Multipurpose Terminal Interceptors: Game-Theoretic Cost Effectiveness Comparisons for Mixed Forces
Abstract
A simple game-theoretic representation of terminal defense against multicomponent offense has been investigated for two cases: (1) Each offense component must be countered by a threat-specific interceptor type. For example, reentry vehicles (RVs) are countered by an ABM interceptor such as SPRINT, high- altitude air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) by a high-altitude missile such as Hercules, and low-altitude ASMs by a low-altitude missile such as HAWK. (2) Some interceptors are multipurpose. For example, suppose SPRINT could intercept RVs and high- and low-altitude ASMs, Hercules could intercept high- and low-altitude ASMs, and HAWK could intercept only low-altitude ASMs. With single-purpose interceptors there is a (game value) offense allocation that forces the defense to respond as if the offense (unknown to the defense) allocated all of its resources to any one of the offense threat types. The outcome, with this defense response, is completely independent of the actual offense allocation. Most reasonable offense allocations require essentially the same defense response, since the allocation optimization is 'flat' with respect to offense resources but 'spiked' (discontinuous) with respect to defense resources. With multipurpose interceptors, the same statements are true. But the effective number of interceptors available against any threat type is the sum of the numbers of all interceptor types effective against that threat. The result is that the offense's advantage in deploying more than one component is strongly reduced, or even reversed.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Nov 01, 1968
- Accession Number
- AD0845037
Entities
People
- J. W. Hindes