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(1)

HEADQUARTERS
1ST BRIGADE (AIRBORNE)
1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
APO U.S. Forces 96490

AD833869

1 BR-CO

21 April 1968

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report
(MACV/RCS/J3/32)

TO: Commanding General
1st Air Cavalry Division
ATTN: G3
APO U.S. Forces 96490

D D C
R R R
JUN 18 1968
R R R

1. NAME: Operation LINCOLN
2. DATES: 250700 Mar - 082400 Apr 66
3. LOCATION: II Corps Tactical Zone, Pleiku and Darlac Provinces: Area bounded by the Cambodian Border on the west to YA 6530, east to YA 8230, southeast to YA 8728, northeast to ZA 0840, east to ZA 2440, south to ZA 2400, west to the IA TAE River vic ZA 0200, southwest along the IA TAE River to the IA MEUR River, south along the IA MEUR River to the YA LOP River to the Cambodian Border. (See Incl #1)
4. COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1st Brigade (Airborne), 1st Air Cavalry Division
5. REPORTING OFFICER: Col. John J. Hennessey, Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade (Airborne), 1st Air Cavalry Division
6. TASK ORGANIZATION:

UNITS

410, 1st Bde (Abn)
1st Bn (Abn), 8th Cav
2nd Bn (Abn), 8th Cav
1st Bn (Abn), 12th Cav
Co B, 1st Bn, 69th Armor
Co C, 3rd Sqn, 4th Armored Cav
2nd Bn (Abn), 19th Arty (DS)
B Btry, 2nd Bn, 17th Arty
Plat, Co A, 8th Engr Bn

Plat (-), 545 MP Co
Sig Spt Tm, 13th Sig Bn
Tm 1, IPW/CI Tm, 191st
MI Det (Spt)
Tm 1, 10th RRU
Tm 1, 54th Inf Det (R.D.R)
Tm 1, 16th Weather Sqn
Tm 1, 41st C. Co
1st Fwd Spt File (Spt)
Water Point, 8th Engr Bn

7. SUPPORTING FORCES:

- a. USAF:
(1) Total Sorties

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(FOROT-RD) WASH DC 20310
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STATEMENT #2 UNCLASSIFIED

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(a)	Fighter - Pre-Planned	50 sorties
(b)	Fighter Immediate	67 sorties
(c)	C-130 sorties	24 sorties
(d)	Total sorties	141

(2) Ordnance Expended:

(a)	General Purpose Bombs	210
(b)	Napalm	216
(c)	Fragmentation Bombs	268
(d)	White Phosphorous	66
(e)	CBU	180
(f)	Rockets	376

b. Artillery: ANNEX A (2nd Bn (Abn), 19th Arty, After Action Report, LINCOLN)

8. INTELLIGENCE:

a. GENERAL: The enemy situation in the area included by Operation LINCOLN indicated a general build up of caches, preparation of routes, and other activity associated with the initial phases of a NVA/VC monsoon offensive in the PLIKU area. The consensus of opinion was that this preparation effort would continue until completed and the unfavorable monsoon weather had set in. At that time the NVA/VC, in conjunction with local forces, would launch widespread local harrassing attacks to tie down reaction forces while the main effort would attack PLIKU USZF Camp, DUC CO USZF Camp and the LE THINH District Headquarters. The monsoon period with low ceilings and reduced visibility would hinder any air mobile operations in the area. The ground trafficability would be reduced by the rains and mechanized or motorized units operating in the vicinity would also be hindered. Since firm specific enemy information was not available, the initial phases were oriented on terrain that was suspected as possible areas of VC activity.

b. 25 - 31 Mar 66:

(1) OPERATIONS: The first phase of the operation was conducted during the period 25 - 30 March in the vicinity of DUC CO USZF Camp and west to YV 7910 to ZA 0001 to ZA 0300 and the Cambodian Border. It was anticipated that in this area preparations for an attack on the DUC CO USZF Camp and LE THINH District Headquarters would be found. On 25 March the only contact made was by B Company 1/12 Cav at YL 750238 which encountered 5 VC in black pajamas. The VC were taken under fire and one was killed. On 27 March A Company 1/12 Cav captured a VCC after having made contact with an unknown number of VC and killing seven. The VCC said that he was a cook from the 2nd Bn, 141st Regt, which was moving south from KOMPHEU. Later another VCC surrendered and said that he was a deserter from the 20th Company (Transportation), 33rd Regt, which was located west of CHU PONG Mountain. That night in the same general area (YL 712 268), A Company 1/12 Cav sprang an ambush which resulted in one VC KIA (DC) and 5 VC KIA (IP). During a search of the ambush site a bundle of 200,000 piasters in 500 piaster notes was found; however, no documents explaining the purpose of the money were uncovered. Except for the one VC KIA reported by A Company 1/12 Cav vicinity YL 712269 and 29 March there was no significant activity. On this day the battalions had cleared their respective areas and the 1st Brigade prepared to continue operations to the east.

(2) CONCLUSIONS: During the initial phase of Operation LINCOLN no extensive series of trails, caches, rest areas, or fortifications were found that would indicate an imminent attack being staged in the area. The area had indications of past NVA/VC activity but most of it seemed to be residue from the DUC CO Operations of August and November. The contacts made near YA 712 268 were close to the SI BAN River which has been long recognized as an infiltration route from KONTUM to CHU PONG. Although A Company 1/12 Cav remained in that area for three days, it did not contact any of the NVA/VC units reportedly moving through the area. None of the VC KLA were identified as to unit or mission at this time. The VCC report of the 2nd Bn, 141st Regt moving southwest from KONTUM to CHU PONG was not confirmed by later contact in the area.

c. 30 Mar - 8 April 66:

(1) OPERATIONS: The second phase of Operation LINCOLN was conducted in the area south of CHU PONG Mountain to the YA LOP River during the period 30 Mar - 8 April. The initial area of operations was bounded by the Cambodian Border, the YA LOP River to YA 934800, the LA HUR River to YV 972930, and west to the border. Later the area was extended north into the protected western valley of the CHU PONG Mountain.

Interest in this area began on 28 March when the 1/9 Cav captured two VCC near YV 939799 who identified their unit as the 5th and 6th Battalions, 320th Regiment. Further questioning indicated that they were part of a replacement packet for the 32nd NVA Regiment. On 30 March at 1540 hours near YV 863876 A Troop, 1/9 Cav rifle platoon captured a VCC who stated that there were "1,000 VC" in the area. This area was well fortified and until then had been very quiet. The VC opened fire and A Company 1/12 was dispatched to help extract A Troop 1/9 Cav rifle platoon. During the extraction the VCC was killed in a helicopter crash and, although the rifle platoon was extracted, the infantry company came under increasing fire and could not be extracted. It was estimated to be in contact with a reinforced battalion. The VC in the area were wearing NVA type OD or khaki uniforms and seemed to be moving in a northwesterly direction towards CHU PONG Mountain. On 31 March the contact was exploited and the entire 1/12 Cav was committed. During the day 4 VCC were taken and the 2nd Bn, 6th Regt, 207th Div and the "New" 18th Regt were identified as their parent units. Two of the VCC could not be interrogated and their units were not identified. Documents found during the day later confirmed the 18th Regt as being a separate unit from the two other units also known as the 18th Regt. Based on fortifications and VC sightings in the area it was estimated that there was a battalion along the line YV 8088 to YV 8381. Later during the day the estimate of enemy forces in the area increased to two battalions. The 1/9 Cav located major routes of egress along the YA LOP River west from YV 9078. Some commo wire running into Cambodia was found at YV 865884 and YV 844900.

On April 1 a police of the 31 March battle-area began. The extent of the fortified area began to come to light when B Company 1/12 Cav reported 800-900 positions vicinity YV 865825. One VCC of 2 VCC captured claimed his unit as the 7th Bn, 56th Regt. The other could not be interrogated due to wounds. Indications of green VC troops were beginning to accumulate as VC dead were found in hasty graves with weapons and the battle area had weapons abandoned on it.

On 2 April the VC launched a mortar attack of about 20 rounds of 82mm mortar on D Company 1/12 Cav at YV 855885. A scout patrol out during the same period observed a VC Company move from the west to the east at night. The 1/12 Cav made several contacts with an estimated platoon size unit during the afternoon.

B Company 2/8 Cav working down the YA LOE River near YV 947737 observed two groups of about 15 VC going west and attempted to engage them with negative results.

Platoon size VC contact again was made on 3 April with C Company 1/12 Cav near YV 860892 and the action continued sporadically throughout the day.

On 4 April the 1/9 Cav interdicted the route of egress along the YA LOE River near YV 827719 and killed 43 VC by body count. The VC were moving in the open and were not making any attempt to defend themselves from either the 1/9 Cav or the TAC Air strikes. C Company 1/12 Cav found a quantity of enemy supplies including "one time code pads" and 3 FM radios. 5 and 6 April saw light contact during sweeps of the battle area. On 6 April it was concluded that major enemy elements had withdrawn into Cambodia and though capable of attacking in up to three battalion strength, the possibility was considered very slight.

On 7 April enemy activity was characterized by contact with squad size and smaller elements, and except for chance contacts this phase of the operation was over and units started closing in the Brigade Base at OASIS.

(2) CONCLUSIONS: The second phase of Operation LINCOLN was characterized by extensive enemy contact in the 1/12 Cav area. The other two battalions areas experienced minor contact.

The 1/12 Cav area of operations was well fortified and is believed to be a regimental CP and bivouac area. Although some fighting bunkers were found, the majority were simply protective bunkers and fortifications. Two occasions on 30 March and several instances later indicated that although the NVA/VC had a .50cal/12.7mm AA capability. There was no fire directed against aircraft. Indications were insufficient to estimate the number of these weapons or size of AA unit mentioned. Although the area was extensively used there were no specific preparations for a monsoon offensive.

The NVA/VC line of drift did not offer any one conclusion as to their principle direction of effort. The two replacements for the 32nd Regt were moving north west toward CHU PONG Mountain which apparently was a result of 3rd Bde, 25th Division activity. When pressure was applied the units generally moved into Cambodia utilizing several crossing points. For the most part the units moving west were guiding on terrain features with the YA LOE River on the south and CHU PONG Mountain on the north forming the channel. One company size element was observed to move from west to east on the night of 1 - 2 April.

The actions of the NVA/VC Troops suggested that they were either in battle for the first time or had not yet been trained. Their methods of movement, contact, and lack of direction all supported this. Also an additional indication

was the fact that in several instances the battlefield was not policed of VC weapons and dead even though the action permitted it. Several of the VC dead were buried with their weapons. The action of 4 April by the 1/9 Cav, in which the III/VC did not take even the most rudimentary defense against air strikes, is another indication of the presence of new troops.

Areas of specific interest are the two separate reports of a camouflaged road being constructed from North VIETNAM, through LAOS, to CAMBODIA, and joining Highway 19. The VCC who were messengers attached to the 28th Engr Co, 15th Engr Bn, 304th Div corroborated this.

Another point mentioned by two prisoners is that they were instructed not to tell anything about their unit if captured. This is a new attitude from the one formed during the PUEI ME - IA DRANG Valley Operations and Operation LINDOR.

d. Supporting Agencies:

(1) Psychological operations were used extensively on Operation LINC LN. Although no concrete results of psychological operations could be specified, all prisoners interrogated were aware of the programs and several indicated that the psychological operation efforts were having effect. It is still advisable for the aircraft to have an audio check over a ground station to adjust the volume and altitude prior to the mission. As the missions became more frequent, the pilots became more conscientious about entering the proper nets for instructions about artillery fire control. Psychological operation ground terms were not used due to lack of indigenous population.

(2) Infra-red flights were of limited value due to the evening thunder storms and many fires within the operational area. Whether on purpose or by accident, several IR runs were washed out by extensive ground fires. In these instances a visual observation should have been made to see if the fires had any pattern. It would be better if the G-2 Air gave negative reports when missions were unsuccessful, as units will continue to await results until informed.

(3) Weather teams currently attached to the brigades are very limited in scope. The members cannot advise or forecast, they can only give an observation and read the forecast prepared by a forecasting station. Since the prepared forecasts are readable by the G-2's and are sent out by radio or RMP, the weather teams provide only a messenger link. Unless the forecasting capability is given to these teams the teams are of negligible value and should not be attached for future operations.

(4) Photo coverage was adequate although there was a shortcoming which was not worked out until the operation was nearly over. The photos were being used as map supplements and proved very valuable. This was brought out early in the operation but unfortunately the map supplement photos were given low priority. In particular the topographic maps did not show the cleared or burned areas, or details of stream banks; photos provided this information.

A second factor was that the brigade units did not have enough time to request spot photography to be of assistance during operations. The warning order to execution time simply was not long enough or the photo cycle not fast enough.

As a method of getting at least some photo coverage, the units would request a basic coverage of the entire area in three copies. A system of rapid delivery proofs with selected reprints made by a high speed system is a solution. The 1/25,000 CONFIDENTIAL photo map was found to be of great assistance. For future operations one per battalion and brigade headquarters is recommended.

(5) RRU activities were not as productive as in past operations. This seemed attributable to the NVA/VC using telephone communications to a greater degree than before and the distance and location of the RRU teams with respect to the areas of contact. Even from higher headquarters negligible RRU results were reported.

(6) Scout dog teams were attached to the ranger battalions. The dog and handler were not given good working conditions as contact when made was generally so violent that the scout dog and handler could not work. In areas of no contact there were no hidden NVA/VC to be discovered.

9. MISSION:

a. Directed Missions:

(1) LINCOLN:

(a) Deploy by C-130, and ground transport on or about 25 March to western PLIKU Province. Initial assault forces to be helilifted directly into the area of operations. Brigade responsible for securing convey to forward area on 25 March.

(b) Commence reconnaissance in force operations in zone to find, fix and destroy enemy forces and installations. Priority initially to area 551 (Vicinity YA 9511).

(c) Provide security for installations supporting Operation LINCOLN.

(d) Provide one battalion as FFORCIV Reserve/Reaction Force available on twelve hour notice.

(e) Maintain liaison with 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

(2) BRIG O # 6089-2: Continue the attack east and south of CHU PONG Massif. Reconnaissance In Force operations in zone are to be completed not later than 031800 April and all significant forces located and destroyed.

(3) BRIG O # 6002-2:

(a) Attack north, on CHU PONG at H-Hour on 4 April.

(b) Maintain one Bn as Div reserve to be committed only on the authority of this headquarters.

b. Implied Missions:

(1) LINCOLN I:

(a) Establish brigade command and logistical facilities within assigned area of operations.

(b) Secure Highway 19 during the surface movement of convoy elements to the brigade area of operations on 25 March.

(c) Secure the brigade forward base area prior to the arrival of surface elements.

(2) FRAG O # 6089-2 and 6092-2: Missions stated did not imply additional missions.

10. CONCEPT OF OPERATION: The concept of the brigade operation was to conduct reconnaissance in force operations utilizing two infantry battalions while the third infantry battalion served as brigade reserve/reaction force and provided security for command and logistical installations. Artillery was to be positioned throughout the operation in sites which would enable the firing batteries to provide continuous fire support to the searching infantry elements. Initial assaults were conducted and blocking positions were established vicinity the Cambodian Border in an effort to deny the enemy the use of this sanctuary. All enemy contacts were to be aggressively maintained until the enemy force had been fixed and totally destroyed.

11. EXECUTION:

a. (220700 - 250700 Mar 66): At approximately 0700 hours 22 March 1966 the 1st Brigade (Airborne) received 1st Air Cavalry Division ORDER 6609 (LINCOLN I) (U) which assigned the brigade the mission of conducting reconnaissance in force operations in the area generally between PLEIKU and the Cambodian Border. Due to the immense amount of personnel and equipment involved and the distance to be travelled, an initial planning conference was held that same afternoon with representatives of all units to outline the commander's concept of the operation and to determine possible problem areas. Following this meeting the unit representatives returned to their own units to complete planning and coordination. A final brigade briefing was conducted on the afternoon of 21 March and H-Hour was confirmed as 250700 March for the start of the deployment west from AN KHE.

b. (250700 - 252400 Mar 66) (Incl #2)

(1) GENERAL: The 1st Brigade (Airborne) deployed from AN KHE into its assigned area of operations to the west of PLEIKU, a distance of over 70 miles, utilizing Army and Air Force aircraft and a surface convoy of over 450 vehicles. The movement commenced at 0704 hours and by 1843 hours the last elements of the task force had closed into the operational area. Task Force LINDSEY, originating from PLEIKU, was assigned the mission of securing Highway 19 and to clear the brigade command/logistical base vicinity LA THIAN District Headquarters. One infantry battalion and one artillery battalion were airlifted by Air Force aircraft from AN KHE to DUC CO USSE Camp from where the infantry battalion air assaulted into selected landing zones within its assigned sector. The second infantry battalion, brigade headquarters company, support and logistical elements moved overland in convoy from AN KHE to the brigade base while the third infantry battalion air assaulted directly from AN KHE to their assigned sector south of DUC CO USSE Camp.

(2) **TR. INEAT LN:** At 0520 the lead elements of B company 1/69 Armor (-) plus one platoon from C Troop, 3/4 Armored Cavalry departed the 3rd Brigade, 25th Division assembly area vicinity PIIKIU. Two hours and ten minutes later, at 0730 hours, this element reported Highway 19 secured from the MANG YANG Pass to PIIKIU. At 0720 hours the second element of TR. INEAT LN, consisting of C Troop, 3/4 Armored Cavalry (-) plus one tank platoon from B company 1/69 armor departed PIIKIU and swept down Highway 19 to the brigade base site at OASIS (ZA 115280) which was reported secured at 0845. The troop was immediately followed to OASIS by a 70 vehicle convoy composed of the brigade quartering party, A Battery 6/14 Arty, 1st Logistical Command, and 1st Forward Support elements. The highway remained open throughout the day until 1843 hours when the last elements of B company, 1/69 Armor closed OASIS from the MANG YANG PASS.

(3) 1/12 Cav: Commencing at 0715 hours, the first of five C-130 aircraft utilized to move the 1/12 Cav and 2/19 Arty lifted off the airstrip at AN KHI and touched down at DUC CO USST Camp (YA 845255) at 0745 hours. The five aircraft continued to shuttle between AN KHI and DUC CO throughout the day for a total of 24 sorties in all. The 1/12 Cav closed DUC CO at 1223 hours and the last elements of the 2/19 Artillery closed at 1740 hours. At 1230 hours D Company and the battalion headquarters moved overland down Highway 19 to LZ PEARL (YA 795239) closing at 1435. A Company lifted off from DUC CO at 1315 hours and assaulted LZ RUBY (YA 751234) touching down at 1350 hours with negative enemy contact. The company was followed into LZ RUBY by B Company which closed at 1435 and moved north toward its assigned sector. A Company remained at LZ RUBY with its final elements closing at 1605. Vicinity YA 750238 B Company observed 5 VC who fled without further contact. Later at YA 747243 the company made contact with one VC which resulted in the first VC KIA (JC) of the operation. At dusk B Company was located vicinity YA 751247. C Company in the meantime had lifted off from DUC CO at 1434 hours and closed LZ TOPAZ (YA 785295) at 1555 hours where the company remained during the night. B Battery, 2/19 Artillery was airlifted to LZ PEARL from DUC CO during the afternoon by CH-47.

(4) 1/8 Cav: At 1108 hours B Company lifted off from CAMP RADCLIFF and air assaulted LZ BEAR (YA 825161) touching down at 1204 with negative enemy contact. The initial assault was supported by elements of the 2/19 Artillery which had been landed earlier by C-130 at DUC CO. The remainder of the battalion followed B Company by UH-1H and CH-47 and closed LZ BEAR by 1300 hours. During the afternoon the battalion conducted local patrolling in the vicinity of LZ BEAR. C Battery, 2/19 Artillery was moved by CH-47 from DUC CO to LZ BEAR during the afternoon to provide fire support for the battalion.

(5) 2/8 Cav: The battalion departed AN KHI at 0704 hours in a convoy consisting of brigade headquarters company, B Battery, 2/17 Artillery, 1st Forward Support and other support and logistical elements. The convoy moved without incident to PIIKIU where C Company left the convoy and proceeded to the TURKEY FARM (ZA 235528) to secure the aviation group laager area. The remainder of the convoy continued on to OASIS closing at 1521 hours. At OASIS the battalion assumed responsibility for the security of the base area and the brigade reserve/reaction force mission.

c. (260001 - 262400 Mar 66) (Incl 43)

(1) **GENERAL:** The brigade continued reconnaissance in faroo operations

with two infantry battalions conducting operations along the Cambodian Border while one infantry battalion secured the brigade base and served as the reserve/reaction force.

(2) 1/8 Cav: B Company lifted off LZ BEAR at 0857 hours and air assaulted LZ DO (YA 785214) touching down at 0901 and closing by 0943. From LZ DO the company swept south during the day to LZ BUCK (YA 731185) where the company remained during the night. A Company was scheduled to assault LZ TIGER (YA 785149) at 1000 hours, however, TAC Air reported receiving ground fire from the area during the LZ preparation and the assault was delayed until 1041 hours while additional fires were delivered into the area. On landing A Company discovered that the VC in the area had fled and there was no reported enemy ground contact. By 1101 the company had closed the LZ and commenced to sweep north to YA 793174 where the company was located at dusk. C Company conducted a combat patrol south of LZ BEAR during the day with negative enemy contact. The battalion CP and D Company remained at LZ BEAR throughout the period.

(3) 2/3 Cav: The battalion (-) with B Company 1/69 Armor attached continued to secure OASIS by conducting local patrols. C Company remained at the TURKEY FARM securing aircraft laagered there.

(4) 1/12 Cav: The battalion continued reconnaissance in force operations with A and B Companies sweeping to the northwest and consolidating for the night at YA 727248 and YA 752254 respectively. C Company swept southwest approximately one mile along the IA KILL River and returned to LZ TOMA for the night. The battalion CP and D Company remained at LZ BEAR. There was no enemy contact reported during the period.

(5) C Trp, 3/4 Cav: At 0633 hours a platoon of C Troop escorted an element from A Company, 8th Engineer Battalion to CAMBOKA airfield (YA 205343). The engineers checked the airfield for mines and at 0948 hours the first CV-2's began landing with equipment and supplies for the 1st Forward Support Element. The last CV-2 departed at 1640 hours and the platoon C Troop returned to OASIS.

d. (270001 - 272400 Mar 66) (Incl 4)

(1) GENERAL: The 1st Brigade continued reconnaissance in force operations with two battalions vicinity the CAMBODIAN Border, and the third battalion secured the brigade base. Elements of the force at the brigade base conducted armored sweeps both north and south of that location.

(2) 1/8 Cav: At 0728 hours B Company commenced to sweep from LZ BUCK to a pickup zone vicinity YA 805206 from where the company was extracted at 1505 hours and closed into LZ BEAR at 1550 hours. A Company began sweeping parallel to B Company at 0750 hours in a northeast direction to YA 829189 where they discovered punji stakes, foxholes and trenches along a trail. From that location the company turned south and closed LZ BEAR at 1610 hours. The battalion CP, C and D Companies remained at LZ BEAR with C Company conducting platoon size patrols to the southeast of LZ BEAR out to a distance of 2,000 meters and returning to LZ BEAR prior to dark.

(3) 2/8 Cav: The battalion continued to secure the brigade base at OASIS with C Company remaining at the TURKEY FARM. Task Force 1/69 consisting of two platoons from B Company, 1/69 Armor and one platoon of C Company departed OASIS at 0704 hours and swept south to ZA 090225 and then northeast to ZA 130248 passing through five villages enroute. From ZA 130248 the task force retraced their original route and closed OASIS at 1620 hours.

(4) 1/12 Cav: During the early morning hours C Company swept from their company patrol base vicinity LZ TOPAZ south approximately 2,000 meters and returned with no reported enemy contact. B Company patrolled from their company base (YA 751258) approximately one kilometer to the southwest and returned with negative contact. At 1615 the company was extracted and air-lifted to LZ EMERALD (YA 676253) closing at 1655 hours and consolidated for the night. A Company conducted saturation patrols from LZ RUBY to the northwest and at 1000 hours a patrol from the 1st Platoon ambushed seven VC killing all seven. The remainder of A Company was moved to the general area where the ambush had been conducted (YA 712268) and captured two VCC during the early afternoon. That evening at 1933 hours the company made contact with approximately 10 VC at YA 712270 and estimated 4 VC KIA. One body was discovered in the area the following morning. D Company continued to secure the battalion CP and artillery battery located at LZ PEARL.

(5) C Trp, 3/4 Cav: At 0730 hours the troop departed OASIS and moved east on Highway 19 to ZA 167338 from where they commenced to sweep the area north of the CHITCKA Tea Plantation. Vicinity ZA 159399 the troop discovered a platoon size rest area that apparently had been occupied the night before. The troop continued to sweep to ZA 089340 from where they returned to OASIS closing at 1206 hours with negative enemy contact.

e. (280001 - 282400 Mar 66) (Incl #5)

(1) GENERAL: The 1st Brigade continued to search the area vicinity the Cambodian Border with one battalion along the SI SAN River north of Highway 19 and another battalion sweeping the area north of the LI DRANG River. The third battalion remained at the brigade combat base and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force.

(2) 1/8 Cav: B Company lifted off BEAR at 0828 hours and air assaulted LZ BOBCAT (YA 803108) touching down at 0833 hours and closing at 0853 hours. C Company lifted off BEAR 0856 hours and closed BOBCAT at 0925 hours. From BOBCAT both companies swept back toward BEAR with C Company on the west and B Company on the east. C Company closed BEAR at 1715 hours and B Company followed at 1730 hours. Neither unit reported enemy contact during the sweep operation. The battalion CP, A and D Companies remained at BEAR with A Company conducting combat patrols to the north of BEAR during daylight hours.

(3) 2/8 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to secure the brigade command and logistical facilities at OASIS and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force. C Company remained at the TURKEY FARM providing security for the Aviation Group aircraft laager area.

(4) 1/12 Cav: A Company continued intense patrol activity throughout the day in the area of the previous night's ambush; however, there was no fur-

ther enemy contact reported. At dusk the company concluded search operations vicinity YA 718265 and established night ambush sites in the immediate area. B Company swept east from LZ GENERAL to vicinity YA 700245 during the day. C Company moved overland to a pickup zone vicinity YA 808282 where at 1021 hours the company was airlifted to LZ ONYX (YA 675278). The company touched down at 1027 hours and closed ONYX by 1100 hours. From ONYX C Company swept east to YA 702282 where the company remained during the night. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ PEARL throughout the period.

(5) C Trp, 3/4 Cav: The troop departed OASIS at 0701 hours to conduct a route reconnaissance south and east to the PLEI MI USSF Camp. Along the route the troop encountered many obstacles, consisting primarily of punji stakes and trenches. A small stream was forded with difficulty vicinity ZA 132227 and by 1508 hours the troop had reached the main north-south road between PLEIKU and PLEI MI vicinity ZA 215217. The troop then retraced its original route back to OASIS closing at 1615 hours.

f. (290001 - 292400 Mar 66) (Incl #6)

(1) GENERAL: The 1st Brigade continued reconnaissance in force operations as one battalion shifted its sector to the east and the second battalion concluded operations north of Highway 19 and prepared to assume the security mission of brigade base and logistical support areas. The third battalion of the brigade which had been assigned the reserve/reaction force mission prepared for commitment on the following day.

(2) 1/8 Cav: A Company lifted off LZ BIR at 0931 hours and air assaulted LZ FINE (YA 842093) closing at 0958 hours. At 1001 hours the recon platoon air assaulted LZ OK (YA 874127) and was followed by the mortar platoons of A and C Companies which closed by 1028 hours. C Company lifted off BIR at 1034 hours and closed LZ DOGWOOD (YA 870180) at 1056 hours. From DOGWOOD and FINE C and A Companies swept toward OK with C Company closing OK at 1825 hours and A Company closing ten minutes later. Both units reported negative enemy contact during the sweep toward OK. The battalion C, B and D Companies remained at LZ BIR throughout the period.

(3) 2/8 Cav: The battalion continued to provide the brigade reserve/reaction force until 1200 hours when the mission was assigned to the 1/12 Cav. C Company lifted off the TURKEY FARM at 0943 hours and closed OASIS at 1101 hours. The battalion continued to secure OASIS and prepared for commitment to the west the following morning.

(4) 1/12 Cav: During the early morning hours a trip flare was activated near an A Company ambush site. Troops at the ambush site fired into the area and at first light discovered one VC KIA (3C). After sunrise, A, B and C Companies swept from their overnight locations to LZ DIAMOND (YA 710265). At 1005 hours A Company lifted off DIAMOND and closed the TURKEY FARM at 1256 hours where the company assumed the mission of securing the Aviation Group laager area. B and C Companies remained at LZ DIAMOND and D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ PEARL. No additional enemy contact was reported during the day.

g. (300001 - 302400 Mar 66) (Incl #7)

(1) GENERAL: The 1st Brigade continued reconnaissance in force

operations employing two battalions within the brigade assigned area of operations. The third battalion terminated operations within their assigned sector and returned to the brigade combat base to provide security for command and logistical elements and provide the EFFORCEV Reserve/Reaction Force. Due to heavy contact to the south of CHU PONG Mountain, the brigade was relieved of the EFFORCEV mission at 2030 hours and, shortly thereafter, the mission of securing the Aviation Group laager area.

(2) 1/8 Cav: At 0725 hours A Company began to move overland from LZ ONE to LZ BARK (YA 899168). At 1145 hours the company observed three VC in khaki clothing with ruck sacks. The company pursued the VC but were unable to locate them due to the dense vegetation in the area. At 1630 hours the company closed LZ BARK, from where the company was airlifted at 1715 hours to the TURKEY FARM closing at 1857 hours. C Company began at 0833 hours to sweep from LZ ONE toward blocking positions at LZ WALNUT (YA 920147). At YA 905141 the company discovered several abandoned huts and 500 pounds of rice which they destroyed. At 1820 hours the company closed LZ WALNUT. B Company lifted off LZ BEAR at 0800 hours and by 0853 hours had closed into blocking position WALNUT. D Company and the battalion CP followed B Company into LZ WALNUT with the first element touching down at 0956 hours and the remainder of the unit closing 1009 hours. Also during this period C Battery, 2/19th Artillery was moved by CH-47 from BEAR to WALNUT.

(3) 2/8 Cav: Commencing at 0900 hours B Company, 1/69 Armor swept along Highway 19 from OASIS to LZ POX (YA 975291). C Company lifted off OASIS at 1025 hours and closed LZ TYPHUS (YA 835198) at 1105 hours. A Company followed C Company from OASIS into LZ TYPHUS lifting off at 1125 hours and closing TYPHUS at 1245 hours. From TYPHUS the two companies began a coordinated sweep to the east and at dusk A Company was located vicinity YA 873203 and C Company vicinity YA 878218. At 1202 hours B Company lifted off OASIS and air assaulted LZ BOIL (YA 950255) closing at 1218 hours. At LZ BOIL, B Company relieved C Troop, 3/4 Cav of the mission of securing A Battery, 1/30th Artillery. D Company lifted off OASIS at 1258 hours and closed LZ POX at 1330 hours followed by the battalion CP which closed POX at 1349 hours. During the afternoon three five man patrols were dropped at LA 035307, LA 043292 and LA 041279 and began to sweep west toward LZ BOIL. There was no enemy contact reported during the period by elements of the battalion.

(4) 1/12 Cav: Commencing at 1055 hours the battalion began movement from LZ DIAMOND and LZ PEARL to OASIS. C Company closed OASIS at 1200 hours, followed by B Company which closed at 1254 hours and D Company and the battalion CP which closed at 1313 hours. A Company, which had moved to the TURKEY FARM the previous day, lifted off the TURKEY FARM at 1625 hours and landed at LZ EAGLE (YV 854882) to assist in the extraction of a ground element of A Troop, 1/9 Cav. The A Troop element was extracted at 1812 hours, however, intense ground fire in the landing zone prevented the extraction of A Company as planned. At approximately 2300 hours a resupply of small arms ammunition was airdropped by CV-2 into the A Company perimeter.

(5) A Trp, 1/9 Cav: At 1219 hours scout elements of the troop observed three VC vicinity YV 863878. When the troop engaged the three VC an additional 30 VC fled into bunkers and foxholes in the immediate area.

TAC Air was called in and following the airstrike the ground platoon of A Troop was put on the ground. On landing the element became heavily engaged and four aircraft were shot down attempting to extract the platoon. At 1650 hours A Company 1/12 Cav landed and relieved the pressure on the 1/9 Cav element which was extracted at 1812 hours.

(6) C Trp, 3/4 Cav: One platoon from the troop escorted A Btry 1/30 Arty from DUC CO US3F Camp to LZ BOIL closing at 0945 hours. The platoon remained at BOIL until relieved by B Company, 2/8 Cav. At 1300 hours the troop was detached from brigade control and moved South on Highway 14 to rejoin their parent unit, the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.

h. (310001 - 312400 Mar 66) (Incl # 8)

(1) General: The heavy fighting resulting from the commitment of A Co 1/12 Cav South of CHU PONG Mountain precipitated the movement of the maneuver elements of the brigade into the area in an effort to relieve the pressure on the company and to exploit the contact. During the night A 1/8 Cav and an artillery battery were air lifted into a position from where the artillery could assist the surrounded company. Shortly after sunrise the remainder of the 1/12 Cav air assaulted into the area of the contact and relieved the ~~beleaguered~~ company. Throughout the day the other two battalions of the brigade were lifted into the area in an effort to find, fix and destroy the withdrawing enemy elements.

(2) 1/8 Cav: A Company was airlifted from the TURKEY FARM at 0032 hours and air assaulted into LZ CAT (YV 845895) touching down at 0105 hours. At 0147 hours the landing zone was secured with negative enemy contact reported and the first elements of A Battery, 2/19 Arty were airlifted into the landing zone. At approximately 0310 hours the first rounds were fired in support of A Company, 1/12 Cav at LZ EAGLE. The remainder of the battalion was airlifted from LZ WALNUT beginning at 1010 hours to LZ CAT and closed 1255 hours. Throughout the day the other two batteries of the 2/19 Arty and two howitzers (155mm) of A Battery, 1/30th Artillery were airlifted into CAT. The 1/8 Cav conducted small unit patrols in the area surrounding LZ CAT and became the brigade reserve/reaction force.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 1230 hours D Company and the battalion CP moved by truck from LZ POX to O.SIS closing at 1430 hours. A and C Companies terminated their coordinated sweep to the East and moved to a pick up zone from where they were ~~extracted~~ at 1445 hours, to LZ DIME (YV 916815). B Company was lifted from LZ BOIL and D Company and the battalion CP from O.SIS to LZ DIME with the entire battalion closing LZ DIME at 1858 hours.

(4) 1/12 Cav: A Company remained at LZ EAGLE during the night with the VC breaking off their attacks during the early morning hours prior to sunrise. C Company air assaulted from O.SIS to LZ EAGLE touching down at 0710 hours and closing at 0742 hours. The company linked up with A Company and upon the arrival of the remainder of the battalion moved out to the North and East of EAGLE reaching YV 890902 by dusk.

B Company followed C Company into LZ EAGLE at 0804 hours and swept to the South of LZ EAGLE along the CAMBODIAN Border. D Company and the battalion CP closed into EAGLE by 0926 hours. Throughout the day all elements of the battalion continued to uncover VC dead and equipment which had been abandoned in the vicinity of LZ EAGLE. Sporadic contact occurred at several locations during the day with small VC elements who apparently had been separated from their parent unit.

i. (010001 - 012400 Apr 66) (Incl # 9)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to conduct search and destroy operations with two battalions South of CHU PONG Mountain while one battalion secured the brigade combat base and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force. Remainder of A 1/30 Arty closed psn CAT.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion remained at LZ CAT as the brigade reaction force and secured artillery units within the LZ Area. Local patrols were conducted around the landing zone during the day with negative enemy contact reported.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0501 hours C Company began a sweep from DIMI to LZ WHITE HORSE (YV 896795) which was secured by 0830 hours. A Company departed DIMI at 0505 hours and followed C Company to WHITE HORSE. From WHITE HORSE both companies conducted local patrols in the general area surrounding the landing zone with negative enemy contact. At 1420 hours C Company was picked up at WHITE HORSE and airlifted to YV 876858 to secure a downed UH-1B from the 1/9 Cav until the aircraft could be stripped of all usable components. At 1709 hours the company was lifted back to DIMI closing just prior to dark. B Company swept from DIMI to YV 902831 with negative enemy contact. D Company and the battalion CP remained at DIMI with the recon platoon conducting patrols to the North, Northeast and Southeast of DIMI.

(4) 1/12 Cav: B Company swept from YV 859842 to YV 853827 during the day. At YV 865825 the company uncovered 16 dead VC and 5 weapons. C Company swept from YV 890902 to YV 872858. At YV 872855 the Company had a brief firefight with 3 VC which resulted in one VC KIA (BC). The battalion CP and A and D Companies conducted local patrols around LZ EAGLE. At YV 857880 D Company discovered 28 dead VC buried in hasty shallow graves.

j. (020001 - 022400 Apr 66) (Incl # 10)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued search and destroy operations in the area South of CHU PONG Mountain with two battalions while the third battalion continued to secure artillery positions at CAT and provide the brigade reaction force.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion remained at LZ CAT securing arty positions and providing the brigade reserve/reaction force. Local patrols were conducted around LZ CAT during the period with negative enemy contact. At 0948 hours C Company was extracted from CAT and closed O.313 at 1245 hours to supplement the security of the brigade logistical base.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0505 hours A Company departed WHITE HORSE and swept to LZ NICKEL (YV 873777) closing at 0630 hours. B Company lifted off PENNY (YV 910835) at 0800 hours and air assaulted LZ QUARTER (YV 876766) closing at 0852 hours. A Battery 2/19 Arty was then airlifted from LZ CIT to LZ QUARTER. D Company and the battalion CP were lifted from DIMB at 1010 hours to LZ QUARTER closing at 1140 hours. At that time B Company began search and destroy operations to the West and South. At YV 848737 the company made contact with approximately 30 VC at 1645 hours. Artillery was called in and the VC withdrew toward the West. At 1443 hours C Company lifted off DIMB and closed QUARTER at 1537 hours. The company then moved overland toward the area where B Company had made contact and by nightfall both companies were located at YV 850737. During the day A Company conducted platoon size sweeps around NICKEL with no enemy contact reported.

(4) 1/12 Cav: During the early morning hours prior to sunrise LZ EAGLE came under a probing attack supported by 20 rounds of mortar fire and two rounds of 2.75 rocket fire. The probe was repulsed and three VC dead were found in the area. At 0818 hours C Company began sweeping to the Northwest from YV 872858. B Company, to the South of LZ EAGLE, swept South of their overnight positions to YV 854818 and returned to their original location. At 1257 hours a helicopter scout team from the 1/9 Cav reported an undetermined number of North Vietnamese troops vicinity YV 860895. A patrol dispatched from D Company to check the area reported contact at 1308 hours with an estimated reinforced company. C Company then turned North and joined D Company in the pursuit of the VC at 1430 hours. TC Air, RA, Artillery and the Riot Control Agent aircraft were employed on the withdrawing VC Company. At 1704 B Company was air lifted from their location in the South and closed into the battle area by 1804 hours. Upon the closure of B Company the elements from D Company returned to LZ EAGLE. B and C Companies maintained contact with the VC unit until 1925 hours when the VC broke contact. At that time B Company was located vicinity YV 852892 and C Company vicinity YV 855894. During the afternoon the companies had counted 15 VC bodies and estimated at least an additional 15 VC KIA.

k. (030001 - 032400 Apr 66) (Incl # 11)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued search and destroy operations within assigned area of operations employing two battalions as search elements while the third battalion secured artillery positions, logistical facilities, and provided the brigade reserve/reaction force.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at LZ CIT securing artillery units and providing the brigade reaction force. C Company remained at OISIS with the mission of securing the brigade logistical base area.

(3) 2/8 Cav: Beginning at 0001 hours, C Company moved from YV 850737 to LZ QUARTER closing prior to 0600 hours. Also during the hours of darkness the recon platoon conducted a sweep from LZ QUARTER to the northeast returning to LZ QUARTER at 0320 hours with negative enemy contact.

Throughout the day, B Company occupied two platoon ambush sites at YV 850748, YV 863746, and A Company established ambush sites at YV 854767, YV 866777, and YV 873784. All ambush sites reported negative contact and A Company closed NICKEL and B Company closed QUARTER prior to dark. The battalion CP and D Company remained at QUARTER throughout the period.

(5) 1/12 Cav: At sunrise B and C Companies continued to sweep North and West from vicinity YA 855890 in an effort to regain contact with the VC force they had encountered the previous day. C Company continued to discover VC bodies and abandoned weapons during the day and at YV 843909 at 1610 hours the company regained contact with element of undetermined size. The contact was sporadic and at 1840 A Company began to move from LZ AGLE to assist C Company closing the C Company location at 1855 hours. Both Companies remained at YV 843910 during the night. B Company also encountered numerous VC dead during their sweep North and at sunset the company was located vicinity YV 850919. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ TAGLE until noon when they were airlifted to LZ HAWK (YV 888913) closing prior to 1500 hours. A Battery 2/19 Arty was airlifted from LZ QUARTER to LZ HAWK closing prior to dark. During the day the battalion reported 37 VC KIA (BC), 20 KIA (JST) and recovered 21 individual weapons and 8 crew served weapons.

1. (040001 - 042400 Apr 66) (Incl # 12)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade in coordination with the 3rd Bde, 1st Air Cav Div and the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division conducted air assaults into the Western slopes of CHU PONG Mountain to block VC escape routes into CAMBODIA. One battalion was airlifted during the early morning hours into blocking positions along the CAMBODIAN Border while the second battalion moved overland to blocking position to the South of the Mountain. The third battalion remained uncommitted during the period providing the Division/Brigade reaction force and securing forward artillery positions and logistical facilities.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) remained at CAT securing artillery positions and providing the Division/Brigade Reaction Force. During the afternoon B Company replaced C Company at OASIS with B Company returning to LZ CAT prior to dark.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0525 hours A Company moved overland from LZ NICKEL to LZ QUARTER closing at 0645 hours. With the entire battalion now located at LZ QUARTER. B Company lifted off at 0654 hours and air assaulted LZ COTTON (YV 843956) closing at 0715 hours. A Company followed B Company into LZ COTTON closing at 0804. From LZ COTTON A Company moved overland to blocking position #1 (YV 834983) and B Company moved to blocking position #3 (YV 843962) with one platoon moving to OP #3 (YV 855975). The recon platoon which had also landed at LZ COTTON proceeded to blocking position #2 (YV 839973). C Company lifted off LZ QUARTER at 0720 hours and air assaulted LZ CLOTH (YV 852942) closing at 0804 hours. From LZ CLOTH the

From LZ CLOTH the company moved West to blocking position #4. At 1007 hours positions #2, #3, and #4 were reported secured. D Company and the Bn were airlifted from LZ QUARTER into LZ WOOL closing at 1147 hours. A Company reported blocking position #1 secured at 1140 hours. The only enemy contact reported by the battalion was sporadic small arms fire encountered by the initial lift of B Company into LZ COTTON at 0700 hours.

(4) 1/12 Cav: At start of the day B Company was located at blocking position RED (YV 849923) and A and C Companies at blocking position WHITE (YV 843911). At first light A Company moved south from WHITE to blocking position BLUE (YV 845892) closing at 0900 hours. During the day the battalion reported numerous contacts with small isolated VC elements of squad size or less. A total of seven VC KIA (BC) were discovered.

(5) 1/9 Cav: Vicinity YV 827919 elements of C Troop observed an estimated 60 - 70 VC in an open field. TAC Air and armed helicopters of the troop engaged the VC force as they fled to the west into CAMBODIA. A total of 43 VC bodies were observed in the area east of the border and one 75mm Recoilless Rifle was recovered.

m. (050001 - 052400 April 66) (Incl # 13)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued to occupy blocking positions with two battalions to the south and west of CHU PONG Mountain to prevent enemy forces in the area from withdrawing into CAMBODIA. The third battalion was utilized to secure the brigade forward base and to provide the division/brigade reaction force.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to defend artillery positions at LZ CAMP and provide the division/brigade reaction force. B Company remained at OLSIS as a security force for the brigade logistical base.

(3) 2/8 Cav: There was no change in unit dispositions during the day as all elements of the battalion conducted extensive small units patrols between blocking positions. At 0708 hours C Company observed 4 VC in khaki uniforms at YV 847938. The company engaged the VC and captured one VC WIA. Twelve other VC were observed in CAMBODIA at YV 825970 but were not engaged.

(4) 1/12 Cav: The battalion continued to occupy blocking positions with A Company at BLUE, B Company at RED, C Company at WHITE, and D Company and the battalion CP at LZ HMK. At 0155 hours an ambush site from A Company observed 5 VC at YV 850895. As a result of the fire fight that followed A Company accounted for 2 VC KIA (BC). At 1545 C Company received small arms fire from an estimated 12 VC vicinity YV 846908. Artillery was called in and C Company swept the area but was unable to locate any trace of the VC element.

n. (060001 - 062400 April 66) (Incl # 14)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued Operation LINCOLN with two battalions maintaining a portion of their forces on blocking positions along the CAMBODIAN border. The remainder of the battalion swept the area east of the blocking positions in an attempt to drive any VC forces operating in the area against the established blocking positions. The third battalion remained as the brigade reaction force and secured artillery and logistical areas.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) remained as the brigade reaction force and secured artillery positions at LZ CAT. During the afternoon A Company replaced B Company as the security force around O.SIS.

(3) 2/8 Cav: Commencing at 0600 hours the recon platoon moved overland from blocking position # 2 to blocking position # 4. On arrival C Company they swept to the northeast and at dusk was located vicinity YV876964. At 0630 hours one platoon from A Company moved overland from blocking position # 1 to blocking position # 2. B Company remained on blocking position # 3 and conducted combat patrols to the northeast during daylight hours. The battalion C and D Company remained at LZ WOOL. There were no significant enemy sightings reported by the battalion during the period.

(4) 1/12 Cav: All elements of the battalion, with the exception of A Company remained at their locations of the previous day. At 0703 hours A Company moved overland from blocking position BLUE to LZ EAGLE. On arriving at LZ EAGLE at 0817 hours A Company was airlifted to LZ SPARROW (YV 908942) closing at 0909 hours. The company then swept northwest then southeast and at dusk was located vicinity YV 927896. At 1320 hours C Company made contact with an estimated VC platoon moving east vicinity position WHITE. Following a brief fire fight the VC platoon withdrew back into CAMBODIA leaving two VC KIA (BC) in the area. Additional VC casualties could not be determined due to the proximity of the border.

o. (070001 - 072400 April 66) (Incl # 15)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade continued operations vicinity CHU PONG Mountain employing one battalion conducting search and destroy operations within assigned sector. The second maneuver battalion concluded search operations and was airlifted to LZ BIN HO north of PLBIKU while the third battalion continued to provide the brigade reaction force.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) continued to provide the brigade reaction force and secure artillery units at LZ CAT. A Company remained as security force at O.SIS.

(3) 2/8 Cav: Commencing shortly after sunrise, all elements of the battalion began moving overland toward LZ WOOL. A Company closed LZ WOOL at 0815 hours and at 0832 hours lifted off for the TURKEY FARM to assume responsibility for securing the Aviation Group laager area. The remainder of the battalion was airlifted to LZ BIN HO (LR 770542) closing at 1427 hours.

(4) 1/12 Cav: At 0702 hours B Company began moving from blocking position RED to LZ ROBIN (YV 864900). Enroute to LZ ROBIN the company passed through an abandoned VC position consisting of bunkers and foxholes vicinity YV 960897. Three VC were discovered hiding in this area resulting in two VC KIA (BC) and one VCC. The company closed LZ ROBIN at 1138 hours. C Company remained at blocking position WHITE throughout the day with negative enemy contact reported. A Company continued its sweep toward LZ HAWK at 0730 hours and closed LZ HAWK at 1252 hours. At 1403 hours the recon platoon which had swept south of LZ HAWK encountered an estimated VC platoon. AR and TAC air strikes were called in on the VC position and at 1520 hours A Company was lifted from LZ HAWK to a landing zone near the area of contact. A Company then swept to the recon platoon location. At 2017 hours A Company linked up with the platoon and both units moved overland back to LZ HAWK closing at 2331 hours. D Company and the battalion CP remained at LZ HAWK.

p. (080001) - 082400 Apr 66) (Incl # 16)

(1) General: The 1st Brigade concluded Operation LINCOLN by extracting the remaining two maneuver battalions from the operational area to the brigade logistical base. The third battalion secured the aviation group landing area with one company and prepared for future operations. Operation LINCOLN officially terminated at 082400 April 1966.

(2) 1/8 Cav: The battalion (-) moved by CV-2 and helicopter from LZ HANK to OLSIS commencing at 1349 hours and closing OLSIS at 1815 hours.

(3) 2/8 Cav: At 0655 hours C Company began moving overland from blocking position WHITE to LZ ROBIN closing at 0755 hours. At 0902 hours the first elements of C Company were airlifted from LZ ROBIN to OLSIS. B Company followed C Company from LZ ROBIN and the remainder of the battalion was moved from LZ HANK to OLSIS. By 1200 hours all elements of the battalion had closed OLSIS.

(4) 1/12 Cav: Shortly after sunrise C Company moved overland from blocking position WHITE to LZ ROBIN closing at 0755 hours. One platoon from A Company and one platoon from D Company swept South from LZ HANK at 0647 hours and discovered 2 VCC, 12 VC KIA (BC) and 6 weapons. At 0901 hours C Company and B Company lifted off LZ ROBIN for OLSIS. The remainder of the battalion lifted off HANK commencing at 1040 hours and closed OLSIS at 1200 hours.

12. RESULTS:

a. Friendly losses:

(1) KIA 28

(2) WIA 58

b. Enemy losses

(1) Personnel

(a) KIA (BC) 383

(b) KIA (TST) 228

(c) WIA (TST) 162

(d) VCC 17

(e) VCS 1

(2) Weapons

(a) Individual 80

(b) Crew served 14

(3) Ammunition

(a) Grenades 69

(b) SA and MG 1,000+

(c) 2.75 in RL 13

(d) 82mm 36

(e) 60mm 3

(f) Flares 1,920

(4) Communications Equip

(a) Radio Parts Box 11

(b) Radios 3

(c) Code Books 3,000

(5) Miscellaneous Items

(a) Rice 7,800 lbs

(b) Medical Supplies 10 lbs

(c) Documents 1 bag

(d) 82mm Bipods 1

(e) M1 Mortar Sight 3

(f) 60mm Mortar Base

plates 2

13. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS:

a. Supply: The 1st Forward Support Element (FSE) displaced to the Brigade Base at OMSIS on D-Day, 25 March 66. The 1st Logistical Command co-located the Forward Support Area (FSA) with the 1st FSE. The base was supplied by a ground Line of Communication (LOC) from the PLEIKU Support Area and from the depot at QUI NHON. This arrangement worked well; however some delay was experienced in receiving all Class V items required for a three day stockage level.

b. Maintenance: Maintenance contact teams of the 1st FSE were used effectively in forward areas when the density of equipment warranted.

c. Treatment of Casualties:

(1) The majority of casualties were sorted at the clearing station in the brigade base. The 542nd Medical Company, in direct support of the clearing station was located at PLEIKU, but had very few facilities which were not available at the station or at the 2nd Mobile Army Surgical Hospital. As a result very few casualties were evacuated to the 542nd Medical Company.

(2) A qualified surgeon was located at the clearing station which greatly improved the surgical capability and provided a higher level of care at that location.

(3) Battalion Surgeons, located at the clearing station, had the opportunity to see many personnel of their battalions. This results in the following advantages:

(a) The men of the battalion are less likely to become "lost" in the chain of evacuation.

(b) Patients have a greater chance of being returned to duty in a shorter period of time thereby clearing beds of the clearing station for the more serious casualties.

(c) Forward Air Teams composed of two or more senior aidmen equipped with a greater variety of medical supplies than the platoon aidman, including liquid, demonstrated their usefulness by the improved care provided casualties in forward areas.

d. Signal: Secure teletype communications were not established between the Division Forward Command Post at PLEIKU and Ban Khe until approximately 24 hours after the brigade closed the area of operations. This lack of communications hampered the flow of secure communications between the brigade and division during this critical period.

14. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND TECHNIQUES USED: Parachute delivery of critical items of supplies by CV-2 air craft proved very effective. This technique was used during the hours of darkness to deliver ammunition and rations to a surrounded company. Due to the situation, other types of delivery were not possible.

15. COMMANDERS COMMENTS: The use of Aerial Rocket Artillery during the night of 30 March to provide fire support to A Company 1/12 Cav at LZ HIGLEY was greatly instrumental in preventing the VC from massing a major attack against the A Company perimeter. From dusk until the early morning when tube artillery was moved to within supporting distance of LZ HIGLEY the ARI provided a continuous rain of fire into the area. The devastating effect of this support was evident by the large numbers of VC bodies discovered in the area during the next two days.

Also that same evening a night air assault operation involving a rifle company and an artillery battery was conducted with no prior reconnaissance into a difficult landing zone; the success of this operation attests to the professionalism of all members of the team.

16. LESSONS LEARNED:

a. Water:

(1) General: Due to the extremely dry weather conditions which existed in the area of operations a majority of the streams encountered were dry. Troops on the ground were unable to replenish their water supply from the local area and an unusual number of sorties were required from the base area to supply the line companies.

(2) Recommendations: That support personnel are made aware of the additional water requirements when operations are conducted in dry areas and prepare for the unusually high water requirements.

b. Medical Evacuation:

(1) General: During the conduct of reconnaissance in force operations the extended distances from the brigade base area to the forward units created a communications problem for medical evacuation.

(2) Recommendations: That whenever possible the airborne relay aircraft include a MEDICAL EVACUATION frequency to improve the time required for medical evacuation.

c. Ambushes:

(1) General: Ambushes conducted during the course of this operation met with more success than ever has been experienced in the past. Troops appear to be becoming more accustomed to this type of action and are waiting until the enemy forces are well within the "killing zone" before opening fire.

(2) Recommendations: That units at all levels stress the employment of both day and night ambushes along trails, streams, and other likely enemy routes.

d. Aircraft Utilization:


(1) General: By retaining reaction force laager aircraft under brigade control the brigade was able to react with more flexibility to unexpected situations.

(2) Recommendations: That aircraft not committed to missions for the battalions be laagered under brigade control during future operations.

e. Airstrikes:

(1) General: One close air strike directed against a dug-in enemy position resulted in one napalm bomb dropped on friendly troops.

(2) Recommendations: That increased emphasis be placed on the marking of friendly unit locations before an airstrike is called in. This will require troops to carry additional smoke grenades during daylight hours and flares or other illumination devices at night.



JOHN J. HENNESSEY
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

INCLOSURE #1

AREA OF OPERATIONS 25 MARCH - 08 APRIL



40 — | YA — 80



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IA MEUR R.



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SCALE - 1:250,000

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
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



25 MARCH 1966







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


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INCLOSURE 4





27 MARCH 1966







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
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


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



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


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
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
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






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
A

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NOTE: C2-8 MOVE FROM
TO OASIS AT 10

B




NOTE: C2-8 MOVE FROM TURKEY TO OASIS AT 1000

C

INCLOSURE * 7

30 MARCH 1966



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BOIL

FROM OASIS

2-19 (C)
A1-30



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A 2-8 1025-1105
C 2-8 145-1245

TYPHUS




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8


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DI-8 0950-1009

C2-19 0900-0955


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
INCLOSURE # 8 31 MARCH 1966



1966



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
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1/12 = 1/8

1/8
2/8




2-B (EST) 1445-1858



C

D



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
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



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
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


1/8
2/8



C







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96

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
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

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
87 — 83



INCLOSURE # 11 3 APRIL 1966



B





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
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
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

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



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












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
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


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98




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34




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




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

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




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

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INCLOSURE * 15 7 APRIL 1966




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



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
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B2-19

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
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
INCLOSURE 16

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