

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD825107

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors; Critical Technology; 15 NOV 1966. Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development (Army), Attn: OT-RD, Washington, DC 20310. This document contains export-controlled technical data.

AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980


THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.


DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.



IN REPLY REFER TO
AGAM-P (M) (23 Feb 67) FOR OT

24 February 1967

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters,
48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport)**

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) for quarter ending 31 October 1966. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

C. A. STANFIEL
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

1 Incl
a/s

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding General
US Army Combat Developments Command
US Continental Army Command
Commandants
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army War College
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Armor School
US Army Chemical Corps School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Ordnance School

(Continued on page 2)

' FOR OT RD
66 04 56

— STATEMENT #2 UNCLAS

This document is subject to special export controls and each transmittal to foreign governments must be made only with prior approval of *Att. - DT-FO*

Do not release to nationals may be
Dept. of Army
Robert D C 200310

١٥

HEADQUARTERS
48TH TRANSPORTATION GROUP (MOTOR TRANSPORT)
APO 96491

AVCA-SGN-AB-OP

15 November 1966

SUBJECT : Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Quarter Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS-CSFOR-65)

THRU: Channels

TO: Department of the Army
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Washington, D. C. 20310

SECTION I

SIGNIFICANT ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

1. Mission: In addition to the TOE mission assigned, this headquarters is assigned the additional functions of operating truck terminals and trailer transfer points in the US Army Support Command, Saigon area of responsibility; providing port clearance, line haul, and local haul motor transport services; providing direct motor transport support to tactical units in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zone; and coordinating and controlling specified civilian contract motor equipment; in accordance with letter, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Saigon, Subject: Letter of Instruction, 48th Transportation Group, dated 12 October 1966.

2. Command and Organizations: a. This headquarters is organized as HHD, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) under TOE 55-12E, 64 (SRC 55-012E 4001), with an authorized strength of 13 Commissioned Officers, 2 Warrant Officers, and 44 Enlisted Men. The 48th Transportation Group (MT) is assigned to the US Army Support Command, Saigon.

b. The following additional units were attached and attained operational capability during the reporting period.

- (1) 86th Trans Co (Lt Trk).
- (2) 87th Trans Co (Lt Trk).
- (3) 261st Trans Co (Lt Trk).
- (4) 543d Trans Co (Lt Trk).
- (5) HHD, 6th Trans Bn (Trk).
- (6) HHD, 7th Trans Bn (Trk).

DE OTRO
660456

(7) 506th Trans Det (Trailer Transfer Point).

(8) 508th Trans Det (Trailer Transfer Point).

3. Key Personnel Changes:

a. Maj Ralph L. Doane was reassigned to the 506th Field Depot APO 96307 eff 16 Aug 66.

b. Captain Vincent Terrana was promoted to Major and assigned principle duty as Group S-4 effective 15 Aug 66.

c. Captain Brian R. Bulley was reassigned to the 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) for duty as Contracting Officer's Representative (COR).

d. Captain James F. Miner relieved of duty as S-1 and Hq Det Commander and assigned duty as Highway Operations Officer effective 27 August 1966.

e. Capt Robert L. Sobel assumed command of Hq Detachment as an additional duty.

f. CWO-2 Granville L. Deatherage attached from Hq, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) effective 23 August 1966 and assumed duties as Adjutant effective 27 August 1966.

g. Captain Dale Hungerford was reassigned to the 7th Transportation Battalion (Truck) effective 21 August 1966 for duty with Saigon TTP.

h. Captain William A. Collins assigned principle duty as Group Maintenance Officer effective 8 September 1966.

i. Chaplain (Maj) Ezra Everett assigned effective 11 October 1966. (Duty station with 64th QM Bn - area coverage).

4. Civilian Personnel:

Employment of local national employees averaged approximately 500 personnel during the reporting period plus approximately 150 personal hire employees. Average overtime hours utilized: Approximately 15,000 hrs per month. Average monthly payroll: Approximately 1,500,000. \$VN.

5. Military Personnel:

a. Shortages were experienced in task vehicle drivers to the extent that mission capability was impaired. Efforts were made to resolve this problem by attaching personnel to this command in TDY status from the 90th Replacement Battalion. The command experienced an increase of approximately 180% in authorized and assigned personnel with a corresponding increase in administrative and logistics problems.

b. Status of Personnel:

<u>As of</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asg</u>
31 Jul 66	779	801
31 Aug 66	865	952
30 Sep 66	881	912
31 Oct 66	1600	1638

c. Personnel Turbulence:

(1) Personnel turbulence within the command has been high and is attributed to the inability of the replacement system to provide replacement personnel on a timely basis and to forecast gain factors.

(2) To maintain authorized strength based on a 12 month foreign service tour necessitates deployment and receipt of approximately 135 personnel each month. ..

(1) Except for a relatively few alien MOS, effective utilization of personnel in accordance with AR 600-200 has been possible. The delegation of authority to Battalion Commanders facilitated alleviation of this problem by readily permitting internal adjustment of strength and movement of personnel within the command to adjust strengths by MOS in critical areas.

(2) The command effected the following appointments during the reporting period.

NUMBER

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Total</u>
E-4	74	35	86	195
E-5	13	6	51	70
E-6	2	3	2	7
E-7	1	0	0	1
E-8	0	1	0	1

e. Law and Order:

The command has experienced a generally consistent decline in incidents and violations of regulations necessitating action. Rates per 1,000 personnel are as follows:

<u>Offense</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>
AWOL	4.20	4.38	0.61
Article 15, UCMJ	23.10	35.08	20.75
Traffic Violations	16.80	15.35	7.32
Summary Court-Martial	3.15	7.67	5.49
Special Court-Martial	1.05	2.19	1.83
Class II Incidents	36.76	17.50	14.04

6. Safety Statistics:

~~Mileage~~ during period: 1,307,398

Number Accidents: 13

Percentage Rate: 0.99%

7. Savings Participation:

The participation in the savings program has consistently increased throughout the reporting period. The minimum goal established for the command is 90%. The current rate of participation is 96.4%.

8. Special Service Activities:

The command was placed on the circuit for USO shows and received a total of three shows during the reporting period. Action has been initiated to improve day rooms, kits have been requested, and the 48th Transportation Group Officers Lounge was opened 31 October 1966. Sites have been made available to Long Binh EM Open Mess to provide for enlisted and NCO Club construction on a contract basis.

9. Operations: a. During the period 1 August - 31 October 1966 units of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) participated in Operations EL Paso, Bluejay, Aurora, Kahana, Meadowlark, Oahu, Skybolt, Toledo, Wren, Mallard, Robin, Tulsa and Shenandoah. Units supported were 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions; 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division; 173rd Airborne Brigade; 196th Infantry Brigade; 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment; and the Philippine Civic Action Group. Operational locations included Tay Ninh, Cu Chi, Lai Khe, Di An, Phu Loi, Phuoc Vinh, Xuan Loc, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau and Long Binh. Operational accomplishments are shown below.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Tons(S/T)</u>	<u>Passengers</u>
August	61,146	7,641
September	54,707	9,235
October	69,543	16,001
Total	185,396	32,877

b. Transportation furnished by contract.

(1) The Equipment Incorporated (Sea Land) contract continues under the supervision of the 48th Transportation Group (MT). Responsibility for the operation of the Office of the Contracting Officer's Representative has been delegated to the 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck). The contractor has a requirement to operate 240 Ford two-ton government-owned and furnished trucks and 200 10-ton contractor owned International trucks. This capability was reduced to 212 Fords and 190 Internationals after a Viet Cong attack on the contractor motor pool on 14 September, 1966, that resulted in the destruction of 38 trucks. Clearance of indigenous drivers into Air Force installations continues to cause slowdowns because of the authority of the Vietnamese Air Force to authorize or deny entrance of indigenous drivers onto air bases.

(2) The contractor motor pool at Thu Duc continues to be an apparently prime target for Viet Cong attack. As mentioned above, the motor pool was attacked on 14 September 1966 resulting in the loss of personnel and equipment. As a result of this attack a permanent guard force of 33 enlisted men and 1 officer was assigned to guard the motor pool during the hours of darkness. On 10 October 1966, the motor pool was again attacked. No penetration was made of the perimeter. Four Viet Cong were killed by body count. The American officer was seriously wounded and three enlisted men received minor wounds. The officer, 2LT Peter H. Brown of the 120th Transportation Company, was awarded the Silver Star and 5 enlisted men were awarded the Bronze Star for Valor. Intelligence reports indicate that further attacks are planned, but none have materialized.

c. A major problem area continues in signal equipment. Supported tactical units are equipped with the new VRC-12 series radios. Units of the 48th Transportation Group (MT) are equipped with VRC-10 and 18 radios. This results in a lack of adequate communications during convoy operations due to the difference in band widths between the two sets of radios. New radios have been authorized and will be installed upon receipt. Transportation Companies in direct support of tactical units should be authorized radios that can net with tactical units.

d. Security.

(1) Internal Security: No significant problems have been encountered as regards internal security. Expansion of the perimeter, addition and deletion of units have caused revision to guard posts and the internal security plan. Improvement of defenses continues. Test exercises have been conducted both by this headquarters and Long Binh Post. Several instances of light small arms fire from outside the unit perimeter have occurred, but have had no significant effect on operations. Requirement for illumination exists in the form of fixed lights for the perimeter and hand flares or M-79 illumination rounds.

(2) Convoy Security: Small arms fire has been received during convoy operations but has had no great effect on operations. The need for constant alertness and security consciousness on all operations must and continues to be stressed. Insufficient personnel are available within the

truck units to furnish assistant drivers or security guards for vehicles scheduled for convoy duty, because fresh and rested drivers must be available upon the return of the convoy for vehicles to be recommitted due to the twenty-four hour day, seven day per week operation. Assistant drivers/guards are essential for all around observation and to provide fire coverage in the event of ambush. Assistant drivers/guards are generally being furnished from units outside the 48th Transportation Group (MT). On occasion the TOE assistant drivers are used as guards. In a situation where the unit operates 24 hours a day, as all units do at present time, this has the effect of reducing the number of trucks available for commitment during the shift immediately after return of a convoy because no fresh driver is available to operate the vehicle. In many instances where guards are provided from outside the operating unit, they are not qualified to operate the vehicle in case of casualty or fatigue. Better security of personnel and equipment could be realized and higher operational levels attained if sufficient resources were available internally to provide the assistant drivers/guards for convoy operations.

10. Communications: a. A switchboard operation servicing all units within Camp TC Hill, guard posts and Cogido Barge Site has been established by consolidating the wire section from the 6th and 7th Transportation Battalions (Truck) under the 48th Transportation Group (MT) Signal Section. Equipment was authorized by USARV Form 47 to meet the additional requirements.

b. The signal section constructed, repaired and maintains a wire net within Camp TC Hill down to company level. The consolidation of the wire sections as stated in "a" above has made available personnel to construct the necessary wire net and a wire team to trouble-shoot these lines on a 24-hour basis.

c. A power distribution system was constructed within Camp TC Hill. The 48th Transportation Group wire section is in the process of expanding the power distribution system to accommodate new units and provides maintenance to the entire system.

11. Maintenance: a. Deadline Rates: The 2½ ton truck deadline rate decreased from 20% in September to 10% in October. This decrease is attributed to the fact that the 86th Transportation Company (Lt Trk) was assigned and has new vehicles. The 5 ton tractor deadline rate increased from twenty-two (22) percent in September to twenty-six (26) percent in October. The support maintenance deadline decreased by one (1) percent whereas the organizational deadline rate increased by 5 percent. The major factor causing the increase in the organizational deadline rate is the critical shortage of certain repair parts. Those repair parts that are critically short are Direct Exchange items. The major items which are short are as follows:

<u>FSN</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Due Out</u>
2920-974-7626	Starter	6
2 30-741-1070	Master Cylinder	10

<u>FSN</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Due Out</u>
2920-737-4750	Generator	3
2910-788-8475	Carburetor	2
2530-353-3038	Wheel Cylinder	4
2920-953-9784	Regulator	7
2530-693-0679	Brake Shoe	3
2530-737-6689	Air Pack Assy	4
6140-057-2554	Battery	7 1/2
	Windshield 2 1/2 ton and 5 ton	99

Action taken to alleviate this problem is twofold. When a vehicle is dead-lined for parts and the part is not available, a Red Ball Express Requisition is submitted immediately. Secondly, this headquarters contacts the Material Expeditor at Support Maintenance informing him of the parts needed. Through the above procedures the PLL should be filled to authorized levels in the course of time.

b. Self Service Supply Center: The stockage level of tools in the Self Service Supply Center represents a critical problem. Units have been short hand tools which has affected the accomplishment of organizational maintenance and have not been able to obtain these tools due to limited stockage at the Self Service Supply Center. Requisitions that have been submitted to obtain these tools are returned stating that the item is a Self Service Supply Center item, thus the tool shortage continues.

c. Motor Pool Areas: With the increase in the number of units assigned to this headquarters there was a demand for additional motor pool space. Laterite has been used for fill purposes and the motor pools have been enlarged to accomodate units which have arrived. This command is now in the process of having the current motor pool space topped with tar. This will eliminate the muddy conditions that are common each time it rains. This should enhance the operator maintenance program.

11. Logistics: a. The overall supply situation has improved over the past three months. Many comfort items i.e., bedding, footlockers and wall lockers are not available, however tentage and generator power also remain a constant problem.

*covered
equipment*

b. Utilization of local nationals has proven extremely effective especially in the self help construction area. A construction force of individuals of assorted skills is being employed in the construction of cantonment areas at Camp TC Hill. Since 1 June 1966 this organization has constructed the following buildings:

- (1) Mess Hall (525 capacity)
- (2) Command Building
- (3) Staff Building
- (4) Chapel

(5) Quonset Huts (3 each)

(6) Tropicalised buildings, 20' x 40' (11 each)

Construction is continuing on troop areas utilizing local national skilled and unskilled labor with a minimum of supervision by military personnel.

c. A well planned and executed self help program has proven to be one solution to the lack of engineer support available for construction of troop cantonment areas.

SECTION II

PART I

OBSERVATIONS - LESSONS LEARNED

1. a. Item: Utilization of TDY personnel to compensate for shortage of driver personnel.

b. Discussion: Utilization of 132 replacement personnel in TDY status as drivers pending receipt of permanently assigned drivers was not effective to the desired degree. Time expended in obtaining licenses, training personnel, familiarization with routes and storage areas, administration of pay, records and discipline infringes upon effective utilization of personnel to the extent that value is very limited.

c. Observation: Replacements should be furnished on a timely basis and permanently assigned to the unit where requirements exist.

2. a. Item: Utilization of TOE assistant drivers as guards during convoy operations.

b. Discussion: When operating on a 24-hour day, utilization of TOE assistant drivers as guards results in a reduction of vehicle availability during the first shift after the vehicles return due to there being no fresh, rested drivers to man them.

c. Observation: An increase in authorization of drivers is required if full availability of vehicles is to be expected on a 24-hour a day basis.

3. a. Item: Communications during Tactical Convoys.

b. Discussion: Units from this headquarters have the old series radios in lieu of the new series radios.

c. Observation: When convoy elements from this headquarters are provided for combat support missions, it has been the experience of these convoy elements that they cannot net with other elements of the convoy or combat support elements.

4. a. Item: Communications with Saigon Support Command

b. Discussion: Primary means of communications between this headquarters and the Transportation Office, Saigon Support Command is by telephone. This has proved to be an ineffective means of communication.

c. Observation: An alternate means of communication such as radio teletype or landline teletype can efficiently supplement the present communication system.

5. a. Item: FM radio net with Long Binh Post.

b. Discussion: Primary system of communication with the Long Binh Post is telephone. Secondary system is by messenger. In the event TC Hill is attacked this means of communication can easily be disrupted.

c. Observation: An alternate means of radio communication with Post Headquarters should be established to become operational in the event any part of the post is attacked.

6. a. Item: Contamination of Interior of Engines.

b. Discussion: The climatic conditions which exist in Vietnam make the interior portions of engines more susceptible to becoming contaminated.

c. Observation: Engine oil should be changed weekly or each one thousand (1,000) miles whichever occurs first.

7. a. Item: Tentage.

b. Discussion: The average life span of a tent in continuous use in this climate is approximately six (6) months. Tentage tends to become rotten and is beyond repair capabilities.

c. Observation: It is necessary that using units request replacement tentage not later than 90 days after tent is erected to insure that replacement tentage will be available when required.

8. a. Item: Generators.

b. Discussion: Insufficient generators require a unit to keep available generators in continuous operation producing power at the maximum rated capacity. This allows no time for a cool off period and proper maintenance since refrigeration for messes and essential electrical equipment are powered by these units.

c. Observation: Daily maintenance must be performed. Without the scheduled maintenance the life span of a generator is severely reduced.

9. a. Item: Local National Usage.

b. Discussion: A local national work force has proven extremely effective. See Section I.

c. Observation: Careful screening of applicants is imperative to assure that Vietnamese hired are in fact skilled as stated on applications. Simple tests of basic knowledge of skills were employed by this organization with good results. Work habits, physical characteristics and strengths of local nationals are limiting factors in the speed with which projects are completed. A two for one ratio, as compared to US standards, is a good planning figure for civilian space requirements in an organization.

10. a. Item: Engineer Class IV Support.

b. Discussion: The self help program has been initiated due to the priority of engineer support given this organization. Building materials have not been sufficient and the limiting factors on the availability of equipment, i.e., cement mixers, front loader and earth moving equipment have continuously been a problem.

A considerable amount of time is lost stockpiling material in preparation for building due to the non-availability of certain building supplies.

d. Observation: Strict controls must be placed on building materials to insure that materials are used on projects for which they were drawn. A complete plan should be formulated for the overall cantonment area and drawn in such a manner as to allow for expansion and yet remain within the overall base development plan.

SECTION II

PART II

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommend that replacement personnel be assigned directly from CONUS installation to ultimate unit of assignment without being diverted enroute by any echelon of command. Should personnel priority exist which necessitates reassignment within theater, recommend this requirement be placed by Hq USARV on subordinate units in the form of personnel levy utilizing command channels. Further recommend that the functions and performance of replacement processing units be monitored closely to reduce and to insure continued reduction of the number of personnel in the replacement stream. Direct liaison with replacement units to solve this problem has proven unsuccessful in the past.

2. Recommend that a twenty (20) percent increase in driver personnel be authorized for transportation truck units which operate on a 24-hour day basis and which are involved in a high percentage of convoy operations to insure maximum availability of vehicles at all times.

3. Recommend that the issuing of new series radios to transportation truck units be given a higher priority. Radios are presently on requisition for all units of the command.

4. Recommend that all transportation units be authorized additional maintenance personnel from maintenance cells authorized by TO&E 29-500 in accordance with FM 55-35 when operating on a twenty-four (24) hour basis.

5. Recommend that hand tool stocks be increased in Self Service Supply Centers. Additionally, if the items are not in stockage, recommend that units be allowed to requisition items that they are short. Requisitions for hand tools not available in Self Service Supply Center have been cancelled in spite of justification for same.

6. Recommend that stockage level of tentage be set high enough to accommodate recurring requirements. From experience this unit has requisitioned tents far enough in advance to avoid a shortage, but increased depot stockage would reduce the long lead time.

7. Recommend back up generators be issued to using units to provide constant power when existing generators are down for maintenance. This unit has been refused a backup generator in spite of proven need and this has resulted in lack of power on occasions.

8. Recommend civilian personnel offices be established in major subordinate commands to insure that necessary skills are obtained and proper labor controls and management are practiced. A civilian personnel office has proven very effective in this command.

9. Recommend that a central equipment pool be established for the purpose of the self help utilization. This would eliminate the necessity for units having to depend entirely on availability of engineer equipment. Construction projects have been delayed on many occasions due to lack of readily available equipment.

10. Recommend that a higher priority be given self help material provided that units concerned have a means of accomplishing construction projects that meet acceptable engineer standards.


S. M. COOMBS
Colonel, EC
Commanding

AVCA SGN-GO (15 Nov 66)

1st Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65) (48th Trans Group)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON, APO San Francisco 96307 8 DEC 1966

THRU: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307
Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, APO 96307
Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of The
Army (ACSFOR, DA) Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded in accordance with paragraph 9, AR 1-19, dated May 1966.
2. Reference Section II, Part I 4a. Point to point contact (sole user circuit) will be established between Director of Transportation and 48th Transportation Group.
3. Reference Section II, Part II Recommendations.
 - a. ITEM 3: New series radios, recently made available to this command, are currently being installed on vehicles of the 48th Transportation Group.
 - b. ITEM 5: Hand tools have been in short supply throughout the command. However, recent receipts of these items by the 506th Field Depot indicates that the supply pipeline is beginning to catch up with the demands. Until adequate stocks are received, hand tools in short supply, will continue to be prorated by the self service supply centers.



GILBERT P. LEVY
Colonel, OrdC
Commanding

AVCA GO-O (15 Nov 66)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307 9 DEC 1966

TO: Commanding Officer, US Army Support Command, Saigon, APO 96307

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) forwarded by your headquarters is returned for the following reasons:

a. The total number of days during the reporting period that the command engaged in training, troop movement, and/or operations was omitted (USARV Regulation 870-2, paragraph 5(1)(b)).

b. Numerous comments and recommendations concerning problem areas were made without a statement as to what action is being taken to correct them or to initiate corrective action by higher headquarters. These omissions pertain to the following items:

(1) Section II, Part I, paragraph 1a, Utilization of TDY personnel to compensate for shortage of driver personnel: Does your headquarters concur or nonconcur? If nonconcur, why, and has the unit been informed. If concur, has your headquarters brought this matter to the attention of higher headquarters? If so, what was the reply?

(2) Section II, Part I, paragraph 2a, Utilization of TD and assistant drivers as guards during convoy operations: The unit stated an increase in authorization of drivers is required if full availability of vehicles is to be expected. Does your headquarters concur? If so, is an MTC being initiated by the unit?

(3) Section II, Part I, paragraph 5a, FM radio net with Long Binh Post: Does your headquarters consider the observation valid? If so, what action has been taken to obtain the desired communications?

(4) Section II, Part II, paragraph 2: Has an MTC been initiated?

(5) Section II, Part II, paragraph 3: Has a request to higher headquarters been submitted requesting that the issue of the new series radios to transportation units be given a higher priority?

(6) Section II, Part II, paragraph 6: Has your headquarters experienced a shortage of tents within the 506th Field Depot? If so, has your headquarters initiated corrective action? If no shortage exists, is the supply system not responsive enough for reasons of production and shipment? If so, has this been determined by your headquarters and explained to the subordinate unit?

AVCA GO-0

9DEC 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 October
1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(7) Section II, Part II, paragraph 7: Has the subordinate unit submitted a request for additional generators? Does your headquarters concur with the recommendation?

(8) Section II, Part II, paragraph 8: Has the subordinate unit submitted a request for civilian personnel offices to be established in major subordinate commands? Does your headquarters concur with the recommendation?

(9) Section II, Part II, paragraph 9: Has a request for a central equipment pool been submitted by the subordinate unit? Does your headquarters concur with the request?

(10) Section II, Part II, paragraph 10: Has the unit requested thru channels that a higher priority be given to the issue of self-help material? Are there reasons already known to your headquarters as to why a higher priority can or cannot be given? Has the unit been informed?

2. Operational Reports - Lessons Learned are not to be used as a substitute for normal staff actions.

3. Request your headquarters review USAKV Regulation 870-2 and forward the omissions outlined in paragraph 1 above by indorsement to this headquarters MTF 13 Dec 66.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Lynx 782/930

1 Incl
nc

GLENN A. DOYLE
Capt. AOC
Asst. AG

AVCA SGN-GO (15 Nov 66) 3rd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND, SAIGON, APO US Forces 96307 13 1111

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-C, APO 96307

1. The 48 Transportation Group engaged in operations for a total of ninety-two days during the period 1 August 1966 through 31 October 1966.

2. The following information is submitted concerning observations and recommendations:

a. Section II, Part I, paragraph 1a, utilization of replacement personnel in TDY status as drivers pending receipt of permanently assigned drivers was a temporary expedient. This use of personnel was coordinated with ACS, Personnel, 1st Logistical Command in order to meet an urgent operational requirement. A command letter concerning the replacement system as it affects this Group has been submitted by the 48 Group Commander.

b. Section II, Part I, paragraph 2a. Unit will be directed to submit an MTOE if deemed necessary.

c. Section II, Part I, paragraph 5a. Both this headquarters and 48 TC Group (MT) have recommended establishment of radio communication with Headquarters, Long Binh Post (a USARV unit). Equipment has been requisitioned.

d. Section II, Part II, paragraph 2. Unit will be instructed to prepare an MTOE if necessary. Reference sub-paragraph 2b above.

e. Section II, Part II, paragraph 3. Paragraph 3a, 1st Indorsement states that problem has been solved. No further action deemed necessary.

f. Section II, Part II, paragraph 6. A continuous shortage of tents exists within the theater depot system. Requisitions for adequate stocks of tents have been submitted to the CONUS Supply Agencies but the agencies in the past have been unable to procure or ship sufficient quantities to increase the depot stockage to an adequate level. Director of Supply, 1st Logistical Command is aware of situation and units are aware of shortages and reasons for shortages.

g. Section II, Part II, paragraph 7. A command letter was submitted on 29 November 1966, by unit. HQ, USASUPCOM, Saigon Area Engineer informed unit that they were scheduled to receive one of twenty-eight generators which arrived in-country on 4 December 1966.

h. Section II, Part II, paragraph 8. This sub-paragraph states "A civilian personnel office has proven very effective in this command". The recommendation is appropriate for other commands utilizing numerous local national employees. This headquarters concurs in recommendation.

AVCA SGN-GO

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

i. Section II, Part II, paragraph 9. Do not concur in recommendation that a central equipment pool be established in the Long Binh area for use of units under the "self-help program". The operation of this type of equipment is beyond the capability of most units. The majority of equipment referred to is operated and maintained by TOE Engineer Construction battalions.

j. Section II, Part II, paragraph 10. Issue of self help material has in the past and will in the future conform to MILSTRIP standards regarding establishment of priorities to requisitions.

k. Reference paragraph 2, 2nd Indorsement. Concur in guidance that Lessons Learned are not to be used as a substitute for normal staff actions.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: Tiger 875

1 Incl
nc


ROBERT C. LEWIS
Major, AGC
Adjutant

AVCA GO-O (15 Nov 66)

4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 October 1966
(RCS CSFOR-65).

Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96307 4 JAN 1967

TO: Deputy Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVNGC-DH,
APO 96307

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by the 48th Transportation Group for the period ending 31 October 1966 is forwarded herewith.
2. Reference paragraph 1, Section II, Part 1: This headquarters requested the assistance of USFV in providing 200 drivers (MOS 64A and 64B) on a TDY basis for a period of 30 days. Assistance was required due to an unacceptable backlog of cargo at Saigon Port caused by the fact that a contracting trucking concern had labor difficulties. Saigon Support Command was verbally informed of the difficulty that may be encountered in such a case since TDY personnel were to be received from the 90th Replacement Battalion. Qualified drivers, familiar with routes and storage areas, were not available from personnel resources of 1st Logistical Command to satisfy this immediate requirement.
3. Reference Section II, Part I, paragraph 3: As indicated in 1st Indorsement new series (AN/VI C-12) FM radios have been issued to the 48th Transportation Group and are being installed. These radios have been installed and no further action is required.
4. Reference paragraph 4, Section II, Part I. Nonconcur. Paragraph 4 stated that an alternate means of communications to the Director of Transportation, U. S. Army Support Command, Saigon was necessary. The 1st Indorsement stated that a sole-user point-to-point telephone line had been requested for this purpose. This request has been returned without action from this Headquarters because the justification did not meet the MACV criteria for sole-user circuits. A sole-user point-to-point telephone line is being established from the ACofS, SP&O, U. S. Army Support Command, Saigon to Headquarters, 15th Support Brigade. Since the 15th Support Brigade controls the 48th Transportation Group, any necessary instructions from the Director of Transportation, U. S. Army Support Command, Saigon can be passed to the control unit by use of this telephone line. U. S. Army Support Command, Saigon, has been informed of action at this Headquarters.
5. Reference paragraph 5, Section II, Part 1: As indicated in 3d Indorsement necessary radios have been requested to establish an FM radio net with Headquarters, Long Binh Post in the event normal communications are disrupted. No further action is necessary.

6. Reference paragraph 6, Section II, Part I: Policy is to change oil every 1000 miles which may be modified under unusual operating circumstances. There is no need for changing motor oil weekly unless operating conditions warrant it.

7. Reference pages 10 & 12, Section II Part I, Paragraph 8 and Section II, Paragraph 7: The lack of sufficient generators to provide back-up power has caused problem areas in all support commands. Until the permanent power plants and distribution systems can be constructed, units must make maximum utilization of available generator assets. Maintenance should be scheduled during off-peak periods and power outages will be minimized if these schedules are closely followed.

8. Reference page 10, Paragraph 10: Any knowledge of use of construction materials for purposes other than for which drawn, should be reported to this headquarters as required by regulations.

9. Reference paragraph 1, Section II, Part II: Nonconcur with the proposed recommendation. Personnel priorities must be established at various levels of command to insure accomplishment of the command mission.


10. Reference paragraph 4, Section II, Part II: This action has been considered previously and is not feasible at this time.

11. Reference paragraph 8, Section II, Part II: The establishment of civilian personnel offices in subordinate commands is unauthorized since the Area Civilian Personnel Office is responsible for all such service. The use of a civilian personnel office by the 48th Transportation Group should remain in effect as an exception since the overall value obtained for a unit of that type has been proven.

12. Reference page 13, Item 9: This headquarters agrees with the noncurrence of the USASUPCOM, Saigon, concerning the equipment pool of engineer items for the use of units under the "self-help program." Most units do not have trained personnel available to operate such items as front loaders and earth moving equipment. Misuse can cause an appreciable shortening of the useful life expectancy of these items which are already in short supply.

13. Concur with the basic report as modified by the comments contained in the preceding indorsements. The report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GLENN A. DOYLE
Capt. AGC
Asst. AG

TEL: Lynx 430/782

1-Incl
nc

AVHOC-DH (15 Nov 66)

5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

23 JAN 1967

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOF-OT
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966 from Headquarters, 48th Transportation Group (Motor Transport) as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments are as follows:

a. Reference Paragraph 1, Part II, Section II, Page 12: Non-concur with the 48th Transportation Group Commander's recommendation.

(1) The shortfall in arrivals, changing mission responsibilities, unpredictable battle casualties and the rapid buildup of forces in RVN require that the personnel replacement system be monitored closely to react to and detect current and projected shortages of personnel in the combat, support and service support units. Immediate response to these shortages requires that a small percentage of personnel be diverted from their original units of assignment to positions that will enhance the combat posture of the entire command in Vietnam. As such, this redistribution of manpower resources is a command responsibility at all echelons. The indiscriminate diversion of replacement personnel is not employed at any level in this command.

(2) Selective levies have been used within USARV when essential skilled positions must be filled and time is not of prime importance. To resort to mass levies to compensate for units' losses due to battle casualties and shortfalls in replacement arrivals is impractical.

(3) Based on the above, it is believed that a greater problem will exist if the recommendation of the 48th Transportation Group Commander is adopted.

b. Reference Paragraph 5, Part II, Section II, Page 12; and Paragraph 3b, 1st Indorsement:

(1) Comments made in the 1st Indorsement reflect an improving stockage posture of hand tools in RVN.

AVHOC-DH (15 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

(2) Nonconcur with unit's recommendation that more hand tools be stocked in self-service supply centers. The limited supply of hand tools in RVN are prorated among self-service supply centers and selected units which have such large requirements that bulk issue from depot facilities is justified.

(3) Nonconcur with unit's recommendation that it be allowed to requisition hand tools not available in its Self Service Supply Center. Want slips, available for the customer's use, serve the same purpose as requisitions and further assist self-service supply centers in updating stockage lists with resulting improved customer service.

c. Reference Paragraph 6, Part II, Section II, Page 12: Tentage of all types continues in short supply in RVN. Stockage objectives are adequate; however, due to present shortages, stockage levels cannot be attained until increased shipments are received from sources outside of this command.

d. Reference Paragraph 7, Part II, Section II, Page 12; and Paragraph 7, 4th Indorsement: Supply of generators in RVN is not sufficient to fill authorized allowances. There are, consequently, insufficient of these items to provide floats.

e. Reference Paragraph 7, Part II, Section II, Page 17; Paragraph 21, 3d Indorsement; and Paragraph 12, 4th Indorsement: Nonconcur with desirability of establishing such a pool for reasons stated in the 3d and 4th Indorsements.

f. Reference Paragraph 10, Part II, Section II; and Paragraph 23, 3d Indorsement: Nonconcur with unit; concur with the statement contained in the 3d Indorsement. A shortage of engineer materials precludes adoption of the recommendation.

g. Reference Paragraph 8, Part II, Section II, Page 12 and Paragraph 11, 4th Indorsement: The Civilian Personnel Office referred to is not a Civilian Personnel Office but a point for centralized

AVHOC-DH (15 Nov 66)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

recruitment that was established by 48th Transportation Group due to the nonavailability of a building for the Long Binh Area Civilian Personnel Office. When the physical facility for the Long Binh Area Civilian Personnel Office is completed at the Long Binh Post, the recruitment point established at 48th Transportation Group will be discontinued. At that time, any personnel furnished by the 48th Transportation Group should be returned to normal duties.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



R. J. THORNTON III

1st Lt, AGC

Asst Adjutant General

GPOP-OT(15 Nov 66)

6th Ind


SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 October 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65), HQ 48th Trans Gp (Motor Transport)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 1 FEB 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



G. L. McMULLIN
CPT, AGC
Asst AG