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AMSO-TR-68-63

09365-6003-R0-00

Final Technical Report

(U) TEST PLANNING
FOR
IN-PLACE HARDNESS DEMONSTRATION


Volume I
STUDY REPORT SUMMARY

Air Force Contract F04694-67-C-0134

Prepared By
TRW Systems Group
Redondo Beach, California

15 February 1968

Prepared For
Department of the Air Force
Headquarters, Space and Missiles Systems Organization
SMNP-1
Air Force Systems Command
Norton Air Force Base, California



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UNCLASSIFIED ABSTRACT

This study has developed a test program plan for demonstrating the in-place hardness of an advanced ballistic missile weapon system. A test requirements analysis methodology was devised, utilizing a systems approach, to examine a WS-120A system baseline design with respect to a given weapons effects environment criteria, define the testing required to assure hardness of each system element, trade off applicable simulation techniques, and recommend a series of test concepts. These concepts were then logically combined into efficient and cost-effective in-place hardness demonstration test programs for the launch facility and launch control facility.

This report has been divided into five volumes and classified as follows:

- Volume I Study Report Summary (Unclassified)
- Volume II Methodology (Unclassified)
- Volume III Test Requirements Analysis (Secret, RD)
- Volume IV Test Program Plan (Unclassified)
- Volume V Selected LF Subsystems Test Plan (Unclassified)

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FOREWORD

(U) This document is the final technical report of the Test Planning for In-Place Hardness Demonstration Study submitted to SAMSO/NAFB in January 1968. This study was conducted by the Systems Support Group, Science and Technology Department of TRW Systems Group, Redondo Beach, California, for the Space and Missile Systems Organization, Air Force Systems Command, Norton Air Force Base, California, under Contract No. F04694-67-C-0134, dated 1 June 1967.

(U) The study effort covered by this report was initiated in June 1967 and completed in February 1968. The United States Air Force management control for this task was provided by Mr. C. B. Totten, SMNP-1. Technical direction was provided by Mr. S. Italia and Mr. C. R. Smith, Weapon Systems Division, Aerospace Corporation, San Bernardino Operation.

(U) Mr. C. K. Stein was TRW Systems Group's project engineer for this study and was responsible for attaining its overall objectives. Mr. J. P. Bednar (TRW) and Mr. J. Karagozian (consultant) were co-authors of the Final Technical Report.

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(U) This technical report has been reviewed and is approved.



Charles B. Totten
Project Officer
Resources, Planning and Programming Division
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this study is to provide the Air Force with a test program plan for demonstrating the in-place hardness of an advanced ballistic missile weapon system.

1.2 SCOPE

The scope of this study includes the performance of a test requirements analysis in which the WS-120A system baseline design and weapons effects environment criteria are examined, applicable simulation techniques are identified, and test concepts are recommended. It also includes the logical development of the recommended test concepts into a test program plan and the preparation of a single test plan for a selected test concept.

1.3 BACKGROUND

Since 1959, the Air Force has sponsored a series of studies on new generation ballistic missile weapon systems capable of surviving the effects of a nuclear environment in extreme high overpressure regions. The criteria for design were largely developed on the basis of advanced analytical techniques, and judgment was obtained from nuclear experimental results. Field test data from underground nuclear tests and high explosive simulation tests have been extrapolated where appropriate and combined with advanced analytical techniques for the development of facility configurations capable of surviving the high overpressure region.

The AEC/DOD have designed underground nuclear effects tests at the Nevada test site which have improved the design technology for hardened facilities. Predominantly, the directly transmitted shock wave environment on hardened tunnel liners was simulated in these tests. However, some thought has been given to an underground nuclear explosive shock tube (NEST) in which both the air induced and directly transmitted shock environment together with thermal and nuclear radiation environment may be simulated on a subscale hardened facility.

The Air Force has developed a high explosive simulation technique (HEST) which has been used to confirm the design techniques on the Minuteman weapon system. Presently, the Air Force Weapons Laboratory is developing the direct induced high explosive simulation technique (DI-HEST) as a means for design verification tests on new systems. Peak pressure, shock wave velocity, impulse, and durations will be tailored to match estimates of the nuclear phenomena. DI-HEST, when developed, is expected to be used in combination with HEST to simulate air over-pressure and ground shock simultaneously.

The advanced hardened missile system will require in-place hardness demonstration tests using simulation techniques. This study performed a test requirements analysis and subsequently prepared a test program plan that prescribes the spectrum of testing required to ensure hardness of the system.

1.4 STUDY REPORT CONTENT

This technical report presents the study material in a logical and conveniently usable manner, as follows:

Volume I:	Study Report Summary
Volume II:	Methodology
Volume III:	Test Requirements Analysis
Volume IV:	Test Program Plan
Volume V:	Selected LF Subsystems Test Plan.

The technical tasks specified in the statement of work (SOW) are hereby satisfied with the submission of this technical report. Specifically, SOW Task 2.0, test concepts task, is accomplished in Volume III, Test Requirements Analysis (TRA), and SOW Task 3.0, test planning task, is satisfied by Volume IV, Test Program Plan and Volume V, Selected LF Subsystems Test Plan. Volume II, Methodology, is provided in response to an informal request by the customer for a description of the methods used in the TRA.

This volume presents the results of the study in the form of a summarized test program plan for the launch facility (LF) and the launch control facility (LCF) in Section 3.0. (Complete method and results are in Volumes II, III, and IV.) The test plan for the selected test (Volume V of this report) was developed for a specific system defined by SAMSO/ Aerospace and is not one of the system tests recommended from the TRA; the selected LF subsystem test plan is summarized in Section 4. Conclusions are summarized in Section 2. Recommendations for extending the system approach to hardness demonstration are given in Section 5.

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2. CONCLUSIONS

This study program has resulted in two significant conclusions. One is that the methodology developed for the study is a good approach, with high potential for use in the development of other test plans. The second conclusion is that the test program plan developed in this study includes some areas of uncertainty that must be recognized and dealt with at the appropriate time.

2.1 METHODOLOGY

A methodology was developed during the course of the study to permit the systematic examination of the weapon system elements with respect to the weapons effects environment it would experience, the identification of test requirements, the tradeoff of simulation techniques, and the recommendation of test concepts. This methodology is described in detail in Volume II of this report. The test requirements analysis in Volume III of the report is the product of the in-place hardness test planning task accomplished in accordance with the methodology.

The TRA results have shown that a systems approach methodology can be used effectively in the planning of test programs for complex systems. Although the methodology described in Volume II was developed for the in-place Hardness Demonstration Test Planning Study, it certainly could be used effectively for airborne hardness test planning; and, with some modifications, it would be a valuable tool in the preparation of system development or system life cycle test program plans.

2.2 TEST PROGRAM PLAN UNCERTAINTIES

The test program plan presented as Volume IV of this report is felt to be a good, comprehensive treatment of the in-place hardness demonstration testing problem. It is the product of a unique test requirements analysis. The pattern of tests it describes reflects the information that was available as inputs to the study.

There are, then, uncertainties in the test program plan caused by the use in the TRA of :

- a) An assumed, and very general, system configuration
- b) Free field environment data acknowledged to be imprecise
- c) Cursory information regarding the characteristics of key weapons effects simulation techniques.

All of the test program plan uncertainties can be resolved by the application of more detailed and/or more valid input data to the test requirements analysis. The methodology adopted for the TRA was developed to be insensitive so that such changes in input data can be introduced without loss of continuity or effectiveness.

Recommendations for overcoming these uncertainties in the TRA input information are included in Section 5.

3. SUMMARY OF RESULTS—TEST PROGRAM PLAN

The results of this study are in the form of a test program plan for in-place hardness demonstration of an advanced weapon system. The test program plan is described in four parts:

- 1) System Description
- 2) Test program flow
- 3) Documentation tree
- 4) Test phasing schedule.

The system description identifies the weapons systems analyzed for the launch facility (LF) and the launch control facility (LCF) in the test requirements analysis. The test program flow identifies the recommended test concepts and appropriate test facilities determined from the TRA. The documentation tree describes the proposed systematic organization and documentation requirements for proper implementation of the test program. Finally, the test phasing schedule shows the complete time cycle for testing from the facilities definition phase through the facilities construction phase. The test program plan for the LF and LCF are given in Subsections 3.1 and 3.2.

The basic premise upon which the in-place hardness demonstration test program plan has been developed is that the sum of a series of inter-related components tests, subsystems tests, systems tests, and total facilities tests would constitute a hardness demonstration (reference Figure 3-1). It must be emphasized that the hardness demonstration test program is the summation of these sequential tests up through each system level to the complete facility, and no one test demonstrates hardness completely.

A test requirements analysis (Volume III of this report) was conducted in which tests were considered for all system elements at every level of system complexity in a manner that would progressively increase confidence in total system hardness. The results of that analysis are represented on the test program flow (reference Figure 3-2).





Figure 3-1. Hardness Demonstration Test Program Composition



A.

COMPRESSIVE
STRENGTH TEST
CONCRETE CORE
SAMPLES
3 COMMERCIAL LAB

STATIC PRESSURE TEST
MAIN CLOSURE
(SUB-SCALE)
1.4 LAB

THERMAL RADIATION
TEST
MAIN CLOSURE
(SUB-SCALE)
1.5 ROCKET TEST STAND

DYNAMIC PRESSURE
TEST TEST
MAIN CLOSURE
(FULL SCALE)
BLAST VALVE STRUCTURE
3.1 AFVAC FIELD
EMP ELECTRICAL
CONTINUITY
TEST
MAIN CLOSURE
3.2 AFVAC FIELD

UNDERGROUND
NUCLEAR TEST
COMPOSITE RADIATION
EFFECTS MAIN CLOSURE
7.2 DASA AEC INT

AIR BLAST AND DIRECT
INDUCED EFFECTS TEST
(RE SURFACE BURST)
MAIN CLOSURE SYSTEM
BLAST DOORS 1 and 2
PARTIAL SILO STRUCTURE WITH PENETRATIONS
INTERSTATE CABLE
AIF ANTENNA SYSTEM
8.1 SAWSO HIGH EXPLOSIVE TEST SITE

AIF ANTENNA
PERFORMANCE TEST
(WITH DEBRIS COVER)
8.5 SAWSO HPT SITE

TRAND TEST
SHOCK ISOLATORS,
LIVE CAPSULE,
W. LOOPS, FLEX CON.
7 IN-PLANT

SHOCK IMPACT AND
DROP TEST
5.1 LIVE CAPSULE
WITH OGE
2.12 IN-PLANT

SHOCK IMPACT AND
DROP TEST
5.1 LIVE CAPSULE
WITH MISSILE
2.13 IN-PLANT

ACOUSTIC PRESSURE
AND DEBRIS
SEPARATION TEST
OGE (BQU)
2.14 IN-PLANT

SUBSYSTEM
INTERACTION
TESTS
BLAST TEST
(PORTABLE BLAST GEN.)
AIR ENTRAINMENT
SYSTEM
8.1 SAWSO HPT FAC
TRAND TEST
LIVE CAPSULE SYSTEM
8.2 SAWSO HPT FAC

EMP TEST
DIPOL-CABLE
CONDUCTOR AND
HARDENED BACKFILL
9 LAB

B.




Figure 3-2.

In-place hardness demonstration tests are considered to be those tests that confirm or provide data that increases confidence in the hardness of the system element tested. These tests will normally use prototype systems as test articles. However, in some cases a more developmental type of testing (e.g., using subscale models, engineering models) may be required. Development testing will be called for only if it is a necessary prerequisite to a subsequent demonstration test. Note that certain system development tests, when completed successfully, can be accepted as hardness demonstration tests.

The in-place hardness of a system can be demonstrated to some degree at every stage of the system development cycle. With careful and early planning, a spectrum of testing can be identified that will ensure hardness of certain elements very early in the development stage, thus providing a strong data base upon which to design (or redesign if necessary) interacting system elements. Examination of the total system piece by piece will allow the identification of system elements that lend themselves to early testing. It will also identify more complex systems that would more logically be tested later in the development program. The hardness demonstration tests can follow much the same pattern as system development tests, that is, systems elements are evaluated in their simplest form first; then, as the components are combined, more complex testing is conducted. This method provides a test base that accumulates as each test is conducted until hardness is ensured. It also provides an inherent insensitivity to design changes that in the redesigned components or subsystems may be re-evaluated with simple tests; this eliminates having to retest a large complex system to ensure hardness.

3.1 TEST PROGRAM PLAN—LAUNCH FACILITY

The launch facility configuration shown in Figure 3-3 identifies the facility systems considered in the test requirements analysis. The systems are defined at four levels,

- Level 1: The complete facility
- Level 2: Major parts of the complete facility

SYSTEM LEVEL

①

SYSTEM LEVEL


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SYSTEM LEVEL

③


SYSTEM LEVEL

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


A.

B.



B.



140 FT

LAUNCH FACILITY SYSTEM CONFIGURATION





Figure 3-3.

C.

D.

- Level 3: Major systems
- Level 4: Subsystems with lines leading to the parent Level 3 system.

It identifies system elements that are meaningful or critical to the hardness and vulnerability problem. These elements represent either the missile and launch essential equipments that are sensitive to an attenuated weapons effects environment or the elements that are functional in protecting the sensitive system elements from the free field weapons effects environment.

The launch facility test flow (Figure 3.3) was developed as the result of a test requirements analysis (as documented in Section 2 of Test Requirements Analysis, Volume III of this report) in which LF system elements were first identified, the weapons effect input to the element established, and consideration given as to whether tests were necessary to ensure hardness. Test requirements were then written for each element requiring test, and simulation techniques tradeoffs performed to establish recommended testing concepts.

The test concept flow presents a progression of recommended tests that, if accomplished, will provide increasing measures of confidence in system hardness. The flow covers the total spectrum of hardness demonstration testing required to ensure in-place hardness of the LF. Beginning at the left of the launch facility test concept flow with components and combinations of components, and progressing to the right through systems and system combinations of increasing degrees of complexity, all components, subsystems, and systems are examined. Where testing is recommended, simulation techniques have been tradedoff, and appropriate test facility recommendations have been shown.


A feature of the launch facility test program worth noting is that the bulk of the testing is done at the component, subsystem, and combined subsystem levels in an attempt to ensure hardness of those system elements to the environments that they will experience. This approach simplifies the requirement for testing at the major system or complete facility level to the evaluation of system interaction in response to the

simulated weapons effects environment. The environments considered to cause system interaction are direct-induced and air-blast-induced ground motion and EMP. It is felt that the ground motion need not be simulated in exact magnitude but that the composite characteristics of the environment should be produced to a degree that it will shake the total system. A high explosive contact surface burst technique is believed to produce an acceptable environment.* As for EMP, the most meaningful tests are those conducted while the total system is functioning in a standard operating mode. The test program plan requires these EMP tests to be done with a large Marx generator before and after the system interaction ground motion tests.

The documentation tree (Figure 3-4) contains a block listing of the required documentation to systematically control and manage the launch facility test program plan.

The launch facility test program phasing chart (Figure 3-5) presents a time phasing relationship between the test blocks shown on the launch facility test program flow (Figure 3-2). The phasing chart also schedules each test block with respect to the weapon system development schedule (reference WS-120A Preliminary Technical Development Plan). The test scheduling judgments shown on Figure 3-5 are based on normal conditions of funding and nominal planning and construction time. The basic in-place hardness test planning philosophy of ensuring system hardness before it becomes operational is reflected on the phasing chart with the major testing being scheduled for completion at about the time of the facility critical design review (CDR).

*Further evaluation and development is definitely needed to identify the most useful test concept for ground motion simulation.



LAUNCH FACILITY TEST PROGRAM

DOCUMENTATION






Figure 3-4.



A.



B.

3.2 TEST PROGRAM PLAN— LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY

The launch control facility (LCF) is identified like the launch facility (LF) (see Figure 3-6) with systems at four levels. It should be noted that this facility has eight major systems (i.e., Level 2 systems).

- Equipment capsule
- Access shaft
- Personnel capsule
- Intersite cable plant
- HF antenna
- UHF antenna
- MF antenna
- LCF ground system (undefined).

The first three systems, equipment capsule, access shaft, and personnel capsule, have strong structure interaction, and the other systems interact with each other through critical cable connections. The importance of testing combinations of Level 2 systems lies in the vulnerability of these connection links to differential ground motions resulting from the direct and crater induced weapon effects. The LF, by comparison, is a more compact system without any Level 2 systems with strong structural interaction. The Level 3 and Level 4 systems are similar to systems in the LF and consequently similar test concepts will be recommended at the lower level subsystems.

The test program features are similar to those in the LF test program plan; that is, the bulk of the testing is done at the component, subsystem, and combined subsystem levels in an attempt to ensure hardness of those system elements to the environments that they will experience. This approach simplifies the requirement for testing at the major system or complete facility level to the evaluation of system interaction in response to the simulated weapons effects environment. The environments that will cause system interaction are direct induced and air blast induced ground motion and EMP. It is felt that the ground motion need not be simulated in exact magnitude but that the composite characteristics of the environment should be produced to a degree that it will shake the total system. It is believed that a high explosive contact

SYSTEM LEVEL

①

SYSTEM LEVEL


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
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SYSTEM LEVEL


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
A.



B.



c.



D.

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


③

4

4-1.5.3.3

E.



LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY

SYSTEM CONFIGURATION





Figure 3-6.


surface burst technique will produce an acceptable environment. As for EMP, the most meaningful tests are those that are conducted while the total system is functioning in a standard operating mode. The test program plan requires these EMP tests to be done with a large Marx generator before and after the system interaction ground motion tests.

The test concept flow and documentation tree for the LCF are presented in Figures 3-7 and 3-8, respectively. The testing and documentation philosophy reflected here is basically the same as that presented for the LF system.


The launch control facility test program phasing chart (Figure 3-9) presents a time phasing relationship between the test blocks shown on the Launch Control Facility Test Program Flow (Figure 3-7). The phasing chart also schedules each test block with respect to the weapon system development schedule. The test scheduling judgments shown on Figure 3-9 are based on normal conditions of funding and nominal planning and construction time.



A,



B.



Figure




Figure 3-7.

TEST
BLOCK

MONTHS FROM START →

FACILITIES DEFINITION PHASE

ENGINEER

- 3.1 NUC. RAD. BLOW-OFF IMPULSE TEST - CLOSURE, EMP SHIELD
3.2 NUC. RAD. SHOCK TEST - CLOSURE, EMP SHIELD
- 1.3 NUC. RAD. PENETRATION TEST - PC & EC BLAST DOOR SYSTEMS
7.1 UNDERGROUND NUC. TEST - CLOSURE, UHF ANT., CABLES
1.2 COMPRESSIVE STRENGTH TEST - CLOSURE CORE SAMPLES
3.3 D.I. STRESS TEST (HE SURF BURST) - AES DUCTING
- 1.8 DYNAMIC PRESSURE TEST - AES, EXPANSION CHBR.
1.9 NUC. RAD. ATTENUATION TEST - AES, EXPANSION CHBR
1.10 THERMAL RAD. ATTENUATION TEST - AES, EXPANSION CHBR
1.7 SHOCK TEST - BLAST VALVE ACTUATION SYSTEM
5.1 DYNAMIC PRESSURE TEST - BLAST VALVE STRUCTURE, ACTUATION SYSTEM
- 2.1 STATIC PULL TEST - SHOCK ISOLATORS
2.2 DYNAMIC PULL TEST - SHOCK ISOLATORS
4.1 TOTAL DISPLACEMENT SHOCK TEST - S.I.
2.3 SHOCK IMPACT & DROP TEST - S.I. & PLATFORMS
2.9 REL. DISPL. AND STATIC PRESSURE TEST - FLEX CONNECTIONS
2.8 SHOCK IMPACT & DROP TEST - S.I., PLATFORMS, EQUIP.
- 1.1 VIBRATION TEST - EC OGE SYSTEMS
2.5 EMP TEST - OGE SYSTEMS
2.4 VIBRATION TEST - PC EQUIP. SYSTEMS
2.6 EMP TEST - PC EQUIP. SYSTEMS
2.7 ACOUSTIC PRESS. & DEBRIS SEP. TEST - OGE (CRITICAL COM.)
- 4.2 NUC. RAD. FRAGILITY TESTS - CRITICAL EQUIP. & OGE SUBSYSTEMS
- 1.4 SHOCK TEST - SPLICE CASES, ESA'S
2.11 EMP TEST - SPLICE CASES, CABLES
2.12 ELECTRICAL SURGE TEST - ESA'S CABLES
- 2.10 RF SIGNAL ATTENUATION TEST - MF & UHF ANTENNAS
- 1.5 BLAST TEST - ANTENNA SYSTEMS
1.6 EMP TEST - ANTENNA SYSTEMS
- 6.1 AIR BLAST & D.I. TEST (HE SURF. BURST) - CRITICAL SUBSYSTEMS
6.2 POST BLAST EMP TEST - CABLE, MF & HF ANTENNA SYSTEMS
6.3 PERFORMANCE TEST - UHF, HF & MF ANTENNAS
6.4 POST BLAST ELECT. CONTINUITY TEST - CLOSURE, BLAST DOOR SYSTEMS
6.5 NUCLEAR RADIATION ATTN. TEST - SHAFT & TUNNEL STRUCT.
- 7.2 UNDERGROUND (TUNNEL) NUCLEAR TEST - CLOSURE SYSTEM
- 7.3 UNDERGROUND (TAMPED) NUCLEAR TEST - HORIZ. TUNNEL STRUCT.
8.2 BLAST TEST (PORTABLE BLAST GEN.) - AES, EXP. CHAMBER, BLAST VALVE
8.1 TWANG TEST - EC & PC SHOCK ISOLATOR SYSTEMS
- 8.3 HARDNESS PROOF TEST (HE SURF. BURST) LCF
8.4 POST BLAST EMP TEST - LCF
- 9.1 AIR BLAST & D.I. EFFECTS TEST - OPERATIONAL LCF
9.2 POST BLAST EMP TEST - OPERATIONAL LCF

PLANNING & ANALYSIS FOR SPECIAL FACILITY

PLANNING

PLANNING

CONSTRUCTION

A.

ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT PHASE

SITE SELECTION

FACILITIES
PDR

FACILITIES
CDR

3.1
3.2

1.3

CONSTRUCTION

2.1

1.2

1.8

3.3

1.9

1.10

1.7

5.1

2.1

2.2

4.1

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1.1

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2.7

4.2

1.4

2.11

2.12

2.10

1.5

1.6

PLANNING

CONSTRUCTION

6.1

6.2

6.3

6.2

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PLANNING

CONSTRUCTION

CONSTRUCTION

7.3

PLANNING

B.





















Figure 3-8.

C.



A.



B.

LAUNCH CONTROL FACILITY TEST PROGRAM

DOCUMENTATION




Figure 3-9.

4. SELECTED LAUNCH FACILITY SUBSYSTEMS TEST PLAN

The test plan developed for the selected test is presented as Volume V of this report. The test selected by SAMSO/Aerospace was not one of the test concepts recommended as a result of the test requirements analysis (TRA). It is, however, a test that will fulfill in a timely manner a number of test requirements identified by the TRA.

4.1 BACKGROUND

To ensure high confidence in the hardness of the dual capability facility (DCF), a series of hardness demonstration tests have been prescribed by the in-place hardness demonstration test program plan. DCF system elements basic to the hardness of the system are those that have been identified as critical subsystems. These include the silo structural shell, the main closure, MF antenna, antenna feed cable, and silo penetrations. These subsystems must withstand the air blast and ground motion effects associated with a high overpressure environment.

Because the desired environment may not be produced with nuclear devices in the atmosphere, the effects must be simulated.

The overpressure environment can be adequately simulated with a high explosive simulation technique (HEST). Coupled with the overpressure pulse, direct induced ground motion effects can be simulated to some degree with the direct induced high explosive simulation technique (DI-HEST). The technique of coincidentally simulating the overpressure and the direct induced effects (HEST/DI-HEST) will be used for the LF subsystems test.

4.2 TEST PLAN SUMMARY

The purpose of this LF subsystem test plan is to prescribe a test program that will provide high confidence in the capability of critical launch facility subsystems to withstand the simulated air-blast and direct-induced effects of a high overpressure environment.

The plan outlines the requirement for the test program, describes the LF system elements to be tested, and prescribes test objectives and success criteria. It also identifies the controlling test documentation, specifies test program tasks and designates how and when they will be accomplished.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

During the course of the study it became evident that a number of things could be done to alleviate some of the problems associated with demonstrating in-place hardness with a high degree of confidence. A basic factor in the solution of the problem, the test program plan, is presented as a result of this study. Three future activities are recommended in the following subsections as logical supplements to this initial step in the development of a sound in-place hardness demonstration program. These include development of test techniques, test program plan updating, and publication of test management and data evaluation plans.

5.1 TEST TECHNIQUE DEVELOPMENT

The most critical factor affecting confidence in system hardness demonstrations, is the validity of the simulation techniques available to do the required testing. For purposes of this study, test validity was defined in terms of:

- a) The degree to which the simulation technique reproduces the desired nuclear weapons effect
- b) The degree to which the test article simulates the operational configuration
- c) Past performance record of the test technique.

In the evaluation of the validity of currently available simulation techniques, it was found that the magnitude and characteristics of some weapons effects environment inputs to the system elements could not be adequately simulated.

The test concepts recommended in the test requirements analysis range from laboratory and in-plant tests that simulate a weapons effects environment input to a component or subsystem, to a number of field test concepts that simulate an effects environment input to a major system or a total facility. Laboratory and in-plant test concepts are state of the art, and a good experience record exists for the recommended concepts.

However, our experience with field tests is limited, the cost of field tests will be high, and the validity of field tests for increasing confidence in hardness may be very low.

The important test techniques considered in the test requirements analysis are as follows:

- a) Nuclear underground cavity test (NEST)
- b) High explosive simulation technique (HEST)
- c) Direct induced high explosive simulation technique (DI-HEST)
- d) High explosive contact surface burst
- e) Underground nuclear burst (tamped nuclear)
- f) Underground nuclear tunnel test
- g) EMP by synthetic pulse diagnosis (SPUD)
- h) Blast simulation technique for testing air entrainment systems and blast valves.

These critical test techniques are discussed in Section 4 of Volume III, Test Requirements Analysis. More detailed evaluation and development of each of these test techniques is required to increase the validity of this study to demonstrate hardness for the postulated nuclear burst.

Further development of the current simulation techniques and the investigation of new simulation concepts is therefore recommended.

5.2 TEST PROGRAM PLAN UPDATE

The in-place hardness demonstration test program plan submitted as Volume IV of this report is completely valid only for the weapon system configuration and weapons effects environment described in the test requirements analysis (Volume III). It is recommended, therefore, that a test program plan update and improvement task be initiated to introduce more detailed and up-to-date configuration and weapons effects environment data into the test requirements analysis. In addition, critical simulation techniques should be studied carefully and experiment design analysis be performed where possible to determine the optimum use of simulation techniques in the test program.

As the configuration of the system evolves and the physical and function characteristics of system elements become more definite, the test program plan should be re-evaluated, through the mechanism of the test requirements analysis, and updated as necessary to reflect the design changes as well as further knowledge about simulation techniques. Likewise, should the weapons effects environment criteria change to reflect, perhaps, free field environment magnitudes in which there is greater confidence, the test program plan will require re-examination.

5.3 TEST PROGRAM MANAGEMENT AND DATA EVALUATION PLANS

The test program plan presented as Volume IV of this report represents a system approach to test planning. It is recommended that the implementation of that test program plan and the evaluation of the resulting test data follow the same basic philosophy.

A common failure of test programs is that, even though the planning may have been diligent and the test documentation complete, management of the test program implementation (e.g., the pretest engineering and analysis, test conduct) has failed to maintain and support the originally planned test concepts. Planned test objectives, success criteria, test configurations, and data measurement requirements are misinterpreted or misplaced so that the once carefully planned sequence of tests that were meant to cover a particular spectrum of requirements becomes distorted to the point where the validity of the total test program may become questionable.

Another area in which test programs are commonly deficient is in the use of the test data. Results of test programs are, more often than not, written into reports and promptly forgotten. Too often individual tests become ends in themselves. It is desirable in all test programs that test data be quickly evaluated and the proper feedback be generated to dictate system design refinements and/or retesting where required. Though desirable on all test programs, a proper data evaluation and feedback loop is mandatory for a test program that has been developed with the systems approach. A test program based on the "systems" philosophy will inherently include a series or progression of tests that

are interdependent. That is, certain tests would not be profitable to conduct without first having the benefit of the resulting data from prior tests.

The two problem outlined above can be effectively eliminated if they are first recognized as significant problems, and then the proper planning is initiated to avoid the specific pitfalls experienced in past programs. This can be done by the preparation, publication, and implementation of test program management plan and a test data evaluation plan.

The test program management plan would describe the hardness demonstration test program lines of authority and responsibility within the system development team. It would also include interagency agreements and prescribe modes of operation.

The test data evaluation plan would provide a charter for the hardness test data evaluation group and prescribe the manner in which test data will be handled and evaluated. Feedback loops to design and test functions will also be specified.

ABBREVIATIONS

AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
AES	Air Entrainment System
AFSWC	Air Force Special Weapons Center
AFWL	Air Force Weapons Laboratory
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AVE	Aerospace Vehicle Equipment
BV	Blast Valve
CBR	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological
CDR	Critical Design Review
CG	Center of Gravity
DASA	Defense Atomic Support Agency
DI	Direct Induced
DIHEST	Direct Induced High Explosive Simulation Technique
DOD	Department of Defense
EC	Equipment Capsule
ECU	Environmental Control Unit
E-M	Electric and Magnetic
EMP	Electromagnetic Pulse
ERDL	Engineering Research and Development Laboratories
ESA	Electrical Surge Arrestor
FAC	Facility
GTM	Ground Test Missile
HE	High Explosive
HEST	High Explosive Simulation Technique
HET	High Explosive Test
HF	High Frequency
HPT	Hardness Proof Test
IITRI	IIT Research Institute
LASL	Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory
LCF	Launch Control Facility
LF	Launch Facility
MC	Main Closure
MF	Medium Frequency

ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

NEST	Nuclear Explosive Shock Tube
NTS	Nevada Test Site
NWSSG	Nuclear Weapon System Safety Group
OGE	Operating Ground Equipment
OP	Operational
PC	Personnel Capsule
PDR	Preliminary Design Review
PSI	Pounds per Square Inch
PTPD	Preliminary Test Development Plan
RF	Radio Frequency
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAMSO	Space and Missile Systems Operation
SI	Shock Isolator
SOR	System Operational Requirement
SOW	Statement of Work
SPUD	Synthetic Pulse Diagnosis
TRA	Test Requirements Analysis
TREES	Transient Radiation Effects, Electronics System
TSE	Test Support Equipment
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
WES	Waterways Experiment Station

Unclassified

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R&D												
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)												
1 ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) TRW Inc., TRW Systems Group One Space Park Redondo Beach, California 90278		2 REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified - Vol. I, II, IV, & V Secret, Restricted Data- Vol. III										
3 REPORT TITLE (U) Test Planning for In-Place Hardness Demonstration												
4 DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Final Technical Report, June 1967 through January 1968												
5 AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, initial) C. K. Stein J. Karagozian (consultant) J. P. Bednar												
6 REPORT DATE 15 February 1968	7 TOTAL NO OF PAGES 608	7a NO OF REFS										
8a CONTRACT OR GRANT NO F04694-67-C-0134	9a ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 09365-6003-R0-00 (Vol. I) 09365-6004-R0-00 (Vol. II) 09365-6005-R1-00 (Vol. III) 09365-6006-R0-00 (Vol. IV) 09365-6007-R0-00 (Vol. V)											
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11 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		12 SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY										
13 ABSTRACT This study has developed a test program plan for demonstrating the in-place hardness of an advanced ballistic missile weapon system. A test requirements analysis methodology was devised, utilizing a systems approach, to examine a WS-120A system baseline design with respect to a given weapons effect environment criteria, define the testing required to assure hardness of each system element, trade off applicable simulation techniques, and recommend a series of test concepts. These concepts were then logically combined into efficient and cost-effective in-place hardness demonstration test programs for the launch facility and launch control facility. This report has been divided into five volumes and classified as follows: <table><tbody><tr><td>Volume I</td><td>Study Report Summary (Unclassified)</td></tr><tr><td>Volume II</td><td>Methodology (Unclassified)</td></tr><tr><td>Volume III</td><td>Test Requirements Analysis (Secret, RD)</td></tr><tr><td>Volume IV</td><td>Test Program Plan (Unclassified)</td></tr><tr><td>Volume V</td><td>Selected I&E Subsystems Test Plan (Unclassified)</td></tr></tbody></table>			Volume I	Study Report Summary (Unclassified)	Volume II	Methodology (Unclassified)	Volume III	Test Requirements Analysis (Secret, RD)	Volume IV	Test Program Plan (Unclassified)	Volume V	Selected I&E Subsystems Test Plan (Unclassified)
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14 KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
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