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AUTHORITY

OAG, D/A ltr dtd 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (11 Jul 69) FOR OT UT 692039

16 July 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 3d Battalion,
506th Infantry, Period Ending 30 April 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

Kenneth G. Wickham

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Major General, USA
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 3D BATTALION (AIRBORNE) 506TH INFANTRY
APO San Francisco 96317

3 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry, for Period ending 30 April 1969, RCS C8FOR-65 (RI)

TO: See Distribution

1. Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Elements of the 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry were involved in combat operations during the entire reporting period. Training was conducted concurrent with combat operations and during periods when units were refitting and preparing for future operations.

b. Task Force 3-506 participated in the following operations during the reporting period:

- (1) Operation HANCOCK EAGLE, Phase I
(a) Dates: 4 February - 21 February 1969
- (2) Small Unit Operations (unnamed)
(a) Dates: 22 February - 27 February 1969
- (3) Operation HANCOCK EAGLE, Phase II
(a) Dates: 28 February - 3 March 1969
- (4) Operation HANCOCK QUEEN
(a) Dates: 3 March - 20 March 1969
- (5) Operation HANCOCK EAGLE Phase III
(a) Dates: 23 March - 31 March 1969
- (6) Combined US-ARVN Pair off operations and small units operations
(Unamed)
(a) Dates: 1 February - 30 April 1969

c. Significant Activities

(1) Operation HANCOCK EAGLE commenced during the first week of February 1969. The three phases of HANCOCK EAGLE included the majority of the reporting period as discussed in Section I, Para b.

For a complete account of Operation HANCOCK EAGLE, Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III see inclosure I: Combat After Action Report: HANCOCK EAGLE.

(2) TF 3-506 conducted small unit operations in Binh Thuan Province from 22 February to 27 February 1969. At 220200 February 1969, a mortar, rocket and sapper attack was launched on TF 3-506 Base Camp, LZ Betty. Enemy sappers breached the defensive perimeter at HHC/3-506 and E/3-506 (combat support) areas. In the 4.2" mortar section E/3-506, enemy B-40 rockets detonated a 4.2" ammunition bunker which resulted in a sympathetic detonation, and caused several friendly casualties. Results of the attack on LZ Betty were 2 US KHA and 29 US WHA. One 4.2" mortar and 1200 rounds of 4.2" ammo were destroyed and several buildings were destroyed and/or damaged. Enemy losses were: 21 VC KIA, 1 VC PW, 8 AK-47, one US cal .45 pistol, 45 Chicom grenades, 6 satchel charges, 7 Bangalore torpedoes, one B-40 rocket launcher and 7 B-40 rockets captured. The 1/A/3-506 conducting RIF operations north of Phan Thiet in the vicinity of AN752169 engaged an esti-

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mated VC platoon with SA and AW fire. Results of the contact were negative friendly casualties and 1 US WHA. 1 carbine, 2 SKS's, and assorted documents were captured. B/3-506 (-) while conducting RIF operations north of Thien Giao in the vicinity AN857304 detonated a booby trapped 175mm round resulting in 1 US KHA and 2 US WHA. On 23 February 69, 1/A/3-506 while conducting RIF operations NE of Phan Thiet in the vicinity of AN952169 was engaged by an enemy sniper, friendly fire was returned and a sweep of the contact area was conducted. Results of this contact were: 1 US WHA and enemy unknown. On 25 February 69, 2/A/3-506 while conducting RIF operations in the vicinity of AN938135 detonated a booby trap resulting in 4 US WHA. On 26 February 69, 2/D/3-506 found 2 graves containing 2 VC KIA as a result of SA fire in the vicinity of AN813289. B/7-17th Cav while OPCON to TF 3-506 engaged an estimated VC platoon in a bunker complex in the vicinity of BN044281. Cobra gunships were employed killing 1 VC. B/7-17 CAV Infantry Platoon was inserted into the contact area and was engaged with SA and AW fire and B-40 rockets resulting in 7 US WHA. On 27 February 69, 1/C/3-506 while combat assaulting into the Le Hong Phong Forest was inserted into a "hot" LZ at BN054163. An estimated VC squad engaged 1/C/3-506 as the platoon was inserted. The platoon returned fire and maneuvered off the LZ overrunning the enemy positions killing 3 VC and capturing 3 rucksacks. There were no friendly casualties. A/3-506 (-) while conducting RIF operations on 27 February 1969 in the vicinity AN822201 detonated two booby traps resulting in 7 US WHA. 3/C/3-506 while conducting Bushmaster operations in the vicinity BN058283 engaged 5 VC with SA and AW fire, a sweep through the contact area resulted in 2 VC KIA and 1 AK-47, 1 M-1 carbine and 1 Chicom pistol being captured.

(3) Operation HANCOCK QUEEN commenced 3 March 69 and terminated 20 March 69. For a complete account of HANCOCK QUEEN see Inclosure II: Combat After Action Report: HANCOCK QUEEN.

(4) TF 3-506 conducted combined pair off operations with ARVN and Regional Forces and small operations commencing 1 April 69. On 1 April 69 a Reconnaissance Team, 3-506 while conducting reconnaissance operations in the vicinity of AN728278 engaged 2 VC with SA fire killing 1 VC and capturing 200 rounds of AK ammunition. On 2 April 69 the 2/A/3-506 while conducting Bushmaster operations NW of Thien Giao in the vicinity of AN842293 received sniper fire on three occasions. In the same vicinity 2/A/3-506 detained 4 female suspects. On 3 April 1969, a Reconnaissance Team/3-506, while conducting Reconnaissance Operations in the vicinity of AN830381 engaged a VC squad with SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine and miscellaneous documents captured. 1/D/3-506 combined with 2/2/4-44th ARVN Regiment and cross attached squads to conduct RIF and Bushmaster operations in Binh Thuan Province, NE of Song Mao, in the vicinity of BN4050. Overall results for this operation were negative friendly casualties and 1 VC KIA. On 4 April 69, 2/A/3-506 while conducting RIF operations NW of Thien Giao in the vicinity of AN856318 found 2½ tons of rice which was extracted. On 6 April 69, 2/B/3-506 while conducting Bushmaster operations in the Le Hong Phong Forest vicinity BN108294 engaged 3 VC with SA fire, a sweep through the contact area revealed 1 VC KIA and 1 M-1 carbine captured. Reconnaissance Team/3-506 while conducting operations on 6 April in the vicinity of AN730275 was engaged by a reinforced VC squad with SA and AW fire and B-40 rockets. The Reconnaissance Team returned fire, artillery and armed helicopters were employed. A subsequent sweep of the contact area revealed heavy blood trails; friendly sustained 1 WHA. A second combined US-ARVN pair-off operation commenced 7 April 69 and terminated 25 April 69 and terminated 25 April 69. 3/D/3-506 combined with 2/3/4-44th ARVN Regiment and cross attached squads to conduct Bushmaster and Reconnaissance in Force operations in Binh Thuan Province, SW of Phan Thiet in the vicinity of AN7492. Overall results for this operation were negative friendly casualties; 2 VC KIA and 1 mauser captured. Later on 7 April 69, the third platoon Company C, 3-506 vicinity AN752288 engaged 3 VC with SA fire, killing 2 VC and capturing 2 AK-47 rifles and 1 French rifle. 3/C/3-506 sustained 1 US KHA. The 2/D/3-506 while conducting

RIF operations in the vicinity AN245032 found 3 graves containing 3 VC KIA as a result of SA fire. On 15 April 69, 2/A/3-506 while conducting Bushmaster operations NW of Thien Giao in the vicinity of AN830227 engaged and killed 1 VC with SA fire. On 16 April 69, 2/C/3-506 while conducting RIF operations in the vicinity of AN924124 engaged and killed 2 VC and captured 1 M-2 carbine. B/7-17 Cav while OPCON to 3-506 and conducting operations in the vicinity of AN980368 engaged an estimated VC squad with a Light Observation Helicopter resulting in 2 VC KIA. 1/C/3-506 in the vicinity of AN920119 engaged and killed 1 VC and captured 1 M-2 carbine and documents. On 17 April 69 2/D/3-506, while conducting RIF operations in the vicinity of AN974381 captured 1 VC and 5 Chicom grenades. B/7-17th CAV while OPCON to TF 3-506 and operating in the vicinity of AN917512 engaged and killed 1 VC. 2/D/3-506 while conducting RIF operations in the vicinity of AN 985363 found a bunker containing 1 PRC-10 radio; the bunker was destroyed and the radio extracted. On 18 April 69, 2/D/3-506 while conducting RIF operations NE of Thien Giao in the vicinity of AN985365, one squad conducting cloverleaf operations sighted an enemy patrol and organized a hasty ambush and engaged the VC with SA and AW fire. Results of the contact were 8 VC KIA and the following items captured: 1-57mm Recoilless rifle, 6-57mm RR rounds, 1 AK-47 rifle, 150 rounds of AK ammo, 150 rounds RPD ammo, 6 Chicom grenades, 3 B-40 rockets, 1 medical kit, 6 entrenching tools, and 8 rucksacks. 1/D/3-506 while conducting RIF operations in the vicinity AN837267 engaged 3 VC with SA and AW fire resulting in 1 VC KIA, 2 SKS rifles and 2 Chicom grenades captured. On 19 April 69, B/7-17 Cav while OPCON to TF 3-506 and conducting operations in the vicinity of AN722011 with a light observation helicopter engaged 3 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA, 1/D/3-506 while conducting RIF operations in the vicinity of AN856267 received sniper fire resulting in 1 US KIA. On 20 April 69, 2/A/3-506 while conducting Bushmaster operations in the vicinity of AN801209 engaged 4 VC with SA fire resulting in 1 VC KIA and 1 SKS rifle captured. On 22 April 69, 3/C/3-506, engaged a VC squad with SA, artillery and armed helicopters, results: 1 VC KIA and no friendly casualties. On 23 April 69, 3/C/3-506 while moving into its night defensive position (NDP) vicinity AN962207 was engaged by a VC squad with SA and AW fire and B-40 rockets, the platoon returned fire, pursued, and a sweep of the contact area revealed 4 VC KIA. During the early morning hours of 24 April 69 a Reconnaissance Team/3-506 while occupying a NDP engaged a VC Platoon with claymore mines and SA. The VC platoon attempted to encircle the Reconnaissance team; artillery and armed helicopters supported. Results: 5 VC KIA and 15 rucksacks captured. On 25 April 69 another Reconnaissance Team/3-506 and 3/A/3-506 while conducting operations in the vicinity AN79175 were observing 9 VC 800 meters north of their positions when an estimated 3 VC engaged them from the south, the friendly squad returned fire, killed 1 VC and captured 1 carbine. Later that same day while approaching a stream bed in the vicinity of AN782187, the squad was again engaged by a VC platoon; armed helicopters, air-strikes, and artillery were employed in support of the contact. Results: 1 VC KIA and 1 US KIA. Combined US-ARVN Pair-off operations were also conducted by Reconnaissance units of TF 3-506 and the 44th ARVN Regiment and were designated Combined Reconnaissance ARVN-American teams (COBRA). These COBRA teams were deployed in Binh Thuan Province for 5 to 10 days at a time in the vicinity of BN 3850, AN738, and BNO334. Overall results for COBRA Team operations during April were negative friendly casualties, 11 VC KIA and the following items captured: 4 AK-47's, 3 carbines, and one .45 cal pistol. A combined US-Regional Force Pacification operation commenced on 27 April 69 and continues at the close of the reporting period. On 28 April 69, 2/A/3-506 combined with the 300 RF company to conduct combined pacification operations south of Thien Giao in the vicinity of AN8823.

d. Significant Intelligence Activities

(a) During the month of February 1969 the enemy intensified his activities within Binh Thuan (P) using his trained sappers and Main Force units along

an disputed avenues of approach and against ARVN/US installations. The high activity of February was followed by relatively light activity during March; however, the enemy used this apparent lack of activity on his part to prepare for an assault against the Thien Giao District Headquarters on 22 Mar 69. In April the enemy virtually withdrew from his normal operating areas in order to prepare for his "SUMMER OFFENSIVE"; however, the Local Force units continued harassing activities while the Main Force units withdrew to secret base camps in the mountains.

(1) FEBRUARY: On 30 Jan 69, PW Ha Huu Thuy, captured in Phan Rang by ARVN MPs, stated that he was a member of the 186 MF Bn, and that his unit had moved from Tuyen Duc (P) into Binh Thuan (P) in early January 1969 for the purpose of attacking Phan Thiet City. PW Thuy also stated that a Provisional Regiment had been formed (482 Regt) and it was composed of the C-20 AKA 200C Bn). All of the above AKAs had not been previously reported. PW Thuy's story appeared to be substantiated by the interrogation of a PW captured in the 26 Jan 69 attack on Phuoc Tho (H) just north of Tuy Phong (B) Headquarters, as the PW stated that he was a member of the 240 NVA Bn. During the month of February 1969 the presence of the 186 MF Bn in Binh Thuan (P) was confirmed. In the early morning hours of 12 Feb 69, elements of the 450 LF Co guided the Sapper Companies of the 186 MF Bn, 240 NVA Bn, and the 840 MF Bn to attack Outpost Sara along QL 1, vic AN9C9185. In addition two companies of the 186 Bn established ambush positions along QL 1 in order to ambush reinforcing elements moving along the highway from Phu Long. The C-4 (Hvy Wpns) Co, 186 Bn and elements of the 840 MF Bn according to statements of PW's, established an LZ ambush to the east of the ambush along QL 1 in order to attack heliborne reinforcing elements. Two PW's were captured in this contact; one from the C-5 (Sapper) Co, 240 NVA Bn, and the other from the C-1 Co, 186 Bn; in addition captured documents also indicated the C-1 Co, 186 MF Bn. A total of 18 VC KIA from the combined sapper elements were found outside the perimeter of SARA, while a total of 51 VC KIA were found in the QL 1 ambush position. On 15 Feb 69, a Hoi Chanh rallied from the C-4 Co, 186 MF Bn at Hai Long District HQs. The Hoi Chanh was an ammunition bearer for 82mm mortar ammunition; he stated that his unit was located on what the enemy had anticipated to be the LZ which US troops would use to reinforce the contact, and the unit's orders were not to open fire until the first aircraft had landed. The C-4 Co was armed with three 82mm mortars, B40 RL and two 57mm RR. At 220200H Feb 69, LZ BETTY received approximately 45 rounds of 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket fire along with a sapper attack from the south and northwest. Three sappers penetrated to within 200 meters of the 3-506 TOC as they employed CHICOM grenades, satchel charges, B-40s and AK-47 fire. Two sappers penetrated from the northwest in the vicinity of the E Co 4.2" mortar position employing B-40s and satchel charges. The results at first light were 21 VC KIA (BC), 1 PW, 8 AK-47s, 45 CHICOM grenades, 6 satchel charges, 7 bangalore torpedoes, 8 B-40 rockets, 1 B-40 rocket launcher, and 1 US .45 cal pistol captured. The PW stated that he was a member of the C-1 Co, 481 LF Sapper/Recon Bn. His unit consisted of 40 personnel and they were deployed along the beach, south of LZ BETTY; however, the PW had no knowledge of any other unit participating in the attack. As friendly elements were still sweeping the graveyard and beach surrounding LZ BETTY, RF elements came in contact with the 482 LF Bn along Highway 8B in Binh Lam (H), vic AN860185. The 840 MF Bn, as it had in the 12 Feb 69 contact east of SARA, was located in an LZ ambush position west of Binh Lam (H) in the vicinity AN845186. Three PWs were captured, all were members of the 482 LF Bn; one of the PWs reported the strength of the 482 Bn at approximately 120 personnel, the lowest this unit had ever been reported. As the contact in Binh Lam (H) continued elements of the 4th ARVN Regt were engaged along QL 1, vic AN9934, by the 186 MF Bn, and elements of the 240 NVA Bn and the 200C Bn. This contact resulted in 46 VC KIA. On 28 Feb 69 a rallier from the C-2 Co, 186 MF Bn returned at Luong Son and he confirmed the identification of the 186 MF Bn as the primary attacking unit along QL 1 on 22 Feb 69. Documents captured by C Company, 3-506 on 27 Feb

69, file BNO53283, contained what was determined to be a sketch of Song Luy (V), as well as casualty figures from the 200C Bn which stated that on the ambushes along QL 1 on 8 Jan 69 and 22 Feb 69 they suffered 34 KIA and 33 WIA. As February came to a close the enemy forces within Binh Thuan (P) in four major contacts had suffered a total of 196 KIA.

(2) MARCH: Enemy activity during March 1969 slackened somewhat during the early portion of the month as compared with the period of intense enemy activity during February. Operation HANCOCK EAGLE commenced and terminated during March with significant Order of Battle information on the VC Binh Thuan Province Liberation Committee being gleaned from documents captured by D Company 3-506, in the vicinity ZT216366, within the Ara Salour Secret Zone. These documents contained the Letter Box Numbers for the Province Committee HQs, its General Staff Section, Political Staff Section and the Province Medical School. In addition the documents contained a roster of the Binh Thuan (P) Rear Services Staff Section as well as the VC Binh Thuan (P) Liberation Committee Chairman (or Province Chief), Nguyen Le. At 220105H Mar 69, the Thien Giao District HQs came under attack by an estimated reinforced VC Company. Initially the enemy employed mortar fire which was followed by a sapper attack with the sappers employing B-40s, AW fire and bangalore torpedoes. The contact was broken at 0400 hours with the VC suffering 33 KIA. No unit identification was gained from the contact however, it was believed that elements of the 482 LF Bn in conjunction with the 200C Bn and the 186 MF Bn participated in the attack. On 15 Mar 69, vic AN812173, RF/PF elements while conducting sweep operations north of FSB SHERRY in the triangle, engaged an estimated VC Company. 2/A/3-506 and 1/69th Armor reinforced the contact area routing the VC from their bunkers. A total of 4 PWs were captured, the most significant of which was Le Son Thai, an Assistant Squad Leader in the C-2 Co, 482 LF Bn. PW Thai stated that the 482 had suffered many casualties at Binh Lam (H) on 22 Feb 69, and the present strength of the 482 LF Bn was 55 personnel. He also stated that the C-3 Co of the 482 LF Bn was completely wiped out in the Binh Lam (H) contact. In order to keep pressure on friendly elements the enemy conducted numerous stand-off attacks by fire during the month of March. Nine stand-off attacks by fire were conducted by the enemy against LZ BMTTY during March with a total of between 73 and 77 rounds of 82mm mortar. FSB SHERRY was mortared four times during the month and received between 30 and 37 rounds of 82mm mortar fire.

(3) APRIL: During April the enemy forces withdrew into the mountains and avoided contact with friendly elements. On 5 Apr 69, Recon Team 75 engaged and killed 5 VC; two of the VC KIA were identified by documents as members of the C-4 Co, 482 LF Bn. A Hoi Chanh from a Rear Services element later identified the same VC as being members of the 482 LF Bn and as being KIA by an ambush. On 16 Apr 69, a 44th ARVN Regt Convoy along QL 1 was engaged by an estimated VC Bn at BNO10354. On 15 Apr 69, north of QL 1, vic AN967379, a COBRAA Team captured documents from VC KIA which identified two of the VC KIA as Recoiless Rifle crew members of the C-4 Co, 186 MF Bn. Although there were no documents or PWs captured during the contact on 16 Apr 69, it is believed that the 186 MF Bn in conjunction with local force elements initiated the ambush. On 27 Apr 69, B/7-17 Cav captured a female laborer, vic BN3947, who had carried rice from the Le Hong Phong into the mountains northeast of Song Mao for the 840 MF Bn as well as a document which substantiated the statements of the female laborer in that it contained a request from the 840 Bn to the Thuan Phong District Committee for rice. In addition the 44th ARVN Regt captured an NVA PW who stated that he was a member of the 304 NVA Bn, which had infiltrated into Binh Thuan (P) in January 1969 and had entered SVN in March 1968, but according to the PW his unit had never been engaged in any contact with friendly forces. The PW had been a cook and a member of the unit's Rear Services element or rice collection element, and could

not give any detailed information, no correlating information could be obtained from interrogation sessions but the time frame of the 304 infiltration closely coincided with that of the 240 NVA Bn. Numerous Hoi Chanhs returned at Hoa Da District HQs during the month, all of which were from local force elements. Two Hoi Chanhs from the 440 LF Co indicated the presence of the 840 MF Bn in the Song Mao area prior to the capture of the female laborer; these same Hoi Chanhs also indicated that the 840 and the 440 were preparing for offensive action in the Hoa Da area. Previous captured documents and agent reports indicated the enemy's intention to target on the Song Mao-Hoa Da area. As April came to a close and the traditionally active month of May began, it was anticipated that the enemy would increase its activities, especially in the eastern portion on AO SHERIDAN.

(b) During the reporting period the S-2 TF 3-506 continued daily liaison with Province S-2 and S-2 Advisor, National Chieu Hoi Center, National Police Field Force, Police Special Branch, OSA, the PIOC and DIOCCs. A total of 307 interrogations were conducted during the reporting period; the classification was as follows: 14 FWs, 90 Civil Defendants, 174 Innocent Civilians, 14 Hoi Chanhs, and 15 refugees.

Overall Results for this Reporting Period Were:

Results:

- a. Personnel (Friendly)
 - (1) 13 US KHA 109 US WHA (48 Medevac, 61 Minor)
 - (2) 3 VN KHA 5 VN WHA

- b. Personnel (Enemy)
 - (1) 201 VC/NVA KIA
 - (2) 10 VC/NVA POW
 - (3) 14 VC/NVA Hoi Chanhs
 - (4) 159 VC/NVA DET

- c. Equipment losses (Friendly)
 - (1) 1 ea, 4.2" mortar (destroyed)
 - (2) 1200 rounds 4.2" mortar ammo (destroyed)

- d. Equipment losses (enemy)
 - (1) Captured:
 - 2-57mm Recoilless Rifles
 - 104 SA wps
 - 1-.30 Cal MG
 - 32 tons of rice
 - 115 Grenades
 - 55-B-40 rockets
 - 2-B-40 rocket launchers
 - 90 rucksacks
 - 7 Bangalore torpedos
 - 11 Satchel charges
 - 10 protective masks
 - 48 M-79 rounds
 - 7,400 SA rounds
 - 44 Crew-served rounds
 - 3 PRC 10 radios
 - 6 Entrenching tools
 - 1 Medical supply bag
 - 1 Sewing machine

(2) Destroyed:
1-81mm mortar
1-Cricom LMG
2 Tons of rice
56 Cricom anti-personnel mines
35 60mm mortar rounds

2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel. None

b. Operations

(a) OBSERVATION: It has been noted during combined operations that the average ARVN soldier has a tendency to initiate ambushes prematurely.

(b) EVALUATION: ARVN Soldiers, even more so than US troopers, have a tendency to initiate ambushes prior to allowing the majority of the enemy element to enter the effective killing zone.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Combined US-ARVN pair off operations have decreased premature firing incidents. It is believed that the ARVN soldiers have truly learned that by waiting until the enemy is within 50 meters before opening fire, the ambush will produce results. The use of claymores was emphasized and the ARVN now have increased confidence in its safety and employment in an offensive role.

(2) Exchange of SOI's

(a) OBSERVATION: MACV and ARVN advisors and US unit leaders are issued different SOI's by higher headquarters.

(b) EVALUATION: During combined ARVN/US operations, communications have been hampered because MACV and ARVN advisors use different SOI's from US units. This problem has been alleviated by causing all units to exchange SOI's prior to commencement of the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That SOI's be exchanged during the planning phase of any combined operations.

(3) Effective Cordon and Search

(a) OBSERVATION: On 11 April 69, D/3-506 (-) and 2/A/3-506, effected a cordon in Bin Lam Hamlet vicinity AN860185, while 1/D/3-506 and 213 NPFV platoon conducted a search of the Hamlet.

(b) EVALUATION: The cordon elements were in position around Bin Lam Hamlet by 0700 hours 11 April 69; however, the NPFV did not initiate the search until 0800 hours. This delay allowed people in the hamlet time enough to hide items and VC suspects which they did not want discovered by the search teams.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An effective cordon and search operation requires fast and accurate cordon of the objective area and equally important, search teams must initiate their work in the objective area simultaneously with the final establishment of the cordon.

(4) ARVN Use of Marking Panels and Mirrors

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Marking panels and mirrors are effective methods to mark unit positions, reducing the possibility of compromising friendly unit positions.

(b) **EVALUATION:** US units have proven the effectiveness of fluorescent panels and signal mirrors for marking DZ's, PZ's and LZ's. Fluorescent panels are easy to identify by aircraft from high altitudes, i.e. 1500-2000 feet. Mirror flashes can easily be observed from the air, thus avoiding detection by the VC. Of course both methods are silent whereas smoke grenades when ignited make a distinguishable "pop" noise and attract more attention from enemy observation posts.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** US Units and ARVN advisors should employ mirrors and marking panels when marking their positions for DZ's, PZ's and LZ's.

C. Training

(1) Forest Penetrator and Stokes Litter

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Newly assigned soldiers in Vietnam are not familiar with medical evacuation procedures using the Forest Penetrator and Stokes Litter.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Whenever casualties are sustained and have to be evacuated and the vegetation is so dense that there no acceptable LZ's in the area, either a forest penetrator or a stokes liter will have to be employed by the MEDEVAC helicopter. When using the Stokes litter for medevac, the casualty should be placed in the litter and fasten the restraining straps across him. The forest penetrator is not a difficult apparatus to operate; however, unless instructed on its proper use, a soldier who has never used the forest penetrator may have complications. The casualty should be moved to the litter rather than moving the litter to the casualty.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** When replacements arrive to their assigned unit in Vietnam they should be given orientation on medical evacuation procedures including the use of the forest penetrator and Stokes litter.

(2) Armed Helicopter Employment

(a) **OBSERVATION:** When armed helicopters have been employed in support of a unit in contact it has been noted that improper adjustment procedures have hampered rapid employment.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Commanders and small unit leaders expecting to use armed helicopters in support of combat operations should be familiar with the correct procedure for employment of such aircraft. It has been noted in recent enemy contacts that vital time was lost while the unit commander on the ground attempted to explain to the pilots of the supporting aircraft where the enemy and friendly positions were located.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: G-3 Staff Sections should coordinate with aviation units and organize classes for commanders and small unit leaders on armed helicopter employment to be given during periods of stand down or preparation for future operations. Small unit leaders should be afforded the opportunity to fly in an armed helicopter to more fully understand what the pilot needs to know to engage enemy targets and to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the aircraft.

d. Intelligence

(1) COBRA Teams (COMBINED RECONNAISSANCE ARVN-AMERICAN TEAMS)

(a) OBSERVATION: COBRA Teams have been highly successful in gathering intelligence and engaging the enemy astride commo-liaison routes.

(b) EVALUATION: Documents captured from VC KIA by COBRA Teams have revealed enemy VCI within hamlets and villages as well as commo-liaison agents between NVA, VC Main Force, Local Force and guerrillas elements. The combined aspect of the reconnaissance teams offers immediate identification of the enemy units or quick determination of the importance of captured documents and material. In addition the COBRA Teams add professionalism as well as a detailed knowledge of the area and the enemy.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Combining LRP trained ARVN soldiers and American Reconnaissance personnel offers a unique and professional approach to Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols, and also assists in the upgrading of ARVN forces.

e. Logistics

(1) Water Resupply

(a) OBSERVATION: Combat Maneuver elements operating in dry terrain may request water resupply between normal ration resupply periods.

(b) EVALUATION: Maneuver elements should attempt to be self sustaining as long as possible between water resupplies. A normal period between water resupply is 3 to 5 days. Resupply aircraft activity increase the probability of compromising friendly unit locations. Units operating in dry areas may be forced to request water resupply between regular ration resupply periods.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Disposable water containers which may be air dropped are ideal for such an intermediate resupply. 175mm gun and 8" Howitzer cannisters are disposable and will eliminate having aircraft to return to a unit for backhaul of empty containers. These containers may be air dropped which will minimize the possibility of compromising friendly unit locations. When using 175mm gun and 8" Howitzer cannisters

for air-drop water containers, 8" - 10" expansion space should be allowed to preclude damage and loss of water when dropped.

f. Organization. None

g. Other. None

Manuel Alves

MANUEL A. ALVES

LTC, Infantry

Commanding

2 Incl

~~1. Combat After Action Report,~~

~~"HANGCOCK EAGLE"~~ Incl 1 wd Hq, DA, published separately as Combat After
Action Report 69X014

~~2. Combat After Action Report,~~

~~"HANGCOCK QUEEN"~~ Incl 2 wd Hq, DA, not published

AVBE-SC (FWD) (1 May 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report Lessons Learned (ORLL), 3d Qtr FY 69, 3d Bn
506th Abn Inf (Ambl)

Commanding Officer, Task Force South, APO 96204, 13 May 69

THRU: Commanding General, I FFORCEV (ATTN: G3 O & T) APO 96350

TO: AC of S for Force Development, DA (ACS for DA), Washington D.C. 20310

Attached Operational Report Lessons Learned (ORLL), 3d Qtr FY 69, 3d Bn,
506th Abn Inf (Ambl), is forwarded in compliance with USARV Regulation 525-
15.

FOR THE COMMANDER

William M. Kerens
For DAVID W. BENNETT
1LT EN
Adjutant


AVFA-GC-OT (1 May 69) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry for
Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

DA, Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam, APO 96350 8 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and 1st Indorsement and
concur.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


FREDERICK E. HOLLAND
1LT AGC
ASST AG

Copy Furns:
2-ACSPOR, DA
1-3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf

AVHGC-DST (3 May 69) 3d Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report, 3d Battalion (Abn), 506th Infantry, for
Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for
the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, 3d Battalion
(Airborne) 506th Infantry and concurs with the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



C. D. WILSON
1LT, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
3d Bn, 506th Inf
I FFV


GPOP-DT (3 May 69) 4th Ind (U)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 3d Bn (Abn), 506th Inf for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 JUL 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorse-
ments and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:


C. F. SHORT
COL, AGC
JUL 69

UNCLASSIFIED

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