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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310



IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (3 Sep 69)

FOR OT UT 692302

11 September 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Depot, Qui Nhon, Period Ending 30 April 1969

AD 859531

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Qui Nhon
APO San Francisco 96238

AVCA-QND-GM

7 May 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, ATTN:
AVCA-QN-GO, APO 96238
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA-GO-O,
APO 96373
Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-
DST, APO 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPDP-
OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

a. Since last reporting period, relocation of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon to Long My Valley (Grid Coordinate BR 994186) is progressing on schedule in accordance with USAD QN OPLAN 60-69 (Revised). The Headquarters, Troop Command was relocated on 15 February. This vastly improved the administrative control of the personnel located in Long My Valley. On 21 February, Troop Command Headquarters was visited by Brigadier General D. H. Richards, Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon. General Richards was briefed on the unit mission and current construction activities. The US Army Depot Command Group, Directorate for Supply and Transportation, and Directorate for Management were relocated on 22 March. The Directorate for Administration was relocated on 23 March and the Directorate for Security, Plans and Operations was relocated on 1 April. The new Depot Headquarters building at Long My was officially dedicated at an appropriate ceremony on 29 March 1969. Colonel Marshall M. Motes, Commanding Officer of the Depot, conducted the ceremony. The following distinguished guests were present:

Major General Joseph M. Heiser, Commanding General 1st Logistical
Command.

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Brigadier General D. H. Richards, Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon.

Brigadier General Frederick A. Shaefer, III, Deputy Commanding General, 4th Infantry Division.

Brigadier General Nguyen Van Hieu, Commanding General, 22nd ARVN Division. The ARVN contributed a platoon of troops and band for this ceremony.

b. The Facilities Division, from 1 February through 30 April 1969, directed, supervised and participated in the construction of the following:

- (1) Self Help Platoon- Construction
 - (a) 4 double story BM Billets, 20' x 100'
 - (b) 1 Troop Command Headquarters 20' x 96'
 - (c) 1 double story headquarters building, 20' x 100'
 - (d) 1 Dispensary 20' x 96' Quonset Hut
 - (e) 1 TOC Headquarters Bunker
 - (f) 1 Directorate for Services Bunker
 - (g) 1 Tailor Shop 20' x 40'
 - (h) 6 mobile homes relocated from Qui Nhon to Long My Valley
- (2) Self Help Platoon- Earth Moving
 - (a) Foundation and floor preparation for 7 buildings
 - (b) Graded and leveled trailer court site.
 - (c) Hauled 21,500 cubic yards of sand, gravel and fill dirt
 - (d) Constructed 8000 feet of road outside perimeter fence
 - (e) Dug 1 non-potable water well 30 feet deep.
 - (f) Constructed 1000 feet of secondary road
 - (g) Perimeter fence clearing - 300 man hours

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ENCLOSURE

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- (h) Depot road maintenance - 300 man hours
- (3) Self Help Platoon - Electrical
 - (a) Secondary and interior wiring for 9 double story buildings, 3 single story buildings, water point and trailer court
 - (b) Perimeter lights, installation and maintenance - 734 man hours
 - (c) Repair and Utilities activities - 1096 man hours
 - (4) Self Help Platoon - Plumbing
 - (a) Installed 15,000 feet of water line
 - (b) Converted Long My Depot to a potable/non-potable water distribution system
 - (c) Installed water distribution and sewage system for Long My Trailer Court
 - (d) Repair and Utilities activities - 900 man hours
 - (5) Self Help Platoon - Water Supply
 - (a) Non-potable - 3,600,000 gallons hauled
 - (b) Potable - 1,800,000 gallons hauled
 - (6) Communications Chief
 - (a) Established the communications PLL for Depot
 - (b) Installed the intercom system in Depot Headquarters, Long My
 - (c) Installed 2 telephone hot lines at Long My
 - (d) Installed 2 AN/VRC 46 radios on Depot 1/4 Ton vehicles
 - (e) Removed D/SP&O radios from Qui Nhon Depot and re-installed at Long My (2 VRC 46, 1-VRC 47, 2 RC - 292 antennas)
 - (f) Repaired 1 SB 86/P switchboard, 1 SB 22/PT switchboard, 16 field telephones, 12 handsets and microphones, 4 AN/PRC - 25 radios.
 - (g) Submitted requests for 2 class C telephones
 - (h) Continuous maintenance of all field wire lines

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- (1) 160 man hours expended on pre-IG inspection Team
- (7) Electrical Shop
 - (a) Removed three (3) air conditioners, cleaned and serviced for installation at Long My Valley
 - (b) Installed electric service with replacement of a breaker box in building TD 223
 - (c) Installed new 100 amp breaker box in QN consolidated mess hall
 - (d) Installed 25 receptacles in QN Depot area
 - (e) Made 6 service calls to Depot EM Club
 - (f) Made 8 service calls to Companies A & B
 - (g) Replaced 60 AMP breaker on nailing machine
 - (h) Perimeter light maintenance and replacement of 25 perimeter light bulbs
- (6) Fire Inspection
 - (a) Inspected 91 Cantonment buildings
 - (b) Inspected 2 mess halls
 - (c) Inspected 2 motor pools
 - (d) Inspected 5 outside storage areas
- (9) Sign Shop
 - (a) 419 assorted sizes of informational, unit and sections signs
 - (b) 15 assorted sizes of charts
 - (c) Painted 25 suggestion boxes
 - (d) Stenciled organizational markings on 2½ ton vehicles
- (10) Office Machine Repair
 - (a) Repaired 88 typewriters
 - (b) Repaired 6 Calculators

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- (c) Repaired 13 Adding machines
- (d) Repaired 3 Thermo-fax machines
- (e) Repaired 1 duplicator
- (11) Box/Pallet Division
 - (a) 36,385 pallets of assorted sizes
 - (b) 3,570 assorted size boxes for packing, retrograde and storage
 - (c) 4 gate guard buildings
 - (d) 11 perimeter bunkers
 - (e) 7 field latrines
 - (f) 12 Local National check point tables
 - (g) 3 Depot organization signs and frames
 - (h) 800 louver nailer blocks
 - (i) 1 - 10 x 12 steam cleaner shed
 - (j) 1 movie screen
 - (k) 1 septic tank
 - (l) 6 - 15 foot culverts
 - (m) 1 conference table
 - (n) 8 distribution boxes
 - (o) 500 shipping chock blocks
 - (p) 350 feet of picket fence
 - (q) 200 feet of drainage trough
 - (r) 3 equipment storage boxes
 - (s) 7 IBM retrograde boxes

c. The Property Book Division during this period, accomplished the following significant actions:

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(1) Processed 1,869 documents; TDA 361, Installation 389, and 1,198 expendables.

(2) Processed approximately 50 hand receipt changes for TDA property.

d. Operating Equipment Division: From 1 February through 30 April 1969, this division continued its depot mission of organizational maintenance of equipment and providing transportation support for inter and intra depot operations. During the period 16 February to 9 March 1969 the Transportation Section provided support to the 8th Transportation Group. At the Long My Motor Pool a self-help program was initiated to construct an office, PLL storage dispatch and driver testing facilities. A wash rack was completed at the Qui Nhon Motor Pool and has improved maintenance capability.

e. The Directorate for Supply and Transportation reported the following significant activities:

(1) On 21 February 1969, Project Count II undertook the mission of completing a 100% inventory of all US Army Depot, Qui Nhon assets. This inventory is to be completed on or about 29 August 1969. Thus far Project Count has inventoried a total of 32,759 lines, or approximately 24% of the total lines presently on the Availability Balance File. Of the FSN's inventoried 11,419 agreed with recorded balances, 10,858 showed overages and 10,482 were short of recorded balances. Thus far Project Count has "found" 4745 lines not recorded on the Availability Balance File. Quality Control and Quality Assurance checks over Project Count inventory have revealed an average of 89% overall accuracy. Personnel of the Management Office, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon are presently conducting extensive studies to assure that the accuracy developed by Project Count is not lost during processing of inventory data.

(2) Project STRIP. (a) The Operations Control Office completed, on 7 March 1969, its coordination and supervision for preparation and movement of excess material from the 4th Infantry Division and 173d Airborne Brigade.

(a) 4th Infantry Division Data. Serviceable material retrograded included 1272 short tons for US Army Depot, Qui Nhon retention, 66 short tons for thru put, and 2 short tons for lateral distribution (total 1340 short tons) valued at 3.88 million dollars. Unserviceable material retrograded included 1592 short tons valued at 4.46 million dollars.

(b) 173d Airborne Brigade Data. Serviceable material retrograded included 1310 short tons for US Army Depot, Qui Nhon retention, 109 short tons for thru put, and 15 short tons for lateral distribution (total 1434 short tons) valued at 1.12 million dollars.

(3) An Operations Control Office representative, as a member of USARV

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inventory team, conducted an inventory of the Americal Division during the period 1 - 5 April 1969. The Operations Control Office thereafter will be responsible for coordination and supervision of the preparation and movement of excess material from the Americal Division. Action began 7 April 1969 on 1783 lines approximating 1365 short tons valued at 4.07 million dollars.

(4) Kick Box Program. The Kick Box Program is a concerted effort to identify and nominate on-site Depot bulk excess for retrograde. The Operation Control Office Kick Box field team, between 21 March and 28 April 1969, surveyed 1,952 items; generated 721 location changes in storage; generated 115 stock status adjustments; and nominated 25,842 short tons for retrograde.

(5) Qui Nhon Storage Branch.

(a) There was no official change in the mission of the Qui Nhon Storage Branch. However, the organizational structure did change. The Shipping and Mailing Sections were taken over by the Transportation Division. The Receiving Section and Storage Area "B" were moved to Long My Depot.

(b) The Storage Branch experienced a loss of 28 personnel due to CONUS rotation. Of the 6 officers authorized in the Storage Branch only one is presently assigned. No replacements have been received since January 1969. The Chief, Storage Branch rotated on 1 February 1969; and the Operations Officer took over as Chief. 40 personnel were transferred to Long My Storage Branch. Under the re-warehousing program, 95 short tons were re-warehoused in February and 87 short tons in March, for a total of 182 short tons. Most of the re-warehousing was in Location 21. The relocation of supplies from Qui Nhon Storage Branch to Long My slowed down during February and half of March due to a shortage of transportation. From 23 March 1969 to 23 April 1969, 1,112 short tons involving 4,560 line items were moved to Long My and 4,717 locations were killed in Qui Nhon. The following locations have been moved or discontinued since 23 March 1969: Warehouse 15; Warehouse 16; Location 02; Warehouse 20; Locations 033, 038, 053, 032, in the repair parts area. On 20 February 1969, a command retrograde program began on all excess supplies. From 20 February 1969 (when processing of MRD's began) until 14 April 1969, 1595 short tons were retrograded. Shipments included 1069 tons to Okinawa, 467 tons to Japan, and the remaining to Cam Ranh and Long Binh Depots.

(c) In comparison with the previous quarter's report, MRO's processed increased and MRD's decreased. Report of MRO performance is included in Inclosure 1.

(d) Training in the new J.SVN supply system continued. By now the majority of storage personnel are well acquainted with the system. Local

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Nationals have been attending classes in typing and military correspondence conducted by the Qui Nhon Civilian Personnel Office and forklift operation taught by the Depot. Both classes have proven valuable. Depot employees finished high in their classes and are now adding much to the efficiency of operation.

(6) Long My Storage Branch. The period 1 February through 30 April 1969 was spent accomplishing the depot mission, plus re-warehousing supplies to accommodate the continuing move from Qui Nhon to Long My. Also during this period one bulk storage warehouse was converted to a pallet rack warehouse and one new warehouse was constructed to accommodate the clothing items being transferred from Qui Nhon to Long My. This branch received and processed approximately 160,000 Material Release Orders.

(7) Location 40. The mission of Area 40 is the receipt, issue and storage of Class I, non-perishable and II and IV supplies specified in the depot stockage list. This quarter, Area 40 has received 1067 short tons of Class I and 1975 short tons of Class II and IV. Plans for the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon indicate Area 40's Class I will be attrited out with all incoming receipts going to the Qui Nhon Class I yard. Since 7 March 1969, Area 40 has not received any Class I supplies and has shipped 7058 short tons of Class I and 3794 short tons of Class II and IV. The most significant shipment of the reporting period was 1220 short tons of Class I between 4 and 7 March 1969. 2900 tons of Class II and IV were re-warehoused expending a total of 3400 man hours. Project Count II has again been active in its inventory and location efforts. Although final results cannot be determined until completion of the 6 month count, observation and investigation indicate that effort will be extremely valuable to the depot. The depot's retrograde program has also been of great importance this quarter. A total of 2467 tons have been shipped with an additional 240 tons awaiting transportation. These figures indicate an increase of over 2100 tons from the previous reporting period.

(8) Stock Control Division. From 1 February through 30 April 1969, the Stock Control Division processed the following:

(a) Normal Issues	122,426
(b) Post-Post Issues	12,219
(c) B/O Release Issues	42,758
(d) B/O Release-Substitute Issues	2,638
(e) B/O Established	97,212
(f) Exceptions Processed	377,174

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(g) Lines Passed 79,403
(h) Retrograded 30,000

(9) Class I Division. During this reporting period significant changes have occurred in the Class I Yard as follows:

(a) Class I shipping and receiving operations are now being performed on a 24 hours per day basis. It was determined that the majority of requested vehicles for movement were arriving in the evening after return from convoy thus making it necessary to re-adjust our workload over a 24 hour period to conform to this same pattern.

(b) Several physical changes in the area have improved the operation. These changes include the following: Semi-improved open storage area has been constructed using 4 x 4's and PSP and one general storage warehouse with 26,400 square feet has been gained.

(c) The Class I mission is to supply subsistence in Northern II Corps Area and has assumed responsibility for fully supplying Tuy Hoa as of 23 March 1969. Class I support is provided Air Force, ROKV and US Army personnel in that area. Total tonnage processed during report period:

	<u>Received</u>	<u>Shipped</u>
Perishable	12,903 S/T	13,148 S/T
Non-perishable	9,169 S/T	18,215 S/T

(10) Collection, Classification and Segregation Division. During the report period, a continuing study and evaluation has been conducted of the operations of the various organizational segments for the elimination of operating deficiencies and improvements in work simplification and cost reduction planning. These efforts are producing tangible results such as improvements in the timeliness and the accuracy of accounting and reporting procedures as well as in operating techniques. For example, considerable time and cost savings have been achieved thru the processing and cleaning of retrograde equipment on incoming transport thereby eliminating off-loading and reloading prior to haul to the port facility. A major improvement has been achieved in the grading of roads within the CO&S operating area. Material is currently on hand for treatment of these dirt roads to all-weather condition. Other actions to expedite handling of material include a construction project for a concrete loading ramp to facilitate loading and off-loading of Sea/Land vans. The arrival of a newly assigned military chief, Major Dale E. Coy, has resulted in major improvement in both short and long range planning for correction of deficiencies and the development of better operating procedures.

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f. Directorate for Automatic Data Processing. (1) During the months of February, March and April, the Directorate for Automatic Data Processing concerned itself with running the daily, weekly, and monthly cycles of 3SVN; with implementing automated procedures in support of Project Count II; and organizing the procedures for running the Field Stock Record Support System. The processing of daily, weekly, and monthly 3SVN cycles met with only minor system difficulties. Most difficulties encountered could be attributed to the establishment of a workable interface between the United States Army Inventory Control Center, Vietnam and the United States Army Depot, at Qui Nhon.

(2) Cycle statistics for the months of February, March and April 1969 are listed in the following tables:

(a) Cycles Run per Month

	<u>Daily</u>	<u>Weekly</u>	<u>Monthly</u>
February	17	4	1
March	21	4	1
April	14	4	1

(b) Transaction Data

	<u>Input</u>	<u>MROS</u>
February	337,869	54,030
March	625,956	68,912
April	629,690	77,063

(c) Demand Accommodation and Satisfaction

	<u>B/A</u>	<u>D/S</u>
February	86%	65%
March	88%	77%*
April	87%	61%

*This computation utilized A4 referral orders in the computation.

(3) One of the more significant projects undertaken was the quarterly Due Out Reconciliation. This procedure is comprised of two basic parts.

(a) The first phase is concerned with an analysis of the Customer Status and Performance File for all due out that are over 89 days old.

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Cards are then created on these dues out. Customers are then requested to indicate their desire to have their respective dues out cancelled, modified, or retained by entering the proper advice code on the due out reconciliation card and returning it to Stock Control. This was accomplished during mid March.

(b) The second part of this reconciliation is the running of the Create Due Out Reversal Tape when all reconciliation cards have been returned. This tape then updates the Customer Status and Performance File and cancels or modifies the records on the Due Out File. This was accomplished during the latter part of April. Another important project undertaken was the conversion of military pay handled by 13th Finance Disbursing Station to automated procedures. The analysis of the problem and the writing of the necessary programs was accomplished during March. During this same period coordination was effected between 13th Finance and the Directorate for Automatic Data Processing in order to clearly establish areas of responsibility, schedules, and units to be included on the first runs of this system. The Military Pay Processing System consists of 11 Univac 1005 computer runs. These load all data changes received during the current month, automatically calculate tax and income changes, and print military pay vouchers. An integral part of this system is a Pay File Audit which edits all punched items for correctness and then produces an error listing of cards not punched correctly. As of April 1969, a total of 1073 accounts have been converted to this system. These units are HHC, 41st Signal Bn; 160th Maintenance Co; HHD, US Army Support Command; and the 593d General Support Group.

(c) Data service support to Project Count II was another project undertaken. Project Count II is a 100 percent Depot-wide inventory. This inventory is accomplished by the freezing of selected Federal Stock Classes for a period of 10 days during which inventories and locations are recorded for all items within the selected FSC. Program development for Project Count II was developed by the DPU at the United States Army Depot, Long Binh. These programs consisted of 14 7010 runs and 16 1460 runs. The program packages arrived in early February. However, because of insufficient documentation and of incomplete programs, extensive program maintenance was required to make all Project Count programs operable. This was an especially pressing requirement because the first count inventory was scheduled to be performed on 19 February 1969. The Directorate met this requirement. Basically, the Project Count II programs prepare duplicate DKA (Inventory) cards for each item within the FSC that is frozen. Additional blank DKA cards are produced for any items which are found during the FSC inventory. These DKA cards are then compared; and if there is an error in the count of more than 10 percent or if the dollar value is more than \$100, a third

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count is made to confirm the data from the original count cards. The final product of this procedure is the "Over/Under" Report and the punching of ZL1 (Location) Cards, and D8 and D9 (credit and debit) Cards. This punched output is then entered into the next daily locator and transaction cycles.

(d) Responsibility for the Army Field Stock Record Support program has changed from the 2d Logistical Command, Okinawa to the 1st Logistical Command. The US Army Depots of the 1st Logistical Command are designated as stock record support activities for their respective authorized Army requisitioners. Each authorized customer of the supporting Depot will receive the following Stock Record Support "package". Customers without data processing equipment receive pre-printed title inserts for items authorized; decks of pre-punched requisitions DA FORM 2765 for each item on their ASL; listings reflecting pertinent changes in item nomenclature, price, stock number, unit of issue or FIA status; listings of currently authorized stockage list items with the applicable interchangeable and substitute stock numbers, at least quarterly. Those customers with data processing equipment receive the listings and punch cards reflecting changes in catalogue data for items on their ASL, and listings of currently authorized stockage list items with the applicable interchangeable and substitute stock number, at least quarterly. The system which processes the data and generates the listings and documents for Stock Record Support consists of six 7010 computer runs and nine 1460 computer runs. These programs arrived at the Directorate for Data Processing from Hq. 1st Logistical Command in early April. Not one program was fully documented and none were immediately operational despite the fact that 1st Log had stated that the first Stock Record Support cycle would be completed by 10 April 1969. After extensive research and program maintenance, this first Stock Record Support cycle was run by the Directorate, and data was distributed to supported customers by the end of April.

g. In accordance with the Army wide policy of recognition for outstanding service, many personnel were recommended for awards during the reporting period. A list of awards presented to individuals of this command is indicated below:

APPROVED AWARDS

	<u>FEB</u>	<u>MAR</u>	<u>APR</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Soldier Medal	1	0	0	1
Bronze Star Medal	6	4	5	15
Army Commendation Medal	17	13	12	42
Certificate of Achievement	<u>6</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>29</u>
TOTALS	30	28	29	87

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h. Several key personnel changes took place during the period:

(1) LTC Carl Davaz, Chief Storage Branch Long My was reassigned to the 62d Maintenance Battalion as Commanding Officer on 7 February 1969.

(2) LTC Pierre J. Dolan from the 394th Transportation Battalion was assigned to the Depot as Director for Management on 19 February 1969.

(3) LTC James W. Helt was assigned as Depot Chaplain for a period of six weeks, replacing Major John McLean who returned to CONUS on 19 February 1969.

(4) LTC Roger V. Crowson, then Director for Security Plans and Operations was reassigned to US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon as Chief of Staff on 2 March 1969.

(5) LTC Coyle H. O'Neal, Jr arrived in the Depot and was assigned as Director for Administration replacing LTC Edwin A. Dayton who was reassigned to 1st Logistical Command on 3 March 1969.

(6) LTC Frank W. Richnak was assigned to the Depot as Director for Security, Plans and Operations on 11 March 1969.

(7) LTC James W. Helt, reassigned to 1st Logistical Command was replaced by Major John A. Deveaux as Depot Chaplain on 26 March 1969.

(8) LTC George A. Finter assumed command of Troop Command during a change of command ceremony at Headquarters, Troop Command, Long My, on 26 April 1969. Outgoing commander was LTC William T. Duba who returned to CONUS.

i. Personnel status of the Depot as of 1 February 1969 and 30 April 1969 is indicated below:

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned (1 Feb 69)</u>	<u>Assigned (1 Apr 69)</u>
Officers	110	92	86
Warrant Officers	15	12	15
Enlisted	2117	2129	1864
D.A.'S	61	36	12
Local Nationals	1223	1054	1206

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j. As in the past, the Depot was visited by many distinguished persons both military and civilians. A list of prominent visitors is indicated below:

VISITORS TO THE US ARMY DEPOT, QUI NHON

Rear Admiral John H. Maurer, Chairman CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board

Major General Raymond O. Conroy, ACoFS, Logistics, J-4, MACV

Major General William A. Henmark, The Inspector General, Dept of the Army

Major General Joseph M. Heiser, Jr, Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, Vietnam

Major General Shelton E. Lollis, Commanding General, US Army Tank Automotiv Command, Detroit, Michigan

Major General George L. Mabry, Jr, Chief of Staff (Designate) USARV

Major General Noble F. Schlatter, Commanding General, 86th ARCOM

Brigadier General Allen M. Burdett, Jr, Commanding General, 1st Aviation Brigade

Brigadier General Ross R. Condit, Member CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board

Brigadier General John D. Crowley, Member CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board

Brigadier General John D. McLaughlin, Member CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board

Brigadier General William J. Durrenberger, Member CINCPAC Joint Transportation Board

Colonel Robert G. Cramer, Chief, Plans Division, G-4, USARPAC

Colonel William E. Dyer, Chief, Customer Assistance Office, RVN (AMC)

k. Security, Plans and Operations. (1) Effective 1 February 1969, General Orders 150, Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon attached the 387th Transportation Company (TS) to United States Army Depot, Qui Nhon temporarily for a period not to exceed 90 days.

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Approximately 250 Local National employees and 10 NCO's from the unit were to be used for renovation and construction of security barriers and facilities at United States Army Depot locations. The Local National labor was utilized to clear 460,000 square meters of jungle growth in the Long My area. 55 EM from the unit were assigned to the Qui Nhon Storage Branch. The same General Orders authorized the creation of another troop unit for US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, Company F (Provisional), with authorized strength of 2 Officers, 98 NCO's and 300 EM.

(2) In anticipation of the TET Offensive, the city of Qui Nhon was placed off limits to US personnel for the period 14 - 22 February 1969. Each night during this period the Qui Nhon Installation alert condition was changed from WHITE to GRAY. Local National employees did not work on the 18th, 19th and 20th in observance of the holiday.

(3) On 23 February 1969, the expected spring enemy offensive began in the Qui Nhon area. The ARVN Ammunition Supply Point in the Depot Defense Sector was blown up; Depot Location #42 received small arms fire and two mortar rounds; guards at the Laterite Hill Water Point within the Depot Defense Sector received small arms fire resulting in three slightly wounded; one suspect was fired upon and killed outside perimeter area at Camp Granite, another US Army Depot Defense area compound; also on the same evening the US Ammunition Base Depot at Phu Tai operated by the 184th Ordnance Battalion had several pads destroyed by sappers. On the evenings of 23 and 24 February the Qui Nhon Installation alert status was YELLOW.

(4) On 4-5 March 1969 a Counter Intelligence inspection was conducted by 524th Military Intelligence Detachment (CI).

(5) On 6 March 1969, the 84th Engineer Battalion utilized the mortar squad operated by Company B, 41st Signal Battalion, Vung Chua Mountain Signal site on suspected enemy movements near the 84th Engineer Battalion perimeter. Both units were within the Depot Defense Sector known as Sub-Installation Charlie.

(6) On 20 March 1969, an 8-10 man sapper team successfully penetrated POL Tank Farm #2 blowing up the remaining four tanks still in use after the 3 January 1969 attack on the same location. Sappers entered at almost the same place as previously and were able to place charges at the base of three tanks without being detected. There were no friendly casualties. Some enemy were wounded as pools of blood were found on escape routes. Again the US Ammunition Base Depot at Phu Tai was attacked, and in conjunction, a small arms attack was waged on US Army Depot, Location #40, resulting in one US personnel killed and one wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown. At a

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result of the series of successful sapper attacks in the Qui Nhon area, security postures were seriously studied with a view towards construction and renovating. On 26 March 1969, a list of needs was submitted to Headquarters, United States Army Support Command, Qui Nhon to include weapons, ammunition, guard towers, bunkers, lighting equipment and the engineer support to install the equipment.

(7) During March 1969 several plans were drawn for the role which the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon will play in the following projects: Operations Steel Cable, Project Buddy, Project Skills I, and the new defense plan for US Army Depot and attached units. With the move to Long My the Depot is no longer defense coordinator for units immediately west of Qui Nhon but has assumed responsibility for defense coordination of a new and smaller group of units in the Phu Tai/Long My area. The Qui Nhon Installation is no longer organized into sub-installations but is presently composed of 12 compound complexes. New operations orders, letters of instructions, SOI's and regulations were either published or drafted for publication to effect a smooth transition of the new system in this new area of responsibility.

(8) At 1200 hours on 1 April 1969, Director of Security, Plans and Operations, moved from the Qui Nhon location of US Army Depot, Qui Nhon to the new Long My location. Simultaneously, the old sub-installation system of defense coordination for the Qui Nhon Installation was eliminated and replaced by the compound complex system. US Army Depot assumed responsibilities for an area known as Compound Complex Delta, one of 12 compound complexes in the Qui Nhon Defense Installation. This area is smaller in area, number of units and personnel strength than the former sub-installation controlled by US Army Depot. Through a series of meetings and proposed OPLAN, the coordinated change was effected without encountering any serious problems.

(9) During the period 15-17 April 1969, the MACV Inspector General's Security Inspection Team visited US Army Depot. No major deficiencies were noted. Minor deficiencies are in the process of being corrected.

(10) On 26 April 1969, at approximately 2300 hours, two local national civilians, supposedly from adjacent Long My hamlet, were apprehended while cutting the barbed wire on the outside of the perimeter fence at Long My Depot. The two were taken to the Qui Nhon Combined Police Station for interrogation by Military Intelligence Officers. One of the two was carrying M26A fragmentation grenades.

1. A record of Performance Data is included at Inclosure 1.

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2. Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendation.

a. Personnel (1) Project Count II

(a) OBSERVATION: Due to the tedious nature of continuous inventory activity, it is difficult to inspire personnel to a continuing desire for production and accuracy. In order to develop incentive and reward those who are doing outstanding work continuously, Project Count developed the "Individual/Team Accuracy and Achievement Report".

(b) EVALUATION: This report is developed by controlling each count card and individual to which it is issued. The number of count cards completed by each individual is then totaled. When the third count card listing is received, the serial numbers are reviewed to determine which individuals are making the least or most errors. Based on the findings of these observations, outstanding individuals are publicly recognized and are appropriately rewarded. This report not only isolates the outstanding performance but also makes public those individuals who are hurting the team effort by not accomplishing their portion of the mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each depot operation devise similar controls in order that outstanding individuals may be appropriately recognized for their continuous efforts.

(2) Operating Equipment Division.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the entire reporting period the Operating Equipment Division operated with a critical shortage of mechanics (MOS 63C) and heavy truck drivers (MOS 64B).

(b) EVALUATION: These shortages adversely affected the Division mission. Assistance was obtained for mechanics but the heavy truck driver situation is still critical.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued effort be given to alleviate these shortages.

(3) Utilization of Local Nationals.

(a) OBSERVATION: The training of Local National personnel in forklift operation, MRO processing, and clerical work has proven to be of great value in compensating for the shortage of military personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: To properly support a storage operation it is essential that experienced and trained personnel be available in sufficient numbers in proportion to the workload and mission requirements. Because of the lack of military personnel and fast turnover rate, it becomes increasingly necessary to look to and depend on the local national work force as a

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prime source to fill the void presented by shortages in trained military personnel. Once trained to operate equipment, fill MRQ's and accomplish clerical work, they become a prolific source of permanent labor and skilled workers. Thus, they assure continuity in storage operations, regardless of military losses. In addition they free military personnel for supervision.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That programs for training of Local Nationals be increased and greater emphasis be placed on formal training in all areas.

(4) Inspection and Identification Activities (I&I)

(a) **OBSERVATION:** Meaningful improvement in I&I ability to affirm or deny the findings in Technical Inspection Reports performed on incoming unserviceable vehicles has been denied due to a lack of MOS qualified inspectors.

(b) **EVALUATION:** TDA authorization of inspectors is 22 enlisted men in the several MOS ratings for armament, signal, engineering, quartermaster, tactical and tracked vehicles, etc. Present assigned personnel in this area is 4 of which one is in the hospital and one on emergency leave. Other personnel are willing workers but are not technically qualified.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** Major effort by all elements and echelons to provide I&I with MOS qualified personnel.

b. Operations. (1) Security, Plans and Operations

(a) **OBSERVATION:** US Army Depots in RVN are organized on MIDA along the lines of comparable Depots in CONUS. As such the Security, Plans and Operations was eliminated and Troop Command was to assume its mission and function.

(b) **EVALUATION:** Depots located in remote combat areas of Vietnam must have the capability to defend themselves against enemy attacks. When the Depot locations are separated by several miles and not surrounded by friendly units, the requirement for defensive measures both active and passive is greatly increased. The Security/Intelligence planning and supervision necessary under such circumstances is beyond the capability of Troop Command. A staff section at Directorate level capable of planning and coordinating the security, training and intelligence operation of the Depot under combat conditions is essential.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** That recognition be given to the requirement for a Directorate for Security, Plans and Operations to provide policy guidance and staff supervision pertinent to operations, planning, task organization of command, command inspection, training security and defense of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon and any units attached for defense coordination.

(2) Operating Equipment Division.

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(a) OBSERVATION: MTRDA equipment authorizations are still not approved and required equipment cannot be requisitioned.

(b) EVALUATION: The lack of equipment has significantly hampered the mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That continued effort be made to obtain approval of section III of the MTRDA.

(3) Accounting for MRO's in Float During Inventories.

(a) OBSERVATION: In the course of the cyclic inventory presently conducted, Project Count II has been subtracting quantities on MRO's in float from totals gained by physical inventories in the field.

(b) EVALUATION: Quantities on MRO's in float have already been deducted from the Availability Balance File, but the stock is still in location. Since this stock is counted during the physical inventory, the quantities on the MRO's in float must be deducted from the physical count total. This insures that a correct overall balance is entered on the Availability Balance File.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that all inventories, to include all special inventories, take into account MRO's in float prior to posting quantities to the Availability Balance File.

(4) Area Care and Preservation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Because of the limitations of personnel and equipment of the Depot Care and Preservation Section, located at the Qui Nhon Storage Branch, they are not capable of handling the volume of materials we presently have which require care and preservation.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been necessary to supplement C & P production by establishing a local C & P area in the open storage location. Much of the material requiring C & P only requires repacking because of damaged containers. Since Depot Care and Preservation is not equipped to handle the large volume and bin locations cannot accommodate the material, it sometimes sat in a holding area where often it was damaged by rain or pilfered. Also a large backlog developed. In order to alleviate this problem wooden boxes were ordered from Services Division. Whenever material required only transfer from a damaged container to one that was serviceable, personnel at the storage location accomplished this and returned the material back to stock. When this program was put into effect the backlog was quickly cleared away and materials expeditiously returned to stock.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Continue the present area C & P operation until the

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Depot Care and Preservation Section is able to accommodate the volume, or the move to Long My is completed.

(5) Improper Handling of Commodities.

(a) OBSERVATION: Supplies shipped from CONUS are arriving in an unserviceable, unstorable condition.

(b) EVALUATION: Because of the numerous times the supplies are handled, and the various types of banding used, most of which is too small, storage areas are plagued with a very large recouping burden. Approximately 4,000 man hours were spent during this reporting period, recouping unserviceable commodities. This particular problem hinders accomplishment of the primary mission, which is to receive, store and issue supplies. Repacking and preservation should take up no more than 10 percent of receipts and issues but is now running 25 to 50 percent.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Closer supervision of personnel responsible for the on and off loading of commodities, from CONUS to storage yards. Also, adequate banding material should be utilized in banding supplies shipped.

(6) Convoy Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: During the past 3 months, the Equipment Storage Section, Cha Rang Storage Branch, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, has transported in convoy approximately 1,500 vehicles, including M48A3 combat tanks and 290M tractors, along the 22 mile route between the point of debarkation and the storage location. Prior to dissemination of US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, QNSC Regulation 210-2, escort vehicles were designated by use of flashing red lights, and "escort vehicles" signs. While properly marked, no injuries to life or property occurred. On receipt of the above regulation all markings were removed from escort vehicles. Vietnamese, Korean, and US personnel give no attention to unmarked vehicles. While operating without identification, a total of four accidents occurred that could have been prevented if escorts had been marked. A letter requesting exception to the regulation was submitted to US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, on 29 February 1969, and no written reply has been received.

(b) EVALUATION: Properly identified escort vehicles contribute to the preservation of lives and property.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Vehicles providing escort to large tracked and wheeled equipment should be identified in order to allow advance road clearance on convoy routes.

(7) Safety Convoy Operation.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Prior to 24 April 1969, convoys dispatched by this location for transporting vehicles being shipped by LST were permitted to utilize the causeway on the DeLong Pier to insure a safe, direct route. On 24 April this location was notified that this route was closed to traffic enroute to LST docking facility. Convoys must now utilize Qui Nhon city routes which are narrow and crowded with traffic. Convoy operations are slow and very hazardous to normal city traffic and pedestrians.

(b) EVALUATION: Routes presently provided to convoys to the LST facility are not in keeping with the command's safety policies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Safer, more direct routes should be provided to convoy operations to and from the LST facility.

(6) Armored Personnel Carrier Procedures.

(a) OBSERVATION: To date this storage area has furnished on a repeated basis chains, and binders, to the transportation unit moving heavy vehicles and equipment to forward areas. Approximately 6500 feet of chain and 500 binders have been furnished but not returned.

(b) EVALUATION: The repeated loss of chain and binders is a needless waste of Government funds. The transportation unit is neither preserving nor returning the "loaned" items.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Transportation units should be required to furnish chains, binders, and any other equipment and material necessary to the proper loading of heavy vehicles and equipment with the exception of personnel. Transportation units should be required to maintain such equipment in order to provide continued use for the intended purpose.

(9) Inspection and Classification of Unserviceable Equipment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Under present conditions the Unserviceable Property Division is unable to properly verify or deny Technical Inspection findings reported by maintenance support organizations rendering such reports. This is especially true where a bent or cracked frame is reported on vehicles heavily coated with mud and road tar to a degree which makes it obvious that a meaningful technical inspection was not conducted to support such findings.

(b) EVALUATION: Supporting DSU/GSU should be required to perform a proper technical inspection of all equipment turned in to Unserviceable Property Division as Not Repairable This Station (NRTS). Unserviceable Property Division inspection is intended to be a verification of such DSU/GSU technical inspections. Also, DSU/GSU findings of bent or cracked frame should note approximate position of such damage and frame member marked at such location. Since determination of actual frame damage is of

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primary importance in classification of equipment for rebuild or disassembly and disposal thru Property Disposal Officer, this is a matter of prime importance in operation of the Unserviceable Property (I&I) Division.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Command action to provide DSU/GSU capability of performing their mission responsibility relative to technical inspection and proper Technical Inspection Reports on equipment being turned in to Unserviceable Property Division as NRTS.

(10) Removal of Recoverable or Needed Components from Code H, Disassembled Items.

(a) OBSERVATION: No definite demands are placed on the Disassembly Branch by the DSU/GSU units as to parts needed. Last list was furnished Disassembly Branch 4 February 1969. Quantities furnished at this time were not realistic. This resulted in DSU/GSU units refusing to accept parts after their immediate needs were filled.

(b) EVALUATION: Removal of components not needed by DSU/GSU or Depot for rebuild is time consuming and results in unnecessary work.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that a listing be published monthly on the parts needed by DSU/GSU units and depot overhaul facilities, both for mandatory recoverable and needed items. This would result in a tremendous savings by securing parts needed and no longer removing parts not needed. Items which are only rarely received by Unserviceable Property Division activity could be handled on an individual basis. Normally these items can be held in the cannibalization point until recoverable components list could be received.

c. Training.

(1) 3 SVN Training of Newly Assigned Personnel.

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(a) OBSERVATION: Newly assigned personnel in the Stock Control Division are not fully trained in 3 SVN.

(b) EVALUATION: Numerous errors are being made because personnel are not familiar with 3 SVN procedures or formats.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Require that all new personnel assigned to Depots in Vietnam attend a 3 day familiarization class on 3 SVN upon assignment to the Depot.

(2) OJT of Technical Inspectors in Lieu of Formal MOS Qualification.

(a) OBSERVATION: The extreme shortage of MOS qualified inspectors requires maximum use of OJT for the untrained and inexperienced personnel presently assigned to I&I Division.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of untrained personnel to verify Technical Inspection findings rendered by DSU/GSU, does not permit meaningful inspection of in-coming unserviceable vehicles. Since a detailed inspection and complete Technical Inspection Report are a primary requisite for proper classification of such equipment to determine repairable or non-repairable status (Code F or Code H), vehicles are evacuated to Okinawa as Code F, economically repairable when they are actually Code H uneconomically repairable. The opposite is also true. Thus, in lieu of qualified inspector it is necessary to use the OJT to the degree possible under the work load involved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Maximum effort be made to provide Unserviceable Property Division with MOS qualified personnel for proper inspection and classification on incoming unserviceable vehicles; that OJT continue on an accelerated basis; that MOS qualified inspectors be placed on TDY with Unserviceable Property Division from adjacent DSU/GSU to aid in OJT and proper inspection and classification of vehicles.

d. Intelligence. Security, Plans and Operations.

(1) OBSERVATION: Enemy sappers gained entry through a US perimeter on 2 January 1969 and again on 20 March 1969 at approximately the same location.

(2) EVALUATION: The enemy has learned to utilize effectively all natural cover and concealment, capitalizing on poor perimeter lighting and ineffective perimeter fences. After one successful entry they were able to enter the same compound employing the same methods at a later date in approximately the same location.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Perimeter fences must be upgraded to form an

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effective barrier to enemy sappers. Engineer effort must be applied to remove the cover and concealment which provides enemy sappers easy access to US compounds. Guard towers must be positioned to permit Security Guards to maintain continuous surveillance over the outer perimeter with adequate lighting to detect intruders.

e. Logistics. 1-1/4 and 2 Inch Banding

(1) OBSERVATION: 1-1/4 and 2 inch banding is ideal to combat the problem encountered in securing loads on line haul vehicles. This size banding does not stretch enroute and is easily secured by the Vietnamese laborers employed by the contractor. Loads from Cha Rang, due to the tonnage involved and a lack of proper banding, have shifted on trailers enroute to Pleiku. This is hazardous to the driver as well as causing damage to vital cargo.

(2) EVALUATION: The shortage of proper banding material adversely affects operational capability. In order to prevent cargo from shifting a ratio of 4 strands of 5/8 inch banding is required for each 2 inch band.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Proper size banding be made available.

f. Organization - None

g. Other. Use of Sandbags in Towers and Bunkers.

(1) OBSERVATION: After a period of exposure sandbags used in tower and bunker construction deteriorate causing additional labor and expense to rebuild these structures.

(2) EVALUATION: US Army Depot, Qui Nhon has commenced manufacturing concrete blocks to replace sandbags in bunkers and towers. Use of these blocks will result in considerable savings of manpower and material by eliminating the requirement for future reconstruction.

(3) RECOMMENDATION: Original construction of defensive structures should be of concrete blocks.

3. Section 3. Escape, Evasion or Survival - None.

TEL: Phu Thanh 978

Theme T. Everton
THEME T. EVERTON
COL, GMC
Commanding

~~1 Incl~~

Performance Data

Incl wd Hq, DA

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AVCA QN-GO-H (11 Jun 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, US Army Support Command, Qui Nhon, APO 96238 16 JUN 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O,
APO 96384

1. (U) The Operational Report, Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 has been reviewed by this headquarters and the following comments are submitted.

a. SECTION 2, paragraph a (1): Concur. The proposed "Individual/Team Accuracy and Achievement Report" will assist in the identification and rewarding of those individuals who continuously perform in an outstanding manner.

b. SECTION 2, paragraph a (2): Concur. As of 23 May 1969, this command had 75% of its authorized drivers assigned. On 24 May, the Adjutant General, QNSC, sent letter to the Depot Commander discussing this situation and pointing out the possible malassignment of some drivers. On 27 May 1969, the Depot Commander directed the reassignment of overstrength drivers, if any, and of malassigned drivers to authorized positions. These actions will not completely solve the problem, however, due to the 25% shortage. This headquarters will assign drivers to the Depot on a proportionate basis as they become available through the pipeline.

c. SECTION 2, paragraph a (3): Concur. Local National training programs are being given increased emphasis, with CTI classes in English language, military correspondence, and typing presently being offered through the ACPO in Qui Nhon. In addition, CTI instructors have been made available for an extensive training program of forklift operators in depot, and an effort is presently being made to obtain instructors for CTI in Saigon to teach courses for automotive mechanics, telephone linemen, etc. As instructors become available, classes will be taught at the unit level wherever possible, utilizing equipment and facilities available on site. The training program has been highly successful so far, and every effort is being made to continue it.

d. SECTION 2, paragraph a (4): Concur. A review of Depot manpower assets reveals that nine of the 21 enlisted spaces can be filled by present Depot personnel assets. Recommend that the Depot personnel management officer periodically review depot manpower utilization to insure that maximum usage is being made of personnel assets, and that malutilization of personnel is being held to an absolute minimum. This headquarters will provide personnel to fill existing vacancies based on graded MOS as they become available through the pipeline.

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e. SECTION 2, paragraph b (1): Concur. USAD, QN, should include reconstitution and movement of the SP&O function from Troop Command to the Depot Headquarters as a directorate function. This must be accomplished by developing an MTDA change and identifying appropriate trade off spaces for development of an office of the Director, SP&O. As planning is underway for modification of the TDA, it is recommended that the proposed SP&O change be given conceptual approval and included in the MTDA presently being developed.

f. SECTION 2, paragraph b (2) and (3): Concur. Action is being taken, as recommended, to correct the situations described.

g. SECTION 2, paragraph b (5): Reports required by AR 700-58 which details the procedures applicable to damaged cargo have not been received by the appropriate agencies at this headquarters. When such deficiencies are so reported, appropriate action can be taken. Steps have been taken to obtain wider type binding, which has been in short supply within the QNSC.

h. SECTION 2, paragraph b (6): This headquarters has recommended to the USAD that action be initiated to install yellow caution lights on their escort vehicles in lieu of the red lights requested. Under the provisions of USASUPCOM, QN, Reg 210-2, the only vehicles authorized such emergency equipment as red lights and sirens within this command are military police vehicles, fire trucks, ambulances, the Commanding General's vehicle, emergency pipeline vehicles, wreckers and tank transporters. No other vehicles will be supplied with emergency equipment. The utilization of yellow caution lights and appropriate warning signs on their escort vehicles should fulfill the requirements and additionally increase the overall safety of the escort mission.

i. SECTION 2, paragraph b (7): Nonconcur. Change 1, dated 21 Feb 69, to USASUPCOM, QN Reg 210-2 in paragraphs 1a and 1b of Annex B specifically states that traffic between the Valley and LST Beach or DeLong Pier, will use the new and old causeways.

j. SECTION 2, paragraph b (8): Nonconcur. Chains and binders are not included in MTOE and TOE authorizations for medium truck companies. The shipper should include the chains and binders on the Transportation Control and Movement Document (DD 1384) which accompanies the cargo. This should insure that accountability is maintained.

k. SECTION 2, paragraph b (9): Concur. The USA Support Command, Qui Nhon, ACoFS, Maintenance through coordination with the ACoFS, Retrograde and Disposal, forwarded message AVCA GN-GM 4-539, on 1 April 1969, directing that DS/GS classified equipment be steam cleaned to enable

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closer inspection of frames and power trains. DS/GS units were further directed to have their Shop Officers personally verify, by signature on the DA Forms 5-23, 461-5 or 2404, that these frames had been properly inspected.

l. SECTION 2, paragraph b (10): Nonconcur. 1st Logistical Command message UNCLAS 6743, from AVCA GL-PM-PP, dated 10 May 1969 directs that no parts will be removed from CRC "H" equipment at the disassembly section of the USA Depot Unserviceable Accounts Division until specific disposition instructions have been received from ICCV. All non-Closed Loop unserviceable equipment on-hand are reported through the Availability Balance Files (ABF) to the USAICCV. The only exception will be Closed Loop items disposed of in accordance with LC Reg 700-39.

m. SECTION 2, paragraph c (1): Concur. A 3SVN training program should be established by the USAD to satisfy this need.

n. SECTION 2, paragraph c (2): Nonconcur. Recommend that personnel at the Unserviceable Property Division be sent to their supporting DSU/GSU for basic instruction in the preparation of Technical Inspections. It is assumed that valid requisitions have been placed for the required MOS personnel.

o. SECTION 2, paragraph d: Concur. Such improvements are being made at the present time.

p. SECTION 2, paragraph e: Concur. Action is being taken to correct this situation, as recommended.


q. SECTION 2, paragraph g: Nonconcur. This procedure would require units to set up facilities to manufacture their own concrete blocks and concrete is in relatively short supply at the present time. Furthermore, a defensive structure built of concrete blocks would be extremely difficult to move, as is sometimes necessary due to changing defensive perimeters. The problem would be better solved by using sand-filled wooden revetments instead of sandbags.

r. SECTION 3 (DA Survey information) was not required for this reporting period.

2. (U) The report is considered adequate as modified by the above comments.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TELE: QNL 2161


JOSEPH J. KRAYNAK
CPT, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

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AVCA GO-MH (7 May 69) 2nd Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot, Qui
Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 1 4 JUL 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC-DST,
APO 96375.

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US
Army Depot, Qui Nhon for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 is
forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning Project Count II, page 17, paragraph 2a(1).
Concur. Each depot has instituted a similar program.

b. Reference item concerning Operating Equipment Division, page 17, para-
graph a(2). Concur. A shortage of drivers does exist throughout this command.
Intensive management is applied to the assignment of replacements to insure
equitable distribution of assets among the support commands. This shortage
has been brought to the attention of higher headquarters. In addition, a
vigorous program for monitoring malassignments in this command has resulted
in a reduction in the percentage of malassigned personnel thereby allowing
maximum use of available resources.

c. Reference item concerning Security, Plans, and Operations, page 18,
paragraph b(1). Concur. Where depot operations are located in an isolated
area as at Qui Nhon, the function of security should be the responsibility
of a directorate on the staff of the depot commander. This condition,
however, is unique only to Qui Nhon Support Command and requires MTDA action
by only that headquarters. Each of the other Army Depots, Cam Ranh Bay,
Long Binh and the Field Depot at Da Nang, are interior elements within
an overall larger perimeter. Consequently, the security, plans, and
operations staff section is not required.

d. Reference item concerning Operating Equipment Division, page 18,
paragraph b(2). Concur. MTDA was forwarded from this headquarters on 19
Oct 68. Informal information received by this headquarters is that the
MTDA, less Section III, has been approved and that interim approval of
Section III will be given pending a detailed study of this section. No
approved document has been received by this headquarters.

e. Reference item concerning Accounting for MRO's in Float During
Inventories. Concur. 1st Log Comd Reg 740-3, paragraph 6c(2) directs this
action to be taken.

AVCA GO-MH (7 May 69) 2nd Ind

14 JUN 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon for Period Ending 30 April 1969 RCS CSFOR-65.

f. Reference item concerning Improper Handling of Commodities, page 20, paragraph b(5). Concur. This headquarters dispatched a message on 19 Jun 69 under the Commanding General's signature to all Support Commands and Depots pointing out that numerous items of heavy equipment are being returned with damages which were obviously caused by mishandling during off loading and loading. This message directs that Commanders throughout the supply pipeline look into this matter and report deficiencies noted and actions taken to positively detect and fix responsibility for damages.

g. Reference item concerning Convoy Operations, page 20, paragraph b(6). Concur. Under provisions stated in paragraph 24, AR 385-55, only emergency vehicles are authorized to have flashing red lights. Vietnamese law allows blue lights to be used as well as red for emergency purposes. For escort vehicles, when movement of equipment on the highway is a hazard to other traffic, amber or yellow lights are authorized. Because of the size of much Army equipment being escorted over narrow roads in RVN, recommend all vehicles regularly performing such duty in RVN be authorized and be required to use such warning devices.

h. Reference item concerning Inspection and Classification of Unserviceable Equipment, page 21, paragraph b(9). Concur. Action taken by the Support Command was appropriate and a positive step in improving the quality of inspections of unserviceable equipment. The Unserviceable Property Division of USAD Qui Nhon should have the prerogative not to accept equipment if the technical inspection is not correct.

i. Reference item concerning Removal of Recoverable or Needed Components from Code H, page 22, paragraph b(10). Concur. Listings of mandatory recoverable and cannibalization items are being prepared by this Headquarters. These listings will not supercede previous directions as stated in paragraph 1 of 1st Indorsement. Disposition instructions must still be received from USAITCV.

j. Reference item concerning OJT of Technical Inspectors in Lieu of Formal MOS Qualification, page 23, paragraph c(2). Intensive management is applied to the assignment of all incoming replacements to insure equitable distribution of MOS qualified personnel in each support command. Valid requisitions have been made to higher headquarters for the required MOS personnel.

k. Reference item concerning Security, Plans and Operations, page 23, paragraph d. Concur. Requests for adequate security fencing should be submitted by the using unit through normal command channels. Once installed, maintenance of fencing is the responsibility of the using unit. If removal

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of cover and concealment around the perimeter is beyond the unit's capability, an operational support request should be submitted. Guard towers are originally sited in accordance with the desires of the using unit. If the locations chosen are not adequate, the towers can be moved by the using unit.

1. Reference item concerning Use of Sandbags in Towers and Bunkers, page 24, paragraph g. Nonconcur. In addition to the comments given in the first indorsement, paragraph iq, the effectiveness of concrete block should be first evaluated with respect to energy absorbing characteristics, especially shattering and spalling.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839



C. D. STAFFORD
1Lt, AGC
Asst Adjutant General

CF:
USASUPCOM-QN
USAD, QN

AVHGC-DST (7 May 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Qui Nhon, for Period
Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JUL 1969

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558


1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1969 from Headquarters, United States Army Depot, Qui Nhon.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Operating Equipment Divisions," section II, page 18, paragraph b(2). The DA Output Summary, which is the formal authorization for equipment and personnel, was distributed to Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command on 15 June 1969. Processing TDA/MTDA documents is an involved, time consuming process. Currently a unit can expect three months to elapse from the time this headquarters submits the request until the unit is notified of the approval.

b. Reference item concerning "OJT of Technical Inspectors in Lieu of Formal MOS Qualification," section II, page 23, paragraph c(2). Concur with 1st Indorsement, paragraph 1n and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2j. Nonconcur with the recommendation of the basic correspondence that MOS qualified inspectors be placed on TDY. The additional training required to accomplish a specific function is a command responsibility unless the additional specialized training is of such a magnitude that specialized training in CONUS is required. A requirement of this nature has not been indicated.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


A.R. GUENTHER
CPT. AGC
ASST ADJUTANT GENERAL

Cy furn:
USA Dpt, Qui Nhon
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (7 May 69) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Depot, Qui Nhon
for Period Ending 30 April 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 12 AUG 69

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forward-
ing indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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