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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980

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AD824984

HEADQUARTERS  
4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND  
APO US Forces 96307

AVLC TA-NIS

20 December 1965

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965

THRU: Commanding Officer  
1st Logistical Command  
APO US Forces 96307

TO: Commanding General  
USARV  
APO US Forces 96307

SECTION I: Significant Organizational Activities

1. The main body of the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 4th Transportation Command left Fort Eustis at 1930 hours on 14 July 1965 under the direction of Col. R. W. Aronson, Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command. The advanced party of the headquarters had left the previous day, 13 July 1965, under Lt. Col. Barnet Faverman, Deputy Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command to fly directly to the Republic of Vietnam. The main body flew from Patrick Henry Airport outside Newport News, Virginia to Travis Air Force Base, San Francisco, California, arriving at 0930 hours on 15 July 1965. The headquarters traveled by bus to the Oakland Army Terminal and boarded the USNS General Hugh J. Gaffey and traveled on Voyage Number 136 (Outbound) to the Republic of Vietnam.

2. Col. R. W. Aronson was the Troop Commander for this voyage and directed the military units through his Voyage Staff that consisted of officers selected from the various units. Last minute additions to the troop list caused crowded conditions in the troop billeting and messing areas. Steps were taken by the Army Voyage Staff and MSTC crew to reduce the strain on the ships accommodations. CWO Curtis E. Davis, Voyage Staff Mess Officer, succeeded in establishing a troop mess that could meet the increased demand placed on the ship's messing facilities. Col. Aronson allowed maximum pass privileges at all ports of call and this helped maintain a high morale even though all of the ship's major troop recreation facilities were utilized for billeting areas.

STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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Asst. Chief of Staff  
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3. The first port of call for the USNS Gaffey in the Republic of Vietnam was on 11 August 1965 at Cam Ranh Bay. Col. Aronson and members of his staff went ashore for a few hours and met with the Support Command Commander. On 12 August 1965 the USNS Gaffey anchored at Vung Tau and the Headquarters and Headquarters Company debarked and flew from Vung Tau to Tan Son Nhut Airport, outside Saigon. The main body was billeted with the advanced party at Ten City "B" in Tan Son Nhut. The advanced party had arrived in Vietnam on 18 July 1965.

4. The initial headquarters for the 4th Transportation Command was in Tent Camp "B". The 4th Transportation Command was placed directly under the 1st Logistical Command for operational control with the Saigon Logistical Area Command providing administrative and logistical support for the headquarters.

5. The mission of the 4th Transportation Command given in 1st Logistical Command letter AVLOG-GO-0, 1 August 1965, Subject: Letter of Instruction which stated, "The Commanding Officer, 4th Transportation Command will:

a. Operate ground terminals as required to transfer cargo and personnel from one mode of Transportation to another.

b. Operate air terminals as required through Joint Services agreements with the other military services.

c. Operate water terminals located at Can Tho, Saigon, Vung Tau, Cam Ranh Bay, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, and other locations as directed by this headquarters.

d. Establish and operate a Transportation Movement Control Net, to include all available modes of transportation.

e. Provide port clearance, to include delivery of cargo and personnel to depots, staging areas, and other destinations as directed by this headquarters.

f. Be prepared to assume all of the terminal operations at the Saigon Port, currently performed by the United States Navy, when directed by this headquarters.

6. The same letter also directed that the 4th Transportation Command will "become operational on 17 August 1965. The major battalions, headquarters and their units that were placed under operational control of the 4th Transportation Command are included in Inclosure I. A provisional terminal service battalion and port command was established at Cam

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this did not completely materialize. Time was lost in bringing the units up to a semi-operational level, which was achieved. Contracts governing civilian stevedore and drayage services were reviewed and recommendations were made to renegotiate them to expand the scope of the services provided.

10. In the middle of August, planning for "Operation Highland" began at the operation level for the 4th Transportation Command. "Operation Highland" was the code name assigned to the landing and movement in-country of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). This movement of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) was the first time in the war, to date, that a full division was brought into theater. Moreover, it was the first time that the logistical support units in the Republic of Vietnam would be required to assist in an operation of this magnitude. The 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal), commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas Emery, was given the task of directing the transportation requirements of the move at Qui Nhon. In planning for "Operation Highland" a number of problem areas developed:

a. It became apparent that available materials handling equipment would be inadequate to meet the requirements. As previously noted, the problem was not isolated at Qui Nhon. Whatever MHE that could be obtained without crippling other terminals, aerial ports and depots were repositioned to augment Qui Nhon.

b. The repair parts situation constituted a major problem. Authorized prescribed load list levels had been drastically reduced by normal operations, in-country stock was nonexistent and the supply pipeline had not yet been established.

c. Lighterage was not available in sufficient amount to equal the discharge rate of the hatch gangs.

11. Under Col. Aronson's direction, the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) was augmented with additional resources from other areas within the 4th Transportation Command. Before the operation began over 3,000 transportation troops were under Col Emery in the Qui Nhon area. Lt. Col. Norman Kirby, S-3 of the 4th Transportation Command was sent to Qui Nhon to assist Col. Emery during the project. Actual discharge operations commenced with the arrival of the first vessel on 10 September 1965. Few problems were encountered in the actual discharge of the ships except in the vessels sustaining capabilities. The poor condition of some ships gear rendered the vessel non-self-sustaining although advanced information designated them self-sustaining. As the operation progressed the rough terrain forklift deadline rate reached over 50%. Increased requirements

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Ranh Bay pending the arrival of the 10th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and their assumption of control in that area on 21 September 1965.

7. Major personnel changes: Major Edward K. Burdeau (S-1) was transferred to MACV and Major Leo A. O'Connell arrived as the S-1 on 1 September 1965.

8. After the headquarters became operational three immediate problems confronted the command.

a. The first dealt with communications with the various units and ports. The command had TC troops at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay, Vung Tau, Saigon and truck companies in direct support of the 1st Cavalry (AM) at An Khe. This lack of communications reduced command response to the many problems that developed.

b. The second problem area was that of personnel. Both at this headquarters and at the unit level immediate studies were made that resulted in the transfer of some units to take advantage of local conditions, attachment of many small transportation detachments to larger units, and the reorganization of the Support Services Branch of the S-3. The Support Services Branch, technical services officers, geared themselves to provide supply and materials handling advice to this headquarters and to disseminate information to major consignees and all interested agencies receiving cargo arriving in the Republic of Vietnam by ship. (Reference Inclosure 2). During this difficult period of experimentation and development, over 405,000 tons of cargo was cleared through the terminals.

c. The third initial problem area that developed was concerned with repair parts for unit equipment. Many of the detachments and companies had been in-country for a number of months and the deadline rate on many items increased as repair part stocks became exhausted. Critical deadline rates existed throughout this entire period in material handling equipment (MHE), Amphibians, LARC's, Marine Landing Craft and task vehicles. The problem still existed at the end of the period, but aggressive supply and follow-up action by this headquarters is expected to bring favorable results in the near future.

9. A study involving the S-3 and S-4 was undertaken to determine future port requirements. All aspects of terminal operations were considered, tonnages were projected and available resources evaluated. The results of this study pointed to a potentially critical situation. Two (2) truck units, one (1) light and one (1) medium, arrived without their TO&E task vehicles. Original planning had called for the units to be brought up to full vehicular strength from in-country resources, but

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to support the petroleum dumps, ammunition supply points, ration break-down points, the Engineer supply point and unit positions of the 1st Cavalry Division (AM) at An Khe forty-five (45) miles in-land exhausted the MHE capabilities. Line haul (truck) deliveries to the Division's forward areas progressed in a satisfactory manner. Had sufficient MHE been available on the beach and at off-loading sites a better line of communications operation would have been possible. The line haul capability was enhanced by the operation of a trailer transfer point which permitted maximum use of the five ton tractor (M52A1). The 120 stake and platform trailers per company that were authorized by USARPAC were not available, but were requisitioned during this period. On 28 September 1965 "Operation Highland" was terminated after twenty-one (21) ships were discharged with a total of over 50,000 long tons of cargo, 16,000 troops and 477 aircraft. The regular operation of the port was also maintained during this period. In total, the operation was successful and merited official praise from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, COMUSMACV and the Commanding General of the 1st Cavalry (AM).

12. The offices and billets of the 4th Transportation Command headquarters were moved from Tent City "B" on 24 September to the Le Lai Hotel in Saigon at 76 Le Lai Street. The headquarters of the 11th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) were also moved into the Hotel. Telephonic communications were increased and plans were initiated for a full communications center to be placed in the headquarters to reach all major ports by direct line teletype.

## SECTION II: Recommendations

1. That maximum use be made of pallets and containers for cargo shipments: Loose or "broken" stowed cargo slows discharge and increases the possibility of damage, loss or pilferage. PX cargo seems to have the highest percentage of broken stowage. 5V

2. That cargo be block stowed. Whenever possible, cargo for the same consignee should be block stowed within the hatch. This method will speed discharge, permit better cargo control and reduce the incidents of partial overstorage of cargo increments spread throughout the hatch. 5V

3. That Port of Embarkation's outloading for RVN must be provided with a current listing of activity addresses and project codes. This is particularly necessary for automatic resupply items for units whose in-country destinations have changed. This will greatly reduce the frustrated cargo rate and relieve the strain placed upon terminals to transship this cargo to it's proper destination. 5V

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4. That all possible cargo be waterproofed. The lack of adequate covered storage facilities in Vietnam necessitates this additional waterproofing. 56

5. That whenever possible, ships destined for the Republic of Vietnam be loaded for a single port of discharge. A serious problem now exists in Vietnam due to the large number of ships awaiting discharge at each of the principal ports of entry. This problem is compounded by the necessity of having to rig the gear and open and close hatches each time a ship is worked at a different location. Considerable difficulty has also been experienced because of overstow on ships with cargo for more than one port of discharge. Further, the mixture of cargo has delayed operations due to the need for selective discharge.

6. That all vessels for Vietnam be self-sustaining. Floating crane and heavy lift facilities are extremely limited and not reliable. This is particularly true in the case of Qui Nhon where weather conditions and the unprotected harbor often prevents the use of a floating crane. In any case, non self-sustaining vessels delay discharge operations and increase ship turn around time.

7. That tractors be stowed to allow their discharge prior to the discharge of trailers. This will permit immediate clearance of the trailers from the port or beach areas.

8. That support elements, eg: Divisions, Supply and Transportation Battalions, be programmed to arrive in the first increment of a large unit move. The early arrival of this type unit is mutually beneficial to the main body and the technical support units.

9. That maximum use be made of cargo space in unit vehicles. Critical equipment such as mess gear, ammunition, weapons, etc. must be stowed so that it can be readily discharged and made available for use. This can be accomplished by using all available space in unit vehicles.

10. That logistical and support units be programmed into the theater at full TO&E levels well in advance of the major combat units. Terminal command and battalion headquarters should arrive before their operating

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units to insure continuity of action and provide for a unified command structure.



R. W. ARONSON  
Colonel, TC  
Commanding

2 Incl  
as

Copies Furnished:

- 2 - CG, USCONARC
- 1 - CINCUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-MH
- 1 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G-3
- 1 - CO, 1st Log Comd, ATTN: AVLOG-GO-0

AVLC-QUI-SPO (20 Sept 65) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965.  
(RCS CSGPO-28) (RI)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST LOGISTICAL COMMAND, APO US Forces 96307 15 JAN 1966

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVC (Historical Officer), APO US Forces 96307

1. Concur with comments and recommendations of 4th Transportation Command.
2. This headquarters has initiated action to effect accomplishment of these recommendations.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



J. F. BRODY  
Major AGC  
Asst AG

2 Incl  
nc

AVC (20 Dec 65)

2d Ind


SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965

Headquarters, United States Army, Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96307 20 JAN 1966

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH  
APO US Forces 96558

Concur with the comments and recommendations of the 4th Transportation Command, and the comments in the first indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
Captain A.C.G.  
Asst Adjutant General

UNITS ASSIGNED TO THE 4TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1965

(Cam Rhan Bay - Nha Trang)

10th T Bn (L.L.) HHD\*

10th T Co.  
63rd T Co.  
82nd T Co.  
97th T Co.  
123rd T Co.  
159th T det.  
169th T Det.  
261st T Det.  
263rd T Det.  
266th T Det.  
271st T Det.  
276th T Det.  
347th T Co.  
380th T Det.  
515th T Co.  
564th T Plt.  
565th T Co.  
587th T Det.  
783rd T Det.  
1097th T Co.  
670th T Co.

(Saigon - Vung Tau)

11th T Bn (TML) HHD

62nd T Co.  
117th T Co.  
120th T Co.  
163rd T Co.  
259th T Det.  
262nd T Det.  
264th T Det.  
265th T Det.  
275th T Det.  
586th T Det.  
588th T Det.  
592nd T Det.  
670th T Co.  
783rd T Det.  
1099th T Co.

(Qui Nhon - An Khe)

394th T Bn (TML) HHD

14th T Plt.  
71st T Co.  
119th T Co.  
155th T Co.  
168th T Det.  
253rd T Det.  
344th T Co.  
396th T Det.  
585th T Det.  
783rd T Det.  
1098th T Co.  
2nd T Co.  
58th T Co.  
61st T Co.  
151st T Co.  
541st T Co.  
597th T Co.

\*Assumed operational control 24 September 1965.

CARGO ADVISORY NOTICE

ITEM	ETA	POD	SUPPORT/LOGISTICAL AREA FOR USING UNIT	PIECES	PACK	WEIGHT	CUBE
Vehicle Military	Unk	RGA	Nha Trang (VGV, VHC, VBL)	280	Ve	1890102	180736
Cans NOS	Unk	RGA	Nha Trang (VBL)	18	Pc	89640	15102
Vehicle Military	Unk	RGA	Saigon (VRC, VGO, VFO)	108	Ve	1887236	160811
Vehicle Military	Unk	RGA	Saigon (VGO)	8	Ve	14155	1728
Vehicle Tracked	Unk	RGA	Saigon (VFO)	1	Ve	40750	1957
Vehicle Military	Unk	RG1	Saigon	1	Ve	14835	2306
General Cargo	Unk	RGA	Nha Trang (VGV)	5	Px	2050	252
General Cargo	Unk	RGA	Saigon (VGO)	7	Ex	3968	318

AVIC TA-FORM 2 (26 Sep 65)

NOTE: The above information pertains to a shipment of Class II & IV Supplies arriving on vessel SS MORMAC TRADE. Any exceptions or inquiries should be directed to the Support Services Branch, Headquarters, 4th Transportation Command, Phone: CHINA 251, 215, 316, 210, or 232 via "LION" switchboard.

Incl #2

GPOP-MH (20 Dec 65)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 9 FEB 1966

TO: Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army,  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. The Command Report of the 4th Transportation Command for the quarterly period ending 30 September 1965 is forwarded herewith. Comments that follow are keyed to Section II, Recommendations, of the basic Command Report.
2. Paragraph 1: The Western Area Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (WAMTMS) informed this hq that maximum palletization and containerization is being made of loose cargo arriving at West Coast terminals to include drummed asphalt.
3. Paragraph 2: Cargo is being block stowed at CONUS ports of loading.
4. Paragraph 3: The responsibility for assignment of Activity Address Codes (AAC) for Vietnam is delegated to USARV which is required to notify Letterkenny Depot (Army Central Service Point) and USARPAC of all AAC additions, deletions, and changes. Letterkenny Depot in turn promulgates these to all Army supply and transportation activities in CONUS and to over-sea commands by transceiver. USARV therefore is obliged to report to Letterkenny and this hq all destination changes for in-country units immediately as they occur, refer to AR 725-50, para 9-6.
5. Paragraph 4: No known requirement for waterproofing cargo has been received. WAMTMS advises that palletized units are capped with cardboard.
6. Paragraph 5: MIMTS is loading vessels for one-port discharge insofar as possible.
7. Paragraph 6: Loading ports have been requested to load self-sustaining insofar as possible and to insure that ships heavy lift gear is in operable condition before sailing.
8. Paragraph 7: This matter should be referred to MIMTS for implementation.
9. Paragraph 8: Concur.
10. Paragraph 9: Unit vehicles are normally stowed with unit equipment when delivered to the loading port and left intact.

GPOP-MH (20 Dec 65)

3d Ind

9 FEB 1966

SUBJECT: Command Report for Quarterly Period Ending 30 September 1965

11. Paragraph 10: Logistical and support units are being programmed into the theater as well equipped as resources will permit and as far as possible in advance of the combat elements.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



**M. S. KNASIAK**  
**MAJOR, WAC**  
**ACTING ASST AG**

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