattered groups, effectively ending the rebellion.

Since November 1964 civil conflict in the Congo has been localized, but it shows no sign of ending. The northeastern two-thirds of the country between Stanleyville and the Uganda-Burundi border remains a no man's land, controlled by neither the rebel survivors of Olenga's group nor the Congolese army. A similar state of malaise besets national politics. Colonel Joseph Mobutu, who comes nearest of any Congolese public figure to being a unifying force, carried out a second coup d'état late in 1965; he dismissed President Kasavubu and extracted from Parliament approval for himself as President, with dictatorial powers. The most probable course for the Congo in its second half-decade of independence is a gradual trend toward political normalcy on its own terms.

ANALYSIS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF CONFLICT

Political Factors

The political factors operating in the Congo conflict from 1960 to 1965 were largely international in scope. The Congolese Republic, in a rather unusual way, became the captive of the United Nations. That is to say, pressures were imposed on the Congo through the UN medium, and almost without exception the major powers utilized indirect rather than direct methods to achieve their policy objectives in the Congo. In this respect, the conflict in the Congo differs markedly from other recent crisis situations, notably the Cuban missile crisis, Hungary, and the US landings in Lebanon.

Internationalization of the Congo conflict may have been inevitable under the unfavorable circumstances of the Congo's attainment of independence. Having surrendered authority, Belgium sought to retain a dominant economic and political position which extended even to support of those Congolese factions seeking the overthrow of the central government. Possibly a broadly based Congolese government could have carried off a rejection of Belgian aid without the necessity of external help. The internationalization of the Congo conflict through UN intervention may well have prevented direct confrontation of the major powers, and such intervention in other cases may serve to insulate an unstable state (or area) from East-West conflict.

The presence of ONUC was the main political factor in the Congo at least until mid-1964. In this context it is important to note that the original request of the central government of the Congo to the United Nations was for direct technical and

military assistance. The collapse of public security led the United Nations to interpret this as "technical assistance in the field of security," even as the Congo government turned to the United Nations to aid in the realization of its fundamental national objective of survival as a state. Internal security was maintained by multilateral intervention in a member state's internal affairs, a fact which distinguishes the conflict in the Congo from other situations that have invoked world tensions. The United Nations played a much larger role than anticipated because of the defection of the ANC, the reintroduction of Belgian troops, the absence of central authority, and the fact that rival factions sought and received external support in their struggles with each other. This last political element was crucial. With one exception, the Congo's leaders feared a return of Belgian troops as the chief threat to their security. Tshombe, the exception, viewed Belgian forces in the context of their value to his strategy for Katanga. Belgian misjudgment of the original Congo situation which resulted in independence was repeated when the breakdown in public security endangered Belgian civilians and Belgium sent its troops back into the Congo. In this case intervention was not only unilateral but seems to have had no basis in international law. Was Belgium in fact guilty of "aggression" against its former colony? The arrival in Leopoldville of the first ONUC units with a "legitimate" mandate to assist the Congolese government, suggests that this could have been the case. Certainly it was followed by a positive Council resolution ordering Belgium to withdraw its troops.

ONUC's general objective of the restoration of public security under an acceptable government was complicated by the lack of a genuine leadership acceptable to all Congolese factions. Patrice Lumumba came nearer than others to a charismatic presence, but hatred between him and Tshombe ran too deep. President Kasavubu seems to have lacked the necessary force of character to achieve a consensus, although he served as a moderating influence. The Security Council's resolution of July 14, 1960, subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly, authorizing the Secretary General to assist the Congolese government with military support until its own security forces were capable, in the Congolese government's opinion, of maintaining order, had almost no chance of achieving its objective. The central government lacked the strength, unity, and political astuteness necessary to lead the Congo. Although the new state had the right under international rules to ask for external assistance, it possessed few of the conventional attributes of nationhood. It had no elected legislature and no constitution except an unratified law authorizing a constitution.

The UN force in the Congo had both military and civilian objectives. The military was perhaps the shorter in range--to expedite the withdrawal of all foreign troops, to restore order, to assist in unification. Beyond this ONUC was concerned to forestall all forms of attempted interference with Congolese sovereignty. As suggested earlier, interference was interpreted in terms of Belgian aggression, particularly the dispatch of metropolitan Belgian troops to assist the Katanga rebels. Congolese statements that they were ready to turn to the Bandung powers if not the Soviet Union for direct aid undoubtedly hastened the UN effort to organize a peacekeeping force.

Hammarskjold himself defined the limits of UN military objectives in the Congo. ONUC's responsibility was nonaggressive in nature; soldiers would exert no force except in self-defense. Operations beyond these strict limits would be unauthorized and contrary to the ONUC mandate. Personnel for the force would be recruited from uncommitted or disinterested member states, with African nations specifically included; permanent members of the Security Council, who had already laid out fixed objectives in the Congo, would not be invited to participate. The battle lines for the Congo crisis were thus drawn as multilateral deterrence rather than bilateral conflict.

The UN strategy was to preserve its integrity with a screen of conventional forces, interposed, like the "casques bleus" of the UNEF at Suez, between the unstable Congo and competing national interests. This shielding process was expected to give the civilian personnel of the force sufficient time to build up the nucleus of a viable state in the Congo. Political, military, and technical assistance operations were to be integrated into a broad policy for developing stable Congolese institutions. Appointment of a political officer from the Secretariat (initially Sture Linner of Sweden) as Hammarskjold's special representative in charge of both civilian and military programs, was a sharp break with previous UN practice in peacekeeping forces; it indicated the extent to which the United Nations was prepared to become involved in direct aid to an individual state. At the same time the UN "presence" was judged a sufficient deterrence both to reimposition of traditional colonialism (i.e., Belgian) and to new forms of external interference caused by the international power rivalries which converged on the Congo.

The Congo crisis revolved about personalities to an extent greater than any other recent conflict situation. Hammarskjold solved the problem of recognition and sanction of rival contenders in the Congo by working directly with President Kasavubu, who had remained apparently neutral in the power struggle. The

Secretary General's impartiality extended to the point of direct negotiations with Tshombe rather than through Lumumba, during the latter's brief tenure as Prime Minister. The officials who served as Hammarskjold's special representatives in the Congo, however, were faced with severe practical problems in maintaining impartiality. The best illustration is provided by General Rajeshwar Dayal (India), special representative from September 6, 1960, to May 20, 1961. As the visible symbol of the United Nations in the Congo, Dayal came under fire for Hammarskjold's refusal to sanction any Congolese official except Kasavubu. Matters were not improved by the UN representative's refusal to accept the first coup of General Mobutu and his ouster of Lumumba as legitimate acts of sovereignty. When Dayal was replaced by Mekki Abbas, a Sudanese, the Congolese greeted him with a brass band and a parade through Leopoldville streets.

Objectives and Strategies of External Powers

The convoluted nature of the crisis in the Congo is shown by the performance of both major and lesser powers. Intervention by external forces resulted in UN intervention, but the UN participation became so complex or intense because of internal Congolese politics that external forces increased their intervention through the United Nations. A large part of the crisis was developed and manipulated at the United Nations in New York by the United States and the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly the Western and Communist blocs treated the Congo as a means to advance their strategic objectives in Africa, rather than as a genuine problem of internal security in a new member state. General lines of agreement on UN policy followed traditional bloc and alliance patterns. However, the rapid disintegration of internal security in the Congo encouraged individual defections from traditional alignments and response in the form of aid to one faction or another. Thus France and South Africa joined the Soviet bloc in abstaining from the resolution which established ONUC.

The official US position was clearly stated. It underlined the carrying out of US national objectives by encouraging the formation of a sovereign, stable, but non-Communist Congo. Left to its own devices without outside interference, the Congo could presumably have developed into a member of the peaceful world community of nations, independent but interdependent, envisaged in President John Kennedy's State of the Union address in January 1962. The United States was prepared to accept an international military force in the Congo to accomplish this objective, and to refrain

from any bilateral or direct intervention even in the area of technical aid, as inappropriate. However, American and UN objectives coalesced because of the internationalization of the Congo crisis rather than through US altruism. Not until the secession of Katanga was ended did the United States modify its stand against even bilateral technical aid, and then only after 1963, when a US AID mission was established in Leopoldville.

The central government of the Congo was of course responsible for giving a global turn to the Congolese situation, by accusing Belgium of aggression against the sovereignty of the Congo, and hence creating a threat to world peace. The Congo made no secret of its intent to appeal to the signatories of the Treaty of Bandung and to other sources if there were no response from the United Nations. Constitutional crises and the disintegration of public security prevented the Congo from playing any significant role in its own internal conflict.

The personal hostility which developed between Hammarskjold and Lumumba was a factor in the increased participation of the USSR in the Congo through direct aid and obstructionism in the United Nations. Soviet national objectives and strategy in the Congo were to exploit Congolese instability and Belgian/UN intervention to effect the establishment of a pro-Communist (or at least nonaligned) government. The USSR supported ONUC, since under its terms of establishment the West (Belgium) was considered the aggressor in the Congo. The Soviet Union also insisted on the right of the Congo to request and obtain bilateral assistance, although the Soviet contribution was entirely technical. Third, the USSR viewed ONUC as an instrument of Western policy in Africa, and not as an international peacekeeping mechanism. The Soviet UN delegate, V. Kuznetsov, noted that his affirmative vote on the resolution to create ONUC should not be considered a precedent. The murder of Lumumba and "General" Mobutu's expulsion of Communist diplomats and technicians from the Congo increased Soviet resentment over the partiality of the United Nations to Western objectives in the Congo; the USSR even recognized Lumumba's deputy, Antoine Gizenga, as his legitimate successor in office. The Soviets also objected to the nonmilitary activities of ONUC, first on the grounds that they placed the Congo in the category of a Trust Territory and infringed on its sovereignty; second, because the disproportion between Western and Soviet-bloc civilian experts assigned to the Congo (21 to none out of a total of 65, as of August 15, 1960), cast doubts on its neutrality and objectivity.

Other than a shipment of 100 trucks, 11 IL-14 transports, and a small group of Soviet technicians, sent in response to

Lumumba's request, there was no formal Soviet or Communist-bloc intervention in the Congo. The available evidence suggests that the Communist bloc was uninterested in building a viable economic or political structure in the Congo, but preferred to back Lumumba, as the Congolese leader most likely to help them gain certain political advantages in Africa. The bitterness of the USSR at its semipermanent minority status in the United Nations, however, inspired a determined effort to utilize the Congo crisis against the organization itself. The Soviets interpreted ONUC as a pro-Western effort to forestall their objective of neutralizing the Congo in preparation for an eventual intrusion of communism into the country. They attacked through the Secretary General. Hammarskjold's lack of impartiality toward Lumumba, during the period of civil strife, and his concept of preventive diplomacy, drew the particular wrath of the Soviet Union. From September 23, 1960, until Hammarskjold's death the USSR refused to recognize him in his official position. Withdrawal of recognition was followed by refusal to contribute to ONUC--a refusal that was never reversed. In this crisis situation, in which the majority of nations sided against the Soviets, they shifted strategy to an oblique method of gaining their objectives which did not involve a frontal attack.

Organizational and Tactical Factors

ONUC was formed in response to the request of a member state and derived its operational concepts from Chapter VI of the UN Charter as interpreted by Hammarskjold. Compared with the Civilian Operations staff's objective of state-building, which was long-range, profound, and complex, ONUC's military objectives were relatively simple. The aim was internal peace, the restoration of public order in the Congo. Yet to achieve this objective ONUC was forced to fight tribal bush battles, guerrilla engagements, police actions in cities, and a formal war of sorts to end Katanga's secession. It played the role of an army, although there was no law and no duly constituted government representing the popular will for it to defend. Given these criteria the accomplishments of ONUC in its four-year existence (1960-1964) are phenomenal.

At its peak strength in 1960-1961 ONUC numbered 19,800 men, contributed by 20 countries. The peak was built up rapidly in July-September 1960 by a US 322nd Air Division airlift. Troops from 15 nations--Canada, Congo itself, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Ireland, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Pakistan, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, UAR--provided troop contingents which were taken to

staging airports all over the world and then airlifted to Congolese fields. The problems encountered in mounting such an airlift contain valuable lessons for future conventional international force operations in areas such as Africa. Inadequate communications, ill-equipped local airports, vast distances between landing points, and language barriers (between troops and pilots, pilots and landing-field personnel), hampered the efficiency of the airlift.

Eight countries--India, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Ghana, Ireland, Sweden, and Liberia, in order--provided the bulk of the UN force. Hostility to the Mobutu regime caused Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and the UAR to pull out their contingents, 5,000 men in all. The importance of India's contribution was not only in size (5,700) but in its illustration of the non-Western, neutralist nature and strength of ONUC.

In all, 93,000 troops from 35 nations served in the force between 1961 and 1964. Outside of actual military operations these troops had little contact with the Congolese population. In a sense they were an army of occupation, and they were regarded as invaders by both Congolese and European residents. Grouped into 19 combat battalions with automatic weapons and armor, they were essentially a combat force, but a force whose objective in intervening in the internal affairs of a member state was to restore order. Aside from the questionable legal basis of this intervention, the objective of ONUC was made more difficult to achieve by the frequently conflicting interests and policies of those member states that did not provide troop contingents. The example cited above of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and the UAR, will suffice to show how tenuous ONUC unity was. Differences in military background, military experience, culture, religion, language, even food habits, reduced its efficiency. Fortunately the power base of the Katangese gendarmerie was even less secure, in spite of its superior numbers and firepower.

In addition to its objective of ending the mutiny of the ANC and the restoration of Congolese unity, ONUC was expected to reorganize and train an effective force for national defense and security. General Kettani (Morocco) served as Consultant for Military Instruction in the Congo from September 1960 to February 1961. In terms of state-building and internal security, the ONUC programs prepared by General Kettani and his successor General Mengesha Iyassu (Ethiopia) ought to have had first priority. In fact they were limited severely in scope and in effectiveness by the opposition of the Congolese. Mobutu, the Commander in Chief of the ANC, accepted in principle an arrangement for military training by UN instructors, but assigned only one ANC unit, a

paratroop commando battalion, for this training. Efforts by Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula, during 1962-1963, to create a separate modernization and training program for the ANC on a multilateral basis, with the United Nations coordinating various categories of training assistance from Belgium, Canada, Italy, Israel, Norway, and the United States, were blocked by the UN's own Advisory Committee on the Congo on grounds that it was a 100% Western undertaking. The positive efforts in this sector were entirely bilateral; thus Israel trained 220 paratroopers during 1963-1964 and the United States financed police training for 1,500 police officers under UN auspices.

In general the same problems of coordination, liaison between units, command structure, and national unit relations that operated in connection with the 1956 UN Emergency Force in Suez, hampered the United Nations in the Congo. National contingents operated as separate units. Morale was difficult to sustain because of local conditions and inequities in the salaries and allowances paid to the units. The limiting rules of the UN mandate and the extreme insecurity of the Congo meant that the various units of ONUC had no really safe base of operations.

Military and Strategic Factors

The events that took place in the Congo after 1960 were not a war in the traditional sense. Rather it was a series of disconnected military operations which extended over an extremely fluid front. The comparison with Vietnam in this respect is quite clear. When ONUC units began to move into Katanga, they found a milieu of strife in which Tshombe's mercenary forces and Baluba tribesmen (the Baluba comprise 50% of the Katangese population) were engaged in a constant round of skirmishes. The Baluba, whose leadership favored a unitary Congolese state, resented Tshombe's use of a narrow plurality (27-25) in the Katanga provincial assembly to announce that Katanga had unanimously decided to secede. Introduction of UN troops was initially a strategic move aimed at reducing casualties and restoring order between the two groups. Since neither the Baluba nor Tshombe's men--except for the mercenaries--could distinguish between their opponents and the UN soldiers, the disorder intensified. UN units came under fire. Patrols were ambushed. During the period April 3-5 the units holding Elisabethville airport for transport purposes were besieged by thousands of Katangese. On April 8 Ethiopian troops resisted an attack in northern Katanga and captured a number of Katangese soldiers, including 32 mercenaries. This was the first application of the UN's "use force if

necessary" authority given to the units under the resolution of February 21 which recognized the breakdown in public security in the Congo as a fact. Beginning in late 1961 UN objectives were modified. The new strategy was threefold: to expel all foreign military personnel recruited by provincial governments and not under UN authority; to prevent civil war by force if necessary; to preserve the territorial integrity of the Congo. On its side the central government's primary objective under Prime Minister Adoula was to end the Katanga secession.

UN strategy to maintain internal security and prevent civil war was to patrol constantly, to control river crossings, and to hold strong points in force. Where there were large European populations, as in Stanleyville, Leopoldville, and other cities, ONUC set up protected areas. Congolese officials were afforded protection if they requested it; in Equator, for example, the entire provincial cabinet was given a UN guard. This interrelated strategy aroused some hostility among the tribal peoples, and at times ended in disaster; an 11-man Irish patrol was ambushed on November 8, 1960, with 9 casualties. But the UN force did serve to assert international power in a chaotic area and kept Congolese rebel units off balance most of the time.

The ONUC engaged in three armed clashes with the Katanga gendarmerie in 1961-1962, the net result being the submission of Tshombe to the central government and Katanga's reincorporation into the Congo. The first, in two stages (Operation RUM-PUNCH and Operation MORTHOR), was a series of clashes between conventional land forces. The sole element of airpower was a Belgian-piloted Fouga Magister jet; it carried out bombing attacks on UN forces and may have been indirectly responsible for the fatal crash of Hammarskjold's plane on September 18, 1961.

The crash and the failure of the United Nations to relieve the besieged Irish garrison in Jadotville impelled UN commanders to order combat aircraft. The arrival of Swedish Air Force Saab fighters and F-86 planes from the Ethiopian air force enabled ONUC to neutralize the Katangese aircraft. Thus in order to achieve tactical objectives ONUC was forced to use conventional land and air operations. The two-stage operation represents the high point of UN interference in internal Congolese affairs. The resolution of February 21 said nothing about direct action against Katanga or any other dissident force. ONUC's mandate was limited to the prevention of civil war. UN intervention, if it had succeeded in its dual objective of capturing Tshombe and his ministers and apprehending the mercenaries, conceivably could be described as falling within this mandate.

The second series of military operations by ONUC against Katanga, in December 1961, occurred under a much broader authorization for the use of force, and against a background of repeated armed actions and acts of brutality against the "casques bleus." By this time the United Nations had air support, a strong defense perimeter around Elisabethville, and 6,000 troops, as against a strength of 1,400 in the previous clashes. Conventional weapons were used, and the combination of UN ground and air action was successful. In the year of relative military calm which followed it became evident that Tshombe would not honor his agreement on "indissoluble unity of the Congo," and that the ANC was incapable of ending Katangese secession. Various military incidents occurred during the year and evidence of Katanga's attitude was clear in such developments as its laying of unmarked mines (a violation of the Geneva Convention), purchase of aircraft, and addition of another 300 to 500 mercenaries to Katangese troop strength. In December 1962, Katangese gendarmes attacked UN positions in strength. On December 28 UN troops took action, in self-defense and to restore order; in three weeks they had ended the secession of Katanga by force.

CONCLUSIONS

There are various villains in the Congo drama, and they share a collective responsibility for its involvement in international conflict. Responsibility for Congo chaos belongs initially to Belgium. The immense Belgian investment in the Congo, the economic achievements of Belgian state and parastate organizations, Belgian success in building this economy to create the relatively high standards of living for the Congolese at least in comparison to other African states, was not accompanied by instruction in political administration. On the other hand, the transfer of power to moderate or better-educated Congolese leaders by Belgian fiat, instead of to the psychotic, racist Lumumba by default, might well have produced the Belgo-Congolese cooperative community which Belgium expected.

As an illustration of the changing nature of modern war, the Congo has certain unique features. First, application of force to achieve objectives was made by an international force against the military units, and wholly within the territory, of a sovereign state. Second, the units which comprised this force represented states comparable in size and international importance to the state invested. Third, intervention in the Congo against Katanga, under the resolution of November 24, 1961, denied the right of the Katangese provincial authorities to self-determination

according to the UN Charter itself. On the other hand, it supported the legal government of the Congo in its efforts to carry out its responsibilities to preserve the integrity of the state.

The removal of duly constituted authority (i.e., Belgium) in the Congo produced chaos, not only because the transfer of power had been incomplete, but also because of the political and administrative immaturity of the Congolese people. This combination of circumstances is not uncommon in the present world, and there are developing situations for which the Congo provides lessons in the application of force. In its capacity of preventing aggression the United Nations can serve effectively if major powers do not regard their vital national interests or objectives as threatened. The natural limitations on any international force militate against its use by one major power or another to advance specific national objectives. As long as the United Nations itself remains a forum, and not an initiating or controlling body, the forces organized under its jurisdiction are likely to correspond to internal, conventionally equipped security forces. In the Congo crisis this fact kept military operations at a relatively low level; there was not even a hint (as in the two Cuban crises, which also concerned major-power conflict on the territory of a sovereign state) of use of nuclear operations. In this case a UN force, acting in third-power relation to the East-West conflict, apparently controlled and limited development of conflict. The possibility of international forces acting as insulators or buffers between great powers in conflict situations is promising and merits further exploration.

The fact that the USSR generally found itself a minority in the United Nations in dealing with the Congo crisis suggests a more dangerous conclusion. The Soviets were isolated and outvoted; even though they came around to support ONUC, this was clearly opportunism, in the expectation that the force would not succeed in pacifying the Congo. Soviet bitterness toward Hamarskjold grew out of the conviction that the Secretary General had "sold out" to Western interests, that his concept of "preventive diplomacy" was designed to thwart a communized Congo. If the Vietnam conflict were to reach the UN conference table, the Congo experience suggests that employment of the preventive diplomacy concept would overcommit the Secretary General and produce a further crisis within the organization.

In sum, the Congo conflict indicates that modern war is multifaceted, with purely military operations of less permanent significance than nonmilitary tactical or strategic maneuvers in the United Nations or elsewhere away from the field of conflict. Few lives were lost by formal military action in the Congo, and

the bulk of the casualty rate resulted from internecine battles between tribes and factions. There is no final evidence that the civilian advisers attached to ONUC rescued the Congo from feudal savagery, but considerable evidence that they were able to lay the foundations of a modern state.

Errata Sheet--Volume III

Conflict in the Congo (1960-1965), by William Spencer

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British Intervention in East Africa

(January 1964)

by

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In January 1964, British forces were very considerably extended. In Cyprus there had been a major outbreak of civil war, and the forces on the British base had had to act to prevent it from spreading into full-scale war between Greece and Turkey. In Southeast Asia sizable British forces were engaged under the treaty with Malaysia in dealing with Communist Chinese action in Sarawak and Indonesian infiltration in Borneo. The position in Aden and on the borders of the South Arabian Federation with the Yemen was extremely unsettled. The British South African protectorates had required the dispatch of troops to restore order during the Swazi elections in 1963, and in the Caribbean the situation in British Guiana continued to smoulder on the edge of communal war.

In some respects this situation was by no means abnormal in British experience since 1945. The process of decolonization is a difficult and tricky one. The temptation to hotheads in the countries advancing to independence to use force to hurry the process is great; especially as control of power at the moment of independence brings with it so much material reward, and so much opportunity to perpetuate that control. Nor are there ever wanting in such situations legitimate sources of intercommunal tension and suspicion. Nor, unfortunately, are there wanting those external powers who see an opportunity of substituting their own power for that which Britain is abdicating, by backing one faction or one community against another, by subverting the forces of law and order or by installing their own nominees.

In 1956 the British army was caught so unprepared for fire brigade activity that its amphibious warfare authorities were driven to commandeer old World War II DUKWs that had been carrying

trippers "round the harbour" at Britain's leading seaside resorts. Profiting from this experience, the British defense authorities had evolved, a little belatedly, a strategy which kept a mobile reserve with an air and sea component east of the Suez Canal, partly in Southeast Asia, partly in Aden and East Africa, a force the backbone of which was the sea, or to be more precise, the Indian Ocean, and the Royal Navy Squadrons that moved ceaselessly between Singapore, Aden, the Persian Gulf, and the waters of East Africa. This strategy was shown at its best in the month of January 1964, when the three new East African states, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, were forced to call for British aid less than two months after celebrating their achievement of independence. In the operations which followed, the flexibility of British air and sea power and the new East of Suez strategy were tested and justified.

The political background to this demonstration was the following. Until December 1963 Britain ruled four colonial territories in East Africa: the colonies of Kenya and Uganda, the mandated territory of Tanganyika (formerly German East Africa), and the Sultanate of Zanzibar, a spice island formerly seized by Arabs from Oman from its African inhabitants, a great center of the slave trade in the 1860s and still divided between Arab land-owning and merchant classes and the African peasant groups mainly employed in growing and picking the cloves and nutmegs on which Zanzibar's economy now depends. Kenya was inhabited by a mixture of African tribes with a numerous group of British settlers, and had been the center during much of the 1950s of the Mau Mau uprisings. Uganda and Tanganyika had small British settler and mercantile populations. All three mainland territories had sizable Indian communities mainly engaged in shopkeeping and small-scale trading. In addition to having a considerable group of white settlers, Kenya was riven by tribal divisions and very much at odds with its northern neighbor, Somalia, as the Northern Province of Kenya contains about 50,000 Somalis, on the basis of whose presence Somalia claims the whole province. In January 1964 three of Kenya's five battalions of troops were engaged in containing Somali pressure on the northern frontier.

Between them the three mainland states had fallen heir to Britain's principal native force in East Africa, the eight battalion strong Kings African Rifles. Five of these had become the Kenyan African Rifles, one battalion had gone to Uganda which was in the process of raising a second, and the remaining two had gone to Tanganyika. Formerly officered entirely by British officers, the eight battalions were undergoing a process of rapid Africanization, which in January 1964 had run about half its course. Each of the three forces was still commanded by British

colonels and brigadiers, as were all but one of the eight battalions. These officers were seconded for service to the three new states and owed allegiance in theory not to Britain but to the governments of the three states. Zanzibar had no armed forces at all, apart from the Sultan's bodyguard and a small police force.

The trouble began in Zanzibar. On January 12, leaders of the Afro-Shirazi party, a left-wing party led by African intellectuals and highly hostile to the Arab ruling classes, staged a coup d'état. Its instrument was a gang of about 500 armed troops whose leader, the self-styled Field Marshal Okello, claimed to have served with the Mau Mau and was believed to have had training in Cuba. The coup was sudden, violent, and completely successful--too much so. The African mob got out of hand, and Arab merchants and landowners were beaten up, robbed, and murdered. The Afro-Shirazi leadership found that they had raised up forces they could not control--especially Okello himself. After four days they appealed to Tanganyika for police assistance; and in the name of African sentiment, President Nyerere sent off to Zanzibar his 150-strong mobile riot squad, armed, disciplined, and thoroughly reliable. At the same time talks were begun which were to lead to the present uneasy union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in the state of Tanzania.

The coup was too sudden for any hope of reversal. And the British, having burned their fingers at Suez, and being resigned to a certain amount of Tito-style left-wingism in Africa, made no effort to act. They did, however, feel it within their rights to dispatch to Zanzibar two warships with two companies of troops, the frigate H.M.S. Rhyl and the fleet survey ship H.M.S. Owen, together with the fleet auxiliary H.M.S. Phebe. Their ostensible mission was to evacuate British subjects; it is possible that they might have intervened had the new government broken down and public order with it. But the police from Tanganyika were adequate. The British did, however, take off the Sultan and his harem; and he lives now as a British pensionary in Britain itself. The Zanzibar government at the same time persuaded Okello to go on "a visit of inspection" to Tanganyika. On January 19 he arrived in Tanganyika's capital, the port of Dar es Salaam.

The precise connection between his arrival and subsequent events has never been established. It may well be that it was a pure coincidence, although it did not seem so at the time. Most probably it was simply the example of the ease with which the Zanzibari coup had taken place which inspired the Tanganyikans. On the evening of January 19, a sergeant and 13 privates of the first battalion of the Tanganyikan Rifles met in the bush near their barracks at Colito outside Dar and, adopting the

grandiloquent title of the Army Night Freedom Fighters, agreed to mutiny and to remove all the British officers. Later that night they agreed to act at once. At midnight they overpowered the barrack guard and captured the armory. They then sounded the camp siren, arrested all the British officers whom its sound brought running, and sent parties to arrest the others at their quarters. Early in the morning and acting with a military precision and degree of understanding of how to organize coups d'état which has never been explained and is the biggest argument for assuming some kind of external advice, they moved into Dar es Salaam, seizing the police headquarters, the post office, and the radio and cable offices and blocking the road to the airport. At the same time they set up machinegun posts at the port to hinder any British landing of troops. The President's house was cordoned off and the Minister of Defence, Oscar Kambona, arrested and carried off to Colito barracks.

As Dar gradually awoke, the city workers coming in from the country found the mutineers manning roadblocks and turned back. Within the cordoned-off areas gathering crowds were told by the mutineers, "This is not political. We are getting rid of our British officers." The crowds began to celebrate, but hooligan elements quickly got out of hand and began to loot the Arab shops. The mutineers in places tried to stop the riots by firing into the air but failed. Some Arabs, terrified for their lives, fired back, and the roused troops proceeded to restore order with mortar fire, rifles, and machineguns. By the time they had restored order, there were some 17 dead, including two mutineers, and over 100 injured.

In the meantime, Kambona had been patiently negotiating with the mutineers, whose main complaint was the low rate of army pay. By 11 A.M. he had succeeded in persuading the mutineers to release the British officers and put them on a plane for Nairobi. He himself was allowed to get in contact with President Nyerere and obtain his permission to announce pay raises. Nyerere then thought it prudent to disappear, and Kambona remained to quiet the city. By 2 P.M. he had the mutineers back in barracks and the police again on the streets and had time to broadcast an appeal for order.

Meanwhile the British defense authorities were taking immediate precautions. At that moment they had at their disposal: the 24th Infantry Brigade, consisting of three battalions of infantry, the Gordon Highlanders, the Staffordshire Regiment and the Scots Guards; the Third Light Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery; the 38th Royal Air Force Regiment Field Squadron; the aircraft and commando carrier, H.M.S. Centaur with the helicopter-mounted 45 Royal Marine Commando; the destroyer H.M.S. Cambrian, the frigate

H.M.S. Rhyl, the fleet oiler H.M.S. Tidesurge, and H.M.S. Owen and Phebe already mentioned; and a pool of Royal Air Force Transport Command aircraft. Of these H.M.S. Rhyl already lay off Dar with one company of the Staffordshire regiment, unloading refugees from Zanzibar. The Guards battalion and the heavy ships were at Aden. The remainder were in Kenya. On the news of the Tanganyika mutiny, the Guards were immediately flown from Aden to Nairobi and held there. H.M.S. Centaur, Cambrian, and Tidesurge, with 45th Royal Marine Commando, sailed for Dar es Salaam. H.M.S. Owen with its stray company of the Gordons returned to Mombasa, the main port of Kenya.

On January 21, the other battalion of the Tanganyikan Rifles inland at Tabora mutinied and deported its British officers. Kambona acted swiftly, appointing the senior African officer, a captain, to command and promising redress of grievances. The mutineers in Dar pledged their loyalty to the government, and by January 22 President Nyerere felt it safe to show himself again. But from that day the whole situation began to deteriorate rapidly.

On January 23 one company of the 1st Uganda Rifles at Jinja mutinied at the precise moment when the Ugandan Minister of the Interior, Felix Onama, was visiting Jinja barracks. The following day troops of the 11th Kenyan Rifles at camp near Lanet in the Rift valley broke into the camp armory and seized weapons. And in Tanganyika President Nyerere, his position weakened by his failure to show leadership at the time of the revolt, was under very strong pressure from left-wing elements in the trades unions, and the mutineers were beginning to be restless again.

The governments of Uganda and Kenya, however, had learned from what had happened at Dar. On the second day of the Tanganyikan mutiny, Prime Minister Obote of Uganda had taken the precaution of securing the telephone exchange, the radio and television station, and other government buildings with loyal and armed police. And on the day of the Ugandan mutiny, in accordance with his prior request, the Staffordshire regiment, augmented by one company of Scots Guards, flew in from Nairobi to Entebbe, Uganda's capital. The same day the Kenyan leader, President Jomo Kenyatta, his years in a British jail under sentence for alleged leadership of the Mau Mau rebellion forgotten, asked that the British troops in Kenya be authorized to intervene if the Kenyan government requested it. On January 24, the day of the Kenyan mutiny, the British authorities decided to reinforce the Kenyan garrison by flying out the 41st Royal Marine Commando from Britain.

The turning point came on January 25. In Uganda, British troops, rushing through the night from Kampala and Entebbe in commandeered lorries, stormed the Jinja barracks before dawn. The mutineers awoke to find the armory secured and the camp surrounded by British troops. Behind them Uganda police manned roadblocks. The operation was carried out without a single casualty on either side. Two days later all men in two companies of the 1st Ugandan Rifles below the ranks of senior NCO were dismissed from the army. The ringleaders were arrested and court-martialed. A Ugandan lieutenant who had threatened army action if demands were not met was cashiered. And a little later in the year Obote purged his party of its left-wing Secretary General, John Kalconga. The whole action took place under rigid censorship, which was not raised until a month after the mutiny was over. British troops finally left Uganda on March 11.

In Kenya British troops had already been taking precautionary measures. On the day of the mutiny at Lanet, armored cars from the Royal Horse Artillery had moved quickly to secure the armory and the officers' mess. On January 25, 100 men of the mutinous Kenyan unit staged a sit-down strike on the barrack square, but returned to barracks and laid down their arms when a burst was fired from an armored car's machinegun. The Gordons moved quickly to guard Nairobi airport and radio station, to cover the other Kenyan African Rifle units in the south and a police barracks when the unit's loyalty was suspect. The 41st Royal Marine Commando, landing at Nairobi airport, found itself welcomed by the Kenyan Minister for Pan-African Affairs, Mr. Koinange, with the British High Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey de Freitas. One Kenyan soldier was killed and one wounded.

As in Uganda airlifted troops, and in Kenya mobile armored cars, in Tanganyika the sea-lifted troops of the 45th Royal Marine Commando provided swift, effective application of small amounts of force. At dawn on January 25, the guns of H.M.S. Centaur and Cambrian, at anchor in Dar es Salaam harbor, fired a tremendous salvo of blank cartridges. Under cover of this the Marines were airlifted by helicopter to Colito barracks, the airport, and Williamson police barracks, where police loyalty was suspect. A rocket fired into the guardroom killed three mutineers, and about half the rest, still groggy with sleep, surrendered. The remainder took to the bush, hotly pursued by helicopter patrols. The barracks secured, the Commando's transport equipment was airlifted into the barracks, whence a convoy of jeeps and light scout cars moved into Dar es Salaam, where loyal police guarded the radio station and disarmed the mutineers guarding the President's house. In the afternoon a company of the Marines and a detachment of the Royal Air Force regiment flew to Tabora, where the other

Tanganyikan battalion was stationed. On arrival they were met by the African district commissioner and a British official representative who had together succeeded in securing the loyalty of the troops there. On January 25 H.M.S. Victorious, one of Britain's largest carriers, arrived off Dar to relieve Centaur. On January 30, the 41st Royal Marine Commando flew from Nairobi to relieve the 45th who returned with Centaur to Mombasa. On February 2, President Nyerere dismissed all the privates of the 1st Battalion. Nineteen noncommissioned officers and privates were charged with mutiny. The police were purged too, and a number of leading trades unionists were arrested. British troops finally withdrew on April 5, after President Nyerere had secured a Nigerian army unit to replace them.

With the final withdrawal of troops from Kenya, the British defense authorities sat down to assess the lessons of the exercise. The first was that the new apparatus of control from the Defence Operations Centre in the Ministry of Defence in London had functioned well. There had been no disorganization, troops had moved easily and freely and had been handled with skill, speed, and daring, and, above all, with excellent timing and liaison with the local political authorities. Following the example set by the American intervention in Lebanon in 1958, they had made no effort to force their intervention before it was wanted on those whom fear of seeming a traitor to Pan-Africanism and a tool of colonialism had inhibited from action. They were very much aided by the strength and determination of the Ugandan and Kenyan governments, whose example finally nerved President Nyerere to invoke their aid too. But to disarm and neutralize so many units with no casualties to their own troops and only a handful, six in all, dead among the mutineers, was quite a feat. Despite their determination it is doubtful whether even Obote or Kenyatta could have survived the infliction of any serious casualties on their own men by British troops.

From a military point of view the undertaking proved the extreme value of air and sea mobility at a time when Britain's military strength was stretched to the utmost. It was noted that units of all three services were employed almost interchangeably, Marines and Royal Air Force regiment men on internal security in Dar es Salaam, infantry units of the Army in a marine role on Royal Navy vessels off Zanzibar. A key role was clearly played by the naval units, especially the Marine Commando with its helicopters off H.M.S. Centaur. It was noted also that the main forces in Kenya were hardly engaged, and that the reinforcement of the 41st Royal Marine Commando was useful mainly to release the 45th Commando from internal security duties and to restore Centaur to its usual role again.

The question must be asked, though, what exactly the British had succeeded in forestalling. At the time the more alarmist writers in the press saw a Sino-Cuban conspiracy at work to subvert the whole of independent East Africa the moment after it had achieved independence. Cooler reflection discounts the full version of a conspiracy without totally rejecting it. What was really to be feared was chaos, anarchy, tribal and communal warfare which could then be exploited by the Chinese and their tools in time for Chou En-lai's visit to Tanganyika, which was to have taken place a couple of months later. (It was cancelled.) The Zanzibar coup was clearly organized and concerted from outside Zanzibar, and was no spontaneous uprising. The first mutiny in Tanganyika was so well planned, so thorough, so much a textbook operation that the story of a minor conspiracy of enlisted men led by a sergeant which emerged from the court-martial seems a very inadequate explanation. On the other hand, the mutineers made no attempt to exploit their initial success; the excesses of the crowd offended them because of their training, and they acted against the crowd rather than as its leaders; and they allowed Oscar Kambona to talk them back into their barracks. Taken together these suggest not so much a Communist leader as an expert instructor somewhere along the line. Attempts to exploit the mutiny in Dar came rather belatedly three days after the initial coup, which suggests at most belated prodding from outside rather than any preconcerted arrangements. The mutinies in Uganda and Kenya may have been ill-led parts of the same concerted plan. But they look much more like spontaneous echoes of the Tanganyikan mutiny.

Kenya was the real focus of British anxieties. A good deal of quiet thought and contingency planning had gone into measures to aid the civil forces against a possible breakdown in Kenya. In the month after independence political terrorism had grown. The Mau Mau had begun to be active again with its abominable oath-taking ceremonies. There were large numbers of unemployed, and there had been demonstrations in Nairobi. Chinese diplomats were suspiciously active. The bulk of the Kenyan army was tied up on the Kenyan border with Somalia; and Kenyatta's own cabinet included one or two men believed to have sizable private armies and equally sizable subsidies from abroad. Kenya possessed all the characteristics of a magazine filled with explosives. With any weakness or vacillation by either the Kenyan or the British authorities a very nasty situation indeed could have developed. It was this that the British acted so firmly to forestall. And their success is the biggest justification for their current sea-borne air mobile East of Suez strategy.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The British operations in East Africa in 1964 must essentially be seen as an exercise in the maintenance of stability. The decolonization of East Africa was the biggest of all British gambles in the general transformation of the old colonial empire into the new Commonwealth. In Kenya, the Mau Mau rebellion had not long been suppressed. The sizable white settler community still occupied land which the Africans regarded as theirs. There were bitter intertribal rivalries and suspicions. A considerable volume of Sino-Soviet money had been distributed among the left wing of the Kenyan African National Union, the principal African nationalist party. The Indian and Arab minorities were, if anything, more disliked by the Africans, both for their social exclusiveness and for their economic role, than the white settlers. There was a considerable volume of unemployment in Nairobi and of adolescent violence which could be turned to political ends. The process of building up a local African elite to replace the colonial administrators and police and army officers was only a few years old. The example of the Congo was always present as a terrible warning against transferring power before local conditions warranted it. By contrast with Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika seemed more stable societies, although each faced its problems and a sense of unity seemed always rather precarious in both countries. In British circles, there was a considerable volume of opinion which held that East Africa could well disintegrate into chaos and anarchy once the cement of British rule was removed. Such chaos would provide an excellent opportunity for China or the Soviet Union to repeat the tactics which had so nearly been successful in the Congo of backing one contender for power with money, arms, and advisers, if not by "volunteers" into the bargain.

2 In such circumstances, it was of the first importance that Britain, acting here as the custodian of a good deal more than her own imperial interests, should be able to rely on the good will of the local governments. In the process which led to the transfer of power the British government and its on-the-spot representatives had come under a good deal of criticism for their concentration on building up good relations with the principal leaders of the emergent African governments, that is with President Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Prime Minister Milton Obote in Uganda, and President Julius Nyerere in Tanganyika. This criticism was particularly fierce in Kenya, where the white population was large enough to form a potential military force on its own. But British encouragement of local white leaders like Michael Blundell who argued in favor of a reconciliation with the African

leaders, and the encouragement of Kenyatta and Tom Mboya and the more independent and less eastern-oriented leaders of KANU, and a rigid refusal to intervene between KANU and its rival more decentralist party, the Kenyan African Democratic Union, avoided the alienation of Kenya's future rulers. In Uganda and Tanganyika, the colonial Governors were successful, by sheer force of personality, in establishing equivalent relations of confidence. The example of the Congo, moreover, was not without its effect on the local African leaders.

Membership in the Commonwealth, finally, provided a legitimate framework for the African leaders of the three states to invite British intervention once the threat of mutiny became apparent. They were to come under a good deal of criticism from other African states for turning to Britain rather than to their fellow Africans for assistance; but the availability of British aid made it unnecessary for them to choose sides in the existing split between moderates and extremists in the Organization for African Unity. And Britain could be relied on to withdraw her troops once they were no longer required, a state of affairs which could not be absolutely counted on with some of the African alternatives. The Tanganyikan government, the least self-confident of the three, did accept a Nigerian contingent to replace the British troops. As an Anglophone state and a moderate one, Nigeria was much more welcome than Ghana as a source of troops, and membership in the Commonwealth again supplied legitimization for the acceptance of Nigerian aid.

3. Once the invitation to intervene had been issued, and the decision to accept taken, the single most important factor was the speed with which action could be taken. This in its turn was governed by the three factors of availability, mobilizability, and suitability for action. Of these the availability of forces depended on their presence in or near the area of intervention, and the location of bases from which they could operate. The available British forces had a land base in Kenya from which to intervene. In landlocked Uganda the element most essential to their intervention was government control of the airfield at Entebbe. In Tanganyika the mutineers controlled the airfield at Dar es Salaam. Here the vital element in British ability to intervene was the Commando carrier, H.M.S. Centaur, with the helicopter mounted 45th Royal Marine Commando. Without the presence of British forces in the area with an adequate air- and sea-lift capacity, and armored vehicles in Kenya, British intervention would have lacked the factor of immediacy which contributed so much to its success.

Mobilizability was also extremely important. The British troops in Kenya or at sea in the Indian Ocean were operational, with only a very small administrative tail. They were all practiced in air- and sea-portability. The move of units by air from Aden to Nairobi, from Nairobi to Entebbe, and from Britain to Nairobi was swift and without delay. Equally the British army units were easily and quickly embarked and disembarked on ships of the Royal Navy. Finally, the available forces proved to be suitable for the kind of operation they had to undertake. Numerically, they were not too large to be moved without concealment. The greatest use was made of night movements and the factor of surprise. More troops could not have been moved so speedily, nor with such secrecy. Too great a demonstration of force could well have resulted in a growth of anticolonialist anxieties and resentments. As it was, the action took place with the minimum of local resentment and the maximum of local censorship. Finally and most important, the speed of the British movements and the tactical surprise achieved in all three cases kept bloodshed to the absolute minimum. The intervention thus preserved the appearance of action to prevent civil disorder rather than to end civil strife. And none of the governments at whose invitation the British intervened lost appreciably in public support or esteem as a result.

4. A factor which made possible the speed and effectiveness of the British action was the unity of command and control exercised in London. British practice lays down that operations such as the East African should have a single control center--in this case the Defence Operations Centre in the Ministry of Defence, in London. The system is not incompatible with a high measure of local initiative; but overriding control with immediate ability to fly out reinforcements from the strategic reserve in the United Kingdom was maintained in London over the units of all three services, Army, Navy, and Air Force, involved in the operation. The contrast with the difficulties encountered in the American operation in Lebanon in 1958 is to be noted.

5. The Tanganyikan side of the operation underlined the extreme importance for such operations in "short-of-war" situations of a seaborne, air-mobile force. There were no air bases on land near enough for a relief operation to have been mounted once the mutineers had taken control of Dar es Salaam's airport. Without the helicopters of H.M.S. Centaur's Royal Marine Commando, intervention would either have involved the hazards of a possibly opposed seaborne landing or an attempt at a long-range airborne operation of the kind practiced by the Germans in Crete in 1941. A possible third alternative would have been an irruption by land from Kenya, although the state of the road communications between

the two countries would have made both speed and the achievement of tactical surprise very difficult to achieve. In operations of this kind effectiveness depends on size of forces, the speed with which they can be brought into action, and tactical and strategic surprise. Such operations are impossible, however, without the support and initiative of the local political leadership.

6. In brief, the importance of the East African action to this study lies:

a. In the technological field: in demonstrating the speed of movement available with modern air-/sea-portable forces in a permanent state of near readiness, and the centralization of command and control possible in an accurate and prepared radio-link system between the central control and the field forces;

b. In the use of strategic and tactical forces: in demonstrating that, with centralized command and control and forces on a ready-to-move basis, tactical surprise becomes much easier to achieve and, with comparatively small forces, can achieve success where the use of larger units would be self-defeating; the move of one unit from the strategic reserve was all that was necessary to prevent local reserves from being totally absorbed; in demonstrating at the tactical level again the importance in a stabilizing situation of the helicopter carrier with a Marine Commando or equivalent unit;

c. In the field of changing political attitudes: in demonstrating (a) the advantage of acting only at the invitation of local authorities and cooperation with local security forces or police where these have stayed loyal; (b) the advantage for Britain and her allies of the Commonwealth tie, which provides in such cases a "neutral" framework for intervention, where decolonization has been carried out without offense to local susceptibilities; (c) the importance of speed and tactical surprise as substitutes for the use of force and shedding of blood.

d. In the general context of East-West relations: in demonstrating the importance of not indulging in direct attack on local pro-Communist forces, but of leaving them to be mastered by their local political rivals. There can be little doubt that British intervention against the Zanzibar revolution would have prejudiced the whole western cause in East Africa, and made any subsequent invitations by the governments of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika to come to their aid politically impossible.

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PART TWO

SELECTED ANALYTIC PAPERS

Relationship of Military Force to Political Objectives
in Internal War

by

Daniel Wit

THE HISTORIC CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLICATIONS
OF INSURGENCY

A discussion of the relationship of military force to political objectives in internal war requires some initial perspective on the major goals and characteristics of this form of warfare. In general, internal wars may be classified in three types: civil wars (including organized revolutions), coups d'état, and insurrections or insurgencies. Insurgencies, since they are uprisings against established regimes with formal military establishments, normally employ the tactics and techniques of guerrilla warfare. It is with this type of internal war that the United States, because of its world position, its national objectives, its specific commitments, and the prevalence of internal war itself, is most likely to be involved in the future.

Neither insurgency nor guerrilla warfare is new on the world scene. Ancient Rome, ancient China, and even earlier states, as well as those that have followed in more recent ages, found it necessary to put down insurgencies and contend with guerrilla fighters. Insurgents have fought against established regimes with which they were dissatisfied; they have also fought against invaders in defense of their property. The guerrilla techniques which insurgents have normally used have also been employed as adjuncts to conventional warfare. Hence it is not with guerrilla warfare per se that this paper is concerned but with guerrilla warfare as a tool of insurgency and with the characteristics of the insurgent and his actions, i.e., the insurgency.

Historic characteristics of insurgency and of guerrilla activity may be described as follows:

1. Insurgency, as distinguished from mere banditry, even in the past required for most men a high level of frustration with existing conditions of life and a feeling of hopelessness about the possibilities of achieving adequate satisfaction under the current political regime. Obvious sources of frustration might be economic, social, or political--the denial of adequate means to satisfy strongly felt needs in these aspects of social living. These reasons for insurgency, however, have usually been intertwined with various personal motivations, such as desires for individual and familial dignity, independence, status, power, or achievement. The core of insurgency, therefore, always has been and remains to a significant extent a matter of personal psychological motivation. In fact, there are many cases in which such revolts have been both led and staffed by people who were not themselves economically oppressed and who, if they succeeded, were materially worse off than they had been before their "liberation."

2. Apart from individual economic, social, political, and psychological motivations for insurgency against one's own government, there also have been ideological motivations for it throughout history. Men of all ages have had elaborate visions--transcending the level of specific grievances--of an improved or an ideal society for whose attainment they were willing to fight. While communism, fascism, socialism, and liberal democracy may be modern, the world has known many other ideological causes which inspired insurgency.

3. In the case of insurgencies against "foreign"-imposed or "foreign"-dominated governments, a very common nonmaterial motivation throughout history has been what modern analysts call "nationalism." When conquered tribes rose against ancient Rome, or American colonists rebelled against their English kin, they were manifesting a sense of separateness and of collective identity--a social psychological sense of community--which led them to believe that they had to be independent. The essence of nationalism is very old, even though the modern concept of nationalism and the nation-state may be viewed as a product of the French Revolution of 1789.

4. Insurgents, in order to be successful or, indeed, to continue to exist, have been dependent upon assistance from substantial portions of the local population. Since they do not maintain lines of communication comparable to those of conventional military forces, they seek their material support from the areas where they are, and active opposition from a loyal populace

dooms their insurgency to failure. Similarly, when an insurgency is being supplied from outside, as was the EOKA in Greece, cutting off the line of supply, as occurred when Yugoslavia broke with Russia, will make it practically impossible for the insurgents to continue.

5. Since an insurgency is against the forces of law and order, there has been no limitation on the amount of destruction or the type of activity in which insurgents have engaged. The exception to this mode of operation has resulted from recognition of the adverse impact on popular support or the desirability of preserving institutions or resources for later use.

6. Insurgents generally have fought without the advantages of contemporary conventionally armed forces: advanced weapons, extensive supporting supply systems, extended training, elaborate organization, and legality and legitimacy derived from open sponsorship by recognized governments. Resort primarily to insurrection and guerrilla warfare usually has been evidence of military weakness and even of desperation.

7. The basic tactics of insurgencies also have been roughly similar throughout history. They derive from that military weakness which normally characterizes them, at least initially. As a result, insurgencies have been marked by "hit-and-run" and ambush tactics, the taking of refuge in relatively inaccessible terrain, disappearance among the populace after an attack, efforts to arm at the expense of government forces, and selective use of terror to control a populace and undermine government morale. By using concealment and superior intelligence to achieve surprise, the insurgents have been able to attain local superiority for brief periods over an enemy that greatly outnumbered them overall. The dispersion of the counterinsurgent forces that the hit-and-run tactics have made necessary has added, in turn, to the guerrilla's success. Since this type of harassment customarily has not been capable, in itself, of destroying strong government forces, insurgents either have had to hope that their activities would so discourage, tire, and politically divide the regime under attack that it would collapse from within or, ultimately, they have been compelled to resort to more conventional warfare (if possible) in order to succeed.

If the above are classic characteristics of insurgency, what then is new? Have there been any recent developments which have seriously transformed the nature of insurgency, and therefore, must be reflected in contemporary strategy? Or, does it remain what it was--as some published discussions imply--when American

irregulars fought the British in the Revolution or the cavalry and frontier scouts campaigned against the Indian tribes?

THE CONTEMPORARY CHARACTERISTICS OF INSURGENCY
AND WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION

Since 1945, the doctrinal substance, strategic role, and tactics of insurgency have been greatly developed through more specific definition and more systematic managerial integration. This process has been based upon modern operational experiences as well as upon an elaborate ideological view of history and social scientific analysis of contemporary society. Put another way, the use of force in unconventional, internal warfare has been affected by new technological and social forces and skills, has been associated by some contemporary aggressive powers with new forms of ideological and social analysis, and also has been subjected by them to the discipline of new and more encompassing levels of conflict management. As a result, it has now become essential for all other governments to engage in comparable conceptualization, but in terms of their own national interests, objectives, and ideologies.

What, then, are these changes in the nature of insurgency?

World-wide Political Forces Stimulating Insurgency

The 20th Century, and particularly the period since 1945, is an age of revolution. Human aspirations--and so causes for frustration--in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America have steadily risen to the point of developing explosive force. They have been stimulated by increased awareness through modern communications and transportation of the possibilities for improvement in human living conditions. They also have been stimulated by the initial World War II defeats of the European colonial powers, particularly where such defeats were inflicted on hitherto supposedly invincible Europeans by the Japanese. Subsequently, they were stimulated by the success of indigenous nationalist movements in forcing the dismantling of European colonial empires. In addition, they have been stimulated by the mutually reinforcing claims, as moral "rights," of the various new Afro-Asian states--with their UN majority--against the wealthier and chiefly Western countries for material assistance to improve their condition. There also have been the extensive promises of indigenous nationalist leaders to their peoples about the "milk and honey" benefits

which would rapidly come with freedom from imperialism. Finally, human aspirations and frustrations have been stimulated by the Communist countries of the world as part of their "protracted warfare" to destroy Western power and achieve global dominance.

Much of the world since 1945 has been in the throes of social, economic, and political tension and discontent, if not actual revolution. In such circumstances, some form of incipient or actual insurgency has become almost "normal" and will undoubtedly remain so for the foreseeable future, since desires have greatly outstripped governmental ability to satisfy them in most of the underdeveloped lands.

The Communist Role

The international politics of the contemporary world are now dominated by the "protracted warfare" campaign of the major Communist states to gain world domination. This has greatly stimulated resort to Communist support of insurgent warfare for aggressive and expansionist purposes, further heightened the importance of its nonmilitary components, given it a new strategic role in global terms, systematized its tactics, and introduced more coordinated and skilled management of this type of conflict.

The major reasons for the impact of communism on insurgency are:

1. Communist ideology is rooted in the concept of conflict as both inevitable and essential to human progress toward utopia. The Communist powers, therefore, view conflict of all types as natural rather than as abnormal.

2. An integral element of Communist ideology is the belief that the foe is capitalism as epitomized by the Western democratic powers, and to varying degrees by all other non-Communist states. Capitalism, democracy, imperialism, and oppression are regarded as interacting elements of a single complex which Communists are determined to destroy in the name of proletarian liberty.

3. The Communist operational view of society and of relations among societies is pre-eminently "political," despite an ideological commitment to economic determinism. Since the goal is the destruction of "capitalist-imperialist" power and its replacement by communism, the struggle is viewed primarily as one of political warfare. No universal concepts of morality are

accepted as applicable to such warfare because it is ideologically assumed that "capitalist-imperialism" is fundamentally evil and immoral.

4. The ideological beliefs, operational attitudes, and totalitarianism of the Communist powers lead them to a highly developed and integrated view of conflict management. Since struggle is waged in all aspects of social existence, at all levels of violence, without territorial limitations, and over an extended period of time, coordination is essential to ultimate victory. This coordination, moreover, is provided by a political leadership which manipulates military, economic, social, ideological, and scientific factors as components of a single weapons system. Decentralization does not involve fragmentation of this weapons system but rather geographic deconcentration of decision-making to regional and national Communist Party leadership, with global integration and discipline maintained as far as possible.

5. In view of the preceding, every effort is made to take advantage of the turmoil which prevails in the contemporary world and to attempt to harness for Communist purposes all of the existing forces of discontent--social, economic, political, ideological, and psychological.

6. From the Communist, and particularly from the Maoist viewpoint, insurgency and sublimated warfare thus have a major strategic role. Moreover, the waging of such campaigns has been systematized by the identification of stages in their development, and tactics to be employed at each stage, moving from basic preparation of a target society by infiltration and subversion through the total spectrum of its collective activities to the launching of guerrilla attacks, the establishment of "base" areas, the creation of regular mobile military forces, and ultimately to victory over the government in essentially conventional warfare, with guerrilla activities and political warfare providing continued assistance. Throughout the entire conduct of the insurgency, external assistance (advice, arms, training, rest areas, "volunteers," and even regular troops) is provided, where feasible, by other Communist countries, and international political warfare is waged against the defending government and its foreign allies. At the international level, appeals also are made to third parties and international organizations for sympathy with a "popular" uprising, and propaganda activities attempt to sow disunity and confusion both within the target government and among the people and leadership of its allies.

The Nuclear Stalemate

Contemporary international politics is also characterized by nuclear stalemate. The mutual fear to employ thermonuclear weapons, in combination with other major advances in armament, causes great powers to avoid conventional warfare which might lead to strategic, general war. Conflict among great powers, therefore, is "safest" if it is conducted through smaller, nonnuclear, proxy nations, and particularly if its intensity is below the level of declared international war. This, too, increases resort to the promotion of internal wars as instruments of great power rivalry.

MILITARY FORCE, POLITICAL OBJECTIVES, WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION, AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Both the historic and the contemporary characteristics of internal wars suggest a number of things about the relationship of military force to political objectives in their conduct. Viewed from the perspective of current US national objectives, policies, and strategies, these implications will be discussed primarily in terms of counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, they also are significant for American policy in those situations in which national interest actually may call for support of insurgencies.

Mao Tse-tung has stated the role of political objectives in wars of national liberation in the clearest possible terms, and his view has become basic to all contemporary insurgency doctrine. Mao wrote:

Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained. The essence of guerrilla warfare is thus revolutionary in character.

For the management of counterinsurgency, the same basic principles are applicable: (1) national political objectives must be clear, for they provide the framework within which force must be applied; (2) they must be so defined and enunciated that they are compatible with indigenous aspirations in the country whose populace must be rallied to counterinsurgency before it can really succeed; (3) the specific uses of military force must represent a

flexible response to the political objectives of counterinsurgency; (4) conflict management must be structured to reflect the psychopolitical nature of the warfare.

Political Objectives and the Uses of Military Force

To begin with, American political objectives in a specific counterinsurgency must mesh with American objectives in the region concerned, as well as globally. Contemporary national objectives, as reiterated many times since 1945 by presidents, vice presidents, secretaries of State and Defense, and other authoritative spokesmen, may be summarized as follows: (1) the belief that, in the long run, American national security, prosperity, values, and institutions will best be promoted by the development of an international order based upon independent governments, rooted in the consent of the governed, which resolve their problems through negotiation within the framework of law rather than by resort to violence; (2) at an intermediate level, and until the proper international order is established, the development of collective self-defense arrangements through which the security, prosperity, and independence of free nations can be guaranteed against both conventional foreign aggression and indirect aggression by aid and guidance to insurgencies; (3) more specifically, the containment of aggressive forces such as communism until clear evidence is presented of willingness to pursue a policy of peaceful coexistence. Short of the long-term goal of a peaceful and self-regulating international order, therefore, American national objectives are based upon a desire to frustrate and contain aggression (including subversive insurgency) designed to destroy national independence, particularly in countries and regions in which the success of such aggression would directly threaten American national security and well-being.

With this broad definition of national political purpose, what can be said about the nature, problems, and implications for military force of its more specific application to countries which confront an insurgency?

Differences Among Insurgencies

First, it is essential to distinguish among insurgencies. It is not automatically in the American national interest to oppose all insurgencies all over the world. Realism requires that insurgencies be distinguished in terms of their particular significance for US national security and global objectives. Realism

also requires that insurgencies be evaluated in terms of the American capability to succeed in counteracting them. This will depend upon military considerations as well as upon the level and intensity already achieved in the insurgency and the degree of popular support for it. In addition, it is important to determine whether an insurgency has political goals which are more compatible with those of the United States than are those of the incumbent regime. American intervention in an insurgency must be determined on the basis of criteria derived from American national objectives.

Differences in US Aims

The immediate political objectives of American participation in counterinsurgency efforts can vary from situation to situation, depending upon its total domestic and international context. As a result, the political definition of "victory" or a successful outcome will also vary from one counterinsurgency campaign to another. Where, for example, a friendly country--whose separate identity, independence, and widely supported government have been well established and recognized under international law--becomes the victim either of locally inspired and led or externally prompted insurgency, the primary political objective of American counterinsurgency assistance probably will be the total defeat of the insurgency. A second situation may involve a country which has been temporarily divided, like Korea, although all parties including the United States are committed to its future reunification. If the friendly government of one-half of the country becomes the target of subversive insurgency led by an unfriendly government in the other half, the American objective in providing counterinsurgency assistance might be the ultimate reunification of the country under the friendly government. If this is not possible because of great power support for the unfriendly government, however, the American political objective might then be the stabilization and perpetuation of the division as a frontier between great power spheres of influence. In a third situation, in which the weak and unstable government of a new state faces an insurgency supported by small neighboring lands but also deeply rooted in local national frustration with governmental inability to resolve basic problems, the only long-run solution to popular needs might require political association of the target country with its neighbors, and this might be a primary objective of the insurgency. American counterinsurgency assistance might then be predicated upon and associated with the political objective of negotiating the creation of a new regional federation or confederation. In a fourth situation, American counterinsurgency assistance to a government which clearly commands the support of only a portion

of its population, while the insurgents are indigenous and clearly command the support of another major portion of the population (ethnic, religious, and/or political), may be associated with the primary political objective of achieving a negotiated settlement between the two groups rather than the complete imposition of the will of one side. In a fifth situation, an insurgency may have strong indigenous as well as external great power support and may be occurring in a country whose government is friendly to the United States but whose importance to American national security and commitments is marginal. The political objective of counterinsurgency assistance may then be a negotiated settlement under which the friendly factions will be assured some meaningful leadership role in a coalition regime. Obviously, the use of American military force in such circumstances should be very limited and employed primarily as a bargaining instrument.

In all of the above "model" situations as well as in many other possible variations and combinations of conditions, the primary American political objective may differ. "Victory" will then be defined differently in each situation. Clearly, the level and type and uses of force also will have to be adjusted to these differences. It is extremely important, therefore, that the primary political objective be identified so that military strategy and tactics can be tailored to it. This suggests the need to apply the concept of flexible response to meet the variety of counterinsurgency situations and not merely to various major categories of conflict.

Coordination of Effort

Establishment of an objective in a specific counterinsurgency situation is only the beginning. As the situation and the US part in it develops, with various US elements concerned with different aspects, it is essential that their efforts be carefully and constantly coordinated, in order to maintain uniform goals and to adapt totally to changing situations as they develop.

The US Image

With the United States in the role of a foreign power going to the assistance of a friendly government confronting an insurgency, it is essential to convince the local populace that American objectives in intervening are compatible with local aspirations. It must be made clear that the United States is committed to the preservation of national independence, to the indigenous population's right to choose a government suited to its cultural,

psychopolitical, economic, and social requirements, to the withdrawal of American military forces at the earliest feasible time, and to the provision of subsequent long-term foreign aid and technical assistance to help the country maintain its independence, otherwise develop as it desires, and repair the ravages of the war. The specification and continuous communication of such objectives to the local populace is necessary to counteract inevitable charges of imperialism and militarism and, thereby, to achieve the success of the counterinsurgency effort. It is a vital aspect of the psychopolitical context within which counterinsurgency is waged.

When major military bases are constructed in order to support the military aspects of the struggle, therefore, it should be made clear that they are not "permanent" American bases in the country but are authorized by the government being aided and will either be dismantled, converted to civilian purposes, or operated in the interest of the country's defense after the insurgency is ended. Similarly, every effort must be made to demonstrate that American military forces are serving the indigenous government and are not new imperial forces. In all ways, to quote Brig. Gen. Gilbert L. Pritchard (USAF), "Our fish must swim among the people just as the communist fish does."

The Local Regime

Critical to victory in counterinsurgency is the existence of significant political and governmental capability on the side of the regime under attack. Therefore, if a high degree of such capability does not exist, it becomes essential for the United States to do everything possible to assist in its development. The most successful counterinsurgency campaigns have been waged by governments which have earned popular support through the efficiency and effectiveness with which they performed their leadership and problem-solving functions in accordance with popular needs and aspirations. While it is impractical to try to impose Western political democracy on societies which do not understand or desire it at a particular stage in their history, it should be an American political objective to assist the development of popular government (government responsive to mass needs and aspirations) in both its political and administrative forms. In fact, one major consideration in the initial American decision concerning the feasibility of waging successful counterinsurgency in support of another country must be that of its political-governmental condition. In political warfare of this type, victory requires inspirational, honest, and effective leadership.

This political objective also has implications for the use of military force. It constitutes another reason why American soldiers or civilians engaged in counterinsurgency must be clearly associated with the indigenous national government and must engage in activities which serve the constructive revolutionary purposes of that government. They cannot function like Hessian mercenaries or foreign imperial troops.

Constructive Pacification

Since victory in counterinsurgency requires the successful rallying of the masses of a society to its government, popular support becomes an overriding political objective. As noted above, the first step is to provide competent and inspirational government. However, the winning of men's "hearts and minds" also requires that tangible evidences of its problem-solving capabilities in terms of popular needs and aspirations be provided. Counterinsurgency must launch its own constructive revolution. To accomplish this in socioeconomic terms will necessitate great efforts to eliminate those types of popular distress that have fed the insurgency. The cleared areas, in particular, must be made attractive examples of the new society, just as the insurgents attempt to do in their base areas. Where this is achieved, those who are apathetic or neutral for social and economic reasons will more readily become supporters of the government and some active insurgents may, themselves, be won over. Action by civilian government, with American civilian assistance, can be linked to civic action by government armed forces, with American military assistance. The resultant defectors from insurgency of course must be well treated and given opportunities to play constructive roles as individuals and as citizens. The discouraging fact that all this may be sincerely tried, and that the counterinsurgent effort still may fail, does not remove it as a first prerequisite for success.

When a major source of popular frustration is the absence of opportunities for participation in the local, provincial, and national political process, a political objective of counterinsurgency must be to make clear provision for eliminating the grievance. Maximum effort will have to be made to provide the degree and types of political freedom desired, at least in areas under effective government control.

If popular support for an insurgency is based upon previously frustrated hopes for social, economic, and political reform, popular support for counterinsurgency can be won only by the provision of such reforms as rapidly as possible. In so doing, the ideological and nationalistic motivations for insurgency can also be

eliminated or, in cases where they are related to the establishment of a totally different system (e.g., Communist), at least blunted. Even Bismarck's Prussia and Imperial Germany were able to rally a major portion of German trade union and intellectual Marxists and promote their conversion from communism to social democracy by skillful socioeconomic and political concessions to reform.

The necessity to win over the populace to counterinsurgency places certain controls on the use of military force and dictates certain tactical considerations. It means, basically, that the psychopolitical costs of a military action must be carefully weighed and paid with full understanding of the political objective. While local military conditions will always be a major factor in the appraisal, certain broad guidelines seem to derive from the nature of the conflict as portrayed:

1. First, maximum conventional force should be applied to insurgent base areas, if such have been established, for these must be destroyed to prevent escalation of the insurgent campaign and also to prevent the insurgents from claiming and exercising regular governmental authority. In such base areas, the populace will have to decide whether it wishes to cooperate with the insurgents or flee to government-controlled areas where, obviously, the refugees should be well treated and helped to reestablish themselves. The application of all usable forms of conventional ground, sea, and air power would appear to be appropriate, but nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons would not. Psychopolitical considerations make their use counterproductive. From a military point of view a preponderant force is essential to ensure success.

2. In other areas which are not insurgent bases, but contain regular insurgent military units, more selective applications of military force would seem to be necessary. Here, all forms of conventional and unconventional (e.g., counter guerrillas) force should be used to the maximum possible extent to destroy these conventional military units, and to interdict their manpower and supply systems. However, the least possible damage should be done to the civilian populace and its economic infrastructure. Mass destruction weapons, therefore, become politically questionable. While the process of "clearing," moreover, should be military, the process of "holding" and aiding should be primarily police and civilian functions.

3. In gray areas subject to guerrilla harassment, military force should combine its conventional superiority with maximum mobility. Depending upon terrain, transport and supply by water

and land may vary in effectiveness. Air transport, air supply, and close ground support by airpower, however, provide counterinsurgency with major advantages unequalled by insurgents and against which they have only limited deterrent capability. Together with appropriate modern communications systems, therefore, they greatly enhance the ability to assemble and commit ground forces and otherwise to engage in continuous punishment of the guerrillas and to separate them from the local populace. Counter-guerrilla guerrillas may also prove very useful in routing out and selectively destroying insurgent irregulars. Such punishment and military defeat weakens insurgent determination, belief in ultimate victory, and conviction that they are "heroes" rather than bandits, and it also helps to convince the neutral and apathetic as well as the loyal among the local populace that the counterinsurgency will win. With increased public confidence, counterinsurgency intelligence will also increase, insurgent intelligence will decrease, and the hard-core guerrillas will be forced to commit greater acts of terrorism against the local populace in order to gain their help in surviving. These acts will serve to alienate them even more. Counterinsurgent forces, for their part, should avoid indiscriminate bombing and shelling, and acts of counterterrorism, which could provide insurgents with grist for propaganda. Punishment for cooperation with guerrillas, moreover, should be meted out by civil and police authorities when possible, and on a firm but fair rather than a ruthless basis. Always, the objective of winning the people rather than of killing or terrorizing them must be kept in mind.

4. In all areas of a country, military force should be employed to provide security for the local populace. It is only when such security has been achieved, then maintained by local police and taken advantage of to build the type of society desired, that the masses of the people will fully commit themselves to the government.

Exploiting Enemy Differences.

Insurgencies frequently proclaim their political and socio-economic objectives in broad and propagandistic terms which attack government failings but avoid detailed specification of their own positive program. This may be done because there are actual or potential disagreements within the insurgent leadership or between that leadership and its followers. A tactical political objective of counterinsurgency, therefore, should be to identify and exploit such areas of disagreement. This may involve actual efforts to appeal to certain leaders and groups (civil and military) within the insurgent forces and even to negotiate with them, thereby

splitting the insurgency. On other occasions, especially where insurgents are supported by foreigners, national, ethnic, and political differences may be successfully exploited.

Military force can be employed as a bargaining instrument, as a psychological weapon, as a controlled source of pressure for political action, and for destruction. Depending upon the circumstances, maximum force may be used against the regular units of the enemy and less against its irregular units, or it may be applied against the regular units of the foreign allies of the insurgents more than against the indigenous fighters, or it may be used more against the forces under the command of certain insurgent leaders and groups than against others.

Where active support (including troops) or direction is being provided an insurgency by a foreign power, it might be advisable to launch a retaliatory guerrilla and insurgency campaign in the foreign country. The political objective would not necessarily be the overthrow of the foreign regime but could be limited to harassment and interruption of aid. Popular grievances in the foreign country may be exploitable, too. While the use of conventional American ground forces for such a retaliatory effort would not be advisable, in certain appropriate cases selective and coordinated use of American airpower might be applied to facilitate the retaliatory insurgency, keeping in mind the need to avoid mass destruction actions which might cause the populace of the third country to rally to its own government.

Stopping the Insurgency Early

Since prolonged reliance by an insurgency primarily on guerrilla warfare tends to exhaust its popular support because of the great physiological, social, and psychological pressures on participants--something which Mao also recognized in his writings--a political objective of counterinsurgency should be to prevent the insurgency from securing base areas and functioning therein as a government. It is important that insurgents be forced to act as terrorists and bandits, even though their motivations and significance should not be analyzed in those terms.

This, too, suggests certain things about the use of force. As noted earlier in conjunction with the general counterinsurgency problem of winning over the populace, the prohibition and destruction of insurgent base areas are essential and warrant maximum use of conventional power. The insurgency must be deescalated at as early a stage as possible and not permitted to become civil war, for the latter might make necessary the destruction of a major

part of the country, produce the long-term alienation of a large portion of the populace, and require indefinite military occupation and counter guerrilla activity. Unless the primary political objective is to divide the country in two as a compromise settlement, therefore, restriction of counterinsurgency effort to enclaves composed of secure areas while permitting the insurgents to regularize their control of other areas is self-defeating.

Committing the Populace

Even in major insurgencies, only a minority of the populace normally is actively involved either in the rebel forces or in the regular armed forces of the government. Much of the populace may actually be neutral and may be following a "wait-and-see" attitude. Since counterinsurgency should be a total effort, however, another political objective becomes that of committing as much of the populace as possible to it. There is thus an important tactical political reason for the creation of effective and reliable self-defense forces, apart from sound paramilitary and police reasons. If insurgents are compelled to fight "people's" forces composed of the rural population they are trying to control and dominate, they become enemies of the people rather than their "liberators."

Creating and Exploiting Insurgent Errors

Still another tactical political objective is that of compelling the insurgents to make political mistakes. Their timing in developing the insurgency from one stage to another, their appeals, their methods and use of force should be made faulty in political warfare terms. The selective application of force in combination with nonmilitary actions, as the successful British campaign in Malaya demonstrated, should be linked to this political objective, too.

Conflict Management

The fundamentally political nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and the resultant necessity to use military force in harness with socioeconomic and psychopolitical instruments, also suggests the need to structure decision-making and command of the whole counterinsurgency effort in ways that will permit the maximum integration of all power factors into a single weapons system. Military commanders cannot be expected to engage in the necessary

analysis of the nonmilitary implications of their use of force. The managerial system, therefore, must provide means to assure the essential coordination.

As remarked earlier, in the long run, military force should be used to the greatest possible extent for constructive, nonmilitary purposes rather than just for destruction. To gain military victories without regard to the nonmilitary costs may cause eventual loss of the political war, for it may make it necessary for the military victor either to occupy a country indefinitely and be involved in almost continuous suppression of insurgency or, despite the victory of force, eventually to withdraw in frustration and weariness and turn over the land to the militarily defeated but politically victorious foe (as occurred, in effect, in Algeria). One cannot win the war and lose the people.

In the Communist management of insurgency, "the Party" leads the army, as testified to by such practitioners as Mao and General Giap. Even the discipline of insurgent forces is based upon "political consciousness," according to Giap. In this "people's army" approach, the Communists are applying what the French Revolutionary armies discovered earlier--the importance to victory in modern war of the ability to rally and discipline the masses through psychopolitical and ideological appeal. Military force is a major component but not the only component in an insurgency "crusade." The management of such conflict, therefore, is placed under political direction by the Communists both by subordinating the military to political "national liberation fronts" (dominated by the Communist Party) and by assigning political commissars to almost all levels of military units so that they can provide commanders with political analysis and troops with political indoctrination. Moreover, guidelines for proper behavior in dealing with civilians are issued to insurgents, with emphasis placed upon the need to win popular sympathy and to use both force and terror discriminatingly.

The use of military force in American counterinsurgency efforts must be applied with comparable concern for what the Communists call "the art of the struggle." This, of course, does not mean a duplication of the managerial devices of the Communists, which are reflections of one-party totalitarian dictatorship. Moreover, since American forces participate in counterinsurgency operations in independent foreign countries, there are special problems in their relationships with the host government and its civil and military agencies. Nevertheless, it is critical that organization for the use of American and host government military force not be conventional in wars of insurgency and "national liberation." Organization must be based upon an integrated

civil-military command and advisory structure. Although the United States does not conduct counterinsurgency operations from a position of recent colonial authority as was true of the British in Malaya, it would nevertheless seem essential to come as close as is feasible to the successful British managerial formula. That was one of maximum political-military integration at the level of supreme command and, at all other levels down to the smallest territorial unit, campaign planning by a triumvirate composed of the senior public administrator (government unit head), military commander, and police chief, with political leadership dominant. In addition, socioeconomic aid and propaganda activities also would be subordinated to the civil administrator.

In its specific application to the conflict situations most likely to be faced by the United States, three primary alternative patterns can be visualized:

1. Situations in which an insurgency is functioning at a relatively low level of intensity and the government appears to be capable of controlling and eliminating it with American assistance.

In such situations, the host government should be advised to develop an integrated civil-military-police structure of the type outlined above. Since American assistance will be primarily advisory, no large numbers of US armed forces will be involved. The US ambassador should serve as the senior authority, assisted by his country team. US civil and military advisers should be clearly tied to the ambassador. If the situation warrants, and if the host government is receptive, US mixed advisory teams (civil-military-police) should be assigned at all appropriate territorial levels of the country to aid the government's own civil-military-police command teams. There should not be functionally fragmented American advisory groups operating with relative autonomy and in different territorial patterns.

2. Situations in which an insurgency is functioning at a sufficiently high level of intensity, and government control of the situation is sufficiently uncertain to warrant large-scale direct American participation in the counterinsurgency effort.

a. Joint command structure. Maximum integration in conflict management obviously would be produced through a joint command system, if such were acceptable to all parties. Under this arrangement, the American ambassador, aided by his country team, would be the senior US authority. He would meet regularly with the host government's prime minister (or president) and appropriate cabinet officers, together with the respective senior military

and police commanders. This group would constitute the joint counterinsurgency decision-making leadership. At all other territorial levels, appropriate American civil-military-police teams would be assigned to form, with their counterparts of the host government, the planning and senior decision-making bodies for counterinsurgency. Naturally, the host government officials would constitute the only legal authority and all civil and police actions would have to be authorized by them and conducted in their name. The American "presence" would have to be as discreet as possible to avoid any suggestion of authority over the constituted government.

b. Dual command structure. Where joint command was not feasible, American civil-military-police advisory teams might be assigned at all territorial levels, under overall direction of the American ambassador, who would provide direct contact with the national government's political leadership. These American advisory teams would also provide the senior American military commander at each territorial level with advice on the nonmilitary implications of his use of military force. They would, moreover, constitute his link with the local government and help to provide coordinated effort in counterinsurgency.

Managerial arrangements of these types obviously go beyond the POLAD concept in the American armed forces. However, they or other possible alternatives represent an effort to provide counterinsurgency campaigns with some integrated planning and decision-making structure which would reflect the fact that this is political warfare. To allow fragmented planning, decision-making, and operations along relatively autonomous functional military, political, economic, psychological, intelligence, and police lines is to jeopardize the entire counterinsurgency effort. In such circumstances, military force cannot easily, if at all, be effectively employed for the appropriate and pre-eminent political objectives.

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Relationship of Military Force
to Political Objectives in General War

by

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GENERAL WAR IMPLICATIONS FOR
POLITICO-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

For the purposes of this study, general war has been defined, following the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, as "armed conflict between the major powers of the communist and free worlds in which the total national resources of the belligerents are employed and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy." By definition, then, if general war occurs in the future it will be thermonuclear war. As in any other form of war, the relationship of military force to political objectives would depend upon the interaction of two sets of considerations: (1) the implications for the politico-military relationship of that form of struggle (in this case, the general war environment); (2) the layers of political objectives ranging from the strategic down through the tactical, as identified immediately before the conflict, during the conflict, and immediately prior to the termination of the conflict.

Any attempt to identify the specific characteristics of general war between thermonuclear powers is necessarily extremely speculative in light of the fact that no such war has ever been fought. Professional literature, therefore, is marked by dispute about the validity even of applying conventional strategic concepts to such speculation. Experts disagree about the extent to which thermonuclear power can or cannot be assimilated into previous military analysis. What produces this dilemma for policymakers and strategists is, of course, the fact that the greatest powers now have the technological means to apply force of such unprecedented intensity that they can destroy most if not almost

all of an enemy's population and property. Such force, moreover, is potentially available even to small powers which in traditional terms would be incapable of threatening world peace or the extermination of foes. Modern science and technology, therefore, have created weapons of almost doomsday capabilities and have given every indication of the possibility of even more awesome breakthroughs in the future.

To add to the uncertainty surrounding the nature of general war in a thermonuclear age, there appears to be universal agreement that, if at all possible, such war should be avoided. This view is expressed by civilian and military leaders as well as by professional analysts of strategy throughout the world. In fact, so fearful of the potential consequences of modern strategic war are the existing nuclear and near-nuclear powers that all conceive of their nuclear armament as primarily "deterrent" in nature rather than as weaponry to be employed positively for military purposes. If there is a major difference in this regard between the Communist (Soviet and Chinese) and the Western (United States, Britain, and France) powers, it is the greater willingness of the Communists to utilize their possession of such capabilities for "cold war" psychopolitical objectives, i.e., their employment of nuclear blackmail both by resort to threat against others and by boasting of their nuclear might. Only in this sense, however, are the Communists willing to use nuclear weapons positively. For the rest, the Soviet Union consistently has refused to accept the idea (at least in public statements) that controlled nuclear war either at the tactical or at the counterforce levels is possible. Both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union have clearly emphasized that their pursuit of global hegemony--given the overwhelming strategic war might of the United States--will be conducted at the sublimited warfare level. Despite differences in the Chinese and Soviet views of the role of thermonuclear power in international politics, both appear to be committed to the belief that general war would be disastrous--the cost even of "victory" would be excessive. As a result, "the art of the struggle" against the West not only should be subnuclear but, to minimize the risk of paying the costs of general war, it should also be below the level of overt hostilities.

Nevertheless, "thinking about the unthinkable" is a responsibility of leadership, since it is also recognized that, for various reasons, general war always is a possibility despite the universal aversion to it. What, then, are the implications for politico-military relationships inherent in modern general war?

Probably the outstanding implication to be deduced is the greatly enhanced pre-eminence of the political element in that

relationship. Although all forms of war which are not geared to ultimate political objectives are irrational, and contemporary insurgency war is, first and foremost, political warfare, a thermonuclear general war probably represents the maximization of political dominance in warfare. On the face of it, this sounds strange in light of the fact that such warfare also constitutes the application of the maximum military force yet devised by man. It would seem logical that military force and military leadership in general war would be more dominant than ever before in the history of warfare. Just the opposite appears to be true upon further analysis, however, for several significant reasons.

The Decision for War

The initiation of general war would most probably be the result of a political decision made by political leadership. It is increasingly difficult to visualize the initiation of general war between Communist and Western powers by "accident." Both sides place great emphasis upon a variety of safeguards against mechanical and human failure in the control of thermonuclear weapons, and with each year the various techniques to make the respective systems "fail-safe" are greatly improved. It is, of course, conceivable that a proliferation of nuclear weapons among an increasing number of countries may lead to an "accident" on the part of a new nuclear power. This, however, would not necessarily produce a great power general war, for nuclear proliferation will be accompanied by the steady improvement in great power detection devices, command and control systems, antiballistic missile systems, and intercommunications arrangements to prevent such an "accident" from producing a "spasm" response leading to general war.

Both the major Communist and the major Western powers emphasize civilian control and, in so doing, severely limit the discretionary authority of military commanders to engage in major actions based upon their own military judgments. Even military use of tactical nuclear weapons, therefore, must be approved by civilian political authorities.

Conventional conflict between Western and Communist powers cannot automatically produce a nuclear exchange, although both sides are concerned about escalation possibilities. The fact is that both the Communist powers and the United States have evidenced a commitment to privileged sanctuary targets in order to keep conventional and subconventional warfare limited. Thus, the United States did not attack mainland China during the Korean War, while China and its Soviet ally avoided efforts to interdict

American naval and maritime logistical support for the action within the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the United States exercised great caution in the Cuban missile confrontation with the Soviet Union and has avoided various air attack targets in North Vietnam and South China during the current Vietnamese war. Soviet actions in the various Berlin crises are other examples. The rationale of both sides for such self-imposed restraints has been the desire to limit escalation to nuclear war. Even the Soviet refusal to accept the possibility of tactical nuclear war has been in terms of the fear of escalation into general war. Given the continued exercise of this restraint, escalation into general war from subconventional and conventional warfare is most likely to result from conscious judgment by political leadership as to the extent to which it would serve national objectives. It is not likely to be a result of purely military considerations generated on the battlefield.

Both the Communist and Western powers, because of the nature of their decision-making systems, determine the use of force within a political context. In the case of the Communists, Marxist-Leninist ideology combines with the nature of their totalitarianism to commit them to "protracted conflict" under politically pre-eminent management. There is a conscious effort not to gamble with what they believe to be their historically inevitable triumph by resort to wars they cannot win or in which the costs of victory will be excessive. In the case of the Western democracies, and particularly in the American case, public discussion and political debate inevitably help to shape foreign and military policy decisions. This is particularly true whenever decision-making takes time and is not immediately followed by an all-out national commitment to general war. Thus, if war is not the product of a sudden and unanticipated sneak attack which preempts public discussion and political consultation by national leadership, a decision to engage in war inevitably will be preceded by political debate over US national interests and objectives. Democratic leadership, tied to civilian dominance, cannot help but be influenced by such discussion.

When one views these characteristics of both the Communist and Western systems, it also becomes clear that the Communist propensity for political warfare (which they regard as one of their great strengths) and desire to avoid military gambles makes them prefer to "soften up" an enemy by resorting to indirect aggression combined with propaganda appeals to segments of public opinion within the enemy country. Generally, they prefer that the people of the target country have a chance to wonder and to worry about the morality, legitimacy, and utility of engaging in war. It seems most likely, therefore, that as long as American nuclear

deterrent and defense capabilities are maintained at a level sufficient to permit the country to withstand an enemy thermonuclear strike and then to retaliate with such force that the attacker can be devastated to the point of possible elimination as a viable country, the chance of sudden general war is very small. Instead, escalation into it over a period of time (during which political discussion and the political determination of objectives will occur) is more likely. Where American defense capabilities for subnuclear conflict are also maintained at a level which prevents defeat, the possibility of such escalation to general war also is severely reduced.

An important factor to remember, however, is that of competitive risk-trading in an intense crisis. Although neither power wants escalation to general war, one may be more willing to run the risk of escalation than the other, in order to put further pressure on the opponent. He may do this because his stake in the conflict is of more importance to him than to his opponent, because he has a significant degree of military superiority, or because he is less rational or less skillful.

Command and Control Systems

Modern command and control systems emphasize decision-making dominance during general war by national political leadership. Modern scientific and technological developments not only in thermonuclear weaponry but in communications have led to the creation of national command and control systems which greatly enhance the ability of civilian political leadership to dominate military action in conflict situations. Never before in history, as a result, has it been as possible to limit the discretionary authority of military commanders in time of war and to centralize not merely strategic but even tactical decision-making in the hands of national political leadership. This veritable revolution in conflict management was demonstrated most clearly by the Presidential role in the Cuban missile crisis. It appears safe to assume that, whenever the threat of escalation into general war exists, or if a general war actually occurs, the key decisions will be made by national political leadership. Moreover, increased improvement in the protection of national command and control systems in time of nuclear war will decrease the likelihood of an initial attack's eliminating that leadership and, thereby, leaving strategic decision-making to military commanders. Greatest decision-making discretion for military commanders, therefore, exists at subnuclear conflict levels and particularly when there is slight threat or danger of general war.

US Strategic Thinking

Dominant American strategic thinking emphasizes political control of general war for political objectives. The movement in American strategic thinking from massive retaliation to controlled nuclear response represents an effort not only to make the conduct of nuclear war rational but also to make certain that it is firmly tied to the national command and control system and is waged for national objectives. Although a narrow interpretation of counterforce strategy may no longer prevail, it seems clear that the United States is committed to a retaliatory, "second strike" posture and that it would like the potential enemy to think in terms of controlled nuclear exchanges rather than in terms of movement directly into all-out war. As a result, the basic definition of general war not operative is one which incorporates the possibility of target limitation--of privileged target sanctuaries--if the enemy also limits its attack.

Even if one accepts the view of some expert analysts that tactical nuclear warfare is not possible both because of the resultant blast and fall-out conditions and because the Soviet Union insists that its initiation would immediately lead to massive thermonuclear attacks, and even if one also accepts the judgment that, in operational terms, no clear-cut distinction between counterforce and countercities attacks can be made (particularly in view of America's highly urbanized condition) it is still clear that the United States wishes to avoid spasm thermonuclear war, if at all possible. This means that national leadership has interpreted the national interest to be one of controlling nuclear weaponry rather than of being a prisoner of it. It also means, of course, that the American national interest has been defined as one of avoiding all-out thermonuclear war even if general war should occur. This, in turn, opens up the possibility of pursuit of several layers of political objectives during the conduct of general war.

Psychopolitical Considerations

The psychological and physiological implications of general war make psychopolitical considerations a critical factor in the initiation, conduct, and termination of such war. So terror-stricken are the majority of people about thermonuclear general war that it is considered to be "unthinkable." Throughout the world, therefore, the popular desire to avoid such a conflict has greatly stimulated peace movements and pacificism, generated

violent attacks on those strategists who are willing to think about the "unthinkable," and otherwise produced important psychopolitical pressures on political leadership, not only in the West but also in Communist countries. These pressures make it extremely difficult for rational leaders to give serious thought to the launching of initial thermonuclear attacks which are certain to bring devastating reprisals. In this sense, world public opinion tends to emphasize that no political objectives warrant the unleashing of such warfare. National leadership everywhere cannot help but be conditioned to some extent by an awareness of this popular view, which constitutes one additional restraint upon preemptive attacks as well as upon thermonuclear aggression.

The psychopolitical implications of this universal fear of general war also raise serious question about the "will" to fight such war, particularly in the case of democracies whose leadership is responsible to the citizenry. Although "better red than dead" movements do not include most Western nationals, they are indicative of the fear which, to varying degrees, grips most people. Such fear not only leads to active support for political control over the use of military force, in general, but also has implications for the initiation of general war. It poses the possibility, for example--in light of current public opinion trends--that, faced with the threat of general war and given time to engage in prolonged discussion and debate, massive public opinion and legislative support might develop in behalf of a "Fortress America" strategy in order to avoid general war. It is certainly conceivable that if the threat of general war were imminent enough and Communist psychopolitical warfare against the United States were sufficiently skillful, the American political "left" (now neo-isolationist in orientation) and elements of the American political "right" (those which still adhere to various forms of isolationism or to the "realism" of reliance on US capabilities to defend the Western Hemisphere) might join in calling for withdrawal from the outside world in order to avoid all-out general war. Such pressure could, perhaps, be great enough to affect the national "will" as expressed by political leadership to engage in general war.

If general war did occur, but did not immediately become an uncontrolled exchange--due to the limited character of initial nuclear exchanges--opportunities for the expression of public opinion as well as of opinion by local, state, and congressional leaders also most probably would exist. It has been estimated that, short of an initial massive exchange and an emptying of nuclear arsenals, a general war might be conducted for several months, based upon the combination of counterforce and counter-cities strategies. In such a war, one must assume the rapid

emergence in all participant countries of very great pressures on political leadership to seek a settlement based upon limited political objectives. The popular will to continue the conflict undoubtedly would be shaken and it is even conceivable that coups d'état might be attempted in all combatant countries in order to terminate the struggle. Any of these actions would further accentuate the domination of the "political" even during the conduct and termination stages of general war.

MILITARY FORCE AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

IN GENERAL WAR

The first part of this discussion has stressed the reasons why modern general war would probably enhance rather than reduce the domination of political control, both in terms of leadership and in terms of decision-making. What, however, are the types of political objectives for which the United States might fight a general war and what are their implications for the use of military force?

The American national interest--the highest political formulation of national objectives--has been repeatedly stated in its fundamental long-range terms by innumerable civil, military, and nongovernmental leaders and analysts. For Secretary of State Dean Rusk, it is to bring about a peaceful world community in which nations are free to decide on their own course and their own systems of government, allowing others freely to do so also. For Walt W. Rostow, it is "to maintain a world environment for the United States within which American society can continue to develop in conformity with the humanistic principles which are its foundation."¹ This "progressive development of the quality of American society would, of course, include the physical protection of the country; but the protection of American territory is viewed essentially as a means to a larger end--the protection of a still-developing way of life." For Alain C. Enthoven, it is "to establish and maintain a peaceful world order based on a belief in the worth and dignity of the individual, and on freedom for each person to develop his own capacities in the way he chooses."² In these and many other statements, it is clear that the national interest involves physical survival of the United States, the perpetuation of the American way of life, and the promotion of an international order whose political, economic, military, and ideological characteristics will favor continued development of American society.

When American military objectives are introduced into the discussion at a comparable level of analysis, they take the general form to be found in Enthoven's statement: "The role of military force, in the pursuit of this objective [the national interest], is to prevent would-be aggressors who do not believe in freedom and human dignity from forcing free men to live under a system based upon tyranny and coercion. The problem of formulation of defense policy is to select those forces which will contribute most effectively to these multiple objectives."³ With somewhat greater particularization, Henry Rowen has identified our "major defense objectives" as "detering nuclear assault on the United States; limiting damage to the United States if war comes, while seeking a favorable war outcome; deterring aggression against our major allies and aiding in their defense; finally, helping to defend other allies and the free world."⁴ In the view of General Barksdale Hamlett (USA), the "fundamental military objective" for the foreseeable future "will be to deter or defeat Communist aggression in any form or degree against ourselves and other nations of the Free World. . . . This requires a capability to survive and win a general nuclear war and to defeat lesser acts of overt or covert Communist aggression that threaten our vital interests and those of our allies anywhere in the world."⁵ In all such statements, and in accordance with American traditions, military strategy and the use of military force are firmly linked to national objectives, whose overall formulation is political.

When one moves from this highest level of identification of national interest and national objectives to one of greater specificity and with clearer strategic implications, Walt Rostow's statement, as follows, appears to reflect the professional consensus since the late 1930s:

[The United States is] essentially . . . a continued island off the greater land mass of Eurasia. Various combinations of power in Eurasia have been and remain a potential threat to the national interest. . . . [In] the twentieth century the United States has been thrice placed in jeopardy, and instinctively sensed that jeopardy, when a single power or combination of powers threatened to dominate Western Eurasia, Eastern Eurasia, or both. . . . [The] whole sweep of American history, [therefore, requires] taking the American relationship to the power balance in Eurasia as central to the nation's security problem. . . . Since the combined resources of Eurasia could pose a serious threat of military defeat to the United States, it is the American interest that no single

power or group of powers hostile or potentially hostile to the United States dominate that area or a sufficient portion of it to threaten the United States and any coalition the United States can build and sustain. . . . Whatever the military situation might be, a Eurasia coalesced under totalitarian dictatorships would threaten the survival of democracy both elsewhere and in the United States. It is, therefore, equally the American interest that the societies of Eurasia develop along lines broadly consistent with the nation's own ideology; for under modern conditions it is difficult to envisage the survival of a democratic American society as an island in a totalitarian sea."⁶

Although Rostow's summarization of the primary national strategic interest may correctly represent the prevalent view and may clearly identify the power and ideological bases for American concern with the interplay of forces in Eurasia and between Eurasia and ourselves, it also produces a major question for American strategic analysis at the general war level. Does this formulation provide an adequate political framework for the conduct of thermonuclear general war? Or, must it be seriously modified to provide that realistic definition of political objectives which would be critical to the rational management of such conflict? Obviously, in any conflict situation there are layers of political objectives of varying degrees of specificity whose pursuit, even though within the broad framework of fundamental national objectives, must be tied to various contingencies. What modifications would be necessitated in a thermonuclear general war situation, and what would be their implications for the use of military force?

Causes, Participants, and Initiation

The causes of a general war, its participants, and the manner in which it was initiated would be major determinants of strategic objectives and the use of force. If, for example, a general war occurred because of a sudden, massive thermonuclear attack stemming from great, irreconcilable, and emotionally charged clashes which had taken place in an atmosphere of frustration and complete hopelessness about the possibilities of peaceful accommodation and co-existence, the victim (presumably the United States) probably would have little recourse but to seek the rapid elimination of its attacker. In such a situation, immediate movement to all-out massive retaliation would be likely and probably would be coupled to a desire for the unconditional surrender of the foe. In these circumstances, and if Red China and the Soviet Union fought as

allies, both the Communist powers and the United States probably would seek the destruction of the other's regimes and the opportunity to dominate their future reconstruction in political and ideological terms compatible with the maximum formulation of their national objectives. Moreover, they would probably seek similar reconstruction of the regimes of their respective allies (even though they were not involved in the exchange). It would, in effect, be a struggle to mold the course of future world history, with one ideological utopia pitted against another. The unprecedented military force unleashed and the destruction wrought would make it possible to pursue war aims which, in scope, would exceed even those of Nazi Germany (whose relatively limited power, by comparison, necessarily placed restrictions on its World War II objectives). Military force in being at the time of the exchanges would determine the outcome, and the rapidity of the conflict would provide little opportunity for popular participation in the discussion of objectives once the war had begun.

It is, of course, conceivable that only one of the two major Communist powers might be involved in such an attack and that the other would remain "neutral." If this were the case, it would become necessary for the United States to hold some retaliatory power in reserve not only to impose its will upon its attacker but also to make certain that the other Communist power did not either attack it subsequently or engage in nuclear blackmail based upon its still intact thermonuclear armament. This situation could open the way to some limitation of American global objectives, with only the immediate attacker's regime and possibly those of its satellites being eliminated while the other Communist power was untouched on a quid pro quo basis. Such bargaining might also involve participation by America's nuclear allies (e.g., Britain and even France). Thus, if the attacker were Communist China, and if Europe were untouched in the initial exchanges, the Communist and western states of Europe might acknowledge a stalemate condition and agree to preservation of a European status quo.

If, however, a general war were initiated as a result of "accident," third party catalytic action, escalation from a limited conventional conflict or from a thermonuclear attack by a Communist power on American allies (e.g., Western Europe or Japan) or critically important neutrals, or even from a limited (tactical or counterforce) nuclear attack, the American response might be more controlled and associated with more limited political objectives. Since the initiation of general war on one of these bases is more likely, and the range of political objectives and related uses of military force greater, separate discussion of these possibilities is necessary.

Controlled General War

If movement into a general war situation were sufficiently gradual to permit prior popular political discussion and consultation, it is probable that American retaliatory power would be associated at least initially with efforts at political bargaining and the pursuit of limited political objectives. This assumption is implicit in earlier parts of this analysis. Under such circumstances, the current formulation of national objectives and strategic interests could undergo very great modification.

For one thing, under popular pressure (both domestic and in the form of world "public opinion") and in conjunction with the type of political warfare to be expected from the Communists, the definition of American national objectives would tend to be forced down to the bedrock of national consensus. The moralistic and crusade-like fervor which has characterized American resort to force in the past--after great initial reluctance to employ even limited force for national objectives--and which provided popular underpinning for the "unconditional surrender" objective in World War II, might not prevail in the face of thermonuclear war. Instead of seeking maximum objectives, the tendency might be to seek minimal ones. Without complete protection provided by antiballistic missiles and an elaborate civil defense system, the fear and horror of thermonuclear war on the national territory could generate great pressure for negotiated settlement. Public fear, lack of familiarity with sophisticated and possibly academic formulations of escalation ladders, and limited understanding of complex international issues muddied by the Communist "strategy of ambiguity," might well cut deeply into the national will of a democracy to pursue maximum goals. The quality of American political leadership at such a time would then be critical, for it would fall to this leadership to communicate the nature of the crisis and to identify the American national interest in order to rally broad public support despite understandable fears.

If a general war were initiated by a controlled Communist thermonuclear attack in the wake of escalation from a limited conflict, the American objective might be to force a compromise settlement of the catalytic dispute without movement to full-scale general war. Under such circumstances, American military force could conceivably be employed for retaliation at a level comparable to the initial attack and combined, simultaneously, with an offer of cease-fire to permit negotiation of a settlement. If the vigor of the American response and the credibility of American willingness to escalate further, if necessary, were clear, the result might very well be one of military "pause" for

diplomatic negotiation. During such negotiation, it would also be possible for some mutually agreed deescalation to occur in the form of pledges concerning the use of force or through various political gestures. A complete failure of such negotiations would undoubtedly produce further escalation of the conflict. However, this might possibly be by resort to conventional force rather than thermonuclear power or (less possibly) even by sub-conventional efforts to overthrow the enemy regime or cause rebellion among its allies. Short of all-out thermonuclear exchanges, therefore, it is conceivable that general war might be conducted by a controlled "mix" of military force. Much would depend upon judgment of the opponent's "will" to continue the struggle despite initial losses and ultimate possibilities.

It is important, in the above respect, to keep in mind the fact the Communist and Western attitudes probably are not symmetrical: the Soviets suffered an estimated 20 million to perhaps 30 million casualties in World War II; the Chinese also have had experience with heavy population losses even in previous limited wars; both societies are less urbanized and industrialized than the United States and so might feel themselves better able to withstand further nuclear escalation than the United States; and the Communist powers are heavily committed to and skilled in psychopolitical warfare. The possibility of satisfactory negotiation would probably hinge on an "eyeball-to-eyeball" contest of wills. The outcome of such a contest would depend on which nation believed it had the higher stake in the contest, which had military superiority, or which was the more skillful negotiator.

If, on the other hand, general war were initiated by a Communist thermonuclear attack on Western Europe, in conjunction with skillful, preparatory psychopolitical warfare, it is conceivable that the American national interest might be determined to call for the threatening of strategic retaliation unless a cease-fire and immediate negotiations were begun rather than one of automatic nuclear response. Much might depend upon the causes of the original attack, the country or countries involved and their relationship with the United States at that time, and any political conditions set by the Communist attacker at the time of the assault. It is also possible, of course, that the United States would respond immediately with either a limited or a major counterforce strike to assure the rapid termination of the conflict. This could be linked to demands for negotiation under threat of further strikes by the United States or, depending upon the success of the initial strike, could suddenly produce an American effort to overthrow the enemy regime and seek the maximum objective of elimination of communism both in the attacking country and in its neighboring, dependent satellites. Such options could

conceivably be available to American political leadership, if, in fact, it interpreted a first strike by the Soviet Union on Western Europe as justifying a pre-emptive but essentially second strike by the United States, and if that strike achieved great success.

It is also obvious, however, that if the United States did not immediately respond to a Soviet attack on Western Europe but called for negotiation, instead, it would be seriously modifying its alliance commitments. This would constitute documentation of the view of some contemporary American analysts and foreign leaders that, in thermonuclear general war, alliances are outmoded or at least un dependable.

One must also consider the possibility that, in the face of a limited Chinese Communist thermonuclear strike in Asia or a Soviet strike in Western Europe, carried out after extensive psychopolitical and even sublimated military preparation in which US forces were not directly involved, the American political decision might be to urge negotiation between the combatants while itself avoiding direct involvement. Such a decision might result from extensive internal political disagreement about the extent to which the national interest was dangerously threatened or from the pressure of public opinion. It might be associated with a hope that Chinese or Soviet objectives were limited, with a hope of future Sino-Soviet conflict, or with a belief that under thermonuclear general war conditions, the possibilities of damage to the American homeland would be so great as to be unacceptable. Therefore, major revision would be required in the view that the balance of forces within Eurasia is sufficiently important to national security and survival to warrant American intervention at any cost. A new isolationism, emphasizing either "Fortress America" or an America with strategic interests extending only to the Eurasian island littoral--and backed by narrowly defensive use of strategic power--might provide the political framework for national objectives.

While this is not necessarily to be assumed to be the most likely development in the future American political definition of national interest, it cannot be ignored as a possibility. Under such circumstances, military force would be employed in general war only if the United States were directly attacked in strategic terms. In association with such a strategy, American diplomacy might devote most of its efforts both to negotiation with the Communists and to organization of a more effective United Nations with governmental and international strategic police power. American military strategy, then, would be completely and narrowly retaliatory and American military power would be employed primarily for bargaining purposes with the goal that of international stalemate.

CONCLUSIONS

The weight of professional writing and public discussion of American strategy emphasizes the unthinkability of all-out thermonuclear general war. The world is faced by the fact that there no longer is much significant physical limitation to the destructive capabilities of military force and by the associated fact that all countries can be reached by thermonuclear enemies without the need to engage in direct invasion and regardless of major differences in manpower and degree of industrialization. As a result of the tremendous advances in science and technology, many of the traditional national factors of power are no longer relevant when general war is considered. Modern military capabilities have greatly increased the importance of the "political" and the psychopolitical. Probably more than ever before, and to a greater extent than for other levels of war on the conflict spectrum, the skill and will of political leadership and the morale of the public combine with the strength of military forces-in-being to dominate in general war situations. Under these circumstances, and in light of the predisposition of the Communists, military conflict probably is unlikely at the level of general war. For the United States, at least, all indications are that most thinking about the initiation, conduct, and termination of general war is in terms of its control to avoid escalation into all-out conflict. This type of thinking accentuates the importance of identifying limited rather than maximum political objectives for the use of military force and depends upon maximum control in the use of such force by political leadership.

Footnotes

1. Harry Howe Ransom (ed.), An American Foreign Policy Reader (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1965), p. 65.

2. "American Deterrent Policy," Address to the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Los Angeles, February 10, 1963, Survival, May-June 1963, p. 94.

3. Ibid.

4. Ransom, p. 156.

5. Barksdale Hamlett, "The Army of 1970," Army Information Digest, February 1963, pp. 9-10.

6. Ransom, p. 66.

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Observations on Study Papers

by

Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir John Slessor*

CORE AREAS

The paper on Hungary (1956)** deals with a point that is of key importance to the study--the matter of zones of influence, or core areas, as Dr. Janos calls them. This point goes right to the heart of the problem of political and military planning. In a nuclear age, when nations will risk major war only when their national existence is more or less directly threatened, it is vital to be clear--and clear far in advance--about not only what are one's own core areas but what are the potential enemy's core areas. And the importance of core areas leads to the problem of gray areas. Especially for democracies, the problem of what to do about gray areas is very difficult. If one does nothing about them and allows the enemy to dominate them, he may then begin to encroach on the core areas. East Germany is, I think, a case in point; unlike Poland or Hungary it is not an essential part of the Russian defensive glacis. It is, or should be, a gray area, but by giving way in 1945 we have allowed it to become a real threat to our core area.

This is really the same problem that was discussed in the early 1950s, when we called it the "stop-line" problem--the problem of where you say "thus far and no farther." The trouble

*These notes, made informally by the British strategist and former Chief of the Air Staff in commenting on several of the study papers, were considered of such value to the study as a whole that they have been edited and reproduced, with the author's permission, in this form.

**See Great Power Response to the Hungarian Revolution (October-November 1956) by Andrew C. Janos, Volume III, Part One.

is, of course, that if one is too specific about his stop-line he tends to give a green light to the enemy for action on the far side of the line.

The core area problem is very like the familiar military problem of the organization of a defensive position. There are usually some features which must be held as outposts because they are vital to the main defensive line. But the wise commander does not try to hold little salients or isolated features which are either not defensible at all when the chips are down, or will absorb a far higher proportion of resources than they are really worth.

At the tactical level this problem is relatively easy, but at the higher strategic levels it is bedeviled by political complications and is far more difficult. Sometimes, as in Cuba, the question of core areas is clear. Elsewhere, as in Berlin, it has been far from easy. And if initially a political misjudgment is made it inevitably leads to a much more onerous military commitment than should have been necessary. The result may be to weaken the natural strength of the main position--as it was when the Russians were allowed a free hand in Eastern Europe toward the end of World War II. This is a fascinating story of a failure of long-term political planning and what it can let one in for. An initial political misjudgment can also so commit prestige in some area in no man's land, not itself vital, that to withdraw would be the equivalent of a major defeat.

The difficulty, then, is to define the core areas--and reach agreement among Western nations about them. What about the Middle East? Fifty years ago it was definitely a core area for the British, and was treated as such. Is not one of our troubles there that since World War II we have not had agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and France about the real importance of the Middle East? When it was an effective British sphere of influence there was stability in the area. There has not been since. The Western nations treated it rather half-heartedly as a Western interest, organizing a "Northern Tier" against a highly unlikely threat, while ignoring the real threat of the Communists' eating away the Northern Tier from behind. If the Middle East was a core area worth having an alliance to defend, we should have had the courage to keep the Russians from supplying Nasser with arms.

The really critical question today of course is the Far East --what are the core areas there? Are Formosa and Hong Kong legitimate US and British zones of interest, or is there good reason

for China to regard them in the same light as the United States regarded the possibility of Soviet missiles in Cuba?*

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ELECTION TIME

There is another point of significance about the Hungary crisis. In the old days the time for statesmen to be alarmed about the possibility of a crisis leading to war was when the crops were in, in the autumn. Now the time when we ought to be specially on our guard is when the elections are pending!

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY**

Is it not true to say that counterinsurgency operations by American military forces in a country like Vietnam have something significantly in common with the "policing" operations by British or British-Indian military forces in places like the northwest frontier of India and tribal areas of Iraq and Arabia in earlier days? In both cases the "enemy" consists of people of the country for whose administration, prosperity, and general well-being those in authority are responsible. In the old days, the British were those in authority; now, in a country like Vietnam, it is the indigenous government. The "enemy" are, at least in many cases, fellow-citizens temporarily in a state of insurgency, and the object of the operations is to restore order and good government with a minimum of damage. We do not want to kill insurgents if we can avoid it. We do not want to destroy their property, crops, or cattle, as this would intensify the poverty which is often a basic cause of the insurgency. We want merely to compel them to act as law-abiding citizens, so that we can get on with the measures necessary to improve their lot and thus reduce the tendency to insurgency. For the British in the old days these constructive measures included building roads, irrigation, education, improving the breed of stock, and similar programs. As Dr. Wit says, "The least possible damage should be done to the civilian populace and its economic infrastructure."

*Editor's note: For Sir John's views on Asian policy and strategy, see his The Great Deterrent (London: Cassell and Company, 1957), pp. 161-167, and Chapter 17.

**From comments on Relationship of Military Force to Political Objectives in Internal Wars, by Daniel Wit, Volume III, Part Two.

This was the principle underlying the system known as "air control" in the 1920s and 1930s. I think the RAF can claim to have been pioneers in the art of making war without killing people. Our object, which we often came pretty close to achieving, was to quell insurgency without any loss of life--not by killing insurgents but by making life so unpleasant, unprofitable, and boring that they preferred to accept terms.*

The problem is now seriously complicated, of course, by external intervention, Communist ideology, and other factors. But we had the problem of intervention, in a very minor way, in the old days also--Saudi intervention on the southern borders of Iraq, Akwan raiding against Transjordan, Yemeni intervention in the Aden Protectorate, and so on. Clearly the existence of the United Nations as a forum for protests and the world-wide publicity given such incidents today complicates the problem of dealing with insurgencies quickly and firmly.

In the context of the Wit paper, two points on counterinsurgency tactics strike me. First, I wish we could spend money and brainpower on developing some really effective nonlethal weapons and methods. I agree that chemical weapons would not be appropriate for dealing with insurgent base areas, as Dr. Wit says, if lethal chemicals are what is meant. But I believe that nonlethal chemical agents used from the air would be an admirable way of dealing with insurgent base areas. Some use has apparently been made of them in Vietnam but not nearly enough. I would like to see establishment of a "Nonlethal Warfare Research and Development Center," charged with the development of techniques and tactics for nonlethal, incapacitating operations. The goal would be to make insurgents incapable of fighting for a period of hours, come in with helicopters and disarm them, and then put them through a rehabilitation process. The procedure would unfortunately be unpleasant for civilians affected as well as insurgents, but it would be far less unpleasant than the effects of bombs and napalm.

The second question, which also arises from British air control experience between the wars, is this: Are we making as much use as we could and should of selective, discriminate bombing, after due warning, not necessarily of military targets only, against North Vietnam? I have a feeling that we are playing the enemy's game by confining our attentions--however effectively, and it may well be increasingly effectively--to North Vietnamese

*Editor's note: See Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue (New York: Praeger, 1957), Chapter 3, especially pp. 61-70.

military forces and military communications. Surely there are a lot of installations--power stations, docks, railway centers, dams, factories, and other similar things--that North Vietnam could not do without? A possible approach would be to make a list of perhaps half-a-dozen such objectives; issue warnings, as the British used to, by pamphlet, radio, and so forth, that any time after not less than one week from that day one of the six objectives would be demolished from the air without further warning, so that all civilians should be evacuated from the vicinity of all of them; then in a week, or ten days, or two weeks, take one out. A second list would then be broadcast, and the whole program repeated, with the explicit understanding that the process would continue as long as, and no longer than, the Viet Cong continued to receive military support from North Vietnam and the North Vietnamese refused to come to the conference table.

After all, in Vietnam not only insurgency, but war is being dealt with. American troops, to say nothing of South Vietnamese, are being killed by North Vietnamese intervention, and there should be limits to the extent operations are kept "sublimited." It could not be said that the enemy had not been given every opportunity of obviating or limiting human losses, and the results in any case would be nothing as brutal as the record of the Viet Cong against the inhabitants of South Vietnam. Towns as such should not be bombed, and when dealing with objectives in or near towns, one should be very selective and careful--as, for instance, we were when we were able to take out the marshaling yard in Florence with hardly a casualty to the civilian population in the immediate vicinity. And the issuing of the warnings would in itself be calculated to cause great disruption.

QUEMOY AND US ASIAN POLICY*

This paper seems to me of real value to the study, because I have always thought that the whole Formosa affair provides excellent lessons--mainly, I am afraid, negative--on the relation between political strategy and military strategy. It suggests factors which should govern relations with allies, the influence of foreign policy on command decisions at the highest level, the procedure for decision-making at the top, and the essential need (so often neglected), before embarking on any course of political

*From comments on The Quemoy Crisis (1958), by S.M. Chiu and Angus M. Fraser, Volume III, Part One. These comments were made on an earlier version of the paper.

action, really to examine its implications in the widest sense and strike the right balance between political commitments and the military price one is prepared to pay to fulfill them. I wonder if we have really got all this right in connection with the events leading up to the present situation in Vietnam?

Too often in our history the politician has made commitments --without really thinking them through--that have put an insupportable burden on inadequate military resources. The British Scandinavian policy in 1940 is a case in point. And, too often, inadequately considered political pronouncements have led--when circumstances have changed--to military commitments which should have been foreseen. Acheson's writing off of South Korea in 1950 is an example. One must try to foresee the effect on the mind of a potential enemy of this sort of thing. And, I suspect, the Korean case is at least partly due to what seemed to us British at the time a surprising lack of intimate consultation between the State Department and the Pentagon.

So far as the matter of defending Formosa is concerned, I wonder whether the JCS were ever asked to make a careful military appreciation (a) of the real military importance of Quemoy and Matsu to the defense of Formosa or (b) of the possibility of Chinese invasion of Formosa. Surely they cannot have forgotten the lessons of "Overlord" to an extent that they would have advised Dulles that any such thing ~~was~~ even remotely possible.

I was always unhappy in 1954 and 1958 about American policy vis-a-vis China, and I am still not happy about it. Things have changed a lot since then, notably with the appearance of the Sino-Soviet rift. But I still think the rigidity of US policy toward China might have very dangerous implications when the next Formosa crisis blows up--as it will. And in years to come Chinese nuclear capacity may have very sinister relevance to this problem.

The moral as far as this study is concerned seems to me to be that military strategy in a vacuum never solves anything--it is a means to a political end, but only one means. It must be complemented stage by stage by political, diplomatic, and economic strategy. That of course means being quite clear in our own minds as to our political objective, as to what situation we want to bring about, and then working toward it, by a combination of military and political action.

President Johnson now seems to have this approach clearly in hand in Vietnam. Although I believe the situation could have been

avoided 10 years ago,* I think the United States is now doing the only possible thing there. In fact, I believe that more could be done, and that Washington may be unnecessarily inhibited by the fear of Chinese intervention. I do not believe that Peking has any intention of intervening, mainly because it could not intervene effectively even if it did wish to.

SOVIET AND CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS**

There is an aspect of the Suez affair which I think contains important lessons in connection with this study. This is the extreme importance of correct judgment of Russian political intentions and military capacity. The one thing that caused me no anxiety whatever was the Russian threat to rocket England, with its implications that the Suez affair could escalate into World War III. I never believed that, and do not now. It suited the Soviet Union to make us believe in that possibility; they have played the game of colossal bluff on more than one occasion, and too often we fall for it. But I have never believed that the Kremlin has the slightest intention of risking a world war on any issue except a direct threat to Russia herself.

I was anxious at the time of Cuba, but did not really believe Khrushchev would risk total war on that issue. And I think it is very important that we assess this factor correctly in future crises. We shall have it again, I have little doubt. But as long as we are quite tough and united, it will again be what it has been in the past--bluff.

I have sometimes wondered what the effect on US policy would have been if, in response to the Cuba quarantine action, the Kremlin had sealed the Helmstedt autobahn and moved 10 or 12 additional divisions into East Germany. I suppose the fact that it did not is really due to what I think is the most important and hopeful feature of the Cuba crisis--the sudden and, to the Soviets, surprising realization on their part that the United States was not a "paper tiger"--a realization that Khrushchev passed on to the Chinese just after the episode. That, to me, has always been a key point about

*See The Great Deterrent, pp. 242-243.

**From comments on Suez (1956) by D.C. Watt and Cuba--The Missile Crisis and the Great Power Response (October 1962) by William Spencer, Volume III, Part One.

the Cuba affair--that it greatly reduced the risk, which I had always feared before, that the Soviets' misjudgment of American resolution might lead them to persist in some course of action that might reach a point of no return and make nuclear war inevitable.

President Johnson obviously understands, in relation to Vietnam, that "strategy must be developed within a framework which does not require absolute or unconditional responses." Let us hope Peking and Hanoi come to see that, and that the President does not get pushed by antiwar agitation in the United States into compromising what Secretary Rusk has called "the integrity of the American commitment." I do not think he will. And he will surely find no pressure from his British ally in that direction. We, after all, still have some 100 commitments, great or small, all over the world. If the integrity of the American commitment were to be compromised, what hope would we have of maintaining ours?

SOVIET TACTICS AND WESTERN UNITY*

A general point about Suez, which is so obvious that it hardly needs stressing, was that it was an example of the invariable Russian (and indeed Chinese) tactic of exploiting every conceivable opportunity of dividing the Allies and disrupting NATO. Suez, Cuba, Indonesia, Vietnam--it is always the same. Surely this is an example of the crying need to reorganize and extend the responsibilities of the North Atlantic Council and its permanent staff, to have a political policy planning staff as well as a military planning staff to coordinate Western policy, not only in the narrow NATO area but world-wide. I wish our governments would take some notice of the recommendations of the Atlantic Convention of NATO Nations in January 1962--the Declaration of Paris. We simply cannot afford a repetition of the sort of thing that went on between Washington and London and Paris from July to October 1956. I cannot help think that if there had been a political policy planning authority of the kind just mentioned in 1956 and before, we should have been spared the errors of the Eden-Dulles negotiations and the ultimate folly of Suez.

*From comments on Suez (1956), op. cit.

NOTES ON THE BERLIN CONFRONTATIONS**

An obvious, but still not universally understood, point that emerges from this paper is that the nuclear deterrent is in fact a factor making for peace, in that it inhibits the power with greatly superior conventional forces, and with vast reserves of docile, disciplined, expendable manpower, from forcing matters to the ultimate issue of war. This is obviously a very important factor not only in relation to Russia but still more to China.

The fact that in focusing on our own difficulties we overlooked our opponent's is, as Dr. Smith says, not a new phenomenon. It is, however, worth stressing in connection with this study. I have known a number of occasions, during and since the last war, when our own strategy has been handicapped by our habit of attributing to the enemy a capacity to overcome practical (for instance, logistic) difficulties, and a willingness to take risks, which we would never accept ourselves.

The rapid liquidation by the Kremlin of the Berlin encounter when faced with determined opposition was typical of the Russians. Historically, they have always done it politically. They will probe and probe and be quick to exploit success or weakness in an enemy, but when faced with really determined opposition they recoil--"reculer pour mieux sauter"--and try somewhere else, round a flank. This is a very important thing to remember about Russian policy--Tsarist just as much as Communist. Russian policy is always to leave themselves an avenue of retreat. And they can do it much more easily than the democracies--though decreasingly so as the rigid control of the Kremlin becomes looser--because of their control of information and consequent ability to give way without loss of face with their own public opinion.

The points about the inherent difficulties of coalition operations and the value of the United Nations as a recognized but informal channel of contact are obvious, but well worth stressing. I think a general point in this connection is the unwisdom of taking a public stand on the morality of a given course of international policy. Secretary Dulles was terribly liable to do that. Foreign policy and diplomacy must be flexible, capable of adaptation to changing circumstances. If a line is publicly taken that a certain course of action would be wicked or immoral, it is very much more difficult to take a different line when changed

*From comments on Berlin (1948-1949, 1960-1961), by Jean Edward Smith, Volume III, Part One.

circumstances require it in self-interest. There are times when one must be inflexible, as when a pledged word or a solemn treaty is involved. And the moral is, a pledged word should not be given nor a solemn treaty entered into unless one is sure that he will be politically and militarily able and willing to honor them when the time comes.

INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

It is certainly true, as Dr. Smith says, that "technological development makes man more dependent." It certainly also makes governments less independent, and I believe this is a very important point in relation to both Russia and China.

When Russia was an unindustrialized country with a population mainly of illiterate peasants, and with vast distances lacking any proper communications, road or rail, the Tsars and the early Communist leaders could pursue a far more independent policy than now, when the standard of literacy is very high, the country has modern communications, and the leaders increasingly have to consider public opinion. And, of course, the trackless wastes that were old Russia's protection have been nullified by the airplane and the missile.

Likewise, I have always seen the growing industrialization and technological development of China as a growing safeguard against external adventure--though I have never been sure that external conquest finds a place in Peking's policy. When ruling a country with a vast area, mainly populated by ignorant peasants laboring for a bare living, it is easy enough to defy all comers and say that if 300 million people are lost under nuclear attack it does not matter. Moreover for thousands of years the Chinese have been acclimated to wholesale catastrophe; the Yellow River has taken a toll every generation greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb. But when the population becomes more literate, communications are improved, the Yellow River is brought under control, and the country gets more and more dependent on industry, then it becomes more vulnerable to nuclear attack, and government policy is bound to become more cautious. The actual policy of Peking, however, in contrast to some of the pronouncements, has always been rather cautious.