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Technical Report 70-13

Military Advisors and
Counterparts in Korea:
2. A Study of Personal Traits
and Role Behaviors

by

Dean K. Froehlich

HumPRO Division No. 7 (Social Science)

AD _____

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Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

September 1970

Prepared for:

Office, Chief of
Research and Development
Department of the Army

Contract DAHC 19-70.C-0012

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HumRRO Division No. 7 (Social Science)
Alexandria, Virginia
HUMAN RESOURCES RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

Technical Report 70-13
Work Unit MAP
Sub-Unit II

The Human Resources Research Organization (HumRRO) is a nonprofit corporation established in 1969 to conduct research in the field of training and education. It is a continuation of The George Washington University Human Resources Research Office. HumRRO's general purpose is to improve human performance, particularly in organizational settings, through behavioral and social science research, development, and consultation. HumRRO's mission in work performed under contract with the Department of the Army is to conduct research in the fields of training, motivation, and leadership.

The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

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FOREWORD

This report describes the results of research conducted in 1966 with American advisors assigned to the U.S. Army Advisory Group, Korea (KMAG) and their counterparts in the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). The objectives of the research were to compare American advisors and Korean counterparts with respect to the natures of the personalities of co-workers with whom they preferred to work and to identify the types of behaviors each regarded as critical to the other's performance of his role.

This report, the second of three, represents publication of a portion of the results obtained from research conducted under HumRRO Work Sub-Unit MAP II: Studies of Advisor-Counterpart Interactions. The first report, *Military Advisors and Counterparts in Korea: 1. Job Characteristics*, Technical Report 69-15, describes the types of changes advisors typically seek to effect through their relations to counterparts, the types of obstacles they encounter, and other aspects of their work. A report in preparation, "Military Advisors and Counterparts in Korea: 3. An Experimental Criterion of Proficiency," will report the results of work directed toward the development and validation of an experimental criterion of advisor-counterpart interaction effectiveness.

The research described in this report was conducted by HumRRO Division No. 7 (Social Science), Alexandria, Virginia. The research was performed and most of the report preparation completed while HumRRO was part of The George Washington University. Dr. Arthur J. Hoehn is Director of the Division. Dr. Dean K. Froehlich was the Work Unit Leader. Dr. John W. McCrary conducted many of the interviews, and contributed generally to the work from planning to publication. Mr. Jerome P. Corbino assisted in the management of the data during the statistical analysis phase of the research.

LTC Monroe D. King, Chief, U.S. Army Research Unit, Korea (USARUK) provided administrative and logistical support and coordinated the research with KMAG. Assistance was given throughout the work by Mr. Cho Hui-sok, research technician, and Mr. Kim Chi-kyong, translator-interpreter, USARUK.

COL Carroll B. Hodges, KMAG AG, served as principal point of contact during the developmental and data collection phases of the work. BG L.H. Gomes, Senior Advisor to First Republic of Korea Army; COL P.S. Reinecke, Chief of Staff, Detachment L; COL A.L. Baker, Commander, Detachment F; COL W.C. Naselroad, Chief of Staff, Detachment R; COL D. Cooper, Senior Advisor V/VI ROKA Corps, Detachment West; and COL M.F. Schroader, Deputy Senior Advisor I/II ROKA Corps, extended their hospitality and use of their facilities, and arranged for interviews with their officer advisors.

Appreciation is expressed for the courtesy and cooperation shown by General Min Ki-shik, Chief of Staff, ROKA, for providing the opportunity to brief his subordinate commanders on the research; to MG Yo Gun-chang for reviewing the research materials, approving their distribution, and providing a point of contact within ROKA; to the commanders of the First and Second Republic of Korea Armies and the commanders of the First and Fifth ROKA Corps for granting time and permission to interview their personnel.

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Meredith P. Crawford
President
Human Resources Research Organization

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

PROBLEM

To establish training guidelines for military advisory personnel requires knowledge of the culturally determined differences between advisors and counterparts concerning the types of personalities with whom they prefer to work. Advisors, because they lack command authority over counterparts, may need to rely more than those in other military roles upon the development of personalized relations to counterparts to be effective.

This research effort was undertaken to determine whether advisors and counterparts differ with respect to the types of traits they use to discriminate between most- and least-preferred co-workers, and to provide a means by which to assess the validity of an experimental technique for estimating the effectiveness of advisor-counterpart interactions. The first report in this series dealt with the characteristics of the military advisor's job.¹ This report describes and compares the co-worker preferences expressed by advisors and counterparts, while assessments of the validity of the technique are described in a separate report.²

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Information descriptive of the co-worker personal trait preferences and judgments concerning critical role behaviors were collected from nearly all Army personnel who were serving as advisors to counterparts in the Republic of Korea during the Summer and Fall of 1966. Counterparts who had been identified by advisors as participants in their work provided comparable information. Directives issued by the headquarters of the military organizations, requesting cooperation in the study, accompanied the research materials, which were distributed and returned through military message centers. Approximately 66% of the advisors and counterparts originally sampled completed and returned the materials.

The descriptions and judgments given by advisors and counterparts were statistically analyzed. Differences between advisors and counterparts with respect to specific traits used to discriminate most- from least-preferred co-workers were identified. Counterparts' descriptions of the personal traits of advisors with whom they were actually working were compared to their preferences, and a parallel analysis of advisors' descriptions of counterparts was performed. The preference ratings were factor analyzed to yield descriptions of the basic dimensions along which judgments were made. Advisors' and counterparts' conceptions of behaviors required to satisfactorily fulfill the respective roles were determined and compared.

FINDINGS

Co-worker Personal Trait Preferences

(1) Both American advisors and Korean counterparts discriminate between personnel with whom they prefer and prefer not to work with respect to two basic factors:

¹ Dean K. Froehlich, *Military Advisors and Counterparts in Korea: 1. Job Characteristics*, HumRRO Technical Report 69-15, August 1969. (For Official Use Only)

² Dean K. Froehlich, "Military Advisors and Counterparts in Korea: 3. An Experimental Criterion of Proficiency," HumRRO Technical Report in preparation.

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- a. **Interpersonal Harmony.** Discriminations between co-workers appear to reflect judgments about whether the co-worker interacts to smooth or irritate the rater. The extent to which the co-worker accommodates himself to the rater's sense of mental well-being, accepts and gives recognition to the rater's status, and grants him autonomy, all contribute to a definition of this factor.
 - b. **Professional Competence.** Discriminations between co-workers appear to reflect judgments about how well-trained, experienced, knowledgeable, and productive the co-worker is in performing his work.
- (2) American advisors and Korean counterparts tend to use several different factors when discriminating between co-workers who are and are not members of their own ethnic group. The following factors have been tentatively identified:
- a. **Unselfishness:** American advisors discriminate between most- and least-preferred American co-workers with respect to whether they are or are not selfish.
 - b. **Conventional Conduct:** American advisors discriminate between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers with respect to how well they satisfy the American conception of hygienic behaviors.
 - c. **Power Status:** Korean counterparts discriminate between most- and least-preferred American co-workers with respect to their perceived status within American society and the military advisory group.
 - d. **Fate:** Korean counterparts discriminate between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers with respect to how favored they have been by fate.
- (3) Very few traits discriminated between advisors' conceptions of most-preferred American and Korean co-workers. Similarly, counterparts discriminated very few differences between most-preferred Korean and American co-workers. Exceptions are (a) advisors judged most-preferred American co-workers to be somewhat more *forgiving* and *generous* than most-preferred Korean co-workers, and (b) counterparts judged most-preferred Korean co-workers to be somewhat more *content* than most-preferred American co-workers.
- (4) In general, advisors regard least-preferred American co-workers as acting in socially disruptive ways to a greater degree than least-preferred Korean co-workers, and counterparts judged least-preferred Korean co-workers to be somewhat less competent than least-preferred American co-workers.
- (5) Compared to the concept of the most-preferred American co-worker, advisors regard their current counterparts as deficient primarily in competence and productivity. However, there is essentially no difference between the current counterpart and the advisors' ideals with respect to harmonious interpersonal relations.
- (6) Current advisors, compared to counterparts' conceptions of a most-preferred co-worker, are judged to be somewhat less *harmonious*, *friendly*, *trustworthy*, *generous*, *sympathetic*, and so forth. While counterparts tend to view their advisors as falling short in the establishment of harmonious interpersonal relations, they show more satisfaction than dissatisfaction with respect to their competence.
- (7) A limited number of personal traits discriminated advisors' and counterparts' descriptions of one another from their conceptions of a most-preferred co-worker. A most-preferred co-worker who was a member of the same ethnic group as the rater was judged more favorably than the current co-worker in the traits *forgiving*, *generous*, *enthusiastic*, *leader*, *organized*, *adaptable*, *consistent*, *sympathetic*, *superior*, *wise*, *thoughtful*,

learned, trustworthy, and valuable. This cluster of personal traits defines an area of interpersonal perception in which there exists a "favorability gap."

CRITICAL ROLE BEHAVIORS

Advisors' Conception of the Counterpart Role

(1) Advisors expect their counterparts to *more often* keep them better informed about matters in which they have an interest.

(2) More than 50% of the advisors want their counterparts to *less often* fail to inform them of conditions that are of concern to them, and *less often* give briefings that contain too little information to be understood correctly. They want counterparts to *less often* fail in the use of ordinary logic when planning a course of action, and *less often* permit their subordinates to turn out substandard or inaccurate work.

(3) Forty percent or more of the advisors want their counterparts to *more often* volunteer information that will help the advisors understand problems or situations they are trying to improve; *more often* conduct careful inspections of the performance of their subordinates to ensure high standards; *more often* actively cooperate in implementing recommendations designed to tighten control over funds and/or materials supplied by the MAP, and *more often* take inventive actions that go beyond routine procedures and methods when those have proven inadequate.

Counterparts' Conception of the Advisor Role

(1) Fifty percent or more of the counterparts indicated that their advisor should *less often* oppose or nonconcur with recommendations that ROKA makes to KMAG; *less often* appear ignorant of differences between what is SOP in ROKA and in the U.S. Army; *less often* leave the impression that they give more credence to what Americans say than to what Koreans say.

(2) Counterparts want their advisors to *more often* take actions to procure materials, supplies and equipment for them, and take personal actions to expedite the delivery of these items. They want the advisor to *more often* advocate their requests and recommendations in KMAG staffings and *more often* support them in satisfying the requirements that their superiors have levied on them. Nearly two-thirds of the counterparts want their advisors to keep them *more often* informed through periodic reports on the status of requests, plans, work in progress, and so forth. Finally, they want advisors to display *more often* an interest in becoming knowledgeable about their country's language, history, economy, customs, and the feelings of their people.

In summary, counterparts want their advisors to understand how they differ from Americans, to believe and support their recommendations, and to show a complimentary interest in their culture. Advisors want their counterparts to voluntarily keep them informed, establish and maintain higher standards of performance, and develop inventive solutions to problems when routine procedures and methods are inadequate.

CONCLUSIONS

(1) Contrary to the opinions of some overseas observers, it is feasible, at least in Korea, to collect, by means of survey methods, information from MAP counterparts that

is critical of the personal traits and role behaviors of advisors. The results obtained in this study contradict the notion that advisors and/or counterparts as groups, withhold judgments about one another that could be construed as expressions of dissatisfaction.

The kinds of both satisfactions and dissatisfactions that were reported appear, when related to important elements defining the advisor-counterpart relationship, to be candid and consistent with impressions obtained by other means. Thus, it appears possible to draw conclusions based on the data obtained by these survey groups.

(2) American advisors and Korean counterparts generally approve highly of one another's personal characteristics.

(3) Dissatisfactions with respect to personal traits reflect differences between the cultural backgrounds of the two groups. Advisors tend to view counterparts as deficient primarily in work-related characteristics, while counterparts tend to view advisors as deficient primarily in traits associated with harmoniously affiliative relationships.

(4) The identification of a cluster of traits (see Finding 7) defining a "favorability gap" helps to pinpoint the personal characteristics of advisors and counterparts that are most likely to be associated with failure to establish the status of a preferred co-worker. It is with respect to these particular personal traits that the two cultures are most likely to differ. Judgments of co-workers with respect to them, perhaps more than others, may reflect failures to correctly discriminate the intentions of co-workers and/or the application of cultural standards not shared by the co-worker.

(5) Advisors and counterparts have conceptions of each others' role that are in part similar but, to a greater degree, different. Neither group appears completely satisfied with how well they are kept informed concerning the status of plans and matters under consideration within the other group. While they share dissatisfaction with each other's communication characteristics, within this similarity differences were detected. Advisors' dissatisfactions with counterparts tend to be associated with the presentation of information that does not answer all of their questions, while counterparts tend to be dissatisfied with a lack of information from advisors.

(6) Advisors and counterparts hold conceptions of each others' roles that include a degree of acceptance of their requests and recommendations that is not satisfied in reality. However, within this similarity, differences are observed. For counterparts, matters pertaining to the acquisition of physical resources and KMAC concurrence with their plans and recommendations seem of primary importance. For advisors, matters pertaining to counterparts' utilization of physical resources in accordance with established U.S. policies and procedures seem most important. For counterparts, dissatisfaction is associated with direct and formal nonconcurrences with their requests; for advisors, with counterparts' inaction in response to their recommendations.

(7) Counterparts expect advisors to manifest a complimentary interest in learning about the historical and contemporary social context in which they operate. These expectations range from comprehending the nature of their relations to superiors and other factors affecting their sense of well-being, to general information on Korean history, economics, customs, language, and so forth. In sum, counterparts expect advisors to see the immediate local situation as they do, to endorse their judgments about what actions are appropriate to the conditions, and to provide the needed support.

(8) Advisors and counterparts differ both in the type of personal relations desired and in a limited number of role behaviors. In general, counterparts expect a degree of personal attention from advisors that American culture and membership in a military organization ordinarily neither require nor develop. Advisors, on the other hand, appear

to expect counterparts to adhere to rules and standards designed to regulate their military activities to a degree not accepted by counterparts. These differences reflect pervasive differences between the cultural backgrounds of the two groups.

Specific differences between advisors and counterparts tend to occur in matters pertaining to the control of resources, people, and events. Counterparts appear oriented toward achieving greater autonomy in managing the resources provided to them, and toward attaining more control over decisions made within the advisory group.

Attainment of MAP objectives depends upon the proficiency with which advisors utilize available resources to establish and maintain relationships to counterparts that result simultaneously in enhanced support for U.S. policies and the American presence and in increased military capability within the counterpart force. The management of both the cultural and role conflicts that exist between advisors and counterparts is an essential element of the advisor's job.

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**Military Advisors and
Counterparts in Korea:
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and Role Behaviors**

INTRODUCTION

MILITARY PROBLEM

General George C. Marshall spoke of the conflicts and frustrations that he felt were related to cultural differences between advisors and counterparts when he admonished General Joseph Stilwell, shortly before the latter became the chief military advisor to the Nationalist Chinese Government in 1942, "... to develop more of patience and tolerance than is ordinarily expected of a man and much more than is your constitutional portion" (1). A recent Chief of the U.S. Army Advisory Group, Korea (KMAG) acknowledged the importance of these differences when, during an orientation briefing to new advisors, he informed them that if any found they were unable to get along with their counterparts they would be considered for a transfer to a different assignment. Traditionally, KMAG had stressed the importance of developing a useful relationship to counterparts by means of the commandment that states, "I realize that I stand or fall with my counterpart. I share in credit for his successes and in blame for his failures" (1).

Successful implementation of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) puts unusual demands upon the advisor's ability to establish meaningful and effective dialogue with each of his counterparts. Like nearly all professional advisors—whether medical, legal, financial, or other specialists—the military advisor must first learn something about the person or people he is to advise. Sources other than the advisee himself may provide information important to comprehending his needs, resources, and problems, but unless that understanding is reflected back to him, he may feel that recommendations made to him were inadequately considered.

Not only does the advisor need to know the advisee, but the advisee must know that he is known. The advisor must know the advisee in order to comprehend his counterpart's circumstances. From the counterpart's point of view, the advisor is probably not a credible source of suggestions on improving his operations until the advisor has communicated that he does understand his counterpart's circumstances. Both the acquisition of information from the counterpart and the counterpart's acceptance of the recommendations depend upon a relationship that stimulates and maintains a free flow of information.

While it must be recognized that interpersonal communication between advisors and counterparts may be influenced by factors other than the personal characteristics of the individuals involved, this neither negates nor diminishes their probable importance to such communication.

The frequent absence of a common language between advisors and counterparts intensifies the difficulties involved in attempts to understand their respective circumstances and personal values. It can be assumed that the willingness of advisors and counterparts to continue communicating and working together depends upon their abilities to overcome these difficulties and achieve a mutual understanding. While it is not practicable to examine all the idiosyncratic differences between advisors and counterparts, it is feasible to determine what is common to each of the groups and to compare these factors. With this knowledge, advisors may be able to perceive differences that are generally characteristic of advisors and counterparts and to take actions to keep them from disrupting the formation of relations that promote counterparts' willingness to continue working with them.

OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

The advisors from whom information was collected were those assigned to KMAG, which is a major subordinate command of the Eighth United States Army. The organization of KMAG parallels that of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA). The Chief of Staff and principal personnel within ROKA Headquarters are advised by the Chief, KMAG, and his general and special staffs. Through permanent detachments, KMAG's advisory functions are extended to include the headquarters and elements subordinate to both the First and Second Republic of Korea Armies.

It is the mission of KMAG personnel to advise and instruct ROKA on operations, tactical and technical training, supply, organization, and administration; advise the Chief of Staff, ROKA, on matters pertaining to programing and budgeting for U.S. military aid and on the ROKA local currency budget; supervise the receipt, storage, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and salvage of materiel and equipment delivered to ROKA under the Military Assistance Program; verify within capability proper utilization of military aid furnished by the United States to ROKA in the form of supplies, materials, and equipment; program for material to be furnished to ROKA through the MAP and maintain the necessary records; advise the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army, and Chief of Staff, ROKA, and subordinate elements directly under the operational control of the Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters, in matters affecting implementation of orders and directives of the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army and in matters pertaining to operational responsibilities for which he is charged.¹

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This research was undertaken to compare advisors and counterparts with respect to two aspects of their relationships: (a) their conceptions of the kinds of personnel with whom they preferred and did not prefer to work, and (b) their conceptions of what kinds of behaviors were critical to satisfactory performance of their respective roles. The research sought to identify, through these comparisons, differences between the preferences and values of advisors and counterparts that might have implications for agencies concerned with their selection, training, and management. Information on the characteristics of military advisors' jobs is contained in an earlier report (2).

A final objective, although not discussed within this report, was to acquire information about the interactions of advisors and counterparts that would permit an assessment of the validity of an experimental criterion of advisory proficiency (3).

RESEARCH APPROACH

Three phases of work characterize the research. Phase 1 included several procedures that were required to develop instruments for collecting the data upon which to base comparisons. A pool of personal descriptors (trait names) were obtained from advisors and counterparts, translated, selected, and assembled in formats suitable to collecting descriptions of the personal qualities of personnel with whom they preferred or did not prefer to work. Second, advisors and counterparts were interviewed to obtain descriptions of fairly specific acts they judged to have been important in the formation of very

¹ A more detailed description of the organization of KMAG and its relationship to ROKA may be found in *Country Study: Republic of Korea*, Military Assistance Institute, The Department of Defense, Washington, 1963. Information presented here is taken from that source.

positive or negative attitudes toward one another. Statements were selected from the interview responses, edited, and cast into an inventory format requiring the respondents to describe and compare an actual co-worker with respect to each of the items.

Phase 2 consisted of selecting samples of advisors and counterparts for participation in the study and distributing the data collection instruments to them. The rating scales and inventories were distributed, in the summer and fall of 1966, to advisors through the KMAC postal channels, while counterparts received their materials through their Army Message Center. Completed materials were returned to the researcher through the same channels. Data for the analysis of pairs of advisors and counterparts who were currently working together were obtained from 51 pairs of respondents. Information was collected from an additional 46 counterparts and 56 advisors for whom it was not possible to match co-workers.

Phase 3 of the research consisted of statistically summarizing and analyzing the collected observations. A factor analysis of the co-worker personal preference ratings was performed to reduce these judgments to basic dimensions. Advisors' and counterparts' descriptions of one another, based on the items in the inventories of critical role behaviors, were scored to yield overall estimates of their satisfaction with one another. Types of role behaviors regarded as especially important by advisors and counterparts were identified.

CO-WORKER PERSONAL TRAIT PREFERENCES

Reliable relationships between styles of leadership and various criteria of group performance have been demonstrated in previous research, principally that of Fiedler (4). While it is inappropriate to conceive of MAP advisors as "leaders," several functions that advisors are frequently called upon to perform are similar to those performed by leaders in the traditional meaning of the word.

For one, advisors are expected to set examples of professional military conduct worthy of emulation by their counterparts. Second, advisors exist not only to provide to counterparts the physical resources they cannot provide themselves, but to influence and control the uses to which the materials are put. Third, some advisors must exert a guiding influence over the direction and form of counterpart plans. Often the influence occurs and develops in small group settings where the personal and habitual ways of relating to others can affect the outcome. Such relations have been demonstrated, by Fiedler and others, under a wide variety of work conditions, including those in which members of different cultures interact.

These findings, along with informally collected, anecdotal reports of experienced advisors, suggested the need to objectively assess the extent to which American advisors and Korean counterparts held similar or different conceptions of the kinds of people with whom they preferred to work. Differences, if observed, could be helpful in guiding research and military agencies responsible for selecting, training, and managing advisor personnel.

METHOD

Advisors and counterparts described each of four types of co-workers by means of seven-point ratings assigned to 40 bipolar adjectival scales. Each scale defined a trait dimension (such as *pleasant-unpleasant*, *competent-incompetent*, *humble-arrogant*, and so forth). Along these scales advisors and counterparts described their conceptions of the following types of co-workers: (a) an American with whom you prefer to work, (b) an

American with whom you prefer *not* to work, (c) a Korean with whom you prefer to work and (d) a Korean with whom you prefer *not* to work.

In addition, each advisor selected the one counterpart with whom he was working, at the time the survey was conducted, on the set of changes he regarded as of prime importance and described him in terms of the 40 scales. Each counterpart who had been described by an advisor was in turn requested to describe that advisor. Thus, descriptions of five different types of co-workers were collected that permitted comparisons to be made between American and Korean preferences as well as between current co-workers and their respective preference standards.

Construction of the Rating Scales

Development of the rating scales required the solution of two methodological problems. The first was in the nature of a sampling problem. Since advisors and counterparts are almost invariably socialized within different cultures, play different kinds of roles in their relations to one another, and use different languages, there is little reason to believe that use of a standard list of personal qualifiers of the type developed from study of American college students would necessarily include the traits most important to the subjects of this work. The need to allow advisors and counterparts to "speak for themselves," and thereby ensure that traits used were salient to them was met by first conducting a pilot study in which sub-samples of each group were administered a list of incomplete sentences (see Appendix A). Advisors were given sentences that required them to supply words to qualify or describe characteristics of counterparts. Counterparts completed sentences with stems parallel to those given advisors with words that described and modified their personal conception of advisors. By this means, the relevance of the sample of traits finally selected for inclusion in the co-worker personal preference rating scales was ensured through demonstrated usage under conditions carrying few linguistic constraints.

Translation of the Trait Names

The second methodological problem was the need to establish translation equivalence between the traits as expressed in English and Korean, as well as the need to select only those for which it was possible to estimate comparable degrees of "oppositeness" between the two ends of the scales. Solutions to these problems involved several steps.

The "qualifiers" obtained from Americans and Koreans in response to the incomplete sentences were listed. Within each list, redundant qualifiers were eliminated except for the qualifier that was given most often. A total of 77 qualifiers were retained from all that were given by the two samples.

Qualifiers originally given in Korean were translated into English by 17 Korean Army officers, whose regular duties involved daily translation. Another group of six Korean officers translated the same list of 77 qualifiers from English into Korean. Qualifiers that resulted in little agreement between the original list and the translation from English back into Korean were eliminated.

The list of qualifiers was then expanded by adding to each qualifier one or more trait names that were regarded as appropriate antonyms, and qualifiers that had been used by other researchers in an effort to answer questions similar to those upon which this study was based.

A list was drawn up, in English, of 212 qualifiers. For each qualifier two Korean words were proposed as equivalent in meaning, and the qualifiers and candidate translations were given to a group of 28 Korean officers. Each officer evaluated the proposed translation for each qualifier, indicated which was best, or if he regarded neither as satisfactory, suggested a third. Judges' endorsements were tabulated and the percentage of

agreement for each candidate translation computed. The same procedure was followed and applied to the judgments obtained from 24 instructors in the Korean Department at the Defense Language Institute.

Qualifiers were retained if 60% or more of the judges agreed with the proposed translation. Pairs of qualifiers were graded, by a professor from the English Language Research Center, Seoul National University, with respect to the extent to which the antonymic relationship between them in English and Korean was equivalent.² Twenty-seven of the pairs given an "A" rating were selected together with 13 given a "B" rating. Thus, 40 pairs of qualifiers were finally selected for use in obtaining descriptions of co-worker personal trait judgments from advisors and counterparts. A copy of the rating scales is contained in Appendix B.

Statistical Analyses of the Ratings

The chief merit of this technique for collecting reports about the personal traits of co-workers is that, in contrast to the simpler procedure of asking only for a description of the personal characteristics desired in advisors and counterparts, it has a built-in criterion for assessing the importance of individual traits. Because it allows for comparisons between preferred and non-preferred co-workers with respect to each trait, it is possible to demonstrate which of the traits are actually used to discriminate between the two types of co-workers.

Two different statistical procedures were applied to the analyses of these ratings. Differences between types of co-workers with respect to each of the 40 traits were assessed by means of Duncan's multiple range test. These analyses compared the characteristics of preferred to non-preferred co-workers, Americans to Koreans, and a current co-worker (a specific advisor or counterpart) to each of the first two types. Thus, it was possible to estimate the extent to which advisors and counterparts held similar conceptions of most- and least-preferred co-workers. Conclusions concerning the extent to which they have similar preferences are therefore based upon an examination of how they actually used these traits to discriminate one type of co-worker from another. Conclusions concerning the extent to which current co-workers are similar to least- or most-preferred co-workers are similarly based upon examinations of the discriminations made by the respective groups. Cultural differences with respect to each of the 40 traits are also determined by this method.

Factor analyses based upon the difference between the ratings assigned to most- and least-preferred co-workers were used to determine the basic dimensions along which Americans and Koreans discriminate the two types of co-workers. Analyses were made of the discriminations that each ethnic group made between co-workers from their group as well as those who were not members of it. These analyses yield clusters of traits (factors) that summarize the specific differences that are described in greater detail by the multiple range tests. Estimates were made of the degree to which advisors and counterparts use similar factors in discriminating between preferred- and non-preferred co-workers who are or are not members of their respective ethnic groups.

²The degree to which antonymic relations between traits defining opposite ends of the ratings scales can be preserved when translating from one language to another may be higher than common sense would suggest. College students have been shown capable of correctly matching, far beyond chance expectations, pairs of adjectival antonyms in a foreign language with which they had no familiarity to pairs presented in English, their native language (5, pp. 301-305). Success under these conditions is more improbable than success under the conditions that occurred in this study, viz. the knowledge and experience of an expert translator familiar with both languages.

RESULTS

Factorial Description of Co-Worker Preferences

In order to reduce the number of observations and to answer several questions about the general nature of co-worker preferences, factor analyses were performed on the ratings collected from advisors and counterparts concerning their conceptions of most- and least-preferred co-workers. The specific objectives of these analyses were:

(1) To identify and define the basic psychological dimensions along which advisors and counterparts discriminate between preferred and non-preferred co-workers.

(2) To determine whether the basic dimensions along which Americans discriminated between preferred and non-preferred co-workers were different from those used by Koreans.

(3) To determine whether the dimensions along which Americans discriminated between most- and least-preferred American co-workers were different from those used to discriminate between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers.

(4) To determine whether the dimensions along which Koreans discriminated between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers were different from those used to discriminate between most- and least-preferred American co-workers.

The procedure that was followed to answer these questions is partially illustrated by the schematic representation of the comparisons that were required, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1

Schematic Representation of Pairings for Factor Analyses^a

Traits	Advisors' Judgments				Counterparts' Judgments			
	American Co-Workers		Korean Co-Workers		American Co-Workers		Korean Co-Workers	
	MP (a)	LP (b)	MP (c)	LP (d)	MP (e)	LP (f)	MP (g)	LP (h)
Polite	(a-b)		(c-d)		(e-f)		(g-h)	
Kind								

^aMP = Most-Preferred Co-Worker
LP = Least-Preferred Co-Worker

Differences between the judgments assigned to most- and least-preferred co-workers were computed for each of the 40 traits. The differences derived from each of the four types of co-workers judged were separately intercorrelated and the correlation matrices separately factored. Thus, the judgments obtained from advisors yielded one set of factors descriptive of the dimensions they had used to discriminate between most- and least-preferred Americans, and a separate set of factors used to discriminate between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers. The analyses of the judgments obtained from counterparts paralleled those applied to the advisors' judgments.

Factors were extracted by the principal axes method and rotated to the varimax criterion. The extraction of factors was ended when the next factor to emerge accounted for less than 4% of the total variance. The number of factors extracted and the amount of variance accounted for by each are presented in Table 2.

The total percentage of variance accounted for by the factors extracted from the advisors' judgments is different from that accounted for by the factors obtained from

Table 2
Factors Extracted and Percentages of Variance
(In Percent)

Factor	Advisors' Factors		Counterparts' Factors	
	American Co-Workers	Korean Co-Workers	American Co-Workers	Korean Co-Workers
I	30.6	28.5	59.4	54.4
II	14.6	18.4	10.9	6.8
III	8.8	4.6	4.7	4.8
	54.0	51.5	70.0	66.0

counterparts' judgments. In addition, the first rotated factor extracted from the counterparts' judgments accounts for a much larger percentage of the total variance than does the first factor extracted from the advisors' judgments. However, the rotated factors extracted from within each of the groups of raters appear to account for approximately equal amounts of the total variance regardless of whether the variance is derived from judgments of co-workers of the same ethnic group as the rater or from a different one. For example, the first rotated factor based upon advisors' judgments accounts for 30.6% of the total variance within the ratings of American co-workers and only slightly less (28.5%) within their ratings of Korean co-workers.

The factors obtained from counterparts' judgments are similar in this respect. The meanings or contents of these factors are described by reference to the variables (trait names) associated with each. In order to identify the components most strongly associated with each of the factors and thereby clarify the interpretation of the factors, only those trait scales that loaded .70 or higher are listed in the tables that follow. (Complete lists of rotated factor loadings, together with indices of factorial similarity, are given in Appendix C.)

Factor I: Interpersonal Harmony

The first factors emerging from the discriminations of both advisors and counterparts (factors that account for the largest share of the variances) have been tentatively identified as reflecting judgments about how harmoniously co-workers relate to them—that is, social harmony. Specific trait scales loading most highly on these factors are shown in Table 3.

Advisors' Judgments

Trait-by-trait comparisons between the two factors obtained from advisors' ratings of American and Korean co-workers suggests the presence of several components within those factors. The two factors overlap with respect to one of the components, but not with respect to two others.

It appears that the domain of harmonious interpersonal co-worker relations is composed of traits (a) descriptive of acts that express an interest in and willingness to adapt to the mental well-being of the individual; (b) that express recognition of the rater's status, especially through deferential and ego-subordinating behaviors; and (c) descriptive of granting the rater autonomy to act upon his own judgment and at his own pace.

Associated with recognition of the individual's personal sense of mental well-being are the traits: *sympathetic, fair, considerate, humble, and forgiving*. This

Table 3
Factor I: Interpersonal Harmony

Advisors' Discriminations Between Most and Least Preferred:		Counterparts' Discriminations Between Most and Least Preferred:	
American Co-Workers (N=98)	Korean Co-Workers (N=95)	American Co-Workers (N=47)	Korean Co-Workers (N=59)
sympathetic- unsympathetic .81	modest- arrogant .78	modest- arrogant .89	tolerant- intolerant .82
fair- unfair .76	tolerant- intolerant .75	friendly- unfriendly .88	likable- unlikable .77
considerate- inconsiderate .76	harmonious- quarrelsome .74	polite- rude .87	modest- arrogant .77
harmonious- quarrelsome .76	patient- impatient .70	tolerant- intolerant .83	polite- rude .76
respectful- disrespectful .76	respectful- disrespectful .70	sympathetic- unsympathetic .82	humble- boastful .72
modest- arrogant .74		kind- unkind .81	respectful- disrespectful .71
humble- boastful .70		respectful- disrespectful .79	
forgiving- revengeful .70		harmonious- quarrelsome .78	
		considerate- inconsiderate .77	
		likable- unlikable .76	
		humble- boastful .76	
		generous- stingy .71	
		consistent- erratic .70	
		forgiving- revengeful .70	

component appears only within the factor derived from advisors' judgments concerning American co-workers. It is absent from the factor descriptive of their judgments concerning Korean co-workers. Subsequent analyses³ indicate that advisors judged least-preferred American co-workers, on the average, to manifest the opposite of each of these traits (except *unfair*) to greater degrees than Koreans with whom they preferred not to work. Thus, it appears that advisors hold conceptions of Korean co-workers in which the wish of advisors to receive recognition of their personal feelings is more likely to be satisfied by Koreans than Americans.

Traits associated with recognition and acceptance of the advisor's status include: *respectful*, *modest*, and *harmonious*. These traits, descriptive of a deference or ego-subordination characteristic of co-workers, form a component that appears in the first factor emerging from advisors' ratings of both American and Korean co-workers. Again,

³Table 8.

subsequent analyses (Table 8) indicate that advisors, on the average, judge that least-preferred American co-workers manifest the opposites of these traits more than least-preferred Korean co-workers. This finding implies that advisors view least-preferred American co-workers as being more likely than least-preferred Korean co-workers to relate to them in an ego-challenging or competitive manner.

Two traits form the third, or autonomy, component: *tolerant* and *patient*, traits identified by General Marshall as being essential to the advisory role (1). This component does not appear within the social harmony factor as it emerges from advisors' ratings of American co-workers. It does, however, appear within the social harmony factor based upon their descriptions of Korean co-workers. Again, subsequent analyses (Table 7) indicate that advisors judged least-preferred American co-workers to be, on the average, much more *impatient* and *intolerant* than least-preferred Korean co-workers.

Counterparts' Judgments

The first factors to emerge from counterparts' descriptions of American and Korean co-workers are similar to those obtained from advisors' descriptions, although minor differences are also observed. In general, the counterparts' first factor is more robust in the sense that it accounts for a larger percentage of the total variance than does the advisors' first factor.

Among the 14 trait scales loading most highly on the counterparts' first factor associated with descriptions of American co-workers are seven that define the advisors' first factor. The overlap between the two sets of factors is greatest with respect to the first component found within the advisors' social harmony factor, that is, recognition of the individual's sense of mental well-being. Traits associated with this component that are shared by advisors and counterparts include: *sympathetic*, *considerate*, *humble*, and *forgiving*. The counterpart version of this component differs from the advisors' in that *fair* is missing. Trait scales loading on the counterpart factor, though not on the advisors, that are most similar to this component include: *friendly*, *polite*, and *kind*.

The second component found within the advisors' social harmony factor also appears within this factor as it emerges from counterparts' descriptions. Traits expressive of modesty, harmony, and respect for the rater are used by both groups, although the only trait scale reaches the selection criterion of having a factor loading of .70 for its only American co-workers.

Tolerant loads on the counterparts' first factor, but its associate, *patient*, has its highest loading (.59) on a second factor associated with counterparts' ratings of Korean co-workers and loads only to the extent of .55 on their first factor based upon ratings of American co-workers. Thus, the tolerance and patience component observed within the advisors' first factor appears separated in the factorial structure of counterparts.

A possible third component within the counterparts' social harmony factor, absent from the advisor version, might be formed from the traits *generous* and *consistent*. These traits do not load, to the criterion level, on the advisors' social harmony factor.

Thus, in terms of the total percentage of variance accounted for by the first factor, the number of identical traits most highly loaded on the two sets of factors, and the similarities of non-shared to shared traits, the first factor emerging from both advisors' and counterparts' judgments of co-workers appears to be based upon the extent to which co-workers interact with the raters in ways that smooth or irritate them, or enhance or diminish their self-esteem and sense of well-being.

A comparison between the first factor emerging from counterparts' descriptions of American co-workers to the first factor associated with their descriptions of Korean co-workers identifies an important difference. Whereas the first factor associated with judgments about American co-workers includes all three components (recognition of personal welfare, recognition of status, and generosity-consistency pair), the factor based

upon descriptions of Korean co-workers is limited almost entirely to traits associated with the second component.

The first factor based upon counterparts' ratings of Korean co-workers has its highest loadings on the traits *tolerant, likable, modest, polite, humble, and respectful*. This implies that, when counterparts discriminate between Korean co-workers, the extent to which they acknowledge the status of the rater by deferential, ego-subordinating acts that allow the rater autonomy is most important. While this component exists within the social harmony factor derived from counterparts' descriptions of American co-workers, comparisons of the mean ratings assigned by counterparts to least-preferred American and Korean co-workers indicates that not one of them discriminates significantly between them. Indeed, only one trait scale associated with the social harmony factor does significantly discriminate between counterparts' ratings of least-preferred American and Korean co-workers; on the average, counterparts judge least-preferred Korean co-workers to be more *inconsistent* than least-preferred American co-workers.

Factor II: Professional Competence

The factor accounting for the second largest share of the variances based upon advisors' and counterparts' discriminations between most- and least-preferred American and Korean co-workers has been identified as a productive competence factor. Trait scales loading on this factor to the extent of .70 or more are shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Factor II: Professional Competence

Advisors' Discriminations Between Most and Least Preferred:		Counterparts' Discriminations Between Most and Least Preferred:	
American Co-Workers (N=98)	Korean Co-Workers (N=95)	American Co-Workers (N=47)	Korean Co-Workers (N=59)
competent- incompetent .82	productive- unproductive .88	organized- unorganized .76	superior- inferior .76
productive- unproductive .82	competent- incompetent .87	enthusiastic- unenthusiastic .75	wise- foolish .76
valuable- worthless .77	leader- follower .81	competent- incompetent .71	learned- ignorant .75
industrious- lazy .73	industrious- lazy .81		competent- incompetent .75
organized- unorganized .71	valuable- worthless .80		organized- unorganized .73
	organized- unorganized .70		enthusiastic- unenthusiastic .70

Advisors' Judgments

Advisors discriminate between preferred and non-preferred co-workers with respect to how competently and productively they act (Table 4). The two factors obtained from analyses of advisors' ratings differ only trivially.

First, this factor accounts for somewhat more of the total variance associated with discriminations between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers than it does for discriminations between American co-workers. From the point of view of advisors, it

appears that individual differences between Korean co-workers with respect to competence are somewhat greater than the range perceived among American co-workers. Second, the trait scale *leader-follower* loads .81 on this factor when based upon ratings of Korean co-workers, but .64 when derived from descriptions of American co-workers. In all other respects the two factors are similar.

Counterparts' Judgments

There are several differences between the counterparts' and advisors' versions of the competence factor (Table 4). Differences also occur between the version of competence obtained from counterparts' ratings of American co-workers and that which emerges from their discriminations between Korean co-workers. They are, however, trivial and best regarded as reflecting differences between how Americans and Koreans weigh traits when forming judgments, or possibly as occurring simply from sampling error.

Because the table lists only those traits that loaded on the factors to the extent of .70 or more, several traits that appear in one of them do not appear on the other and vice versa. Among the traits reaching the criterion for inclusion, based upon counterpart ratings but not advisors', are *enthusiastic*, *wise*, and *learned*. It should not be thought, however, that these traits did not load at all on the advisors' factor. In fact, each of these traits loads on both advisors' factors above .50. Similarly, while the traits *productive* and *industrious* appear on the advisors' factors, but not on the counterparts', both loaded on the latter factors .66 or higher. Finally, each of the four factors is loaded with the trait scale *superior-inferior* to extents ranging from .33 for advisors' ratings of American co-workers, .49 for their ratings of Korean co-workers, to .65 for counterparts' ratings of American co-workers.

Thus, when assessed in terms of the specific traits that load most highly on each of the factors and the degree to which they overlap as well as the similar percentages of variances for which they account, it seems clear that the second most important factor underlying advisors' and counterparts' discriminations between most- and least-preferred co-workers is essentially the same for the two groups and is based upon their judgments concerning the co-workers' level of professional competence, productivity, and skill. Later in this report comparisons will be made (Table 8) to determine the extent to which advisors and counterparts actually report differences between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers with respect to the professional competence factor.

Factor III: Co-Worker Specific Characteristics

The judgments of advisors and counterparts both yielded a third factor that is descriptive of a limited and particular characteristic of each of the types of co-workers who were discriminated. The contents of the four factors coming out of the separate analyses have little in common except that each clearly defines a specific attribute of the corresponding co-worker. The factors appear more closely related to the Interpersonal Harmony factor than they do to the Professional Competence factor. That is, the trait scales that constitute each of the factors contain items that obviously refer to the professional competence of the co-worker, but rather are composed of traits more likely to be associated with the satisfaction or frustration of the individual judge's personal needs, desires, and preferences.

Factor IIIa—Unselfishness

This factor describes a dimension along which advisors discriminate between most- and least-preferred American co-workers. *Sincere*, *thoughtful*, and *content* are the key traits that define the factor. These, combined with the remaining traits loaded on the factor, appear to describe a co-worker whose behavior is not dominated by the pursuit of

Table 5
Factor III: Specific Characteristics^a

Advisors' Discriminations Between Most- and Least-Preferred		Counterparts' Discriminations Between Most- and Least-Preferred	
American Co-Workers (a) (N=98)	Korean Co-Workers (b) (N=95)	American Co-Workers (c) (N=47)	Korean Co-Workers (d) (N=59)
sincere-	civilized-	powerful-	lucky-
insincere .63	uncivilized .66	powerless .79	unlucky .73
thoughtful-	pleasant-	leader-	agreeable-
rash .61	unpleasant .57	follower .77	stubborn .61
content-	likable-	lucky-	generous-
envious .61	unlikable .57	unlucky .69	stingy .35
trustworthy-	rational-	flattering-	
untrustworthy .58	irrational .39	critical .62	
kind-	flattering-	economical-	
unkind .57	critical .29	wasteful .60	
generous-		learned-	
stingy .55		ignorant .55	
tolerant-			
intolerant .47			
economical-			
wasteful .45			
rational-			
irrational .39			

^aSpecific characteristics:

- a = Unselfishness
- b = Conventional Conduct
- c = Success Status
- d = Fate

purely egoistic concerns. Being free from preoccupation with the gratification of selfish personal needs, the co-worker is also seen as being more *trustworthy*, *kind*, and *generous*. What appears to be discriminated is the capacity of a co-worker to interact with and come to know another person, and to use the interaction opportunities and knowledge gained about the other person without exploiting him. This cluster of traits has been labeled "Unselfishness."

Factor IIIb--Conventional Conduct

This factor describes a dimension along which advisors discriminate between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers. Previous factors that were discovered (Interpersonal Harmony and Professional Competence) and found to form the basis of advisors' judgments were applied by them to both American and Korean co-workers. While minor variations in the particular mixture of traits that made up each factor as it was applied to Americans and Koreans imputed a somewhat different flavor to them, the essential ingredients were highly similar.

Advisors tended to judge both Americans and Koreans in terms of whether they acted in ways that were disruptive to maintaining harmonious relationships, and to judge both American and Korean co-workers with respect to how competent and productive they were. Factor IIIb is exceptional because it occurs only among the judgments of advisors and is applied by them to only discriminations between most- and

least-preferred Korean co-workers. The factor is small in terms of the percentage of total variance for which it accounts. Relative to the other factors, this one is somewhat less important as a basis for evaluating Korean co-workers. Moreover, the small number of traits that are loaded on it makes its interpretation more difficult than the major factors.

The key trait associated with the factor is *civilized* followed by *pleasant* and *likable*, traits which suggest that advisors are invoking contemporary American middle-class stereotyped standards of personal conduct as a basis for comparing Korean co-workers. Moreover, the traits that form this factor suggest that the particular standards that are being invoked are those from which deviation is responded to affectively. Feelings of repugnance and disgust, and a desire to avoid contact with the behavior seem probable correlates to this factor.

With these assumptions, an understanding of the factor in terms of specific behavior referents can be extended by noting the more common ways in which some Koreans differ from the contemporary American middle-class standards of personal conduct. Other surveys of the attitudes of American military personnel toward Koreans show that Americans tend to regard some Koreans as unhygienic (6). Americans not infrequently conclude that some Koreans do not bathe sufficiently often, do not launder their clothing often enough, spread disease by spitting and urinating in places where contamination is uncontrolled, and use human manure to fertilize crops. Surely, most Americans would regard these behaviors as deviations from American standards of personal conduct and, presumably, "uncivilized," and the person who violates the standards as "unpleasant" and "unlikable."⁴ The interpretation must be tentative, but its plausibility is strengthened by the fact that only American judges generate the factor and its application is limited to Koreans.

Factor IIIc—Success Status

This factor describes a dimension along which counterparts discriminate between most- and least-preferred American co-workers. The cardinal traits that load on this factor are those that tend to describe attributes of social roles more than personal characteristics. Counterparts who discriminate preferred from non-preferred American co-workers by use of this factor are responding to differences between Americans with respect to their power and leadership status. Koreans want to associate with Americans with high social status as manifested by their power to control events and other people, so the attractiveness of an American co-worker can be expected to vary with his social status with other Americans, as his counterpart perceives it.

Competition for opportunities to interact with the high-status American can be expected to develop. Where opportunities for potential interactions with the high-status American are not grossly unequal between two or more Koreans, the development of actual inequities may be expected to result in jealousy between the competing Koreans. The basic attribute of the American co-worker as reflected in this factor has been labeled his "Success Status." It should be noted that there is some suggestion that Koreans tend to regard the attainment of high social status as a matter of luck or fate rather than or in addition to the reward for ability and hard work.

Factor IIId—Fate

This factor describes a dimension along which counterparts discriminate between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers. Given the extremely small number of traits that this factor comprises, any interpretation of its essential meaning must necessarily be regarded as tentative. Counterparts appear, when using this factor, to be

⁴ Differences between standards of sanitation in the United States and Korea are presented to U.S. military personnel in DA Pamphlet 608-15 (7), and in *Area Handbook for Korea*, (8, Chapter 12).

responding to whether the person is lucky or unlucky. Despite recent efforts of the Korean government to restrict and discourage (primarily by means of licensing and taxation policies) the perpetuation of essentially shamanistic practices, most Koreans are exposed throughout their lives to people who tempt them to interpret their existence as the outcome of factors that are, except by observance of magical rituals, beyond their control.⁵ Because of the widespread belief in predestination and fate, the emergence of a "fate" factor should be given more credence than the purely statistical viewpoint would warrant.

Indices of Factorial Similarity

Estimates of the degree to which advisors and counterparts used similar factors when discriminating between co-workers who were and were not members of their respective ethnic groups were computed by a formula described by Harmon (10, p. 257).⁶

The formula was used to obtain three sets of comparisons. One set compared the three factors advisors used to discriminate between most- and least-preferred American and Korean co-workers. These coefficients provide a basis for estimating the extent to which advisors' preferences vary as a function of the ethnic membership of the co-worker being evaluated. The second set parallels the first, but is based upon the three factors counterparts used. Finally, in order to estimate the extent to which advisors and counterparts used similar factors, comparisons were made between the three factors that had been extracted separately from the ratings given by the two groups.

Coefficients of factorial similarity (see matrix 1 of Appendix C) based upon the first two factors extracted from the judgments of advisors and counterparts indicate that neither group's discriminations between most- and least-preferred kinds of co-workers is influenced by the ethnic membership of the co-worker being judged. A coefficient of +.85 is obtained between the factorial structure of advisors' ratings of American and Korean co-workers with regard to the Social Harmony factor. Counterparts' use of this factor when judging American and Korean co-workers yields a coefficient of +.96 (see matrix 2 of Appendix C). Similar results are obtained when comparisons are based upon the Professional Competence factor. The coefficient of factorial similarity between this factor as it emerged from advisors' discriminations between most- and least-preferred American and Korean co-workers is +.96. A coefficient of +.95 is obtained when the comparison is based upon the Professional Competence factors from counterparts' discriminations between most- and least-preferred American and Korean co-workers.

Considerably less similarity is found when comparisons are made between the four types of Factor III shown in Table 5. Impressionistic interpretation of the nature of these

⁵ Belief in fate is not limited to rural and/or uneducated Koreans. About half of a sample of teachers in the Seoul area, graduates of higher educational institutions, between 30 and 40 years old, reported having had their fortunes told from analysis of the month, date, and hour of birth; 15% had consulted soothsayers and 28% believed that the physical location of ancestors' tombs influenced the prosperity of their descendents. Seventy-five percent of the members of these teachers' families reported having had their fortunes told (9).

⁶ According to Harmon, a coefficient of +1.00 is possible only if each trait scale loads to equal extents and direction on the two factors being compared. Thus, positive coefficients approaching +1.00 may be regarded as evidence of similarity between the factors underlying the judgments. Coefficients of -1.00 and those approaching this limit are indicative of a systematic lack of agreement or systematic disagreement. A coefficient of zero indicates no agreement whatsoever; a coefficient of -1.00 indicates "perfect inverse agreement"—i.e., that the factors are the same except that one is a reversal of the other.

factors, based upon the traits and loadings defining each of them, is supported by the lower coefficients of factorial similarity that are obtained. Factor IIIa suggested that what advisors were discriminating was something akin to "Unselfishness," while IIIb suggested they were discriminating between most- and least-preferred Korean co-workers with regard to a "Conventional Conduct" factor. That these factors are less similar than the others is suggested by the +.53 coefficient of factorial similarity that is obtained. Comparison between the third factor associated with counterparts' discriminations between most- and least-preferred Americans to the third factor based upon their discriminations between Korean co-workers also suggested they were less similar than either of the first two factors. Factor IIIc was labeled a "Success Status" factor, and IIId a "Fate" factor. The coefficient of factorial similarity between these factors is only +.53, suggesting that they are somewhat different.

A high degree of consistency has been demonstrated with regard to the role of Social Harmony and Professional Competence factors in the discriminations that both advisors and counterparts make between preferred and non-preferred co-workers, be they American or Korean.

To find the similarities or differences between advisors' and counterparts' factors, coefficients of factorial similarity were computed between the six factors extracted from advisors' judgments (three associated with ratings of American co-workers and three from ratings of Korean co-workers) and those extracted from similar judgments given by counterparts (Table 6). When coefficients based upon only the first two factors are considered, it appears unmistakable that advisors and counterparts are using many of the trait scales in highly similar ways. The eight coefficients range from a low value of .75 to a high of .91. Because most of the coefficients are above .80, differences between them are too small to justify efforts to explain them.

However, the considerably lower coefficients associated with Factors III (value range from .37 to .66) once again suggest that these factors are rather different from each other. Thus, it appears that with regard to the trait scales forming the first two major factors, advisors and counterparts use them in highly similar ways. The first two factors

Table 6
Indices of Factorial Similarity: Relations Between
Advisors' and Counterparts' Rotated
Co-Worker Preference Factors

Factors Descriptive of Counterparts' Preferences	Factors Descriptive of Advisors' Preferences					
	American Co-Workers			Korean Co-Workers		
	I	II	IIIa	I	II	IIIb
American Co-Workers						
I	.82			.91		
II		.85			.82	
IIIc			.37			.50
Korean Co-Workers						
I	.75			.86		
II		.88			.86	
IIId			.40			.66

which, in the case of advisors account for only somewhat less than 50% of the total variance and, in the case of counterparts somewhat more than half of the variance, reflect their *shared* concern over working with those who are skilled in both the management of interpersonal relations and the achievement of task objectives.

The differences between advisors' and counterparts' use of the remaining trait scales and the factors they form account for considerably less of the total variance associated with their preferences and tend to be unshared by them.

INDIVIDUAL TRAIT COMPARISONS OF CO-WORKER PREFERENCES

While the factor analysis isolates and defines general similarities and differences between the preferences of advisors and counterparts, more detailed comparisons help to locate the specific personal traits that enter into the discriminations that advisors and counterparts make between most- and least-preferred co-workers. Therefore, analyses of variance were separately performed on each of the 38 trait scales to determine where, if any, significant differences occurred between the various co-worker concepts judged by them. Duncan's multiple range test was applied to the results of each of the analyses of variance to determine which pairs of co-worker concepts differed significantly from each other with respect to each trait.⁷

Table 7

Comparisons Between Co-Worker Preference Ratings^a

Counterparts' Ratings of:	Advisors' Ratings of:				
	MPAm	LPKo	LPAm	CCo	CAd
Most-Preferred Korean (MPKo)	2 1	38 38	37 38	14 x	x 21
Most-Preferred American (MPAm)		38 38	37 38	22 x	x 9
Least-Preferred Korean (LPKo)			23 11	38 x	x 38
Least-Preferred American (LPAm)				37 x	x 38
Current Counterpart (CCo)					x x

^aNumber in upper left-hand quadrant indicates number of traits advisors discriminated between the two types of co-workers forming the cell. Number in lower right-hand quadrant the number discriminated by counterparts. Co-worker conceptions not compared are indicated with an "x".

⁷ After data analyses had been completed and recorded in draft, an article was published in which the authors report that the Duncan multiple range test generates more Type I errors than are generally acceptable (11, pp. 43-54). Thus, some of the differences between co-worker personal trait ratings may not be significantly different at the .05 level. The author of this report believes that the risk of erroneously identifying differences where none may exist is less important in the present work than not identifying differences where they may exist. Differences tentatively identified in the present study should, however, in the future be subjected to confirmation by new samples and more conservative tests.

A number of meaningful comparisons are possible because advisors and counterparts described, in addition to one another, four types of co-worker concepts. All of the possible comparisons are shown in the five-by-five matrix that appears in Table 7. The numbers within each of the cells in the matrix indicate the number of trait scales that discriminated significantly between the pairs of co-worker concepts forming each of the cells. In the upper left-hand quadrant of each cell is the number of trait scales that yielded significant differences between advisors' ratings of counterparts; in the lower right-hand quadrant are the number obtained from counterparts.

The results of these comparisons are reported and discussed in the order in which they occur as one moves across the top of the matrix from left to right. Thus, the first three sets of comparisons involve similarities and differences between advisors' and counterparts' conceptions of the kinds of co-workers with whom they prefer or prefer not to work. These comparisons are intended to identify similarities and differences between American and Korean standards against which actual co-workers are compared. After these standards have been defined and described, the remaining two sets of comparisons contrast advisors' and counterparts' descriptions of one another to the standards.

Conceptions of Most-Preferred Co-Workers

Neither advisors nor counterparts have a conception of a most-preferred co-worker who is a member of their own ethnic group that differs appreciably from their conception of a most-preferred co-worker who belongs to a different ethnic group. Comparison between advisors' conceptions of a most-preferred American and Korean co-worker yielded only two significant differences—compared to a most-preferred American co-worker, advisors judged most-preferred Korean co-workers to be somewhat less *forgiving* and *generous*. Comparison between counterparts' conceptions of a most-preferred Korean and American co-worker yielded only one significant difference—compared to their conception of a most-preferred Korean co-worker counterparts judged most-preferred American co-workers to be somewhat less *content*.

While these differences are significant in terms of probability theory, the scale score differences are all very small and represent a slight, but reliable, tendency to view co-workers of the rater's own ethnic group somewhat more favorably. Except for these few differences in degree of favorability, the ratings offer no evidence to suggest that advisors and counterparts have two sets of standards that define different conceptions of a most-preferred co-worker.

Conceptions of Least-Preferred Co-Workers

In contrast to the absence of discriminations between advisors' and counterparts' conceptions of American and Korean co-workers with whom they prefer to work are many differences in their conceptions of those with whom they prefer *not* to work (Table 8). Advisors and counterparts differ in both the number of differences they perceive between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers and the specific personal traits involved.

Advisors' Conceptions of Least-Preferred Co-Workers

Comparisons between advisors' descriptions of least-preferred American and Korean co-workers yielded 23 significant differences. While all are statistically significant, the magnitudes of the differences, measured in trait scale units, are all relatively small. In general, the differences indicate that advisors judged least-preferred American co-workers somewhat less favorably than they did least-preferred Korean co-workers. Possible exceptions to this generalization are the observations that advisors rated least-preferred

Table 8
**Traits Discriminating Between Least-Preferred
 American and Korean Co-Workers^a**

Trait Scales	Advisors' Mean Ratings		Counterparts' Mean Ratings	
	LPAm	LPKo	LPAm	LPKo
consistent-erratic	3.0	3.8	3.2	2.6
fair-unfair	3.0	4.1	3.5	2.8
trustworthy-untrustworthy	4.1	3.7	3.4	2.8
economical-wasteful	4.2	3.8	4.6	3.9
patient-impatient	2.5	3.6		
considerate-inconsiderate	2.6	3.5		
humble-boastful	2.6	3.4		
modest-arrogant	2.6	3.2		
harmonious-quarrelsome	2.9	3.4		
tolerant-intolerant	3.0	3.8		
thoughtful-rash	3.0	3.6		
polite-rude	3.1	4.4		
forgiving-revengeful	3.1	3.8		
likable-unlikable	3.1	3.5		
sympathetic-unsympathetic	3.2	3.7		
content-envious	3.2	3.7		
pleasant-unpleasant	3.5	4.0		
kind-unkind	3.6	4.3		
rational-irrational	3.6	4.0		
respectful-disrespectful	3.8	4.3		
friendly-unfriendly	4.1	4.5		
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	4.2	3.6		
lucky-unlucky	4.6	4.2		
sincere-insincere			3.7	2.9
valuable-worthless			3.5	2.9
leader-follower			4.0	3.0
competent-incompetent			3.9	3.1
productive-unproductive			3.7	3.1
superior-inferior			3.9	3.2
learned-ignorant			4.1	3.5

^aDifferences between the mean ratings that are shown are those that are statistically significant ($p < .05$), estimated by the multiple range test. For complete comparisons see Appendices D and E. Scores could range from one to seven with the latter indicating an extreme degree of the first trait listed.

Americans as being somewhat more *trustworthy*, *economical*, *enthusiastic*, and *lucky* than least-preferred Korean co-workers.

Counterparts' Conceptions of Least-Preferred Co-Workers

Counterparts, compared to their advisors, discriminated only about half as many differences between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers. In each of the 11 differences, counterparts tended to judge the least-preferred Korean co-worker less

favorably than the American. Thus, advisors and counterparts appear similar in their tendency to judge members of their own ethnic group with whom they prefer not to work less favorably than co-workers from outside their group, although advisors discriminated more differences than counterparts. This type of difference may be associated with different styles of leadership, a subject discussed later in this section.

Advisors' and Counterparts' Conceptions of Least-Preferred Co-Workers

The specific trait scales used by advisors and counterparts to discriminate between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers show additional divergences in their conceptions. Out of the total of 30 scales resulting in significant differences, only four were used by both advisors and counterparts, and even two of these were used differently. Counterparts judged least-preferred Korean co-workers to be more *erratic* and less *consistent* than Americans with whom they preferred not to work, whereas advisors judged least-preferred Americans to be more *erratic* than Koreans with whom they preferred not to work. A similar reversal occurred with respect to the trait scale defined by *fair-unfair*. Advisors and counterparts seemed to agree, however, that even though they did not want to work with the particular American they rated, they tended to judge him to be somewhat more *economical* and *trustworthy* than the Korean with whom they preferred not to work.

Perhaps the most important single difference between advisors' and counterparts' conceptions of least-preferred American and Korean co-workers is that counterparts' ratings reflect no statistically significant differences between those groups with respect to how harmoniously they interact (both groups are judged to interact in socially disruptive ways), while advisors do see differences between Americans and Koreans with respect to this characteristic.

From the advisors' point of view, while a least-preferred Korean is disruptive he is significantly less so compared to a least-preferred American. A similar kind of relation is observed in comparing the kinds of traits that counterparts discriminate between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers, but which are not used by advisors. While counterparts consider both the Americans and Koreans with whom they prefer not to work as incompetent and unproductive, from their point of view Koreans are worse than Americans with respect to this general characteristic. Advisors, on the other hand, see both groups as about equally incompetent.

Thus, the overall impression is that, from the counterparts' point of view, the least competent and productive American worker is, on the average, probably a bit more competent and productive than the least productive Korean. From the advisors' point of view, on the average, the most socially disruptive Korean co-worker is probably still somewhat less disruptive than the most disruptive American.

Current Counterparts Compared to Advisors' Conceptions

Advisors' descriptions of the counterparts with whom they were working were compared, trait by trait, to descriptions of their conceptions of most-preferred American and Korean co-workers. The comparisons producing significant differences are presented in Table 9.

Advisors discriminated differences between their current counterparts and their conceptions of a most-preferred American co-worker on about half of the trait scales. In no comparison was the current counterpart found to be qualitatively different from the advisors' conception of a most-preferred American co-worker. "Qualitatively different," in this context, refers to only those differences that reflected raters' use of one end of the bipolar trait scale to describe one co-worker and the opposite end of the scale to describe

Table 9

**Traits Discriminating Current Counterparts from
Advisors' Conceptions of
Most-Preferred American and Korean Co-Workers^a**

Trait Scales	Advisors' Mean Ratings		
	CCo	MPAm	MPKo
powerful-powerless	5.4	5.9	5.8
economical-wasteful	5.6	6.3	6.0
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	5.7	6.7	6.5
leader-follower	5.7	6.7	6.4
organized-unorganized	5.8	6.6	6.3
adaptable-unadaptable	5.8	6.4	6.3
consistent-erratic	5.8	6.3	6.3
productive-unproductive	6.0	6.8	6.6
thoughtful-rash	6.0	6.6	6.4
learned-ignorant	6.0	6.5	6.4
industrious-lazy	6.0	6.6	6.6
trustworthy-untrustworthy	6.1	6.8	6.6
valuable-worthless	6.2	6.8	6.6
competent-incompetent	6.2	6.8	6.6
forgiving-revengeful	5.0	5.6	
generous-stingy	5.5	6.0	
tolerant-intolerant	5.8	6.2	
sympathetic-unsympathetic	5.8	6.2	
superior-inferior	5.8	6.2	
wise-foolish	5.9	6.3	
fair-unfair	6.1	6.6	
sincere-insincere	6.2	6.7	

^aDifferences between the mean ratings that are shown are those that are statistically significant ($p < .05$), estimated by the multiple range test. For complete comparisons see Appendix D. Scores could range from one to seven with the latter indicating an extreme degree of the first trait listed.

the other; when ratings assigned to the two co-workers yielded means that were both above or below the midpoint of the scale, any differences that occurred were regarded as qualitatively similar. All of the differences, in terms of scale units, are relatively small and simply suggest that a very desirable American co-worker is more favorably viewed than most current counterparts.

Advisors also judged their current counterparts to differ, although not qualitatively, from their conceptions of a most-preferred Korean co-worker. On about 35% of the trait scales, the current counterpart was judged somewhat less favorably than the advisors' conception of a most-preferred Korean co-worker.

The trait scales that consistently discriminate current counterparts from advisors' conceptions of both most-preferred American and Korean co-workers are those that are associated primarily with work behaviors, although a few are more descriptive of interpersonal acts. Among the former are traits such as *economical*, *leader*, *productive*, *learned*, *industrious*, and *competent*, while the latter include *thoughtful*, *trustworthy*, *forgiving*, *tolerant*, *sympathetic*, and so forth. Advisors judged current counterparts, on

the average, to manifest these characteristics somewhat less than co-workers with whom they preferred to work.

Current Advisors Compared to Counterparts' Conceptions

Counterparts' descriptions of the advisors with whom they were working were compared, trait by trait, to descriptions of their conceptions of most-preferred American and Korean co-workers (Table 10).

Table 10
Traits Discriminating Current Advisors From
Counterparts' Conceptions of
Most-Preferred Korean and American Co-Workers^a

Trait Scales	Counterparts' Mean Ratings		
	CAd	MPKo	MPAm
agreeable-stubborn	4.5		5.4
generous-stingy	4.1	5.2	5.1
leader-follower	4.8	5.7	5.8
sympathetic-unsympathetic	5.2	6.0	6.0
consistent-erratic	5.6	6.3	6.3
trustworthy-untrustworthy	5.7	6.5	6.5
harmonious-quarrelsome	5.7	6.4	6.3
valuable-worthless	5.7	6.2	6.3
superior-inferior	5.9	6.6	6.5
friendly-unfriendly	5.9	6.5	6.6
forgiving-revengeful	5.2	5.8	
patient-impatient	5.3	6.2	
organized-unorganized	5.5	6.3	
content-envious	5.5	6.2	
considerate-inconsiderate	5.5	6.0	
likable-unlikable	5.6	6.2	
wise-foolish	5.7	6.3	
adaptable-unadaptable	5.7	6.3	
thoughtful-rash	5.8	6.4	
learned-ignorant	5.8	6.4	
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	6.0	6.6	

^aDifferences between the mean ratings that are shown are those that are statistically significant ($p < .05$), estimated by the multiple range test. For complete comparisons see Appendix E. Scores could range from one to seven with the latter indicating an extreme degree of the first trait listed.

Counterparts discriminated differences between their current advisors and conceptions of a most-preferred Korean co-worker in about half of the traits, approximately the number previously reported for advisors' comparisons of counterparts. In addition, the comparisons based upon counterparts' judgments are similar to those obtained from advisors in that the current advisor was never judged to be qualitatively different from the counterpart's conception of a preferred Korean co-worker.

Their judgments suggest, however, that current advisors fall far short of their preferences with respect to two traits: *agreeable* and *generous*. Counterparts' ratings of the agreeableness of advisors is unique among all of the comparisons made. On this trait only, current advisors are judged to be not different from a preferred Korean co-worker, but different from a preferred American co-worker. It appears that counterparts desire a degree of agreeability from advisors that they do not expect from even a most preferred Korean co-worker! Yet, the absolute mean scale score given to advisors on this trait simply indicates that current advisors are, on the average, neither distinctly agreeable nor stubborn.

While comparisons of advisors' descriptions of counterparts to their preferences indicated counterparts fell short primarily with respect to work-related behaviors, the scales shown in Table 10 suggest that just the opposite may be true for counterparts. The majority of personal traits that discriminate between the current advisor and their preferences are those associated with establishing and maintaining harmonious interpersonal relations. In addition to differences regarding *agreeableness* and *generosity*, counterparts judge their current advisors less favorably than most-preferred Korean co-workers with respect to such traits as *sympathetic*, *trustworthy*, *harmonious*, *friendly*, *forgiving*, *patient*, and *considerate*.

Moreover, advisors are judged similarly in about half of the traits listed in Table 10 when compared to counterparts' conceptions of a most-preferred American co-worker. There are few data in this table to suggest that counterparts regard their advisors as incompetent or non-productive. The closest these data come to suggesting dissatisfaction with advisors' work performance is in matters of judgment and motivation, but again the differences in scale score units are very small and the absolute levels relatively high.

Cross-Cultural Discriminative Traits

Certain of the trait scales discriminated, to statistically significant degrees, between both advisors' and counterparts' conceptions of a most-preferred co-worker from their own ethnic group and their ratings of current co-workers. Many of the same traits also discriminated current counterparts from advisors' conceptions of a most-preferred Korean co-worker and current advisors from counterparts' conceptions of a most-preferred American. These 14 traits relative to the two samples of Americans and Koreans from whom ratings were collected, are "universal" discriminators of co-worker personal preferences (Table 11).

All comparisons between a current co-worker, advisor or counterpart, involving these 14 traits and the raters' conception of a most-preferred co-worker of the same ethnic group indicate that the current co-worker is regarded less favorably. In other words, these traits define the complex of desirable personal characteristics that advisors believe Americans possess to a greater degree than Koreans and which counterparts believe Koreans possess to a greater degree than Americans. In that raters appear to favor co-workers of their own ethnic group, these traits seem most likely to enter into ethnocentric judgments concerning co-workers. Rather than conclude, however, that advisors and counterparts are grossly ethnocentric with respect to these preferences, it should be noted that again the mean differences are, in scale unit scores, quite small.

Perhaps the best way to conceive of these differences is that advisors tend to give a slight edge in their preferences to Americans just as counterparts tend to do the same for Koreans. McCrary has observed similar consistent divergences in the preferences expressed by American and Korean enlisted personnel in evaluating one another, which he calls the "favorability gap" (12). The present data on the 14 "universal" personal trait discriminators suggest it is appropriate to extend the concept of the "favorability gap" from enlisted personnel to officers of both military organizations, and from general evaluations to specific personal traits.

Table 11

**Traits Used by Both Advisors and Counterparts to Discriminate
Current Co-Workers From Their Conceptions
of a Most-Preferred Co-Worker^a**

Trait Scales	Advisors' Mean Ratings			Counterparts' Mean Ratings		
	CCo	MPAm	MPKo	CAd	MPKo	MPAm
forgiving-revengeful	5.0	5.6		5.2	5.8	
generous-stingy	5.5	6.0		4.1	5.2	5.1
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	5.7	6.7	6.5	6.0	6.6	
leader-follower	5.7	6.7	6.4	4.8	5.7	5.8
organized-unorganized	5.8	6.6	6.3	5.5	6.3	
adaptable-unadaptable	5.8	6.4	6.3	5.7	6.3	
consistent-erratic	5.8	6.3	6.3	5.6	6.3	6.3
sympathetic-unsympathetic	5.8	6.2		5.2	6.0	6.0
superior-inferior	5.8	6.2		5.9	6.6	6.5
wise-foolish	5.9	6.3		5.7	6.3	
thoughtful-rash	6.0	6.6	6.4	5.8	6.4	
learned-ignorant	6.0	6.5	6.4	5.8	6.4	
trustworthy-untrustworthy	6.1	6.8	6.6	5.7	6.5	6.5
valuable-worthless	6.2	6.8	6.6	5.7	6.2	6.3

^aDifferences between the mean ratings that are shown are those that are statistically significant ($p < .05$), estimated by the multiple range test. Data are from Appendices D and E. Scores could range from one to seven with the latter indicating an extreme degree of the first trait listed.

Nondiscriminative Traits

The extent to which advisors and counterparts tend to describe favorably members of their own ethnic group is limited and does not involve all of the traits over which co-workers were rated. On nine of the trait scales ratings failed to discriminate between either advisors' descriptions of current counterparts and their standards, or counterparts' descriptions of current advisors and their conceptions of a most-preferred Korean or American co-worker (Table 12).

With the possible exception of one trait scale (*rational-irrational*), the complex of personal traits that failed to discriminate are all more descriptive of socially oriented interpersonal behaviors than of work-related behaviors, abilities, and motivations. Thus, these samples of advisors and counterparts tend on the average not to see differences between one another and their conceptions of a preferred co-worker with respect to humbleness, modesty, kindness, civility, respectfulness, pleasantness and politeness. They appear to be generally satisfied with one another in respect to these characteristics. With the strong connotation of deference associated with these traits, the observation that counterparts discriminated no differences between current advisors and their conceptions of a preferred co-worker is remarkable. However, this should not be interpreted as indicating their lack of relevance or salience to the judgments advisors and counterparts make about one another. The factor analysis demonstrates that these traits do underlie judgments counterparts make about advisors and vice versa. What the present data indicate is that, on the average, advisors perform well in the eyes of their counterparts.

Table 12

**Traits Neither Advisors nor Counterparts Used to
Discriminate Between Their Current Co-Worker and Their
Conceptions of a Most-Preferred Co-Worker^a**

Trait Scales	Advisors' Mean Ratings			Counterparts' Mean Ratings		
	CCo	MPAm	MPKo	CAd	MPKo	MPAm
lucky-unlucky	4.6	4.7	4.7	5.0	5.2	5.4
humble-boastful	4.9	4.9	4.8	5.5	5.9	5.7
modest-arrogant	5.4	5.3	5.5	5.7	6.2	6.3
kind-unkind	5.9	6.2	6.0	6.1	6.3	6.4
rational-irrational	6.0	6.4	6.2	5.8	6.2	6.1
civilized-uncivilized	6.3	6.4	6.4	5.9	6.2	6.1
respectful-disrespectful	6.3	6.3	6.4	5.8	6.1	6.3
pleasant-unpleasant	6.4	6.6	6.6	5.9	6.4	6.4
polite-impolite	6.7	6.4	6.5	5.9	6.2	6.2

^aDifferences between the mean ratings are statistically significant ($p < .05$), estimated by the multiple range test. Data are from Appendices D and E. Scores could range from one to seven with the latter indicating an extreme degree of the first trait listed.

Comparisons Between Actual Co-Workers on Factors

The trait-by-trait analyses of variance that were used to describe differences between the preferences of advisors and counterparts can now be summarized more easily. By determining the membership of each discriminative trait on an appropriate factor, it becomes possible to regard each of the specific trait differences as samples of the common factor.

As previously reported, counterparts judged least-preferred Korean co-workers to be significantly worse than least-preferred American co-workers with respect to a dozen traits. Approximately two-thirds of these traits are representative of the Productive Competence factor. Thus, in general, Koreans tend to view their least-preferred Korean co-workers as less productively competent than least-preferred Americans. The remaining one-third of the traits are representative of the Social Harmony factor. Both least-preferred groups are regarded by counterparts as *insincere*, *unfair*, and *untrustworthy*, but they regard these characteristics to be more descriptive of Koreans than Americans. The major difference, however, is with respect to the competence dimension.

Advisors' dissatisfactions with least-preferred co-workers mirror-image those of counterparts. In contrast to Koreans' dissatisfaction with the competence of least-preferred co-workers, Americans appear to form the discrimination between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers on the basis of the Social Harmony factor. In short, advisors appear to dislike least-preferred American co-workers more than least-preferred Koreans because the former tend to behave in socially disruptive ways more than the Koreans.

Compared to the characteristics of the most-preferred American co-worker, advisors regard their current counterparts as deficient primarily on the Productive Competence factor. Current counterparts tend to fall short of the ideal with respect to industriousness, competence, productivity, professionalism, and so forth. There is, however, essentially no difference between the characteristics of the current counterpart and the advisors' ideals with respect to the Social Harmony factor.

Counterparts' descriptions of current advisors, when compared to their conceptions of most-preferred co-workers, show differences that indicate counterparts and advisors do not use the same factors to the same extent when judging each other. While advisors view their current counterparts as falling somewhat short of their conception of the preferred co-worker in the Productive Competence factor, counterparts regard their current advisors as falling short with respect to the Social Harmony factor. When the specific trait differences that discriminated between the counterparts' description of current advisors and their conceptions of the most-preferred co-workers are examined with respect to the factors that are represented by those traits, it is found that approximately 80% of them are derived from the Social Harmony factor (see Table 10).

Current advisors, compared to counterparts' conceptions of the ideal co-worker, are somewhat less *harmonious, friendly, trustworthy, generous, sympathetic*, and so forth, than they would like them to be. Relatively few traits representative of the Productive Competence factor discriminate between current advisors and counterparts' conceptions of the ideal co-worker. Those few traits that do discriminate suggest that counterparts wish advisors would approach them with greater *wisdom, learning, better organized*, and with more *enthusiasm*.

The consistency of the findings independently obtained from American and Korean judges suggests that there is "truth" in the judgments. Americans tend to dislike working with least-preferred Americans whom they judge to act, more than Koreans, in socially disruptive ways. Counterparts appear to perceive Americans in essentially the same manner, and report that their current advisors do not act, as much as they would prefer, in ways leading to harmonious interpersonal relations. When Americans are being judged, advisors and counterparts agree that if an American falls short of their preferences, it is in maintaining smooth interpersonal relations. Koreans tend to dislike working with least-preferred Koreans because they are incompetent and unproductive, a perception advisors appear to share. When Koreans are being judged, advisors and counterparts agree that if a Korean falls short of their preferences it is not because of a failure to establish smooth interpersonal relations, but because he is incompetent and unproductive.

These findings may not be unique to comparisons involving only Americans and Koreans. A similar study in which stereotypes of Americans and Greeks were compared yielded results not inconsistent with those reported here (13, pp. 316-328). Among the negative characteristics of Greek national character reported by Americans was their "poor work habits," or low work effectiveness. The Greeks' perception of themselves agreed with the Americans'. By contrast, Americans regard themselves positively on this factor and the Greeks agree. The Greeks see the Americans as "well-oiled work horses, that is rather dull, but efficient" (as put by one of the interviewees). Consistent with the Korean perception of Americans is the Greeks' complaint that Americans treat them not as equals, but as poor allies who need help. Basically, the Greeks express dissatisfaction with American values, beliefs, and acts that are dissonant with the kinds of social relations they prefer. Americans are regarded as

... *too legalistic*, requiring rigid adherence to procedures; *too rigid*, unable to change their procedures to adapt them to the Greek situation; *too cold*; i.e. they show extraordinary emotional control, social distance, and lack of emotional involvement in social relations; *too suspicious*, they check on every penny of American aid; ... *not sufficiently modest*, i.e. display frequent feelings of superiority; *too hardheaded in personnel decisions*, i.e. give overwhelming weight to competence and not enough to human factors (13).

The Greeks, not unlike the Koreans, "... cannot understand the distinction between 'work behavior' and 'friendship behavior' which is often found in American settings."

... training for greater effectiveness in intercultural situations may involve, on the American side, a slight reduction of emphasis on efficiency, and greater acceptance of 'human factors'

as bases for organizational decisions, as well as training in the appreciation of the culture of the host country. The lesser emphasis on efficiency should reduce the perception of the American by the host as 'inhumanly efficient.' The greater emphasis on the host culture, including language history, and values, should make the host less defensive towards American superiority. On the other side, increased training of members of the host culture in the direction of emphasis on efficiency, discrimination between criteria for work decisions and social decisions, etc., should also help. Changes in organizational procedures that result in rewards for achievement and minimize punishment for mistakes and development of procedures that reward objective decisions that maximize the welfare of the total organization, thus increasing cooperation and decreasing competition between peers, should help the effectiveness of intercultural contact (13).

The similarity of the Koreans' perceptions of advisors to the Greeks' views of Americans makes the above suggestions relevant to any consideration of ways in which to improve advisor-counterpart relations in Korea.

INFERENCES CONCERNING STYLES OF INTERACTIONS

Reference was made earlier to Fiedler's research concerning individual differences in the attitudes and approaches of leaders to members of small work groups and the effects of these differences upon various measures of effectiveness and productivity (4). Because the procedures and methods of analysis Fiedler used in his assessment of individual differences in styles of leadership are similar, although not identical, to those used in this study, it is relevant to compare major findings.

Fiedler's classification of leaders into two types is based upon the observation that there is a highly reliable difference in the extent to which leaders describe the personal traits of least-preferred co-workers favorably or unfavorably. As correlates of this difference have accumulated, it has become possible to further discriminate other differences between those who do and do not favorably regard least-preferred co-workers.

While the interpersonally oriented leader tends to spare the feelings of the co-worker with whom he is least able to work and reacts to him nonpunitively, the task-oriented leader is more likely to regard the personality traits of the least-preferred co-worker as the *cause* of their inability to work well together. While the interpersonally oriented leader tends to separate the unsatisfactory performance of a least-preferred co-worker from his personality traits, the task-oriented leader is likely to relate them to each other. The essential difference between the two styles appears to result from the use of different ways to achieve greater self-esteem. Leaders who describe favorably the traits of co-workers with whom they least prefer to work appear to seek this by gaining their co-workers' recognition. Fiedler regards this as an interpersonal style of leadership. In contrast are leaders who describe unfavorably the traits of co-workers with whom they least prefer to work. These leaders seem more focused upon enhancing their self-esteem by achieving task objectives, and are described by Fiedler as task-oriented. While both types are concerned with their co-workers and with accomplishing work objectives, the means-end relations tend to separate their styles (4).⁸

⁸There are several differences between the specific characteristics of Fiedler's methods and those used in this study. First, the number of trait scales and, hence, some of the specific traits are different; second, Fiedler's classification of leadership styles is based upon an analysis of each subject's mean rating over all trait scales; third, Fiedler does not restrict comparisons to only those scales that discriminate significant differences between different co-worker concepts; and fourth, Fiedler uses an eight-point scale to obtain ratings, rather than the seven-point format used in this study. Despite these differences in detail, the similarities between the two methods are sufficient to permit approximate interpretations of the results obtained by referring them to Fiedler's norms and theory.

When the results from the present study are viewed in the context of the two major styles of leadership just described, several relationships can be observed that indicate the direction toward which advisors and counterparts tend in their relations to one another.

First, it has been observed, as shown in Table 8, that American advisors discriminate about *twice* as many (23 vs. 11) significant differences between least-preferred American and Korean co-workers as do their Korean counterparts. Yet, the mean differences in scale unit scores are very small and, in a majority of the differences, favor the least-preferred Korean more than the least-preferred American. If Fiedler's interpretation of variation in the ratings given to least-preferred co-workers reflects variation in concern for interpersonal relations, then it appears that advisors, on the average, are somewhat more interpersonally and less task-oriented toward counterparts than toward American co-workers.

Moreover, when the absolute scale values of these ratings are compared to norms from Fiedler's studies it is evident that American advisors are somewhat more apt to relate to Koreans in a style characteristic of the interpersonally oriented leader rather than the task-oriented leader.⁹ Using converted norms to make comparisons to Fiedler's data, the following conclusions can be drawn:

While 23 of the traits discriminate between advisors' ratings of least-preferred American and Korean co-workers, a nearly equal number of mean ratings for those two types of co-workers are in the range of scores that Fiedler regards as indicating an interpersonal style of orientation. Fifteen of the 23 means given to the least-preferred American co-worker and 18 of the 23 means given to the least-preferred Korean co-worker fall within that range.

Second, similar relations are observed in counterparts' descriptions of least-preferred American and Korean co-workers. While 11 of the trait scales discriminated significantly between counterparts' conceptions of the two co-workers, the mean differences are small in terms of scale unit scores, and *invariably* favor the description of the least-preferred American co-worker more than the Korean. Seven of the 11 means associated with the description of the least-preferred American fall within the range indicative of an interpersonal orientation as opposed to only one of the 11 means associated with descriptions of the least-preferred Korean co-worker. It appears counterparts assume a much more task-oriented style of leadership toward least-preferred Koreans than toward Americans with whom they prefer not to work.

If the validity of the interpretation of these scores in terms of Fiedler's norms and theory is accepted, it appears that both advisors and counterparts tend to assume a more interpersonally oriented style of leadership with co-workers who are not members of their ethnic group than with those who are.

Considering the conditions under which advisors and counterparts interact (membership in different military organizations and power structures; lack of command authority over one another; disparity in rank; the complexity of problems and obstacles encountered; their dependence upon one another; the long-term involvement required to accomplish tasks; and the voluntary nature of their associations), it seems that the

⁹ Because Fiedler used eight-point trait rating scales, instead of the seven-point scales used in this study, an adjustment is needed to use his norms as a basis for interpretation. This consists of computing the proportion of a seven-point scale that is equal to the segments of an eight-point scale. Fiedler defines a task-oriented leader as one who, on the average, gives a least-preferred co-worker ratings that range between 1.2 and 2.2 on the eight-point scale; the comparable segment of a seven-point scale is from 1.0 to 1.9. Fiedler defines the interpersonal relationship-oriented leader as one who, on the average, gives a least-preferred co-worker ratings that range between 4.1 and 5.7 on the eight-point scale; the comparable segment of a seven-point scale is from 3.6 through 5.0.

interpersonal style is probably the one most likely to be effective. This judgment is further supported by the comparisons presented in Table 10 and the conclusion that to the extent counterparts express any dissatisfaction with advisors it is less with respect to their competence and productivity than with traits associated with the establishment and maintenance of harmonious interpersonal relations, especially those not closely related to acts of deference.

CO-WORKER CRITICAL ROLE BEHAVIORS

The missions associated with advisors' and counterparts' roles typically demand the formation of interdependent relationships. The results sought by each can often occur only when both are able and willing to perform duties that the other cannot. Since success is contingent upon meeting one another's expectations, it is feasible to assess the extent to which advisors and counterparts are satisfied with the behavior of their respective co-workers by (a) determining what each regards as "critical behaviors" and (b) determining the extent to which each group believes these behaviors should occur more or less often than they do with the current co-worker.

This approach seems preferable to obtaining global, one-statement reports which do not permit the reduction of assessments of satisfaction to behaviors that can be regarded as causally related to the level of satisfaction expressed. Systematic attempts to control and increase satisfaction, whether by creating orientation programs, developing training programs and exercises, or through administrative practices, all require knowledge of the specific conditions that influence satisfaction. The approach used in this study has the advantage of allowing for the collection of information that can be used simultaneously to assess the general level of satisfaction and to determine which behaviors appear to influence the respondents' satisfaction.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE METHOD

The objective was to collect statements from advisors and counterparts that described behaviors which each group regarded as having been important determinants of their evaluated impressions of each other. An interview schedule was constructed that contained items designed to establish rapport with the interviewee and define the topic of the interview (see Appendix F). Adequate answers to most of these items required little more than short, factual responses that placed little effort upon the respondents' recall abilities; however, two items requiring lengthier answers were included, designed to elicit statements describing recent critical experiences. Current information was ensured by limiting counterparts' experiences to those with current advisors, and advisors' experiences to those that had occurred with counterparts during their present tour in Korea. To ensure that the information collected was relevant to the development of a technique for assessing satisfaction, counterparts were asked:

Please think back over the experiences with your present K MAG advisor and let me ask you some questions about them. First, try to recall a time when you felt that your present advisor behaved in a way which you thought was highly commendable. Try to remember the circumstances under which it happened and explain what it was about the advisor that impressed you so favorably.

After this question had been answered, a parallel question was asked, substituting "unfavorable impression" for "favorable impression."

Typically, respondents described their experiences with highly abstract, general concepts that did not describe specific behaviors. Initial responses tended to contain abstract nouns, descriptions of personal feelings, and other information irrelevant to the purposes of the interview. Additional questions were asked, therefore, to yield more specific and concrete examples of what the advisor or counterpart actually did. Statements were obtained from 35 advisors and 31 counterparts who were stationed within the respective headquarters as well as in the several detachments and the Army and Corps areas they advised. The verbatim responses were then paraphrased, synopsized into predicate forms, and restated to the respondent to determine whether the rephrasing adequately expressed his intents. These statements were then typed on cards and sorted into categories similar in content. Sixty-seven statements describing "critical role behaviors" collected from advisors and 124 from counterparts were extracted and put into inventory format (see Appendices G and H).

The inventory describing the "critical role behaviors" of counterparts was subsequently distributed, together with the other questionnaire materials, to a new sample of advisors. Respondents were asked to indicate how often their principal counterpart had behaved in the way described by each "critical role behavior" item, how often they felt the counterpart should behave this way, and how important they felt the behavior was. Counterparts evaluated each of the "critical role behaviors" descriptive of experiences with advisors in terms of the same three questions. The responses to each item were tabulated to determine the percentage of respondents who indicated that they felt their principal counterpart should display the behavior more or less often than he had been doing. Tables 13 and 14 are based upon only items for which 40% or more of the respondents indicated their co-worker should show the behavior more or less often than he had in the past. Tabulations of responses to all of the items will be found in Appendices I and J.

Table 13
Counterparts' Judgments of Advisors' Critical Role Behaviors
(Percent; N=97)

Critical Role Behaviors	Endorsing Importance	Should Occur Always or More Often	Should Occur Less Often or Never
My advisor has nonconcurred with ROKA plans and requests	72	0	62
... opposed recommendations that were made by ROKA	72	0	52
... been ignorant of one or more differences between what is SOP in ROKA and the U.S. Army	66	0	55
... seemed to believe what other Americans say more than what Koreans say to him.	65	2	58
... succeeded in getting something for ROKA which other advisors had tried to do but failed.	90	65	1
... voluntarily taken actions to procure materials, supplies, or equipment that would improve the capability, effectiveness or morale of ROKA.	99	48	2
... persuaded KMAC to approve a plan or request that was made by ROKA.	100	51	0

(Continued)

Table 13 (Continued)
Counterparts' Judgments of Advisors' Critical Role Behaviors
(Percent; N=97)

Critical Role Behaviors	Endorsing Importance	Should Occur Always or More Often	Should Occur Less Often or Never
... personally taken actions to expedite the delivery of items needed by ROKA.	95	59	0
... tried to find what I or my superior needed and then has done his best to obtain whatever was needed.	99	46	1
... reacted speedily to my requests for up-to-date information on U.S. Army concepts, procedures, or equipment.	98	48	1
... used much initiative and persistence to obtain support that enabled me to accomplish my mission.	99	52	0
... helped me to keep my superiors informed by giving me periodic reports on the status of requests, plans, etc.	96	64	3
... kept me informed on the current status of the work that we have discussed.	98	47	0
... used his greater experience and training to assist me in fulfilling requests from my superiors.	98	51	1
... given me much help preparing a briefing I had to give to my superiors.	90	50	1
... helped me anticipate and prepare for future requirements.	98	55	1
... seemed primarily interested in teaching me things that are useful to me.	85	54	0
... done something for me which indicated an unusual willingness to help me.	85	48	3
... set good examples for other advisors to follow.	91	41	1
... shown respect for my greater experience and knowledge about ROKA and Korea.	90	51	0
... shown a desire to understand Korean economic conditions.	91	48	2
... shown a desire to understand the Korean language.	76	65	0
... shown a desire to understand Korean history.	77	60	0
... shown a desire to understand Korean customs.	82	48	4
... shown a desire to understand the thoughts and feelings of the Korean people.	97	44	1
... acted as if what Korea needed, he needed.	97	48	2
When I have reached a final decision, ... respected it and helped me to carry it out.	99	43	1

RESULTS

Advisors' Role Behaviors as Judged by Counterparts

Nearly all of the descriptions of advisors' behaviors in the Advisor Behavioral Inventory were judged to be important by the counterparts. (The procedure used to obtain and assemble these items clearly succeeded in identifying advisors' behaviors which matter to counterparts.) Having established the counterparts' consensus concerning the importance of these behaviors, it can be assumed that a comparison between the frequency with which advisors manifest the behaviors to the frequency with which counterparts believe they ought to occur is one index of satisfaction with the advisor. The tabulations in Appendix I indicate that a majority of counterparts were satisfied with the frequency with which their advisor manifested most of the behaviors contained in the Inventory.

Somewhat less than one-fourth of all of the behaviors described in the inventory were judged by counterparts in ways indicative of dissatisfaction. Forty percent or more were in agreement that advisors ought to change with respect to the specific behaviors presented in Table 13. Approximately 50% indicated that their advisor should *less often* oppose or non-concur with recommendations that ROKA made to KMAG; *less often* appear ignorant of differences between what is SOP in ROKA and in the U.S. Army; *less often* leave the impression that they believe other Americans more than Koreans.

It seems that advisors generally engage in very few behaviors that a consensus of counterparts regards as undesirable and wishes to cease. Basically, these appear to be the ones that suggest, correctly or not, that KMAG exercises control over final decisions concerning ROKA's use of the MAP; that the advisor has failed to discriminate differences between what is customary in the two military organizations, and which imply, erroneously or not, that information derived from Korean sources is less trustworthy than what originates from American sources. Although none of the data collected in this portion of the survey sought reasons for these expressions of discontent, no exotic assumptions need be made in order to understand them.

If it is assumed that all behaviors counterparts regard as good or bad are equally important in influencing their satisfaction with the advisor, the data in Table 13 indicate that counterparts are less dissatisfied with advisors' objectionable behaviors than by too infrequent displays of highly commendable behaviors.

The commendable behaviors that counterparts appear to want advisors to manifest *more often* are variations on a limited number of themes, a dominant and recurrent one being the receipt of support from the advisor.¹⁰ Counterparts want their advisors to *more often* take actions to procure materials, supplies, and equipment for them and to take personal actions to expedite the delivery of these items. They want the advisor to *more often* advocate their requests and recommendations in KMAG staffings, and *more often* support them in satisfying the requirements that their superiors have levied on them. Nearly two-thirds of the counterparts want the advisor to keep them more often informed by means of periodic reports on the status of requests, plans, work in progress, and so forth.

Finally, although of no less importance to them, counterparts want advisors to display more often an interest in becoming knowledgeable about their country's language,

¹⁰The appearance of these themes is partially explained by the gap between the industrial productivity of Korea and the United States. Professor Ham In-Young, Pennsylvania State University, estimates that the level of industrialization in South Korea is 120 years behind the U.S., 80 years behind England, 70 years behind European countries and 50 years behind Japan (*Korea Week*, vol. 1, no. 12, 30 September 1968, p. 2).

history, economy, customs, and the feelings of the Korean people.¹¹ These expressions suggest that counterparts are oriented toward gaining greater control over the decisions that are made in KMAC with respect to the administration of the MAP to their Army. They clearly want the past support to continue, but they also want to feel they are more important participants in the decisions concerning that support. It may be assumed that, compared to advisors, they are generally better acquainted with the differences between their Army and that of the United States. They want advisors to know those differences (and, presumably, respect them), and to demonstrate to them that their country is worth learning something about.

Counterparts' Role Behaviors as Judged by Advisors

Nearly all of the behaviors descriptive of counterparts' actions in the Counterpart Behavioral Inventory were judged to be important by more than a simple majority of advisors, although relatively few were regarded as requiring change. The impression obtained from advisors is of a general acceptance of their counterpart's behavior.

However, when judged by their advisors, counterparts appear to dissatisfy 40% or more of them with respect to three matters. Counterparts fail to keep the advisor as well informed as he would like about conditions in which he has an interest. In particular, advisors are dissatisfied with the information, or lack of it, in briefings given by counterparts. Second, nearly two-thirds of the advisors agree that their counterparts permit their subordinates to turn out work that is unnecessarily below standard. Finally, somewhat less than half of the advisors regard their counterparts as failing to use "ordinary logic" in planning a course of action. These are the only behaviors reported by advisors as sufficiently objectionable that they ought to occur less often.

The changes that advisors would seemingly like to see occur in the behaviors of their counterparts are rather evenly distributed between those actions that they want to occur *less* often than now and those they wish to occur *more* often. Advisors report that they want their counterparts to *more often* volunteer information that will enable them to better understand a problem or situation of concern to them. Mirror-imaging the commonly cited fault of counterparts with respect to the standards of work that they accept from their subordinates is the advisors' wish that counterparts will *more often* make careful inspections of the performance of subordinates in order to ensure the establishment and maintenance of high standards.

Of the three critical behaviors of counterparts which 40% or more of the advisors regarded as commendable and wished to see occur more often, two are directly or indirectly related to utilization of resources. On the one hand, advisors want counterparts to *more often* actively cooperate with them in implementing recommendations for tightening control over funds and/or materials supplied by the MAP. On the other hand,

¹¹ Except for a few persons with a professional stake in Korea, the world has taken little interest in its culture. In 1890 the principal American diplomatic representative in Seoul alluded to the image of Korea prevalent in his day. For him the images and attitudes of others toward Korea became problems and obstacles that thwarted his diplomatic efforts. To the U.S. Secretary of State he wrote, "A great difficulty in the way at the outset is the fact that no one appreciates Corea [sic] . . . When I arrived here I confess I was under the same delusion [sic], but the longer I stay the more I am convinced that I was in error . . . I would now like to add my testimony to the value of Koreans, as a people . . . men who have been for years occupied in the education of their youth, tell me they are more intelligent and more studious than either of those races. They seem to have the quickness of the Japanese with some of the persistency of the Chinese, and they are capable of strong feelings and of real patriotism." *Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States*, (14, p. 37).

Table 14
Advisors' Judgments of Counterparts' Critical Role Behaviors
(Percent; N=103)

Critical Role Behaviors	Endorsing Importance	Should Occur Always or More Often	Should Occur Less Often or Never
My counterpart has failed to inform me of conditions about which I expected to be informed.	93	2	61
... given a briefing which did not contain enough information to be understood correctly.	82	0	54
... failed to use ordinary logic in planning a course of action.	90	0	45
... permitted his subordinates to turn out work that is unnecessarily below standard or contains errors.	93	0	68
... voluntarily provided me with information which he believed would help me to better understand a problem or situation I was trying to improve.	99	44	0
... made a careful inspection of the performance of his subordinates to ensure the establishment and maintenance of high standards.	100	45	0
... actively cooperated in implementing recommendations designed to tighten control over funds and/or materials supplied by MAP.	92	46	1
... voluntarily taken actions that go beyond routine procedures, when those have proved inadequate, in order to accomplish his mission.	96	43	4
... accomplished a mission and overcome limitations resulting from inadequate resources by employing ingenious methods.	97	47	0

they want counterparts to accomplish their missions by developing and using ingenious methods when the resources are inadequate.

These data further support the impression, previously demonstrated by the observations pertaining to problems and obstacles, (3) that the successful fulfillment of the advisory role depends largely upon the counterpart's cooperation and assistance. It is now possible to add to this generalization the advisor's specific need and desire to be kept informed by his counterpart. A significant number of advisors regard as highly commendable those counterparts *voluntarily* communicating to them information that enables them to better understand a problem, situation, or plan. Counterparts who ostensibly seek to satisfy the advisor's need for information, but who provide it inadequately, are considered to be behaving in a reprehensible manner. Counterparts, in turn, appear to pay considerable attention to how advisors react to what is told to them. Expressions of skepticism and lack of trust in the information that Koreans provide, if they appear to reflect an obvious bias in the advisor's judgment of truth and accuracy, tend to tarnish the counterpart's impression of the advisor.

Counterparts appear as concerned as advisors with being kept informed. However, because counterparts seem to expect so many more changes from advisors than vice versa, the importance of their being informed by advisors is somewhat diminished. The greater number of counterpart demands should not, however, be allowed to obscure the reports that clearly indicate that advisors are expected to take the initiative *more often* in finding what their counterparts need or want, satisfying those needs, and keeping them and their superiors informed about the status of the requests. They also want advisors to provide them with information that will enable them to anticipate requirements and prepare to respond to them before they are made. Advisors who find ways of giving counterparts an extra measure of lead time are, in their eyes, behaving commendably. Finally, counterparts want advisors to inform themselves not only about the broad societal context into which their recommendations are to be assimilated but also about the specific characteristics of the particular military organization that is involved.

The conditions that appear to influence the satisfaction of advisors are not, however, identical to those that influence counterparts. Counterparts want advisors to detect their needs, to accept and support their own judgments of what is needed, and to provide it. Advisors, in contrast, appear more concerned with getting counterparts to make better use of the resources already available to them. Counterparts who demand more from subordinates and who cooperate with the advisor's attempts to enforce the policies of the MAP are commendable in the eyes of the Americans.

The demands that advisors and counterparts place upon one another are different; the extent to which each meets the other's demands varies, and with it their satisfaction with the relationship. The difference between what each regards as commendable behaviors suggests that some of the implied demands are sources of conflict. The characteristics of the advisor-counterpart relationship, in terms of demands and sources of satisfaction, define conditions that often are resolved by acts that either constitute or lead to bargained compromises.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS

The techniques developed in this study can be regarded as diagnostic instruments useful in the detection of those differences between MAP advisors and their foreign counterparts that are relevant to achieving an understanding of the respective roles. Further developing and applying them to similar situations seems warranted.

The differences found can be useful in the development of guidelines for military and research agencies concerned with the training, selection, and management of advisor personnel. Both specific and general differences can be used to identify aspects of advisor-counterpart interaction that require special attention and treatment.

The techniques developed in this study provide a way to objectively evaluate selection, training, and management procedures aimed at ensuring effective advisor-counterpart interactions. To the extent that these approaches produce advisors who satisfy the expectations of counterparts without compromising the policies and missions of the Military Assistance Program, they contribute to the achievement of an important objective.

Results obtained from comparing the personal preferences and behaviors associated with advisors' and counterparts' conceptions of the respective roles assist in identifying the proficiencies required of advisors, thus focusing on the kinds of interpersonal skills for which prospective advisors might profitably be selected and/or trained. While the observations upon which the following suggestions are based were drawn from MAP advisors and counterparts operating in a single Asian country, the proficiencies implied seem inherent to several fundamental characteristics of the Program that are probably

shared by advisory groups working in other developing nations. The relationship of the proficiencies to the operational context in which they occur thus supports extension of the present conclusions to countries other than Korea.

Satisfactory performance of the advisor role, as judged from the perspective of counterparts, appears to require two basic types of proficiencies: professional competence and the establishment of harmonious interpersonal relations. Techniques for the selection and/or training of prospective advisor personnel will be relevant to counterparts' conceptions of the role to the extent they effectively yield personnel who meet these requirements. Formulation of selection and training objectives might profitably be guided by the following conclusions:

CO-WORKER PERSONAL TRAIT PREFERENCES

(1) The basic dimensions along which Americans and Koreans evaluate co-workers, whether of the same or different ethnic groups, are very similar (Tables 3 and 4); both groups judge co-workers in terms of their professional knowledge, skills, achievements, productivity, and ability to establish and maintain harmonious interpersonal relations. Few differences were observed between American and Korean conceptions of the personal traits associated with descriptions of most-preferred co-workers.

(2) Differences between American and Korean co-worker preferences appear to reflect variation between the two cultures with respect to the importance attached to the basic dimensions. Americans seem to make finer discriminations and perceive larger differences between co-workers with respect to their levels of professional competence and productivity than do Koreans. In contrast, Koreans tend to make finer discriminations and perceive larger differences between co-workers with respect to their ability to establish harmonious interpersonal relations (Tables 9 and 10).

(3) Thus, American advisors judge their principal Korean counterpart to be somewhat deficient, compared to a most-preferred American co-worker, in the level of his military competence and productivity. Principal counterparts are essentially indistinguishable from most-preferred American co-workers in their ability to establish and maintain harmonious interpersonal relations (Table 9). In contrast, Korean counterparts judge their American advisors to be deficient, compared to either a most-preferred American or Korean co-worker, in traits associated with the social harmony factor. None of the comparisons of current advisors to counterparts' preferences indicated general dissatisfaction with their levels of professional competence (Table 10).

CRITICAL ROLE BEHAVIORS

Advisors and counterparts have a limited number of types of dissatisfactions with one another. While both groups cited numerous specific ways in which members of the respective organizations should behave more or less often, these are best regarded as variations on a limited number of themes. The basic themes are clarified by considering only those descriptions of behavior which 70% or more of the respective groups judged to be important and to which 40% or more indicated change was desirable (Tables 13 and 14). Applying these criteria to the selection of critical role behaviors yields the following:

(1) **Communication Characteristics.** The extent to which advisors and counterparts satisfy each other's wishes to be kept informed is a source of dissatisfaction. Counterparts who, either inadvertently or deliberately, withhold information, fail to acquire it, or communicate it in unusable form exert control over the advisor's ability to

plan and act. Similarly, advisors who do not keep counterparts informed concerning the status of plans, recommendations, and requests that have been submitted to KMAG for approval exert control over their counterpart's ability to plan and act.

(2) **Non-Compliance With Requests.** Neither group appears to fully satisfy all of the other's recommendations and requests. The rejected recommendations and the manner in which they are rejected tend to differ. For counterparts, matters pertaining to the acquisition of physical resources and KMAG concurrence with their plans and recommendations seem of primary importance; for advisors, matters pertaining to counterparts' utilization of physical resources in accordance with established U.S. policies and procedures seem of primary importance. For counterparts, dissatisfaction is associated with direct and formal nonconcurrences with their requests. For advisors, dissatisfaction is associated with counterparts' inaction in response to their requests.

(3) **Understanding of Local Situations.** Counterparts expect advisors to manifest a complimentary interest in learning about the historical and contemporary social context in which they operate. The expectations range from knowledge of the counterpart's relations to superiors and other factors affecting his sense of well-being, to general information concerning Korean history, economics, customs, language, and so forth. In sum, counterparts expect advisors to be willing and able to see the immediate local situation as they do, endorse their judgments about what the conditions require, and provide the necessary support.

Maintenance of the discontent-potential inherent in the aspects of these advisor-counterpart relations to tolerable limits is a significant duty of advisors. Personnel selection and training procedures that yield advisors proficient in the management of these aspects of their relations to counterparts can be expected to serve a useful purpose.

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AND
APPENDICES**

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Appendix A

INCOMPLETE SENTENCES USED TO COLLECT TRAIT NAMES FROM ADVISORS AND, IN TRANSLATION, FROM COUNTERPARTS

Please record your age, rank, and the date in the following blanks.

Age _____ Rank _____ Date _____

INSTRUCTIONS: Listed below are incomplete sentences. Read each sentence and write in the *one* word that first occurs to you that will complete the sentence. Do not use more than one word to complete each sentence. Work as rapidly as you wish, but be sure that you complete all of the sentences.

1. The counterpart remained _____ throughout the meeting.
2. When we first met the counterpart I thought that he was _____.
3. In contrast to other counterparts, this one is _____.
4. After having met the counterpart many times, I realized that he was _____.
5. Most counterparts are not _____.
6. When the pressure is on them, counterparts act _____.
7. The trouble stems from the fact that counterparts are _____.
8. I found the counterpart to be _____ most of the time.
9. Successful counterparts are _____.
10. _____ counterparts should be removed from counterpart slots.
11. We like counterparts who are _____.
12. It's the _____ counterpart who pleases us most.
13. Counterparts are very _____.
14. Counterparts who are _____ make me angry.
15. Counterparts seem to think that most Americans are _____.
16. Working with Americans, counterparts are _____.
17. With other Americans, counterparts are more _____.
18. I sometimes think that the counterpart is _____.
19. Counterparts are less _____ than Americans.
20. Americans differ from counterparts by being more _____.
21. After the meeting was over the counterpart acted _____.
22. Only rarely was the counterpart _____.
23. Counterparts fail because they are _____.
24. The situation has not improved because the counterpart is _____.

25. We do not prefer counterparts who _____.
26. _____ counterparts do not like America.
27. Koreans like people who are _____ and Americans like people who are _____.
28. I have the impression that the counterpart thinks I am _____.
29. On social occasions with Americans, counterparts are _____.
30. Counterparts are more _____ to Americans than to Koreans.
31. The best word to describe counterparts is _____.
32. Counterparts are more _____ than Americans.
33. Counterparts do not understand because they are _____.
34. Before the meeting the counterpart seemed to be _____.
35. A person who is going to be a counterpart should be _____.
36. _____ counterparts are needed very much.
37. My present counterpart is more _____ than his predecessor.
38. The more you get to know counterparts the more _____ they are.
39. Most counterparts are too _____.
40. Most of the time the counterpart acted _____.
41. I was surprised to discover that counterparts are _____.
42. With Americans, counterparts act _____.
43. Counterparts are more _____ to Koreans than to Americans.

Appendix B

TRAIT SCALES USED TO COLLECT CO-WORKER PERSONAL PREFERENCE RATINGS FROM ADVISORS AND, IN TRANSLATION, FROM COUNTERPARTS

CO-WORKER PREFERENCE RATINGS

INSTRUCTIONS

On each of the next five pages you will find lists of adjectives which are to be used to describe five different people with whom you have worked. You are asked to describe: (1) The American K MAG advisor with whom you *currently* work, (2) the American K MAG advisor with whom you *least* preferred to work, (3) the American K MAG advisor with whom you *most* preferred to work. After you have completed these ratings, then you are asked to describe: (4) the Korean Army person with whom you *least* prefer to work, and (5) the Korean Army person with whom you *most* prefer to work. Except for the ratings of the current American K MAG advisor, you may rate people with whom you have worked in the past and no longer work with or you may rate people with whom you currently work. The adjectives are arranged in pairs at the opposite ends of a seven-point scale like this:

cooperative	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	uncooperative
graceful	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	awkward

Your task is to rate the person indicated at the top of the page, in terms of each pair of adjectives. The side of the scale on which you place the X depends upon which of the two adjectives is more characteristic of the person you are asked to judge on a given page.

Place an X in either end space if the adjective at that end applies to the person to a *very great* degree.

Place an X in the second space from either end if the adjective at that end applies to a *great* degree.

Place an X in the third space from either end if the adjective at that end applies to a *slight* degree.

If neither adjective of a pair applies to the person you are rating, place an X in the middle space on the scale.

Work as rapidly as you can without making mistakes, and give your first impressions. Try to concentrate on the particular person you are rating on each page; do not look back over ratings you have done nor try to remember previous ratings. Make each judgment as independent of the others as you can.

Describe the American KMAG advisor with whom you *currently work* and whom you have described in the preceeding questionnaire materials.

pleasant	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unpleasant
impatient	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	patient
adaptable	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unadaptable
enthusiastic	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unenthusiastic
unorganized	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	organized
polite	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	rude
unfair	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	fair
thoughtful	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	rash
stubborn	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	agreeable
kind	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unkind
follower	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	leader
economical	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	wasteful
ignorant	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	learned
generous	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	stingy
unsympathetic	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	sympathetic
professional	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unprofessional
unlucky	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	lucky
industrious	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	lazy
inconsiderate	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	considerate
superior	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	inferior
quarrelsome	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	harmonious
valuable	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	worthless
unfriendly	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	friendly
competent	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	incompetent
content	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	envious
disrespectful	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	respectful
tolerant	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	intolerant
likeable	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unlikeable
productive	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	unproductive
erratic	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	consistent
sincere	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	insincere
uncivilized	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	civilized
arrogant	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	modest
trustworthy	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	untrustworthy
powerless	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	powerful
rational	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	irrational
boastful	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	humble
revengeful	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	forgiving
foolish	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	wise
flattering	: _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ : _ :	critical

Concept 1

Describe the American KMAG advisor with whom you *least prefer* to work. Is the advisor with whom you least prefer to work your current advisor?

☐ NO

☐ YES (If you check this box, then it is not necessary to make any ratings on this page. Turn to the next page and rate the co-worker who is described on it.)

(List of adjectives on previous page.)

Concept 2

Describe the American KMAG advisor with whom you *most prefer* to work. Is the advisor with whom you most prefer to work your current advisor?

☐ NO

☐ YES (If you check this box, then it is not necessary to make any ratings on this page. Turn to the next page and rate the co-worker who is described on it.)

(List of adjectives on previous page.)

Concept 3

Describe the Korean Army person with whom you *least prefer* to work. Are you currently working with this person? (Check one of the following boxes.)

☐ NO

☐ YES

(List of adjectives on previous page.)

Concept 4

Describe the Korean Army person with whom you *most prefer* to work. Are you currently working with this person? (Check one of the following boxes.)

☐ NO

☐ YES

(List of adjectives on previous page.)

Appendix C

CO-WORKER PERSONAL PREFERENCE FACTORS

Indicos of Factorial Similarity Based Upon
Rotated Factor Loadings^a

Matrix 1

Factors Descriptive of Advisors' Preferences

American Co-Workers	Korean Co-Workers		
	I	II	IIIb
I	85	25	62
II	17	96	31
IIIa	70	38	53

Matrix 2

Factors Descriptive of Counterparts' Preferences

Korean Co-Workers	American Co-Workers		
	I	II	IIIc
I	96	-77	-60
II	-68	95	82
IIId	76	-60	-63

Matrix 3

Relations Between Advisors' and Counterparts' Co-Worker Preference Factors

Factors Descriptive of Counterparts' Preferences		Factors Descriptive of Advisors' Preferences					
		American Co-Workers			Korean Co-Workers		
		I	II	IIIa	I	II	IIIb
American Co-Workers	I	82	41	72	91	40	71
	II	-53	-85 ^b	-54	-51	-82 ^b	-54
	IIIc	-48	-74	-37	-30	-80	-50
Korean Co-Workers	I	75	53	74	86	51	63
	II	-55	-88 ^b	-50	-49	-86 ^b	-51
	IIId	84	37	40	69	40	66

^aBased upon formula 12.31, H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis*, University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 257.

^bNegative signs result from the arbitrary order in which factors were rotated.

**Co-Worker Preference Factors:
Advisors' Ratings of Americans**

	1	2	3	4
1. pleasant-unpleasant	21	21	15	74
2. patient-impatient	60	03	-25	43
3. adaptable-unadaptable	06	55	07	49
4. enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	-13	69	-04	43
5. organized-unorganized	39	71	-18	-04
6. polite-rude	36	06	36	66
7. fair-unfair	76	10	29	09
8. thoughtful-rash	30	28	61	19
9. agreeable-stubborn	67	-09	-02	42
10. kind-unkind	31	08	57	57
11. leader-follower	39	64	-24	-08
12. economical-wasteful	09	45	45	12
13. learned-ignorant	48	57	03	-16
14. generous-stingy	26	02	55	39
15. sympathetic-unsympathetic	81	01	14	28
16. professional-unprofessional	-03	76	15	12
17. lucky-unlucky	44	19	-16	-09
18. industrious-lazy	-11	73	16	03
19. considerate-inconsiderate	76	07	22	21
20. superior-inferior	-19	33	29	-18
21. harmonious-quarrelsome	76	-06	17	31
22. valuable-worthless	-01	77	28	17
23. friendly-unfriendly	69	21	05	43
24. competent-incompetent	-01	82	24	07
25. content-envious	15	-04	61	12
26. respectful-disrespectful	76	00	30	11
27. tolerant-intolerant	33	04	47	44
28. likeable-unlikeable	24	23	44	54
29. productive-unproductive	-08	82	25	-03
30. consistent-erratic	56	35	16	-12
31. sincere-insincere	26	33	63	16
32. civilized-uncivilized	67	17	13	01
33. modest-arrogant	74	-06	14	24
34. trustworthy-untrustworthy	14	41	58	02
35. powerful-powerless	34	51	-18	-18
36. rational-irrational	12	47	38	20
37. humble-boastful	70	-12	25	11
38. forgiving-revengeful	70	-05	30	-04
39. wise-foolish	51	53	06	-28
40. flattering-critical	-01	-27	24	50

**Co-Worker Preference Factors:
Advisors' Ratings of Koreans**

	1	2	3
1. pleasant-unpleasant	33	14	57
2. patient-impatient	70	-16	-06
3. adaptable-unadaptable	24	55	17
4. enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	-17	54	16
5. organized-unorganized	13	70	-07
6. polite-rude	67	-02	34
7. fair-unfair	66	31	09
8. thoughtful-rash	59	32	16
9. agreeable-stubborn	66	-11	11
10. kind-unkind	52	06	46
11. leader-follower	-12	81	-02
12. economical-wasteful	35	57	01
13. learned-ignorant	-02	65	30
14. generous-stingy	48	30	34
15. sympathetic-unsympathetic	66	11	23
16. professional-unprofessional	-05	78	01
17. lucky-unlucky	-12	35	49
18. industrious-lazy	-02	81	-01
19. considerate-inconsiderate	62	10	31
20. superior-inferior	03	49	32
21. harmonious-quarrelsome	74	-13	28
22. valuable-worthless	09	80	01
23. friendly-unfriendly	53	-20	50
24. competent-incompetent	06	87	-06
25. content-envious	58	05	-18
26. respectful-disrespectful	70	03	43
27. tolerant-intolerant	75	-17	30
28. likeable-unlikeable	49	10	57
29. productive-unproductive	-03	88	-04
30. consistent-erratic	53	36	-01
31. sincere-insincere	52	53	05
32. civilized-uncivilized	26	24	66
33. modest-arrogant	78	-09	03
34. trustworthy-untrustworthy	25	55	27
35. powerful-powerless	-23	66	18
36. rational-irrational	30	39	39
37. humble-boastful	68	03	-01
38. forgiving-revengeful	67	11	23
39. wise-foolish	33	59	23
40. flattering-critical	06	-25	29

**Co-Worker Preference Factors:
Counterparts' Ratings of Americans**

	1	2	3
1. pleasant-unpleasant	67	-37	-20
2. patient-impatient	55	-38	29
3. adaptable-unadaptable	59	-61	-09
4. enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	29	-75	-23
5. organized-unorganized	16	-78	-27
6. polite-rude	87	-35	-07
7. fair-unfair	58	-54	-28
8. thoughtful-rash	61	-56	-20
9. agreeable-stubborn	65	02	01
10. kind-unkind	81	-26	-16
11. leader-follower	-05	-03	-77
12. economical-wasteful	15	-37	-60
13. learned-ignorant	42	-59	-55
14. generous-stingy	71	-17	-25
15. sympathetic-unsympathetic	82	-21	-22
16. professional-unprofessional	-38	-55	12
17. lucky-unlucky	23	-35	-69
18. industrious-lazy	31	-67	-49
19. considerate-inconsiderate	77	-20	-24
20. superior-inferior	37	-65	-49
21. harmonious-quarrelsome	79	-20	-08
22. valuable-worthless	66	-38	-34
23. friendly-unfriendly	88	-35	-12
24. competent-incompetent	43	-71	-44
25. content-envious	68	-14	-08
26. respectful-disrespectful	79	-40	-10
27. tolerant-intolerant	83	-25	-19
28. likeable-unlikeable	76	-08	-08
29. productive-unproductive	37	-69	-26
30. consistent-erratic	70	-31	-27
31. sincere-insincere	53	-52	-30
32. civilized-uncivilized	39	-62	-53
33. modest-arrogant	89	-25	-04
34. trustworthy-untrustworthy	69	-43	-29
35. powerful-powerless	21	-21	-79
36. rational-irrational	37	-64	-34
37. humble-boastful	76	-09	-07
38. forgiving-revengeful	70	-18	-31
39. wise-foolish	50	-67	-37
40. flattering-critical	01	36	62

**Co-Worker Preference Factors:
Counterparts' Ratings of Koreans**

	1	2	3
1. pleasant-unpleasant	68	-43	02
2. patient-impatient	45	-59	38
3. adaptable-unadaptable	64	-58	12
4. enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	39	-70	12
5. organized-unorganized	38	-73	09
6. polite-rude	77	-24	39
7. fair-unfair	64	-41	19
8. thoughtful-rash	60	-63	13
9. agreeable-stubborn	10	06	62
10. kind-unkind	67	-26	44
11. leader-follower	15	-68	21
12. economical-wasteful	33	-60	38
13. learned-ignorant	29	-75	42
14. generous-stingy	39	-15	35
15. sympathetic-unsympathetic	64	-18	48
16. professional-unprofessional	-16	-53	-07
17. lucky-unlucky	07	-36	73
18. industrious-lazy	43	-66	08
19. considerate-inconsiderate	67	-27	41
20. superior-inferior	40	-76	09
21. harmonious-quarrelsome	55	-25	34
22. valuable-worthless	68	-54	09
23. friendly-unfriendly	58	-47	29
24. competent-incompetent	41	-76	11
25. content-envious	68	-38	13
26. respectful-disrespectful	71	-23	55
27. tolerant-intolerant	82	-29	01
28. likeable-unlikeable	78	-19	-04
29. productive-unproductive	40	-68	19
30. consistent-erratic	54	-61	28
31. sincere-insincere	56	-62	05
32. civilized-uncivilized	25	-68	49
33. modest-arrogant	77	-21	42
34. trustworthy-untrustworthy	65	-59	-03
35. powerful-powerless	10	-63	45
36. rational-irrational	53	-43	34
37. humble-boastful	72	-10	38
38. forgiving-revengeful	66	-18	21
39. wise-foolish	42	-76	20
40. flattering-critical	-52	45	07

Appendix D

ADVISORS' MEAN CO-WORKER PERSONAL PREFERENCE RATINGS^a

Trait Scales	Advisors' Judgments of Co-Workers				
	Most-Preferred		Current Counterpart	Least-Preferred	
	Korean	American		American	Korean
agreeable-stubborn	5.4	5.3	5.4	2.6	3.1
civilized-uncivilized	6.4	6.4	6.3	4.7	4.9
pleasant-unpleasant	6.6	6.6	6.4	3.5	4.0
patient-impatient	5.8	5.6	5.6	2.5	3.6
polite-rude	6.5	6.4	6.7	3.1	4.4
kind-unkind	6.0	6.2	5.9	3.6	4.3
considerate-inconsiderate	6.3	6.4	6.0	2.6	3.5
harmonious-quarrelsome	6.0	6.0	5.8	2.9	3.4
friendly-unfriendly	6.6	6.5	6.4	4.1	4.5
content-envious	5.4	5.7	5.3	3.2	3.7
respectful-disrespectful	6.4	6.3	6.3	3.8	4.3
likeable-unlikeable	6.6	6.6	6.3	3.1	3.5
modest-arrogant	5.5	5.3	5.4	2.6	3.2
rational-irrational	6.2	6.4	6.0	3.6	4.0
humble-boastful	4.8	4.9	4.9	2.6	3.4

Trait Scales	Most-Preferred		Current Counterpart	Least-Preferred	
	American	Korean		American	Korean
superior-inferior	6.2	6.0	5.8	4.4	4.2
sincere-insincere	6.7	6.5	6.2	3.5	3.8
foolish-wise	6.3	6.2	5.9	3.6	3.8
fair-unfair	6.6	6.4	6.1	3.0	4.1
sympathetic-unsympathetic	6.2	5.9	5.8	3.2	3.7
tolerant-intolerant	6.2	6.0	5.8	3.0	3.8
adaptable-unadaptable	6.4	6.3	5.8	3.1	3.2
organized-unorganized	6.6	6.3	5.8	3.7	3.8
leader-follower	6.7	6.4	5.7	3.6	3.8
learned-ignorant	6.5	6.4	6.0	4.3	4.5
industrious-lazy	6.6	6.6	6.0	4.2	3.8

Trait Scales	Advisors' Judgments of Co-Workers				
	Most-Preferred		Current Counterpart	Least-Preferred	
	American	Korean		American	Korean
valuable-worthless	6.8	6.6	6.2	3.4	3.7
competent-incompetent	6.8	6.6	6.2	3.5	3.8
productive-unproductive	6.8	6.6	6.0	3.8	3.8
powerful-powerless	5.9	5.8	5.4	4.5	4.2
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	6.7	6.5	5.7	4.2	3.6
thoughtful-rash	6.6	6.4	6.0	3.0	3.6
economical-wasteful	6.3	6.0	5.6	4.2	3.8
consistent-erratic	6.3	6.3	5.8	3.0	3.8
trustworthy-untrustworthy	6.8	6.6	6.1	4.1	3.7
generous-stingy	6.0	5.7	5.5	3.9	4.2
forgiving-revengeful	5.6	5.2	5.0	3.1	3.8
lucky-unlucky	4.7	4.7	4.6	4.6	4.2

^aMeans *not* underscored by the same line segment differ significantly ($p < .05$); means underscored by the same line segment do not differ significantly (Duncan's multiple range test).

Appendix E
COUNTERPARTS' MEAN CO-WORKER
PERSONAL PREFERENCE RATINGS^a

Trait Scales	Counterparts' Judgments of Co-Workers				
	Most-Preferred		Current Advisor	Least-Preferred	
	American	Korean		American	Korean
pleasant-unpleasant	6.4	6.4	5.9	3.0	2.7
polite-rude	6.2	6.2	5.9	2.8	2.9
kind-unkind	6.4	6.3	6.1	3.5	3.1
lucky-unlucky	5.4	5.2	5.0	3.9	4.1
industrious-lazy	6.5	6.4	6.0	4.2	3.6
respectful-disrespectful	6.3	6.1	5.8	3.1	3.1
tolerant-intolerant	5.8	5.8	5.4	3.0	2.6
civilized-uncivilized	6.1	6.2	5.9	4.2	3.8
modest-arrogant	6.3	6.2	5.7	2.8	3.0
powerful-powerless	5.6	5.3	5.1	4.0	3.8
rational-irrational	6.1	6.2	5.8	3.7	3.2
humble-boastful	5.7	5.9	5.5	3.0	2.7
fair-unfair	6.4	6.2	5.9	3.5	2.8
economical-wasteful	5.9	5.8	6.2	4.6	3.9
competent-incompetent	6.4	6.4	5.9	3.9	3.1
productive-unproductive	5.9	6.0	5.6	3.7	3.1
sincere-insincere	6.6	6.5	6.0	3.7	2.9

Trait Scales	Most-Preferred		Current Advisor	Least-Preferred	
	Korean	American		American	Korean
patient-impatient	6.2	5.9	5.3	2.9	2.8
adaptable-unadaptable	6.3	6.2	5.7	3.0	2.5
enthusiastic-unenthusiastic	6.6	6.5	6.0	3.9	3.3
organized-unorganized	6.3	6.1	5.5	3.9	3.3
thoughtful-rash	6.4	6.3	5.8	3.4	2.9
considerate-inconsiderate	6.0	6.0	5.5	3.1	3.0
likable-unlikable	6.2	6.1	5.6	2.8	2.7
forgiving-revengeful	5.8	5.7	5.2	3.2	3.1

Trait Scales	Counterparts' Judgments of Co-Workers				
	Most-Preferred		Current Advisor	Least-Preferred	
	Korean	American		American	Korean
wise-foolish	6.3	6.2	5.7	3.8	3.3
learned-ignorant	6.4	6.3	5.8	4.1	3.5
generous-stingy	5.2	5.1	4.1	2.8	3.1
sympathetic-unsympathetic	6.0	6.0	5.2	3.1	3.0
harmonious-quarrelsome	6.4	6.3	5.7	3.1	2.8
friendly-unfriendly	6.5	6.6	5.9	2.9	2.8
leader-follower	5.7	5.8	4.8	4.0	3.0
superior-inferior	6.6	6.5	5.9	3.9	3.2
valuable-worthless	6.2	6.3	5.7	3.5	2.9
consistent-erratic	6.3	6.3	5.6	3.2	2.6
trustworthy-untrustworthy	6.5	6.5	5.7	3.4	2.8
content-envious	6.2	5.5	5.5	3.5	3.4
	Most-Preferred		Current Advisor	Least-Preferred	
	American	Korean		American	Korean
agreeable-stubborn	5.4	4.8	4.5	3.0	3.1

^aAny two means *not* underscored by the same line segment differ significantly; means underscored by the same line do not differ significantly (Duncan's multiple range test).

Appendix F
CRITICAL ROLE BEHAVIORS INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

KMAG C-1 SCHEDULE

Name _____
Rank _____ Bldg. _____
Tel: _____ Date _____

1. How long have you been serving as a KMAG advisor?
(a) _____ months
2. How many more months do you expect to remain in Korea?
No. months _____ Until: _____ day _____ month
3. Is this your first tour in Korea?
☐ YES ☐ NO
4. If in Korea before, when? From _____ to _____
year month year month
5. Have you had any previous experience as an advisor to members of a foreign military organization?
☐ YES ☐ NO
If YES, in what country? _____
If YES, at what time? _____ to _____
year month year month
If YES, in what country? _____
If YES, at what time? _____ to _____
year month year month
If YES, in what country? _____
If YES, at what time? _____ to _____
year month year month
6. Have you received any special training that was primarily designed to prepare you to serve as an advisor to foreign nationals? For example, have you ever attended classes at the Defense Language Institute or the Military Assistance Institute?
DLI: ☐ YES ☐ NO Language _____ Year _____
MAI: ☐ YES ☐ NO Courses _____ Year _____

Comments: _____

7. How would you describe your present advisory duties? In general terms, what does your position require you to do with or for your counterparts?

(a) _____

8. To approximately how many ROKA counterparts have you acted in an official capacity as a KMAG advisor since you have been in your present assignment?

Total number _____

9. If answer to item 8 is more than 1, then ask: Is there one counterpart with whom you have worked more than the others.

☐ YES ☐ NO

10. Please think back over the counterparts in ROKA with whom you have worked and let me ask some questions about them.

- (a) First, try to recall a time when you felt that a counterpart, anyone of those with whom you have worked, behaved in a way which you thought was highly commendable. Try to remember the circumstances under which it happened and explain what it was about the counterpart that impressed you so favorably.

What did the counterpart do? _____

Predicate synopsis: _____

- (b) Approximately when did this happen? _____ year _____ month

- (c) What was the rank of the counterpart? _____

- (d) Was the rank of the counterpart (higher) (same) (lower) than yours?

- (e) Was the age of the counterpart (older) (same) (younger) than yours?

- (f) Did the counterpart use an interpreter to communicate to Americans who did not speak Korean?

☐ YES ☐ NO

- (g) How many advisors do you think have had similar experiences?

_____ Almost all of them
_____ Most of them
_____ Few of them
_____ Almost none or none of them

11. Now please think back over the counterparts with whom you have worked or had contact and let me ask you some more questions about them.

- (a) Try to recall a time when a counterpart behaved in such a way as to leave you with a very *unfavorable* impression of himself. Try to remember the circumstances under which it happened and explain what it was about the behavior that impressed you so favorably.

What did the counterpart do? _____

Predicate synopsis:

- 59

17. (This question seeks to determine whether or not advisors and counterparts hold mutually agreed upon definitions of the role of the advisor. What misconceptions of the advisor's role do counterparts have?)

Have you ever had the impression that your counterpart expected something of you that was clearly *not* an official part of your advisory duties?

☐ YES

☐ NO

If YES, describe _____

18. What do you think advisors should be taught about Korea, ROKA, and the job of advising Koreans before they come to Korea?
-

19. If one advisor knew these things and another one did not, how do you think they would differ with respect to the type of working relationships they would establish with their counterparts?
-

Appendix G

ADVISOR BEHAVIORAL INVENTORY (ABI)

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

INSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of this questionnaire is to find out how often your present advisor has behaved toward you in the ways described on the following pages and what your attitude toward his behavior is. Please read each description carefully and do the following:

- (1) From the five alternatives that appear in the first column next to the description, select the one word that best indicates how often your present advisor has acted toward you in the way described. Circle the number next to that word.
- (2) From the five alternatives that appear in the second column, select the phrase that best indicates how often you would like your advisor to act toward you in the way described. Circle the number next to that word.
- (3) From the four alternatives that appear in the third column, select the phrase that best indicates how important you rate the behavior described. Circle the number next to that phrase.

Example 1:

		<u>How often has this occurred?</u>		<u>How often should it occur?</u>		<u>How important has this behavior been?</u>
Advisor comes to my office in the morning to learn if there is anything he can do to help me.	1	always	1	always	1	very important
	2	often	②	more often	②	fairly important
	③	sometimes	3	no change	3	not important
	4	rarely	4	less often	4	not applicable
	5	never	5	never		

Comments: _____

(This rater's present advisor occasionally comes to the rater's office. The rater indicates, however, that he would like his advisor to come more often. He regards this behavior as fairly important.)

Example 2:

		<u>How often has this occurred?</u>		<u>How often should it occur?</u>		<u>How important has this behavior been?</u>
Advisor comes to my office in the morning to learn if there is anything he can do to help me.	①	always	1	always	1	very important
	2	often	2	more often	2	fairly important
	3	sometimes	3	no change	③	not important
	4	rarely	④	less often	4	not applicable
	5	never	5	never		

Comments: I'm usually very busy in the morning with routine matters that have to
be given immediate attention. When my advisor appears at these times, I usually cannot
take the time required to discuss matters with him.

(This rater indicates that his present advisor "always" comes to his office and that he wishes his advisor would come "less often". However, he does not consider this behavior very important. He then explains his answer.)

The space labeled *Comments* is for your use if you wish to explain your answers. If you think your reasons are obvious, you do not need to make any comment.

Answer all of the items in this and the following parts of the questionnaire on the basis of your personal experiences with the advisor whose name appears on the attached letter.

Note: The items used in this questionnaire are listed on the following pages. All were answered as shown in the examples.

1. My advisor wouldn't accept my judgment, but refused to take the trouble to check the basis for my judgment.
2. My advisor has taken unilateral action without consulting me or taking my opinion into account.
3. My advisor has submitted unfavorable reports on the status of personnel, equipment, or supplies under my responsibility to my superior officer without first discussing the situation with me.
4. My advisor has coordinated reports with me before submitting them to higher headquarters.
5. My advisor has insisted that I do something his way even though the matter is insignificant and could be done just as well my way.
6. My advisor has disregarded my views and done things his own way.
7. My advisor has kept me informed on the current status of the work that we have discussed.
8. My advisor has shown a willingness to compromise what he wants with what I want.
9. My advisor has listened patiently to my questions and explanations.
10. My advisor has shown respect for my greater experience and knowledge about ROKA and Korea.
11. My advisor has seemed unconcerned about what my superior might think of me when my recommendations and plans have been rejected.
12. My advisor has seemed irritated and annoyed with my questions and explanations.
13. My advisor has seemed unconcerned about how I felt when he rejected my recommendations and plans.
14. My advisor has acted toward ROKA personnel in such a way that they lost face.
15. My advisor has not made clear to me what he expected from me or my subordinates. Only when he has become angry have we known that we did not behave as he expected.
16. My advisor has seemed interested only in criticizing what I have done or failed to do.
17. My advisor has tried to make me feel that I am doing a good job.
18. My advisor became angry and unfairly blamed ROKA when he found a condition existed which he thought should not exist.
19. My advisor has expressed dissatisfaction about something without taking ROKA's limitations into account.
20. My advisor embarrassed me (hurt my feelings) by recommending to my superior an obvious change that I had been unable to make due to lack of funds.
21. My advisor has seemed to act as though he is more important than other people.
22. My advisor has acted as though he is the boss and I am his subordinate.
23. My advisor has acted as though he is the superior of higher ranking ROKA officers.
24. My advisor has over-stepped the limits of his authority and "chewed out" one or more of my subordinates.
25. My advisor has acted as though he were the commander of some of my subordinates.

26. My advisor has *ordered* me to do something.
27. My advisor has acted as commander instead of advisor.
28. My advisor has directly interfered with my actual command responsibility.
29. My advisor has questioned and criticized plans in front of many of my subordinates.
30. My advisor has interfered with command responsibility by public criticism of plans and by directing changes in them.
31. My advisor has insulted my superior and questioned his execution of command responsibility.
32. My advisor's comments on a request for concurrence in a project were inaccurate and inconsistent and prevented me from completing my project.
33. My advisor has shown me he doesn't know his job; he doesn't have enough professional knowledge to be of any help.
34. My advisor has been ignorant of one or more differences between what is SOP in ROKA and the U.S. Army.
35. My advisor has given a bad recommendation to me but refused to admit that it is a bad one.
36. My advisor has been unable to answer my questions.
37. My advisor has been unable to give me recommendations that help me do my job.
38. My advisor has tried to fool me by pretending that he knew the answer to my question when he really did not know it.
39. My advisor has tried to give a detailed explanation of the reasons why a ROKA plan or request cannot be approved.
40. My advisor has expressed opinions that are contrary to those expressed by his predecessor and they have been worse than those expressed by his predecessor.
41. My advisor has expressed opinions that are contrary to those expressed by his predecessor but they have been better than those expressed by his predecessor.
42. My advisor has nonconcurred with ROKA plans and requests because he lacked the knowledge required to thoroughly understand and evaluate the reasonableness of them.
43. My advisor has wasted MAP funds and materials by allowing things to be sent to us that we do not need.
44. My advisor has tried to ensure that ROKA gets the greatest benefit from the expenditure of MAP funds.
45. There has been enough work for my advisor to do, but he has not had the knowledge or experience that was required to do the work.
46. My advisor has expressed opinions that are contrary to what I was taught at an Army school in the States.
47. My advisor has criticized one or more of my superior officers in my presence.
48. My advisor has disregarded normal military courtesy.
49. My advisor has wanted me to sit in the rear of a jeep while an American with lower rank than mine sat in the right front seat.

50. My advisor has humiliated a ROKA officer of higher rank by not giving to him the proper seat in a KMAC vehicle.
51. My advisor has cursed at me.
52. My advisor has spoken rudely to me.
53. My advisor has used vulgar language or spoken rudely in my presence.
54. My advisor has barged into my office without any warning and expected to speak to me immediately.
55. My advisor has acted crudely and seemed to try to impress me that he is really a "tough guy".
56. When I have gone to see the advisor at his office he has stood up when I entered, saluted, asked me to sit down, and offered tea or coffee to me.
57. My advisor has acted too casually and informally in the presence of higher ranking ROKA officers.
58. My advisor has spent money out of his own pocket in order to entertain me.
59. My advisor has shown that he is a complete human being by taking an interest in my personal welfare and showing a willingness to help me.
60. My advisor paid all my travel expenses on an official trip we made together.
61. My advisor has given me the feeling that he wants to avoid me.
62. My advisor has seemed shocked at some of the things I say and do.
63. My advisor has seemed to think I do not like him because I cannot afford to entertain him the way he has entertained me.
64. My advisor has acted as if what Korea needed, he needed.
65. My advisor has shown a desire to understand the thoughts and feelings of the Korean people.
66. My advisor has shown a desire to understand the Korean language.
67. My advisor has shown a desire to understand Korean history.
68. My advisor has shown a desire to understand Korean customs.
69. My advisor has shown a desire to understand Korean economic conditions.
70. My advisor has seemed to encourage other advisors to dislike Koreans.
71. When my advisor has visited a ROKA unit with me, he hasn't hesitated to eat our (ROKA) food.
72. My advisor has seemed to like mingling with me socially, as well as at work.
73. My advisor has shown he likes to mix with his counterparts.
74. My advisor has rejected my attempts to become friends.
75. My advisor has been friendly to me when we met.
76. My advisor has reciprocated my invitations to participate in social and recreational activities.
77. My advisor has demonstrated that he has *injeong*.

78. My advisor has used good Korean table manners when eating Korean style.
79. My advisor has taken my feelings into account when he has talked to me.
80. My advisor has voluntarily taken actions to procure materials, supplies, or equipment that would improve the capability, effectiveness, or morale of ROKA.
81. My advisor has seemed to want to make sure that MAP-supplied materials and equipment are not misused.
82. My advisor has persuaded KMAG to approve a plan or request that was made by ROKA.
83. My advisor has inspected conditions in order to ensure that ROKA personnel are getting everything that ROKA regulations permit.
84. My advisor has opposed KMAG opposition to a ROKA request.
85. My advisor has seemed interested in making sure that I do not get what I have requested.
86. My advisor has nonconcurred with ROKA plans and requests.
87. My advisor has opposed recommendations that were made by ROKA.
88. My advisor has tried to find out what I or my superior needed and then has done his best to obtain whatever was needed.
89. My advisor has blocked a project my superiors and I consider important.
90. My advisor has used his authority to deny a ROKA request because he was angry with someone in ROKA.
91. My advisor has made no real effort to help me with problems and used red tape and regulations as an excuse for not giving assistance.
92. My advisor has used a MAP regulation to prevent ROKA from doing something that was obviously very worthwhile.
93. My advisor has seemed to be more concerned with trying to reduce expenditures than with improving the capability of ROKA.
94. My advisor has imposed excessive control over the use of MAP funds or items.
95. My advisor has reacted speedily to my requests for up-to-date information on U.S. Army concepts, procedures, or equipment.
96. My advisor has not reacted promptly to a request which I have submitted to him.
97. My advisor has reacted too slowly to ROKA requests.
98. My advisor has personally taken actions to expedite the delivery of items needed by ROKA.
99. My advisor has succeeded in getting something for ROKA which other advisors had tried to do but failed.
100. My advisor has used much initiative and persistence to obtain support that enabled me to accomplish my mission.
101. My advisor has helped me anticipate and prepare for future requirements.
102. My advisor has helped me to keep my superiors informed by giving me periodic reports on the status of requests, plans, etc.

103. My advisor has given me much help preparing a briefing I had to give to my superiors.
104. My advisor has used his greater experience and training to assist me in fulfilling requests from my superiors.
105. My advisor has used his office personnel and supplies to help me complete a job I had to do for my higher headquarters.
106. My advisor has used his better transportation and communication facilities to perform some of my duties for me.
107. My advisor has done something for me which indicated an unusual willingness to help me.
108. My advisor has seemed primarily interested in teaching me things that are useful to me.
109. My advisor has not been interested in the work that needs to be done.
110. My advisor has recommended changes in ROKA plans which resulted in a greater degree of accomplishment of my mission.
111. When I have reached a final decision, my advisor has respected it and helped me carry it out.
112. My advisor has delayed my accomplishing work on an important problem by bothering me about less important matters.
113. My advisor has made such detailed inspections of ROKA that it has seemed he does not trust the information that we give to him.
114. My advisor has seemed to be disgusted and despise ROKA.
115. My advisor has seemed to think that ROKA cannot be trusted.
116. My advisor has made me feel that he trusts me.
117. My advisor has seemed to believe what other Americans say more than what Koreans say to him.
118. My advisor has probed too deeply into purely ROKA matters.
119. My advisor has refused to comply with ROKA regulations.
120. My advisor has explained clearly what he expects of me and my subordinates so that there are never any misunderstandings.
121. There has not been enough work for my advisor to do.
122. My advisor has set good examples for other advisors to follow.
123. My advisor has led me to believe that KMAC would concur with a request, but the request was returned with a nonconcurrence.
124. My advisor has acted honestly and fairly.

125. If you could change just one thing about your advisor, what change would you like to make?

126. Please list the names of all of the ROKA personnel whom you know to have had enough contact with this advisor to be qualified to make the preceding ratings.

	Name	Rank	Position	Unit
1.				
2.				
3.				
4.				
5.				
6.				
7.				
8.				
9.				
10.				

Appendix H

COUNTERPART BEHAVIORAL INVENTORY (CBI)

INSTRUCTIONS

The purpose of this questionnaire is to find out how often your current counterpart has behaved toward you in the ways described on the following pages and what your attitude toward his behavior is. Please read each description carefully and do the following:

(1) From the five alternatives that appear in the first column next to the description, select the one word that best indicates how often your current counterpart has acted toward you in the way described and circle the number next to the word.

(2) From the five alternatives that appear in the second column, select the phrase that best indicates how often you would like your counterpart to act toward you in the way described and circle the number next to the phrase.

(3) From the four alternatives that appear in the third column, select the phrase that best indicates how important you rate the behavior described and circle the number next to the phrase.

Example 1:

		How often has this occurred?		How often should it occur?		How important has this behavior been?
Counterpart comes to my office in the morning to learn if there is anything he can do to help me.	1	always	1	always	1	very important
	2	often	(2)	more often	(2)	fairly important
	(3)	sometimes	3	no change	3	not important
	4	rarely	4	less often	4	not applicable
	5	never	5	never		

Comments: _____

(This rater's current counterpart, in practice, occasionally comes to the rater's office. The rater indicates, however, that he would like his counterpart to come more often. He regards this behavior as fairly important.

Example 2:

		How often has this occurred?		How often should it occur?		How important has this behavior been?
Counterpart comes to my office in the morning to learn if there is anything he can do to help me.	(1)	always	1	always	1	very important
	2	often	2	more often	2	fairly important
	3	sometimes	3	no change	(3)	not important
	4	rarely	(4)	less often	4	not applicable
	5	never	5	never		

Comments: I'm usually very busy in the morning with routine matters that have to be
given immediate attention. When the counterpart appears at these times, I usually cannot
take the time required to discuss problems with him.

(This rater indicates that his current counterpart "always" comes to his office and that he wishes his counterpart would come "less often." However, he does not consider this behavior very important. He then explains his answer.)

The space labeled *Comments* is for your use if you wish to explain your answers. If you think your reasons are obvious, however, you do not need to make any comment.

Answer all of the items in the questionnaire and do so on the basis of your experiences with the person in K MAG who is currently your principal officially designated counterpart.

Note: The items used in this questionnaire are listed on the following pages. All were answered as shown in the examples.

1. My counterpart gives briefings which are complete and correspond accurately with the real situation.
2. My counterpart has sought my recommendations without first giving me enough information to understand the situation or problem.
3. My counterpart has helped me establish (or maintain) a good relationship with another counterpart.
4. My counterpart has given me information which was intentionally falsified.
5. My counterpart has responded to an emergency condition or civil disaster with prompt and appropriate actions.
6. My counterpart failed to reply to my correspondence to him.
7. My counterpart has not implemented my recommendations to control and reduce diversions of MAP funds or supplies.
8. My counterpart has voluntarily taken actions that go beyond routine procedures, when those have proven inadequate, in order to accomplish his mission.
9. My counterpart has carefully examined a situation or problem, collected the facts, and presented them to me *before* seeking my recommendation.
10. My counterpart has taken "corrective action" which was contrary to my advice and which made the situation worse.
11. My counterpart has used social and political means to advance himself rather than seeking advancement on the merits of his work.
12. My counterpart has voluntarily provided me with information which he believed would help me to better understand a problem or situation I was trying to improve.
13. My counterpart has not reported losses of supplies for which he is accountable.
14. My counterpart has not responded appropriately to a situation requiring urgent actions.
15. My counterpart has resisted my effort to increase and improve the amount of coordination within ROKA.
16. My counterpart has lost his temper in my presence and spoken or acted with hostility toward other ROKA personnel.
17. When the usual channels and personnel in ROKA react unfavorably to a recommendation I make, my counterpart effects cooperation with other personnel in ROKA to initiate the changes.
18. My counterpart has attempted to understand the "American point of view" when it conflicted with the Korean view.
19. I have found my counterpart asleep in his office during duty hours.
20. My counterpart has asked me to purchase items for him from U.S. sources which are not authorized to him.
21. My counterpart has tried to explain to me why he holds certain attitudes or beliefs, or why he takes certain actions.
22. My counterpart has attempted to instill courage in his subordinates by being courageous himself.
23. My counterpart has made me familiar with Korean customs.

24. My counterpart has presented me with a gift.
25. My counterpart has permitted his subordinates to turn out work that is unnecessarily below standard or contains errors.
26. My counterpart has persisted in misusing equipment or supplies despite my advice and caution.
27. My counterpart has investigated a condition which I recommended be changed in order to verify my reasons for the recommendation.
28. My counterpart is unable to answer my questions.
29. My counterpart has failed to inform me of conditions about which I expected to be informed.
30. My counterpart has shown a willingness to compromise when what he wants differs from what I want.
31. My counterpart has actively cooperated in implementing recommendations designed to tighten control over funds and/or materials supplied by MAP.
32. My counterpart has remained calm and in control of himself under a stressful condition.
33. My counterpart has treated one or more of his subordinates disrespectfully.
34. My counterpart has refused to discuss a problem with me and has not tried to reach an agreement with me.
35. My counterpart has taken an action aimed at improving the morale of his subordinates.
36. My counterpart has readily adopted and implemented one of my recommendations.
37. My counterpart has neglected his personal appearance and hygiene.
38. My counterpart has taken actions to establish and maintain good relationships between ROKA personnel and local Korean civilians.
39. My counterpart has physically mistreated or abused one or more of his subordinates.
40. My counterpart has introduced U.S. Army methods and procedures into ROKA.
41. My counterpart has used his rank and position to get his subordinate personnel to adopt a recommendation that I made to them.
42. My counterpart has made a careful inspection of the performance of his subordinates to ensure the establishment and maintenance of high standards.
43. My counterpart has tried to impress others by putting up a good front while seriously neglecting much more important aspects of his job.
44. My counterpart is probably diverting MAP supplies, funds, or materials.
45. My counterpart has failed to use ordinary logic in planning a course of action.
46. My counterpart has demonstrated that he knows how to apply knowledge he gained by attendance at a military school.
47. My counterpart has tried to make my tour in Korea pleasant by inviting me to participate in social and recreational activities with him.
48. My counterpart has completely ignored a recommendation made to him.
49. My counterpart has given a briefing which did not contain enough information to be understood correctly.

50. My counterpart has informed me about diversions of MAP funds or supplies.
51. My counterpart seems angry with me when I insist upon using an interpreter with him.
52. My counterpart has taken actions which have significantly reduced the diversion of MAP funds or supplies.
53. My counterpart has sought my assistance in trying to conceal a diversion of MAP funds or supplies after it was discovered by others.
54. My counterpart has persisted in trying to obtain something from KMAG by circumventing me and using other channels.
55. My counterpart has failed to appear at a scheduled meeting, conference, or other function which required his presence.
56. My counterpart has acted in a way that made me feel he disliked Americans.
57. My counterpart has ignored a suspense date that I have given him.
58. My counterpart has given me the impression that he wants to avoid me.
59. My counterpart grasped a new idea and implemented a new way so readily he risked alienation from his own group.
60. My counterpart has tried to put off the implementation of one of my recommendations by saying that it had to be staffed.
61. My counterpart has put me in a situation where I had to accept food, drink, and/or entertainment from him and then he has asked me for a "favor" I am not authorized to perform.
62. My counterpart has responded promptly to my request for information.
63. My counterpart has made a last-minute change in a schedule or itinerary that had previously been set up and confirmed.
64. My counterpart has accepted an undesirable condition in ROKA and has no desire to improve it.
65. My counterpart has persisted in ignoring proper MAP procedures with the excuse that the advisors had not given him proper guidance.
66. My counterpart has insulted a Korean person who works in my office.
67. My counterpart has accomplished a mission and overcome limitations resulting from inadequate resources by employing ingenious methods.

Appendix I

COUNTERPARTS' JUDGMENTS OF ADVISORS' CRITICAL ROLE BEHAVIORS

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
1. My advisor wouldn't accept my judgment, but refused to take the trouble to check the basis for my judgment.	68	2	73	25
2. My advisor has taken unilateral action without consulting me or taking my opinion into account.	65	0	72	28
3. My advisor has submitted unfavorable reports on the status of personnel, equipment, or supplies under my responsibility to my superior officer without first discussing the situation with me.	62	0	89	11
4. My advisor has coordinated reports with me before submitting them to higher headquarters.	93	36	61	3
5. My advisor has insisted that I do something his way even though the matter is insignificant and could be done just as well my way.	53	4	69	27
6. My advisor has disregarded my views and done things his own way.	64	2	79	19
7. My advisor has kept me informed on the current status of the work that we have discussed.	98 ^a	47	53	0
8. My advisor has shown a willingness to compromise what he wants with what I want.	97	34	65	1
9. My advisor has listened patiently to my questions and explanations.	99	16	84	0
10. My advisor has shown respect for my greater experience and knowledge about ROKA and Korea.	90 ^a	51	49	0

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
11. My advisor has seemed unconcerned about what my superior might think of me when my recommendations and plans have been rejected.	58	6	58	37
12. My advisor has seemed irritated and annoyed with my questions and explanations.	62	2	79	19
13. My advisor has seemed unconcerned about how I felt when he rejected my recommendations and plans.	58	2	56	42
14. My advisor has acted toward ROKA personnel in such a way that they lost face.	68	3	75	22
15. My advisor has not made clear to me what he expected from me or my subordinates. Only when he has become angry have we known that we did not behave as he expected.	60	2	74	24
16. My advisor has seemed interested only in criticizing what I have done or failed to do.	61	3	75	21
17. My advisor has tried to make me feel that I am doing a good job.	62	25	74	2
18. My advisor became angry and unfairly blamed ROKA when he found a condition existed which he thought should not exist.	64	0	71	29
19. My advisor has expressed dissatisfaction about something without taking ROKA's limitations into account.	63	0	64	36
20. My advisor embarrassed me (hurt my feelings) by recommending to my superior an obvious change that I had been unable to make due to lack of funds.	50	7	87	7
21. My advisor has seemed to act as though he is more important than other people.	41	0	66	34
22. My advisor has acted as though he is the boss and I am his subordinate.	53	0	82	18
23. My advisor has acted as though he is the superior of higher ranking ROKA officers.	60	2	69	29

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
24. My advisor has over-stepped the limits of his authority and "chewed out" one or more of my subordinates.	60	2	91	7
25. My advisor has acted as though he were the commander of some of my subordinates.	56	2	88	10
26. My advisor has ordered me to do something.	55	2	92	6
27. My advisor has acted as commander instead of advisor.	60	2	91	7
28. My advisor has directly interfered with my actual command responsibility.	60	2	84	14
29. My advisor has questioned and criticized plans in front of many of my subordinates.	55	6	74	20
30. My advisor has interfered with command responsibility by public criticism of plans and by directing changes in them.	58	2	85	13
31. My advisor has insulted my superior and questioned his execution of command responsibility.	59	2	83	15
32. My advisor's comments on a request for concurrence in a project were inaccurate and inconsistent and prevented me from completing my project.	62	3	65	32
33. My advisor has shown me he doesn't know his job; he doesn't have enough professional knowledge to be of any help.	69	3	62	35
34. My advisor has been ignorant of one or more differences between what is SOP in ROKA and the U.S. Army.	66 ^a	0	45	55
35. My advisor has given a bad recommendation to me but refused to admit that it is a bad one.	58	0	92	8
36. My advisor has been unable to answer my questions.	56	2	52	46
37. My advisor has been unable to give me recommendations that help me do my job.	65	3	60	37

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
38. My advisor has tried to fool me by pretending that he knew the answer to my question when he really did not know it.	58	2	87	11
39. My advisor has tried to give a detailed explanation of the reasons why a ROKA plan or request cannot be approved.	92	25	68	7
40. My advisor has expressed opinions that are contrary to those expressed by his predecessor and they have been worse than those expressed by his predecessor.	54	0	72	28
41. My advisor has expressed opinions that are contrary to those expressed by his predecessor but they have been better than those expressed by his predecessor.	73	36	55	9
42. My advisor has nonconcurred with ROKA plans and requests because he lacked the knowledge required to thoroughly understand and evaluate the reasonableness of them.	68	2	63	35
43. My advisor has wasted MAP funds and materials by allowing things to be sent to us that we do not need.	67	0	87	13
44. My advisor has tried to ensure that ROKA gets the greatest benefit from the expenditure of MAP funds.	99	35	65	0
45. There has been enough work for my advisor to do, but he has not had the knowledge or experience that was required to do the work.	69	0	63	36
46. My advisor has expressed opinions that are contrary to what I was taught at an Army school in the States.	58	0	88	12
47. My advisor has criticized one or more of my superior officers in my presence.	56	0	94	6
48. My advisor has disregarded normal military courtesy.	68	0	67	33

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
49. My advisor has wanted me to sit in the rear of a jeep while an American with lower rank than mine sat in the right front seat.	60	0	84	16
50. My advisor has humiliated a ROKA officer of higher rank by not giving to him the proper seat in a KMAG vehicle.	61	2	80	18
51. My advisor has cursed at me.	59	0	96	4
52. My advisor has spoken rudely to me.	57	0	85	15
53. My advisor has used vulgar language or spoken rudely in my presence.	60	0	84	16
54. My advisor has barged into my office without any warning and expected to speak to me immediately.	41	13	66	21
55. My advisor has acted crudely and seemed to try to impress me that he is really a "tough guy."	40	0	89	11
56. When I have gone to see the advisor at his office he has stood up when I entered, saluted, asked me to sit down, and offered tea or coffee to me.	76	20	77	3
57. My advisor has acted too casually and informally in the presence of higher ranking ROKA officers.	62	0	72	28
58. My advisor has spent money out of his own pocket in order to entertain me.	29	7	78	15
59. My advisor has shown that he is a complete human being by taking an interest in my personal welfare and showing a willingness to help me.	43	25	72	2
60. My advisor paid all my travel expenses on an official trip we made together.	18	6	75	19
61. My advisor has given me the feeling that he wants to avoid me.	45	0	90	10
62. My advisor has seemed shocked at some of the things I say and do.	28	4	76	20

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
63. My advisor has seemed to think I do not like him because I cannot afford to entertain him the way he has entertained me.	27	0	92	8
64. My advisor has acted as if what Korea needed, he needed.	97 ^a	48	50	2
65. My advisor has shown a desire to understand the thoughts and feelings of the Korean people.	97 ^a	55	44	1
66. My advisor has shown a desire to understand the Korean language.	76 ^a	65	35	0
67. My advisor has shown a desire to understand Korean history.	77 ^a	60	40	0
68. My advisor has shown a desire to understand Korean customs.	82 ^a	48	48	4
69. My advisor has shown a desire to understand Korean economic conditions.	91 ^a	48	49	2
70. My advisor has seemed to encourage other advisors to dislike Koreans.	58	0	89	11
71. When my advisor has visited a ROKA unit with me, he hasn't hesitated to eat our (ROKA) food.	55	25	71	4
72. My advisor has seemed to like mingling with me socially, as well as at work.	83	39	59	1
73. My advisor has shown he likes to mix with his counterparts.	89	49	51	0
74. My advisor has rejected my attempts to become friends.	58	8	83	9
75. My advisor has been friendly to me when we met.	94	27	73	0
76. My advisor has reciprocated my invitations to participate in social and recreational activities.	80	22	77	1
77. My advisor has demonstrated that he has <i>injeong</i> .	76	40	59	1
78. My advisor has used good Korean table manners when eating Korean style.	55	26	74	0
79. My advisor has taken my feelings into account when he has talked to me.	91	26	72	2

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
80. My advisor has voluntarily taken actions to procure materials, supplies, or equipment that would improve the capability, effectiveness, or morale of ROKA.	99 ^a	48	50	2
81. My advisor has seemed to want to make sure that MAP-supplied materials and equipment are not misused.	94	16	83	1
82. My advisor has persuaded K MAG to approve a plan or request that was made by ROKA.	100 ^a	51	49	0
83. My advisor has inspected conditions in order to ensure that ROKA personnel are getting everything that ROKA regulations permit.	77	32	67	2
84. My advisor has opposed K MAG opposition to a ROKA request.	78	39	48	12
85. My advisor has seemed interested in making sure that I do not get what I have requested.	53	0	90	10
86. My advisor has nonconcurred with ROKA plans and requests.	72 ^a	0	38	62
87. My advisor has opposed recommendations that were made by ROKA.	72 ^a	0	48	52
88. My advisor has tried to find out what I or my superior needed and then has done his best to obtain whatever was needed.	99 ^a	46	53	1
89. My advisor has blocked a project my superiors and I considered important.	69	0	76	24
90. My advisor has used his authority to deny a ROKA request because he was angry with someone in ROKA.	58	0	83	17
91. My advisor has made no real effort to help me with problems and used red tape and regulations as an excuse for not giving assistance.	64	0	64	36
92. My advisor has used a MAP regulation to prevent ROKA from doing something that was obviously very worthwhile.	64	0	74	26

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
93. My advisor has seemed to be more concerned with trying to reduce expenditures than with improving the capability of ROKA.	66	2	50	48
94. My advisor has imposed excessive control over the use of MAP funds or items.	62	0	65	35
95. My advisor has reacted speedily to my requests for up-to-date information on U.S. Army concepts, procedures, or equipment.	98 ^a	48	51	1
96. My advisor has not reacted promptly to a request which I have submitted to him.	68	3	67	29
97. My advisor has reacted too slowly to ROKA requests.	64	2	62	36
98. My advisor has personally taken actions to expedite the delivery of items needed by ROKA.	95 ^a	59	41	0
99. My advisor has succeeded in getting something for ROKA which other advisors had tried to do but failed.	90 ^a	65	34	1
100. My advisor has used much initiative and persistence to obtain support that enabled me to accomplish my mission.	99 ^a	52	48	0
101. My advisor has helped me anticipate and prepare for future requirements.	98 ^a	55	44	1
102. My advisor has helped me to keep my superiors informed by giving me periodic reports on the status of requests, plans, etc.	96 ^a	64	33	3
103. My advisor has given me much help preparing a briefing I had to give to my superiors.	90 ^a	50	49	1
104. My advisor has used his greater experience and training to assist me in fulfilling requests from my superiors.	98 ^a	51	48	1
105. My advisor has used his office personnel and supplies to help me complete a job I had to do for my higher headquarters.	63	43	57	0

--Continued--

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
106. My advisor has used his better transportation and communication facilities to perform some of my duties for me.	76	43	54	3
107. My advisor has done something for me which indicated an unusual willingness to help me.	85 ^a	48	49	3
108. My advisor has seemed primarily interested in teaching me things that are useful to me.	85 ^a	54	46	0
109. My advisor has not been interested in the work that needs to be done.	62	14	68	18
110. My advisor has recommended changes in ROKA plans which resulted in a greater degree of accomplishment of my mission.	82	45	49	6
111. When I have reached a final decision, my advisor has respected it and helped me carry it out.	99 ^a	43	56	1
112. My advisor has delayed my accomplishing work on an important problem by bothering me about less important matters.	60	0	71	29
113. My advisor has made such detailed inspections of ROKA that it has seemed he does not trust the information that we give to him.	59	2	75	23
114. My advisor has seemed to be disgusted and despise ROKA.	59	0	81	19
115. My advisor has seemed to think that ROKA cannot be trusted.	59	0	74	26
116. My advisor has made me feel that he trusts me.	92	32	68	0
117. My advisor has seemed to believe what other Americans say more than what Koreans say to him.	65 ^a	2	41	58
118. My advisor has probed too deeply into purely ROKA matters.	48	5	60	35
119. My advisor has refused to comply with ROKA regulations.	54	2	78	20

Continued

Appendix I (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
120. My advisor has explained clearly what he expects of me and my subordinates so that there are never any misunderstandings.	91	35	64	1
121. There has not been enough work for my advisor to do.	56	4	73	23
122. My advisor has set good examples for other advisors to follow.	91 ^a	41	58	1
123. My advisor has led me to believe that KMAG would concur with a request, but the request was returned with a nonconcurrence.	64	2	59	39
124. My advisor has acted honestly and fairly.	99	26	73	1

^aItems appearing in Table 13 and discussed in text.

Appendix J

ADVISORS' JUDGMENTS OF COUNTERPARTS' CRITICAL ROLE BEHAVIORS

Role Behavior	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
1. My counterpart gives briefings which are complete and correspond accurately with the real situation.	89	34	63	2
2. My counterpart has sought my recommendations without first giving me enough information to understand the situation or problem	76	1	36	63
3. My counterpart has helped me establish (or maintain) a good relationship with another counterpart.	73	17	83	0
4. My counterpart has given me information which was intentionally falsified.	79	0	71	29
5. My counterpart has responded to an emergency condition or civil disaster with prompt and appropriate actions.	72	27	72	2
6. My counterpart failed to reply to my correspondence to him.	85	2	64	33
7. My counterpart has not implemented my recommendations to control and reduce diversions of MAP funds or supplies.	82	12	50	38
8. My counterpart has voluntarily taken actions that go beyond routine procedures, when those have proven inadequate, in order to accomplish his mission.	96 ^a	43	53	4
9. My counterpart has carefully examined a situation or problem, collected the facts, and presented them to me before seeking my recommendation.	95	57	39	4
10. My counterpart has taken "corrective action" which was contrary to my advice and which made the situation worse.	78	0	60	40

Continued

Appendix J (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
11. My counterpart has used social and political means to advance himself rather than seeking advancement on the merits of his work.	38	0	78	22
12. My counterpart has voluntarily provided me with information which he believed would help me to better understand a problem or situation I was trying to improve.	99 ^a	44	56	0
13. My counterpart has not reported losses of supplies for which he is accountable.	65	16	60	24
14. My counterpart has not responded appropriately to a situation requiring urgent actions.	93	8	54	38
15. My counterpart has resisted my effort to increase and improve the amount of coordination within ROKA.	90	2	71	27
16. My counterpart has lost his temper in my presence and spoken or acted with hostility toward other ROKA personnel	63	2	79	20
17. When the usual channels and personnel in ROKA react unfavorably to a recommendation I make, my counterpart effects cooperation with other personnel in ROKA to initiate the changes.	73	40	56	4
18. My counterpart has attempted to understand the "American point of view" when it conflicted with the Korean view.	83	40	59	1
19. I have found my counterpart asleep in his office during duty hours.	48	0	92	8
20. My counterpart has asked me to purchase items for him from US sources which are not authorized for him.	55	0	57	43
21. My counterpart has tried to explain to me why he holds certain attitudes or belief, or why he takes certain actions.	82	40	58	1

Continued

Appendix J (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
22. My counterpart has attempted to instill courage in his subordinates by being courageous himself.	86	20	80	0
23. My counterpart has made me familiar with Korean customs.	82	39	61	0
24. My counterpart has presented me with a gift.	38	0	79	21
25. My counterpart has permitted his subordinates to turn-out work that is unnecessarily below standards or contains errors.	93 ^a	0	32	68
26. My counterpart has persisted in misusing equipment or supplies despite my advice and caution.	79	0	65	35
27. My counterpart has investigated a condition which I recommended be changed in order to verify my reasons for the recommendation.	94	35	64	1
28. My counterpart is unable to answer my questions.	90	2	71	27
29. My counterpart has failed to inform me of conditions about which I expected to be informed.	93 ^a	2	37	61
30. My counterpart has shown a willingness to compromise when what he wants differs from what I want.	91	25	73	2
31. My counterpart has actively cooperated in implementing recommendations designed to tighten control over funds and/or materials supplied by MAP.	92 ^a	46	52	1
32. My counterpart has remained calm and in control of himself under a stressful condition.	95	16	82	2
33. My counterpart has treated one or more of his subordinates disrespectfully.	73	0	76	24
34. My counterpart has refused to discuss a problem with me and has not tried to reach an agreement with me.	88	1	82	17
35. My counterpart has taken an action aimed at improving the morale of his subordinates.	95	33	66	1

Continued

Appendix J (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
36. My counterpart has readily adopted and implemented one of my recommendations.	98	24	75	0
37. My counterpart has neglected his personal appearance and hygiene.	78	0	82	18
38. My counterpart has taken actions to establish and maintain good relationships between ROKA personnel and local Korean civilians.	89	17	83	0
39. My counterpart has physically mistreated or abused one or more of his subordinates.	79	0	93	7
40. My counterpart has introduced U.S. Army methods and procedures into ROKA.	93	32	67	1
41. My counterpart has used his rank and position to get his subordinate personnel to adopt a recommendation that I made to him.	79	18	81	1
42. My counterpart has made a careful inspection of the performance of his subordinates to ensure the establishment and maintenance of high standards.	100 ^a	45	55	0
43. My counterpart has tried to impress others by putting up a good front while seriously neglecting much more important aspects of his job.	84	0	64	36
44. My counterpart is probably diverting MAP supplies, funds, or materials.	80	0	68	32
45. My counterpart has failed to use ordinary logic in planning a course of action.	90 ^a	0	55	45
46. My counterpart has demonstrated that he knows how to apply knowledge he gained by attendance at a military school.	97	28	72	0
47. My counterpart has tried to make my tour in Korea pleasant by inviting me to participate in social and recreational activities with him.	69	15	83	1
48. My counterpart has completely ignored a recommendation made to him.	87	0	67	33

Continued

Appendix J (Continued)

Role Behavior	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
49. My counterpart has given a briefing which did not contain enough information to be understood correctly.	82 ^A	0	46	54
50. My counterpart has informed me about diversions of MAP funds or supplies.	72	73	26	2
51. My counterpart seems angry with me when I insist upon using an interpreter with him.	43	0	94	6
52. My counterpart has taken actions which have significantly reduced the diversion of MAP funds or supplies.	82	58	42	0
53. My counterpart has sought my assistance in trying to conceal a diversion of MAP funds or supplies after it was discovered by others.	69	3	92	5
54. My counterpart has persisted in trying to obtain something from KMAG by circumventing me and using other channels.	81	0	80	20
55. My counterpart has failed to appear at a scheduled meeting, conference, or other function which required his presence.	74	0	87	13
56. My counterpart has acted in a way that made me feel he disliked Americans.	80	1	91	8
57. My counterpart has ignored a suspense date that I have given him.	78	0	62	38
58. My counterpart has given me the impression that he wants to avoid me.	74	0	89	11
59. My counterpart grasped a new idea and implemented a new way so readily he risked alienation from his own group.	70	13	79	8
60. My counterpart has tried to put off the implementation of one of my recommendations by saying that it had to be staffed.	71	0	68	32

Continued

Appendix J (Continued)

Role Behaviors	Percentage Indicating Behavior is Important	Percentage Indicating:		
		Behavior Should Occur Always or More Often	No Change is Necessary	Behavior Should Occur Less Often or Never
61. My counterpart has put me in a situation where I had to accept food, drink, and/or entertainment from him and then he has asked me for a "favor" I am not authorized to perform.	75	0	87	13
62. My counterpart has responded promptly to my request for information.	100	18	82	0
63. My counterpart has made a last-minute change in a schedule or itinerary that had previously been set up and confirmed.	58	0	56	44
64. My counterpart has accepted an undesirable condition in ROKA and has no desire to improve it.	91	0	57	43
65. My counterpart has persisted in ignoring proper MAP procedures with the excuse that the advisors had not given him proper guidance.	81	0	84	16
66. My counterpart has insulted a Korean person who works in my office.	64	0	95	5
67. My counterpart has accomplished a mission and overcome limitations resulting from inadequate resources by employing ingenious methods.	97 ^a	47	53	0

^aItems appearing in Table 14 and discussed in text.

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13. ABSTRACT In order to develop successful selection procedures, training materials, and management policies for Military Assistance Program (MAP) advisors, the conditions under which they work were analyzed, including identifying the culturally determined preferences counterparts have for the people with whom they wish to work, and the extent to which advisors and counterparts satisfy what each regards as critical role behaviors of the other. U.S. Army advisory personnel assigned to the U.S. Army Advisory Group, Korea (KMAG) and counterparts in the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) were surveyed in the summer and fall of 1966. Through rating scales and questionnaires, observations were made of the kinds of personalities with whom advisors and counterparts most preferred to work. In addition, advisors and counterparts judged one another in terms of a large number of role behaviors previously identified as important.		

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