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**ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE  
PACIFICATION SYSTEM**


**PRELIMINARY REPORT**

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⑥ PRELIMINARY REPORT. 1 Apr 67-Apr 68,  
ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE PACIFICATION SYSTEM.

(Office of Naval Research Contract N00014-67-C-0352) - New  
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## ABSTRACT

About a year ago we undertook an ONR-sponsored study of the U.S. Marine Corps training for pacification activities in Vietnam.

A basic assumption was that among the many kinds of skills required by pacification (counterinsurgency), that in which the average Marine was most deficient was the skill in personal interactions with people of a very different culture. At this midway point in the project we are not at all sure that this is true, or in fact that skill in cultural interactions is of such critical importance in counterinsurgency as most people assume.

However, our work has led us to believe that these appropriate interpersonal skills are one dimension of pacification, as military and civic actions skills are other dimensions, and that together these skills constitute a capability for effective counterinsurgency. Together - as a total system. Our analysis has demonstrated the interrelatedness of basically dissimilar activities in a pacification system. It is, in fact, a most complex system, in which it is difficult for the Marine to evaluate his activities not only as they relate to each other but as they contribute to overall achievement of objectives. It is a system in which an individual or a group must have enough flexibility to adapt behavior to the varying situation and not simply react with a particular trained behavior pattern to all situations.

This seems to us to imply the need for a system of training which simulates the complexity and variety of actual pacification, which does not isolate training in military skills from training in civic action skills or interpersonal skills, which emphasizes objectives and creates an awareness of the requirement for individual initiative.

## INTRODUCTION

Early in 1967 Matrix undertook a project, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, to "analyze the problem of training Marines for pacification activities in Vietnam."

### Objectives

In the Matrix proposal the following objectives were identified: (1) to analyze the pacification mission of III-MAF in the Republic of Vietnam; (2) to determine qualitatively and quantitatively the specific requirements placed upon the individual Marine with regard to this mission -- in other words to analyze the structure of the individual task; and (3) to relate the specific nature of the task to the Marine training program for pacification.

As so often happens in applied research, objectives have proliferated, simply because the Marines, ONR, and the people engaged in the study all have specific interests to be served. The Marines are interested in correcting deficiencies in their training programs not only for "pacification" and not only for Vietnam, but for all Marines in any foreign nation. ONR supports this interest, but it also has an interest in advancing the frontiers of knowledge in the complex inter-disciplinary area of cultural interaction. Our own interests compel us to move in the direction of so structuring the complex problem of training Americans for cultural interaction that it can be attacked in a systematic, planned, and effective fashion.

### Approach

The approach outlined in the proposal has been followed rather faithfully, except that information has been collected only by interviews and not by questionnaires. The proposal listed five steps:

(1) A systems approach to analysis of the Marine pacification mission, identifying goals and objectives and attaching priorities to these.

(2) An inventory of tasks designed to accomplish the pacification mission.

(3) An evaluation of the above tasks in terms of the objectives they support and of the training which support them.

- (4) An indication of task and training deficiencies.
- (5) The construction of a model of the pacification "system".

### Methodology

The techniques used in the various steps outlined above are: (1) systems analysis techniques, assuming that "pacification" is a system the outputs of which can be defined as goals and objectives attained by Marines performing specific activities; one of the critical inputs to such a system is training for the specified activities; obviously where inputs are deficient outputs will be deficient; (2) task analysis, which is simply a logical attempt to break an activity down into its most basic component elements of information, behavior, and attitude; and (3) model-construction, by which we mean abstracting from many activities the elements common to all of them.

### Structure of the Report

This report is presented in three sections. The first section is an analysis of the pacification system. Outputs are goals defined in terms of primary and supporting objectives. The transformation process consists of all Marine activities designed to achieve objectives. Inputs are Marines trained to implement the necessary activities. Priorities are assigned to all objectives. Networks are constructed to simulate the transformation process. The implications of the system for training are explored.

The second section briefly describes a "model" of the system. The model is a three-dimensional matrix in which one dimension represents classes of activities, the second represents classes of objectives, and the third represents categories of relevant knowledge, skills and attitudes. The implications of the model for training are explored.

The third section describes approaches to evaluating training for pacification. A qualitative evaluation is made to provide perspective. Then an evaluative approach from the system point-of-view identifies the data required as a basis for any recommended modification of present training.

The basic conclusion reached is that if Marines are to function effectively in a pacification system they must have some basic comprehension of the system as a whole as well as special knowledge and skills to implement sub-systems. Therefore, training would necessarily emphasize objectives and behavioral options as well as necessary behavior.

## SECTION 1. ANALYSIS OF PACIFICATION AS A SYSTEM

The attention of this project has been specifically focused on Marine "pacification" activities. Like a good many comparable terms (counterinsurgency, revolutionary development, area development, etc.), "pacification" is a simple word which stands for a very complex process. If we were to evaluate the program designed to train Marines to play roles in that complex process, we had first to define it explicitly.

"Official" definitions were not very helpful. On 2 November 1967 COMUSMACV sent a memorandum to CINCPAC headed "Clarification of Terms". It gave the following definitions of "pacification", "revolutionary development", and "nation building":

Pacification is the military, political, economic and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or reassertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion. The economic element of pacification includes the opening of roads and waterways and the maintenance of lines of communication important to economic and military activity.

Revolutionary development, the leading edge of pacification, is the formalized Government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level.

Nation building is the economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban centers. It is related to pacification in that it builds on the results of pacification and contributes to the establishment of a viable economic and social community.

Even COMUSMACV in its "clarification" has fallen into the trap of confusing processes with programs, systems with organizations. Some Marines have done this, as well, considering their Combined Action units the agents of "pacification"; by this definition the only training for "pacification" is carried out at the Combined Action school in Danang. However, at policy levels and operational levels within the Marine Corps there is an awareness that most Marine missions in Vietnam have pacification objectives.

The confusion about the precise meaning of "pacification" led some people to think that we should have focused on another term. In our opinion it did not really matter. Our analysis quickly led us to the conclusion that we were talking about what some people refer to as "the other war" and what others have long referred to as "counterinsurgency". We were reasonably certain that whatever else it was, it was complex. And for that reason we chose to consider it a system -- a complex system -- the outputs of which were achieved objectives, the inputs of which were for our purposes Marines equipped and trained and supported to attain Marine objectives. The transformation process -- between inputs and outputs -- was the things Marines were doing.

#### The Systems Approach

The systems approach is to work "backward" from outputs to transformation process to inputs. So we looked first at the outputs -- the goals and objectives of the pacification system -- to attempt to determine what the desired achievements of the system were.

Outputs: Goals and Objectives The process of determining outputs involved the logical rearrangement of two kinds of information: (1) a wide variety of reports and articles dealing with the subject, the most useful of which are referred to in the Bibliography, and (2) information based on interviews with Marines who had been or were involved with the program.

The "logical rearrangement" might be referred to as functional. It is a vertical ordering, or hierarchy, which extends downward from goals to primary objectives, to supporting objectives, to activities, to the knowledge, attitudes, and behavioral skills upon which the activities are based. In other words, we have tried to specify as logically as possible all of the critical aspects of significant activities which are necessary to the achievement of a supporting objective, which is logically a requirement in the achievement of a primary objective, which is a necessary element of attaining a major goal.

MARINE CORPS' ROLE IN VILLAGE PACIFICATION  
AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM

GOAL I: REPLACE VIETCONG VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE WITH REPUBLIC  
OF VIETNAM INFRASTRUCTURE (Priority 1)

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: DESTROY VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE (Priority 1)

SUPPORTING  
OBJECTIVES:

Seek and destroy Vietcong (Priority 1)  
Defend against Vietcong attack (Priority 1)  
Defend against subversion (Priority 2)  
Develop Vietnamese capability to resist  
Vietcong (Priority 2 )  
Participate in anti-Vietcong propaganda (Priority 3)  
Support rehabilitation of Vietcong (Priority 3)

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: ACHIEVE VIETNAMESE COOPERATION (Priority 2)

SUPPORTING  
OBJECTIVES:

Gain Vietnamese acceptance (Priority 1)  
Gain Vietnamese involvement (Priority 1)  
Introduce desired change (Priority 3)

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE: SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT (Priority 3)

SUPPORTING  
OBJECTIVES:

Provide immediate welfare needs (Priority 1)  
Provide support for rebuilding public  
services and facilities (Priority 2)  
Provide support for rebuilding private  
sector activities (Priority 2)

GOAL II: SUPPORT NATION-BUILDING ACTIVITIES (Priority 2)

SUPPORTING  
OBJECTIVES:

Support development of governmental  
structure (Priority 1)  
Support economic development program (Priority 2)

Figure 1.

To make explicit the desired outputs of the Marine "pacification system", we used the official COMUSMACV definitions as a baseline. There seemed to be at least two major pacification goals: (1) to replace the Vietcong infrastructure with a Republic of Vietnam infrastructure, and (2) to support long term revolutionary development activities. (Figure 1) The first goal was given Priority 1 by everyone we consulted. It seemed to us that real progress toward the second goal was based on some degree of accomplishment of the first goal; and it appeared to be based upon many of the same supporting objectives and tasks of Goal 1, but in a slightly more "removed" fashion. For these reasons we concentrated on an analysis of the first goal.

Analysis of Goal 1. To replace the VC infrastructure with RVN infrastructure appeared to depend upon achieving the following primary objectives (which are distinguished from goals only in that they are more specific statements (a) to establish cooperation with Vietnamese people, (b) to destroy the VC infrastructure, and (c) to support revolutionary development. These are still rather abstract statements, but they are specific enough to lend themselves to quite different description.

We then proceeded to break the primary objectives down into more specific supporting objectives, each supported by a series of activities. For example, one of the supporting objectives of the primary objective "to destroy VC infrastructure" was "defend against subversion". On Figure 1 we have listed two primary activities by means of which this objective is to be attained: (1) establish internal police, and (2) establish counterintelligence. Both are broken down into lists of sub-activities or tasks: e.g., take census, issue identification cards, designate off-limit areas, etc. (Table 6). This procedure was followed for each supporting objective subsumed under Goal 1, and the tables are to be found at the end of this chapter. Under Goal 2 the two primary objectives which appear on the chart (Figure 1) are further defined by supporting objectives in Tables 13 and 14.


This is a commonsense exercise. Our technique was to extract from the literature about "pacification" every statement of goal, objective, activity, task, attitude, and behavior we could find. We then began to assemble these at the proper levels of generalization -- changing, adjusting, discarding, supplying additional activities, etc. where there was an obvious omission. What finally resulted was a reasonably detailed hierarchy of statements about "pacification". It is obviously not the only hierarchy of statements that could

be made. Others might phrase things somewhat differently, might have more goals, more or fewer supporting objectives, etc. The point is that it provides a method of relating a very specific activity to a much more general objective -- and to other activities which support the same objective. This should make it possible to evaluate the activity as a part of the "pacification" system, for the attainment of objectives is the output of the system, and the activities of Marines constitute the transformation process by means of which the inputs -- properly trained, supported, organized, directed Marines -- produce the outputs.

Complexity of the System. Pacification is demonstrably a complex system. One has only to glance at Tables 1 through 14 to realize that:

- (1) The number of finite activities is great.
- (2) The activities may apply to a unit or to an individual
- (3) The activities can be classified in a variety of ways: some are "civic action", and some are essentially inter-personal.
- (4) Marines may undertake activities by themselves, with RVN military or semi-military units (ARVN, RF, PF), or with American or Vietnamese government officials and representatives.
- (5) Some activities would seem to precede others: a number of factors apparently impose sequence in some cases.
- (6) Some activities would appear to be more important than others -- i.e., should be assigned a higher priority.
- (7) Many activities interrelate in a very significant way.
- (8) It is difficult to measure the outcome of some activities and easy to measure the outcome of others.
- (9) Many apparently incompatible activities (such as a weapons activity, an attempt to win support, and civic action) may necessarily take place concurrently.

Obviously, these conditions must be taken into account if one is to structure the system in such a way that requirements for training can be derived from it.








Figure 2. Pacification Net





Operations outside village compl  
 Psychological Warfare and Milit  
 at regional levels provide an u



Operations outside village complex; include: Combat with organized V.C. units, company size or greater; Psychological Warfare and Military Intelligence on a regional basis; Political, social and economic progress at regional levels provide an umbrella for village level Pacification (Revolutionary Development) Operations





Figure 3. Pacification Checklist

s, company size or greater;  
cal, social and economic progress  
(Evolutionary Development) Operations



igion:  
reatment of Elders  
vidance of direct  
hysical contacts  
ace of women in  
ociety  
andards of living  
(material possessions)

Avoid "compound complex" & participate in community life within bounds of the Vietnamese customs






Figure 4. Pacification Net  
courtesy Col. Wykoff, USMC

It was therefore necessary to look at the system from an operational, as opposed to functional, viewpoint, to determine the general nature of the transformation process. And it was also necessary to attempt to attach some system of priorities which would enable us to evaluate objectives.

The Transformation Process. We attempted to establish a network of representative activities for the transformation process - specifically the total gamut of activities supporting the goal REPLACE VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE WITH RVN INFRASTRUCTURE in a given village (Figure 2). The network made us aware of serious transformation problems: (1) there is no single pattern of pacification: rather, there are many individualistic and somewhat fortuitous patterns depending upon local circumstance; (2) we could not fit many of the activities into a predictable time frame; (3) military and quasi-military or non-military activities were confused; and (4) the roles of various organizations were not easily identified.

We modified the net in the form of an activities checklist (Figure 3), separating unit operations from individual operations, and military from civilian operations. A net identifying roles and objectives of various organizations was drawn up for us by Col. Wyckoff, head of Civic Action, USMC (Figure 4).

Our purpose was to attempt to make an operational statement of the jobs Marines actually undertake in the pacification system. Without such a statement a training program for pacification (counterinsurgency) would be fragmented and perhaps meaningless, because the networks indicate:

(1) How different activities fit into sequential patterns, and how they are related at key points in time; they thus help assign priorities, particularly for supporting objectives.

(2) The nature of those very basic activities which always come first and must be carried out successfully if the mission is to proceed successfully. This creates reasonable immediate objectives, the achievement of which has meaning.

(3) The difference between strictly military and quasi-military or civilian activities while at the same time emphasizing the close relationships that exist between and among such activities.

(4) That the pacification process depends upon the timely introduction of various kinds of U.S. and Vietnamese agencies and programs.

(5) A number of activities that had not been brought out in our previous analysis (although these appear in the tables).

Perhaps the most important result of analysis of output and transformation is that we were able to put some tentative dimensions on the breadth and depth of training requirements. For example:

(1) The output analysis revealed that many activities require a continuum of language skills, from meagre to competent; that some activities require a knowledge in depth of Vietnamese social systems, behavioral patterns, and value systems; that some activities require a sensitivity to signs of Vietnamese approval or disapproval; that most activities require a thorough comprehension of mission; etc. (Section 3)

(2) The transformation analysis revealed that some activities are pervasive -- they must be carried out by all Marines -- while others relate to specific missions and positions of command; it also revealed the demands on the Marine to play military, civic action, and supportive counterpart roles concurrently -- certainly one of the most difficult challenges a training program faces.

Assigning Priorities There are two purposes to be served in assigning priorities (indicated as arabic numbers 1, 2, and 3 in parentheses, Figure 1). One is to provide a training program with options: since it is usually impossible to fit all training requirements into a program, it is desirable to know which requirements are most important. The other is to indicate a probable sequence of activities, so that training can emphasize the importance of being certain that first objectives are achieved before one expects the achievement of second and third objectives. Priorities change as situations change, but our tentative ratings are shown in Figure 1.

An early consensus was that destruction of the VC infrastructure was PRIORITY 1, because until that was accomplished, at least to some measurable extent, it would not be possible to get any desired measure of cooperation. Similarly, cooperation seemed to be a sine qua non for supporting revolutionary development. This is simple enough, although as the networks show, it is not a matter of undertaking the tasks for PRIORITY 1 objectives first, the tasks for PRIORITY 2 objectives second, etc. It is more a realization that one cannot expect to attain PRIORITY 2 objectives until some measure of achievement is reached in PRIORITY 1 objectives.

The priorities attached to supporting objectives therefore have the same weight as those attached to primary objectives.

This is somewhat confusing, admittedly. For example, although ACHIEVE VIETNAMESE COOPERATION is PRIORITY 2, two of its supporting objectives are PRIORITY 1. This simply means that the activities under these objectives must be carried on concurrently with those under the PRIORITY 1 supporting objectives of DESTROY VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE, which is PRIORITY 1.

Thus the priority arrangement of supporting objectives is as follows:

- Priority 1    Seek and destroy Vietcong
  - Defend against Vietcong attack
  - Gain villagers' acceptance
  - Gain villagers' involvement
  - Provide immediate welfare needs
- Priority 2    Defend against subversion
  - Develop villagers' capability to resist Vietcong
  - Provide support for rebuilding public services and facilities
  - Provide support for rebuilding private sector activities
- Priority 3    Support rehabilitation of Vietcong
  - Participate in anti-Vietcong propaganda
  - Introduce desired change.

Although we have not attempted to assign priorities to all activities in Tables 1 through 14, but only to those pertinent to the objectives of this study, priorities are treated in precisely the same way: a PRIORITY 1 activity under any objective, no matter what the objective's priority is, has the same value and immediacy as any other PRIORITY 1 activity.

Inputs to the system. System inputs are Marines, trained to carry out the activities we have described. Since the period of the "banana wars", Marines have largely been involved in conventional military operations, as opposed to counter-insurgency, and Marine training has been geared to performance

of military missions. Early recognition that the Vietnam conflict was significantly different led to the development of the Personal Response training program, and to this particular study.

Studies basic to the development of the Personal Response program have measured some dimensions of the inputs, particularly with respect to the attitudes of Marines toward their Vietnamese counterparts (ASSESSMENT OF ATTITUDES OF THIRD MARINE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE TOWARD THE VIETNAMESE, June 1967, Personal Response Project, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FORWARD), FPO San Francisco 96602). Further measurement is taking place now, in the second phase of this project, both as a means of evaluating the training inputs for various aspects of pacification and as a method of determining how well Marines in the field comprehend the nature of the overall pacification process and their roles in it.

A preliminary evaluation of training has been made (Section 3) based largely on a comparison of the details of the system outlined in this chapter with the details of present training.

#### Implications of the System for Training

We have attempted to define the pacification system so explicitly that a Marine will be able to know why he doing what he is doing, how what he is doing contributes to immediate and future objectives and goals, how it relates to other required activities, and what he can expect as an outcome of his activities.

We believe that few people not actually involved in counterinsurgency activities are really aware of the demands such a complex system puts upon the individual and upon the organization. Not only officers and NCO's, but all Marines, to be effective, must be keenly aware of the nature and value of individual missions. And they must be flexible and adaptable, responding to feedback quickly to change their approaches to interpersonal situations in particular.

For in this system they may undertake tasks by themselves, with RVN military or quasi-military units, or with American or Vietnamese government officials and representatives. They may undertake purely military tasks, such as conducting sweeps and patrols or engaging the enemy. They may undertake what might normally be thought of as "civilian" tasks, such as the diverse components of civic action. And individually they may undertake purely interpersonal tasks, such as gaining the

confidence and acceptance and collaboration of Vietnamese counterparts. And these tasks may not be clearly separated in time: they may be concurrent. A sweep through a village combines all three, calling on a Marine to be militarily alert and correct but at the same time carrying out the civic action components of a sweep in as non-threatening a manner as possible. It is a lot to expect of an individual. And therefore it places a heavy responsibility on training.

To work effectively as inputs to this system, Marines of all ranks and grades, in a wide variety of missions, must have varying levels of sophistication in their comprehension of the system, must understand the roles they will be called upon to play, must understand their options in playing such roles, and must be able to evaluate how effectively they are playing them. Much of the knowledge and many of the skills they already possess. Their esprit de corps, their mission-orientation and desire to achieve, and the discipline they bring to the jobs they do are already established.

In an attempt to relate all these parameters in systematic fashion, we have used a matrix format as a model of the system.

**TABLE 1**

**GOAL I**

**PRIMARY OBJECTIVE A**

**SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1. GAIN VIETNAMESE ACCEPTANCE**

- a) Understand clearly importance of Vietnam acceptance to achievement of pacification mission, by:
- Being able to relate military mission to role of Vietnam acceptance
  - Being able to measure accomplishment both with and without Vietnam support.
- b) Create positive interpersonal relationships with Vietnam counterparts, by
- Accepting them as equivalents
  - Knowing how much positive feedback to expect
  - Being sensitive to any and all indications of acceptance or non-acceptance and adjusting behavior as necessary.
- c) Adjust interpersonal behavior to culture, by
- Speaking local language to extent possible
  - Using critical features of "culture language"
  - Emphasizing supportive behavior (patience, overt friendliness, kindness, understanding).
  - Avoiding threatening behavior (don't show anger, avoid confrontation, emphasize equality).
- d) Adapt to culture, by
- Understanding taboos
  - Respecting customs and ceremonies
- e) Initiate emergency welfare activities, by
- Determining emergency requirements
  - Providing food, medical aid, etc.
  - Providing transport, shelter, etc.

TABLE 2

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE A

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2. GAIN VIETNAMESE INVOLVEMENT

- a) Institute joint programs, by
- Developing close interpersonal relationships with counterparts
  - Developing working relationships with RVN civil and military officials
  - Coordinating all efforts with local officials, leaders, elders
  - Promoting joint work activities
  - Supporting and helping with any ongoing activities (harvest, construction, etc.)
- b) Build morale, by
- Proving security, showing confidence
  - Showing regard for human welfare
  - Encouraging potential leadership
  - Recognizing and rewarding achievement
- c) Persuade and convince, by
- Soliciting support of leaders, elders
  - Communicating reason for being there
  - Accomplishing quick results in desired action programs
  - Appealing to deeply-felt wants
  - Using firm but reasonable coercion

TABLE 3

GOAL 1

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE A

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3. INTRODUCE DESIRED CHANGE

- a) Create incentives, by
- Setting culturally-meaningful rewards for "good" services
  - Associating status with cooperation
  - Using elders and village leaders as award donors
- b) Use moderately coercive measures to achieve proper behavior, by
- Determining what culturally-meaningful coercive measures can be used, such as:
    - Denying goods and services to non-cooperators
    - Creating a punishment-and-rewards system.
- c) Use group discussions and all available media, sources of authority, etc., to instill basic desired attitudes of cooperation, adoption of new concepts, by
- Appealing to basic felt needs
  - Reiterating rewards of new system
  - Reiterating simple basic elements of new system
  - Suggesting culturally-meaningful "punishments" accruing to Vietcong system
- d) Support organized pre-school activities which will lay the groundwork for future change, using all available media, by
- Introducing modern technology (tape recorders, radios, cars)
  - Introducing games (achievement, competition, reward, teamwork, etc.)
  - Broadening life outlook (movies, slides, TV).

TABLE 4

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1. DEFEND AGAINST VIET CONG ATTACK

a) Establish military base

- Reconnoiter and move to village
- Establish military communications network
- Install perimeter defense barriers
- Arrange military logistics
- Requisition property for military use

b) Establish intelligence network

- Photo-map area
- Search area
- Search people
- Search homes
- Interrogate
- Identify Viet Cong, Viet Cong relatives, sympathizers, refugees
- Identify displaced persons
- Censor communications
- Solicit informants

c) Begin defense activities

- Establish check points
- Establish patrols
- Continue area survey and control
- Evacuate designated areas
- Photo-map area
- Develop local militia

TABLE 5

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2. SEEK AND DESTROY VIET CONG

- a) Reconnoiter area
- b) Conduct sweeps
- c) Patrol

TABLE 6

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3. DEFEND AGAINST SUBVERSION

a) Establish internal police action

Take census

Issue proclamations, orders, instructions, and restrictions

Photograph inhabitants and families

Issue identification cards

Designate off-limit areas

Patrol area

Control population movement

Impose curfew

Report absences

Relocate refugees and displaced persons

Relocate inhabitants

Control labor force

Control black market

b) Establish counter intelligence

Account for material of potential value to Viet Cong

Control firearms

Confiscate Viet Cong property

Confiscate firearms

Enlist spies

Control Viet Cong sympathizers, families, relatives

Destroy means of Viet Cong sustenance

Publicize open arms program

Make use of defectors

TABLE 7

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 4. DEVELOP VILLAGERS' CAPABILITY  
TO RESIST VIET CONG

a) Furnish motivation

Convince of worth in resisting  
Providing security of United States military strength  
Accomplish quick action projects worth protecting

b) Develop physical capability

Increase villagers' health and vitality  
Train in anti-Viet Cong activities  
Select and train local militia  
Provide weapons

TABLE 8

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 5. PARTICIPATE IN ANTI-VIETCONG PROPAGANDA

Supervise communications media  
Establish newspaper, loudspeaker, and other mass media  
Hold compulsory indoctrination meetings  
Use defectors

TABLE 9

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 6. SUPPORT REHABILITATION OF VIETCONG

Support open arms program  
Provide work for defected Vietcong  
Insure acceptance by others  
Provide incentives for defection

TABLE 10

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE C

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 1. PROVIDE BASIC WELFARE NEEDS

- (a) Determine deeply felt needs, by
  - Careful inquiry
  - Personality, motivation analyses
  - Culture analysis
- (b) Provide urgently required materials, such as
  - Food and medicine
  - Construction materials
  - etc.
- (c) Provide urgently required services, such as
  - Medical services
  - Labor
  - Transport
  - Communications
  - etc.

TABLE 11

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE C

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 2. PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR REBUILDING  
PUBLIC SERVICES AND FACILITIES

a) Help build:

Roads and trails, streets  
Landing fields  
Water supply systems  
Sewage  
Schools  
Dispensaries  
Hospitals  
Offices  
Communications systems  
Irrigation, canals, dams

b) Provide:

Nurses, medical aides  
Vehicle operators  
Equipment operators  
Teachers

c) Allocate resources

Ration scarce items  
Supervise distribution of supplies  
Control real property  
Recruit labor  
Inventory skills  
Assign labor

TABLE 12

GOAL I

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE C

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVE 3. PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR REBUILDING  
PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITIES

Provide manpower, machinery, and supplies for emergency support in agriculture: harvest, soil preparation, crop care, fertilizer distribution  
Rebuild damaged stores, warehouses  
Rehabilitate local cottage industries  
Clear land for farming, industrial, housing uses

TABLE 13

GOAL II

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE A

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES

1. Build political institutions
2. Establish political participation machinery
3. Develop local institutions
4. Develop internal security, police, fire protection
5. Build education and training institutions
6. Establish banking/credit system

TABLE 14

GOAL II

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE B

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES

1. Increase production of primary industries
2. Develop manufactures
3. Develop retail/wholesale distribution facilities
4. Foster home and village - level industries

## SECTION II. A PACIFICATION MODEL

We are dealing with (1) a complex system and (2) a complex organization.

(1) The system is supposed to produce distinctive outputs (military, civic action, interpersonal) by means of relatively simultaneous and even conflicting activities in a complex and diffuse transformation process. The inputs are all ranks and grades of Marines, plus assorted "other" military, quasi-military, and civilian personnel - chiefly American and Vietnamese, but also from other nations. The knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary as training inputs to optimize the activities in the transformation process are similarly diverse, varying from simple to sophisticated.

(2) The organization, because it includes military and civilian components with a wide variety of military, political, economic, and social missions, is also complex.

### A General Model

To reduce this to manageable format - for our purposes - without losing its flavor of complexity, we have adapted a three-dimensional matrix of almost infinite capacity for sub-delineation of inter-relationships.

In our matrix (Figure 5), one dimension represents class of activities, another class of objectives, and the third categories of knowledge, skills, and attitudes.

### Objectives

Each cube within the 3 x 3 x 3 matrix now represents an "interaction" of three specific parameters, and all elements of all parameters are inter-related. For example, we can examine the entire gamut of knowledge required for all activities designed to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure. Each individual cube in the matrix is another, more specific, matrix which can be broken down into its logical components. For example, cube #6 relates civic action, support revolutionary development, and knowledge. It might look like Figure 6.

Each cube within this matrix is an address for information. For example, cube 100 relates the activity "Determine needs"

A PACIFICATION MODEL




Figure 5.

SUB-ELEMENT 6 OF THE PACIFICATION MODEL




Figure 6.

to the knowledge category "Techniques of analyzing socio-economic status". The operational procedure for determining needs and the knowledge required to do this properly and effectively should indicate who in the Marine Corps must have this overall responsibility and how it is done. Thus the model provides a logic for relating activities not only to objectives and knowledge (plus skill and attitudes) as inputs to training, but also to Marine organizational structures.

#### Implications for Training

The basic implication of this model is that objectives, activities, and the knowledge, skills, and attitudes to be imparted by training are functionally inter-related to each other and to the structure of Marine organization.

This means that categories of Marines should receive training relevant to the level of responsibility they can be expected to be assigned in counterinsurgency, which should in turn be about the level of achievement they can expect in training.

It also means, however, that all Marines should understand enough about the activities they will undertake to comprehend:

- (1) How they relate to the overall objective
- (2) What they are supposed to achieve
- (3) How they will know what their degree of achievement has been
- (4) What options they have in modifying activities if achievement levels are too low.

Operating within an integrated and inter-related system requires enough knowledge about any particular subsystem to facilitate and encourage some behavioral latitude. Training strategy may depend more heavily on system comprehension than on job training, since the job environment can vary tremendously.

SECTION III PRELIMINARY EVALUATION OF MARINE TRAINING FOR PACIFICATION

The best measure of the quality of Marine training for pacification or counterinsurgency is obviously a measure of how well the system works. In other words, if the outputs of the system are desired outputs, why change it?

The outputs of the system have not, by American standards, been desired outputs, particularly since the Tet offensive. But this does not necessarily mean that training has been ineffective. In fact, a military reversal does not, in our opinion, mean that all achievements have been nullified. The major goal, REPLACE VIETCONG VILLAGE INFRASTRUCTURE WITH REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM INFRASTRUCTURE, has certainly not been achieved. But goal attainment is a product of the attainment of objectives. Achievement can be measured in terms of progress toward objectives. And progress toward objectives is the product of the successful carrying-out of many activities. So in the final analysis an objective evaluation of the progress of pacification in Vietnam should depend not simply on gross measures of goal attainment but upon a wide variety of measures of the success or failure of activities. And this, of course, is the basis for determining training requirements.

A qualitative evaluation of the present situation in Vietnam will demonstrate this concept.

The Tet offensive has been widely reported in the news media as representing a major setback to pacification. Suppose we think of this in terms of our primary and supporting objectives:

Our priority one primary objective was DESTROY VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE. Has the infrastructure been destroyed? Hardly. Our principle measure of achievement of this objective has been in terms of the supporting objective SEEK AND DESTROY VIETCONG. The data on this are constant and are used as basic measures of achievement. But despite the apparently great odds in numbers of Killed in Action, we have not been completely successful in our efforts to DEFEND AGAINST VIETCONG ATTACK, DEFEND AGAINST SUBVERSION, AND DEVELOP VIETNAMESE CAPABILITY TO RESIST VIETCONG.

Our priority two primary objective was ACHIEVE VIETNAMESE COOPERATION. Have we managed this? It is difficult to say, but it appears that we have GAINED VIETNAMESE ACCEPTANCE in many localities. To a lesser extent, but at least to some extent, we have GAINED VIETNAMESE INVOLVEMENT. And we have

certainly pushed hard in the material areas of INTRODUCING DESIRED CHANGE. On the whole, we may have gained more of this objective than of the first.

Our priority three primary objective was to SUPPORT REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT. To an important extent we have been able to PROVIDE IMMEDIATE WELFARE NEEDS, whether officially or unofficially, and we have certainly made a real effort to PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR REBUILDING PRIVATE (AND PUBLIC) SERVICES AND FACILITIES.

Does this mean that our total effort has been nullified? We think not. It is unthinkable that those Vietnamese who learned to accept Americans no longer accept them, that civilians who reported booby traps and turned in arms have turned completely against Americans, that the program of providing material goods -- pigs, seed, building materials, food, etc. -- has been destroyed or "taken over" by the Vietcong.

Nor is the military setback ascribed to poor training. There are many reasons given for the apparent success of the Tet offensive: insufficient numbers of American troops, the self-imposed restrictions we have placed on our military in a "limited" war, strategic surprise, etc. But training has never been criticized in this connection.

We conclude that to evaluate training for pacification it is not enough to evaluate only the outputs of the system. For that reason we have made no attempt at this juncture to include a discussion of the "PACES" system devised by MACCORDS or the reports resulting from JUSPAO's NATIONWIDE HAMLET SURVEY.

We had two alternatives: (1) take an overview of Marine training in terms of the systems requirements we had defined, asking Marines acquainted with the system to identify training deficiencies; and (2) with these judgments in mind, develop a program of data collection designed to further specify training deficiencies.

#### A Qualitative Analysis of Marine Training for Pacification

A very large part of the life of any military organization is training. Many of the advances in training techniques have been introduced by the military, and much of the present sophisticated training technology was developed by military-supported research. We expected to find that Marine training was excellent by most standards, and it was. In fact, it appears to excel in producing military skills and a spirit of professionalism that is basic to the famous Marine esprit de corps.

Marines train for a wide variety of skills -- military, technical, linguistic, managerial, etc. Training programs for sophisticated electronics skills are based on advanced techniques of task analysis. Programs designed to inculcate attitudes (professionalism) and behavior (leadership) have been extremely successful. There are programs providing orientation in the culture of Vietnam. And there is a growing program of Personal Response training, developed by the Navy Chaplains Planning Group and designed to teach Marines how to get along with their Vietnamese counterparts.

Marine training covers a wide range of activities because the nature of military operations is such that normal life in an area may be badly disrupted and the military must have the capabilities of restoring and supporting such basic functions and institutions as government, transportation, communications, trade, the courts, medical services, etc. The Joint Manual for Civil Affairs (FM 41-5) indicates the breadth of military responsibility in assuming control over entire regions or nations after some natural calamity or revolution or war has disrupted life. Moreover, Marines train to carry on psychological warfare -- to produce propaganda and to counter enemy propaganda.

So it would certainly appear that there is almost no objective of "pacification" which the Marines are not capable of attaining, no "pacification" activity for which they are untrained. To a considerable extent, that is the situation. As we checked the various activities in Tables 1 through 14, we found there were training programs for most of them.

However, the Marines' repetition of the importance of "winning hearts and minds", the emphasis placed upon the Personal Response program by General Krulac, the public statements by General Walt that to gain anything at all we had to win the people -- all these focus attention on activities in which Marines deal directly with Vietnamese people. Such activities exist throughout the network (Figure 2) and the checklist.

For many of these activities there are training programs: (1) for the entire gamut of activities subsumed under the heading "civic action" there are training programs, (2) there is training for psychological operations, (3) there is special training for Combined Action groups in Vietnam, (4) there is training for military advisors, (5) in addition, there are Personal Response programs, predeployment training, NCO leadership training, etc. The Marine Corps has

probably paid as much attention to the various facets of training for operations within another culture as any organization sending Americans abroad -- and a good deal more than most.

Nonetheless, it was the opinion of a majority of our Marine respondents that in the counterinsurgency context training was weakest in the areas of gaining Vietnamese acceptance and gaining Vietnamese involvement -- in other words, in the general area of cultural interaction.

It was in response to this feeling that the Chaplains Planning Group created the Personal Response program. And of course this has been a continuing problem of Americans abroad: it is by no means limited to the military.

We discussed this problem with a variety of people at Marine Headquarters, with training and civic action officers at CINCPAC, with Marine officers and enlisted personnel on Okinawa, and with Marines involved in the Combined Action program in and around Danang. Our impressions coincided with what we might have expected to find: (1) that the Marines who had worked in closest contact with Vietnamese for the longest time periods both liked them best and felt that they had been moderately successful at "cultural interaction", but that (2) these Marines also felt that Marines in general had not been successful; (3) that the relationship of positive cultural interaction to other aspects of counterinsurgency was understood only in a very negative way: that is to say, the evaluation was that some Marines were involved in "bad" incidents which were inimical to success, but there was no balancing evaluation that many Marines involved in "good" incidents could in specific ways create success; and (4) while there was a widespread comprehension of how military action could "win the war" there was very little comprehension of how positive cultural interaction could "win the war".

Actually, this is very much like the attitude patterns of American civilians working in some branch of the government abroad: they understand, many of them, that they are supposed to be empathic, but they don't really know how this contributes to job achievement. One thing they do learn, as have many of the Marines in Vietnam, is current American policy, which covers such broad directives as "We are not here to introduce American ideas, but to support the duly constituted government of South Vietnam" to such intermediate directives as "Don't do things for the people; only provide the material support" and finally down to such specific dicta as "Don't give the children candy!" These policy statements spread quickly and are just as quickly used as substitutes for thoughtful, responsive action.

As a result of these conversations and our overview of Marine training, we began to develop a kind of working hypothesis that the training problem might be as much a problem of objectives as of specific content. It seemed to us that some aspect or another of training touches upon most of the knowledges, skills and attitudes that the many activities subsumed under objectives seemed to call for, but that training did not approach the total problem. In other words, there seemed to be a need to structure and coordinate present programs.

Accordingly, we looked at our systems structure with the idea of determining how it might provide information about training requirements, and in particular we looked for weaknesses in the areas of cultural interaction, system comprehension, and self-measures of achievement.

#### Identification of Training Requirements in the Pacification System

It is difficult and not particularly useful to solicit opinions on the extent to which Marines have achieved goals or primary objectives, because these are very abstract concepts. But it is less difficult to ask them about supporting objectives and explicit activities because these are within the dimensions of real experience, not abstractions from experience.

Since the systems approach is designed to link concrete activities with abstract goals, the latter information is relevant. It was therefore useful to know to what extent Marines of all ranks and grades understood pacification objectives, clearly saw how their activities related to such objectives, had some idea of how much "success" reasonably to expect, had been trained for the activities they undertook, and in general had been "educated for counterinsurgency". To examine these dimensions of the training problem, we looked at all aspects of the system.

Outputs. There seemed to be some relevant and possible data to collect at the level of supporting objectives. For example, there are 12 supporting objectives. For each of these we could ask: Were you ever involved in activities designed to attain this objective? What job did you have? Were you trained for this job? On the other hand, this process seemed somewhat redundant, and it involved each time an explanation of what we meant by each objective. It seemed more reasonable simply to ask the questions, "What jobs have you had?", and for each different job, "Were you trained to do this job?", "Do you feel you were successful or unsuccessful?", "How do you know?", "Did the job involve working with Vietnamese?",

"Did your contacts with Vietnamese help you or hinder you in doing a successful job?"

These questions, while difficult to analyze quantitatively, would give us some substantive data on what Marines were doing, how they perceived what they were doing, and how they evaluated what they were doing.

They would not, however, tell us much about the transformation process, that complex of activities in which many roles are played and critical, life-or-death judgments must constantly be made.

Transformation. We visited a number of Combined Action Platoons around Danang. The program was relatively new, it was not heavily manned, and it varied from village to village, depending chiefly on whether the area was relatively secure or not. Where the area was relatively secure, Marines seemed to be able to play their non-military roles rather effectively. Where it was not, the problem of playing the role of an alert, military Marine and at the same time the role of a friendly, empathic Marine was a real dilemma. It is in this confusing behavioral zone between purely military and purely civic action behavior, a zone which would appear to be fairly typical of counter-insurgency situations, that a clear-cut knowledge of objectives to be attained and the mix of activities necessary to attain them should help resolve the problem of playing what appear to be inimical roles.

We are not saying that the Combined Action program is pacification. (Nor are we saying that all Marine activities in Vietnam involve pacification.) But in many contexts of Marine jobs and missions the three primary pacification objectives are sought pretty much simultaneously, and the dilemma suggested above is common.

What we need to know about training for the transformation procedure is this: is it realistic? Do the training programs in simulated Vietnamese villages represent the real situation? Are all the simultaneous objectives stressed? Is there some effort to provide Marines with the total experience as represented in Figure 2? I think the answer, from what we have seen, is that the simulations are not by any means representative of real situations, and that the values stressed relate almost exclusively to personal survival.

We stress this point because there is probably no other way to introduce an American to a counterinsurgency situation in Vietnam other than by simulation. No two circumstances in

Vietnam will be the same; no two patterns of behavior will produce exactly the same results; and even "policy" will fail one if somehow his experience has not included some actual involvement in the multiplicity of activities and events which very often constitute a normal morning's work in Vietnam. A comprehension of one's objectives, a reasonable expectation of achievement, and an ability both to evaluate an activity and adjust it to meet a new situation can only be "practiced" in a simulated learning environment.

Do we know enough about the transformation process to produce a realistic learning environment? The answer to that question is both "yes" and "no". Yes, we know what goes on in a variety of real counterinsurgency situations, or experiences, in Vietnam. No, we do not have frequency data on kinds of situations. And perhaps more significantly - no, we do not have data on how the individual Marine views and evaluates his role in such situations.

Therefore, we need to learn more about kinds of missions: their military - civic action - interpersonal encounter mixes, their primary objectives, the dilemmas which confuse the Marine, and the critical events which spell success or failure.

The operational research program which would give us these answers is not possible for many reasons. But we hope to simulate it by a program of questionnaires, interviews, and observation in Vietnam. We will put heavy emphasis on reported "jobs" which involved both clearing out Vietcong and dealing with Vietnamese civilians. We want to know what priorities individual Marines put on various aspects of a complex task, what they did, what seemed to them to be their chief decision-making problems etc., so that it will be possible to reconstruct such situations.

Inputs. Finally, what are the raw materials of the pacification system -- men modified by present training systems? What attitudes and knowledge do men bring to the Marine Corps, and how are these molded by successive stages of training and by experience in Vietnam? No suggestions can be made about a present training program until one has some idea about the general characteristics of potential Marines -- both enlisted and officers, and the way these traits are modified by training.

#### Next Steps

It is apparent at this point that we have not solved any problems but perhaps have succeeded in defining the problem specifically enough to have some clearer indication of how to go about solving it.

Specifically, we have developed a program involving: (1) questionnaires to measure the quality of inputs: these will be given to recruits and to men who have finished Basic Training; to new members of Officer Candidate School and to officers who have finished Basic School; to officers and men who have finished Pre-deployment Training; and to officers and men with varying kinds of experience and varying times in Vietnam; (2) an observation program which will show us the content and practice in training programs in all the situations above except in Vietnam; our main purpose will be to observe how realistically the actual counterinsurgency situation in Vietnam is portrayed; and (3) standardized interviews of officers and men in Vietnam to give us some measure of outputs as well as operational content of the transformation process.

At the moment we have designed, tested, and started to administer the questionnaire. We have tried out various interview techniques and contents. We are observing key training programs. Very shortly we will begin our analysis of the questionnaires and will simultaneously start our interviews in Vietnam. With data from both these efforts we can examine the various assumptions, and tentative conclusions stated in this report and can make some concrete training recommendations to the Marine Corps.

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<p>The purpose of this study is to improve Marine training for pacification or counterinsurgency activities. A systems analysis approach has been applied to such activities in Vietnam. The objective was to define the pacification system so explicitly that a Marine would know <u>why</u> he was doing <u>what</u> he was doing, <u>how</u> <u>what</u> he was doing contributed to immediate and future objectives and goals and how it related to other required activities, and what he might <u>expect</u> as outcomes of his activities.</p> <p>Having thus defined the system, it was necessary to look at present Marine training in terms of the system and to sample Marine comprehension of the system as it operates in Vietnam. The present phase of the study is focused on this data collection effort.</p>			

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