THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE FLN

Abstract

An analysis of the French military and political offensive against the National Liberation Front (FLN), Algeria, 1958-1960. General de Gaulle's strategy against the Moslem insurgents had a two-fold purpose. Its military goal was first to neutralize and then to destroy the insurrectional apparatus. Its political goal was to gain support of the Moslem populace through economic, political, and social rehabilitation. Contrary to some opinions, the French Army had not devised a new and radical theory of fighting revolutionary wars. The unconventional tactics that were used so successfully were often due to on- the-spot improvisations and to lessons learned in Indochina. The French command wanted not just to neutralize the populace but also to win its support. However, methods swift and terrible enough to demoralize the enemy risked driving the civilians further into the guerrilla camp. The French offensive in Algeria--its successes and its limitations--is still much debated in France.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Sep 01, 1967
Accession Number
AD0824975

Entities

People

  • Constantin Melnik

Organizations

  • RAND Corporation

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Space
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Counterinsurgency
  • Defense Systems
  • Governments
  • Guerrilla Warfare
  • Insurgency
  • International Security
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • Personnel Management
  • Security
  • Terrorists
  • Unconventional Warfare
  • Urban Areas
  • Violence
  • Warfare
  • Warning Systems

Fields of Study

  • Political science

Readers

  • International Relations and European Studies
  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies