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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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AD824986



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (24 Feb 67) FOR OT

28 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for quarterly period ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. Stanfield
C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
a/s

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FOR OT RD
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Incl 142

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 5TH TRANSPORTATION COMMAND (TERMINAL A)
APO 96238

AVCA QN-5TCC

15 November 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)

TO: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN:
AVCA QN-GO (Historian), APO US Forces 96238
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-O
APO US Forces 96307
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVC,
APO US Forces 96307
Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-MH,
Fort Shafter, Hawaii, APO US Forces 96557
Asst Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION I

During the period of this report, Headquarters and Headquarters Company 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) completed its training cycle, completed preparations for overseas movement, and deployed to this command. With the completion of a field training exercise on 5 August 1966, the personnel devoted their major effort toward packing of equipment for overseas shipment. Integrated with the packing of equipment was the problem of securing the remainder of the equipment that had been previously unavailable. By aggressive action the majority of these supplies and equipment were secured, and packed. The vehicles and other category "2" equipment were loaded on the SS OCEANIC TIDE in Norfolk, Virginia on 22 August 1966. The remainder of the equipment was shipped as Red Circle (TAT) and departed for the West Coast on 28 August 1966. It accompanied the personnel on the troop transport. PCM leaves were given to all personnel during the period 10 August to 5 September 1966 on a staggered basis.

The advance party, consisting of the Commanding Officer, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4, departed Fort Story, Virginia on 1 September 1966 and arrived in Qui Nhon on 4 September 1966. Predicated upon arrival of the advance party, the 5th Transportation Command was assigned to the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, and the Commanding Officer was appointed as the Commander of the US Army Port of Qui Nhon on 6 September 1966. Additionally, the 159th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) and the 394th Transportation Battalion (Terminal) were attached to the 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) on 6 September 1966.

The main body of personnel arrived in Oakland Army Terminal on 9 September 1966 and loaded aboard the USNS GEIGER. The GEIGER sailed for Vietnam on 10 September and arrived in the Qui Nhon harbor on 29 September 1966. The personnel were billeted in the cantonment area located on a hill overlooking the outer harbor at the southern edge of Qui Nhon. The Headquarters was temporarily set up in tentage and available temporary buildings and was fully operational on 1 October 1966.

The majority of the headquarters staff elements are located within the cantonment area; however, the S-3 Operations, Movements, Documentation, and Support Services Branches are located in the port operations area on the LST Beach.

The headquarters is organized functionally in the same manner as specified in the Table of Organization and Equipment. The organization consists of the normal "S" Staff, a Judge Advocate Section, Chaplain, Fiscal Officer, Surgeon, and Provost Marshal. Presently the Judge Advocate Section, Chaplain, and Fiscal Officer are fully employed in support of the US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, Headquarters. The surgeon's arrival in country was held up for medical reasons; however, upon arrival his services will also be offered to an appropriate medical unit. The unit is now at 97 percent of authorized strength, and no significant personnel changes are anticipated.

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Upon the appointment of the S-2 as the Port Security Officer, US Army Port of Qui Nhon, a survey of the Port was made, on the spot corrections were initiated, and detailed plans containing definitive guidance on security were provided to subordinate units. With the arrival of the main body, physical security became a dual function of the S-2 and the Provost Marshal, resulting in cooperation on projects reflecting great improvements in the pass system, lighting, fencing, positioning of guards and communications, and facilities.

Port security responsibilities were better delineated on 19 October 1966 when the Commanding Officers, 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) and the Naval Coastal Surveillance Center together with the Qui Nhon Provost Marshal signed a Memorandum for Understanding relative to Port and Harbor security in Qui Nhon.

Personal liaison has been the key note in the intelligence and security field. The S-2 has initiated and maintained liaison with the Binh Dinh Sector Advisory Officer, the 524th Military Intelligence Detachment, the Coastal Surveillance Center, the Joint Technical Advisory Detachment, the Advisor to the ARVN Special Police, as well as the local Korean and Popular Force units in the vicinity.

Since the majority of the ships are unloaded in the open roadstead, weather is a critical factor. At some times it is impossible to operate in the outer harbor due to the surf condition. Even when surf conditions are good, it is a difficult operation. This situation has improved to a extent by the completion of 25% of the DeLong pier during the month of October. Since completion, the operational portion of the pier has been utilized only 20% due to the interference with pier construction and the lack of channel buoys, which prevented deep draft vessels from entering the inner harbor. Conditions will improve with completion of the entire pier permitting berthing of four vessels by 1 December 1966.

Due to loading practices in the CONUS Ports, vessels are arriving here classified as non-self sustaining, when proper stowage at the loading port would permit unloading with use of the ship's gear. In most instances vessels require the use of a Barge Derrick. This port is equipped with a sixty (60) ton Barge Derrick, but its capability is limited due to surf conditions in the outer harbor. This problem has been reduced to some extent as the inner harbor has been expanded and one vessel is being anchored temporarily until completion of the DeLong pier. Three mooring sites are planned for the inner harbor with completion date during the month of January 1967. With the completion of the DeLong pier and dolphin mooring sites this port will accommodate seven deep draft vessels in the inner harbor.

All of the newly arrived Terminal Service units, 387th, 300th, and 854th, are weak in experienced stevedore personnel. Having undergone a maximum of two (2) to six (6) weeks AIT-BUT at Fort Eustis and Fort Story, Virginia, it is estimated that these units are only thirty (30) percent trained at the present time. By giving them OJT under more experienced stevedores, these units will be operationally proficient within a sixty (60) to ninety (90) day period.

During the period 1 through 31 October 1966, 2658 U.S. Troops were moved through the US Army Port of Qui Nhon. These troops were moved from the ship to the beach by LCU (when available) utilizing a Barge Cargo as a staging dock at ship side. When LCU's were not available, LCM's or LARC LX's were utilized. The last 500 troops were loaded directly onto LARC LX's from the side port and accommodation ladder of the troop ship.

During the reporting period this command handled a total of 272,997 short tons of Cargo, with a monthly average of 90,999 short tons.

SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 RCS CSGPO-28 (RI)

SECTION II
PART I

LESSONS LEARNED

SUBJECT: Part II Observations (Lessons Learned)

1. Item: Availability of MHE and Engineer Equipment

a. Discussion: The availability of MHE and engineer equipment has leveled off with an average of 60% of equipment being available per day. It is recommended that in order to increase availability a maintenance float be made available to replace equipment in need of maintenance. At present it is hard to deadline an item of equipment for preventive maintenance unless it completely breaks down.

b. Observation: A program is under study to consolidate maintenance of all MHE and engineer equipment in one location. This will put maintenance under the control of one officer who will become technically qualified on this equipment. PLL will also be consolidated and can be controlled and maintained in a better manner.

2. Item: Debarcation of Troops

a. Discussion: Debarcking troops from ships in the outer harbor becomes risky if swells of four (4) feet or more are encountered, and extremely dangerous with swells of eight (8) feet or more.

b. Observation: Utilization of lighterage smaller than the LCU will make the above risk conditions even more critical.

3. Item: Processing and Movement of Vehicles

a. Discussion: As many as thirty (30) Depot vehicles and trailers have been on the beach at one time. The processing and movement of these vehicles is hampered by such a quantity and also a limited work area.

b. Observation: It has taken as long as three (3) days to begin processing once the vehicles arrive, and with such a backlog, delivering to the Depot is extremely slow.

4. Item: Crane 100--165 Ton Capability

a. Discussion: This port's capability is limited to 60 short tons for heavy lifts at the present time. The only heavy lift capability is one 60-ton Barge Derrick. This Command has requested the lease or procurement of one each crane capable of lifting a minimum of 100 tons. The present Barge Derrick (60-ton capacity) is scheduled to be replaced by a 100-ton Barge Derrick during January 1967. This will assist in discharging heavy lifts however it must be realized that approximately 25% of vessels arriving are not self-sustaining, largely due to condition of ships gear and heavy seas.

b. Observation: When planning a facility such as a DeLong pier, planning should also include a crane capable of discharging heavy lifts, otherwise the full benefit of the facility can not be attained.

5. Item: Shortage of TOE Vehicles (55-131E)

a. Discussion: The S-3 Section of this command is not authorized a single vehicle. This section is by far the most active element of a Transportation Command (Terminal A), and accounts for 50% of all personnel authorized. An equitable distribution of assigned vehicles has been made. Justification for additional vehicles has been submitted, however approval time is required.

AVC: QN-5TCC

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SUBJECT: Operations Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
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In accordance with Paragraph 3d, Section I, TOE 55-131E, 24 March 1964, additional motor vehicles are authorized to support a command of this type.

b. Observations: That administrative transportation is at a premium in the theater. This is primarily due to the distance between facilities within each command. To properly supervise and accomplish the mission, additional administrative transport is essential. A minimum of six vehicles are required to enable this section to have proper supervision over the port complex and coordinate the receipt of cargo at the eight different depot accounts.

PART II

COMMANDER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That Procurement or lease of one each crane, 100 to 165 ton capability be made available at the earliest possible date.
2. That additional vehicles allocation be approved in the immediate future to assist the command in fulfilling its mission. This Command will prepare a recommended change to TOE 55-131E, to include additional vehicles.
3. That depots' capability to receive be considered when determining the capability of the port complex. The true capability of any port engaged in discharging cargo is based on the depot reception capacity.

TEL: QNL 466

/s/ Louis J. Maricle
/t/ LOUIS J. MARICLE
Colonel, TC
Commanding

AVCA-QN-GO (15 Nov 66) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period
Ending 31 October 1966 RCS CSGPO-65 (R1)


HEADQUARTERS US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, QUI NHON, APO 96238 29 NOV 1966

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-0,
APO 96307

A Purchase Request and Commitment DA Form 114-115 was submitted
10 Nov 66 requesting lease of one (1) 100-150 Ton crawler crane from
Delong Corporation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

QNL 167/142


H.S. NEWPORT
CPT, AGC
Adjutant General

AVCA GO-O (15 Nov 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307 • 4 DEC 1966

TO: Deputy Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DH, APO 96307


1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) for the quarter ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.

2. The 5th Transportation Command engaged in 5 days of training, 34 days of POM, 20 days of troop movement and 33 days of combat support operations during this reporting period.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by the preceding indorsement. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Lyrx 782/930



GLENN A. DOYLE
Capt. AGC
Asst. AG

AVHGC-DH (15 Nov 66)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

19 DEC '66

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT
APO 96558


1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 5th Transportation Command (Terminal A) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 1, Part I, Section II, Page 3: Due to the shortage of MHE and cranes, there is not sufficient stocks available to provide a maintenance float in the authorized amount at the present time. Maintenance floats will be established as deliveries of MHE and Engineer equipment to RVN permit.

b. Reference Paragraph 5, Part I, Section II, Pages 3 and 4: The unit TOL, TOL 55-131E states that unit is dependent upon supporting administrative and support services units for required support to include additional vehicles when required. The additional six vehicles required should be obtained from sources as stated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


W. R. AUTREY
Cpt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

GPOP-OT (15 Nov 66)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)


HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 15 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters concurs with basic report as indorsed.

2. Reference paragraph 2a, 3d indorsement, and paragraph 1, Part I, Section II, Basic Report. An MHE conference was held at Headquarters USARPAC during the period 30 January 1967 through 3 February 1967 with USARV and CONUS representatives. The conference dealt with all aspects of the MHE problem to include maintenance, repair parts support, and maintenance float authorizations. It is anticipated that implementation of policies formulated at this conference will alleviate, to a great extent, the MHE problems described in the ORLL.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, APO
Asst IG