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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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IN REPLY REFER TO

AGDA (M) (27 Feb 70) FOR OT UT 694049

11 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, US Army
Depot, Cam Ranh, Period Ending 31 October 1969

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 4b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT UT, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

1 Incl
as


ROBERT E. LYNCH
Colonel, AGC
Acting The Adjutant General

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
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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

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ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR FORCE DEVELOPMENT
(ARMY) ATTN FOR OT UT, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY DEPOT CAM RANH
APO 96312

AVCA CRB-D-MGT

6 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period Ending
31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R-1)

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay,
ATTN: AVCA CRB-GO-O, APO San Francisco 96312
Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command,
ATTN: AVCA GO-O, APO San Francisco 96384
Commanding General, US Army Vietnam,
ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, US Army Pacific,
ATTN: CPOP-OT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

I. Section I. Operations: Significant Activities.

A. Personnel.

1. In August, September and October the Depot experienced key staff personnel changes as follows:

a. COL William E. Brockmeier departed for assignment to US Army Depot, Qui Nhon on 27 September 1969. COL Samuel C. Skemp Jr. assumed command of Depot 27 September 1969.

b. LTC William C. Jones was reassigned to Headquarters, MACV, on 4 October 1969. LTC Frederick W. Knoebel assumed duties of Deputy Depot Commander on 1 October 1969.

c. LTC Leonard J. McCoy changed duty assignments from Director of Supply and Transportation to Chief, Quality Assurance. LTC Walter L. Davis reassigned from 1st Logistical Command and assumed duties of Director of Supply and Transportation on 15 August 1969. LTC McCoy subsequently reassigned to USASUPCOM, Saigon on 3 October 1969.

d. LTC Chester L. Langley Jr., Director of Services, reassigned to USASUPCOM, Cam Ranh Bay, on 6 October 1969. MAJ Ralph W. Gilbert Jr. assumed duties as acting Director of Services on 3 October 1969.

e. LTC John G. Belt, Commander of Troop Command, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, reassigned to HHD, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, effective 1 October 1969. LTC Robert L. Alderman, assigned to Depot from Headquarters US Army Support

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Command, Cam Ranh Bay, and assumed command of Troop Command. LTC Alderman, upon reorganization of Depot, assumed command of Support Battalion (Provisional), with additional duty as Director of Administration.

f. MAJ Jimmy L. Greene assumed duty as acting Director of Data Processing upon departure of Mr. Jasper Barto in October 1969.

g. LTC Frederick V. Slocum Jr. assigned to Depot and assumed duties as Chief, Quality Assurance, effective 30 October 1969.

2. Awards and Decorations: A total of 111 awards were presented during the period July through October 1969. (See inclosure 1).

3. Strength: Strength at the beginning of period (1 August 1969) was 1945 military, 48 DAC, and 956 LN. At the end of the period (31 October 1969) the strength was 2075 military, 35 DAC and 900 LN.

4. Reenlistment rates for the quarter: Career RA, 100%; 1st Term RA, 100%; AUS 33.3%; and ER-NG, 0%. (See inclosure 2).

5. Promotions: Commanders promoted 616 Enlisted Men to the next higher grade. (See inclosure 3).

6. Courts-Martial: Misconduct within the command led to 17 Enlisted Men receiving Special Courts-Martial. One Enlisted Man received a General Court-Martial. No Summary Courts-Martial were conducted. (See inclosure 4).

7. Religious Services: Services are available in the area for the three major faiths as well as denominational services. Religious instruction, Bible study and discussion groups are scheduled each week.

8. Character Guidance: Character Guidance classes were conducted throughout the quarter with Commanders taking active roles in the presentations.

H. Operations.

1. The Depot was operational for 92 consecutive days.

2. The Data Processing Directorate participated in a conference for the standardization of the 3SVN ADP program among all ADP installations in country. This Depot processed 24 daily cycles during August, 24 during September and 17 during October as against 1st Log's goal of 20 per month.

3. Project See/Move was established by Command Message, CG 1st Logistical Command, unclassified 11838, dtd 170330 Jul 69. Standard Operating Procedures were established by the Storage Division for committee members in obtaining nominations for Project See/Move.

4. Under the new operational concept, large quantities of retrograde

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are being staged and booked in the Depot and held awaiting moving instructions. SOP have been established for reporting retrograde to the ICC by the use of D6A and D7A cards. Worksheets have been printed so that items, quantities on hand, deletions and shipping data on unserviceable materials could be transcribed by Depot Data Processing on Availability Balance File reports. Direct Supply Units were provided this SOP to improve operations and trans-shipping of retrograde property.

5. Effective 1 September 1969, Vinnell Corporation took over the operation of the material handling equipment pool, to include dispatching operations, administrative record keeping and log-operations. At present, the Director of Services is still charged with the overall supervision of the MHE branch.

6. 1st Logistical Command directed the Depot to establish a scrap yard at Phan Rang. This was done and the Property Disposal Division accepted accountability for the Nha Trang Property Disposal Account on 16 October 1969.

7. The 109th Quartermaster Company (AD) conducted the following airdrop operations:

a. During August the 109th QM Co. (AD) prepared approximately 150 short tons of Class I, II, III, IV, and V supplies for airdrop. These supplies were delivered during two airdrop operations made in support of elements of the Americal and 101st Airborne Divisions respectively.

(1) The first was conducted on 20 and 22 August at Tra-Bong. The Container Delivery System (CDS) of airdrop was employed and 154 A-22 containers were utilized. On 22 August, a team was dispatched to provide technical assistance to the Americal Division in the recovery of parachutes and air items. All air items were recovered and fifty-eight of the ninety-six C-12D parachutes were recovered.

(2) The second was conducted on 27 August in the A Shau Valley. A similar team was dispatched to support the 101st Airborne Division in recovery of equipment. All air items were recovered and forty of the forty-four G-12D parachutes were recovered.

b. During September the 109th QM Co. (AD) prepared approximately thirty short tons of Class III and V supplies for airdrop, and rigged seventy-four 500 gallon fuel bladders for heli-lift.

(1) On 13 and 15 September, one sortie by C-130 aircraft dropped fifteen short tons of Class III and V supplies by CDS. No recovery was made of air items.

(2) On 3 September, a team was dispatched to Nhon-Co to prepare a heli-lift of eighteen 500 gallon fuel bladders to Gia-Nghia; again on 6 September

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a team was dispatched to the same location to rig fifty-six additional fuel bladders.

8. The initial run of the Appropriation Finances Secondary Items Transactions (SIT) was submitted to 1st Log on 10 October 1969. This is a monthly report of financial dollar value of all Depot assets, receipts and issues by material category budget coded.

9. There were 1759 reimbursable documents forwarded to US Army Pacific during the reporting period, as compared to 2108 forwarded the previous period. The decrease was due to Depot loss of accountability for all MACV and Class I reimbursables.

<u>CLASS</u>	<u>DOLLAR VALUE</u>	<u>NO. REQUISITIONS</u>
I	\$ 371,255.78	1717
Ind. Gas	1,964.68	42

10. Distribution of mail and messages and reproduction activities.
(See inclosure 5).

11. Project Keystone Cardinal: Under this new program the Depot has assumed the responsibility for retrograding Keystone Cardinal materials which are uneconomically repairable and classifying components for repair, return to stock, or disposal.

12. Project HHI: This Depot has been selected as the receiving depot in Vietnam for all of the Army's Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) telecommunications equipment. Stringent controls on identification and storage have been effected.

C. Training.

1. During the quarter, a long range Planning-Training Committee was established to meet the training needs of personnel in the Storage Division. A POI is being established consisting of 20 subjects to be presented to Division personnel. To date, a total of 14 classes have been presented.

2. On-the-job training classes were conducted for enlisted and DAC personnel pertaining to See/Move Operations.

3. Monthly classes on the preparation of Transportation Control and Movement Documents have been held to insure that all TCMD's are correctly filled out in order to prevent unauthorized cargo from leaving the Depot. All personnel have been made aware of the changes in AR 55-10 and DOD Pamphlet 4500-32R.

4. Local Nationals are being trained in the preparation of TCMD's. This cross-training will compliment their regular duties as file clerks and typists.

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5. An intensive program of cross-training of Depot personnel has been initiated to insure that qualified personnel are available at all times when absences occur due to rotation or emergencies.

6. Instruction was given to personnel of the Packing and Crating Section on guidelines and standing operating procedures for shipping multi-fuel engines, generators, teletypewriters and signal shelter.

7. Instruction on the use of the water blaster was given to the Heavylift Section personnel.

8. Classes in basic procedures for the 3SVN computer program have been developed and presented to replacement personnel. In-house resources have been geared to develop and present classes in specific problem areas on an as-required basis. Results in these classes have shown considerable improvement in operations as well as developing a more thorough job understanding.

9. A special Depot training course was held for personnel in the Electronics Section. The school consisted of one week of NICP operations, three weeks of Depot Operations and one week on special items of interest from ECOM. In addition, special instruction was given in signal supply procedure.

D. Organization.

1. On 4 October 1969, the Troop Organization of US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, was reorganized from Troop Command into Support Battalion (Provisional), and an Operations Battalion (Provisional), with each battalion consisting of four companies.

2. The reorganization was accomplished in order to decrease the size of each company and to allow for better control of personnel. Under the new organizational concept personnel will have the same supervisory personnel on the job and control in the quarters areas during off-duty hours. Previously, in many cases, the men were required to work for one NCO or officer during duty hours and were under the control of other NCO's and officers in the unit areas.

E. Intelligence/Security.

1. A Security, Plans and Operations Office was established for the Depot.

2. On 24 September 1969, the entire Security Guard Company was placed under the control of the Commanding Officer, US Army Depot. Under the two battalion concept the Security Guard Company was placed under the control of the Support Battalion (Provisional), USAD-CR. The control and operation of the company is conducted in a much smoother and efficient manner now since the Commanding Officer of the Security Guard Company answers to only one commander and has control of the entire company.

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II. Section II. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations and Recommendations.

A. Personnel.

1. Use of Rigger Personnel.

a. Observation: Highly trained parachute rigger personnel were utilized to prepare loads for external lift by rotary wing aircraft. This mission is not properly one for parachute riggers since current doctrine charges the "transported unit" with this responsibility. The underlying danger here is the possibility of diverting parachute riggers from their primary mission on a regular basis.

b. Evaluation: By the nature of their training, parachute riggers are familiar with the equipment used to rig loads for external heli-lift. However, they are not specifically trained in the preparation and configuration of these loads and the technical problems involved in helicopter operations.

c. Recommendations:

(1) That parachute riggers be utilized for only their primary missions, i.e., rigging loads for airdrop.

(2) That units and supply organizations train personnel assigned to those units in the rigging of loads for external heli-lift as required.

(3) That parachute riggers participate in training by presenting instruction on only standard Army air items used for external heli-lift.

B. Operations.

1. Utilization of Sealand Vans.

a. Observation: A large backlog in retrograde accumulated due to a shortage of lumber in Cam Ranh and a scarcity of RO/RO trailers. In order to meet demands of the Closed Loop Program, Sealand trailers were utilized.

b. Evaluation: Shipping items and assemblies by Sealand provided rapid transportation services as well as reducing backlog.

c. Recommendation: None.

2. Nomination of materiel for retrograde.

a. Observation: Many containers of stock in the Depot have date-of-pack older than 18 months. Often these containers and contents are in need of care and preservation.

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b. Evaluation: The materiel may be stocked in excess quantity or may no longer be needed in the inventory.

c. Recommendation: All containers of stock, inspected by Quality Control Inspectors as part of care and preservation requirements, that have a date-of-pack older than 18 months be nominated for retrograde. This program is in effect in this Depot.

3. Maintaining the original date-of-pack for materiel undergoing care and preservation.

a. Observation: The original date-of-pack was not being placed on materiel processing through care and preservation facilities.

b. Evaluations:

(1) The perpetuation of the original date-of-pack is essential to the prescribed practice of "first-in, first-out".

(2) The original date-of-pack is also used as a valuable tool by quality storage inspectors during required cyclic surveillance for condition code, nomination for retrograde, and care and preservation.

c. Recommendation: Information as described above be disseminated to other areas as applicable. This procedure is being followed at this Depot.

4. Laterite Hardstands.

a. Observation: The laterite in this area is too sandy to be used alone in construction of hardstands because of its unstable nature. It is easily displaced by vehicle wheels.

b. Evaluation: Hardstands made of laterite and covered with 2" minus base rock enable commercial as well as rough terrain forklifts to operate in the storage area.

c. Recommendation: All laterite should be compacted with a 13 wheel roller and then covered with base rock placed in 3" lifts and compacted by the use of a 13 wheeled roller or a steel roller.

5. ISSA Support.

a. Observation: A liaison visit was conducted with all ISSA Customers of this Depot to determine if support of CSS & I was effective. It was noted that supply procedures relative to CSS & I needed revision.

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b. Evaluation: After having reviewed the support rendered to each ISSA customer, it was determined that revision to the Depot SOP relative to ISSA support was required.

c. Recommendation: The problem concerning ISSA support has been rectified by establishing better procedures and by special handling. The Customer Assistance Office is now the focal point in the Depot for all ISSA customers. Status is maintained on each request from time of input to issue.

6. Liaison visits with Depot customers.

a. Observation: After having conducted a liaison visit with all Depot customers, it was noted that the lack of supply publications is a problem throughout all units.

b. Evaluation: Most units have requested supply publications relative to their operation; however, distribution seldom reaches the units.

c. Recommendation: In view of the problem above, it is recommended that a review be conducted relative to the procedures for requisitioning publications. This should include the "pin point" system as well. Furthermore, it is recommended that a list of all supply publications be prepared and distributed to each unit.

C. Training.

1. Project Count Always.

a. Observation: Lessons learned from Project Count I and II demonstrated the requirement for extensive training of count personnel prior to starting the inventory. Testing in all aspects of the inventory was also determined to be necessary.

b. Evaluation: Preliminary phases to logically stage planning, training and testing of count procedures were set up in meetings with all affected elements. Count schedules have been published and distributed to all customers and depot personnel. Training and testing phases will be completed prior to start of inventory.

c. Recommendation: Continuation of extensive planning and training prior to the actual starting date of inventories to insure that all personnel are orientated on their individual responsibilities.

2. Training of Local National Mechanics.

a. Observation: Training of Local National mechanics in the Depot Consolidated Motor Pool and operators in the Depot material handling equipment pool by trained USARV Local National Instructor teams provide a foundation for a more effective work force.

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b. Evaluation: Training of Local Nationals by skilled Local National Instructor teams results in less deadline of equipment, a more effective work force and an increase in productivity and morale.

c. Recommendation: In order to develop a skilled Local National work force and to achieve an effective work force in the shortest possible time, Local Nationals should continue to be trained by skilled Local National instructors.

D. Intelligence. None.

E. Logistics.

1. Pre-Rigged Contingency Stock.

a. Observation: All pre-rigged contingency stocks maintained by the Depot at great expense could not be utilized during airborne operations conducted during this reporting period.

b. Evaluation: Experiences during the reporting period and the past year have illustrated that the current pre-rigged loads are not needed in the types and quantities now required. Significant savings in cost and manpower resources can be achieved by reducing the requirement for pre-rigged stocks.

c. Recommendation: That the request for a reduction in the quantity of pre-rigged stocks made by this Unit in a letter dated 20 August 1969, be acted upon.

F. Organization. None.

G. Other. None.

6 Incl

~~1 - Awards and Decorations~~

~~2 - Resenlistment Rates~~

~~3 - Enlisted Promotions~~

~~4 - Courts Martial~~

~~5 - Distribution~~

6 - Organizational Structure

Incls 1 - 5 wd HQ, DA

Samuel C. Skemp Jr.

SAMUEL C. SKEMP, JR.

COL, CRDC

COMMANDING

AVCA CRB-GO-O (6 Nov 69) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of US Army Depot - Cam Ranh Bay for the period ending 31 Oct 69, RCS CSFOR-65-(R2)

DA, Headquarters, US Army Support Command, Cam Ranh Bay, APO 96312 20 NOV 1969

TO: Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command, ATTN: AVCA GO-O
APO 96384

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Depot - CRB for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follows:

a. Reference: Section I, Paragraph A3: Records at this headquarters indicate the end of reporting period military strength for USAD-CRB to be 2098 personnel, as opposed to the military strength of 2075 reported by the US Army Depot, CRB.

b. Reference: Section II, Paragraph A1: Nonconcur. The use of qualified riggers is considered to be within the overall mission of this Command. In addition, this training has proved to be very useful in maintaining the degree of proficiency desired for "transporting units."

c. Reference: Section II, Paragraph B1. Nonconcur. The availability or non-availability of Roll On/Roll Off (RO/RO) trailers does not have a direct bearing on the accumulation of retrograde. Retrograde cargo does not have to be shipped RO/RO, although this is a convenient method.

d. Reference: Section II, Paragraph E1. The letter referenced in the US Army Depot's recommendation has been approved. Subject letter provides for a 63% reduction of pre-rigged stocks and limited quantities of standby stocks to be stored in an un-rigged condition for immediate use.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this indorsement. This report is considered adequate.

FOR THE COMMANDER


ROBERT W. RETTIG
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

CF: USAD-CRB

AVCA GO-MH (6 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOK-65 (R2)(U)

DA, Headquarters, 1st Logistical Command, APO 96384 22 DEC 1969

TO: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam, ATTN: ANHGC-DST
APO 96375

1. The Operational Report - Lessons Learned submitted by Headquarters, US Army Depot Cam Ranh Bay for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 is forwarded.

2. Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning use of rigger personnel, page 6, paragraph A1. Nonconcur. The use of highly trained riggers in roles other than airdrop has been and continues to be a common practice. In view of the fact that airdrop is an emergency mode of delivering supplies and equipment, it is obvious that unless there is a rapidly deteriorating tactical situation, non-divisional parachute rigger units will be confronted with long periods of inactivity. In order to maintain proficiency in an exacting occupational specialty and to obtain maximum utilization of existing personnel resources, a number of secondary missions have been assigned to airdrop units of this command, to include:

- (1) Preparation of external helicopter loads.
- (2) Inspection of helicopter slings and cargo nets.
- (3) Training personnel in external helicopter load techniques.
- (4) Packing of emergency parachutes for Army aircraft.
- (5) Packing of cargo parachutes for Australian Forces Vietnam.

b. Reference item concerning utilization of Sealand vans, page 6, paragraph B1. Concur. The use of Sealand for retrograde is and has been previously authorized. The shipper is required to certify on the offering TCMD that "container service is required". Sealand should be used only when RO/RO or CONEX are not available and cargo is not susceptible to being shipped as general cargo. A determination to use Sealand must include consideration of the cost of this premium service.

c. Reference item concerning nomination of material for retrograde, page 6, paragraph B2. Nonconcur. This command presently has in effect Project SEE/MOVE. The purpose of this project is to provide a basis for increasing the efficiency of retrograding excess supplies from the depots.

AVCA GO-MH (6 Nov 69) 2d Ind

22 DEC 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the US Army Depot Cam
Ranh Bay for period ending 31 October 1969 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)(U)

Stocks are suspected excess when they show long standing weather wear for which no issue has been made. This means of identifying possible retrograde supplies is much more efficient than using arbitrary 18 month or older date of pack, in that frequently stocks are received in the depots that have already been in storage in Okinawa or CONUS and have a DOP of 18 months or older.

d. Reference item concerning laterite hardstands, page 7, paragraph B4. Concur in part. In the preparation of the laterite, attention should be given to shaping the laterite so that it will drain so as to avoid the possibility of standing water. Rock can be laid level over the shaped laterite and a better hardstand can be achieved by mixing fines in with the 2" minus rock and compacting with a steel roller. Lifts can be up to 6". A 13-wheel roller is not as effective as a steel roller in compacting the rock. Rough terrain fork lifts, due to their high torque, tend to tear up rock hardstands. A more durable rock hardstand can be produced by including fines with the rock, mixing in cold asphalt as a binder, then compacting with a steel roller. In this process, 6 to 8 days must be allowed for curing. The hardstand cannot be used during this period.

3. Concur with the basic report as modified by this and previous indorsement.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

TEL: LBN 4839

CF:
USASUPCOM, CnB
USAD, CnB

Thomas P. Hyle 27 ABC
C. D. STAFFORD
115. ABC
ADJ. ADJ. GEN. 11

AVHGC-DST (6 Nov 69) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the US Army Depot, Cam Ranh, for Period
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 24 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, US Army Depot, Cam Ranh and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning "Utilization of Sealand Vans", section II, page 6, paragraph B1; 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c; and 2d Indorsement, paragraph 2b; concur. As explained in the 2d Indorsement, the use of Sealand vans for retrograde of cargo is authorized. A recent study has shown that the preparation cost of retrograde for shipment by Sealand is about one-half of that for break-bulk shipment. However, due to the higher cost of shipping by Sealand, cargo should be limited to that which is container required.

b. Reference item concerning "Nomination of Material for Retrograde", section II, page 6, paragraph B2, and 1st Indorsement, paragraph 2c; non-concur. As explained in paragraphs 2c, 2d Indorsement, 1st Logistical Command presently has in effect Project SEE/MOVE which provides a basis for increasing the efficiency in retrograding excess supplies from depots. Stocks are suspected excess when they show long-standing weather wear which indicates no issues have been made. The SEE/MOVE method is more efficient than the proposed 18-month Date-of-Pack system since stocks are frequently received in depots which have previously been in CONUS or Okinawa storage in excess of 18 months.

c. Reference item concerning "Maintaining the Original Date-of-Pack", section II, page 7, paragraph B3; concur. Perpetuation of the original date-of-pack is essential to the prescribed practice of "First-in, first-out." The original date of pack is also a valuable tool for use by quality storage inspectors during required cyclic surveillance for condition codes, nominations for retrograde, and care and preservation. It has been requested that 1st Logistical Command disseminate instructions to all depots to assure perpetuation of original DOP.

d. Reference item concerning "Laterite Hardstands", section II, page 7, paragraph B4; 2d Indorsement, paragraph 3d; nonconcur. The design of stabilized hardstand must take into consideration the intended use of the pad, the type equipment that will operate on the pad, and the materials

24 JAN 1970

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available for construction. Upon a review of these factors an appropriate surface will be designated.

e. Reference item concerning "Liaison Visits with Depot Customers", section II, page 8, paragraph B6; concur. A letter has been forwarded to 1st Logistical Command requesting that a list of current supply publications be provided USARV, ATTN: AVHGD-SPP, for dissemination to all units.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


C. E. MICHELS
MAJ, AGC

Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
USA Depot, CRB
1st Log Comd

GPOP-DT (6 Nov 69) 4th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, US Army Depot Cam Ranh for Period Ending
31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 29 JAN - 70

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310


This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

US ARMY DEPOT - CAM RANH
ORGANIZATION CHART



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