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AUTHORITY

ago, d/a ltr, 29 apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (28 May 68) FOR OT RD 681239

31 May 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 307th  
Combat Aviation Battalion, Period Ending 31 January 1968

ADSS 4443

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

1 Incl  
as

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R JUN 27 1968 RECEIVED

3  
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
307TH COMBAT AVIATION (PHANTOM) BATTALION  
APO San Francisco 96296

AVBN-PC

15 February 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 January  
1968, (RCS CSFOR -65)

SECTION I

Significant Organization or Unit Activities

A. Organization: During the reporting period, the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion included:

1(U). Headquarters and Headquarters Company 307th Combat Aviation Battalion.

2(U). The 199th Reconnaissance Airplane Company (O-1).

3(U). The 221st Reconnaissance Airplane Company with the 325th Signal Detachment (RL) attached.

4(U). The 235th Armed Helicopter Company with the 608th Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 190th Signal Detachment (RL) attached.

5(U). The 244th Surveillance Airplane Company with the 502nd Transportation Detachment (KD) and the 537th Signal Detachment (RL & RX) attached.  
(See Organization & Stationing Chart)

B. Significant Activities and Events:

1(U). On 21 December 1967 command of the Phantom Combat Aviation Battalion (Provisional) passed from LtC William H. Harper to LtC Charles F. Hutchins. The ceremony took place at Soc Trang Army Airfield, RVN and was attended by M.G. Robert R. Williams, CG, 1st Aviation Brigade and Col Robert L. McDaniel, Commanding Officer, 164th Cbt Avn Gp.

2(U). Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion was activated 20 December 1967 by GO 311 HQ USARPAC and assigned to the 164th Cbt Avn Gp. The order was implemented by a formal activation ceremony conducted at Soc Trang, RVN on 19 January 1968. The source of personnel and equipment was the Phantom Cbt Avn Bn (Provisional) which was deactivated at the same time. The Phantom Cbt Avn Bn had been organized 25 August 1967 from TO&E resources of the 13th CAB to relieve the span of control problems caused by the influx of new aviation units in the IV CTZ in first quarter 68.

FOR OTRD  
681239

3(U). The 235th Armed Helicopter Company closed at Can Tho on 1 November 1967. In-processing and orientation was completed 5 November 1967. This unit became fully operational 24 December 1967. Initial employment has been in support of airmobile operations, immediate reaction missions and night firefly missions in support of IV Corps. Utilizing an infusion program, CONUS replacements and the in country AH-1G NEST team, the unit had a full complement of AH-1G, Cobra qualified aviators prior to the arrival of the first AH-1G's. The unit originally equipped with 24 UH-1C helicopters, had a full Cobra (AH-1G) capability at the end of this reporting period and is in process of turning in their remaining UH-1C's.

C. Operational and Administrative Aviation Support:

1(U). During this period the O-1 units rendered visual reconnaissance and surveillance support to the 7th, 9th and 21st Infantry Divisions (ARVN), the 44th Special Zone, IV Corps and separate direct support to each of the sixteen (16) provinces in the IV Corps area. The O-1 assets are placed under operational control of each province and ARVN Division senior advisor. This measure gives each of the supported units a responsive capability to check enemy movements and targets of a fleeting nature which is characteristic of the insurgency in the IV Corps area.

2(U). The 244th Surveillance Airplane Company continues to operate under the operational control of the G-2 Air, IV Corps for mission assignment and for reporting channels. The unit, in addition to its primary function of reporting information to the Corps G-2 Air, has been able to make inflight reports of significant sightings to all provinces as it passes over them nightly. This has allowed provinces to rapidly evaluate their targets with either visual reconnaissance from O-1's or ground patrols and engage with artillery, gunships or Navy PBR's.

3(U). The Christmas and New Year's truce periods generated an additional requirement for increased visual and electronic surveillance in the IV Corps area. The effectiveness of the intelligence gained can only be evaluated at higher echelons of command; however, the increase in enemy troop movements and significant sightings was evident when compared to the normal daily activity.

4(U). The battalion with its assigned and attached units provided tactical combat support and direct combat support to the IV ARVN Corps, the IV Corps MACV Advisory Group and U.S. Special Forces. This support included command liaison, radio relay, visual and electronic surveillance, armed aerial escort, aerial direct fire support and reconnaissance and security operations. Statistics generated in support of these missions are listed below:

	NOV	DEC	JAN	TOTAL
Hours Flown	6230	7081	6826	20,137
Total Sorties	7014	7617	8705	23,336
VR Sorties	4158	3343	3751	11,252
Helicopter CBT Sorties	-	1039	1784	2,823
F/W Sorties	7014	6264	6847	20,125
Fire Fly Missions	24	47	38	129
VC KBA	87	163	354	604
VC Sampans Dest	146	150	287	583
VC Structures Dest	127	195	190	442

## SECTION II PART I

### A. OBSERVATION (Lessons Learned)

#### 1(U) ITEM: Additional Bomb Rack on O-1 Aircraft

a. **DISCUSSION:** The O-1's have the mission to fly security over the three major airfields in the Delta during the hours of darkness. In the event of an attack on the airfield by direct or indirect fire weapons, the O-1 proceeds to the source of the fire, illuminates the area and directs gunships or artillery to neutralize the source. The presence of the aircraft has the psychological effect of a deterrent. The present O-1 is equipped with four (4) bomb shackles and is limited to carrying four (4) MK-24 flares or 12 minutes of illumination. The addition of two (2) more bomb shackles at available hard points increases the illumination time to 18 minutes. The weight of each MK-24 flare is 24 pounds and therefore the extra weight does not exceed the static wing load on the O-1 of 250 pounds per wing.

b. **OBSERVATION:** There is a need for a longer period of illumination and the O-1 is capable of performing this mission with minor modification. Providing extra bomb shackles and racks are made available, this is a readily available measure which can be employed to increase illumination station time.

#### 2(U) ITEM: Use of Dyalens Model S-023 Gyrostabilized Binocular System on VR Missions

##### a. **DISCUSSION:**

(1) This unit has been testing the above system to determine applications for tactical reconnaissance use and techniques of employment. The binoculars system consist of three components: power source (battery belt), power control box, and binoculars with attached gyroscope mechanism. A cable connects the binoculars to the power control box and another cable runs from the power control box to the power source. The binoculars have a power zoom control

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which can increase magnification of a target from 2½x to 12x. The speed of the zoom can be varied by the operator. The power zoom controls function independently of the gyroscope. The binoculars can be utilized as ordinary binoculars by simply detaching the gyroscope mechanism.

(2) The binoculars were utilized to confirm and further identify targets initially picked up by the naked eye, and also to initially locate targets along canals, banks, and tree lines. When flying over wooded areas, movement should be detected with the naked eye, and then the binoculars at 2½x power to fix the target in the field of vision. The observer could then zoom in on the target with the power zoom control and enlarge it 12x.

(3) When flying parallel to canals or tree lines, the binoculars are used to pick up targets without first having to locate them with the naked eye. With the 2½x setting, a target is picked up and then the zoom controls used to enlarge it for positive identification.

(4) The binoculars were used in three separate aircraft: The OV-1 Mohawk, UH-1D, and the O-1 Bird Dog. The best altitude found for the Dynalens S-023 was from 1000' - 2000' absolute. These altitudes permitted good viewing time of targets before they passed behind the aircraft, and enabled positive identification to be made of targets as personnel or small boxes and bales.

(5) The binoculars functioned most effectively in the helicopter and in the Bird Dog. Vibration and speed of the Mohawk were greater than in the other two aircraft, and viewing out of the right side of the cockpit was difficult as the harness retards much lateral movement of the torso and shoulders.

b. **OBSERVATION:** The Dynalens Model S-023 Gyrostabilized binoculars system provides an excellent means of observation while employed in a helicopter or Bird Dog. It is effective to a lesser degree in the OV-1. The system is utilized for location and positive identification of personnel. The binoculars will eliminate 80 - 90% of image movement when used in the helicopter and Bird Dog and eliminate 50 - 60% of image movement when used in the OV-1. The binoculars are excellent for detecting personnel, camouflaged objects and cargo in sampans. These binoculars enhance the results of VR missions as numerous targets can be detected and identified that ordinarily would escape detection by the naked eye.

3(U) **ITEM:** OV-1 Mohawk/AH-1G Cobra Night Search and Destroy Operations (Snake Hunt)

a. **DISCUSSION:** An integrated hunter/killer team, consisting

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of a Huey Cobra light fire team and two Mohawks have been successfully employed within the IV Corps area in attempts to restrict VC movement during the hours of darkness. An infrared equipped Mohawk searching within a specified strike zone is closely followed by a second Mohawk, carrying twelve M-24 aircraft flares, and an AH-1G Cobra Light Fire Team. When the infrared Mohawk spots a target either visually or electronically, a flare drop command is given to the flare equipped Mohawk. The target is described to the Light fire team who then engages the target as continuous illumination is provided by the Flare Mohawk. The infrared Mohawk moves to a pre-designated check point while the target is being engaged then returns to the target area to take post strike photos at the conclusion of the strike. All elements of the hunter/killer team regroup at a rendezvous point, and then proceed to the next search area. The Mohawks fly at 150 knots IAS to allow more time for the sensor operator to search for targets, and to be more compatible with the Cobra's cruise airspeed.

b. OBSERVATION: The Mohawk/Cobra team can work successfully to search a wide area. However, under current regulations, time consuming prior permission must be received to fire on targets. Detailed preflight planning and precise inflight coordination is essential and should include the following:

- (1) Intelligence briefing to cover the area of operation.
- (2) Designated check points within the search area.
- (3) Plans for take off, rendezvous, routes, target engagement and recovery of downed crews.

4(U) ITEM: Survival Vest

a. DISCUSSION: CV-1 Survival Vest, FSN A220-300-006, was uncomfortable to the wearer and items for immediate use were not available. These items included:

- (1) Compass
- (2) Marker Beacon
- (3) Flashlight
- (4) Survival Radio
- (5) Ammunition

b. OBSERVATION: This unit modified the vest by:

(1) Reinforcing the shoulder straps with a heavy cotton webbing which provides even distribution of the weight.

(2) Adding a light marker beacon secured to the right shoulder strap which gives the survivor immediate access to the signaling device.

(3) Removing the compass from the survival pocket and placing it in the weapon pouch on the right front side of the vest.

(4) Removing the ammunition bandoleer from the survivor kit pocket and affixing it to the vest on snaps already provided for that purpose.

5(U) ITEM: Survival Kit

a. DISCUSSION: The OV-1 Pararaft Kit, FSN 8465-J01-0742, was not properly rigged when assembled as outlined in TM 55-8465-206-13. If the securing lanyard is left inside the kit, it is almost impossible for a man to remove it while floating on the water. If the lanyard is not attached to the individual prior to ejection, he may forget to attach it prior to the release of the seat pan.

b. OBSERVATION: Rig the lanyard to the raft so that the attaching hook and 12 inches of the lanyard are exposed. The lanyard can then be attached directly to the seat occupant prior to take off, eliminating the confusion of the ejectee hooking it to himself during or after ejection.

6(U) ITEM: Nickle Cadmium Batteries for the OV-1 Aircraft

a. DISCUSSION: The nickle cadmium batteries were overheating and exploding. The reason was found to be the clogging of the battery vent lines, FSN 6140-522-3564.

b. OBSERVATION: The lines must be blown clear using air pressure to eliminate this problem. In addition, care must be taken to insure that the vent lines do not twist when the battery is removed or replaced. The vent lines, when twisted, will restrict the passage of air and take a permanent set.

7(U) ITEM: Use of Imagery Interpreters in SLAR Data Terminal Stations

a. DISCUSSION: This unit consolidated, within the operation restricted area at Can Tho, its authorized data terminal station (DTS). This consolidation enables efficient use of personnel, and,

A

due to the non-existence of repair parts for the data terminal stations, the most efficient use of operational DTS equipment components. In order to expedite the interpretation of the SLAR film processed by the SLAR processor RC-166, an enlisted Imagery Interpreter was placed in one of the SLAR ground stations, together with the operator. The two were able to quickly and accurately interpret the imagery in an air-conditioned motionless atmosphere. The results were called to the interested Sector or Division TOC, or the IV Corps TOC. The distant operation centers received timely results by radio relay from the DTS through the airborne SLAR aircraft's sensor operator.

b. OBSERVATION: Use of the imagery interpreter in the ground data terminal station is an excellent and efficient means to expedite SLAR film interpretation and to relay the results to interested tactical operations centers. It is expected that imagery interpreters will also expedite film interpretation from airborne infrared transmitters when IR rapid data processors become available.

8(U) ITEM: Forward Air Controlling By Army Air

a. DISCUSSION: On several occasions, had Army C-1, Command & Control aircraft or army gunships been permitted to adjust an Air Force strike on targets of a fleeting nature, the action could have been more decisive. The rapid application of fire power at a precise point is paramount in some operations to prevent small airmobile forces from becoming bogged down in a heavy action and slowing the pace of the battle. Many airmobile operations are conducted without artillery support and the Air Force tactical air is the heaviest fire support available. The army air in support of the operation is on station for a longer period of time and has a better awareness of the tactical situation and troop disposition. When an Air Force FAC arrives, he must be directed in and on the target and fully briefed as to the situation prior to employing the tactical air. This procedure is time consuming and slows the operation to a stand still while putting in the tactical strike.

b. OBSERVATION: There are occasions when the scarcity of Air Force FAC support aircraft have delayed or forced cancellation of a tactical strike. The field expedient has been to make available an Army C-1 aircraft either flown by the Air Force FAC or Army pilot with the FAC as an observer to direct the strike. If Army pilots were given training in forward air controlling, the procedures to be followed and the permission to control Air Force tactical air, the tempo of engagements could be maintained and cancellation of valuable fire support would not be necessary.

9(U) ITEM: Special Management Items

a. DISCUSSION: The system presently used by aviation supply for Special Management Items (SMI) has a definite purpose but tends to cripple the aviation unit. In order for a unit to receive an SMI such as an engine or propeller, an Equipment Deadlined for Part (EDP) requisition must be submitted. This critically reduces the aircraft availability. The SMI system can still operate if the unit is allowed to have on hand one or more Special Management Items and still be able to EDP for an additional engine. This enables the using unit to have a quick change assembly (QCA) for installation. Utilizing this method, an engine, for instance, can be replaced in

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approximately four (4) hours.

b. OBSERVATION: If the aviation unit was allowed to use the above mentioned method it would benefit both the maintenance and supply systems. Maintenance personnel would be able to get the job done in a timely manner and the supply system would still be able to record a demand. Equipment not operationally ready due to supply (NORS) is also reduced because the time required for delivery is no longer a critical area.

10(U) ITEM: O-1 Tailwheels

a. DISCUSSION: It has been noted many of the O-1's in Viet Nam are hard to steer, with the rudders, during taxi operations. This problem is a result of the extremely dusty or muddy ground areas in which the aircraft are operated.

b. OBSERVATION: By merely washing down the tailwheel daily with fresh clean water this problem of hard steering can be eliminated. A small hand fire extinguisher is very useful in this type of work. Proper lubrication of the tailwheel should follow the wash down.

11(U) ITEM: Audio Bullet Detection For The AH-1G (Cobra)

a. DISCUSSION: The AH-1G has a very low noise level in the cockpit which is achieved by sound proofing and it is almost impossible for the crew to detect hostile fire by sound. In previous versions of armed helicopters the doors were open and the crew consisted of four members watching and listening to establish target detection. The loud audible crack of a bullet could be the first indication of an aircraft receiving fire. Though hearing a round fired is not positive for target identification, reconnaissance by fire over the area can be established. Limited experience gained has shown that numerous hits and firing received by the AH-1G have gone undetected by the crew.

b. OBSERVATION: Audio target detection is almost nonexistent for the AH-1G. There are only two people observing from this aircraft reducing the visual observation by one-half in comparison to previous armed helicopters. The value of utilizing the AH-1G as a reconnaissance by fire vehicle has yet to be established.

12(U) ITEM: Armed Helicopter TO&E

a. DISCUSSION: The present armed helicopter companies utilize variations of the standard airmobile TO&E series 1-77. This TO&E with MTOE does not provide for the personnel or equipment

necessary to manage and maintain the number of armament systems and the volume of ammunition utilized with armed helicopters. The use of gunners from the present TO&E as ammunition handlers has alleviated the problem to some extent however this is a misuse of trained individuals. Organizational armament technicians are required in greater numbers primarily because of an increase in the number and complexity of the subsystems. Vehicles necessary to move class V to the aircraft are non-existent and the vehicles available on the TO&E utilized at present are of insufficient capacity for protracted use. Employment of aircraft is limited to staging areas where ground support personnel are available to refuel and aid the crew in rearming. At present there is only one UH-1H for moving ground support personnel troops to staging areas within the unit.

b. OBSERVATION: The present TO&E/MTOE is not oriented toward an armed helicopter company and appears to be temporary in nature.

13(U) ITEM: AH-1G Attitude Indicator

a. DISCUSSION: The reliability of the attitude indicator is unacceptable. The aircraft is presently restricted from instrument flight and night missions without a visible horizon. Night missions with a horizon or combat essential operations under hours of darkness without a visible horizon are performed. Night interdiction and firefly missions are presently being flown with excellent results however the onset of the southwest monsoon season in the IV CTZ will handicap the aircraft in its performance of night and even some day missions.

b. OBSERVATION: At the present time the attacking helicopters must maintain a safe operational altitude at night to afford reaction time from any disorientation caused by weapon muzzle flashback. The monsoon season with its lowering of ceilings and a reduction in nights with a visible horizon will restrict mission accomplishment. It is imperative that a reliable attitude indicator be provided for the AH-1G

14(U) ITEM 7.62MM Ammunition, Type A-165

a. DISCUSSION: The number of stoppages in the TAT-102 is dependent upon the quality of ammunition utilized provided some care is given to loading and handling. The boxes of 7.62 ammunition of short length (200 rnds) cause an unacceptable delay in reloading the TAT-102 and have led to stoppages due to short or long rounds existing where the belts were spliced together.

b. OBSERVATION: The most reliable ammunition which gives the lowest number of stoppages is Type A-165, 7.62 ammunition.

15(U) ITEM: XM-18 Armament Subsystem

a. DISCUSSION: The number of XM-18 armament subsystems issued with each AH-1G is inadequate to give the flexibility desired with the aircraft. The most common configurations are:

- (1) Light Scout-(2) XM-157 or (2) XM-18; (1) TAT-102
- (2) Scout-(2) XM-157; (2) XM-18; (1) TAT-102
- (3) Heavy Scout-(2) XM-159; (1) TAT-102; (2) XM-18
- (4) HOG-(4) XM-159; (1) TAT-102

The basis of issue for each AH-1G is one XM-18, two XM-157 and two XM-159.

b. OBSERVATION: During the short period the AH-1G has been employed by this battalion, the Heavy Scout configuration consistently meets the requirements of all missions. The pilots are unanimous in their desire for this all purpose configuration.

SECTION II PART II

1(U) Recommend that an armed helicopter company TOE be established or an MTOE O1-77G be implemented at the earliest practicable date.

2(U) Recommend that procurement of A-165 type ammunition be expedited.

3(U) Recommend that two XM-18 armament subsystems be procured and issued for each AH-1G.

4(U) Recommend that a reliable means of ground fire and hit detection be provided for the AH-1G.

5(U) Recommend that special management items be delivered to user ten (10) days prior to anticipated EDP for build up of item.



CHARLES F. HUTCHINS  
LTC, Armor  
COMMANDING

AVLA-C (10 Mar 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1968 (ACB CSFOR)

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST AVIATION BRIGADE, APO 96384

MAIL 4 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO 96384  
Commander in Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GFOP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, DA (ACSFOR DA),  
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed subject report of the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion, considers it to be adequate, and concurs with the contents.

2. The following additional comments are considered pertinent:

a. Sec II, para 9, page 7: The high dollar cost of Special Management Items (SMI) precludes stocking these items at unit level. Units should be afforded the opportunity to obtain SMI items on an O2 priority request with a required delivery date (RDD). In actual practice, RDD requisitions are not filled until an EDP is submitted, thus creating a delay as stated.

b. Sec II, para 13, page 9: Improved and flight tested attitude indicators are presently being installed in all AH-1G aircraft operating in-country. Production line aircraft will be equipped with the new attitude indicator as sufficient quantities of the instrument becomes available.

c. Sec II, para 14, page 9: Department of Defense Ammunition, code A-165 is the most desirable for use with the TAT-102. However, type A-165 is on an available supply rate and is allocated to the units. Undoubtedly, greater quantities of A-165 would reduce stoppages by reducing the need for less desirable substitutes.

d. Sec II, para 12, page 8: A proposed MTOE 1-111T, reorganizing the Armed Helicopter Company has been submitted to DA for approval. This proposed MTOE increases the personnel and equipment necessary to support the units mission.

e. Sec II, para 11, page 8: The improved visibility provided for the pilot and co-pilot/gunner in the AH-1G is far superior to the UH-1B/C. Therefore, a fifty percent crew reduction does not necessarily reduce visible observations by one-half. A bullet detection device for the AH-1G would be of great assistance; however, it would not necessarily have to be of a type capable of emitting an audio signal though this feature would be highly desirable.


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AVBA-C (10 Mar 68) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the Period Ending  
31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR)

MAR 24 1968

3. Unit identification code for the 307th Combat Aviation Battalion is  
WG3070.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



**LEWIS T. TURNER**  
Capt, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

13-  
AVHGC-DST (10 Mar 68) 2d Ind

CPT Arnold/ms/LBN 4485

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending  
31 January 1968 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 963754 APR 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT  
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 January 1968 from Headquarters, 307th Combat Aviation Battalion as indorsed.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning additional bomb rack for O-1 aircraft, page 3, paragraph A1. Concur. Recommend that USAMC study this proposal and, if feasible, modification of the O-1's in RVN be accomplished.


b. Reference item concerning OV-1 Mohawk/AH-1G Cobra night search and destroy operations (snake hunt), page 4, paragraph A3. The concept is sound and can be very profitable. Problem of clearance to fire on targets is a local one and should be resolved at SA, IV CTZ level.

c. Reference item concerning audio bullet detection for the AH-1G Cobra, page 8, paragraph 11; and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2e. This problem is well documented by the Cobra NETT. Both ACTIV and the Limited War Laboratory are engaged in developing a system of satisfactorily detecting the source of small arms fire.

d. Reference item concerning XM-18 armament sub-system, page 10, paragraph 15. Action has been taken through Closed-Loop support to obtain all available XM-18's from current procurement to increase the DOI in RVN. Additional procurement of the XM-18 will be determined after a DA decision is reached on a 20mm system for the AH-1G.

3. A copy of this indorsement will be furnished to the reporting unit through channels.

FOR THE COMMANDER

  
CHARLES A. BYRD  
Major, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Copies furnished:  
HQ 307th Cbt Avn Bn  
HQ 1st Avn Bde

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GPOP-DT (12 Apr 68) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 307th Cbt Avn Bn for Period  
Ending 31 January 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 7 MAY 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


1. This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. Reference Section II, Part I, Item A8, page 7. Provisions for forward air controlling by Army pilots under certain emergency conditions are provided for in Directive 95-10, Headquarters USMACV. In this directive COMUSMACV requires the 7th USAF and USARV to participate jointly in a cross training program for forward air controllers (FAC's) and Army O-1 pilots. The conditional use of Army O-1 pilots as FAC's appears to be based primarily on a lack of experience or formal training of these aviators. The in-country training process described in Directive 95-10 qualifies the Army aviator to some degree; however, a similar program conducted in CONUS could probably qualify the Army aviator fully as a FAC. The feasibility of such a program should be examined by USCONARC.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C.L. SHORTT  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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Incl 1

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11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A		12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	
13. ABSTRACT			