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Technical Report No. 636

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**ARMY ROLES, MISSIONS, AND DOCTRINE
IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT (ARMLIC)**

PRECONFLICT CASE STUDY 2--COLOMBIA

15 DECEMBER 1969

V3

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1. This case study of the preconflict period in Colombia is one of a series undertaken by the Carlisle Research Office of Operations Research Incorporated for the US Army Combat Developments Command Institute of Advanced Studies (USACDCIAS), Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (now designated Institute of Land Combat (USACDCILC)). The purpose is to develop a better understanding of the political, economic, social, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military factors conducive to low intensity conflict and change of indigenous governmental control. A total of seven such studies has been completed and have been placed on file at the Defense Documentation Center (DDC) for authorized users.

2. This and the other case studies were used in support of the USACDCIAS project entitled Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC). However, no assumptions are made as to whether Army actions are desirable or necessary in connection with any given conflict. Rather, it is recognized that Army capabilities, both military and for civilian assistance, are among many means of US Government action available to be used or withheld in furtherance of US policy and national interest; and that these capabilities should be so designed and maintained to best serve the purposes which national authorities may require with the greatest effectiveness and the least cost.

3. The data in this case study have been drawn from open sources, published and unpublished, available through public institutions and Government agencies. No field work is involved, and no policy recommendations are made. The data have been checked against selected classified sources and with knowledgeable individuals. The method used is a modified systems analysis aimed at determining points of tension (or dysfunction) conducive to low intensity conflict. Basic assumptions and methodology, common to all aspects of the ARMLIC study, are on file in USACDCILC.

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Figure 1. Physical and political map of Colombia

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CONTENTS

	Page
PREFATORY NOTE	iii
MAP	v
CONTENTS	vii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
LIST OF FIGURES	xi
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS	
1. Introduction	1
2. Political Factors	2
3. Sociological Factors	4
4. Economic Factors	6
5. Military Factors	9
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY	
6. Nature of the Study	12
7. Descriptive Background	13
8. Political Factors	19
9. Economic Factors	27
10. Sociological Factors	32
11. Military Factors	39
CHAPTER 2 POLITICAL FACTORS	
Section I Government and Political System	
12. Background	46
13. Structure of Government	48
14. Quality of Government Administration	55
15. Security Forces	58
16. Political Culture	59
17. Political Leadership	65
18. Foreign Influence (non-Communists)	68
19. Elements of Political Power and Influence	72
20. Adaptability and Capability of the Political System	76
21. Conclusions	78
Section II Political Parties and Interest Groups	
22. Parties before 1930	82
23. Political Parties 1930-1946	84
24. Immediate Background to Violence 1946-48	90
25. Interest Groups	99

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	Page
Section III Communism	
26. Introduction	103
27. Formation of the Communist Party of Colombia	104
28. Organization and Membership.	105
29. The Common Front	106
30. Activity in the Labor Field.	107
31. Communist Influence.	108
32. Conclusions.	109
CHAPTER 3 ECONOMIC FACTORS	
33. Colombia's History of Growth	111
34. Colombia's National Income and Structure . .	117
35. Traditional Sectors--Agriculture	125
36. Modernizing Industry and Investment.	139
37. Services, Government and Planning.	148
38. Conclusions.	158
CHAPTER 4 SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS	
Section I Demography, Education, Communication, and Culture	
39. Introduction	163
40. An Overview of Cultural Values	163
41. Population and Demography.	167
42. Ethnic Composition and Regional Sub-Cultures	172
43. Education.	175
44. Religion	179
45. Communication.	182
Section II Social Classes	
46. Historical Background.	183
47. Social Change.	185
48. Contemporary Class Structure	186
49. Conclusion	195
Section III The Family and Child Rearing	
50. Introduction	197
51. The Upper Class.	197
52. The Middle Class	198
53. The Lower Class.	199
54. Conclusions.	206
Section IV Public Health	
55. Disease and Death.	207
56. Sanitation	210
57. Nutrition.	214

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	Page
CHAPTER 5 MILITARY FACTORS	
58. Background	219
59. The Colombian Armed Forces	223
60. The Threats and Military Objectives	227
61. Political and Legal Conditions Governing Internal Use of Military Forces	228
62. Appraisal of Armed Force Effectiveness	230
63. The Police Forces	233
64. Economic Factors	235
65. Origins and Status of the Military	236
REFERENCES	240
BIBLIOGRAPHY	258
Annex	
I. STATISTICAL TABLES	267
II. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS.	287
III. COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES OFFICERS.	310

LIST OF TABLES

Table		Page
I	Factors conducive to violence	xi1
II	Chronology of salient preconflict events	xi11
III	Presidents of Colombia, 1930-50	51
IV	Colombian economic indices for selected periods	118
V	Comparison of share of output and active population, 1925-1945	123
VI	Numbers of Colombian farms, by size, 1951	129
VII	1953 Agricultural output (Value, value share, area, area share, land productivity)	136
VIII	Ethnic distribution (during the wars of independence)	237
IX	Permanent government personnel by functional groups, 1948	268

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<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
X	Election statistics since 1914	269
XI	Increase of the population of Colombia by department and territory for 1938-48 and 1948-51	270
XII	Population of capital cities of departments, proportion of population in capital cities and increase in selected areas	271
XIII	Racial composition of Colombia	272
XIV	Illiteracy by departments for all territories, 1934, 1938, 1951	273
XV	Primary school age population enrolled in primary school for 1934	274
XVI	Number of schools (public and private) and enrollment by level of school for selected years	275
XVII	Preparation of primary school teachers as of 1948	276
XVIII	Illegitimate births as a percent of all births by departments for 1938 and 1948	277
XIX	Death rates in Colombia for selected causes: 1930-48	278
XX	Registered vital rates per 1000 population, 1930-51	279
XXI	Crude rates of births, deaths and deaths under 1 year of age, 1930-51, by departments	280
XXII	Corrected vital rates	281
XXIII	Content of the Colombian diet, 1935-53	282
XXIV	Analysis of workers' diets in four important cities and in Colombia, 1946	283
XXV	Colombia: sample of the degree of avitaminosis in some sectors of the population	284
XXVI	Health facilities and resources in Colombia	285

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<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
XXVII	Number of medical personnel and index of inhabitants per medical profession, 1938 and 1949	286

LIST OF FIGURES

<u>Figure</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	Physical and political map of Colombia	111
2	Major regions of Colombia	221
3	Colombian troop deployments	232
4	Natural regions and subregions of Colombia	289
5	The Andean cordilleras	292
6	Five-year study program at the Escuela Militar	312

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Table I

FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA

(Each of the factors is explained in the
Synthesis and Conclusions, pp. 1-11)

Political Factors

1. Polarization of political loyalties
2. Spread of new ideas
3. Inadequacy of political system
4. Cultural acceptance of violence
5. Increasing political mobilization

Socio-Cultural Factors

1. Elite monopoly of control
2. Breakdown of traditional social structure
3. Regional differences
4. Lack of preparation of masses
5. Cultural patterns emphasizing individualism, honor, etc.
6. Poor health and malnutrition

Military and Security Factors

1. Inefficient and partisan police
2. Inability of military to react to emergencies
3. Army-police rivalries
4. Political orientation of officers
5. Public dislike for security forces

Economic Factors. Steady, rapid growth, but:

- a. Widening gap between poor and rich
- b. Inflation and controls
- c. No response to changing expectations

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Table II

CHRONOLOGY OF SALIENT PRECONFLICT EVENTS IN COLOMBIA

1909-28	Period of relative peace, economic and political growth under Conservatives.
1928-29	Banana revolt, Santa Marta, put down by Army.
1930	Liberals win election; peaceful transfer of power; economic and social reforms.
1933-34	Border war with Peru.
1934	Lopez, outspoken Liberal reformer, elected President.
1934	Supreme Court decision requiring documentation of land titles.
1935	Recognition of Colombia by Soviet Union.
1936	Constitutional amendments providing for reforms.
1937	Spanish and German (Falangist and Nazi) penetration.
1939	U. S. Military Missions established in Colombia.
1941	Pan American purchase of German equity in Colombian airlines revealed.
1942	Lopez elected for second (non-concurrent) term.
1943	Colombia declares war on Axis powers.
1944	Attempted Army coup at Pasto.
1945	Increased Conservative opposition; Lopez resigns.
1946	Conservatives return to power through Liberal split; growing violence between radical left and ultra-conservatives.
1947	Rio Pact on hemispheric security signed.
1948	Assassination of Gaitan, Liberal leader; "Bogotazo" riot.

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SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS: FACTORS CONDUCTIVE TO CONFLICT

1. Introduction .

a. This study of preconflict conditions in Colombia covers the period from 1930, when the opposition Liberal Party returned to political power in Colombia through a legal presidential election, until 1948, when the assassination of Jorge Eleicer Gaitan touched off riots in Bogota and exacerbated the already growing rural violence. The intervening years were marked for the most part by fairly steady and rapid economic progress, by surface social stability, and by generally good international relations. In 1946, the Conservative Party recaptured power, again by constitutional processes through a fair election. Yet internal strife, long characteristic of Colombian affairs, grew in intensity from 1946 until 1948. ←

b. It is difficult to specify, with scientific precision, the factors in the Colombian situation which caused "la violencia." The evidence points, however, to certain aspects of the situation--chiefly political and social--that underlay it. The conflict which began in the late 1940's can probably be explained as a complex interaction of longstanding tensions in Colombian politics and society with new elements resulting from the uneven impact of modernization. Economic difficulties, some Communist influence, and ineffective security forces were contributing factors. The Colombia political and social system did not have the capability and adaptability to meet these challenges, dominated as it was by a small and conservative elite; hence the pressures and tensions erupted into major widespread violence. A tabular listing of factors appears in table I.

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2. Political factors.

a. During the period studied, the Colombian political system mingled modern formal institutions with traditional attitudes and action patterns. The two elements were incompatible in some respects. A small elite group of European descent controlled the system and operated it chiefly for its own interests, although social welfare concerns were not wholly lacking. Attachment to the two major political parties, and participation in elections, was strong and widespread; yet political participation and political liberties were more theoretical or ritualistic than real for the great majority of the population.

b. Five characteristics of the preconflict political scene contributed to the crescendo of violence after 1946:

(1) Strong polarization of loyalties between the two political parties. Unlike most other Latin American countries, Colombia preserved the nineteenth century two-party division between Conservatives and Liberals: the Conservatives standing for strong central government, close liaison of church and state, church control of education, limited suffrage and protective tariffs; the Liberals standing for federalism, separation of church and state, free secular education, broader suffrage, free trade. In recent years, intellectual Liberals had absorbed new currents of political and social thoughts from abroad. While certain kinds of people gravitated toward one party or the other--clergy, landowners, military, capitalists and peasants toward the Conservative; middle classes, artisans, small farmers, and intellectuals toward the Liberal--supporters of both parties were found among all classes, and the leadership of both was largely monopolized by the elite. Affiliation

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with one party or the other was usually acquired at birth. Party loyalties, often intense, were commonly sentimental rather than reasoned.

(2) The spread of new ideas, social and political, through improved transportation and communication; and the clash of these ideas with traditional culture and religious doctrines. There was a spread of proletarian thinking, particularly militant unionism, but also European socialism and Communism, after the Bolshevik revolution. The struggle between old and new was personified and exacerbated by two charismatic leaders: Laureano Gomez, Conservative with strong Fascist leanings linked to the traditional elite; and Jorge Eleicer Gaitan, radical Liberal, hero of the masses from whom he sprang. A Communist party was organized in 1930, and achieved a brief measure of attention in the later World War II years, but never became an important political force.

(3) The inadequacy of the political system to respond effectively to the challenge of these new ideas. Aspects of this inadequacy were: the ineffectiveness of the bureaucracy to put policies into practice or provide needed services; the inefficiency and political bias of the police; the inadequacy of the parties (or other institutions) to articulate popular demands; the inflexibility of views among the ruling elite; and the lack of consensus on civic responsibility or the role of the State.

(4) The cultural acceptance of violence as a means of settling disputes or redressing grievances.

(5) The increasing mobilization and political consciousness of the masses. From the end of World War I, the urban population, and to some extent the rural masses as well, displayed gradually increasing dissatisfaction with their traditional lot. Political leaders--especially

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Gaitan--were making increasing use of mass appeals, thus intensifying this trend.

3. Sociological factors.

a. The Colombian social system during the 1930-1948 period was based on three principal institutions: the family, the church, and the system of dependence on strong leaders. Other institutions existed and had some influence. Political and economic institutions also had social functions and these were the principal channels for the spread of modern ideas and procedures. The influence of the basic three institutions, however, remained preeminent, especially in the rural areas; and all of them, throughout the period, tended to reinforce the traditional culture even in face of mounting change. The traditional family showed signs of breaking down under the impact of urbanization and social change. The people of Colombia exhibited some regional and class differences, for both geographic and ethnic reasons. The small dominant upper class was chiefly of near-pure European background (ethnic Europeans comprised about 20 percent of the total population), while the great majority was mixed European and Indian. An emergent middle class still identified with the elites. The mountainous territory and difficulty of communication had long made for regional isolation, and different regions were settled by people of different European origins and different Indian tribes. Nonetheless, virtually all the people spoke some form of Spanish and cherished a culture based on the Hispanic tradition with some Indian admixture. Illiteracy was widespread, particularly in rural areas; it was probably not far from 50 percent in 1948 for the country as a whole. Despite the richness of life among the elite, the life of many Colombians was drab,

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impoverished, plagued with disease, dominated by the ritual and superstition of "folk Catholicism." Internal migration into the central Andean region and urbanization aggravated the breakdown of traditional social patterns.

b. Among cultural and social factors which may have contributed to the violence, the following are preeminent:

(1) Monopolization of power and prestige by a small, educated wealthy upper class, which acted basically in its own interests and did not recognize the growing need for change. Although social mobility was not absent, the values, attitudes, and life style of the elite were sharply differentiated from those of the masses. (This sharp division, however, was beginning to break down during the 1930-1948 period.) The middle class, though growing, was not large enough or cohesive enough to mediate between upper and lower groups or serve as a moderating influence.

(2) Insecurity stemming from undermining of the traditional social structure by rapid social change and internal migration. This undermining affected the basic social institutions of family and Catholic church, as well as traditional status rankings. The effects were more keenly felt in urban than in rural areas. But to some extent in many places, the threat to the status of some, the rising expectations of others, created a situation of intense status strain capable of being projected toward noncausative factors, and utilizing traditional rivalry and hostility between the two political parties as a means of releasing tension.

(3) Regional differences - for both geographic and ethnic reasons - which have inhibited the growth of a strong national identity,

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despite the prevalence of essentially similar basic culture patterns in the upper and middle classes through most of the country.

(4) Lack of preparation of the people for the requirements of modern society. Tradition-oriented and inadequate education did not contribute to the development or understanding of modern political or economic institutions. The conservative Catholic Church, which retained a strong influence on almost all the population, emphasized ritualistic compliance with ancient forms and acceptance of the traditional order in the face of growing social change (although in most recent periods there have been some exceptions).

(5) Cultural patterns which emphasized strong individualism, defense of honor, and machismo (assertion of manliness in sex and social action) on the one hand, and acceptance of the authority of strong charismatic leaders, on the other; which tolerated and even encouraged violence as an acceptable means of settling disputes, and which, partly as a result of change and migration, reinforced feelings of mutual hostility and distrust.

(6) Widespread poor health and malnutrition. Although it is not established that the suffering from sickness and poor diet directly contributed to violence, it seems evident that such poor health conditions must have contributed to dissatisfaction, especially as awareness spread that improvement was possible. Extensive and excessive use of alcoholic beverages may have reinforced cultural tendencies toward hostility and violence.

4. Economic factors.

a. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of Colombia's political and social

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troubles, the economy showed a general picture of steady and fairly rapid growth, although it went through three rather distinct phases before and during the 1930-1948 period and although the growth was uneven, both regionally and among sectors.

b. Colombia was less dependent than many other Latin American countries on outside capital, and plowed back a remarkably high proportion of its national product into investment; its economy, however, was heavily dependent upon the foreign market for its principal export, coffee. The depression of the 1930's had considerable impact in Colombia, drying up the inflow of foreign (chiefly US) capital and sharply curtailing the market for coffee; yet statistics indicate that the domestic economy did not suffer a drastic decline and rather promptly recovered momentum. The impetus for growth came largely from private interests, although state economic intervention gradually increased under the influence of Liberal Party doctrine and the necessity for controls during and after World War II.

c. By the standards of developing countries generally, and notwithstanding administrative complexity, confusion, inefficiency, and (in the 1920's) heavy foreign borrowing, Colombian monetary and fiscal management was fairly sound and conservative. A considerable amount of native entrepreneurial talent, sporadic government encouragement, and relative fiscal stability brought about progress in many areas--especially in consumer goods industries and in coffee-growing--despite the lack of central planning and coordination. However, the important area of food production remained relatively tradition-bound, inefficient, and static; accordingly, food availability no more than kept pace with population growth, and at times may have lagged behind it.

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d. Economic growth was accompanied by development, in varying degrees, of modern economic institutions. Banking and commerce in the major centers were quite sophisticated. Trade unions appeared in the late 1920's, and by the end of the period there were two national federations, although their power was extremely limited. Business and industrial associations also were formed. The Liberals promoted the formation of cooperatives, but apart from the government-subsidized federation of coffee growers (dating from 1927), these were not widely popular. In such important areas as land reform and social welfare, well-intentioned legislation was enacted, but implemented inadequately or not at all. Social security laws were usually enforced only against foreigners and the larger domestic firms.

e. There is insufficient evidence that any economic factors were directly related to the outbreak of violence. It appears, however, that the following factors may have contributed to it in some degree:

(1) A widening gap between rich and poor classes and areas. Colombia appears to be no exception to the general rule that economic development benefits the few urban centers; there was no national market; urban incomes were much higher in 1948 than rural incomes, and urban incomes themselves were uneven. In both cities and countryside, the gap between the few rich and the many poor was widening; and the awareness of the gap was also growing because of improved communications and growing urban population.

(2) The impact of inflation and controls. Particularly in the cities, and to a lesser extent in the countryside, individual purchasing power was considerably reduced by the inflation induced by World War II

8
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and its economic aftermath. Inequalities, inequities, and corruption resulted from wartime shortages and controls.

(3) Lack of response to changing expectations. The Liberal administrations during the 1930's put several potentially far-reaching measures for land reform and social welfare on the books, but failed to assure their implementation--partly from inefficiency, partly from the pressures of the power elite to preserve the status quo. The net effect, increasingly aggravated by demagogic popular appeals of Gaitan and other politicians, may well have been to increase dissatisfaction more than satisfaction. The problem of unfulfilled economic expectations was aggravated, as already pointed out in the political and social fields, by the spread of new ideas and by increasing awareness of the better life of the developed countries.

5. Military factors.

a. The small Colombian armed forces throughout most of the nation's history had been low on the social scale, and had faced few external challenges. Their officers, drawn from elite families, tended to sympathize with the political party in power. Civilian control was unquestioned. The rank and file were conscripted from the 21-30 age group for a two-year period of service, followed by reserve duty to age 40. The forces were stationed chiefly in or near large urban areas and lines of communication. Owing to poor transport and communications, rapid larger scale mobilization of forces was precluded.

b. The military establishment during the 1930-1948 period had limited influence and political importance, in contrast to other Latin American countries, because of the tradition of civilian antimilitarism, the strong

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party influence over the services, the low economic status of all ranks, and the lack of a dynamic role. There were rivalry and bad feeling between the military and the police force, who had primary responsibility for internal order. However, this picture had begun to change by 1948: World War II and the threat to the Panama Canal brought an American military advisory group to Colombia, which assisted in upgrading the professionalism, esprit de corps, and equipment of the armed forces. Disorders beginning in 1946 brought increasing Conservative government reliance on the military to maintain order. An abortive coup by an army officer in 1944 illustrated, on the one hand, the existence of political awareness and political difference in the growing armed forces; and on the other hand, the disinclination of the vast majority of military officers to disregard or usurp authority.

c. The police forces were separate from the armed forces during the period under review. They were partly centralized and partly under the control of separate ministries and regional departments. They were primarily responsible for law and order in settled areas, but they were strongly partisan in their activities toward the political party in power. The inevitable political purge of senior personnel when the Conservatives returned to power in 1946 undoubtedly aggravated the general inefficiency of the police.

d. Although the armed forces of Colombia were generally not an active political force during the period 1930 to 1948, the following negative factors may have favored the onset of violence: (1) an inefficient, politically partisan police force; (2) the inability of the armed forces to react promptly and effectively to violence; (3) army-police rivalries,

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making coordinated action difficult; (4) the political orientations of military officers, which were too weak to inspire revolt or seizure of power, but which made the armed forces either an instrument of the party in power or a source of difficulty and embarrassment to it, thus aggravating inter-party tensions; (5) public dislike for both the police and the armed forces, aggravated after 1948 by the Conservative Party's use of security forces to improve its tenuous political position.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

6. Nature of the study.

a. Colombia is one of seven representative nations selected for analysis of the factors which lead to low intensity conflict and loss of government control. Study of the preconflict period, defined for research purposes as 1930-1948, was conducted on an interdisciplinary basis, examining political, economic, sociological, psychological, public health, scientific-technological, and military aspects of the preconflict period. Definitions, assumptions, and method of the study, which are common to all the countries examined, are on file at the U S Army Combat Developments Command, Institute of Advanced Studies.

b. The data were drawn from an exhaustive perusal of published works on Colombia, with some use of primary and unpublished sources, especially for statistical purposes. The Center for Research on Social Systems of the American University assisted in compiling the bibliography and certain statistical information. The findings, where possible and appropriate, were checked against classified Government materials as an additional means of assuring their validity. The results are summarized in the following sections of this chapter, and are presented at more length, by discipline, in the succeeding chapters on political, economic, sociological (including cultural and public health), and military factors.

c. Descriptive information is included in this report only to the extent necessary for coherent analysis. A brief descriptive paper on Colombia, for general background purposes, is given in paragraph 2, below.

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More complete data are available in the U. S. Army Area Handbook on Colombia and in other works cited in the bibliography.

7. Descriptive background.*

a. Geography. (See also Appendix II, Environmental Factors)

(1) Colombia is located in the northwest corner of South America. With an area of 440,000 square miles, it is the fourth largest country on the continent, about as large as Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined. Colombia has a coastline of more than 900 miles on the Pacific Ocean and 1,100 miles on the Caribbean Sea. Its main river, the Magdalena, empties into the Caribbean. Colombia's location, close to the Panama Canal and bordering Venezuela, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, and Panama, has given it special strategic importance.

(2) The Andes Mountains enter Colombia at the southwest part of the country and fan out in three quite distinct ranges which run through the country from southwest to north and northeast. These mountains divide the country into three main geographic regions: (1) the flat coastal areas broken only by the high Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta mountain range and the semiarid Guajira Peninsula, (2) the highlands or plateau area, and (3) the sparsely settled eastern plains (the llanos) drained by the tributaries of the Orinoco and Amazon Rivers.

(3) The climate varies from extreme tropical heat to steady biting cold. Temperatures are determined largely by altitudes: the lowlands along the coast are hot and humid; the high plateaus have frequent, light

* This paragraph is drawn largely from The Department of State Background Notes, Colombia (publication No. 7767, revised January 1968).

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rains and the weather is always springlike. In the highlands there are generally two dry seasons--from December to February and from June to August.

b. The people.

(1) Colombia's population of 18 million (as of 1968) makes it the fourth most populous Latin American nation after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. About 98 percent of the population is concentrated in the western third of the country at a density of approximately 57 persons per square mile; the eastern plains, which make up some 60 percent of the country, have about 1.7 percent of the population at a density of less than one person per square mile.

(2) More than half of the people are a mixture of white and Indian blood; perhaps one-fifth are white; and the remainder are mulattoes, Negroes, and others. No more than 2 percent of the people are pure Indian; these live in isolated tribes. Population increase (about 3 percent annually) is rapid, and movement from rural to urban areas has been heavy, so that only half of the people now live in rural areas. Colombia is overwhelmingly Catholic, and the literacy rate is estimated at about 60 percent.

(3) Bogota, the capital city, had a population in 1967 of almost 2 million. Other large cities, in descending order of population, are Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. Colombia has more than 20 cities with populations exceeding 100,000.

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c. History.

(1) In 1549 an area corresponding to what is now Colombia was established as a Spanish colony. Bogota later became the seat of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. No marked political changes occurred until the opening of the 19th century when the colony revolted against Spanish rule. In 1810 Bogota arose, banished the Viceroy, and declared its independence.

(2) In 1819 the Republic of Colombia was proclaimed. Then began the long and bloody struggle between Centralists and Federalists--a struggle which soon became complicated with the "church question." During the 19th century nearly 100 insurrections and several wars resulted from the attempt to resolve the issues between the two factions. Liberals and Conservatives alternated in power. A civil war, in which perhaps 100,000 lives were lost, ended in 1902 with the defeat of the Liberals. The following year Panama seceded from the Republic. This shocked the country and a period of reconciliation between the parties followed, but the Liberals remained in eclipse for many years.

d. Political Conditions.

(1) The political picture of Colombia during the past century has been dominated by the rivalry between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Liberal administrations were in power from 1860-1884 and 1930-1946; and Conservative administrations from 1884 to 1930 and 1946 to 1953. Both are historical organizations with roots going back to the 1740's, and both have developed along similar traditionalist lines. Both support constitutional forms and favor evolutionary social and economic reform programs. The

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major factions of the two parties have combined to form the present coalition government of Colombia.

(2) Since 1958, Colombia has achieved substantial progress in its efforts to rebuild a stable political system, after a chaotic decade marked by widespread violence following the political assassination of the Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, in April 1948, and a military dictatorship (1953-57). The two traditional parties are working fairly well in subduing the violent interparty rivalry of the past.

(3) A chronology of major events during the preconflict period, taken for purposes of this study as 1930-48, appears in Table II, page ix.

e. Government.

(1) The Constitution of 1886 is the basic law of the country. It provides the right of suffrage for all citizens more than 21 years of age. It stipulates that the President is to be elected by direct vote for a 4-year term and is not eligible to succeed himself. It authorizes him to appoint his own ministers. A "designate," or vice-president, is elected by Congress every 2 years.

(2) The Senate is elected by popular vote every 4 years. Each department (state) has one senator for every 190,000 inhabitants. The House of Representatives is elected every 2 years on the basis of one representative to every 90,000 inhabitants.

(3) Administratively the country is divided into 22 departments, three intendencias, and five comisarias. Each department has a governor appointed by the President and an assembly elected by popular vote.

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f. Economy.

(1) Since 1930, Colombia has industrialized with comparative rapidity, but it still remains predominantly an agricultural country, with its export economy largely built upon coffee. During recent years, about 65 to 70 percent of its foreign exchange has been realized from the exportation of coffee. The high price of coffee brought unprecedented prosperity and economic progress to the country during the period immediately after World War II, despite the rural violence and political turmoil.

(2) In its development efforts, Colombia has received substantial technical and development assistance under the Alliance for Progress and from international lending agencies. A consultative group of international lending institutions and capital exporting nations was formed in 1963 under the chairmanship of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to review the needs for external capital assistance. Members of this group have assisted Colombia's marked progress in a variety of development projects, such as electric power, housing, education, transportation, steel manufacturing, and agriculture.

(3) Efforts are being made to diversify Colombian production and to stimulate foreign investment and industrialization. Steel production began in 1942, and a completely integrated steel mill at Paz del Rio in the Department of Boyaca has been erected. Petroleum exports have been an important item in the Colombian economy, and crude oil production increased from 46 million barrels in 1958 to 71.8 million in 1966.

(4) Colombia's imports for 1966 amounted to \$674 million, of which slightly less than half came from the United States. Exports

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totaled \$508 million, of which almost \$220 million were destined for the United States. US private investment in Colombia was estimated at the end of 1965 at \$527 million, divided as follows: petroleum 51 percent; trade 9 percent; manufacturing 30 percent; miscellaneous 10 percent.

(5) Growth in the economy has been relatively good, with gross national product increasing at an average annual rate of close to 5 percent over the past 10 years, but the population growth rate of about 3 percent offsets much of this economic progress.

g. Foreign relations.

Colombia has played important roles in the United Nations and the Organization of American States since their founding and is affiliated with most of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Colombia has diplomatic relations with most Western European nations and during the past year has been expanding trade and consular relations with nations of Eastern Europe. Traditionally a strong supporter of Pan-Americanism, Colombia enjoys friendly relations with its neighbors. It has been active in discussing ways to promote economic integration in Latin America and particularly cooperation within the newly formed Andean subregional grouping.

h. US-Colombian relations.

Colombia has maintained close and friendly ties with the United States. As a member of the United Nations and the OAS, Colombia has been firmly devoted to the principles of the free world. It was the only Latin American country to send a battalion to participate in the Korean conflict. In July 1964 it was a prime mover at the OAS meeting, voting new sanctions against Cuba. The United States has given considerable

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support to Colombia's economic development program in the form of technical assistance and loans.

8. Political factors.

a. General. The Colombian political system during the 1930-1948 period was a complex mixture of sophisticated modern formal institutions with traditional attitudes and action patterns. The country was ranked high among Latin American states for its democratic stability. It had a long-established if often-amended Constitution, a history of constitutional civilian control, periodic general elections, a traditional two-party system, considerable freedom of press and opinion, an outspoken legislature with real powers, a fairly independent judiciary, a local government structure with measure of autonomy; but these institutions were mainly of, by, and for the small political-social-economic elite--the "propertied classes." Although some of this elite had a growing awareness of the needs for reform and change, the system was not capable of responding fully to the challenge. Moreover, the country had a long tradition of violence, usually between groups representing the main political parties. This violence had reached peaks of intensity, as in the Thousand Days War of 1899-1902, but was never wholly absent. A threatened resurgence following the Liberal return to power (after over forty years of opposition) in the elections of 1930 was dampened by a conflict with Peru. With the return of the Conservatives to power through elections in 1946 (because of a Liberal split), conflict began to mount in scope and intensity. It burst upon the world's view with the assassination in 1948 of a popular Liberal idol, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, which signalled the era of near civil war known as la violencia.

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b. Structure of government. Colombia's presidents, both in law and in fact, occupied a preeminent role in the governmental system. Centralization of decisionmaking in the presidential office accorded with the cultural tradition of the authoritarian leader. However, the president was elected by popular vote every four years, and was subject to constraints exercised by the legislature. The bicameral Congress had the power of the purse; it could and did defeat legislation and criticize the Executive, but was not itself a force for progress or innovation, despite its 1945 constitutional mandate to prepare national economic development plans. Its Controller had important powers of audit. Law and the administration of justice were well developed along basically Continental lines, but justice moved slowly, recourse to the courts was not sanctioned by the culture, and the system of law and its application may not have been responsive to current social needs. Independence of the judiciary was protected by the Constitution and to a considerable extent was in fact maintained during the period under review. The government bureaucracy was inefficient: there was only the beginning of a non-political career service; there was stratification between upper and lower levels and domination by elite interests and viewpoints; personal loyalties and political rivalries took precedence over public duty; there was little incentive to follow through on plans and goals to their realization; there was over-centralization, legalism, and red tape. Public corporations and semi-autonomous agencies, established in part to circumvent the inadequacies of existing agencies and in part to avoid disturbing these agencies, did to some extent respond to the growing needs of the polity. Government security forces--military and police--were ineffective

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and politically dominated; they were not a major independent element of political power. The 15 territorial departments of the country enjoyed a limited degree of autonomy, with elected legislatures, but the governors were presidential appointees. Latitude for local action--as well as resources to support it--was quite restricted, although historically there had been periods of considerable independence. Nonetheless, the departments, as well as the municipalities and municipal districts, served to some extent as a check on central government power in their areas--for example, the police in many departments were not nationally controlled until after 1948.

c. Political parties.

(1) Differences in political affiliation contributed to the many revolutions and uprisings which have characterized Colombia's history. By the mid-nineteenth century, Colombians grouped around Conservative and Liberal parties and philosophies. Unlike most other Latin American nations, Colombia retained this two-party structure into the mid-twentieth century; third parties played a very minor role, and even the Communists had relatively little direct political influence. (See d. below). Conservatives stood for strong central government (such as Bolivar advocated), close liaison of church and state, church control of education, limited suffrage, and protective tariffs. Liberals, like their Continental counterparts, advocated federalism (as had Santander, Colombia's first vice president), separation of church and state, free secular education, broader suffrage, and free trade. The Conservatives drew their strength from the clergy, the big landowners, the army, some capitalists, and many peasants.

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The middle classes, artisans, small farmers, and intellectuals on the whole supported the Liberals; and so did some peasants, as indicated by the struggles between Conservative villages and Liberal villages, with supporters on both sides.

(2) In both parties, individual personalities played a vital role, particularly in periods of instability; and the basic decisions were made, not by the rank and file, but by the small elite group--particularly the *politicos* among them. The *politicos* formed a sort of debating club in Bogota and called on the electorate only when they were required. Politics was played as a game which was largely irrelevant to the greater part of the nation. In the 1920's and 1930's a changing social and economic environment produced a new attitude on the part of politicians toward the people, and they made a somewhat greater effort to communicate with and respond to the voters--at election time. However, in the 1940's there were still few close ties on an outgoing basis between the national leadership of the parties and the electorate.

(3) The organization was quite loose. A national directorate and departmental and municipal committees existed, but there was no lower grass-root organization. Candidates were chosen by departmental and national conventions, which also wrote the platforms. There was little party activity in the countryside between elections. Yet there was exaggerated partisanship, often amounting to fanaticism, among the people, which derived in large part from the institution of the local political boss, "*gamonal*," who concentrated on getting out the vote for his candidate. Other contributing factors were hereditary ties with one or the other party and the marked localism associated with mountainous terrain

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and poor transportation. An electoral map would show a patchwork of red (Liberal) and blue (Conservative) with very little overlap. Jorge Gaitan attempted to break through the system of gamonalismo by building up mass support of both rural and urban labor; he apparently was well on the way to accomplishing this at the time of his assassination.

d. The Communist Party.

(1) The Communist movement started in the 1920's among the students and workers in Bogota, at a time when the winds of economic and social change had begun to blow in Latin America. Much of the early success of Communist organizers was due to the encouragement and backing of progressive-minded Liberals who saw Communism as a possible means of defeating the conservative elements of the Liberal Party. However, most Liberals returned to the fold in the electoral campaign of 1930, when the Liberal Party regained power. The Communists concentrated their organizing talents on the labor movement, virtually ignoring the rural populace. From 1935, they applied united-front tactics; except for the two-year period of the Hitler-Stalin pact (1939-1941) they cooperated closely with the Liberals, especially in the labor movement.

(2) During World War II the Communist Party reached the peak of its influence and power; but even at the peak, in 1944, the Party attracted only about 3 percent of the national vote. Its main influence was in the labor unions. Its decline after 1944 was due in part to its failure to develop effective national leadership or a mass base; in part to lack of organizational or ideological discipline; in part to the rise to national prominence of Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, whose program appealed to the people along the same lines as the Communists'.

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(3) In the election of 1947, when the Liberal Party was split between its radical and moderate elements, the Communists failed to back the radical Gaitan and thus deprived themselves of the possibility to gain influence through him. Moreover, the close identification of the Communist Party with the aims and desires of the Soviet Union led to disillusionment as the Russian attitude changed in the postwar years, thus alienating Colombians from the national as well as international goals of Communism.

e. Political culture.

(1) Formally, Colombia appeared to have a sophisticated set of operating governmental and political institutions. In fact, however, they were somewhat artificial in that they were not fully integrated even into that of the traditionally-oriented rural masses. The elite were generally devoted to democratic ideals (except for those influenced by the Spanish and German model); but the Hispanic tradition emphasized, not negotiation, compromise, and cooperation, but strong individuality coupled with acceptance of the authority of a charismatic leader--inherently contradictory concepts neither of which is fully compatible with a democratic regime. Other elements of the political culture were the particularism and self-sufficiency of the large landowners; the lack of acceptance of a social welfare responsibility of government; the disdain of the elite for the lower classes; and resistance to change.

(2) Despite universal suffrage, there was no meaningful mass participation in political institutions; the rural people responded to the direction of political bosses and economic overlords or local notables; they were suspicious of government, and accustomed to self-sufficiency.

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However, there were trends toward greater demands of government--first by a few Liberal intellectuals and Communists inspired by European socialist and liberal thinking, then by peasants and farm laborers seeking land reform, and by growing numbers of urban workers who were organizing into unions.

(3) Trends toward increased political awareness were promoted by the mass appeals of Lopez and the radical Liberals in the 1930's and of both Gaitan (Liberal) and Gomez (Conservative) in the 1940's. War-time dislocations, pent up demands, excess of foreign exchange, propaganda, the spread of communications and transport, apparent growing inequity and corruption encouraged new demands. But the political system provided no clear way in which these demands could be articulated or asserted. Moreover, in a culture which put a heavy premium on authoritarian leadership, the leaders apparently were generally motivated to achieve status rather than to realize specific programs. They stirred up "popular demands" as a means of political power to achieve status, but did not then act to satisfy the demands thus aroused.

f. US influences. Although the United States was by no means the sole source of foreign influence, it was the only one of major political significance during the 1930-1948 period apart from the USSR (except for a period of limited German influence). With an investment of \$301,692,000 in Colombia as of 1931 (57 percent of which was in Colombian government securities then in danger of default), the U. S. had a large economic lever, enhanced by the importance of trade between the two countries. A strike against the United Fruit Company in 1928 brought Gaitan into national prominence as a protester in Congress against Draconian Colombian

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government policy. Although the US role in the secession of Panama had reinforced traditional suspicion, an era of official good feeling began in 1938. The effects of US influence during the 1930-1948 period included promotion of economic development; concomitant augmentation of economic and cultural confusion; strengthening of the military establishment; and some reinforcement of conservative political and economic power elements.

g. Elements of political power and influence.

(1) Although there were changes during the period 1930 to 1948, the principal elements of the political power structure were a dominant political-economic-social elite divided between Conservative and Liberal parties, each with several factions around individual leaders; a politically quiescent but increasingly influential military establishment; the Catholic Church; several loosely organized pressure groups, at least some of them dominated by the same elite; the press, also elite-controlled; a small but growing middle class, which tended to align itself with elite standards and goals; a growing pool of industrial workers; university students; and the mass of the people, whose sole effective instrument of political power, the vote, was controlled by the two parties, by local notables, and by the Church. There were regional and local power structures, somewhat similar in their components but narrower in size and function; at this level, the campesinos' machetes were a political power element. In the early 1930's, it could be said that the propertied classes really formed the group that expressed most of the so-called public opinion in Colombia. Increasing political awareness was making the masses more of a political power factor, but their power was largely

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potential for lack of effective institutions for expressing it, and it was being manipulated by ambitious politicians for their own ends.

(2) The rules of the political game seemed to have accepted violence and coercion--potential and sometimes actual--as ways of establishing ascendancy among competing political groups, so that force was not culturally a monopoly of the state. The formal Colombian political system had the necessary adaptability to respond to economic and social change. However, the attitudes of the oligarchy did not permit the necessary changes to take real effect; and the capability of the system either to articulate popular demands or to respond meaningfully to them was inadequate.

9. Economic factors.

a. The Colombian economy as a whole grew quite rapidly during the 1930-1948 period, with output increasing at 4 to 6 percent yearly, against a fairly steady annual population increase of around 2.2 percent. From what had been a semi-colonial, financially dependent economy, powered primarily by a staple-crop export and foreign bond financing, Colombia became a partly-industrialized, partly urbanized community, well along the road to modernity. Her leaders appeared economically sophisticated and aware of their responsibilities. On the books, at least, much social legislation had been passed. By 1948 when the International Bank was invited to analyze and prescribe for the economy, the traditional problem seemed on the way to solution.

b. Problems remained, however, particularly in the agricultural sector. Agricultural output grew much less rapidly than did the modern sectors of industry, transport, and communications: its average growth

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rate of under 3 percent did not exceed national population growth of 2.2 percent by very much, and a good part of this growth was concentrated in the period 1930-1934. Food production, in particular, slumped in the wartime years, but recovered thereafter. Local subsistence farming and local markets were typical throughout the period. Land utilization was inefficient in much of the country; the best land was used for grazing. Land ownership, sharply concentrated in the years before 1930, changed relatively little as a result of the 1936 agrarian reform law, so that large numbers of the rural population owned less land than required for subsistence, or owned none at all. Rural incomes were perhaps not markedly different as between smallholders and sharecropping tenants. However, farm labor conditions and land tenure differed widely among Colombia's various distinct regions. Coffee in 1948 accounted for 75 percent of Colombia's export earnings, and 250,000 growers were dependent upon world coffee prices and demand, both of which had steadily risen since 1941.

c. The modern industrial sector grew rapidly during the 1930-1948 period. Investment was at a high level--financed after 1930 almost entirely by internal savings and taxes. Manufacturing capacity grew quickly, and output increased by almost 8 percent yearly. Although protective tariffs after 1930 helped, this expansion was largely motivated by private enterprise. Limiting factors were continued regional separation and shortages of transport and power, although considerable improvement in the latter occurred. Modern manufacturing accounted for 13.4 percent of 1945 national product, against 7.6 percent in 1925. Leading industrial sectors during the period were non-durable consumption goods--

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textiles, shoes, beverages, refined sugar. Recent additions included chemicals, rubber tires, paper, cement. In the latter category, particularly, the renewal of exchange controls in 1948 slowed production and growth, since such industries depended heavily upon imports and hence on foreign sale of primary products--so much so that Colombia, in Prebisch's terms, was an "outer-directed economy." The petroleum industry, small in comparison to Venezuela, was largely isolated from the domestic economy.

d. Although industrial employment increased (at an estimated 5 percent per year, 1939-1948), it probably did not keep pace with an estimated annual 5.2 percent increase in urban population. Urban wages varied widely: 1953 figures (earlier ones not available) showed a range of 800 pesos (C\$) in footwear and clothing to C\$3500 in beverages and C\$5000 in petroleum and coal by-products. The legal minimum wage for industrial workers at that time was estimated at about three times that for rural workers, although minimum wages were not firmly or uniformly enforced. Although regulations governing work hours, wages, welfare and other benefits were enacted during the period, enforcement was uneven and inspectors were few. The labor federations were politically polarized and showed no great strength. (For Communist penetration of labor unions, see section 1 above.)

e. Despite considerable investment in transport, especially prior to 1930, transportation and power facilities were scattered and generally unintegrated, and were at levels below either demand or their own potential. Truck traffic developed rapidly after the development of a national highway plan in 1945; 36 percent of all freight in 1947 moved by the badly-maintained road network, compared with 33 percent (1948) by rail and 28 percent

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(1947) by waterway. Municipal and departmental competition affected transportation patterns. Two Export-Import Bank loans for road transport, given in 1943, were not used for five years. Nevertheless, transport facilities accounted for 10 percent of total capital in 1945, and transport contribution to national product increased by 9 percent yearly. Power showed the same general pattern. However, by 1945 Colombia's power generation had grown by nearly 400 percent in hydroelectric facilities and 250 percent in thermal facilities.

f. Government contributions to national product in Colombia were relatively small throughout the 1930-1948 period. Central government expenditures tripled from 1939-1948, but a large proportion was for interest on domestic and foreign debt. In 1948, the government share of national product was less than 7 percent, divided among the central government (50 percent), departments (15 percent), and municipalities (35 percent). State revenues were increasingly dependent on direct income and profit taxes, which reached 50 percent of the total in 1948. This modern revenue approach combined with a tradition of State support for local government expenditure; the departments' chief independent source of revenue was from liquor, and that of municipalities, real estate taxes and miscellaneous levies. Just 45 percent of municipality budgets came from these sources, the remainder from the central government. Local financial and jurisdictional independence was sufficient to dilute the effect of central government direction and financing of investment.

g. Government control of foreign trade and foreign exchange was exerted first through protective tariffs in 1931, supplemented by import licensing and a system of foreign exchange controls. The latter,

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administered by the central bank, became the chief instrument of trade control. During World War II, wartime shortages and steady Colombian exports produced a rapid buildup of foreign exchange holdings. When the war ended, pent-up domestic demand led to a heavy wave of imports and a rapid draw-down of exchange reserves. Controls had to be reestablished, and in 1948 the peso was devalued, though not enough to bring prices fully into line. The controls had generally bad effects on the economy in terms of price distortions, protection of inefficient industries, complication of government decisions, and encouragement of corruption.

h. Colombian government economic and financial measures during the period were unusually sophisticated and advanced for their time, particularly in overall economic management and in infrastructure. There was little formal planning, however, and the government's involvement in industry remained small. There was serious inflation during and after the war, which caused unhappiness and concern. However, in the over-all view, the Colombian economy expanded during these two decades of depression and war with relatively few serious strains, and rather smoothly when compared to other South American nations.

i. The Colombian economy as a whole showed both positive and negative elements during the 1930-1948 period, but the positive elements appeared predominant. Economic growth was rapid, sustained, and not notably imbalanced. Colombia ranked among the more modern and forward-moving of Latin American economies, although the proportion of output and employment in manufacturing was below leaders like Argentina and Brazil. Income distribution was undoubtedly uneven, as between rural and city wage earners and among various parts of the modern sector, but it

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seems likely that the differentials were no worse than in such countries as Brazil and Mexico. In terms of economic efficiency, certain sectors ranked unusually low--especially in livestock raising, and the very low use of industrial capacity--implying that a considerable increase of output would result from moderate increases of input. Food production, while increasing on the average faster than population growth, was not very much ahead, and in the war years may have fallen behind. Wartime dislocations of the economy, while not serious in their overall long-run effects, may have had unsettling social implications in the wartime and postwar years, especially as goods shortages and rapid inflation affected particular population groups, especially in the urban areas where unemployment of immigrants from the countryside may have been a growing problem.

10. Sociological factors.

a. Culture values.

(1) Divisions of region, class, and racial origin made Colombia a fairly diverse combination of subcultures. However, most of all the population groups shared a common language, Spanish, and a common recognition of the preeminence of the elite, Spanish-descended "Criollos" and their culture.

(2) The criollos' proud tradition emphasized assertion of the individual's dignity and independence at almost any cost; the protection of women, but at the same time the assertion of masculinity; the importance of family loyalty; and the worth of conflict, including violence, in defense of these values. There was strong class-consciousness among the elite, but barriers to social mobility were not entirely rigid.

Traditional elite standards of responsibility for the welfare of

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inferiors, which had reportedly been an important aspect of the agrarian "hacienda," were losing their force.

(3) Major elements in the Colombia value system, more or less common to all major components of the society, included family loyalty; lesser but important loyalty to village, region, and political party; predominance of the male; self-interest, self-assertiveness, and suspicion of others' motives; ritualistic adherence to Catholicism; the formation of groups for opposition or defense rather than for positive action; and reliance on a leader of requisite character and personality for decision and direction.

b. Demography.

(1) Of an estimated Colombian population of 10,776,890 in 1948, about 71 percent lived in the densely populated temperate Andean plateaus in the center and west, 21 percent along the Atlantic seacoast, 6 percent on the Pacific coast, 1 percent in the eastern plains (with a population density of about one per square kilometer), and the remainder on offshore islands. Population increase had been a little over 2 percent per year since 1928--a relatively low rate--with negligible immigration or emigration. There appeared to be a trend toward internal migration into the central Andean region, the Caribbean port areas, and to some extent the eastern plains.

(2) Urbanization reflected the increasing industrial development: by 1951, 36.3 percent of the population was urban against 29.8 percent in 1938 and 21.0 percent in 1918. The trend was accentuated by the growing rural violence after 1946. Its social effect was somewhat cushioned because the urban influx was spread over the 11 cities of 50,000 or over

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(as of 1951); nonetheless, it produced slums and unemployment in all the larger cities.

(3) Continued high birth and mortality rates led to a relatively young population: by 1951, 44.1 percent of the population was under 15 years of age (compared with 42.0 percent in 1938) and another 3 percent was over 65--creating a considerable burden of dependency on the working adults.

(4) Regionalism, resulting from geographic separation, transport and communication difficulties, and racial and cultural variations, has inhibited the growth of a strong sense of national identity. It was considered one of the main problems plaguing the country through 1948.

c. Education and religion.

(1) Although in theory education was compulsory, in practice many children never went to school and others went only a few years. The quality of education in rural areas was often poor. Many schools were run by the Catholic church, and Church-run schools dominated secondary education. Statistics showed that illiteracy declined from 48 percent in 1934 to 38.5 percent in 1951; but actual rates may have been somewhat higher. Those departments in which most violence occurred showed slightly lower rates of illiteracy.

(2) The Colombian population was about 99 percent Catholic. Religion was taught in all schools, public as well as private, and the Church had a pervasive influence in Colombia, despite theoretical separation of Church and State. For the most part, however, the emphasis was on ritualistic compliance with ceremonies and the religious calendar rather than on principles or ideology. High rates of common law marriage,

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concubinage in the coastal areas, the illegitimate births tend to demonstrate this point, as well as showing that the influence of the Church had limits. Toward the end of the period studied, however, the Church's activities in charitable and social welfare projects were increasing.

d. Social classes.

(1) Colombian society early became differentiated into a caste-like two-class system in which the primary criteria for status were race and land. At the apex of the social pyramid were a small, homogeneous, land-owning elite of pure Spanish blood; far below them were the great masses of Indians, Negroes, and mixed bloods. Among them, there were distinctions by degrees of racial mixture, which were taken very seriously. However, there was some occupational mobility for those of mixed blood. These social distinctions survived until the early 20th Century with relatively little change, except in Antioquia and Caldas departments, where a distinct middle class emerged. As of 1948, the two classes still existed with their different cultures and ways of life, but in many areas there was also an emergent if somewhat amorphous middle class.

(2) Urbanization and colonization of new lands, beginning around 1860, began to undermine the traditional social relationships, and the advance of communications, transport, and industrialization after about 1920 hastened the process, bringing both new opportunities and new tensions and frustrations. The old upper class still dominated the society, and served as a reference group for the classes immediately below it. The "patron" remained to some extent an important intermediary between the peasant and the outside world. But the upward pressures of the growing industrial class, a rural middle class, and the Liberal Party program of

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social reform were viewed as serious threats to the power and status of the upper class. Traditional class lines based on race and wealth were less rigid--although upward mobility of the Indian was still greatly inhibited by race prejudice.

(3) The middle class drew its membership both from the upper class--through attrition of family fortunes and the attraction of professional or government positions--and from those lower-class members who managed to obtain education and wealth. Both elements, however, tended to identify themselves with upper-class view and life styles. Artisans, small businessmen, and white-collar workers constituted a lower middle class in both urban and rural areas. The middle-class elements in rural towns played an important role as intermediaries and communicators between the peasant and the urban culture. It was from these elements that the leaders of guerrilla bands of the 1949-1953 period were chiefly to come. As of 1948, the various strata of the middle class had not coalesced, nor did they yet bridge the wide gap between upper and lower classes; but they were beginning to exercise considerable political influence, using the lower class as a source of power.

(4) An important part of social status was the keeping up of appearances. The middle class tried to maintain the values and living standards of the elite, particularly shunning any activities involving manual labor. Status maintenance was greatly complicated in the 'thirties and 'forties by the rapid increase in the cost of living, which added to the tensions normally associated with periods of social change.

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e. The family.

(1) Upper-class families were patriarchal, although women had an influential role within the home. Family life was stable and divorce was rare, although mistresses were common. Children were pampered and waited on by servants; education and social training were an important part of their lives. The web of kinship ties was strong and extensive, and a major basis for economic and political ventures. The family was also a major transmitter of political ideology. Memories of the past and the desire for revenge were closely tied to hereditary political cohesion. The middle class generally patterned itself on upper-class family norms.

(2) Among the lower classes, there were great variations in family patterns as a result of the differential effects of culture, race, region, and migration. Some lower-class families were without fathers. Concubinage was common in some areas, and households in some cases were "fluctuating co-resident kinship groups," often with a woman as head, although the men exhibited aggressive behavior to maintain a pretense of dominance. In such cases, the dominant feeling within the household may well have been one of open hostility, and kinship ties were tenuous or non-existent. Child-rearing was harsh, even brutal, and endemic feelings of suspicion toward others, especially strangers, were the result. Childhood frustrations, cruelties, fears, and anxieties engendered hostile, aggressive, and cruel adults, dominated by pride, sensitivity, and inner tension despite outward calm and respect. (It is unclear whether regional personality differences were the result of differing family patterns or child training techniques.)

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f. Public health.

(1) Poor health was a major problem in Colombia throughout the 1930-1948 period. Malaria, intestinal parasites, tropical anemia, amoebic dysentery and diarrheal disorder and venereal diseases were major problems in 1948. Tuberculosis, yaws, and various preventable communicable diseases were also common. Pneumonia and bronchitis were leading causes of infant deaths. Although statistics are of doubtful reliability, they indicate that gross deaths and infant mortality actually increased from 1930 to 1948. Health conditions were best in the Caribbean departments of Atlantico, Bolivar and Magdalena, where there was relatively little civil unrest, and worst in the central Andean departments of Caldas, Huila, and Santander and the Pacific departments of Valle del Cauca and Narino, where civil unrest was prevalent. Health facilities and medical personnel were deficient in both quality and quantity, especially in smaller towns and in the countryside.

(2) Sanitation was minimal, so that conditions promoted disease. In 1938, 11 percent of all dwellings (37 percent in cities) had piped water either inside or outside (a figure which rose to 28 percent overall in 1951, and 66 percent of urban houses). Only 6.7 percent had sewage systems in 1938. Of the dwellings examined, 76 percent had no toilet facilities, and by 1951, only 68 percent were still without them. In the autumn of 1949, about one-seventh of Colombia's municipalities had water systems, and many of these were a hazard rather than a benefit to health. Slightly under one-fifth had sewer systems, some of which served the entire urban area. The effect of lack of sanitation was demonstrated by a program of improvement undertaken by the National Federation of Coffee Growers in the 'forties,

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which reduced infection as much as 70 percent in the areas affected. But most areas did not benefit from such programs, and the masses in urban slums or in the country continued under the same poor conditions as had existed for generations.

(3) Several nutritional studies show that the Colombian diet is no more than barely sufficient in quantity, and seriously deficient in quality, for the great majority of the population. Colombian health authorities attributed malnutrition to lack of popular understanding, economic considerations, and dietary habits. A 1948 survey showed that 53 percent of 183,000 school children examined throughout the country had goiters. A survey in 1953 showed a wide and serious incidence of avitaminosis and underweight. The consequence was to stunt growth, reduce life span, and contribute materially to the infant mortality rate. Little improvement seems to have been achieved between 1935 and 1953. A condition possibly associated with poor and insufficient diet was the high consumption of coca leaves, which served as a hunger depressant, and of alcoholic beverages (an average of 33 liters per man, woman and child per year in 1948, a 50 percent increase above pre-World War II levels).

11. Military factors.

a. Strategic position. Colombia's proximity to the Panama Canal, combined with its economic potential, place the country in a position of strategic importance somewhat disproportionate to her size and population. However, the country's security has rarely been seriously threatened by external forces. With the exception of the border war of 1933-1934 with Peru, Colombia's relations with her Latin American neighbors have been generally peaceful. Relations with the United States, except for the

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twenty years following the secession of Panama, have been generally good. Colombia's borders have long been clearly established. She has been protected both by the Rio Pact of 1947 (and the umbrella of American power) and by the terrain. Low-lying, densely wooded areas in the northern and eastern regions, interwoven with streams, would impede movement of ground forces. Three large mountain range segments, among which the bulk of the populace lives, restrict the effectiveness of the road and rail system and make military action difficult.

b. Internal situation.

(1) The same rugged geography which helps protect Colombia from external attack also favors internal dissidence, as does the cultural diversity resulting from various racial and cultural strains and the geographic isolation of the country's distinct regions. The period under analysis, moreover, was characterized by habitual banditry with social and economic revolutionary overtones, a growing friction between social classes, and--toward the end of the period--mounting violence between partisans of the two major political parties. There were 80 armed rebellions, attempted revolutions, and armed coups in the 19th century; the last of these, from 1899 to 1902, is said to have cost 100,000 casualties.

(2) Beginning around 1937 and continuing into World War II (when US intelligence exposed the Nazi threat to Colombia and the Panama Canal), these internal problems were aggravated by influence from the rising tide of the Spanish Falange and German Nazi movements. Certain Colombians also responded to the lure of Russian Communism. Although Communist ideological penetration was only mildly successful, activity increased with the establishment of a large Soviet legation in 1943. International agents

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and native Communists were active in the late 1940's. Communists sought to discredit the Ninth Inter-American Conference at Bogota in 1948 (see section a. above, and Chapter 2, sections I and III).

c. The military establishment and its effectiveness.

(1) Since the founding of the nation, Colombia's energies have been concentrated upon political and cultural rather than military pursuits. There is a strong contrast in this respect with the other two parts of Bolivar's "Gran Colombia"--Venezuela, which has given more importance to military activity and Ecuador, which has given more prominence to religion.

(2) Throughout most of the 19th century, the mission of the very small military forces was wholly defensive, as guardian, policeman, and "messenger boy" for the political structure. Although children of the upper classes filled the officer corps, the status of the military profession was relatively low, and its political power correspondingly weak. There was a reform of the military in 1907, and the French and German missions from 1920 to 1939, as well as an American military mission from 1939 on, expended considerable effort in changing the old concept of the military. However, the practice continued whereby the political party in power influenced military personnel and activities. It has been said that Colombia began its history as a nation with a weak and socially discredited military institution. This initial position has been constantly reinforced by the social structure and political culture whose nature is indicative more of continuity than of change. Thus, although there had been some outward signs of change, the unfavorable image of the military still endured.

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(3) During the period under review, the objective of the Colombian armed forces was twofold: to protect the nation from the external threat (which was larger during World War II than at any time before or since), and to maintain internal security. The subordination of the services to civilian authority was specified in the constitution and laws, and their members were forbidden to vote or run for office.

(4) The Army expanded (as did the other services) primarily because of the conflict with Peru in 1933-1934. The organization of the Army--by far the largest of the three services, and dominant among them--advanced from the "square" concept of the division containing two brigades of two regiments each to a more flexible mixed brigade containing infantry, cavalry, artillery, engineer, and service support elements. The regular establishment was fed by a compulsory draft system of 21- to 30-year-old men who performed 1-1/2 years' service (2 years after 1946), followed by service in the Reserves for 30- to 45-year olds. The officer corps, which previously had been drawn from the social elite, began to attract the middle-class element. The school system for officers and non-commissioned officers appeared ineffectual until the arrival of the US military mission in 1939. After that time, training of officers in the United States began to increase their effectiveness.

(5) The other military services were small. The Navy at the beginning of the period consisted of a frigate, gunboats, cutters, and auxiliary ships. It was reorganized in 1934 under British advisers and two modern destroyers added. A battalion of Marines was added in 1944. The Air Force, organized in 1919, consisted in the early 1930's of one

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training squadron, one service squadron, and about 15 airplanes. A unique aspect of the Air Force was its support of ground forces in the Leticia conflict of 1933-1934. There is evidence that German pilots had influenced the air arm.

(6) The growing split between the military and civilian elements in Colombia over the roles and missions of the armed forces, aggravated by rivalry with an expanding police force favored by the Liberal administration, and military dissatisfaction with low status and low pay, did much to render an otherwise moderately effective military institution helpless to deal with the growing internal turmoil of the 1940's. This ineffectiveness was accentuated by an abortive Army coup d'etat, led by Conservative elements against the Liberal President, Lopez, at Pasto in 1944. On the other hand, Lopez worked to take the military out of politics, and in general the military were not a major influence in civilian politics during the period of this study.

(7) Historically, Army units have been stationed in or near the urban areas and along lines of communication between urban areas. Ability to respond to internal crises depended on the rail and road system. Units were not able to respond in Bogotá until the day after the rioting began in 1948, because of poor transportation facilities. Poor deployment for internal security, and slow reaction time, together with the desertion of some units to the Liberal cause, contributed to the Army's subsequent inability to contain the conflict.

d. Police.

(1) The police system operated under varying degrees of centralization. Some departments and municipalities had their own forces, and

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resisted efforts at centralization. Changes in organization from 1915 to 1940 increased the strength of the national force, expanded its functions, and provided new services to fulfill these functions. For instance, in 1926 there is the first mention of a detective section. A corps of mounted police appeared in 1935. The police force may be characterized as a developing, specialized body of men, raised and administered by the national organization but functionally directed by the ministries or regional departments to which its personnel were largely assigned, and supplemented by regionally and locally recruited personnel of no special competence or training.

(2) There was rivalry and ill-feeling between police and Army, at least at some periods. The national police had been under the Ministry of War until 1902 (and reverted to this status in 1953). President Lopez's favoring of the police over the army was one factor in the army's dislike for him--especially the dislike of the Conservative sympathizers in the officer corps. Nevertheless, army officers were at times assigned in senior capacities to the police force, especially after 1946. A notable characteristic of the police in this period was its political activity, under pressure of the political party which controlled the government. President Lopez, a Liberal, tried to build up the police as an alternative force to the Army. The Conservatives, on coming to power in 1946, organized "political police" which were used against the Liberals who were still in the majority. Liberal sympathizers in the police left the force after the 1948 riot, individually and in groups, and some became guerrillas. Political loyalties often took precedence over impartial law

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enforcement. Generally speaking, the police during most of the period were inefficient, partisan, and disliked by the people.

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CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL FACTORS

Section I. Government and Political System

by Donald S. Macdonald

12. Background.

a. Colombia has been an independent and self-sustaining nation in both form and fact since 1821, following the successful struggle for independence under Simon Bolivar. In 1830, following Bolivar's death, Venezuela and Ecuador split off from what was then called Gran Colombia (New Granada). Although Colombia's name and governmental forms have since changed several times, her borders have been virtually constant except for the separation of Panama, with United States encouragement, in 1903. With minor exceptions--such as a Peruvian incursion on the south in 1931, which served to damp down serious internal struggles--Colombia has not been greatly involved in rivalry or warfare with her neighbors.

b. The population (about 10,000,000 in 1948) is divided by geography, by regional variations, by social class and economics; but except for very small and localized minorities of pure-blood Negroes and Indians, the people are all Spanish-speaking, mostly all Catholic, and regard themselves as common heirs of the Hispanic culture and national history. They apparently are both more aware of their national identity, and less assertive about it, than other Latin American peoples.¹

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c. Colombia enjoys a reputation for cultural preeminence in the continent which is supported, for example, by John Gunther's glowing reports of the sophistication of Bogotá table talk. Yet her roster of internationally-renowned culture leaders is not particularly large. In terms of general education and literacy, the nation is roughly at midpoint in the range among the 20 Latin-American republics.* One might suppose, therefore, that Colombia's culture reputation rests on the keenness and versatility of her urban elite, rather than on notable creativity or on broad cultural dissemination. Nevertheless, Colombians--especially those from the region of Antioquia--are also known for their entrepreneurial abilities.

d. Colombia is also generally ranked high among Latin American countries for democracy and political stability. Her present constitution, though much amended, is still that of over 80 years ago; her two-party system is more than a hundred years old; her leaders have been mostly civilian, rather than military; she has generally enjoyed, in relative terms, a high degree of press freedom and civil liberties; elections for the principal government officials, both direct and indirect, have been frequently and fairly regularly held. On the other hand, political and economic power have been monopolized by a small elite of

* Germani and Silvert put Colombia in the third of four groups of Latin American countries, and report the following characteristics: (data as of 1950) Middle and upper strata, 22% (range: Argentina 36%, Haiti, 3%); % in primary activities, 58% (range: Uruguay 22%, Haiti 77%); % in cities of 20,000,000 and more, 22% (range: Uruguay 50%, Haiti 5%); % middle and upper urban strata, 12% (range: Argentina 28%, Haiti 2%); % literates, 62% (range: Uruguay 95%, Haiti 11%); University students/1000 population 1.0% (range: Argentina 7.7%, Guatemala 0.1%).

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pure European descent, who while cherishing the blessings of liberty for themselves have not--with some notable individual exceptions--been aggressive in improving the lot of the general population.

e. Colombia's reputation for violence is of special concern for this study. Despite the nation's culture, its relative ethnic homogeneity, its relatively stable governmental forms and political parties, and its reputation for democracy, it has been involved in more or less continual violence since its foundation, including the terrible civil war of 1899-1902. Even during the period of relative stability and constitutional government from 1910 to 1948, there was almost constant low-level violence in some part of the country.

13. Structure of government.

a. Constitution.

(1) The governmental structure of Colombia in the 1930-1948 period was laid down, in its essentials, in the Constitution of 1886. Far more detailed than its North American counterpart, this document had been extensively amended (on 15 different occasions up to 1954 and seven since 1930),² particularly in 1902, 1936 and 1945, chiefly to broaden the social and economic rights of the citizens, and the responsibilities of the government. The essential provisions of 1886, for a unitary state with strong executive and separate legislative and judicial branches, remained in effect.

(2) The Constitution contained strong guarantees of civil liberties--subject, however, to stipulations and to authorization for certain legislative restrictions (which made them less than absolute). Stokes notes that "Liberal principles emanating from Puritan Calvinism are found

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in Colombian constitutions."³ It is possible that British subjects' participation in the wars of independence may have been a channel of such influence, as was the influx of European ideas during the 18th and 19th centuries.

b. Political subdivisions.

(1) Colombia's territory of about 440,000 square miles (roughly the size of Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico combined), as of 1948 was administratively divided into 15 departments (departamentos), which comprised most of the important populated areas, and several national territories (intendencias and comisarias) in the sparsely populated south and west. (Two of these subsequently became departments, and the capital city later acquired special status.) Each department had a governor appointed by the President to serve at his pleasure, responsible to the Minister of Government, and an elective assembly with somewhat restricted power of legislation.⁴ Municipalities and municipal districts (of which there were 610 in 1948, ranging in size from the four largest cities to small rural townships) also had appointed mayors (alcaldes) responsible to the governors, and elected councils.

(2) The departments had varying degrees of individuality in tradition, terrain, and social character; in the 19th century there were periods when some of them were virtually sovereign in a loose federal government, but by 1948 there seemed to be neither a serious feeling of separatism, nor any strong desire for a return to extreme federalism,*

* Antioquian politicians in the early 'thirties, however, were calling for more state autonomy because they felt that the distribution of national revenues did not give them a fair share. On the opposite side, one eminent Colombian constitutional authority (Tascon) held that the departments should be abolished.

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although there were problems in delineating the respective areas of administrative and legislative jurisdiction of the three governmental levels. Stokes comments, "Colombia's unique system of checks between the central and regional governments was promising for a number of decades, but it broke down in the period beginning in 1948."⁵ Some years later (although no major structural change had intervened), another observer said in respect to the Department of Valle in the 60's, "Cali's leaders brush the local legislatures off as politically insignificant and concerned almost wholly with petty administrative details."⁶ However, these legislatures "provide a forum for the discussion of local questions and are sometimes used to launch the political careers of men whose objective is Bogota."⁷ The same source observes that although there is no real executive responsibility to local constituencies, "departmental governors are typically sensitive to public opinion and ordinarily must maintain some measure of public support to hold their jobs."

(3) The weakness of departmental and local governments was in large part due to their lack of fiscal autonomy: the most productive tax sources were restricted to the national level, and many local tax rates were set by the national government.⁸ "...Centralization serves as a break (sic) on local initiative. Another fruit of this system is frustration and political apathy at the local level..."⁹

c. Executive.

(1) The character of Colombian government was much affected by the styles, views, and political affiliations of her presidents. During this period they were all popularly elected (except Lleras Camargo, named by Congress in 1945) for four-year terms, in years different from those

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of Congressional elections, and could not succeed themselves:

Table III

PRESIDENTS OF COLOMBIA, 1930-1950

<u>Period</u>	<u>Incumbent</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Background</u>	<u>Age at Inauguration</u>
1930-34	Enrique <u>Olaya</u> Herrera	Liberal (Moderate)	Diplomat	49
1934-38	Alfonso <u>Lopez</u> Pumarejo	Liberal (Radical)	Banker/ Publisher	48
1938-42	Eduardo <u>Santos</u>	Liberal (Moderate)	Publisher	50
1942-45	Alfonso <u>Lopez</u> Pumarejo (resigned)	Liberal (Radical)	(see above)	56
1945-46	Alberto <u>Lleras</u> Camargo*	Liberal (Moderate)	Publisher/ Diplomat	39
1946-50	Mariano <u>Ospina</u> Perez	Conservative (Moderate)	Financier (educated as engineer)	55

Source: Stokes, Latin American Politics; Current Biography Yearbook.

(2) Both by Constitutional provisions and by cultural norms, the Colombian president had extensive powers. He named his own Cabinet and other principal officials. He could declare a state of siege, and govern by decree in disregard of normal restraints, although Congress had to be in session during such periods and to be given reports on his actions. He or his administration initiated most legislation, and even under normal

*Elected by Congress to serve remainder of Lopez' term

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circumstances had considerable unilateral rule-making power. He convened and prorogued Congress, and could call special legislative sessions, the business of which was limited to the topics proposed by the executive. He was commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In practice he apparently was called upon for decision on most matters, large and small, affecting his administration. Yet his powers were subject to real Congressional restraints, reflecting conflicting political interest, as the reforming Liberal President, Lopez, discovered to his cost. Moreover, the Executive's capacity for bringing about sustained, goal-oriented action was limited by the inefficiency of the administration structure (see paragraph 14 below.)

d. Legislature.

(1) As of 1948, the Colombian Congress consisted of a Senate (63 members) and a House of Representatives (129 members), both popularly elected in 1947 for terms of four and two years, respectively, coequal in power although each had certain reserved functions (e.g., the House originated money bills; Senate consent was required for the passage of foreign troops over Colombian territory). The power of the legislature over the Executive derived chiefly from its power of the purse, its legislative functions, the prestige of its leading members, its ability to impeach high officials (from 1930 to 1948, impeachment was threatened on at least one occasion but was not actually initiated), and the legalistic tradition of the country. In addition, the legislature was a forum for criticism of Executive policy and performance. Under the Constitution, the Congress elected alternatives (designados) for two-year terms who would replace the President in the event of death, incapacity, resignation, or absence from

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the country. A Council of State had certain judicial and legislative functions and advised the President. Its membership was named by Congress from lists of nominees submitted by the President.

(2) Gibson comments that one of the most important additions to the power of Congress, made in the codification of 1945, was "to draw up plans and programs for the improvement of the national economy as well as plans and programs for all public works which are to be built or continued in operation." Obviously in practice the actual planning was done--to the extent it was done--by the Executive and opposed by the Congress.

e. Judiciary.

(1) The Colombian Supreme Court, chosen by the two houses of Congress from lists of qualified persons submitted by the President, serving during good behavior,^{*} enjoyed high prestige and a considerable degree of independence. It controlled the appointment of judicial personnel of lower courts in 20 judicial districts, all of which were within a single national system. A Procurator General, chosen by the House of Representatives, and his Public Ministry were responsible for prosecuting cases in the courts, according to the continental system.

(2) The Constitution specifically gave the Supreme Court power to review the constitutionality of the laws. "In over 40 years of operation of the 1910 provisions, the Supreme Court invalidated well over 50 national statutes and a larger number of executive decrees."¹⁰ A considerable

* At times, justices were chosen for fixed terms (e.g., Article 148, Constitutional codification of 1945, and Article 144, codification of 1936, both provide five-year terms).

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measure of independence was displayed in both 1926 and 1934, when the Court ruled against the great landowners by finding that they must have documentary proof of their title, thus furthering the cause of land reform¹¹ (although in the end, the emphasis on title documentation often proved a disadvantage to small holders).

(3) From the Anglo-Saxon viewpoint, the Spanish and Continental legal system--on which Colombia's judicial system is chiefly modeled--is less responsive to social conditions than the English common law system, because it is based on enactments imposed from above rather than on a body of precedent deriving from custom, and because it tends to weight the scales against the defendant when the interests of the state are involved. However, the imposition of laws from on high is in keeping with the authoritarian Latin tradition. It may be that the reported failure of the jury system to operate well in Colombia, where it has been in effect (for fact-finding, not determination of culpability) in certain types of cases for 100 years, is related to the lack of traditional support for such procedures.

(4) The utility of the court system, from the standpoint of the average citizen, apparently was not great. Court dockets were crowded; business moved slowly; and in any event, recourse to the courts was not culturally sanctioned as a means of redressing grievances.¹² Moreover, a Colombian commenting on crime statistics in 1938 pointed out that only about 10 percent of those charged with crimes were convicted, and that the upper classes were in effect above the law.¹³

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14. Quality of Government administration.

a. The Colombian bureaucracy at national, state, and local levels is generally judged to have been inefficient. There was little or no obstacle to an unfettered spoils system in the government bureaucracy. Although talk of reform dated from the thirties, and beginnings were made in 1940, no significant steps toward a unified career service based on merit principles were taken until the late 50's. Up to that time each ministry controlled its own personnel and set its own conditions of employment. In consequence, there were large-scale changes of personnel at all levels in 1930, when the Liberals returned to power after over 40 years in opposition, and again in 1946, when the Conservatives regained power, as well as changes reflecting the rapid turnover in Cabinet personnel. As an example of the latter, within one eight-month period in Lopez' second term, there were five complete turnovers in the Cabinet.¹⁴

b. Most bureaucrats (especially at policy levels) came from the social and political elite, who aspired to government service primarily for reasons of prestige and profit, although public service motives were not absent. Presumably the Colombian civil service, like that of other Latin American countries, was sharply stratified between upper and lower levels and dominated by the elite point of view.

c. It follows that (1) there was a low general level of executive efficiency in policy and action unless exceptional leadership appeared; (2) bureaucrats' attention was centered on personal loyalties and political rivalries, rather than on public responsibilities; (3) there was a strong tendency to give the general public what the elite thought was good for them, and no more of it than necessary; (4) even the best plans

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and concepts often got no further than conception and formalization-- implementation was not given great importance. Thus, even such social legislation as the Liberal presidents were able to push through Congress would have gained nothing in the course of its implementation by government functionaries.

d. A summary of administrative shortcomings, found to be similar in all Latin American countries surveyed, is contained in the report of a public administration survey under the auspices of the Pan American Union in 1965. The report found the principal deficiency to be in employment practices--selection, compensation, obligation, rights, and so on. Other problems were inadequate allocation of functions, lack of decentralization; and "unnecessary or outmoded juridical, legal, or procedural formalities." It also noted "lack of unity and cohesion in the highest levels of administration and the technical weakness of the higher leadership staffs"--due not to lack of Executive authority but to "difficulties of a technical nature for the appropriate channeling of his initiatives, which generally are lost or are enervated by basic difficulties of communication with or without participation by the mechanism of operation throughout the administrative institutional structure of the country." Corrective efforts in this area led to the "parallel administration" of autonomous agencies outside the ministries (see below).¹⁵

e. The bureaucracy also suffered from the lack of concern for formulating specific policies and action programs which characterizes the culture. Emphasis from the top leadership down was put on lofty principles, rather than on the nuts and bolts of cooperative action to get things done.

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f. In 1948, the national government's executive branch comprised 13 ministries. Seven of these had been established since 1930, reflecting the growing role of government in the life of the country. (However, elements of the new ministries had often previously existed as subordinate units of other ministries, and there had previously been a separate agriculture ministry, before it was reconstituted in 1948.) The personnel of the central and local governments in 1948 are summarized in table IX, appendix I. In addition to the ministries, a separate Department of Control was established in 1923, responding to a recommendation of an American economist (E. H. Kemmerer) invited by the Colombian president. Headed by a Controller General elected by the House of Representatives, and protected by specific Constitutional provisions, its principal functions were inspection and audit, and the compilation of statistics.

g. In addition to the growth in the number of ministries, there was also a growth in public corporations and semi-autonomous agencies. These were established, in part, as a way of escaping the inefficiencies and traditional viewpoints of the established agencies, or to view it the other way--"as a major control device to limit the disruptive or unsettling influences of pluralism in the unintegrated environment."¹⁶ Another reason in the case of "functional interest associations--labor unions, chambers of commerce, farm organizations, and the like"--was to insure that these groups were "captives of the ruling group and dominated by the members of the administrative class."¹⁷ Examples of the first type are the national railways, water transport agencies, and various other financial and operating agencies; e.g., the Instituto de Fomento Municipal, Instituto de Fomento Industrial, Instituto de Credito Territorial,

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established during the Santos administration (1938-1942) and the Caja de Credito Agrario and Banco Central Hipotecario, during the Olaya regime (1930-1934). The most distinguished--and highly successful--example of the second type is the Federation Nacional de Cafeterios, established in 1927, which has done excellent work in both economic and social fields, financed by a tax on coffee exports and government subventions.¹⁸

h. Despite the disadvantages of "parallel administration," the use of separate agencies seems in some cases to have produced results, although in others the institutions were more form than substance, or met only the needs of those who needed no help. In a more recent period, one observer noted of the Valle Department that its "disappointing record in public bodies, though perhaps no worse than in many other Latin American cities, has been offset by great strides forward in autonomous public agencies, controlled privately by public-spirited civic leaders."¹⁹

15. Security forces.

a. Throughout the 1930-1948 period, and indeed throughout the 20th century, the military forces in Colombia (discussed in detail in chapter 5) seem to have played no large overt role either in national politics or in internal security. Colombia has far less of a tradition of military intervention than most other Latin American countries. The President of the Colombian Senate in 1946 said that since 1902 "the Army, serving in its support of the government had been a powerful democratic force which had helped to maintain democratic traditions in spite of strife between parties."²⁰ The Pasto episode of 1944, when a local commander seized the visiting President (Lopez) and his cabinet, was a portent of things to come, and demonstrated growing anti-Liberal sentiments among some Army

58
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elements; but it was unusual in the country's recent history and was in fact opposed by the bulk of the Army. Perhaps, as one observer noted, the Colombians are less disposed to fight for sheer power and more to fight for principles. The Constitution provides that the armed forces must not be politically partisan, that soldiers on active duty cannot vote, and that active military personnel may not run for legislative office.²¹

b. The police, rather than the Army, was the principal agency for internal law and order until the eruption of the violencia (although Army units were frequently called out in emergencies when local police could not maintain order--e.g., the Santa Marta banana strike of 1928--and were garrisoned in troubled areas). Indications are that police at all levels often furthered the partisan interests of the political "ins" against the "outs," and that the common people, in Colombia as elsewhere, viewed the police with fear and contempt. Legal provisions prohibiting the police from voting do not seem to have had much effect on this image.*

16. Political culture.

a. The preceding paragraphs convey the apparent picture of a sophisticated set of operating governmental institutions. In fact, however, they were somewhat artificial in the sense that they were not fully integrated even into the culture of the political elite, and hardly at all into the culture of the still traditionally oriented rural masses (except insofar

* Police organization is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. See also section 11, paragraph 23c below, for a discussion of politics and the police in the 1940's (page 61).

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as the masses acquiesced in the inevitability of such agencies as the security forces and the tax collectors).

b. As for the elite, there can be no question of the strong traditional devotion among most of them (a minority of Nazis and Falangists excepted) to democratic ideals, as understood from European and American writings and traditions. But ideals are one thing, and domestic practices, with their requirements for negotiation, compromise, cooperation, and acceptance of majority rule, are quite another. The Hispanic tradition encouraged, on the one hand, a powerful sense of individual freedom, dignity and worth; on the other hand, acceptance of the authority of a charismatic leader, and expectation that responsibility for policy and action should be carried by him.²² The obvious tensions between these two attitudes are inherently destabilizing: one is reminded of Nicholas Wahl's analysis of the instability of French politics caused by the interplay of the authoritarian tradition, which favors strong executive action, and the spirit of liberty, which supports the assembly against the executive. Stokes comments, "The adoption of the presidential system with checks and balances (in Latin America) was achieved only on paper. Hispanic peoples were unfamiliar with the idea of separating powers or dividing functions." Added dimensions of difficulty were the sense both of political and economic independence and of self-sufficiency on the part of the large landowners who had traditionally dominated the political scene; the general view of government--at least at the beginning of the period--as a device to maintain security and conduct foreign relations, rather than to promote the general welfare (although this view had changed considerably by 1948); the disdain of the elite for the lower classes (notwithstanding a strong

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social consciousness among some of the intellectuals); and the opposition to change which came, among other things, from the traditional teachings of the Church (as well as from elite instincts for hanging on to a good thing). Stokes suggests that Latin American tendencies toward "leftist" and "rightist" ideologies stem from the recognition of conflict between traditional values and those of representative democracy.²³

c. As for the rural masses, even though all males over 21 had the constitutional right to vote, there was virtually no real participation in political institutions at all, except as subjects of the local notables. The only meaningful institutions were those of the local gamonal, or political boss, who turned out the vote in the style of American cities in the 19th century; and the groupings of rural folk by allegiance to patrones or other local notables, who dispensed such little justice and charity as there was. Voting, when it occurred, was done at the boss's bidding, in support of the boss's party, which was ipso facto the party of his entourage. The Catholic Church also influenced political attitudes--generally to favor the Conservative Party.

d. Even as late as 1968, one writer commented on the Valle Department in the Southwest Andean and coastal region: "Peasants are accustomed to living and working on their own, asking little of others, receiving nothing. . . They are suspicious of external authority and organization. Without any systematic ways of expressing their interests and achieving their objectives, they remained passive except when accumulated tensions take violent form."²⁴ At the time of the famous banana strike in 1928 (against the United Fruit Company in Santa Marta on the north coast), a sympathetic leader said of the area that the banana workers "are too

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ignorant. . .to appeal from the decisions of the local police and local judges. In fact, they hardly know of the existence of the high authorities. . .primary instruction is hardly known, for the place of the school is taken by the saloon. . ."25

e. Nonetheless, the political consciousness of the masses was increasing during the period. One of the early demands was for land reform. In 1944, "incited by the communists/sic, the humbler folk were demanding that the big estates of absentee owners be broken up and distributed among the landless."²⁶ In the cities, some of the workers were organized into the various labor unions and federations, and through this affiliation were becoming politically more aware. Colombian Liberals allude to artisan support for their party as early as the mid-19th century. The CTC--strongest of the three labor federations--supported the Liberal Party, although it also had a strong Communist element. It was a significant enough political force so that Gaitan was apparently maneuvering to gain control of it in his fight for control of the Liberal Party in 1947. Both Lopez and Gaitan used their appeal to the masses as bases for their political power, thus tending to bring the people more into the political sphere. Again, in this period, "Inflation squeezed the masses. They cried out to the former savior (Lopez), and he was powerless."²⁷ The impact of wartime dislocations, pent up demands, excess of foreign exchange, propaganda, the spread of communications and transport, growing inequality in the distribution of wealth, corruption in high places--all these things had given rise to new demands; but the political culture showed the masses no way to press their demands except by appeal to leaders--or by force.

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- f. One observer of the Latin American scene has noted:

Latin America never went through the process by which those whose skills and resources were appropriate to the mobilization and organization of consent (the middle class) became dominant in the society. . . Latin America did not legitimate democracy, that is to say, it did not restrict political power to only those who could mobilize consent. . . Hence, the power systems of divine right monarchy, military authority, feudal power, and constitutional democracy all exist side by side, none legitimate, none definitive.²⁸

- g. Another source comments:

The government with which a large majority of the people of Latin America are familiar is the government of class, family, clan, Church, army, school, economic system--that of the father, priest, "general from the cuartel", "doctor from the aula", the cacique, gamonal, coronel, candillo, haciendado, estanciero, fazendeiro. The citizen instinctively knows that the power with which he must cope in his day-to-day life is controlled to a limited extent, if at all, by what is written in the constitution of his country."²⁹

- h. While the foregoing observations apply in some measure to Colombia, the political system there seems to have functioned somewhat better than in most other Latin American countries sharing essentially the same cultural traditions. Thus, Fitzgibbon's panel of academic experts rated Colombia fourth in democratic development among 20 Latin American countries in 1945, and sixth in 1950 and 1955.³⁰ Dissent certainly existed, in non-violent as well as violent forms. Although the Constitution was repeatedly changed and amended, the government during most of the country's history had a fair claim to legitimacy and--by Latin standards--to democratic processes. Thus, Stokes notes the assertion by distinguished historians "that all but six or seven national elections have been characterized by imposicion" (coercion or inducement of voters); but even six or seven elections are an achievement. Moreover, other observers agree with Austin Macdonald

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that "there has been less fighting for the personal glory of ambitious dictators than in most of the other countries of Latin America. Colombians have shed their blood instead for vital principles." (The cynic, of course, could observe that the peoples who shed their blood so gloriously are still just as dead; the question is whether the principles defended at such cost are sufficiently important and relevant.)

1. The situation in Colombia was far from static during the period:

Colombia in a quarter century has accepted the idea of governmental responsibility over sectors of national life long considered as within the private sphere. The commitment to state intervention is almost complete. Only the central authorities, it is felt, can sustain social necessities, social solidarities, cooperative assistance, recognition of the interests of the consumer, effective control of industry, just distribution of property, and restriction of competition.³¹

Between 1910 and 1920, capital began to concentrate in new industrial and financial forms. Politically, the system of civil wars gave way to the operation of a parliamentary system where decisions were made, not by victor or vanquished, but by the majority of the minority.³²

- j. However, the change is insufficient and the process is painful:

Throughout most of Latin America. . . circumstances beyond the control of the ruling elites, be they private or governmental, are at work imposing change. . . In nine of the republics (including Colombia), the problem of working out some sort of constructive mix between the institutionalized values of the past and the disruptive desires of the present has not been solved. In part, this results from a continuing strong humanistic ethic in the old elite that rejects technology. . . In part, it is a fear that the status quo would be disrupted by allowing the lower classes access to material to social benefits. Mostly, however, it is simply that social mechanisms that might mediate the conflicting views and integrate the competing parts of the society do not operate effectively.³³

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It is important to recognize that the level of economic attainment or degree of social integration may not mark the difference between success and failure in the adjustment process. The ability to relate past and present effectively is not a function of money, education or change in the class structure. . .It really is the development over time of bridges, of integrating mechanisms that can bind a people together despite the ill logic of their deeply cherished values. . .Given historical events or implacable attitudes held by disrupting factions, (a nation) may be unable to bridge the gap between traditional and modern in a truly constructive manner.³⁴

17. Political leadership.

a. Political institutions, in the Colombian cultural context, have been strongly influenced by the personalities, ideas, and followings of the political leaders, which tend to have more effect on political policies and actions than abstract constitutional precepts or formal organization.

b. Between 1909, when General Reyes resigned, and 1953, when Colonel Rojas Pinilla seized power, all Colombian presidents and most important national party leaders were civilian members of the political and social elite, whose family names often repeated those of earlier leaders. The same was apparently true of much of the political leadership at lower levels throughout the country, except for the guerrilla leaders^{*}; but in the authoritarian pattern, the top national leaders were the main centers of power. Generally these men (of both parties) were wealthy, or from wealthy families; they were university graduates;

* At least one guerrilla leader in a later period, the famous Father Camilo Torres Restrepo, (later killed) also came from the social elite. (Gunther p. 40f).

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they tended to be professional men (lawyers, writers, newspaper publishers, diplomats, or engineers) rather than businessmen, although business was represented. The principal exception to the elitist pattern was Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, a Liberal crusader for social justice, who came of humble origins but succeeded through his brilliance and his wide popular support in crashing the magic circle of power.

c. From a perusal of national leaders' biographies, it seems clear that they have usually emerged as the result of superior personal qualities in the competition with their peers for status and preeminence. The winning combinations have been different at different times; but the important attributes seem to include intellectual brilliance, literacy and oratorical talent, personal charm, and shrewdness in interpersonal relations. Appeal to the masses has generally seemed either unimportant or automatic for men at the national level--except for such leaders as Lopez and Gaitan. * In the case of two men who had disproportionate influence on Colombian events in the late 'forties, Gomez (Conservative) and Gaitan (Liberal), it seems clear that they had unusual personal charisma and strong--although sometimes erratic--convictions.

d. A recent study of Colombian politics challenges the thesis that leadership was restricted to the upper classes.³⁵ The study cites a 1936

* Men whose biographies were examined include Presidents Enrique Olaya Herrera (1930-1934), Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938, 1942-1945), Eduardo Santos (1938-1942), Alberto Lleras Camargo (1945-1946, 1968-), Marimo Ospina Perez (1946-1950), Laureano Gomez (1950-1953); Liberal leaders Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, Carlos Lleras Restrepo (later president, 1964-1968), Dario Echandia; and Conservative leaders Gilberto Alzate Avendano, Roberto Urdaneta Arbelaez, and Guillermo Leon Valencia.

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Colombian survey of the occupations of political officeholders (members of national, state, and local legislatures), which is used to show that "recruitment to political positions is probably no more closed to lower status individuals in Colombia than it is in the United States." Interviews of 130 individuals, as a sample of the 18,699 officials considered to constitute the "Colombian leadership group" in the mid-sixties, indicated that "the bulk of the respondents' fathers had medium or low status occupations." However, the weight of evidence nonetheless indicates that throughout the preconflict period, notwithstanding the fact that lower-class individuals were not excluded from political status positions, the control of government and party policy was firmly in the hands of the elite establishment. Moreover, the small middle class identified itself with upper class values and standards, thus in effect perpetuating the power of the group to whose membership it aspired.

e. The study above mentioned concludes, on the basis of evidence from interviews in 1965, that political leaders' basic motivation is to achieve status, rather than to realize specific programs. "The Colombian politician's knowledge of matters affecting office-holding is matched by his ignorance about matters of policy and policy-making." It follows from this fact that leaders are not basically interested in accomplishment for its own sake; on the contrary, they will attack even the most useful programs if it suits their status aspirations. It also follows that what passes for "mass discontent" may not be

"an autonomous phenomenon directly related to socio-economic circumstances. What often looks like a 'popular demand' is really the agitation of leaders motivated by a strong status incentive. Remove these leaders and 'protest' will greatly diminish. . ."³⁶

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f. This lack of concern with programs apparently combined with the humanist traditions of the Colombian elite, which disdained practical details in favor of philosophical principles, and which held rather narrow views (especially in Conservative circles) as to the responsibility of government or social welfare principles. Awareness of the need for change may have dictated the new Congressional authority for national planning already mentioned, but changes in leadership attitudes apparently came only gradually. Fluharty, commenting on the administration of the Conservative president Ospina Perez (1946-1950), remarks that he did more for the general welfare than the Liberals acknowledged, but "that what the people needed was food, rather than a National Nutritional Institute. . ."

18. Foreign influence (non-Communists).

a. Sources. Foreign influence in Colombia has come (in historical order) from Spain, the source of the culture; England, which supplied mercenaries and some of the philosophy for the war of independence, and later trade and investment; France, an important cultural and philosophical influence with economic interests as well; the United States, the most important external influence in political and economic matters; the Soviet Union, principal inspiration of Communist activity; and Germany which before World War II had considerable political and economic influence. American influence is examined below. Soviet influence is discussed in connection with Communism (see section III). The influence of other countries is chiefly cultural and commercial, and is referred to in appropriate sections of the study.

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b. Basis for US influence.

(1) As of 1931, US investments in Colombia were estimated to be \$301,692,000, the sixth largest amount invested among the Latin American countries. Of this amount, 57 percent was in Colombian national and local government securities. By 1933, Colombia had defaulted on the latter securities (to some extent, it had defaulted even earlier, as a result of the Depression), and this situation continued until after World War II.³⁷ The next largest investment was in petroleum (from \$45 million to \$100 million). Other fields of North American activity included mining (gold, platinum, silver, emeralds); meat packing; sugar; coffee; public utilities; real estate; and religious missions. In the late 1920's the United Fruit Company had 30,000 acres in bananas, had \$4 million payroll, and employed 18,000 local workers.³⁸

(2) In 1928, 80 percent of Colombia's exports (chiefly coffee) went to the United States, and, in turn, the United States supplied 45 percent of Colombia's imports. Trade relations were facilitated by the complementary nature of the two economies and the consequent relative lack of competition between domestic and imported products, particularly during the early part of the period. Trade was drastically affected by the Depression, but the two nations continued to be good trading partners. The Colombian-American reciprocal trade agreement of 15 December 1933 was the first of such arrangements under the "good neighbor policy."

c. US-Colombian relations.

(1) As the volume of US investment continued to mount over the years, many Colombians feared that their country and government might be dominated by foreign capitalists. Up until the "Great Depression," the

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United States was engaged in the direct promotion of investments in Colombia, and the State Department did not hesitate to use diplomatic (and probably financial) pressure to promote and protect the interests of US oil companies. The report (true or not) of the presence of two US cruisers at Santa Marta in December 1928 caused General Cortes Vargas to expend vigorous efforts to suppress a strike against the United Fruit Company.³⁹ The Colombian authorities excused their ruthless procedures against the strikers on the fear of Communism and of the possible landing of US Marines. (The United States had never landed marines in Colombia, although it had done so on several occasions in Panama during the 19th century, usually in support of Colombian government authorities and in accordance with the 1847 treaty.)

(2) Traditional attitudes of suspicion and unfriendliness toward the United States stemmed not only from the general Latin American feelings about the Colossus of the North, but also from the US role in the secession of Panama in 1903. These attitudes were officially reversed during the Santos (Liberal) administration, beginning in 1938, despite vehement Conservative criticism. German interest was at its height in the years immediately before and during the early part of World War II, and there was a strong Fascist-Falangist inclination among some of the Conservatives, notably Laureano Gomez. Nevertheless, Colombia severed relations with the Axis powers in 1941, and has been basically friendly ever since. Even Gomez, an outspoken anti-American, espoused the cause of United States friendship when he became a dictatorial President in 1950, and he dispatched Colombian forces to Korea to prove it;

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this action, however, was probably a smoke screen to cover his unsavory domestic regime.

(3) American influence during the 1930-1948 period had at least four effects: promotion of economic development; augmentation of economic and cultural confusion; strengthening of the military establishment; and some measure of reinforcement of the conservative political and economic power elements.

(4) Economic development came from United States investment and trade, which were actively solicited by the Colombians. Economic confusion came from the fluctuation in North American demand for Colombia's principal export; from wartime trade artificialities, which led to severe inflation and postwar dislocation; and from the problems of paying the interest and principal on funds borrowed from the United States.

(5) Cultural confusion came from the tensions associated with differences in cultural values, attitudes, and institutions of the United States--known and admired by many Colombians--and of the Hispanic tradition, reinforced by feelings of national pride. The influx of foreign capital also had cultural effects--"accusations of dishonesty, fraud, and graft, which (in the 1920's) contributed to the political insecurity of the Conservatives."⁴⁰ The cavalier behavior of American business was of such concern as to motivate a severely critical dispatch by the US Minister in Bogota in the early 'thirties.

(6) As for the military, Edward Lieuwen notes:

In Colombia, United States military aid and assistance in the 1941-1953 period must certainly be considered as one contributing factor that helped to tip the political balance, bringing the Colombian

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Army back into politics in the 1953-1957 period after a half century of civilian rule."⁴¹

(7) American reinforcement of conservatism is due to several considerations. In the first place, American investors favored preservation of order and the continuance of whatever circumstances favored their original investment. This view was supported by the United States government. Secondly, it was the conservative oligarchy with whom American government and business executives usually dealt, because the oligarchy occupied the positions of political and economic power, and had more in common--in terms of language and culture--with the foreigner. These dealings tended to reinforce the oligarchy's power position. Thirdly, so long as the Colombian government was in the hands of conservatively inclined leaders (whatever their party label), the United States in dealing with the government tended to reinforce their policies; to do otherwise would have risked charges of interference in domestic affairs. An example of Colombian feelings is German Arceniegas's objection to Ambassador Beaulac's praise for Conservative President Ospina Perez at a time when Ospina's government was persecuting Liberals.⁴²

19. Elements of political power and influence.

a. The Colombian political power structure underwent some changes during the 1930-1948 period, as a result of the growth of industries, of cities, and of popular political awareness. However, the broad overt features over the period were: (1) a dominant political-economic-social elite, divided by remarkably firm loyalties into two main camps (Liberal and Conservative)^{*} which in turn had several subordinate factions,

^{*} Political parties are discussed in a separate paper.

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organized around individual leaders; (2) a politically quiescent but influential military establishment; (3) the Catholic church which had considerable power even when the anti-clerical Liberals controlled the government; (4) several loosely organized pressure groups, at least some of which were dominated by the same elite; (e.g., the National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), and National Association of Businessmen (FENALCO)); (5) the press, controlled by members of the elite; (6) a small but growing middle class of business, professional and governmental employees, which, however, tended to relate to elite standards and goals rather than to have a group identity of its own; (7) a growing pool of industrial workers, some of whom were organized in labor union federations, but who were not a potent political force for most of the period; (8) university students, often politically active; and, (9) the mass of the people whose sole political power at the national level, the vote, was effectively harnessed and directed by the two political machines, by local notables, and by the church. The United States was also a political power factor, because of American investments and trade as well as concern for the security of the Panama Canal. During the 1940-1944 period "there was a Conservative-Falangist movement with strong Nazi overtones" which left an impression that influenced the later Gomez regime (1940-1953).⁴³

b. Regional and local power structures appear to have been similar to the national power structure, but narrower in size and function in view of the limits on local independent action. Some of the haciendas and rural population centers functioned as largely autonomous political fiefdoms of their respective patrones or caudillos. At this level,

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political power often came from the blades of the campesinos' machetes.⁴⁴

In the Valle del Cauca in 1964, "political power is still concentrated in the hands of agricultural and industrial property owners (many of the latter having their roots in the land). It is sometimes said that a half-dozen men run the Cauca Valley. . . They include a leading industrial figure. . . the head of the CVC (a public development corporation); the editors of the local newspapers both of whom are senators; the Governor; the Bishop; and the sugar producers. . ."45

c. Kling suggests that in Latin American politics, "the distinguishing characteristics of the economy. . . despite the influence exerted by the Church and other institutions, are of primary importance for the retention and transfer of power."⁴⁶ Although land ownership was not so concentrated in Colombia as in some other countries, it was nonetheless an important power base for the large holders. The coffee interests were of major importance; they had a powerful pressure group, the Federation of Coffee Growers, which carried on activities of mutual benefit to its members and enjoyed a national government subvention. Other holdings-- mineral resources and industrial and trading enterprises--were also significant. (Kling points out that extensive foreign holdings make of foreigners and their native associates another power element.)

d. In the early thirties, political power was so narrowly distributed that an American Legation dispatch could say of President Lopez' policies in 1935:

President Lopez (by his tax measures and his appeal to the masses) is making himself extremely unpopular with the propertied classes who really form the group that expresses most of the so-called public opinion in Colombia.⁴⁷

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e. The increasing political awareness among the people--as a result of advances in communication, education, and other fields, as well as of mass appeals by such Liberal leaders as Lopez and Gaitan, and wartime US assistance and presence--was making the masses more of a political power factor during the period. Yet their power was still largely potential, for lack of effective institutions through which to express it, except on occasions of essentially unstructured demonstrations and violence such as the Bogotazo. However, there seems to have been increasing manipulation of the masses by ambitious politicians as gullible pawns in a power game that in reality had little to do with the desires of the campesinos or laborers who were mobilized for demonstrations.

f. According to a recent analysis by Payne, the basic motivation for political activity in Colombia is the desire of the participants at all levels for increased status.⁴⁸ In Kling's view, "in the distinctive power structure of Latin America, government serves as a special transformer through which pass the currents of economic ambition" because government itself is a source of economic power, largely as a result of heavy involvement of foreign investors and foreign markets. Whereas the conventional economic power bases--land, mines, and (though Kling does not say so) industrial properties--remain in the same hands, and (again according to Kling) since domestic capital, markets, and entrepreneurship for new enterprise are wanting, attention therefore focuses upon government position as an avenue to power.⁴⁹ Since Colombia's economy is relatively advanced, Kling's hypothesis probably applies less there than in many other parts of the continent. Nevertheless, both motivations--status

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and economic power--plus the desire for sheer political power (somewhat different from status)--probably account for most political activity. The remainder may be accounted for by genuine noblesse oblige and by the sheer love of the political game.

g. It has also been suggested that Latin American politics are not so unstable as they appear; rather, that the rules of the game accept threats of violence and coercion as ways of establishing ascendancy among competing political groups, which in turn means resort to limited violence when bluffs are called.⁵⁰ This role of violence, as a tacitly permitted political device in a culture which traditionally tolerates violence, should theoretically be distinguished from violence in settling scores with the vanquished political enemy (as Liberals did with Conservatives in 1930, and Conservatives did with Liberals in 1946), as well as from violence associated with rural brigandage (perhaps a pale latter-day extension of the behavior of early Spanish conquistadors) and urban crime. In practice, however, such distinctions are blurred, since motives are often mixed and sometimes unclear.

20. Adaptability and capability of the political system.

a. In terms of formal institutions, the record shows that the Colombian political system is susceptible of considerable change. The Constitution was frequently amended and governmental structure was often changed. There were two legitimate and largely peaceful changes of governmental control during the period in response to free elections--from Conservative to Liberal in 1930, and from Liberal to Conservative in 1946--not counting other Presidential elections. The Liberal Party, and to some extent the Conservative Party, recognized the need for institutional change in

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response to new challenges; but all too often, changes made even by radical Liberals, once recorded in the statute books, had little practical effect. When they were pressed to implementation, the oligarchy moved to negate them, and often succeeded because there was no real mass support or understanding for them, nor effective channels for the expression of support. For example, the newly-elected Conservative President, Ospina Perez, in late 1946 "pushed for implementation of the Social Security laws which had been largely ignored since their initiation in the 1930's."⁵¹

Thus:

Sporadic attention to reform by traditional groups has fallen short of overcoming the shortcomings of the existing political and economic structure, notably its inability to meet the needs of peasant groups and urban poor.⁵²

b. Another problem was the inertia of the bureaucracy and the legal systems, which were wedded to the status quo. This problem was, of course, aggravated by simple inefficiency, but it was basically a matter of attitude.

Unlike many of the Asian and African states, where the public employees were heavily committed to change. . . in most Latin American countries the forces that perceive the preservation of law and order as the primary task of government have retained a dominant role in recruitment and operation of the administrative class.

Even in cases where the dominant political officials are. . .strongly committed to change, . . .the rearguard action of the incumbents may have a delaying effect.⁵³

c. As for the articulation and aggregation of popular demands, the process appears to have been largely blocked by (a) the polarization of political loyalties, (b) support for individuals rather than policies or programs, (c) the attitudes of the ruling elite, (d) the ineffectiveness

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of the electoral process. The largest vote turnout in Colombian history up to 1948 was 1,466,012 in the Congressional elections of 1947 (see table X, appendix I). Since women and persons under 21 could not vote in national elections, this number was about 65 percent of the effective electorate*; but the vote for most citizens was more an expression of party loyalty or of loyalty to a local leader than a rational political choice. In other years, numerical participation was considerably less.

d. In summary, the formal political system had the necessary adaptability, but the attitudes of the oligarchy did not permit the necessary changes to take real effect; and the capability of the political system, either to articulate the demands of the masses or to respond meaningfully to them, was inadequate.

21. Conclusions.

Five interrelated political factors during the period 1930 to 1948 may have led to low intensity conflict:

a. Strong polarization of loyalties between the two traditional political parties, making compromise and alternation in power extremely difficult, and limiting the national consensus on political goals and methods--a polarization enhanced by the strong personalities of Gaitan (Liberal) and Gomez (Conservative);

* The census of 1951 was broken down by age and sex. It can be calculated that the potential electorate in that year was 2,500,000. The comparable figure for 1947 would be about 2,250,000. (The 1938 census, treated the same way, gives a potential electorate of 1,960,000; the vote for President in that year was only about a quarter of the electorate, but there was no Conservative candidate.)

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b. Cultural propensity for extreme individualism coupled with a tradition of authoritarian charismatic personal leadership;

c. Cultural acceptance of violence as an acceptable means of settling disputes and as an instrument of political power;

d. The spread of new ideas, social and political, through improved transportation and communications; and the clash of these ideas with traditional cultural and religious doctrines*;

e. The inadequacy of the political system to respond effectively to the challenge of these new ideas--especially the ineffectiveness of the bureaucracy to put policies into practice or provide needed services, the inefficiency and political bias of the policy, the inadequacy of the parties (or other institutions) to articulate public demands, the inflexibility of view among the ruling elite, and the lack of consensus on civic responsibility or the role of the State.

f. Galbraith summarizes the problem in an eloquent comment on the bogotazo:

. . . Even the wildest demagogue must have been alarmed to see, after nearly fifty years of peace, the appalling savagery of a mob whose feelings had been constantly exacerbated over a period of time by the preaching of doctrines above its standard of political education against a background of unsatisfactory standards of living. ⁵⁴

g. In other words, the lofty social consciousness of young radicals, the manipulations of power-hungry, demagogic politicians, the new communications and new contracts with the outside world, inflammatory oratory--

*The influence of tradition as a factor in violence is stressed by Richard S. Weinert in his American Political Science Review article, "Violence in Pre-Modern Societies: Rural Colombia."

79
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all these things had exacerbated tensions and created expectations among the people which the existing political system was incapable of articulating, let alone satisfying, and which the ruling oligarchy was determined to keep from interfering with their traditional prerogatives. The result was an explosive mixture of rising discontent with a long-established propensity for political violence, which was aggravated by the Conservatives' attacks on the Liberals when the former returned to power in 1946, and was detonated by the adventitious killing of a popular hero.

h. In 1932, the American military attache in Bogota commented tersely in a report to the War Department that there was too much free speech and freedom of action in Colombia, and that there should be more control.⁵⁵ Such an observation today sounds like reactionary heresy, and yet in one sense there is considerable validity in it. When promises are made without any thought of the cost or method of their fulfillment; when people are encouraged to agitate for things that the political elite are resolved not to concede to them; when political hostility is openly and constantly voiced in polemical terms--then the seeds of violence are being nourished. To abolish free speech is hardly the answer, because truth and opinion, like classified information, eventually leak out; but until a way is found of making radicals and demagogues think through the implications of their gospels, and to furnish the programs and channels for realizing their utopias, and until responsible limits can be set to political controversy, conflict is a likely result.

i. Samuel Huntington, in his Political Change in the Developing Societies, has made somewhat the same point. He distinguishes between modernization--the mobilization and politicization of the masses--and

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modernity--the development by a state of the necessary political institutions for formulating and responding to popular demands. He points out that modernization may lead, not to political growth, but to political decay, unless it proceeds in phase with the achievement of modernity. This appears to be a major component of Colombian troubles.

j. It is clear, however, that violence was a traditional element of Colombian political life. This condition, and pressures for social change came together because the Liberals became gradually transformed by the pressure of events from advocates of idealistic, ex cathedra social concessions by the elite into somewhat reluctant spokesmen for popular aspirations, with the beginnings of real mass support. The questions of social reform and civil liberties replaced the traditional differences as the main issue of contention between the two hostile camps of Liberalism and Conservatism. Thus violence fell into the traditional Colombian pattern at the same time it was being fed by the fires of social discontent.

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Section II. Political Parties and Interest Groups

by Eugene H. Miller, PhD

In Colombia men have fought for ideas; anarchy there has had a religious character. . .A Jacobin ardor divides mankind; the fiery Colombian race is impassioned by vague and abstract ideas. . .These sanguinary struggles have a certain rude grandeur. . .In Colombia exalted convictions are the motives of political enmities; men abandon fortune and family, as in the great religious periods of history, to hasten to the defense of principle. These hidalgos waste the country and fall nobly, with the Semitic ardor of Spanish Crusaders. Heroes abound in the fervor of these battles. Obedient to the logic of Jacobinism, Colombia perishes but the truth is saved.⁵⁶

22. Parties before 1930.

a. Colombia, like her Andean neighbors who were freed by Bolivar, underwent a long period of instability following the proclamation of independence in 1810. In the remainder of the century there were ten revolutions of national scope, some 70 less general uprisings, and in 1899-1902 a civil war that allegedly involved 100,000 deaths. The differences that contributed to these conflicts were for the most part political philosophies. As in 19th century Europe, contemporary Colombian Conservatives stood for a strong central government, close liaison of church and state, church control of education, limited suffrage, and protective tariffs. The Liberals, like their Continental counterparts, advocated federalism, separation of church and state, free secular education, broader suffrage and free trade.

b. The Conservatives drew their strength from the clergy, the big land owners, the army, some capitalists and the peasants (not all peasants were Conservative adherents, as indicated by La Violencia in the mid 20th

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century, a situation in which Conservative villages fought with hamlets that were Liberal by tradition). The middle classes, artisans, small farmers, and the intellectuals, on the whole supported the Liberals. Although there was a correlation of sorts between these specific groups and party allegiance, the actual political leadership in both parties usually came from the top social and economic class.

c. Colombia in the pre-World War II era differed from its Latin neighbors in having a fairly stable two-party rather than a multi-party system. However, it resembled them in the vital role that personalities played, particularly in periods of instability. Bogota saw its share of "strong men" who outwardly operated as Conservatives or Liberals, but who were, in reality, the real determiners of policy. One such was Rafael Nunez, who dominated the country, as president or as political leader behind the scenes, from 1880 until his death in 1894. "His technique was to man the administration with 'reformed' liberals and conservatives at first, and then entirely with conservatives."⁵⁷

d. Nunez' departure from the scene was followed by the tragic War of a Thousand Days and by the traumatic experience of the loss of Panama. These painful jolts to Colombia's welfare and dignity brought forth another capable leader, General Rafael Reyes, who served as chief executive from 1904-1909. Like his predecessors in the presidential palace, Reyes was a Conservative and almost a dictator. However, he realized the need for conciliation. "The Liberals," he said, "must vote and not revolt."⁵⁸ They were given a minority of places, in a sort of system of proportional representation, in Congress and in the Cabinet. The best

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men from both camps were thus brought into public life. The Reyes "system" operated for another 20 years following his departure from office.

e. Although the political status quo seemed to be unchallenged from 1909 to 1929, five background forces were at work that were to pave the way for major changes in Colombia: (a) the economic impact of World War I; (b) the spread of proletarian ideas, particularly militant unionism, in the wake of the Bolshevik revolution; (c) the establishment of a network of air communications in the 1920's that not only broke down geographical isolation but for the first time made possible the existence of something like a national press; (d) the opening up, during the same decade, of a broadcasting service that helped the masses to a new national awareness; and (e) a great influx of foreign capital in the 1920's, "The Dance of the Millions"⁵⁹, with an accompanying inflation that brought prosperity to the upper classes but further impoverishment to the poor classes.⁶⁰

23. Political parties 1930-1946.

a. All these influences operated to promote drastic economic and social changes. In their wake came political upheaval--moderate at first, but growing in intensity as Colombia reacted first to a universal depression and then to a world-wide war. The political result was the end of conservative hegemony after more than four decades. The event which precipitated the party's downfall was the terrible strike in the banana plantations of the Santa Marta region in late 1928. The United Fruit Company and native planters had connived with government officials to avoid complying with various labor laws. Banana workers struck. They were joined

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by mine and port workers. The Administration called on the army to break the strike, which was done brutally, with numerous deaths. Jorge Gaitan, who was to move to the front of the political stage at a later date, conducted a personal on the spot inquiry. His findings, laid before Congress in the summer of 1929, shocked that body. The fact that "the army had been unleashed on the peasants to support foreign interests" thoroughly discredited the government.⁶¹

b. The difficulties of the depression, the awakening of the masses, and the revelations of the government's role in the banana strike might still have not toppled the Conservatives from their long tenure of office if they had not split three ways. Moderate Conservatives joined with the Liberals to support Enrique Olaya Herrera, Ambassador to Washington since 1921, to be a presidential candidate. He won a plurality of the votes and the Conservatives peacefully transferred the government into his hands. Nevertheless, the rank and file Liberals, apparently brooding over grievances stemming from their defeat in the War of a Thousand Days and harrassments they had suffered in the ensuing 30 years, initiated a bloody persecution of Conservatives in the countryside.⁶² Entire towns were affected and "veritable mass shootings of defenseless peasants occurred in various areas."⁶³ The violence was not wholly political. Long standing family feuds played a role and, once begun, reciprocal vengence created a self-generating cycle of violence. The violence fortunately was brief--a border dispute with Peru over Leticia united Colombians in a wave of nationalism. However, the fact that the violence occurred and that the government had been unable to control it before an outside threat awakened patriotic feelings, boded ill for the future. Just as the seeds of violence in 1930

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had been planted in the Liberal defeat at the turn of the century, so the seeds of dissension sown in 1930 were to be harvested at the next turn of the political wheel in 1946.⁶⁴

c. In addition to the traditional political and personal elements involved in the difficulties faced by Olaya there was a socio-economic factor that contributed to the unrest. The depression deepened and the masses who suffered most from the "Dance of the Millions" expected remedial action. The Liberal president was unable to accomplish much in the early part of his administration because of opposition by the Conservative-controlled Congress. However, before the end of his term a Caja de Credito Agrario (Agricultural Credit Bank) was set up to help small coffee growers refinance their loans and to offer credit to campesinos for the purchase of land and equipment. Although only a small amount of land was actually acquired the gestures toward reform were enough to generate hope in the voters. The peoples' confidence in the Liberals carried their unopposed candidate, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo, to victory in the 1934 election, 938,000 votes to 3,400 blank ballots.

d. The new president was a man who had been the first president of the American Mercantile Bank in Colombia, Minister to Great Britain, delegate to the London Economic Conference, and to the Seventh Pan-American Conference. Like his aristocratic North American counterpart who inaugurated a "New Deal," Lopez proclaimed a "Revolution on the March." It called for heavier taxation on the wealthy, agrarian reforms, social legislation, the right of labor to organize, and the disestablishment of the Church and removal of its control over education."⁶⁵

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e. Some of the laws were badly drawn and the Agrarian Reform Law proved to be counterproductive (disputes over titles were won by the big landowners who could afford the high cost of litigation). However, "for the first time the government had made a serious and concentrated attempt to help the masses, and Alfonso Lopez became the idol of the people."⁶⁶ As a party the Liberals identified with the workers and peasants. They "perceived that a social revolution was under way, and held that the upward pressure from below should not be suppressed by force" but "directed towards useful development." The Conservatives, on the other hand, "believed in the suppression of these forces where possible, in the minimum of concessions, in the maximum influence of the Church in every field, and in the duty of everyone to conform to the station of life into which he was born, and to leave the management of his affairs to the small privileged and enlightened ruling caste, whose interests and capital were sacrosanct. The class of wealthy industrialists which was springing up was mostly identified with the hereditary landowners in support of the Conservative doctrine."⁶⁷

f. Lopez' "Revolution on the March," while not really restructuring Colombian society, frightened less imaginative Liberals and the party split into two factions, a leftist group who supported his advanced policy and a more moderate right wing led by Eduardo Santos. Riding the wave of reaction to Lopez' reforms the Santos' Liberals won the Congressional elections of 1937 and nominated their leader to be the party's candidate in 1938. The Conservatives abstained from the elections and Santos assumed office unopposed. Owner and editor of one of Latin America's best newspapers,

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El Tiempo, Santos was a capable President who "provided the country with an excellent government," but he was no reformer.⁶⁸

g. Alfonso Lopez, disappointed at the failure of Santos to continue his "Revolution on the March," founded El Liberal, which he used to attack the President and the moderates. His bitter opposition widened the breach between the two wings of the party, a division which played directly into the hands of Laureano Gomez, the extremist Conservative leader. While Lopez decided to run for president a second time, Gomez ruthlessly exploited the split in the Liberal party. He refrained from putting up a Conservative candidate, but backed a moderate Liberal candidate, Carlos Araujo Velez.

h. Lopez entered his second presidency after a highly charged campaign that further divided the Party. The people had voted for a renewal of the "Revolution on the March" but once in office Lopez proved to be no more of a reformer than Santos. His new-found moderation did not appease the opponents of social change. Gomez used his paper, El Siglo, not only to blast Lopez' policies, such as his Declaration of War on the Axis, but to wage a "most unprincipled and vicious campaign of slander against him and his family."⁶⁹

i. War-induced inflation plagued the administration and made the public restive. The "Mamatoco" affair* in the summer of 1943 and the military revolt at Pasto in 1944 made life even more difficult for Lopez.

*"Mamatoco," a pugilist with a police record, was found shot to death in a Bogota park. He had published an occasional paper, Voz del Pueblo, which protested the condition of the masses. A Conservative judge led an investigation which brought a confession from a high ranking police officer that he had planned the killing.

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Gomez' exploitation of the Mamatoco case in El Siglo led to a libel suit, which in turn led to his arrest and jailing for contempt of court, an event which sparked riots by Conservatives in front of the jail in which their leader was held. He was released but "clashes between Liberals and Conservatives in the provinces assumed proportions of incipient anarchy."⁷⁰ The disorders ended in 1944. In that year, while Lopez and some of his Cabinet were attending army maneuvers in Pasto, he and they were held captive for a few days by an abortive military uprising. On the surface it appeared that the President had also survived this crisis. The attempted putsch was insignificant and was easily overcome. However, Lopez was made "to look ridiculous and his prestige was completely destroyed by Gomez' skillful exploitation of the happenings in Pasto."⁷¹

j. By August 1945 Lopez had had enough. Tired, concerned about his wife's illness, "beaten down by the opposition within his party as well as the Conservative, and humiliated by the campaign of slander and invective by Gomez" he gave up the presidency.⁷² Lopez' letter of resignation was prophetic: "There are new factors of disorder. . . such as the awakening of a sleeping social consciousness which can turn toward violence more easily when it learns that violence produces concrete results."⁷³

k. Congress named Alberto Lleras Camargo, then Ambassador to Washington, to finish out the last year of Lopez' term. The new president, "one of the most interesting figures, and possibly one of the most important in the recent history of any Latin American country,"⁷⁴ believed in "National Union" as the only practical way to avert civil war. Three moderate Conservatives agreed to serve in his Cabinet despite Gomez' opposition. With their support, Liberals managed to finish out the year. However,

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the split in the Liberal party itself was deepening. Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, the lawyer-Congressman who had reported on the Santa Marta banana strike in 1929 and thus played an important role in bringing the Liberals to power in 1930, had become increasingly popular with the masses. Disappointed in Lopez failure to revive his "Revolution on the March" they turned to Gaitan as their hope, giving him almost fanatical allegiance. When the Liberal Convention failed to nominate Gaitan, but chose Gabriel Turbay, a Moderate, the Reformists bolted the party and put forth their hero, Gaitan.

1. Gomez shrewdly refrained from taking the Conservative nomination for himself, an act that might have united the Liberals. Instead he supported Mariano Ospina Perez who announced in favor of continuation of the National Union. This stand won him the support of those Liberals, primarily members of the elite, who were not attracted to either Turbay or Gaitan. In the three-way race Ospina won 565,849 votes, Turbay 437,707, and Gaitan 360,263. The Conservatives regained power in 1946 as they had lost it in 1930, as the result of a deep split in the administration party.

24. Immediate background to violence 1946-48.

a. Ospina was a moderate Conservative, "a wealthy and respected engineer, intelligent, courteous, and with great personal courage."⁷⁵ Living up to his campaign promise he tried to continue the policy of "National Union" giving the Liberals half the ten posts in his Cabinet and half the departmental governorships. However, some "Colombia Watchers" fault him for not having consulted Gaitan. In any event, the coalition broke down in March 1948 with the resignation of all the Liberal members. In the meantime Turbay had died in Paris leaving Gaitan as the undisputed leader

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of the party. His popularity among the masses continued to grow even though he was unable to persuade the Liberal majority in Congress to pass his reform program.

b. Events from 1946 to 1948--the split in the Liberal Party, the acrimonious election campaign, the wrangling in Congress, the difficulties inherent in a "union" government--all contributed to instability. The growing tension in Colombian society was reflected in several rural areas by a rising tide of violence. "It is not possible to cite a day and hour on which La Violencia began nor who initiated it. . .it arose out of a more or less constant 'background noise' of personal and political violence."⁷⁶ The election, itself, served to focus or polarize animosities. Conservatives sought revenge for acts committed against them in 1930-1932. At the same time Liberals attacked Conservatives out of frustration at losing the election despite being the majority party.

c. Violence fed on itself as victims and their friends or partisans sought revenge. Local authorities were lenient to members of their own party and harsh on their rivals. The orientation of the police during this period is not clear. Liberal writers express the opinion that "almost from the outset of Ospina's term, the National Police were employed systematically to persecute the Liberals." German Arciniegas, for example, charges that "The police were reorganized into a shock force, and the national army into a party militia with a belligerent general staff. . . In less than six months a reign of terror had been established. The prisons became the scene of tortures."⁷⁷ Conservatives, on the other hand, assert that the police had a Liberal orientation and "either actively persecuted Conservatives or closed their eyes to such persecution."⁷⁸

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In view of police defections during the Bogotazo, both in the capital and in the provinces, Daniel concludes that at that time (April 1948) they were still predominantly Liberal. Simultaneously, more Conservative personnel were being recruited from staunchly Conservative towns such as Chulavita (Chulavita came to be the epithet applied to all police), in an attempt to achieve parity in political orientation, but "prior to 1948 there was no purge of the police."⁷⁹

d. Just as the presidential election of 1946 had contributed to rising tensions so the Congressional poll of March 1947 exacerbated the Liberal-Conservative rivalries. The Liberals won by over 150,000 votes. The Conservatives complained of harrassment of their voters and charged fraud. Gaitan replied with his editorial, "No mas sangre," listing municipalities in which violence had occurred and called upon the Government to end the strife. However, the tempo of violence continued to rise.⁸⁰

e. Up to early 1948 the violence was, in general, amorphous and unorganized. It often took the form of conflicts between individuals and family or village groups who acted for personal reasons--traditional feuds, for example--as well as for political motives.

f. At the same time both Conservative and Liberal bands were in operation. "There are indications that some of these groups were organized and financed by politicians of more than local prominence."⁸¹ The progressive disorganization of the countryside encouraged a substantial migration of peasants to the cities. Gaitan seized on the discontent of the refugees in the cities to organize urban demonstrations. In provincial cities these protests broke down into violence with some demonstrators losing their lives. Bogota's rally was peaceful with Gaitan pleading with the President

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to put an end to violence, "All we ask of you is the guarantee of human life, which is the least a people can ask."⁸²

g. The government did not reply. With the atmosphere becoming increasingly explosive the government went ahead with preparations for the Ninth Inter-American Conference to be convened in Bogota on March 30. Laureano Gomez, in control of the Conservative machine, headed the Colombian delegation as Foreign Minister. Ospina did not appoint Gaitan to the delegation.

h. Meanwhile in addition to the violencia in the countryside there were labor troubles in the capital, on the Magdalena, and in the oil industry, a student attack on the Ministry of Education, and more rioting in Bogota. It was in this charged atmosphere that, as representatives of the American nations were in session, Gaitan was assassinated in downtown Bogota on April 9, 1948. This traumatic event was the signal for a nationwide outbreak of rioting and looting. The mob held sway--the police had gone over to them--attacked the presidential palace, other public buildings, and burned the home of El Siglo and Gomez' own estate near the city. It was several days before the army could restore order.

i. Rioting spread from the capital to other areas: in Barrancabermeja, rioters took over the refineries, stores were looted in Medellin, Barranquilla and Cali fell to revolutionary juntas (Colonel Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, in command of the Third Brigade of the latter city, rapidly restored order), in Tolima the Liberal Governor joined the insurrection and in Ibague over a dozen prominent Conservatives were killed.⁸³ It was estimated that throughout the country, 1,000 persons lost their lives.

93
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j. President Ospina remained steadfast throughout the crisis. He refused Liberal suggestions that he retire in favor of former president Eduardo Santos and rejected Laureano Gomez' demand that he create a military junta. Instead, Ospina reconstituted the National Union government. Dario Enchandia, who had succeeded to leadership of the Liberal Party, was named Minister of Government with authority over the National Police, General Ocampo became Minister of War, and a third Liberal was named Minister of Justice with authority to investigate the death of Gaitan. Laureano Gomez, unwilling to tolerate a coalition, resigned from the cabinet and went into exile.

k. The moderation of Ospina in placing Liberals in the three portfolios controlling law enforcement and justice and Enchandia's appeal to his followers to support the government provided the political leadership that enabled the army to restore order.⁸⁴

l. Whatever merit lies in the suspicions of Venezuelan intervention and Comintern plotting, the sacking of Bogota and parallel events in provincial cities were not due solely to the death of a charismatic leader. They were "the product of an unstable political and social situation which had been developing for years."⁸⁵ As noted above the good sense and patriotism of President Ospina and Liberal leader Echandia resulted in a cooling off of the immediate passions and the formation of a "National Union" government. Unfortunately, within a year this coalition broke up amid tensions that were to develop inexorably into La Violencia.

m. In the final analysis what role did political parties play in the "unstable political and social situation which had been developing for years?" At first glance the existence, over a long period of time, of

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two major parties with different political philosophies would augur well for political stability. In accord with classic political science doctrine, they would alternate in office with one party having sufficient strength to govern effectively while the other served as a loyal opposition. Superficially this appeared to be the case for the century following the formal establishment of the two "traditional" parties in 1848. However, there were some notable exceptions to this scenario. Power changed hands, on several occasions, not at the ballot box but as the result of civil war. Even when a government took office through an election the "outs" voiced well-founded suspicions as to the legitimacy of the conduct of the poll by the "ins." Nevertheless, from 1904 to 1946 elections were held, president succeeded president, and in 1930 Liberals took over after years of Conservative rule.

n. Did this history reflect true stability, a genuine representation of the political state of the country? The answer cannot be simple. It would appear that through World War I, and in varying aspects through the entire period, the masses were not politically conscious. They were content to maintain their traditional loyalties to one of the two parties-- parties that differed in platform but whose leaders came from the same upper class and who did not differ on the basic issue of government by the oligarchy for the status quo.

o. The 1920's saw the unleashing of new social and economic forces that were to challenge the status quo. The Liberals recognized the situation and moved hesitantly, but nevertheless did move, in the direction of accommodating their policies to the dreams of the awakening masses. However, when Lopez' first administration showed what "Revolution on the

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March" really meant, reaction set in on two fronts. The Liberals split into a moderate and a leftist wing while Laureano Gomez took power away from his moderates, shifted even more to the Right and led the Conservatives down the extremist road.

p. The split into factions revealed the basic lack of party unity that had developed, on the one hand, from the struggle to adjust to social change and, on the other, from the fight to defend the status quo. Several attempts to cool off developing violence and to prevent a polarization of political forces on the Left and Right by setting up "National Union" governments proved, unfortunately, to be only temporary expedients. The assassination of Gaitan, the personification of the new forces in national life, tore it. Colombians went to war against each other under the traditional banners.

q. Was La Violencia truly a conflict between Conservatives and Liberals as the banners proclaimed or was it something else? Were the traditional parties responsible, as parties, or were there other factors, historical and contemporary, that were more important? For an answer to these questions we turn to an analysis of the power structure within the parties.

r. A constant characteristic of Colombian politics before the end of World War I was the isolation of the politicians from the people. The politicians formed "a sort of debating club in Bogota and called on the electorate only when they were required at the polls or on the battlefields. . . Politics was played as a game which was largely irrelevant to the greater part of the nation" except insofar as the "game" broke down into civil strife which brought hardship primarily to the campesinos.⁸⁶

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In the 1920's and 1930's a changing social and economic environment produced a new attitude on the part of politicians toward the people, a change that was stimulated by the charismatic appeal of Gaitan. They made a somewhat greater effort to communicate with the voters--at election time. However, in the 1930's there were still few close ties on an ongoing basis, between the national leadership of the parties and the electorate. The organization was quite loose. A national directorate and departmental and municipal electorates existed but there was no grassroots organization beyond the latter. Candidates were not chosen in primaries but by departmental and national conventions which also wrote the platforms. There was little party activity in the countryside between elections; only as these approached did the local leaders organize rallies and make some effort to get out the vote.⁸⁷

s. In face of the apparent apathy toward politics between elections, how did party loyalty among the peasants develop into the "exaggerated partisanship, often amounting to fanaticism" which is characteristic of the countryside? One plausible hypothesis suggests that the campesinos were strongly influenced by their patrones. A peasant might find that his economic link to the patron also involved a political tie since the latter might be the boss (gamonal) of the area. The gamonal's job, as in the case of political bosses everywhere, was to mobilize the vote. He concerned himself little with platforms and doctrines, but concentrated on getting out the vote to send his candidate to the capital. He was rewarded by patronage and in turn rewarded his campesino supporter by serving as his intermediary with the government. The system of gamonalismo tended to develop pockets of Liberals or Conservatives--a trend encouraged

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by the marked localism associated with the mountainous terrain and poor transportation. An electoral map would show a patchwork of red (Liberal) and blue (Conservative) with very little overlap.⁸⁸

t. Jorge Gaitan attempted to break through the system of gamonalismo by building up mass support of both rural and urban labor. He apparently was well on the way to accomplishing this act at the time of his assassination. Without the mass leader, the mass movement broke down and the countryside reverted to traditional partisanship. Violent political oratory which glorified the speaker's party and reviled the opponents as monsters again became the order of the day. Such crudely emotional appeals played a significant role in setting the stage for La Violencia. Daniel concludes that "the most important single political factor" in contributing to the rise and continuation of rural violence was "undoubtedly the intense and highly emotional party loyalties which developed among the peasants." To this he adds "the isolation of the national leadership of the parties from the people, and the strong note of personalism in Colombian politics, particularly loyalty to the local party leader or boss."⁸⁹

u. Anthony Maingot of Yale University analyzes the situation in terms similar to those of Daniel: "Instead of providing a mechanism for compromise and the settlement of hatreds and resentments built up in a social structure such as that of Colombia, the parties have actually served to exacerbate and intensify such conflicts. This has taken place at the grass roots level, where the cacique (foreman) or gamonal (boss) operated, as well as in the top strata of the society, where groups with equal socioeconomic status split along party lines, and along with them

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their entire families, farm laborers, or whoever might be under their power and influence."⁹⁰ Norman Bailey likewise finds that political institutions played a significant role in the phenomenon of La Violencia. He maintains that both the Liberal and Conservative parties must share the blame for its inception and for escalating the conflict. At the same time, he notes evidence of class hatred in the Bogotazo and an element of truth in the picture of a "democratically-inclined people straining to throw off the yoke of the grasping, horny-handed oligarchy." Over-all he comes to the conclusion that although party loyalties were more important than class ties before the inception of La Violencia, once open conflict materialized, the violence "weakened party ties, in the masses and among the elite, and awakened class consciousness."⁹¹

25. Interest groups.

a. Do the loosening of party affiliations and the accompanying intensification of class feelings portend a more influential role for special interest groups in the Colombian body politic? In the past, organized groups had not progressed beyond "a fairly primitive developmental stage." The oligarchy made it a point to inhibit the formation of strong interest and pressure groups. In a static era the Church was the only major organized group. However, with economic and social changes gathering momentum, special interest groups are coming to the fore.⁹²

b. The most prominent one is labor. Trade unions developed as industrialization came to Colombia in the 1920's. Initially they faced hostile employers and an unfriendly government but they eventually found a simpatico administration in Alfonso Lopez' first term. His "Revolution

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on the March" had room for "national" labor and in 1936 the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC) was established. It united some 900 locals representing approximately 100,000 members. The union's commitment to political action was clearly set forth:

. . .the Confederation acknowledges that union members, as citizens, have the duty to perform a political role and to be actively occupied with defending their economic and cultural interests in the same way that they are conceded rights by the democratic regime, sovereignty, and the liberal reforms of the Republic of Colombia. ⁹³

The CTC survived a split between Liberal and Communist-oriented leaders in the early 1940's with the Liberal leadership prevailing and the Communists leaving to form their own organization. A further challenge to the CTC came from a Jesuit-sponsored Union de Trabajadores Colombianos (UTC), favored by the Conservative administration which came to power in 1946. Thus as the period covered by this paper came to a close the UTC, which campaigned with some success for higher wages and advanced social legislation, was making gains at the expense of the CTC. ⁹⁴ In any event a fragmented Labor movement was fated to have less political influence than a united one.

c. Businessmen and industrialists also organized. An employers' organization, the Asociacion Patronal Economica Nacional (APEN), was founded in the mid-1930's. In reaction to the "Revolution on the March" vertical class groups such as the Asociacion Nacional de Industriales (ANDI) and the Federacion Nacional de Comerciantes (FENALCO) also emerged to defend commercial and financial interests. They opposed "unfavorable trade and labor regulations and lobbied for protective tariffs. Their

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impact on government gained momentum with the return of the Conservatives to power in 1946.⁹⁵

d. An "effective and enlightened" interest group, the National Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (NFCC), was organized in 1927. It received official support through tax revenues but maintained a largely independent position. Martz credits it with consistently proposing "constructive measures of fiscal and credit policy."⁹⁶

e. Professional and student groups were being heard from with increasing frequency. Lawyers and engineers had some influence. University students were able to exert increasing political pressure. As in universities in Europe, Asia, and the rest of Latin America, student political divisions paralleled those of the major parties so the campus became a "small-scale battlefield of national politics."⁹⁷ The Colombian national student federation not only exercised its power on the campus in influencing decisions involving university regulations, but has engaged in organized political activity in the national arena. Student participation has been a double edged sword: "The basic desire is for renovation and justice, but their actions occasionally encourage political instability."⁹⁸

f. Two institutional groups whose role in politics is significant are the church and the military.* No nongovernmental institution has wielded as much influence in Colombian life as the Roman Catholic church. Allied with the Conservatives, the Church was intimately involved in

* For further discussion of religion and military affairs, see chapters 4 (section I) and 5 respectively.

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their political wars against the anti-clerical Liberals. Until the Liberals came to power in 1930, not only was Roman Catholicism the State religion but the Church operated the educational system. In a new concordat in 1942 the church lost much of its formal control of education and the Vatican agreed to nominate only Colombians to the local hierarchy. The president had the right of disapproval, and new bishops and archbishops were required to swear allegiance to the Colombian State. In practice the Liberals, having made their legal point in regard to Church-State relations, did not press their advantage. The government's right to control education was exercised but weakly. The Church, in turn, pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence with the government. However, when the Conservatives returned to power in 1946 the Church reverted to its aggressive position on secular affairs. Ospina, as a minority president, welcomed the political support of his party's traditional ally and went along with a revival of Church control over education and a renewed assertion of its position as the established religious body.⁹⁹

g. The military was second only to the Church as an institutional force in Colombia. However, in contrast to most other Latin American countries, the armed forces, before 1948, did not, for the most part, intervene directly in politics but served rather as an institutional pressure group.

h. In summary, interest and pressure groups were among the forces shaping party determination and execution of policy. However, before 1948, it could be held that, with the exception of the Church, these forces were, for the most part, in the developing stage.

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Section III. Communism

by Charles S. Hall, PhD

26. Introduction.

a. The origins of the Communist Party of Colombia date from the 1920's when appeals were made to students and workers in Bogota. This early study group was known as the "Grupo Comunista."¹⁰⁰ Many of the early members and leaders of this forerunner of the Communist Party were actually Liberal Party members who had momentarily dispaired of winning an election and were groping for any means to defeat the Conservatives. As a result of the Liberal ties to the Communist movement, Liberal newspapers reported on the "Grupo Comunista" in a favorable light.¹⁰¹

b. In 1926 the embryonic Communist group in Colombia created the Partido Socialista Revolucionario (PSR). The strength of this party was located in the urban sector of society among workers and intellectuals rather than among the rural population. Beginning in 1928 the Colombian Party was accepted as a "fraternal" member of the Communist International.¹⁰² Also in 1928 there occurred the famous banana workers' strike against the United Fruit Company plantations. The PSR and the Communist International (Comintern) sent help to the strikers; but the Colombian government's use of troops to break the strike with the resulting massacre of 86 people was the end of the party's influence.¹⁰³ Within a short time the Liberals in the PSR began to desert the organization as the national election of 1930 appeared to offer the opportunity the Liberals had been waiting for to turn the Conservatives out of office.

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27. Formation of the Communist Party of Colombia.

a. Comintern Agent Vasiliev had informed the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, two years before the PSR was dissolved, that there was great sympathy for the Soviet Union and its party; but that the people of Latin America lacked "a clear idea of what Communism meant and what the Soviet Union was like."¹⁰⁴ In July 1930 a Comintern Commission arrived in Colombia to dissolve the PSR and to create a national Communist Party. The new Communist Party concentrated its organizing talents on the nascent labor movement, which had been strongly influenced by the PSR from the middle 1920's. This emphasis on urban labor groups typified the growth of the Communist movement in most Latin American countries until after World War II. Beginning in 1929 the Communists had created a central labor organization organized on the basis of industrial unionism. In that same year a Latin American trade union congress was held in Montevideo, where 16 Latin American national Communist trade union organizations were represented. Each organization was urged to implement a United Front from Below tactic in trade union work.¹⁰⁵

b. From 1930 until 1935 the Communist Party of Colombia devoted its efforts to the labor movement, participated in anti-war campaigns throughout the country against the Colombia-Peru involvement over Leticia, and generally criticized the reforms initiated by the Liberals until the election of Alfonso Lopez in 1934. He represented the Liberal Party's reform group and began to reorganize Colombian economic, political and social life along more modern lines.

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26. Organization and membership.

a. As the Communist Party of Colombia developed over the years from 1930, the organizational structure resembled the typical Latin American party with a vertical hierarchal organization adapted to meet Colombian geographical and political conditions. Most of the leadership throughout this period evolved from the middle class or were men that rose to the middle class. The great bulk of the Colombian Party were professional "cadre" Communists, most of whom were trained in the USSR or Eastern Europe and served at some time or other in the international Communist bureaucracy in Latin America and/or Europe. The rank and file of the Communist Party was drawn from organized labor, students and youth, leftist political groups, women, intellectuals, and peasants, in that order. It is interesting that the Colombian Party in this period, 1930-1948, followed the typical Latin American Communist party pattern of virtually ignoring the peasantry as a political source of membership.¹⁰⁶

b. Viota, an important indoctrination and guerrilla training center for the Colombian Party, exemplifies the attitude toward peasants. The Communists moved into this area located in inaccessible mountains 35 miles southwest of Bogota, in 1931. Here the peasantry had been influenced by the Socialists before the Communists arrived on the scene. By 1937 the Communist Party controlled the municipal council as well as the surrounding countryside. The mountainous nature of the terrain plus the Liberal Communist period of cooperation spared the area from police or military action. Yet despite the complete control exercised by the Communist Party, local indoctrination of the peasants was superficial. Although the area was used as a training center for Communist cadres sent nationwide, there

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was no attempt to create a Communist "paradise." The peasants were not organized into full-scale cooperatives, roads were not built within the secure area, nothing was done to improve hygienic conditions in this rural, depressed area.¹⁰⁷ In other words, the Communist Party virtually ignored the countryside and its rural population, concentrating on urban elements, such as the labor force, youth and students.

29. The common front.

a. The Third Latin American Party Conference, held at Montevideo in October 1934, introduced popular front tactics to the Communist Latin American leadership. They were told not to underestimate the contribution of bourgeois national reform parties to the ultimate Communist goal of seizure of power. This new tactic became official at the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935. By May Day 1936 both the Communist Party of Colombia and the ruling Liberal Party had taken steps to join as a common cause. In June 1935 Colombia established diplomatic relations with the USSR so that Soviet influence gained an official foothold in Latin America. No other Soviet Embassy was opened in Latin America until 1942, well after Russian involvement in World War II. On 1 May 1936 President Lopez and Colombian Communist leader Gilberto Vieira shared the same platform at the presidential palace to celebrate this red letter day together. The Communist leader now pledged his support for "the reformist and democratic policies of President Lopez."¹⁰⁸

b. This period from 1935 until the Hitler-Stalin Pact was the high-water mark before the World War II epoch of the United Front in Latin America. All the Latin American Communist parties were called upon to help create a revolutionary, anti-imperialist bloc of classes in their

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respective nations. The Communist party programs in this period generally called for repudiation of foreign debts, nationalization of foreign enterprises, and such social reforms as an eight hour day, higher wages, a minimum wage law and social insurance. Land reform at the expense of the landowners and the church, basic civil liberties, and equality of the races were also featured in these Communist documents. Despite these broad categories the Latin American Communist party programs were often imprecise and vaguely worded. To some extent these programs reflected Comintern guidance about the broad symbols of democracy, national defense, independence, and anti-fascism rather than concentrating on Communist ideals and ultimate goals of seizing power and transforming society.¹⁰⁹

In 1939, however, Liberal-Communist collaboration was ended by the Hitler-Stalin pact.

c. The German attack on Russia in June 1941 brought a renewal of Liberal-Communist cooperation. The Communist Party of Colombia implemented the United Front from Above and Below as never before and in 1944 even changed the Party's name to the "Partido Social Democratico" as had the United States and Cuban Parties.¹¹⁰

30. Activity in the labor field.

Communist and Liberal Party collaboration in the 1930-1939 period extended to the labor union field. Beginning in the summer of 1935 the Liberal-controlled trade unions joined with the Communist Party trade unions to create a national federation. Within two years practically all the radical and moderate trade unions were affiliated with the new national. By 1937 the control of the national labor organization was safely in the hands of the Communist Party trade union officials and

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their sympathizers. This control became quite evident when the Colombian labor federation became one of the four sponsors of the Latin American Confederation of Labor (CTAL). The CTAL, under the leadership of Vicente Lombardo Toledano, became the instrument of Communist penetration and control of the Latin American labor movement. However, the Hitler-Stalin Pact resulted in a split in the labor movement and other mass organizations between the two parties.

31. Communist influence.

a. The Communist movement in Colombia achieved its peak popularity and influence in 1944 in terms of elected officials at national and local levels and in voting strength. However, even at its peak, it was not a major factor in Colombian politics except through its influence in the labor movement. It polled only about 3 percent of the votes in 1944 legislative elections. Except for the brief early period when radical Liberals turned to Communism in reaction to their own conservative leaders, the Communist doctrine and organization had no great appeal for the power elite; and, as has been shown, it made little or no effort to appeal to the mass of the campesinos.

b. The decline in Communist Party members and influence after 1944 can be traced to the rise of the Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan who appealed to the urban and rural electorate as few Colombians had ever done and raised expectations of reforms and a better life; to the failure of the Communists to back Gaitan in the 1946 national election; to the end of World War II, releasing pent up hopes for peace and prosperity as well as disillusionment with the Soviet Union's attitude toward the postwar world; and finally to the failure of the Party not only to produce a truly

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national leader but also to resolve internal ideological differences. For instance, the Colombian Party leadership was split on the question of Earl Browder's position, which was condemned by Jacques Duclos as revisionist. As a result of the triumph of orthodoxy, the Colombian party, like the (North) American, resumed its title as Communist Party in 1947.¹¹¹

c. With these external and internal forces at work on the Communist Party of Colombia, the leadership and rank and file were ill-prepared to take advantage of the assassination of Gaitan on 9 April 1948 in Bogota. Here was a national crisis, for the mob controlled the capital for two days; yet the Communists were unable to attempt a seizure of power because they lacked the organizational and mass base for such an action.

32. Conclusions.

The Communist Party of Colombia from 1930 to 1948 sought to exploit dissident elements in Colombian society to promote political, economic and social unrest, broaden the Party's base, and win supporters for International Communism. Following the directions of the Comintern and the Liberal Party's reform program, the Communists from 1935 to 1939 and again from 1941 to 1946 were successful in gaining influence in Colombian labor unions, and in electing a few members to national and local legislatures; but with the end of World War II the Communist Party declined in influence, as noted above, losing to the Liberal leader Gaitan the following it might have employed to build a national base. In addition, the Communist Party failed to implement any constructive program in securely held areas and to build the type of mass organization that could provide the basis for a seizure of power. Although there were isolated Communist-held areas in

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the 1930's and 1940's, there was no real attempt to unite these enclaves into an organized Communist controlled movement. It appears in retrospect that the Communist Party of Colombia failed to develop the leadership, ideological and organizational discipline, and national appeal necessary to prepare for the national crisis that allows the Party to seize power; and that the same deficiencies, plus lack of practical political realism or bases of influence, prevented its becoming an important element of the Colombian political system.

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CHAPTER 3

ECONOMIC FACTORS

by Harley M. Roberts

33. Colombia's history of growth.

a. The purpose of this section is to analyze the Colombian economy with particular reference to elements which may have contributed to violence and conflict during the 1950's. As a basis for analysis, this introduction attempts to define broad economic periods for Colombia, showing their interrelationship with the historical and political cycles of events in the nation. The study period stretches from 1930 to 1948. However, some discussion of economic conditions both prior and after these end-points is advisable, as a basis for full understanding of Colombian developments.

b. From 1902 (when the bloody "Thousand Days War" ended) until 1930, the Conservative Party held power in Bogota. Its political programs during this lengthy period may be described as strongly-centralized governmental power in public administration, and clericism or strong support of the Church in social affairs. In economic matters, conservative American finance was practiced and outside capital was encouraged. By contrast, the Liberal Party platform allied itself with the ideology of modern Liberalism, decentralized Federalism in government, and hostility to the church hierarchy. Liberal economic doctrine absorbed many modern currents. These opposing political views however, should not be allowed to obscure the central fact that politics on both sides was conducted

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after the Constitution of 1886 by a small social elite group, predominantly Spanish-Creole in origin and either land-owning or former land-owners in economic background.

c. During this lengthy period of 28 years, the economic growth of Colombia proceeded very slowly; according to one study, at a rate not higher than two percent.¹ However, the period of the 1920's differed from those overall trends. During 1925-1929, some \$200 million in US investments flowed into Colombia, almost all of which represented private US purchases by banks and individuals of Colombian governmental (central and provincial) debt.² The cause of this heavy inflow was the complete monetary and fiscal reorganization carried out by the Kemmerer Mission of 1923, which in turn followed a relaxation of Colombian hostility toward the U.S. As in similar Kemmerer-led missions of the twenties and thirties in other Latin American countries, specific laws were written to set up official agencies for customs, the budget, a central bank. As a result, each Colombian department or municipality found itself able to borrow in New York, against pledges of its local tax or monopoly revenues.³ The resulting enormous capital inflow has been nicknamed "the Dance of the Millions."

d. The New York Stock Exchange crash of August 1929, the following deep depression in the United States, and reaction to the spiraling wealth of Colombian politicians, contributed to an abrupt political reversal in 1930, with the election of a Liberal, Olaya Herrera. During 1931, the new leaders introduced a number of social reform measures, which have marked this year as one of Colombia's economic turning-points. Edwin Kemmerer revisited Colombia in the same year; but with international trade

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dramatically off from its 1928/29 peaks, and the resulting depression inside the economy, no renewal of outside capital flows was possible. There was also no way to avoid an indefinite moratorium on all outstanding public debt, lasting into 1940.

e. Despite world-wide depression, the 1930's were years of considerable growth within Colombia.⁴ These were also years of social and political upheaval, typified by the Agrarian Land Tenure Law of 1936. Other social legislation, such as minimum wage and health laws, was enacted. In 1938 and 1939, American investor interest in Colombia revived; considerable petroleum investments were made, as World War II began to cast its shadow ahead.

f. During the Second World War years, Colombian growth continued, although at a slower rate due to the wide disruptions caused in international shipping and trade. The reforming president of the 1930's, Lopez, was elected to a second term. This was a stormy one, resulting in his 1944 resignation and in little advance in Government services or social legislation. During the war, numerous trade, price and profit controls were instituted; sophisticated fiscal policies were applied; and the Colombian economy adapted to some central techniques of management.⁵ The doctrinal and the personality gap between the Liberal and Conservative parties became wider, however, as Laureano Gomez increased his Conservative following, and forced President Lopez out. Colombian exports and the economy were nevertheless expanding through much of the war. In 1946, the Conservative Party regained the presidency after 16 years of opposition, established a "bipartisan" cabinet, and set about the reorganization and restaffing of the entire government.

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g. In purely economic terms, Colombia's development between 1945 and 1950 may be considered as a single period of rather steady growth, even though increasing violence and particularly the famous Bogotazo riots of April 1948 represent a political turning point within this period.

h. Colombia's 20th century history may be grouped into three major periods: 1903-1930 was when Colombian industrialization and modernization began, from a very low, pre-industrial and shattered base. Heavy foreign investment in the pre-depression period helped. 1930-1948 was typified by major Colombian efforts at social reform and change, without the aid of major foreign capital inputs, but assisted by wartime import curtailment and foreign exchange accumulation. The 1948-66 period included several subperiods, when foreign public capital again became available, in growing amounts, when Colombia underwent profound social change, La Violencia and rapid urbanization. Her economy experienced irregular but large expansions in output, and her successive governments found themselves more and more exposed to fluctuations of worldwide demand for goods and the shifting rates of supply of foreign public capital.*

* For purposes of economic overview of 20th century Colombia, it is desirable to sketch briefly the major events of years subsequent to 1948. From early 1950 to 1956, Colombia benefited from high coffee prices and the worldwide demand for agricultural products. Her coffee exports got top prices, and a large expansion of agricultural output was the internal consequence. The devaluation of 1951 assisted this process. The political repression instituted by President Gomez from 1950 to mid-1953 meant that the benefits of these export windfalls were felt rather narrowly.

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1. The 1925-29 period of large official borrowing abroad provided a social-overhead base in transport and municipal facilities that were pre-conditions for later industrial growth. It seems likely that the

Following the 1953 coup by General Rojas and until his deposition in 1957, the economy continued its rapid expansion (with high export earnings and indiscriminate foreign borrowing on both private and public account). The 1956/57 recession in the United States combined with a collapse of coffee prices in 1957 to undermine this economic expansion.

A devaluation in 1958 initiated an overall slowdown in output growth and investment which continued into 1960. During this period, also, there were arrangements for another rescheduling of Colombia's foreign debt, and a reorganization of the government to satisfy the program for rapid economic development first offered by the IBRD mission of 1950.⁶

From 1958 to 1962, under Liberal President Lleras Camargo, economic growth returned slowly to normal from the 1957 depression, as La Violencia subsided. From 1960 to 1962 the Government prepared and announced a ten-year economic development plan, which IBRD and the OAS approved.

By 1962, after a peaceful transition to a government led by the Conservative, Valencia, Colombia again faced foreign exchange problems. These led to the famous and widely-debated devaluation of November 1962. The Valencia administration, aided by large US Government loans and IMF/IBRD assistance, successfully weathered its four-year term, despite steadily rising internal prices and fluctuating export markets; yet it was forced again to yield to IMF pressures for budgetary and exchange reforms in September 1965, and in November 1966.

When Liberal and National Front president Restrepo Lleras succeeded in late 1966, he inherited many benefits from the Valencia period: a vigorous anti-guerrilla, "anti-bandit" program was well underway, the exchange rate had been just devalued, and US and international agencies stood ready to assist in financing solid economic development with large amounts of capital. However, the promise of vigorous action which Restrepo held out was rapidly obscured by ineffective action. Colombian industry remained heavily dependent upon imported raw materials, obtainable only through Governmental licensing controls. The structure of less-progressive economic sectors remained relatively unchanged, and Governmental action to reform the economy continued to be tentative and slow-moving. As of 1968, the Restrepo government had made little progress in expanding internal output, modernizing economic relationships, or in adding to Colombia's social capital. Governmental energy was absorbed as in the past, by the problems posed by the foreign exchange rate, by slow inflows of foreign public capital or aid, the ebb and flow of short-term commercial credits and of risk capital. Social and economic reform measures were nominal only.

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social reforms of the 1930's, despite their limited application, established at least the outline of a structure for modernized social, agricultural and industrial relationships that were prior necessities to any industrializing "takeoff." In such a generalized scheme of economic history, the period of 1945-1953 may be identified as meeting Rostow's "takeoff criteria," of high investment rates, several leading industrial sectors, and a supporting, modern social and political structure.⁷

j. The critical years for economic analysis of the 1930-48 period therefore seem to be 1931, 1939, 1945 and 1948. The best statistics available to compare these years are found in the definitive ECLA study of 1957, which has been relied upon for much of the analysis which follows. A broad analysis of the 1930-48 period shows that overall output grew at 3.5 - 4.2 percent (accelerating progressively after 1945). Population grew 2.1 - 2.2 percent, leaving a modest but steady 1.4 - 2.0 percent growth for average per capita incomes, interrupted only by wartime shortages. Foreign investments in Colombia were drastically reduced from the 1920's and of little importance throughout the 1930-48 period; nevertheless the Colombian economy continued to maintain a high internal investment rate throughout, trending upward from 16 percent of output for 1930-44 to reach 19.9 percent for the 1945-53 period.⁸

k. These estimates provide support for the judgment that Colombia experienced rapid modernization and economic growth, from 1930 through World War II. After 1945, such growth accelerated, and was continued through 1948-56. Incomes expanded, cities grew rapidly, and much modern legislation was passed. But paradoxically, the same period saw increased

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doctrinal extremism within both political parties, culminating in the urban riots of 1948, and in widespread political banditry. This contradiction between trends in the economy and in the society at large is studied below, by examining Colombia's traditional agriculture, her modernizing industry, and the changes in public economic policy.

34. Colombia's national income and structure. The statistical basis for estimates of Colombian national product and income during the pre-war 1920's presents many problems for the historical economist who applies modern concepts backward in time. Statistics are not available, or are non-comparable; analyses of the time reflect the theories then current. Yet meaningful interpretation of national accounts depends heavily upon consistency. Moreover, knowledge of detailed price movements is necessary. Colombia's rapid periods of inflation further complicate such an effort.

a. Statistics of output.

(1) Despite these weaknesses, the main lines of growth for Colombian national output may be outlined with the following ECLA statistics. These represent averages for the years 1927, 1934, 1941, and 1949. (See table IV.)

(2) This table demonstrates that a high level of foreign capital flowed into Colombia during the latter 1920's, and shows the very high rate of domestic investment which these flows financed and induced. With 26 percent of total output going into investment, Colombia represented a nation well beyond Rostow's criterion for economic takeoff. Per capita output was growing very rapidly (5.2 percent) during this period, while internal consumption grew less rapidly but at a respectable rate. Although imported goods and services totalled almost

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as much as fixed investment, exports remained high during the period and covered over five-sixths of import costs.

Table IV

COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC INDICES FOR SELECTED PERIODS

	Averages per annum			
	1925-29	1930-38	1939-44	1944-53
Population (thous.)	5,543	8,000	9,406	11,106
Gross product (million C\$) ^a	2,583	3,350	4,388	6,203
Investment (million C\$)	679	531	729	1,137
Share of investment in product (%)	26.1	15.8	16.7	19.9
Imports (million C\$)	637	486	512	1,011
Foreign capital inflow (million C\$)	198	33	94	126
Net, Balance of payments (mil. C\$)	98	86	80	11
Per capita Growth Rates				
of Gross Output (%)	5.2	2.0	---	3.6
of Consumption (%)	3.4	2.6	(-1.4)	6.2

Source: United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America. Analyses and Projections of Economic Development, III (1957)--The Economic Development of Colombia, p. 11.

^aMillions of pesos (C\$) in 1950 prices. A 1950 purchasing power "parity" exchange rate of 2.7 pesos per US dollar was used by ECLA.

(3) These large inflows of capital were primarily private US funds, but the larger part was attracted in the form of Colombian public borrowings. Municipalities, departments and the central government all issued bonds, with proceeds primarily used for public works, railroads, city streets, markets, power plants and waterworks. The value of such social-overhead investments, for welfare and to create the infrastructure needed by industry, was considerable. It is less certain, and probably cannot be proved, that such social investments also induced a rapid

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growth of "directly productive" investment in manufacturing and service industries, thus permanently raising Colombia's total output capacity in step with her foreign debt. Benefits of social-overhead investment are always slow to emerge, and difficult to account for.

(4) The severe depression after 1929 in the United States cut off this foreign inflow, and created a mild recession in Colombia. In 1931, the Liberal government declared a moratorium on foreign debt servicing. Foreign capital had become extremely scarce, while Colombia's desires for imports remained high. The result was a rapid rundown of gold and foreign currency reserves during 1929-31, and acute deflation within Colombia which cut the available money supply by some 50 percent.⁹

(5) The 1931 devaluation and positive efforts to expand credit and pass new social legislation during following years resulted in a steady climb upwards during 1932-38, but at growth rates well below the record levels of the 1920's. Imports declined in this period, and the level of investment fell off sharply from 26 percent to near 16 percent. Nevertheless, during this seven-year period, Colombia made major strides towards industrializing her economy, overall growth continued at respectable average rates, and the share of output going into investment remained among the very highest in Latin America.¹⁰

(6) By contrast, the Second World War made a major impact upon the Colombian economy. During 1938-39, an expansion of petroleum company investments occurred which helped revive foreign capital inflows. According to IBRD data, gross output in 1939-42 remained roughly level,

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at C\$ 1.24 - 1.34 billion^{*} but in 1943 national product began a sustained and rapid growth which amounted to 75 percent over the 1939-42 level by 1945, and which continued through 1948. This rapid growth in current-pesos output was, of course, exaggerated by a rather high level of inflation, amounting to 172 percent between 1940 and 1948.¹¹ However the real growth attained and the industrial expansion which was fostered, would be notable in any country. The wartime interruptions to European shipping destroyed Colombian ability to import capital and consumption goods from this source, but wartime contracts to supply fixed-price coffee and foodstuffs to the United States permitted Colombian exports to increase, and shortages encouraged import-substituting internal investments in manufacturing. Foreign exchange reserves were accumulated, and when international markets and channels became more normal at the war's end, Colombia was ready to capitalize upon her war-encouraged base.

(7) The post-war expansion in output, investment, imports, and consumption is also defined by the table above, which averages the 1944-53 years together, to describe a 1949 midpoint level. Imports were nearly double the earlier (1944) level, outrunning export growth by a wide margin, and Colombia paid for almost all the difference out of her wartime exchange buildups. As a result, foreign reserves fell quickly, and controls were needed in 1947 and 1948. Government expenditures grew rapidly, for salaries and recurring costs, but especially for public

*The US dollar equivalent in 1942 was about \$600 to 700 million. See exchange rate discussion on page 155.

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works, during 1946-49.¹² Accordingly, the average share of national product going into investment revived to a level just short of 20 percent--extraordinarily high for an underdeveloped country, in the face of far-reaching postwar adjustments.

(8) The present analysis of Colombia's gross-product trends stops with 1948. However, the data provided above cover actual growth through 1953, a second year of critical political importance and the outbreak of extensive violence. During this postwar period, total product grew an average 5.9 percent yearly, with manufacturing (9 percent), transport (14 percent), government and trade (both 9 percent) and the public utilities sectors (13 percent) leading at considerably higher rates of growth.¹³

(9) Only the major sector of agriculture grew slowly during the post-war years, at only 2.7 percent annually. This increase was at a faster rate than Colombia's population growth, according to ECLA figures, but not significantly so. Coffee production increased for export, and this cannot be counted as an addition to food availabilities. Still, the broad picture of food supplies per person is one in which little change, either of progress or retreat, can be seen.

b. Economic structure.

(1) The structure of the Colombian economy changed significantly over the 1930-1948 period, as revealed by national accounts. During these two decades, what was a semi-colonial, financially-dependent economy, powered primarily by a staple-crop export and foreign bond financing, became a partly industrialized, partly urbanized community.

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Colombia had long been described as a land of rich natural resources, with its huge plain and jungle areas (the Llanos and Oriente) providing an ever-present frontier for settlement and growth. Her urban intelligentsia in 1941 seemed to represent the best both of the modern and the traditional world to many outside observers.¹⁴ Economically her leaders appeared "sophisticated" and "socially aware" of their responsibilities. These judgments were supported by the development of her economy during the 1930's, based primarily upon her own resources. The far-reaching social and economic legislation introduced during this period seemed to make Colombia unique among South American nations.

(2) By 1948, when World Bank was approached to send its first mission to any country, to analyze and prescribe for the Colombian economy, it seemed clear that Colombia's continued growth was only a matter of time and management. The nation's traditional problems--difficult internal transportation, dependency upon world demand for coffee, a backward and inefficient rural population--all seemed to be in the process of solution, or sharply altered from their status of 15-20 years before.

(3) The proof of these structural alterations between 1930 and 1948 may be found in comparing the percentages of output and of "active" population (the labor force) at the beginning and end of the period. ECLA data for 1925 and 1945 are used here as an approximation. (See table V).

(4) As table V illustrates, agriculture and livestock output fell below one-half of gross product value during these decades while

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Table V

COMPARISON OF SHARE OF OUTPUT AND ACTIVE POPULATION, 1925-1945

	Share of Output		Share of Active Population	
	<u>1925</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1945</u>
Agriculture	58.8	47.0	68.5	59.9
Manufacturing	7.6	13.4	3.4	5.2
Government	5.7	5.5	na	2.4
All Others	27.9	34.1	28.1	32.5
Totals	100	100	100	100

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America, Analyses. . .III. Colombia (1957) pp. 16-17, tables 3 and 4.

manufacturing increased its share sharply. The same trend is apparent from sector shares in the "active" labor force, although the labor shift into modern sectors is not so marked.

(5) Over the same 1925-45 period, population growth seems to have been steady and rapid, at a rate no less than 2.2 percent. Nevertheless the rural population's share in the total fell from almost 77 percent to 66 percent by 1945, while the "active" labor force was also falling from 37.2 percent to 35.9 percent of total population.¹⁵ (A comparison with later statistics shows that these trends away from the traditional rural and agricultural economy of the 1920's continued through 1953).

(6) The output structure and employment conditions described above are subject to some reservations; however, the trends which they

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suggest were clearly continued beyond 1948, and were strikingly rapid. For 1953, ECLA estimates showed the rural population to be 57 percent of the total, and the active labor force employed in agriculture at only 54 percent of all the working population. Agriculture output had fallen to only 37 percent of the total product, while modern manufacturing grew to 17.2 percent of the total.¹⁶

(7) These relative shares of rural and modern sectors show that Colombia was far advanced toward becoming a modern, urban, industrialized nation. A further proof of this is provided by the input-output tables developed by ECLA for 1953 manufactured-goods sectors of the economy.¹⁷ This table demonstrated that a high degree of interdependence existed between the various Colombian sectors, a characteristic of more modern economies. It also showed the high degree of dependency upon both agricultural output and imports which existed in the manufacturing sectors (plus coffee). Of a total C\$ 5.72 billion in manufactures available for 1953, domestic production provided 75 percent and imports 25 percent. About 20 percent of total availabilities were consumed internally by manufacturing processes, and 15 percent were exported.* Finally 70 percent of the remaining available manufactured goods were sold to final consumers, with only a small share of this representing consumer-durable goods.¹⁸

(8) While it should be possible to analyze income distribution trends in equal detail, for such a modern economy, ECLA data for 1953

* This figure includes rural threshing of coffee beans for export which cannot be separated out and therefore becomes a typically inflated manufacturing and export statistic.

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conditions and general trends provided the only basis for judgment. In 1953, per capita consumption in urban areas was nearly three times that of rural areas, or 924 pesos compared to 326 pesos; in addition, purchases of foodstuffs were only 46 percent of urban consumption, while the rural food share required 63 percent.¹⁹ (The national average per capita consumption was 582 pesos, while average per capita income was 668 pesos).

35. Traditional sectors--agriculture.

a. General.

(1) In most South American economies, rural conditions and agricultural methods are slow changing, with many traditional constraints. The rural economy of Colombia changed considerably, however, during the 1930-48 period. Overall output of crops expanded faster than did the nation's population, and the proportion of the labor force in agriculture fell steadily. Meanwhile, urban centers expanded, and industrial output which provides a steadier market for agricultural crops grew rapidly. Additional farm land was put into cultivation, cash-crop exports expanded, and by 1948 Colombia had attained considerable self-sufficiency in food production.*

(2) These changes and growth in Colombian agriculture must be set against the basic historical, physical and traditional problems which give the rural sectors a special national and local character. Many characteristics of the rural economy did remain unchanged, and overall farm output grew much more slowly than the urban and modern sectors of the

*However, growth was irregular. See p. 137.

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economy. The relatively constant elements were regional isolation, concentrated farm land ownership, and dependence upon a single cash crop of coffee. During the 1930-48 period, official policy in Bogota attempted to alter these conditions, but with modest results.

(3) Colombian agriculture has long been strongly defined by the country's geography. Communications and transport between the farming regions in the valleys, the high plateau, and the northern and eastern plains have long been extremely difficult. Local subsistence farming and local markets continued to be most typical through this period, and wide price differences between various regions were common. Colombian crops depend directly upon her favorable climatic conditions; both rainfall and elevation differences allow a wide variety of crops to be grown. Very stable temperatures encourage multiple cropping throughout the year, and three crops from the same piece of land is not unusual. Even more importantly, in 1930 and in 1948, a large amount of uncultivated land remained potentially available, although inaccessible. These lands included the wide plains (llanos) of the eastern Oriente provinces, and also many forested mountain slopes in the major 16 departments, and unused semi-jungle in the Choco northwest.

(4) These agricultural advantages were balanced by a number of traditional constraints in farming methods, which have held agricultural growth back. Stable rainfall and temperature conditions in differing regions have led to local specialization in crops and farming methods; soil fertility has led to over-exploitation of the land and consequent soil erosion. Social and cultural consequences of the 16th century Spanish invasion may still be seen in the "uneconomic and paradoxical

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use" of available farmland, where the most fertile valley basins are devoted to low intensity cattle grazing, and food and coffee crops are segregated on the nearby steep mountain slopes. Because of difficult transport conditions, rural labor mobility is very low, and there has been little history of movement into the available unfarmed lands, except when these were in nearby departments.

b. Land ownership and use.

(1) The wide variety of climates, topography, and soils in Colombia's different regions have helped to create a wide range of crops, land-use patterns and forms of land ownership. This complexity in land tenure and land labor conditions is difficult to describe without oversimplification; in addition, different Spanish terms for essentially similar farm labor conditions are used in the different valleys or regions. Essentially, Colombian farming techniques may be divided into four types: the plantation form of large-scale farm industry ("plantacion"); the "hacienda" or rural estate, usually devoted to stock raising; the medium-sized farm unit of 5 to 50 hectares (ha) (12.3 to 123 acres) which lacks a precise Spanish title but is here termed "finca"; and the small subsistence-sized farm unit ("parcela," "estancia") which is less than 5 hectares in size.

(2) Considerable confusion has resulted from the Colombian habit of describing both types of larger land holdings as "latifundia," and the smallest-sized farm units as "minifundia." Both categories are frequently attacked as inefficient, under-productive and socially undesirable. However, the large plantacion which is found producing bananas, rice or sugarcane, may be highly efficient in its land use and labor use. Similarly,

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many coffee farm units (traditionally called fincas) are under 5 hectares, yet these are well able to support a normal family.

(3) The IBRD Mission of 1950 determined that a total of 2.3 million hectares (mnha) were used for crops in 1948, and some 4.3 mnha were used for grazing and pasture. These estimates include the large, undeveloped plains of the Oriente interior, used primarily for cattle herding over very large, ill-defined estates. More illuminating data on Colombian agriculture are obtained by excluding this region, and considering only the 16 departments; on this basis, ECLA data for 1953 recorded about 2.9 mnha then in use as cropland, with 26 mnha in pasture. The same study suggested that an additional 35 percent of the land in use in the departments was potentially cultivable, or some 7.7 million hectares. While 1930 land under crops is not known, these statistics show that Colombian farm land was not a limiting factor for output during the 1930-1948 period, and that considerable opportunity for crop expansion continues to be available.²¹

(4) The distribution by size of Colombian farm units in 1951 is given by the table below. Farms of between 5 and 20 hectares may be considered adequate family-sized units, while a farm of less than 2 hectares (4.9 acres) was considered by ECLA to be insufficient to maintain a farm household full time. (See table VI.)

(5) About 268,000 farm units in 1951 were smaller than 2 hectares; that is, 60 percent of the smallest landowning farmers were on plots too small to provide a family's subsistence.²² But the most striking feature of land ownership is the high degree of concentration in land ownership; under 30,000 landlords ("terratenientes") owned 64 percent of all

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Table VI
NUMBERS OF COLOMBIAN FARMS BY SIZE, 1951

	<u>Farm Numbers</u>	<u>Area (000 Ha)^a</u>	<u>Percent Units</u>	<u>Percent Area</u>
Farms, 0-5 Hectares	459,380	951	56.0	4.2
Farms, 5-20 Ha.	230,550	2,434	28.1	10.7
Farms, 20-100 Ha.	101,384	4,746	12.4	20.9
Farms, over 100	<u>29,528</u>	<u>14,558</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>64.2</u>
Totals	820,842	22,688	100.0	100.0

Source: ECLA-1957, page 194

land recorded, and only 16 percent of all farm units covered some 85 percent of all lands. These figures probably understate the real concentration somewhat, since many landlords owned farms in several regions at once. Similar details for 1930 are not available, but it is probable that the very largest holdings were then even more significant.*

(6) Land ownership figures alone do not give a picture of the degree of agricultural power and its centralization in a few hands. The IBRD observed that fertile river-valley land was usually owned by hacendados, while smaller farm units and tenant-farmer plots were on less-

* Smith, pp. 35-36, shows that 1960 shares in land ownership were little changed.

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fertile hillsides. Most haciendas concentrated upon cattle grazing for meat and milk, leaving food crops to be raised by smaller farm units which produced largely for subsistence. In broad terms, Colombian agriculture in 1948 continued to show a highly-traditional pattern of land ownership and land use, with large areas devoted to low-productivity livestock, many small subsistence-level farms, and a low responsiveness of farm production to non-local market needs.

(7) Agricultural labor conditions in Colombia are equally difficult to quantify precisely. By 1948, about 4 million were economically active, in a rural population of 7 million.²³ If an average farm family is taken as five members, then fully one-half the rural population and rural workforce was made up of landless peasants, tenant farmers or rural village inhabitants not engaged in farming.

(8) The composition of this group is greatly obscured by the variety of farm labor arrangements in different Colombian regions, indicated in part by the long list of Spanish terms used for different labor-service arrangements. Among the tenants on large haciendas, "concertados" are paid in kind, "conuqueros" have a subsistence plot assigned to them and owe personal services to their landlord. "Arrendatarios" are land-renting tenants, who may also own their personal land nearby; and "jornaleros" are day laborers, paid in cash or even shares of the crop.²⁴ While local traditions seem to have caused much of this variety, even a clear-cut category such as the share-cropping tenant ("aparceros") may receive anything from 30 percent to 70 percent of the crop, although a 50-50 division is considered normal.²⁵

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(9) The difference between regions is considerable: Caldas, where much coffee is grown, has numerous small landholders and family-sized farms (owner-operator farms). Narino, and Boyaca on the plateau, are areas of localized subsistence farming; in the Cauca valley, former cattle-grazing haciendas have been progressively turned into larger-scale plantations, using day-labor to grow cotton, sugar cane and rice.²⁶ These local differences were clearly marked during the 1930's and have conditioned long-term trends in crop patterns and farm labor.

(10) Clearly, any accurate generalizations about the position of Colombian farm labor are difficult to reach, since these classes of labor and ownership overlap, and the same farm laborer plays several economic roles at once. Perhaps most important is the lack of any clear class difference between the landless, the tenant and the small-holding farmer. Another feature is the widespread peasant desire for personal land, which was evidenced during the later 1920's and 1930's by numerous squatter invasions of nominally-owned but largely unused farmland.²⁷

(11) Official efforts by the Colombian government to reform land ownership and land use patterns may be said to have started in the 1930's, although official encouragement for the opening up of new, unsettled lands has a much longer history. A Supreme Court ruling in 1934 invalidated the legal claims of many old landlord families, whose rights depended upon ancient Spanish crown grants. The immediate result was an increase of squatters ("colonos") and local battles over land rights. In 1936 Colombia's first Agrarian Reform Law was passed, which both set a maximum size for landlord holdings, and established standards for the sale of family-sized units of publicly-held lands. The effect of the law was to prevent

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forcible squatter takeovers, and encourage landlords to divide their lands somewhat.

(12) However, any real reforms were postponed for the entire period under review; the Bogota government provided a ten-year long administrative adjustment period, during which landlords might sell off their oversized holdings, and in 1946 this period was again extended for five years.²⁸ Meanwhile, the first public agency for agricultural credit and assistance to small farmers, the Institute for Parcelization and Colonization, was established in 1941. Its name suggested the official conviction that resettlement of landless peasants on public lands, especially in the unsettled Oriente, could satisfy both the rural hunger for land ownership and traditional land-holding interests.

(13) While Colombia's 1960 agricultural census provides data from outside the period under review here, it is illuminating to consider, in the light of official Colombian policies toward land ownership, under both Liberal and Conservative governments. By 1960, Colombia's minifundia, or farms under 5 hectares, were an even larger proportion of total farms than in 1951: 62.5 percent as against 56 percent. About the same proportion of the total recorded farm area, or a low 15 percent, was included in individual family-sized farm units under 20 hectares, as in 1951. And it is surprising to note that this land concentration in larger-sized units is not markedly different from the concentration still existing in Mexico in 1960. This was despite Mexico's intensive and politically-dramatic land distribution and resettlement programs, during its long 1910-1941 rural and social revolution.²⁹ A reasonable conclusion is that Colombia's official policies on land tenure made little real differ-

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ence over a three-decade period, and that 1930's objective conditions on the land were much the same as in 1948 and 1951.

c. Coffee and export earnings.

(1) Colombia's coffee crop has been vital to the national economy from before 1920; by 1948, this single agricultural export crop provided fully 75 percent of all Colombian earnings from exports, or some C\$ 370 million. Since 87 percent of all coffee farms (called fincas) were small holdings of less than 5 hectares, and some 250,000 coffee growers depended upon this staple export, the rural incomes which depended upon world coffee prices and growth in demand were widely spread.³⁰

(2) Over the decades to 1948, Colombia's coffee crop has responded both to external market conditions, and to internal policies and opportunities. From 1925 to 1934, coffee production expanded very rapidly, as many new trees were planted on newly settled mountain slopes in Caldas, Tolima and Manizales departments. The traditional coffee center, Medellin, shared her former importance with a new center, Manizales city, as Antioquia settlers moved into these areas. The National Federation of Coffeegrowers (FNC) was formed in 1924, to represent the interests of this group; when foreign demand for coffee fell off during the depression 1930's, and very high Brazilian coffee output depressed world prices, the FNC played an important part in determining Colombian governmental policies to subsidize and support coffee growers, and manipulate foreign exchange rates for coffee. However, since coffee trees require 6 years to reach full production, coffee planting and output bear little direct connection to world prices.

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(3) In 1941, Colombia's coffee exports were less than 3 million bags (60 kilograms each). In 1942, however, under the protection of fixed-purchase agreements with the United States and wartime limitations to Brazilian exports, Colombian production reached 5.5 million bags and this level was maintained or exceeded through 1948. Annual exports varied somewhat, but continued to grow after 1945. By 1948, fully 85 percent of Colombian coffee exports were sold to the United States, where demand continued to grow steadily, and coffee prices were double their 1935-39 low point. Exports represented about 15 percent of world output, and were about 160 percent of average Colombian exports of 1930-34.³¹

(4) Official policies on coffee purchases within Colombia were designed to stabilize sales and prices, and to obtain control of foreign exchange earnings by coffee growers through the agencies of the FNC coffee association and Colombia's central bank (BOR, the Bank of the Republic). Growers received a set price per bag, and coffee exporters sold their goods at a special coffee exchange rate designed to maximize and stabilize Colombia's earnings. Special deposit fees and exchange retentions were a later consequence, to limit coffee exchange manipulations. A peso subsidy was also turned back to the FNC, for welfare, research and local activities benefitting its members.

(5) It is worth note that only 13 percent of all coffee landholdings in 1933 accounted for 50 percent of all coffee trees; by 1948, smallholders made up a much larger share of coffeetree owners, although details are lacking.³² ECLA data shows that from 1925 to 1953, coffee output grew at an average 3.5 percent yearly rate, well above population.

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yet more slowly than some other crops. Coffee earnings followed world prices, which fell from 1925-1937 and recovered from 1939-1953.³³

d. Other crops and livestock.

(1) The period between 1925 and 1953 saw various changes in the relative importance of farm crops, excluding coffee. The major trends were all firmly established by 1948: these included a faster growth of food crop output than the growth rates for overall population, coffee output or livestock slaughterings; more rapid growth in cereals production, expansion in plantation-type crops of cotton, rice, sugar cane; and a slower but steady growth of beef-cattle herds.

(2) ECLA charts which compare the volume output of single crops to the 2.1-2.2 percent rate of population growth are particularly illuminating.³⁴ IBRD calculations which cover only the decade preceding 1948 give similar results: high average annual rates of output occurred in barley (17 percent), sugar cane and rice (8 percent), and beans (7 percent). Coffee production and slaughterings grew at 3.5 percent. The growth in area planted was especially striking for corn, up 300 percent between 1930 and 1934, and for rice, up 600 percent between 1930 and 1948.³⁵

(3) An analysis of 1953 crop and livestock production values, area in use, and return per acre is tabulated below. While these data may increase the weight of coffee output values over 1948 shares in agricultural output, the rough proportions are believed appropriate for the earlier year as well. Coffee output was 23 percent of farm output value, all other crops were 40 percent, and livestock products were 37 percent of gross value but used fully 90 percent of all land.

135

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Table VII

1953 AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

VALUE, VALUE SHARE, AREA, AREA SHARE, LAND PRODUCTIVITY

	<u>Output</u>	<u>Share</u>	<u>Area</u>	-	<u>Share</u>	<u>Output per Hectare</u>
Coffee-Staple	899.7	23.8%	831		2.8%	C\$ 1,082
Foodstuffs-Crops	1413.1	37.3%				
			2,069		6.9%	C\$ 723
Non-food Crops	89.9	2.4%				
Livestock-Cattle (slaughtered)	609.3	16.1%				
			26,870		90.3%	C\$ 52
Other Livestock and Products	779.2	20.6%				
Total-Crops, Livestock	3785.2	100.3%	29,770		100.0%	C\$ 127

Source: ECLA-Analyses, III (1957), page 150-151, tables #110 and 112.

Values are in 1953 prices, paid to farmers for 1953 output.
Output (Colombian pesos) and Area (hectares) are in thousands.

(4) Coffee production holds first place in farm output by value, only when cattle slaughterings are considered separately from other livestock products. If beef production and milk output (9.9 percent) are combined to represent "prestige" or hacienda output, this category accounted for the largest single share of value, at 26 percent. Non-beef livestock products may be considered primarily the output of smaller farm units. Among all food and non-food crops, no single crop made up more than five percent of total farm output (excluding coffee).

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(5) Agricultural expansion between 1925 and 1953 averaged a yearly rate of 2.6 percent or faster than population; however, much of this growth was concentrated in the 1925-1934 decade. From 1934 through 1953, according to ECLA calculations, gross agricultural output only just matched the rate of population growth, so that per capita food availabilities on this gross-accounting basis remained unchanged.³⁶ This calculation needs some refinement: gross farm output slumped during 1935-45, experienced a sharp recovery during 1945-49, and underwent modest declines during 1950-53. It is clear that farm growth was present but that it was irregular and showed widely differing trends for different crops.

(6) The table above provides further light on the predominant place of livestock and of land use for pasture, in the Colombian economy. It further shows that the average output per hectare for all non-coffee crops was about C\$ 723, or a level 14 times higher than per-hectare productivity in livestock uses. This differential, if projected backward to the 1930's, goes far towards explaining the land-hunger of Colombian peasants, and the many squatter-invasion incidents of the 1934-36 period. Cattle lands within the departments were clearly inefficiently used as late as 1953; but the weight of livestock (cattle) production in the rural economy had changed rather little since 1930.

(7) A comparison of per-hectare productivity between coffee and all other crops suggests that the average income per hectare of general crops was fully 70 percent of the high incomes received per coffee hectare. While this broad average may conceal a rather wide range in land returns, it suggests that the contrasts between land productivity in coffee and in other crops was not especially marked, and economic interests

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of these two farm sectors were not contradictory, as compared with the tenant-cattle rancher incomes spread.

e. Nonfarm traditional sectors.

(1) Traditional or slow-changing economies contain traditional non-farm sectors that may be important for growth analysis. Output of handicrafts, rural industries, rural marketing and commerce, as well as urban crafts, traditional transport and traditional city services are hard to measure and often ignored. For Colombia, such traditional sectors can be discussed only briefly, since overall data are few.

(2) ECLA has estimated that artisan industry grew faster than did the overall economy, between 1925 and 1953. Starting from about a 3 percent share in total product, it made up 3.8 percent by 1953, growing at a 3.5 percent yearly rate in the later period.³⁷

(3) Other important traditional sectors have been mining and river transport. Colombia's gold and emerald mines have not continued their importance into modern times, but there are still many small mining prospectors active. In 1945-53 this group in "artisan mining" was 1.5 percent of all active labor, or triple the size of modern mining employment. Traditional river transport facilities center upon the Magdalena River, with its trans-shipment points and low efficiency paddleboat methods. Modernization of this sector proceeded slowly, with both technical and political problems which have been discussed by the IBRD Mission in detail. The freight tonnage moved by this route fell off in 1948 but grew to 1.6 million tons by 1950-52.³⁸

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36. Modernizing industry and investment.

a. General.

(1) During the 1930-1948 decades, Colombian industry expanded rapidly and moved the entire economy from a backward agricultural position into a place among the leading South American modernizers. Thanks to a high level of investment, financed almost entirely by internal savings and taxes after 1930, manufacturing capacity grew very quickly and output increased by nearly 8 percent yearly from 1925-1953. Many import-replacing domestic industries were established, behind the protection of 1931 tariff walls, wartime shortages and later foreign exchange preferences. But any conscious governmental policy to support home industry was lacking, and much credit for growth must go to Colombian entrepreneurs.

(2) The geographic regionalism and separatism of Colombia affected industrial growth through its constraints upon market size and transport problems. Essentially there are four distinct market areas. Medellin was the first industrial center, base for coffee trade and early textiles. Bogota, as government center, and serving the plateau market, came second and contained metal trades. Baranquilla, major seaport entrance to the interior, served the lowlands and oil regions; but third place was taken over by Cali, with a modern food-processing industry based on the Cauca Valley, and access by road to Buenaventura, the growing Pacific port.³⁹

(3) The pace at which Colombian railroads, highways and electric power were developed helped to determine industrial growth, and postpone it until after 1930. These sectors are discussed below,

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because Government and municipal policies and investment played the major role. Colombia's petroleum fields, some distance inland in the Magdalena Valley and Santander, were exploited energetically from 1926, by the American Tropical Oil Company. But despite additional foreign investment in 1938-39, an expensive pipeline and a small refinery, the prewar promise of expanding oil exports was not achieved. 1948 production was barely greater than the 1938 level, and insignificant when compared to Venezuela's enormous, expanding and convenient fields. This foreign-owned sector was physically isolated and largely peripheral to Colombian modern growth of this period.

b. Output growth and leading sectors.

(1) Prior to 1925, Colombia had essentially an agricultural economy. Its already-noted cities, Cartagena, Baranquilla, Medellin, Popayan and Bogota relied heavily upon imported manufactures; in 1900 only 128 industrial establishments were listed.⁴⁰ The trade interruptions of the First World War, however, encouraged growth in the earliest industries; textiles, tobacco and food processing. But there was no official effort to encourage or manage industrial growth; instead the foreign capital inflows of the 1920's went into official transport facilities and municipal public works. Industrialization was very modest, and was left entirely to local private entrepreneurs, until 1930.

(2) From 1930, and with the 1931 import tariff restrictions limiting competition, conditions for industry changed dramatically. During 1930-33, some 840 new plants were established, and by 1934, "most of the present (1948) basic Colombian industries had been launched."⁴¹ Value added to the national product by this sector reached C\$ 120 million

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or 11.5 percent by 1939. In 1945, some 7,800 manufacturing establishments employed 135,000 persons, and output reached C\$ 641 million.

ECLA data show that modern manufacturing supplied 13.4 percent of 1945 national product, compared to only 7.6 percent in 1925. By 1953, this share had grown to 17.2 percent.⁴²

(3) The long-term average rate of growth for manufacturing between 1925 and 1953 was estimated by ECLA at 7.7 percent yearly. In fact, output continued to climb through wartime, and accelerated after the war to a 9.2 percent rate. Using more complete data from 1937, some excellent ECLA charts show that domestic output climbed steadily through 1948, while imported manufactures fell off sharply during 1937-1942 and then recovered by 1947 to about the 1937 proportion of total availabilities.⁴³

(4) To put this amazing burst of modernization into perspective, this rapid expansion in plant and output was achieved without the help of significant foreign capital, from 1930 onward. Neither private nor official outside investment for industry or for added infrastructure was available for most of the period. Yet almost all the industrial capital equipment required was imported from abroad; this was possible because of the very high saving and investment rates maintained by private Colombian persons. Thirdly, this growth was achieved without direct assistance from the Colombian governments of the period, although import and exchange restrictions did favor investment goods and restrict imports for consumption. And finally, as recorded for 1948 by the IBRD Mission and later by ECLA, this rapid investment process and industrial growth was amazingly inefficient, since unused industrial capacity reached levels as high as

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75 percent and industrial inventories of raw materials were almost as large as output.⁴⁴

(5) The leading industrial sectors in this history of growth were primarily those supplying non-durable consumption goods, such as cotton textiles, shoes, beverages, refined sugar. Some of these were traditional Colombian leaders; cotton textiles developed rapidly during the 1930's and even more rapidly during the war years. In 1946 Colombian textiles were exported to the US; and in 1947, domestic factories imported some 20,000 tons of foreign cotton to supplement internal supplies.⁴⁵ Other industries were more recently established, such as chemicals, rubber tires, and paper. Construction-goods output also expanded from 1937-48, with cement capacity growing over 10 percent yearly. On the other hand, many new industries depended heavily upon imported raw materials and foreign exchange availabilities. In 1948, renewed exchange controls turned fertilizers, chemicals and iron and steel products into lagging industrial sectors.⁴⁶

c. Urbanization, employment and unions.

(1) The rapid growth of industry was paralleled by a rather less rapid growth of employment, as the average productivity of each worker in manufacturing increased along with the capital available to him. Nevertheless, the IBRD Mission estimated that total employment in industry grew by 5.0 percent during 1939-48; the volume of industrial output grew by 10.5 percent in this space.⁴⁷ Comparable employment figures are difficult to prepare, since 1945 and 1953 collection bases differed. The 1945 industrial census recorded 135,000 workers and employees in 7,810

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factories; ECLA estimates for 1953 showed 261,670 persons employed in 46,000 manufacturing enterprises.⁴⁸

(2) A rate of growth for industrial employment during the post-war period cannot be calculated readily from available data. However, it would be surprising if employment in manufacturing alone expanded more rapidly than the 5.2 percent of urban population growth which was achieved during the 1945-53 period. Industrial employment requires heavy additional outlays of capital; its main employment effects are felt in supporting sectors, such as commerce, transport, construction. ECLA estimates for the total number of skilled and unskilled workers in industry plus these supporting services showed a 33 percent rise between 1938-48, from 753,000 to 1,051,000 workers, and a further increase to 1,253,000 workers by 1953.⁴⁹ The implied average annual increase is about 4.5 percent with a faster average rate, near 5.0 percent for the last five years. Since industrial growth was heavily concentrated in the 3-4 fastest-growing cities, it seems quite improbable that industrial employment and the employment generated in allied sectors was growing fast enough during 1945-1953 to absorb all the growing urban population which wished to work.

(3) The average wages paid to industrial workers, and their productivity in terms of per-worker value added were examined by ECLA in considerable detail for 1953. Yearly wages and salaries varied widely, from under C\$ 800 per worker in the large footwear and clothing industry (22 percent of all employment) to about C\$ 2,000 in the textile industry, C\$ 3,500 in the beverages industry and C\$ 5,000 in petroleum and coal by-products.⁵⁰ In broad terms, it was estimated that the legal minimum wage for industrial workers was about three times that for rural workers.

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(4) Labor organizations in Colombia have been closely tied to political parties, as elsewhere, (See chapter II), but have also been the beneficiaries from extensive official paternalism, under legislation passed during 1930-48. The first confederation of unions, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Colombia (CTC) was not founded until 1935, after minimum-wage legislation had already been passed. Favored by the Liberal president Lopez, the CTC became identified with this political party. In 1946, under Conservative president Ospina, a rival and pro-clerical labor association was formed: Union de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC).

Because of the rivalry between these two confederations, labor organizations tended to be polarized politically. Neither union showed much independent strength, since an extensive set of Government regulations covering hours of work, minimum wages, welfare and other benefits were passed during the middle 1930's and extended during wartime. By 1948 the IBRD estimated that the various legal benefits thus added to basic wages amounted to 36 percent of the total industrial payroll cost. However, these official regulations were enforced very unevenly by the Government; inspectors were few, and only the largest plants and foreign enterprises were required to follow legislation closely. As a further result of the paternalistic relationship between unions and Government, unions not federated with the CTC or UTC tended to disappear. Rural-based unions did not develop, except for minor organizations in the banana and sugar cane plantations.

d. Industry and dependence on imports.

(1) The leading sectors of industrial growth were primarily those

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producing consumption goods and non-durables; this trend in private investment was supported by official import policies to restrict non-essential imports during the 1930's and wartime. The development of many other countries has been led by the same industries. In Colombia's case, however, various analysts believe that industrial growth has altered but not reduced Colombia's dependence upon imports; the existing industry of 1953 was criticized as structurally dependent upon regular imports of raw materials.⁵¹

(2) According to an IBRD analysis of the first industrial census of 1945, about 21 percent of all raw materials used in manufacturing needed to be imported. This proportion was then believed to be declining steadily.⁵² However, by 1953 the ECLA study recorded a higher proportion of imports, or 29 percent of all intermediate goods used by manufacturing, as coming from abroad.⁵³ The dependence upon imported consumer durables and upon imported capital goods was judged to be very high indeed, at 50 percent and 62 percent respectively. During 1946-53 about 17.4 percent of total product was imported.⁵⁴ These figures show that Colombian heavy industry to produce basic materials (and modern consumer equipment) lagged very badly, and that 1953 industry depended very much upon the regularity of imports and foreign exchange availabilities. In this sense, Colombia was still an "outer-directed economy."

(3) Little elaboration of this point seems necessary; Colombia's history of industrial growth was primarily directed by private entrepreneurs, and not by Government policy. The State recognized the lag in basic industries sectors by establishing the Instituto de Fomento Industrial (IFI) in 1941, and this agency proceeded very slowly to plan and execute

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the first iron and steel plant at Paz del Rio, along with chemicals projects. And in 1948-49, the government invited the first IBRD survey mission of its kind to review the Colombian economy; IBRD recommendations for a five-year investment program of C\$ 5.09 billion included a modest C\$ 742 million program for industrial investment, with only C\$ 130 million defined as first-priority investment.⁵⁵

(4) While Colombian industry was far from self-sufficiency, these conditions do not mark the Colombian economy as significantly different from other Latin American nations in 1948 and 1953. Disproportionate attention to Colombia as a case of industrial dependency has been the rule, since ECLA's study of 1957.⁵⁶ However, this condition resulted from natural industrializing processes, determined largely by private enterprise and investment; neither political party appears to have bothered seriously over this issue. National autarky as a political issue seemed to have been satisfied with Colombian legislation of the 1920's, which limited foreign petroleum exploitation opportunities.

e. Entrepreneurship and official policy.

(1) While official actions and attitudes towards industry and urban economic sectors have appeared to vary with the political party in power, these policies cannot be analyzed successfully along doctrinal lines. Liberal party statements have emphasized social welfare goals and economic modernization; conservative policies have stressed market competition and the desirability of attracting foreign capital. Yet in actual practice, both parties have shown a similar preoccupation with State investment in public works, a readiness to tax foreign and domestic

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industries quite heavily, and an unwillingness to intervene directly in industrial investment.⁵⁷

(2) Under these conditions, primary leadership in industrial growth was assumed by private enterprise; Colombian entrepreneurs have accumulated a considerable reputation for energy, and profit levels in 1947-48 were believed to be quite high, averaging 25 percent. Much industrial growth was provided by the reinstatement of high wartime profits.⁵⁸

(3) Considerable emphasis has been placed by Hagen on the leading entrepreneurial role of Medellin industrialists.⁵⁹ This is confirmed by the leading sector of textiles, primarily based in Medellin, as well as by personality analyses of company executives. Despite this initial advantage, industrial growth in Bogota and in Cali enables these centers to catch up to Medellin by 1953.⁶⁰ Large industrial empires were not formed, since difficult transport conditions continued to favor local market industries.

(4) Prior to 1940, Government legislation affected Colombian industry only indirectly; the first policies for this sector were legislated in 1940, and the first Government agency to plan industrial growth IFI came in 1941. However, wartime shortages and slow IFI planning for basic plants in chemicals and steel postponed any real Government action in this field. Through 1948, total disbursements by the IFI were very modest, well below the total funds of C\$ 12 million authorized for this agency's use. The greater importance of private savings and investments may be illustrated by the rapid growth of Colombian insurance companies after the war. In the

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one year of 1948, insurance investments in public bonds, industrial shares and in loans increased by C\$ 12 million.⁶¹

(5) After 1946, IFI efforts to establish a steel plant continued, encouraged by foreign (French) equipment suppliers. Although the IBRD Mission recommended against this project, it was eventually completed in the mid-1950's. Also, unchanged by the postwar Conservative administrations were the industrial and excess-profits tax schedules, as well as minimum wage and benefits legislation passed by the Liberal Party during the 1930's and the war years. In 1948, additional laws provided tax exemptions to new industries.

37. Services, government and planning. This paper has attempted to contrast the "traditional" rural economy with the modernizing or industrial sector, in a manner supporting the conventional belief that economic development consists primarily of a shift from the one into the other. This explanation for modernization is too oversimplified to be a guide to policy, or for economic analysis. Economic growth is only one aspect of "development"; official policies and new institutions were also important aspects of Colombia's efforts toward modernization.

a. Transport and power.

(1) During the 1920's, the largest part of Colombia's foreign borrowing was invested in transport facilities and power. While these municipal, departmental and State bonds helped provide infrastructure for later growth, the striking feature of the period was the fragmentation of effort which was involved.

(2) The construction of railroads, to complement the natural Magdalena river water routes, showed this dispersion of effort. By 1948,

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there were some 14 separate lines which totalled about 3,000 kilometers. These made up two unconnected major systems, Eastern and Western, and five additional entirely isolated systems.⁶² Built over the years, they included both meter and yard-wide gauges, and ownership ranged from the national government, to departmental, to private owners. These railroads carried only about 33 percent of total traffic by 1948. From 1930 onward, there was little additional construction, and no rolling stock was imported during 1930-1940.

(3) The traditional Magdalena river route, from Baranquilla south to the mountainous interior, has long been Colombia's traffic lifeline. Various rapids and transshipment points along its 950 kilometers slowed traffic. In 1947, all waterways carried only 28 percent of total freight.⁶³ In contrast, and despite the extreme difficulties involved, 36 percent of all freight moved via Colombia's badly maintained road network, much of which had been constructed within the previous two decades. Another primary change during this period was in the rapid growth of Buenaventura, as seaport for Cali and the Cauca Valley, as well as entrepot for trucking onward to Bogota. Despite road difficulties and high rates, this freight route offered faster service to Bogota, without the transshipment losses attending river and rail shipments.

(4) Municipal and departmental competition determined transportation patterns. The short 143-kilometer gap between west and east rail systems (Armenia and Ibaque) remained unconstructed despite many plans, and the National Railways was forced to construct and maintain a highway as its major link between the Cauca and Magdalena systems.

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During the 1930's, while foreign investments were halted, the central government took over municipal financing and required much construction of roads by the departments. Again, local issues and administration delayed the full effect of this construction until after 1945; the half-constructed highway between Cartagena and Medellin remained half-built in 1948. But postwar truck traffic expanded rapidly, after an official 1945 highway plan was developed. By 1953, 39 percent of all freight moved by road, compared to 7 percent for the 1920's.⁶⁴

(5) It is apparent that much investment in transportation was too fragmented to have maximum effect. The pattern of locally selected investment was set during the 1920's; this carried over into road-building of the 1930's, and even the use of two Export-Import Bank loans for road transportation, given in 1943, was delayed for five years. By 1945, however, the capital stock represented by transport facilities amounted to 10 percent of total capital in Colombia, and transport contributions to annual product had grown by close to 9 percent yearly, over the previous two decades, or faster than manufacturing.⁶⁵

(6) The power and energy history of growth paralleled the locally-determined pattern described above. The 1920's represented an intense utilities investment period, financed by municipal debts. About 32 percent of gross fixed investment went into such utilities during this period; then during the 1930's, this rapid rate of investment was cut in half.⁶⁶ Through the 1930's, local power shortages appeared, and a trend towards coal-fired power generation rather than hydro-electric installations began. By 1945, Colombia's total energy production had

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grown by nearly 400 percent in hydro-power and 250 percent in coal fuel generation over 1920.⁶⁷

(7) The energy picture must include Colombia's petroleum industry. The earliest oilfield, the De Mares concession to Tropical Oil, began production in 1921 and was producing 20.3 million barrels by 1930. Output continued at this level until the early 1940's, with almost all production devoted to export. After 1938, two additional fields--Barco and Yendo--came into production, as the original field began to fade out. Postwar output to 1948 averaged 25 million barrels. Colombian oil has never matched Venezuelan reserves, nor provided the same continuous impetus toward growth, but its earnings, and the construction of the small Barrancabermeja refinery, were very significant for prewar government policy. While governmental policies towards oil reserves and foreign exploration were advanced, from Colombia's point of view, they discouraged foreign exploration and gave Colombia the reputation of hostility towards foreign enterprise. Belief in an enormous potential, equal to Venezuela's progress, was a common feature of the period.⁶⁸

(8) Up to 1948, Colombian energy and transport resources may therefore be said to have remained considerably lower than the demand or their potential warranted. Difficulties of physical terrain, the early appearance of nationalistic resource policies, and local autonomy in selecting public works were all important explanations of this lagging condition.

b. Government budget and finance.

(1) Total Government contributions to national product in Colombia remained relatively small, during the 1930-1948 period. In 1935, they

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made up 5.7 percent of gross product, and in 1948 represented less than 7 percent.⁶⁹ Governmental expenditure in 1948 was divided between the central government (50 percent), the departments (15 percent) and some 800 municipalities (35 percent), but this represented a considerable shift towards central budget control, compared to conditions of the 1920's.⁷⁰ Central and municipal shares in total expenditures probably should be reversed, to describe 1930 conditions.

(2) The 1923 "Kemmerer Reform" legislation, which set up a central bank, central budget regulations and customs procedures, established very tight restrictions upon central government deficits and spending. Municipalities were able to incur bonded debt abroad, under this system, and their expenditures grew rapidly through the 1920's, as they constructed local public utilities and departmental railroads. In 1931, investment leadership passed to the central government. By 1939, the governmental share in capital formation had reached 33 percent; however, much of this represented central transfers to the municipalities for local public works.

(3) Central State expenditures saw their most rapid growth over the 1939-1948 period, when they tripled. Over this decade, military budgets grew modestly, from 13% to 18% of the total. By 1948, fully 25% of the central budget went for salaries, and a large part went for interest on domestic and foreign debt. Foreign debts of the 1920's were renegotiated and rescheduled, during 1940, 1944 and 1948; the largest part of domestic debt was incurred during 1942-48, when government bonds were sold by direct orders to firms and wealthy persons, to restrain inflation.

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(4) On the revenue side, state revenues shifted to an increasing reliance upon direct income and profit taxes during the 1939-1948 period. These reached 50% of revenues in the later year. The tradition of direct taxation was established in Colombia quite early, during the 1920's. However, major expansion of this tax source came only in the 1930's, when relatively progressive rates were applied. This undoubtedly helped public finances to adapt to the depression years and to wartime trade shifts. The direct taxes fell primarily upon a limited number of persons and firms--in 1948, just 33 companies provided 65% of total profits and excess-profits tax revenues.⁷¹

(5) This rather modern approach to fiscal problems combined with a strong tradition of State support for local government expenditure. Departmental revenues, for example, were derived primarily from a local liquor monopoly, and from excise taxes on tobacco and beer. Municipal revenues depended upon local property taxes, commercial taxes, auto taxes and fees. In 1948, these made up only 45 percent of all municipal revenues, with the remainder coming from central government transfers.⁷² However, local independence was sufficient to dilute the impact of central investment financing; funds were shared out to the departments without full respect for the works projects involved, municipalities received funds more according to their political importance than to actual needs. A Municipal Fund, to provide credit for local projects, was established in 1941, but was underfunded and politically managed.

(6) Since the central government appoints governors for each department, and local mayors for each municipality, the victories of the Liberal Party in 1930, and the Conservatives in 1946 led to thoroughgoing

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personnel changes throughout the local government bureaucracy. Ideological differences between Liberals and Conservatives were intensely debated, but financial relationships between the central and local governments were not altered after 1945. These differences seem doctrinal and not practical. Despite the creation of a civil service department in 1940, only 1155 persons were included in this "career service" by 1948/49,⁷³ and the ability of Bogota's bureaucracy to exercise effective influence in local financial affairs was therefore low.

c. Foreign trade and exchange controls.

(1) A final important area of Governmental control was that of foreign trade and foreign exchange. Starting from 1930-31 tariff reforms, the Liberal administration introduced a protective tariff policy which had the dual objectives of limiting overall consumption imports and conserving foreign exchange. The import licensing system was soon extended by a system of foreign exchange controls, after Colombia's foreign debt moratorium in 1931. Exchange regulations were administered by the Banco de la Republica (BOR--Bank of the Republic), and these soon became the primary vehicle for trade controls. The import licensing and tariff structure remained basically unchanged until 1951. Coffee, being Colombia's major foreign exchange earner throughout this period, felt the brunt of foreign exchange regulations during much of the period. Coffee growers were provided a fixed annual price after 1941, while coffee exporters were required to surrender their foreign exchange at special rates, with a variety of other special benefits and costs assigned to them which nearly defy description. The net effect was to provide significant earnings to the Government. Special exchange rates were established

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for different types of import goods, and by 1948, this system involved at least twelve major exchange rates.⁷⁴

(2) The control pattern established during the 1930's only reached its full bloom after World War II. Worldwide shortages during the war combined with steady Colombian exports to create a rapid build-up in Colombian foreign exchange holdings. After the war's end, pent-up domestic demand led to a very heavy wave of imports and a rapid run-down of exchange reserves. By the end of 1946, import and exchange controls had to be reestablished, since all wartime reserves had been exhausted. In December 1948, the Government devalued the Colombian peso by some 12 percent (from C\$ 1.75 to 1.95 per US \$), but this action was too small to bring internal prices in line with the cost of imported goods. During 1949, differential exchange rates were introduced for various approved purposes which ranged from C\$ 1.75 all the way to C\$ 3.86 per dollar. This intricate system of quotas and special exchange rates was continued until 1951.*

(3) While government and BOR operations during wartime and post-war conditions showed remarkable ingenuity and imagination in moderating the growth of internal import demands, in favoring imports of capital goods and in extracting a large share of export earnings for public use, the involved exchange system which these steps produced had generally bad effects upon the economy.⁷⁵ In general, they permitted serious price distortions internally, they protected inefficient industries as

*The ECLA study used real pesos of 1950 value, with dollars figured at C\$ 2.70/1.

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well as effective ones, they greatly enlarged the complexity of governmental decisions, and they encouraged corruption and favoritism. It is worth note that the Conservative Ospina government was responsible for extensions to the manipulated foreign exchange system which was first developed by a Liberal administration. The postwar financial operation of the BOR, in extending liberal credit facilities to the central government, as well as to various official agencies such as the Caja de Credito Agrario, the "Mortgage Bank" and the Exchange Stabilization Fund during the postwar period, was a continuation of the credit and financing patterns first established under Liberal administrations in the 1930's. Throughout these two decades, the central bank made no serious effort to restrict lending by Colombia's commercial banks, and such lending was biased toward trade, cattle financing, and city construction purposes. The consequent inflation which reached roughly 275% from 1940 to 1949, probably did not affect city and farm sectors equally, and does not seem to have slowed private investment.⁷⁶

(4) In conclusion, Colombian official efforts to expand investment, to diversify revenues, to control imports and foreign exchange, and to insulate the economy from outside pressures appear to be unusually sophisticated and advanced for their time. While these actions greatly extended the central government's potential role for conscious economic management, government expenditures remained rather heavily directed to local governments' investment and infrastructural works. There was little formal planning of the internal economy until arrival of the IBRD Mission in 1949; price control efforts during the war were ineffective.⁷⁷ Colombia did experience considerable inflation during and after the war which

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was considered very serious and upsetting in reports of the time (see chapter II); but the leading modern sectors of the economy expanded much more rapidly than did governmental expenditures, and government's leadership in industry remained small. In overall view, the Colombian economy expanded during these two decades of depression and war with relatively few serious strains, and rather smoothly when compared to other South American nations.

d. Foreign aid.

(1) It would be incorrect to state that foreign investments, official and private, played no part in Colombia's growth during 1930-48. Foreign petroleum investments in 1938-39 and wartime Export-Import loans for road-building have been mentioned. After 1945, various World Bank Loans, American supplied credits and bank credits for specific purposes were provided. By the end of 1952, Colombia's external public debt⁷⁸ reached \$257 million.

(2) Up to 1950, however, postwar foreign investment was relatively small; only \$40 million of the \$177 million external debt added during 1945-52 was incurred before 1950. And the bulk of these and later inflows were for the revival of transportation facilities, energy, public utilities and the State's iron-steel industry, at Paz del Rio. Therefore, it is accurate to state that postwar foreign investment in Colombia was largely officially sponsored, primarily provided after 1949 coffee earnings expanded, and was not important to either industrial or agricultural growth during 1930-1948.

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38. Conclusions.

a. Colombia's economic growth.

(1) In terms of economic theories of development, Colombia presents a complicated case which fits poorly into a number of "growth models". The early 1930-35 period seems to satisfy most parts of Rostow's "takeoff period"; however the social and political structure created by reforms in 1930-46 failed in actual performance during 1948 and 1950-53. The ECLA-Prebisch theory of Colombia as an "outer-directed economy" is supported by many details in the ECLA study of the 1953 economy. But this also fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for Colombia's good growth record, high rates of domestic investment, and rapid modernization in types of crops produced, domestic financial institutions and exchange controls. A third theory of the need for a "big push" strategy of publicity directed investment, particularly to create social infrastructure in transport, power and communications, seems to be partially confirmed by Colombia's history of heavy investments in roads and municipal utilities. However, there was little planning of much of this public investment, and local municipalities and departments retained considerable authority over its use. Colombian industry grew rather rapidly without the benefit of any direct State intervention.⁷⁹

(2) Both advantageous and constraining structural features of Colombia may be chosen as predominating during 1930-48. On balance, the favorable aspects of economic growth seem a more adequate and generalized description. Colombia must be ranked among the more modern Latin American economies, in 1948 and later. By far the largest part of such growth and modernization occurred within the two decades to 1948, and this was

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carried out largely with Colombia's own resources, through a worldwide depression and war.

(3) When compared with other Latin American economies of the time, Colombia must be judged among the leaders, although the proportion of her output and employment in manufacturing lagged behind such leaders as Argentina and Brazil. Similarly, the rather equal growth of Colombia's three main cities, while not absorbing all the inflow of rural labor, did provide a degree of regional balance to the economy. Income distribution was undoubtedly uneven, between rural-city earners and between various modern sectors, but it seems likely that 1948 income differentials were no worse than in such countries as Brazil and Mexico.⁸⁰ In terms of economic efficiency, certain sectors ranked unusually low--especially in livestock raising, and the very low use of industrial capacity. This implied that 1948 conditions permitted a considerable increase in outputs with rather modest increases in input supplies.

b. Economic factors conducive to conflict.

(1) The economic advances noted above do not rule out the possibility that development and modernization helped to increase the political and social tensions within Colombia. Normal levels of economic competition may be sharply increased by the differences in growth between economic groups, economic units such as consumers and company managers, or entire economic sectors. A few possibilities are examined briefly here.

(2) Relative deprivation of certain economic groups as compared to city and modern-sector groups has been proposed as a source of conflict. To the extent this can be measured objectively, incomes or productivity in various sectors provide some guide. Data provided above shows that

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industrial wages ranged from C\$ 800-3500 per year in 1953; this compared to a gross product of C\$ 1,882 per active person (some 4.12 million) in that year, or perhaps C\$ 600 per head, as a national average. Per capita average income of personal tax payers was CR\$ 5,923 or an index 88 times above the national average. The average productivity of one hectare of farmland was also calculated by ECLA for different uses; while no precise figures seem appropriate, coffee-growing smallholders may have received gross incomes at least equal to most industrial workers. An average share-cropping tenant may well have received as little as one-tenth the national average product--but data are not available to test this assumption.

(3) Income trends over the 1930-48 period may be as important as guides to popular expectations for the economic future. For example, internal coffee prices were pegged, after about 1938, and subsequent years saw considerable tree plantings. This investment provides a rough guide to smallholder expectations; however, there was no reason for a reversal of this optimism in 1948 or in 1953, since coffee exports and world prices rose throughout this period. Although coffee was a favored crop, and in fact much of Colombia's rural violence occurred in coffee growing districts, there is little proof that violence represented economic hostility between underprivileged tenants and smallholders.

(4) Tensions may well have arisen between various tenant groups and their landlords. This was demonstrated in 1934-36, when rural squatters invaded idle pasture lands, and resulted in the 1936 Agrarian Reform Law. However, this law was never enforced, and growing resentment against absentee landlords may very well have

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heightened rural tensions and predisposed tenants or smallholders toward violence. This probability requires careful examination; it provides no explanation for the timing of rural violence, nor for the complete lack of official interest in continued land reform, up to 1961-63.

(5) Another potential cause of political and social tension may be found in the heavy migration of rural population into Colombia's cities. Undoubtedly, urban job opportunities did not match this inflow, and the number of urban unemployed or partly employed must have grown considerably. Measures for this tendency are lacking; however, ECLA calculations suggest only that real wages in industry did not increase as rapidly as per-worker productivity. The incomes received in "artisan industry" and urban services have not been estimated.

(6) An economic examination of income differentials within Colombian cities is further complicated by the unequal deprivation caused by a high rate of inflation, such as Colombia's 275% between 1940 and 1949. This inflation clearly affected urban incomes more seriously than it changed rural consumption patterns. A problem for further analysis is caused by the special character of Colombian violence. Save for the April 1948 riots in Bogota, violence was almost entirely rural in its location, and highly primitive in its 1953 style.

(7) It seems that only broad economic potentials for conflict can be isolated from a study of Colombia's economic structure and growth during 1930-48. The most satisfactory analysis of the preconflict period in economic terms remains one which emphasizes Colombia's rapid growth and modernization, the shifts in crop patterns and industrial output which actually occurred, and the broadly similar governmental economic policies

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which were applied throughout the two decades after 1930. The social and political tensions which inevitably accompany development and modernization are poorly explained by the economic tensions generated during 1930-48.

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CHAPTER 4

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

Section I. Demography, Education, Communication, and Culture

by Donald S. Bloch

39. Introduction.

a. This section will describe and analyze the population dynamics, demography, education and literacy, religion, communication and attitudes for Colombia over the period 1930-48. Succeeding sections discuss social classes and the family.

b. Information on this period is not very rich. General histories and surveys of Colombia touch on several of these areas but do not treat them in detail. Specific studies of a sociological nature for this period are few, and official statistics are not too reliable or, in many instances, do not present a time series of similar data. Thus some of the observations will, of necessity, be inferences based on rather scanty data.

40. An overview of cultural values.

a. Although rather intense regionalism and geographic isolation has produced marked subcultures in Colombia, and although there appear to be some contradictions (perhaps more apparent than real)

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between the discussions of the culture of the Colombians and observations made by the very few studies of villages, there are some common characteristics and common Colombian values. The extent of acculturation to Spanish values is reflected in the fact that all except a small proportion of Indians spoke Spanish.

b. Most Colombians were oriented toward the values of the elite, the Criollos of Spanish descent, who dominated the political and economic life of the country. Except for a small number of Indians who still lived a tribal life in remote areas, the Indian had been almost entirely acculturated (far more so, apparently, than in most other Latin American countries). Yet the impact of the original Indian heritage (which showed considerable variation in social and cultural patterns in various areas) is clear, and some social and psychological tensions especially in the lower classes may be related to cultural differences (see section II below). Some Indian influences in dress, housing and cooperative farming were found among the lowest, primarily rural, socio-economic groups. The Negroes, who were brought to Colombia as slaves, also accepted the Spanish culture of Colombia. Some African influences, such as spirit worship and belief in witchcraft, were still evident along the seacoasts where there is a concentration of negroes and mulattoes.

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c. The individual identified most strongly with his family, and his primary loyalty was to the family. Family loyalty took precedence over loyalty to other social units, such as village, region, political party, and in the case of the elite, social class.¹ However, the individual would migrate from village to town or city, or from town to city, in search of better economic opportunities. The few studies of rural villages that are available do not indicate that the migrants maintained close or continued contact with their family. It is, therefore, difficult to assess the strength of the family tie for all except the elite group. Membership in the elite is still based, in large measure, on family background.

d. The very rigid stratification of colonial society which was based on race had been tempered to some degree. There were no legal bars to occupational and social mobility, but the colonial traditions still had much influence: Colombians tended to discriminate against those who had darker skin, who dressed or acted like Indians, or who had less education. In general, the language forms indicate that deference was given to superiors and to elders. Superiors were supposed to be concerned for and protect inferiors. This "patron-client" relationship was most evident on large haciendas and in the spoils system. It did not appear to be all-pervasive even in the rural areas.

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e. The society emphasized the role of the male. He was the dominant figure in economics, politics, government, in social and recreational activities, and formally was the authority in the family. Women, however, had a good deal of power in the family. The concept of machismo was evident in the society. A man should demonstrate his manliness--therefore, he was aggressive in sports and sex, consumed a great deal of alcoholic beverages, and was quick to physically avenge a real or imagined insult.

f. Self-interest and self-assertiveness were inculcated early in the young male child. Self-interest became the basis for an individual's actions, and he tended to be suspicious of the motives of others, fearing that his dignity or self-interest would suffer as a result of another's actions. Such suspicion existed among associates but was strongest toward outsiders. It was expected that outsiders, especially, would attempt to cheat, exploit or deceive.

g. Other than the family, Colombians were born into their religion and political party. About 99 percent of Colombians adhered to Roman Catholicism; however, in general, observance tended to be ritualistic rather than ideological. In fact, one report observed that values pertinent to preservation of the socio-political system took precedence over moral values taught by the Church.²

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h. A Colombian tended to be intensely loyal to his political party. Party membership extended throughout the social hierarchy for both the Conservative and Liberal parties, i.e., neither was made up of a particular social class. Party antagonisms in the past had been physically violent as well as verbally vitriolic, and a tight spoils system produced changes among government officials with changes in party control of the government.

i. Colombians tended to unite against another group rather than uniting for a positive purpose. The leader of a group wielded the power for the group. He was expected to make the decisions and plan the action. He received support from the membership in proportion to his exhibited power and skill at outmaneuvering the leadership of opposing groups. The leader's character and personality were important forces in welding the group into an operational unit.

41. Population and demography.

a. The geography of this mountainous country tended to regionalize the population. Three chains of the Andes run roughly north and south along the eastern portion of Colombia, cutting the country into separate valleys and highlands. There are lowlands on the Pacific Coast and in the extreme north, where the littoral is bounded by the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. A vast plain stretches east from the mountains to the borders of Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, and Brazil. (See annex II: Environmental Factors.)

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b. By far the largest population concentration was along the lower slopes and in the plateaus of the Andes. In 1948 about 71 percent of the estimated 10,776,890 Colombians lived in the Andean region, 21 percent lived in the northern littoral, 6 percent along the Pacific Coast, 1 percent in the eastern plain or llanos, and about 6 percent on the San Andres and Providencia Islands.³ In general, the most densely populated area was the Andean region, next was the northern littoral, then the Pacific coastal region; the least densely populated region was the eastern plains, with less than one person per square kilometer.⁴ The islands, which were some 405 miles off Colombia's Caribbean coast, were the most densely populated area of the nation with almost 120 people per square kilometer.⁵

c. According to the census figures, the population of Colombia increased by 46 percent from 1928 to 1951.⁶ This figures out to an average yearly increase slightly over 2 percent which, as is pointed out in the section on public health, seems to be low. Immigration and emigration were so small that they were not a factor. The statistics presented here should be used to indicate general trends rather than exact figures either for the population itself or for the actual percent of increase. It should also be noted that for many indicators, data was not available prior to 1938.

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d. Statistics show a somewhat uneven increase in population among the Departments and territories for the period 1938-51. This is obvious from table XI, annex I. The variations do not reflect differences in natural increase; therefore, they are probably a product of a rather poor 1948 estimate of the population and of internal migration. There is no way of estimating how much of the apparent increase or decrease was due to a poor population estimate. If one tries to understand the differences in terms of internal migration, it appears that the population was being drawn to the central Andean region, the port areas along the Caribbean and, to some extent, to the eastern plains which would provide a frontier for Colombia.

e. The trends in population change by department and territory do not seem closely related to the tensions and violence which developed in 1946. The pattern of population increase and decrease by departments for the period in which violence was exacerbated after the assassination of Gaitan, 1948-51, does not appear to reflect a movement away from centers of turmoil. The departments of Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Huila, and Valle del Cauca had high rates of population increase which undoubtedly reflect some internal migration even if the actual figures may be in error, and these departments had a high degree of violence. An additional four departments within the disturbed area had lower rates of increase than the national average, and one department had a rate which approximates the average for 1948-51.

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There were six departments in which there was no turmoil or very little. Of these, two had rather high rates of population increase and four had low rates or lost population.

f. The population has become more urban over the years. In 1918, 21.0 percent of the population was urban, in 1938, 29.8 percent, and in 1951, 36.3 percent.⁷ The urban trend was occasioned by increasing industrial development and by the search for the security of the city after La Violencia started in 1948, and continued predominantly in the rural areas of Andean departments. Table XII, annex I presents data on rates of increase of capital cities of the departments. Of the nine departments in which there was substantial violence, the capital cities in six increased in population from 1948 to 1951 by a much greater annual rate than in the ten preceding years; in fact, five capital cities had about the same or a greater increase in those three years as they enjoyed in the preceding ten years. Thus it appears that the search for better economic opportunities was a relatively long-term influence on the migration from rural areas into the cities and after 1948, if not before, widespread violence in the countryside stimulated additional migration to the cities where law enforcement was more effective.

g. Rapid urban population growth produced slums and unemployment in all of the larger Colombian cities.⁸ However, there were 11 cities of 50,000 or over in Colombia in 1951 to absorb the rural influx.

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The problems arising from overurbanization were spread over several cities rather than concentrated in one or two as in many other less developed nations.

h. Colombia had a relatively young population at the beginning of this time period because of high birth and mortality rates. Continued high birth rates produced an even younger population as of 1951. In 1938, 42.0 percent of the population was under 15 years of age,⁹ and by 1951, 44.1 percent of the population was under 15.¹⁰ The population 65 years of age and over remained about constant during this period at approximately 3.0 percent of the total population.¹¹ If these statistics are an accurate indication of the trend, the dependent population increased during this period--that is, a smaller percentage of people in their productive years had to produce goods and services for the total population--while in agriculture, productivity per worker did not increase^{*} since farming was conducted in the traditional manner.

i. Immigration was not a factor in population increase nor was emigration a factor up to 1951. 36,597 people immigrated to Colombia and 36,141 emigrated from Colombia for a net gain of 456.¹² Indications are that although the number of immigrants and emigrants might fluctuate, the net gain or loss had been negligible since 1938.

^{*}See section on Economics.

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42. Ethnic composition and regional subcultures.

a. The ethnic composition of Colombia has been influenced by the conquest of the Indians by the Spanish colonists, the importation of slaves from Africa, and the degree of miscegenation and acculturation of the Indian and Negro with the Spanish stock. It is necessary to think of ethnic composition in terms of both miscegenation and acculturation, since the census dropped the question of race after the 1918 census, and since then identification by "race" or ethnicity has been based in large part on status rather than purely racial features.¹³

b. As table XIII, annex I indicates, although there is some difference in estimates, in general there was basic core of white stock and a continued mixing of white with Indian (mestizo), with Negro (mulatto), and more recently a mixing of Negro and Indian (zambo).

c. The distribution of the "races" and the character of the people tended to be regionalized because the geography permitted a minimum of spatial mobility. Thus, many authors attribute special or different characteristics or subcultures to regional groupings based primarily on the varying background of the original Spanish settlers and on the amount of mixing with the Indians.

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d. For the most part, the whites were of Spanish descent born in Colombia (Criollos). They were the elite group and were found primarily in urban areas. The mestizo were found mostly in the middle highlands rural areas, but were steadily migrating to the urban areas. The Negro and mulatto were found primarily along the coasts and in the northern lowlands, where the slaves were originally brought to serve a plantation economy. The few Indians that were left were found in the more remote regions of Colombia--the higher elevations of the mountains, the Guajera Peninsula, the heavy jungle along portions of the Pacific Coast, and the great eastern plain (the Llanos).¹⁴

e. The regions identified by most authors are the several plateaus, delineated by the Andean ridges, through which the major rivers flow; the Pacific lowlands; the Atlantic or Caribbean coast and lowlands; and the Llanos.

f. The northern Andean region which is now the department of Antioquia, including the city of Caldos, was settled by Basques and Andalusian Spaniards who practically exterminated the Indian population in that area. They developed a strong industrial, commercial, and mining economy along with agriculture. This area was considered to dominate Colombia's industry, commerce, and mining. The Antioquenos had a strong sense of regionalism, and had on occasion set themselves against the central government.¹⁵ The sub-culture reflected the

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Spanish background of the Basques and Andalusians in that they were energetic, traditionalist, conquering, and had a fatalistic and harsh sense of life.¹⁶ Negroes were not utilized in this area during the period of their importation as slaves. Yet it appears that Indians and Negroes were attracted to the area because of economic opportunities, since it was characterized as tri-ethnic.¹⁷

g. Further toward the South in the Cundinamarca-Boyaca region of the Andes, the Castillian and Andalusian conquerors met a more tractable Indian who was rather rapidly acculturated. The inhabitants of this area were characterized as given to gracious living, exaggerated courtesy, wittiness, literary and political interests, and with a desire for knowledge which went beyond their capacity for organizing the knowledge.¹⁸ Fluhar y also points out that the Indians in the area adopted the characteristics of gentility that mark the Spanish. This region was considered to be the center of politics and culture, with the capital city of Bogota taking the lead.

h. The Cauca Valley in the Southern part of the Colonial Andes was settled by Castilians and Andalusians who mixed more readily with both the indigenous Indian and the imported Negro. The people of this area were characterized as being haughty, proud, intelligent, somewhat soft, but quite independent and regionalistic.

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i. Catalonians and Andalusians settled the lowlands bordering the Atlantic coast. Most of the Negroes imported as slaves were utilized on the various plantations in this area. The Spanish mixed with the Negro to the extent that the dominant racial group was considered mulatto.¹⁹ The culture of this group was said to reflect African ancestry as well as Spanish. They were described as generous, fun-loving, thoughtless of the future, and given to "amatory gallantries."²⁰ In this region also the practice of concubinage was strong among all classes.²¹ It is stated that Roman Catholicism was diluted by continued belief in spirits and witchcraft.²²

j. The regionalism found in Colombia tended to inhibit the growth of a strong sense of national identity and was considered to be one of the main problems that plagued this country through 1948. With the relatively recent advent of better means of communication, such as more and better roads, railroads, air transportation, the proliferation of radio receivers, higher rates of literacy, there was a prospect that regionalism would give way to stronger feelings of nationalism.

43. Education.

a. Education is another of the major problems that faced Colombia (and is, perhaps, still a major problem). Although a law was passed in 1927 making education compulsory, there had been little

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attempt to enforce the law. Schools were not found in every village--this was especially true of secondary schools; difficulty of travel inhibited attendance; and the quality of education was very poor in the rural areas.

b. At least three types of primary education were provided by the government (public schools) or by private schools which were run primarily by the Church. There was a five-year primary school in the urban areas and a four-year or two-year primary education available in rural areas. The curriculum (except for the two-year program) was designed to prepare students for the academic secondary schools rather than as a terminal education. All schools, public or private, have courses in the Roman Catholic religion. Other courses included reading, writing, arithmetic, and civics. Girls received some instruction in home economics and boys got some instruction in the elements of agriculture.²³ Of the 13,010 primary schools in Colombia in 1948, 1,141 were private.²⁴

c. There were three types of secondary education offered in Colombia: the academic secondary school (colegio), which offered a six-year education to prepare the student for higher education; the complementary school which offered two years of vocational training and required four years of elementary school for admittance; and the normal school which offered a four-year teacher training curriculum.²⁵

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In 1948 there were 601 academic secondary schools, of which 431 were private; 158 complementary schools, of which 23 were private; and 66 normal schools, of which 22 were private.²⁶ The private schools, mostly run by the Church, dominated academic secondary education.

d. There were 23 universities in Colombia of which eleven were private, nine were supported by departments and three were national. Higher education tended to be oriented toward the professions rather than general liberal arts.²⁷ The professional or vocational orientation was evident from the presentation of official statistics which broke out information for the 62 schools within the universities that are listed in 1948.²⁸

e. Some idea of the extent of education of the population may be indicated by rate of illiteracy. As is indicated in table XIV, annex I, illiteracy was reduced from 48.0 percent in 1934 to 38.5 percent in 1951. One must be cautious in using these figures, however, since the quality of the statistics is suspect and many who had two years of primary school lapsed back into illiteracy after a few years.

f. Although there is wide variation between departments, it appears from table XIV that the nine departments in which the violence took place had slightly lower rates of illiteracy, on the average, than did the other departments. However, all that this may indicate

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is that there were higher illiteracy rates in rural than in urban areas, since the departments with relatively larger rural populations had the higher illiteracy rates.

g. The illiteracy rates tend to reflect school attendance.

Table XV, annex I, shows the percent of the population six to fourteen years of age enrolled in primary schools in 1934 (the last year within the period for which figures are available).^{*} The average for the country, 34.6 percent of this age group enrolled, indicates lack of enforcement of the law requiring compulsory schooling along with a large number of two-year primary schools from which children aged nine and ten would have "graduated."

h. The number of schools and number of students enrolled increased from 1934 to 1951, as is indicated in table XVI, annex I. However, the higher percentage increases were in secondary schools, normal schools, and universities. Here, even major percentage increases still left very few young people gaining more than a primary education and a large number with little education of any kind.

i. The number of students completing each of the school levels was a very small percentage of those who entered. It has been estimated that as late as 1958 only 12 percent of those entering the five-year primary schools completed the fifth year, about 14 percent of those who enter the academic secondary schools actually completed the six-year course.²⁹ About 12 percent of those who entered the universities in 1944 earned their degrees in 1948.³⁰

^{*}The statistics on population by age groups in later reports would not permit comparison.

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j. Poor quality of the teaching staff further contributed to a poorly educated population. As may be seen from table XVII, annex I, 81.5 percent of the rural primary school teachers did not complete secondary school, and it is suspected that many did not complete primary school. Although the situation was better in the urban schools, it left much to be desired. A study of a mestizo village in the Atlantic littoral further points up the poor quality of education, as may be seen by the answers considered correct to several questions as well as the type of question. Question: What has man been created for? Answer: to live in society. Question: How does a bee sleep? Answer: standing. Question: How did Bolivar die? Answer: naked.³¹

k. On the other hand, two studies of villages in Cundinamarca which are not too far from Bogota showed the literacy rates to be over 60 percent, and the researchers were encouraging concerning the progress made and projected in the rural school system.³²

44. Religion.

a. The population of Colombia was about 99 percent Catholic, one of the highest percentages in Latin America.³³ Protestant proselytizing did not start until the 1930's, and Protestant congregations have been negligible.

b. During the colonial period, Catholicism was the state religion. The Church pursued missionary activities with the Indians and the Negro slaves and had complete control of the education system.

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c. After independence from Spain, the Church became a major political issue between the Conservatives and Liberals. The Conservative Party supported a strong role for the Church in Colombia, while the Liberal Party sought to separate Church and State. In 1831 Roman Catholicism was declared to be the state religion, and the constitutions of 1832 and 1843 stated that a role of government was to protect the Church. However, by midcentury, constitutional and legal modifications had been made to provide for freedom of religion and the separation of Church and State. Divorce was legalized, and marriage made a civil ceremony. However, the Church remained a very pervasive and strong influence in Colombia, and Church-State relations were still a live issue, if one of less political significance, up to 1948. The Catholic religion was taught in all of the public schools. The clergy was given the right to select the religious texts and, at times, selected texts in other areas. The church maintained the majority of schools offering secondary academic education.³⁴

d. In general, the Church in Colombia stressed compliance with ritual--i.e., church attendance, celebration of the various holy days and the sacraments--rather than the ideological or theological foundations of the religion.³⁵ Thus we find one study pointing out that houses in the village had pictures of saints, that both sexes attended church, there was deep respect for the clergy, but that it was expected that prayers would be answered and that drinking and worship went hand in hand. The study concluded that devotion to the church was mechanical rather than ideological.³⁶

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e. In a study of another village it was found that spirit worship and the practice of witchcraft did not seem inconsistent to the parishioners with the practice of Catholicism. In this community less reliance was placed on the clergy, who were usually found in towns or in capitals of a political subdivision similar to a county which had the only Church in the area and serviced several villages. The village folk conducted burials and processions without clergy being present.³⁷

f. Fals-Borda indicates that marriage was not considered legal unless there was a religious ceremony, in spite of the fact that a civil ceremony had been legalized.³⁸ In view of this, it is interesting to note that 16.3 percent of all persons ever married were living in common law marriages.³⁹ This tends to substantiate the claim that religious observance emphasized the ritualistic aspect rather than the ideological. Illegitimacy was declining but was still 28.3 percent of all births in 1948. The highest rates of illegitimacy occurred in the departments on the Pacific Coast and the Atlantic littoral, which have been mentioned above as practicing concubinage in all classes, an activity which is against the moral teachings of the Church.*

g. Although it has been stated that the Church was pervasive, the ignoring of religious custom cited above indicates that it may have had the appearance of more power, especially in rural areas, than was in fact the case. During the latter portion of the period

* See table XVIII, annex I.

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we are studying, the Church increased its activities in charitable and social welfare projects. Growth of activity in these areas may gain more real power for the Church in the future.

45. Communication.

a. In 1948 there were 66,525 telephones for a population of almost 11,000,000; there were 375 movie houses and 118 radio transmitters. It is estimated that in 1945 there were about 30 newspapers with a circulation of almost 300,000. 40

b. Because of high rates of illiteracy and because smaller communities were without electric power, the press and radio reached a comparatively small proportion of the population.

c. For the rural inhabitant, market day provided a major means of communication. On the weekly market day, people from several villages congregated at the market and exchanged information and gossip. This was also the day when government representatives informed the public about the latest government decrees. This was done verbally. ⁴¹

d. Because communication was rather limited and because there have been no studies or data concerning the extent of information flow in general nor about specific types of information, no firm conclusions can be drawn about the peasants' expectations of improved social welfare or about their knowledge of political activities to improve their lot.

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Section II. Social Classes

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

46. Historical background.

a. The Spanish conquistadors early established themselves as a ruling oligarchy, appropriated the best lands and pasture for their horses and cattle, and portioned out the Indians as virtual serfs in the various encomiendas. Since the Spaniards had firearms and the natives did not, the latter had little choice but to work on the Spaniards' terms or to flee, as many did, to the more inaccessible areas of the Andes. The Spaniards also imported Negro slaves to work in the tropical lowlands and in the mines. Few white women came to the colonies, and it was only a matter of decades until there were large numbers of mestizos and mulattoes. Since the Spaniards made a clear distinction between those of pure Spanish ancestry and those of mixed blood, Colombian society early became sharply differentiated into a caste-like two-class system in which the primary criteria for status were race and land. At the apex of the social pyramid were the terratenientes, a small, homogeneous, wealthy, land-owning, white, well-educated aristocratic elite. Far below in the social scale were the campesinos, the great masses of Indians, Negroes, and mixed bloods.⁴²

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b. Within the lower class, distinctions were made among varying degrees of racial mixture, for example, between a mulatto, a "terceron" (produced from a white and a mulatto), a "quarteron," a "quinteron," etc. Children of the same "caste" as their fathers were called "tenti en el agne," suspended in the air, because they neither advanced nor receded. Those whose parents were a quarteron or quinteron, and a mulatto or terceron were "salto atras," or retrogrades because instead of "advancing" they went backwards toward the Negro race. The children of a white and a quinteron, if there were no visible Negro features were called Spaniards and were not considered to be tainted by their Negro blood. Similar distinctions were made between various Indian-white and Negro-Indian crossings. An early traveler reported that "every person is so jealous of the order of their tribe or caste, that if through inadvertence . . . you call them by a degree lower than they actually are, they are highly offended, never suffering themselves to be deprived of so valuable a gift of fortune."⁴³

c. In general Negroes and Indians had no rights or privileges. Most occupations except that of unskilled laborer in the mines and fields were closed to them. Mestizos and mulattoes, however, had a degree of occupational mobility. Some became small farmers, artisans, small businessmen, or administrative employees.⁴⁴ Manual labor was denigrated by all, and an individual's occupation was a factor in deciding the stratum of the lower class to which he belonged. Consciousness of race and concern with occupation thus became firmly embedded in the Colombian social pattern.

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d. Within the upper class, the Spaniards accorded higher status to the Spanish-born (peninsulares) than to the native-born white (criollos). As a result of Colombia's independence, the criollos supplanted the peninsulares in power, but the rest of the social structure was little affected. The rigid two-class system with its extremes of wealth and poverty, of power and powerlessness, education and illiteracy; with its great emphasis on race and status; and with its contempt for any form of manual labor, survived with few exceptions into the 20th century.

e. The major exception was to be found in Southern Antioquia and in Caldas where in the 19th century "a determined peasantry . . . engaged in one of the most remarkable bursts of colonization activities . . . that the world has ever seen."⁴⁵ Hundreds of individual farm properties and thousands of other small enterprises were developed. The result was the creation in Southern Antioquia and Caldas of a distinct middle class.

47. Social change.

a. Between 1860 and 1920, insecurity created by civil wars,⁴⁶ agricultural disasters that destroyed the crops, and the threat of epidemics led many peasants to move to the larger towns and cities. Others, encouraged by government policy, abandoned their native villages and sought new agricultural lands.⁴⁷ These developments began to undermine traditional social relationships, but it was not until after

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1920 that marked change took place.⁴⁸ In 1919 the world's first commercial airline was established in Colombia. The subsequent growth of air travel dramatically reduced the distance between various centers of the republic. For the first time, a national press became possible. Almost simultaneously the radio brought a new awareness to the largely illiterate lower classes.⁴⁹ This breakdown in isolation combined with increased economic activity and demographic factors to produce significant modifications in the class structure and to bring new tensions and frustrations to many individuals.

b. Class in Colombia was not a "mere theoretical construction conceived by the analyst. It was, and remained despite social change, a living part of the social structure. It defined each person's mode of life and his relationship with other members of the community."⁵⁰ Social change did not spread evenly throughout Colombia. Nor did individuals and subcultures react uniformly to its impact. Despite this selectivity of response, certain basic patterns emerged.

48. Contemporary class structure.

a. General.

(1) In most, probably all, urban communities as of 1948 the social structure consisted of a small caste-like upper class, a large lower class, and between them a newly developing and somewhat amorphous middle stratum. Both the middle and lower sectors were further divided into sub-strata.

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(2) In rural areas and small villages, there was not always a true upper class in the metropolitan sense--except one represented by a nonresident landlord. A middle class was developing but in many communities was missing.⁵¹ Each village, however, had its own version of "primera" (first), "segunda" (second), and "clase baja" (low class).

(3) One study based on the 1951 census, establishes these categories:

(a) Rural population.

1. The "burguesia"--not more than 2 percent of the population.

2. The "clase media"--15 to 20 percent.

3. The "clase popular"--i. general 75 percent and running as high as 85 percent.

4. "Clase indigente"--some day laborers, unemployed and beggars--no estimate.

(b) Urban population--for cities of Barranquilla, Medellin, and Popayan.

1. The high burguesia--about 2.7 percent.

2. Clase media--about 2.7 percent.

3. Clase popular--77 percent.

4. "Subproletariado"--about 7 percent.

(4) Although this study is considered as of doubtful validity by some authorities, it is given here because no better statistical analysis is available.⁵²

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b. The upper class.

(1) Despite rather rapid economic and technical change, the social, economic, and political life of the nation continued to be dominated by a small, highly educated, sophisticated, and race-conscious upper class. The primary criteria for membership were lineage and wealth. When a family was referred to as an 'old family,' "it usually meant that some of the ancestors on one or both sides . . . had first arrived in the middle of the 16th century . . . or had come a short time later to hold office in the colonial government . . ."53 Class lines were tightly drawn and few individuals without proper lineage were able to cross the barriers.

(2) The wealth of the aristocracy was based primarily on the ownership of large estates. These were the cattlemen and the cotton growers. Some still held lands deeded to their families by the Spanish crown. Loss of wealth might lead to loss of status, certainly to loss of power, but it was not, particularly in the smaller and more conservative towns, necessarily so. As long as a family with the proper credentials followed the 'right rules' of conduct and refrained from any form of manual labor, it continued to 'belong' and was looked up to by the classes below it.

(3) The elite served as a reference group, and its attitudes and values were transmitted to those immediately below it in the social scale. There seems to have been little of the close patron-client

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relationship which formed such an essential part of the Philippine class system and to some extent eased the tension between the peasant and the wealthy landowner. Nonetheless, the "patron" remained to some extent an important intermediary between the peasantry and the outside world--the police and the representatives of the national and local governments--and it was to the patron that the peasant looked for help and for guidance in political matters.⁵⁴ However, by 1948 the position of the upper class was becoming insecure. The upward pressures of the growing industrial class, a rural middle class, and the Liberal Party program of social reform were viewed as serious threats to both its economic well-being and its political influence and social status.

c. The middle strata.

(1) A middle sector was evolving from two elements: one the result of downward, the other of upward social mobility. The high birth rate of the upper class, and the absence of primogeniture laws, necessitated successive divisions of family estates and fortunes. Numerous offspring of aristocratic families were forced by economic pressures to modify their standard of living and to seek employment. Many entered the professions and in some cities also played an important part in newly developing business and industries.⁵⁵ In cities like Bogota, Cali, and Barranquilla, most of the doctors, lawyers, engineers, university professors, and government office holders were probably from elite families. They lived in a modest manner and to all outward appearances were members of a middle class. Some accepted this status, but many clung to their upper class position. They identified with the elite and tried to maintain its values and living standards.

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(2) Every attempt was made to present the proper facade: all manual labor was shunned, even when it meant inadequate income and the sacrifice of physical well-being. In the words of Professor Smith: "Never under any circumstances short of absolute starvation will they consent to engage in any activities involving manual labor, at least in its traditional forms, for that would stigmatize them as acknowledging a mean origin and position. This attitude toward physical labor, the utter impossibility of viewing it as honorable and enabling . . . is the thing which makes it most difficult for tens of thousands of present day Colombians to become full-fledged members of a genuine middle class."⁵⁶ Nonetheless, in the larger cities the ties of many with the landowning oligarchy were gradually weakening.⁵⁷

(3) As one writer points out:

Such a state of affairs is conducive to anything except an optimistic outlook upon life on the part of the sons and grandsons of the important men of the country. Inexorable forces are pushing them down the social scale, making it increasingly difficult for them to maintain the appearance of the type of life to which they were born and which they came to regard as their right. Their actual levels of living may make it clear that they enjoy no more goods and services than a person of middle class status, but their standards, and the amounts to which they feel entitled are far greater.

Eventually the descendants of many of these old families may be expected to contribute to the formation of a genuine middle class . . . but the transition will not be easily nor quickly achieved, and many of the persons involved may become so demoralized that they will forfeit all chances for themselves and their children⁵⁸

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(4) At the same time that some "middle class" members were being pushed down from the top, others were being recruited from the lower class. Expanding trade and industry had provided new economic opportunities and enabled some of the non-elite to accumulate considerable wealth. Seldom if ever were these "nuevo rico" admitted to the upper class, but if one had the proper educational qualifications and maintained the requisite style of life he did move into the upper middle strata. A few of the very wealthy were beginning to push against the barriers of the aristocracy and in some communities were referred to as the "new upper class."⁵⁹

(5) Considerably lower on the social scale were mechanics, masons, small merchants, elementary school teachers, low-level bureaucrats, and artisans (such as cabinet makers and tailors) who had managed to improve their position sufficiently to push out of the lower class. These families put great emphasis on the value of education, the importance of a good appearance, and proper behavior.⁶⁰ It was necessary to wear decent clothes, to live in an acceptable section of the city, to be clean, and to be circumspect in behavior. "These were the chief symbols of differentiation from the lower class and they were abandoned or ignored only at the peril of social decline."⁶¹

(6) It should be noted that although marked negroid or Indian features were still a handicap, the definition of race was being eased. One who could pass for white was white. In many areas "Spanish" was interpreted primarily in terms of language, dress, hair style, and manners.

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This definition weakened the rigidity of the class system and facilitated a degree of upward mobility.⁶²

(7) In the rural areas also, a new middle class was developing. A growing number of mestizos and immigrants from Spain was exerting pressure in the latifundios and Indian communities and the state-owned lands. The results were new settlement patterns and a rising middle class with new expectations and demands for reform of the traditional landowning system.⁶³ In the developing regions, the rural towns were more closely tied to the countryside than to the urban culture. Here the growing middle class (the shopkeepers, the mayors, the parish priests, and the schoolteachers) played an important role as intermediaries between the peasant and the urban culture. These were the people who had some education and perhaps some experience in the city. They were the first to have radios and to subscribe to city newspapers. It was from this group that the leadership of the large and relatively highly organized "cuadrillas" of the 1949-53 period were to come:

The guerrilla chiefs arose from old social structure; they were persons (who were) respected and respectable, who fitted perfectly within pre-war society.⁶⁴

(8) In 1948 the various strata within the middle sector had not joined forces. They did not yet function as a middle class to help bridge the wide gap between the upper and lower sections of society, but they were beginning to exercise considerable political influence and the "lower class provided (them) with an assault force."⁶⁵

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d. The lower class.

(1) The lower class, comprising the bulk--perhaps as much as 70 percent--of the Colombian population, was characterized chiefly by low income, and deficiencies in health, education, and housing. In the urban area it was made up of domestics, the poorer artisans, day laborers, and unskilled factory workers.⁶⁶ The majority of these were recent migrants from the country.

(2) One of the most significant results of the economic and communication changes of the post-World War I period was the increasing dissatisfaction of this group and its awakening to its political potential.⁶⁷

(3) In the rural areas, the lower class included the mine workers and the campesinos. Within the latter group there was considerable variation in status and economic well-being. As in the colonial period, the principal determinants of prestige were race and landownership. At the bottom of the social pyramid was the landless agricultural worker. Next came those who owned a few acres, and at the top those who had enough land to carry on considerable agriculture, maintain some livestock, and employ several workers.⁶⁸ Noteworthy was the high correlation between race and economic position. In Tabio, where there were only whites and mestizos, the whites were more highly represented among the landowners, the mestizos among the farm laborers.⁶⁹ Similarly in Aritama, where the population consisted of "Spaniards"⁷⁰ and Indians, the latter were in an inferior economic, educational, and social position on every count.⁷¹

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(4) One of the most significant items in the class structure of the rural area was the extent to which race prejudice operated to retard the upward mobility of the Indian. This is illustrated by a case study of Aritama, a small village in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. About 1860, Creole farmers from the lowland started moving into the area in search of a better livelihood. What had been an Indian community became a mestizo-Indian settlement divided along caste-like lines. A fence built to delimit the residential areas of the two groups symbolized their almost complete social segregation. Even in the schools, favoritism, social prejudice, and social discrimination were the rule. Ridicule and comparison with "Indians" was by far the most common method of punishing a child. Children of Indian phenotype were often molested and even beaten by the others. The teachers not only condoned this, but actually approved it with the hope that the Indian children would leave school.⁷²

(5) As a result, in the entire trend toward assimilation into the Creole culture, the dominating motive of both the Indian and the lower class mestizo was not toward a higher standard of living but fear of being taken for an "Indian," of being "uncivilized" ("inculto"). The process basically was not one of a slow reorientation of values, but an imitation of external forms. To be "Indian" in the matter of dress, language, or food was a cause for shame. "The inner conflicts caused by constant contradiction between private reality and public make-believe are manifest" ⁷³ The result was a case of extreme anomie not unlike that described by Sapir in his early study of the Seneca Indians, by Linton in

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his writings on "nativism," and by Wallace in his concept of the "disaster syndrome": there was a general disintegration of social values; the traditional religious norms, monogamy, and stable family life virtually disappeared as did honesty, pride in work, and self-respect; the men in particular became characterized by apathy, alcoholism, and unwillingness to accept responsibility. Reichel-Dolmatoff makes it clear that the tensions and frustrations of this group were considerable.⁷⁴

(6) Maintenance of the outward appearance of status so important to both the middle and lower classes was made more difficult in the 1930's and 1940's by the rapid increase in the cost of living. According to official figures, which probably did not overestimate the rise, the price of 15 selected articles of diet increased 272 percent between January 1935 and July 1949. The Bogota middle-class cost of living index rose 158 percent between 1940 and 1949.⁷⁵ The increase for other cities was comparable. Thus to the tensions that normally arise during a period of rapid change in the social structure were added those inherent in the problem of inflation.

49. Conclusion.

a. The period 1920-48 was one in which rapid social change undermined the traditional social structure. The threat to the status of some, the rising expectations of others, created a situation of intense status strain:

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Status strain contributes to a state of tension within the individual. The experience of frustration and stress, when affecting large numbers of people over an extended period of time, may lead to such cumulation of tension that people become susceptible to courses of action not normally indicated by their culture. The accumulated social and psychological effect leads to chronic, ubiquitous dissatisfaction that seems to acquire an existence of its own and that people often cannot trace to its source. People, in such a situation, customarily try to establish some level of stability. They seek to find some standard and are prone to accept a standard from another source. Involvement in collective behavior--crowds, riots, demonstrations, and social movements--may be the result.⁷⁶

b. Such tension does not necessarily seek a rational program of reform.

It may be projected toward non-causative factors and is quite likely to be directed toward the society's scapegoats.⁷⁷ In the case of Colombia the historic rivalry--indeed enmity--between the Liberal and Conservative parties apparently provided an appropriate framework for the release of the tension of those elements of the population that were acutely affected.

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Section III. The Family and Child Rearing

by Jessie A. Miller, PhD

50. Introduction.

a. As already pointed out, Colombia is a land of considerable cultural diversity. The common denominator is the Spanish colonial tradition; but the Indian and Negro cultural input, centuries of slow development, and differing degrees of social and geographical isolation of the varied ethnic groups have resulted in uneven assimilation and in a variety of subcultures. Unfortunately these have been little studied by sociologists or anthropologists. One must rely primarily on the accounts of historians and travelers, which, for study of the family, are too heavily weighted toward the culture of the upper-class elite.

b. Material is particularly scanty in the field of child training and personality development. One study, that of Aritama, in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, is outstanding, but there is no way of telling whether this small mestizo-Indian village is unique or is typical of the other remote communities. Certainly it is not representative of lowland Colombian subcultures. Yet the findings suggest that lack of knowledge about the family may be an important gap in the understanding of "la violencia."

51. The upper class.

a. In upper class families the influence of the Spanish-Catholic tradition was clear. The structure was patriarchal, although women did

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play an important and influential role within the home. Family life was stable and divorce rare, although it was not uncommon for men to maintain mistresses.

b. Children, especially boys, were generally pampered. Education played an important part in their lives, as did training in the proper social amenities. Menial tasks were never assigned, and children, like adults, were waited on by servants.

78

c. The web of kinship ties was strong and extensive. It was made even more so by the system of "compradazo," i.e., the mutual obligations of god-parents and god-children. Having the proper connections was believed essential for economic, political, and social ventures. It was through family contacts with the upper class that many of the middle strata secured their positions as minor civil servants or as office employees in the business world. Also, to an unusual extent, the family was the transmitter of political ideology. Party allegiance was said to "run in the blood" and one who changed his party was looked upon as a traitor. Memories of the past and the desire for revenge were closely tied to hereditary political cohesion.

79

52. The middle class.

a. In the timeframe of this study (1930-1948) the middle class family generally adhered to the norms of the upper class. Those who were downwardly mobile did so from training and a desire to maintain status. Those striving to move up the social ladder sought the approved forms of social behavior.

b. All writers agree that there are marked personality differences between the Bogotanos, the Antiquenos, the Costenos and the Vallecaucanos.

198

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There are no studies, however, to indicate whether family patterns or technique of child training played a role in these differences.

53. The lower class.

a. For the lower classes the varieties of subcultures and their selective response to social changes make generalizations difficult. Everywhere after 1920 the family was seriously disrupted by migration. This upset both the age and the sex ratios of the community, since it was primarily the younger people who moved. In some regions a great many men also began to work on distant haciendas and were absent from home much of the time. In Tabio, for example, in some of the smaller pueblos, the sex ratio for those in the over 15 age group was only 52.2 males to 100 females.⁸⁰

b. Family structure.

(1) In some sections of the country, the family appeared to be patriarchal and stable; in some, it approached the matriarchal form characteristic of the lower class American negro; in others, it was basically patriarchal but unstable. For example, in Tabio, of 517 households studied, less than three-fifths were headed by a father present in the home. In more than 7 percent the husband was away permanently, 16 percent had been broken by death, and nearly one-fifth of all were quasi-family groupings headed by an unmarried man or woman. The proportion of all households made up of broken families was very high but this was particularly "true of the non-agriculturalists or villagers, where only two households out of five (were) composed of what might be called normal family groupings."⁸¹ In no age group were more than 55 percent

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of the women married, and about 20 percent of the males lived out their lives in a single state.

(2) In Saucio, on the other hand, of 70 households studied, almost 70 percent were composed of both parents and children. Twenty percent had been broken by death. In only two cases were the husband and wife separated and in two semi-separated. Only four households were headed by single individuals.⁸²

(3) In Saucio married men were monogamous; concubinage, common in other parts of Colombia was not found; there were few cases of desertion. Newlyweds as a rule settled in houses separated from either parents and established a well-knit economic and social unit. Men dominated the household. They were "knights in their castle, entitled to all prerogatives." They made all the decisions, were responsible for discipline and upholding the family pride. It was not uncommon to hear of husbands beating their wives. On the other hand, unlike those in some areas, the men worked hard to support their families.⁸³

(4) In marked contrast were conditions in Aritama. There, prior to 1860, the dominant forms of marriage were Catholic but free monogamous union was accepted as a socially recognized alternative. After the arrival of immigrants from the lowland, concubinage became common. Practically all of the newcomers kept one or more Indian women:

This system of concubinage and short-term monogamous or polygamous unions. . . continues today in the same form and is practiced not only by the "placeros" ("Spanish" mestizos) but by almost all the inhabitants of the village. Even among

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the upper-class placeros who are married as Catholics, there is not a single man who has not at least one illegitimate child. . .there are some men with monogamous inclinations but they are openly ridiculed by all. ⁸⁴

(5) The temporary nature of many unions makes it necessary to describe the social structure in terms of households rather than family relationships. The household was "essentially a fluctuating co-resident kinship group" which changed in membership as spouses abandoned their partners, as children from previous unions were incorporated, or as adult daughters (sometimes sons) seceded from the family and later returned with offspring. Most two-generation "families" developed in time into a three-generation group composed of several conjugal units. ⁸⁵ It was also possible in the social structure of Aritama for an individual to form a part of more than one household. This was true of all women who lived outside the parental domicile but retained claim to it and also applied to all men who contributed economically to households other than their conjugal units. A man who helped support a concubine or his mother was counted as having membership in two or possibly more households. ⁸⁶

(6) In studying the family as a system of social security, it is customary to use the number of relatives resident with the nuclear family as a social indicator. The statistical approach would be most misleading in the case of Aritama where many individuals, particularly males, were considered morally responsible for contributing to the support of their mothers or even godparents with whom they did not reside.

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(7) The de facto head of the family in Aritama was nearly always the woman. The man's position and authority varied with the degree of his economic contribution. In general the men formed "a fluctuating marginal element which gyrate(d) around the stable center formed by the female-dominated complex."⁸⁷ The men did try, mainly through aggressive behavior, to maintain a pretense of dominance:

Open aggressiveness in the man usually begins directed against some inanimate object. With a sweeping movement of the arm he will send plates, dishes and cups in a clattering mass to the floor, turn over the table and then proceed to the methodical destruction of any furniture that might come within his reach. . . Blows and kicks may follow, and if a good stick is available the woman will receive a sound thrashing. . . Many times the children also receive their share of violence, although they do not intervene in the affair at all.⁸⁸

(8) One gains the impression that in all homes, whether sanctioned by Catholic marriage or not, the dominant feeling was one of open hostility. "No one tried to cover up the harsh facts of tension, hostility and aggressiveness."⁸⁹ Clearly it constituted a focal point of individual anxieties.

(9) Under these situations, how lasting were family ties? It has been generally assumed that the kinship loyalty characteristic of the upper and middle class Colombian society also prevailed in the lower class. In Saucio this does seem to be true. Here there is in all respects an approach to middle class norms.⁹⁰ The Tabio study, although the issue of family tensions is not discussed, concludes that the family is not as strong an institution for caring for the aged and other needy individuals as it is in many rural areas.⁹¹ The Reichel-Dolmatoffs are more explicit. They found that although the importance of close kinship was greatly emphasized in conversation, in actuality,

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the concept was restricted to a small group of interacting individuals. People talked a great deal about mutual obligations and the strong emotional ties that should bind the kinship group, but often added that many showed indifference or even hostility towards their relatives. In families where there was marked social mobility, patterns of envy, shame and prestige often led to the more or less permanent disruption of kinship ties. In small family units that remained on essentially the same economic and social level, strong bonds often united individuals.⁹²

(10) Unfortunately no reliable studies are available of the lower classes in the cities. It is generally assumed that the family as a social institution suffers as a result of urbanization and industrialization, and general accounts do indicate a high degree of disorganization in Bogota and other cities. The fact that Colombia's census of 1938 ignored the existence of divorce, separation, and common-law unions and simply classified the population as single, married, and widowed makes statistical studies unsatisfactory.

c. Child rearing.

(1) Child rearing patterns, like family structure, showed great regional variation. In Aritama, infant training was incredibly harsh. The child was handled roughly with little thought given to his comfort or safety. Weaning was sudden and traumatic. Older children, required to care for a baby, commonly took out their resentment on the child, teasing and mistreating him. Physical punishment began practically at birth, and the practice of frightening children was carried out systematically.

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(2) Not surprisingly, most children showed the effects of these traumatic and anxiety producing experiences. Fainting spells and night terrors were common, as were temper tantrums.

(3) On the other hand, training for a hard life did start early. It was believed that a child was poorly brought up if all his whims and wishes were gratified. He was the last to be served a meal and seldom got a second helping. Patience, strict obedience, and respect for authority were stressed. There were no gangs and few playmates outside the nuclear family. Household chores and farmwork occupied the time out of school hours. Rules were enforced by stern physical punishment. Catholic religious education was an important part of the child's life.

(4) Brutal experience had taught the Indian to be suspicious when approached by strangers, to be cautious about expressing his own thoughts, and to assume an agreeable manner particularly toward superiors. These lessons, or social values, Fals-Borda believed were passed on by Indians and mestizos to the young as part of their cultural tradition. The child early learned to hide its feelings of mistrust. Even within the family one seldom discerned an expansive or even informal mood. The atmosphere of the home was melancholy, the inmates sombre and austere.⁹³ Gradually the child adopted the solemn attitudes of his parents.

(5) It is interesting that the individual in Saucio, despite the apparently less rigorous upbringing, acquired many of the personality characteristics of the man in Aritama. He became extremely self-centered and developed a sensitive pride:

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He wounds or kills with no apparent remorse. His sense of honor and personal pride seem to be always at high pitch, and minor events or mere words and jokes can be taken as threats. He is patient and calm, but when these threats, large or small, goad him into action, he is blind and fanatical, often cruel. . . .

During the last half of the first year, infants often have temper tantrums. . . .After a few minutes of violent screams respiration will almost stop, the face turns purple, and the baby will roll and twist on the floor before starting to breathe and scream again. . . .Such tantrums are very common in all children, occurring about once a week. . . . 94
During temper tantrums babies often urinate and vomit. . . .

The temper tantrums of the first year continue in more and more violent form, up to the seventh year at least. Children will roll on the floor, beat their heads against the wall, and may even break their teeth. . . .tear out their hair, or twist their ears. . . .As soon as children have learned to speak, they scream threats against their mother which becomes increasingly insulting as the child acquires a wider vocabulary.⁹⁵

(6) Significantly, older children, when exposed to a frustrating experience by their parents, tended to project their rage "not upon inanimate objects, but upon any other person present."⁹⁶

(7) As might be expected, in view of the frustrations and cruelties, acute fears, and anxieties of childhood, the individual developed into a suspicious, hostile, physically aggressive, and cruel adult. Pride and sensitivity dominated his life, and although in contacts with outsiders he seemed polite, quiet, respectful, and cooperative, his inner tension was always apparent. The motives of any favor done for a person were always analyzed with suspicion, the idea of disinterested help or friendliness being quite incomprehensible.⁹⁷

(8) In Saucio, by contrast, the child was wrapped in a shawl and tied to the Mother's back. "Thus the Mother (was) close to her

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young child and truly devoted and loving." The father was to a certain extent aloof though he sometimes caressed the child and helped put it to sleep. Weaning and toilet training were gradual and not severe.⁹⁸

When he raises a family, the Saucite claims to know all the answers. He expects the children to obey him blindly. The rearing of his children thus tends to be a duplication of his own life training. He hands to his children the same threat-oriented, introverted, and individualistic (self-centered) personality which he has acquired from his elders.⁹⁹

54. Conclusions.

Although regional variations make generalization difficult the following conclusions were reached:

- a. Family life in the upper and middle classes retained in 1948 a high degree of stability.
- b. The family to an unusual degree was identified with the transmission of political tradition, including party conflict.
- c. Lower class family structure had suffered seriously from rapid social change and from contact between Indian and Spanish cultures.
- d. The impact of these factors, possibly accentuated by the tradition of the pre-Spanish Indian culture, produced a modal personality type that was insecure, tense, hostile, vengeful, and cruel.
- e. This personality type could be easily moved to violent, irrational behavior.
- f. The lower class family, like the upper and middle classes, was closely identified with the Liberal-Conservative conflict.

It is unfortunate that other studies do not indicate the extent and which these traits were nationwide.

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Section IV. Public Health

by Thora W. Halstead, PhD

55. Disease and death.

a. Poor health was unquestionably one of Colombia's primary problems throughout the 1930-1948 period. This poor health was a product of poor nutrition and sanitation, inadequate health facilities and personnel, and a profound lack of health knowledge by the majority of the population.

b. The varied topography compounded the problem by producing climates which ranged from tropical to temperate to cold in different areas. The country was consequently host to tropical diseases as well as those found in temperate areas,¹⁰⁰ and these diseases sapped the strength of the people and the economy.

c. Statistical information pertaining to illness in Colombia was exceptionally inadequate, since a very high proportion of the people were never attended by physicians. Between 1930 and 1948 as many as one-third of the deaths per year were recorded as due to unknown or ill-defined causes (table XVIII, annex I) and few cases of illness without death were documented. The inadequacy of existing records was noted in 1936 by the Department of Coordinated Hygiene Services. Its members subsequently surveyed the country in 1937 and 1938 to ascertain the scope of intestinal parasite infections in the population and found over 90 percent of the people infected.¹⁰¹

d. In 1938 it was estimated that an average of 3,600,000 cases of malaria occurred every year with an approximate death rate of 0.5

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percent. In 1941 there were reportedly more than 80,000 cases of yaws in the Pacific littoral area of Colombia.¹⁰² Between 1944 and 1948, health agencies examined 1,348,365 people and found 51,000 new cases of tuberculosis. Since the people examined were felt to have been representative of the population as a whole, tuberculosis was accepted as a serious health problem.¹⁰³

e. It was not until 1948, however, that a survey was made to determine the most prevalent diseases in Colombia. During that year, the Ministry of Hygiene correlated the incidence of diseases reported in municipal records representing half of the nation's population. Malaria, intestinal parasites, tropical anemia, amoebic dysentery and diarrheal disorders, and venereal disease were the major health problems. In addition, such diseases as diphtheria, smallpox, and whooping cough, which were easily preventable by immunization, occurred frequently.¹⁰⁴

f. Mortality data (table XIX, annex I) substantiated these findings and pointed a finger at pneumonia and bronchitis as well, two leading causes of infant deaths. These illnesses, all amenable to known methods of control, are the diseases of the underfed and poorly housed.

g. Regional variation and progress in health status can be measured by examining the indices of health: birth and death rates, life expectancy, incidence of illness, and nutritional status. Infant mortality rates are exceptionally good indicators. In Colombia, the official 1930-1948 vital statistics are admittedly poor. Nevertheless, they do provide an insight into health trends of the period and the effectiveness of public health programs to control preventable diseases.

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h. The rates of registered gross deaths and infant mortality (table XX, annex I) between 1930 and 1948 indicate that health conditions deteriorated during that period. An examination of similar data from each of the Departments (table XXI, annex I), suggests that health conditions were most favorable in Atlantico, Bolivar, and Magdalena, the departments located along the Caribbean, while poor health and death were most prevalent in the mountainous departments of Caldas, Huila, Santander, and Valle del Cauca and Narino on the Pacific coast. It is interesting to note that civil unrest has been prevalent in these latter departments but absent in the three where better health prevailed.

i. The national demographic data were reassessed by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) of the United Nations and the Latin American Demographic Center (CELADE) in cooperation with the Colombian government in 1960-1961. The team's conclusions indicated that, although health conditions had been much worse than the records implied, they had improved between 1912 and 1951 (table VI). A reexamination of the registered rates (table XXII, annex I) suggests that this improvement might not have been observed if the time period 1930-1946 had been examined separately. According to the ECLA the mean expectation of life of the average Colombian had risen from 35 to 40 years between 1912 and 1951 instead of remaining at 46, and the death rate had dropped from 27 to 18 during this period instead of ranging between 11.2 and 18.6 per 1000 population as the official (Controloria General) statistics had indicated. The population had grown rapidly during this same period despite the high death rate, but this had been due to an equally high annual birth rate

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that had remained at approximately 47 per 1000 population. As a consequence of the higher birth rate and short life expectancy, there were four dependents for every adult worker in 1948, and productivity per capita was naturally low.¹⁰⁵

TABLE VI
CORRECTED VITAL RATES, 1912-1951

<u>Intercensal Period</u>	<u>Births/1000</u>	<u>Deaths/1000</u>	<u>Average Annual Rate of Increase</u>	<u>Expectation of Life at Birth (years)</u>
1912-1938	48	27	2.08	35
1938-1951	47-46	25-18	2.2-2.8	35-40

Source: World Health Organization, Third Report on the World Health Situation, pp. 8-11.

56. Sanitation.

a. Pure water and satisfactory disposal of human excreta and garbage are essential to the health and welfare of every community. Failure to meet these sanitary requirements dooms any health program to defeat. The transmission of disease through inadequacy or lack of sewage and garbage disposal facilities and the concomitant increase in rodent and insect vectors can only be controlled through community effort.

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b. In 1938 the whole of Colombia was surveyed in the First National Housing Census. Of the 1,610,036 dwellings examined, only 11.2 percent had piped water either inside or outside, 37.4 percent in urban and 1.3 percent in rural areas. A scant 6.7 percent had sewage systems, and only 6.1 percent had both facilities. Eighty-eight percent of the buildings had neither of these services and 76 percent had no toilet whatsoever.¹⁰⁶

c. The general lack of adequate waste and sewage disposal systems in Colombia undoubtedly accounted for the high incidence of intestinal diseases, for intestinal infections and infestations arise from contamination of the environment with human waste.¹⁰⁷ The prevalence of these diseases can therefore be used as an indicator of the sanitary conditions within the country.

d. In 1937 the Department of Coordinated Services of Hygiene of the Ministry of Labor, Hygiene and Social Service of Colombia conducted a parasitology survey in 80 municipalities, located throughout Colombia. Of 98,648 examinations, more than 95 percent were positive. An additional 112,757 examinations were performed the following year in over 20 municipalities and of these, 92 percent of the people proved to be infected with one or more types of parasites.¹⁰⁸

e. An indication of what aggressive action can accomplish is the program of the National Federation of Coffee Growers of Colombia. In 1942 the Federation created a six percent tax on coffee exports to provide funds for a rural sanitation program. The preventive hygiene program included water supply, housing, and soil sanitation within

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the coffee-growing districts. Within the areas affected by this program, the index of infection was reduced as much as 70 percent.¹⁰⁹

f. The National Ministry of Hygiene recognized the dire need for sanitation, and outlined a construction program for water supply and sewer facilities to be financed primarily by the Municipal Development Fund. Between April 1, 1940, when the Fund started operations, and December 31, 1943, 79 water supply and 98 sewer projects were completed. These are impressive production figures, for they represented a large proportion of the total facilities existing in 1948: in the autumn of 1949, only 115 of Colombia's 796 municipalities had a water system, and 151 had sewer systems.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, these sanitation programs reached only a limited number of people, and this problem was compounded by the poor conditions and inadequate upkeep of many of the existing facilities. The end product was a pot pourri of sanitation services ranging from modern well run water plants, to contaminated systems that disseminated disease, to no systems at all.

g. In 1949, a country-wide study concluded that the existing water and sewer facilities were a serious hazard to public health. Although most of the large cities had a public water supply, it was frequently inadequate both in volume and purity. Many large towns and most small communities had no public supply and consequently obtained their water from contaminated wells, rivers, ponds and irrigation ditches. When the source was located some distance away, the people purchased water on the street from peddlers who brought it in carts and drums. Sewage facilities were equally inadequate. No Colombian city had a sewer system serving the entire urban area. Cartagena and two other cities with

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populations in excess of 50,000 had no sewer system whatsoever. There were no sewage treatment plants.¹¹¹

h. A survey conducted in 1951 and including 1,713,000 dwellings indicated that the percentage of buildings with either inside or outside piped water had risen to 28.4. The distribution continued to be exceedingly unbalanced, however, for although 66.1 percent of the urban houses were serviced, only 7.3 percent of the rural dwellings had available piped water. Only 21 percent of all the buildings had flush toilets, while 67.6 percent were without toilet facilities of any kind.¹¹²

i. The success of these programs in improving sanitation is best evaluated, however, by observing their impact on the health of the people. In 1941 the Division of Sanitation and Public Welfare of the Department of Atlantico reported that over 90 percent of its population had hookworms.¹¹³ Between 1943 and 1949 Medellin had more than 1,000 cases of typhoid per year due to contamination of the public water supply. Although only a fraction of the cases of disease came to the attention of health authorities, the following incidences were reported for the years 1948 and 1951 by the Republica de Colombia Ministerio de Hygiene, (see table VII, page 214).

j. In 1948 these illnesses represented one third of all reported cases of disease in Colombia, and in 1951 they represented over half of all reported illnesses.¹¹⁴

k. It therefore appears that many of the urban centers of Colombia possessed sanitation systems of varied effectiveness, but these did not serve the majority of the population. The masses lived in certain wards of the cities and in rural areas under the same poor environmental

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conditions that had existed for generations, unserved and untouched by the sanitation projects.¹¹⁵

TABLE VII

Cases of Selected Diseases per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1948 and 1951

	<u>1948</u>	<u>1951</u>
Diarrhea and enteritis of infants less than two years of age	2,328	15,944
Intestinal parasites	1,336	1,440
Hookworm infestation	742	760
Tropical anemia	742	760
Amoebic dysentery	708	550
Typhoid fever	207	88

Source: Republic of Colombia, Epidemiological Bulletin, 1951, pp. 1-12.

57. Nutrition.

a. Although malnutrition no doubt existed for years, studies to determine the nature of the dietary deficiencies were not begun until the 1940's.¹¹⁶ For this reason, comparative observations of the nutritional conditions and trend during the 1930-1948 period are highly speculative.

b. In 1943 the Servicio Cooperativo instituted a nutritional program and department with the aid of the Institute of Inter-American

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Affairs. This nutrition department became the National Institute of Nutrition by Law in 1947. Its responsibilities included research on Colombian foodstuffs and the promotion of better diets by health education. Between 1945 and 1948 it investigated the incidence of simple goiter in Colombia. Of 183,000 school children examined throughout the country, 52.6 percent were found to have goiters. Eight thousand of these children were treated with iodine tablets; and a method was found to iodize salt. By 1950 iodization was started on a small scale in one salt plant.¹¹⁷

c. In 1946 the first World Food Survey was published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). It assessed per capita food consumption in Colombia by preparing a nutritional balance sheet of foods available in the country. It also formulated a method of assessing the energy requirements of the population to determine the adequacy of the national average food supplies. This method took into consideration environmental temperature, body weights, and the distribution by age and sex of the population. An allowance of 15 percent, representing waste up to the retail level, was added to the calculated physiological requirement so that the estimated per capita requirements could be compared with the available food supplies at the retail level.¹¹⁸ Table XXIII, annex I lists the FAO appraisal of the Colombian diet during 1935-1939, 1946 and 1946-1949 and its estimate of the per capita, per diem requirements of the population.¹¹⁹

d. In 1946 an independent study of the status of nutrition in Colombia was conducted by the Mission to Colombia of the International

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Bank for Reconstruction and Development in cooperation with the Colombian Nutrition Institute. The average daily per capita diet (table XXIV, annex I) was determined by ascertaining the available food; deducting losses due to handling, storing, preparing and cooking; determining the nutritive value of the food balance; and dividing it on a per capita basis. A theoretical per capita food requirement standard was also computed, employing the FAO method. In their computation the Mission used 22° centigrade as the average temperature and 58 kilograms as the weight of a 25-year-old adult male. Their national nutritional balance sheet compared favorably with the results of analysis of the diets of workers in four representative cities, based on well documented studies by the Controlaria General of the standard of living and monthly purchases of these workers (table XXIII, annex I).

e. They concluded that the Colombian diet in 1946 lacked most of the protective elements. While caloric intake was barely adequate, there were marked deficiencies in animal proteins, fats, calcium, phosphorous and essential vitamins as niacin and riboflavin. Although they had no data on vitamins A and D, they felt the lack of yellow vegetables and fats in the diet indicated an acute shortage of these nutrients. They felt that losses through inadequate storage methods caused much of the caloric deficiencies, but only increased cattle, fish, and dairy production would alleviate the need for protein, fat, calcium, phosphorous, riboflavin, and niacin. Poor food habits in the home, including selection, preparation, and storage of food caused further deprivation.¹²⁰ Colombian

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health authorities rated the factors underlying malnutrition as lack of popular understanding, economic considerations, and dietary habits in that order.¹²¹

f. Between 1954 and 1956 the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) made a study of the Colombian diet for the period 1951-1953 (table XXIII, annex I). The FAO method was used, as it had been in the previously mentioned studies, to calculate the net available food supplies. Much smaller losses were calculated for many of the commodities in this study than had been calculated in the 1946 study; consequently, it is doubtful that even the meager dietary improvements suggested by the comparison of these works actually occurred. Again the deficiency of proteins, calcium, phosphorus, and vitamins in the diet was noted. The Institute National de Nutricion confirmed these findings by showing in a survey conducted in 1953 the extent of marked avitaminosis existing in the population (table XXV, annex I).

g. Although minor contradictions occurred among all the studies, their conclusions were consistent. Diets were seriously deficient in not only total proteins but animal proteins, fats, calcium, phosphorus and several vitamins, notably riboflavin, niacin and vitamin A. Although the minimum calorie requirements were met by some standards, no margin existed for any extra expenditure of energy due to increased work or illness. Table XXIV, annex I also indicates that the caloric intake of the urban population was generally lower than the country average; however, this difference was caused primarily by the greater amount of carbohydrates rather than protective foods eaten in the rural areas. Nutritionally, the people in cities might actually have been better fed.

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h. The inference drawn from these studies is that if any improvement did occur in the Colombian diet between 1935 and 1953 it was so slight as to have had a negligible effect on the overall health of the population. The majority of the people subsisted on a nutritionally suboptimal diet, and this diet stunted their growth, reduced their life span, and played a major role in the high infant mortality rate.

i. The limited number of regional studies conducted during this period preclude any area comparisons. Area differences in food habits do exist however, determined largely by the topography.¹²²

j. Two other aspects of nutrition, the use of alcoholic beverages and coca drug, deserve mention because they affect both the health and emotional stability of the people. The coca drug was used by workers as a hunger depressant. It was often sold by company stores, and in some areas a proportion of the wage was paid in coca leaves.¹²³

k. Per capita consumption of alcoholic beverages reached 33 liters annually by 1948, a 50-percent increase above pre-World War II levels. These figures must be considered in the light of the fact that 40 percent of the 1948 population were 14 years of age or less.¹²⁴

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CHAPTER 5

MILITARY FACTORS

By Colonel Ralph T. Tierno, Jr.

1. Background.

a. Geography.

(1) Colombia occupies a position of international importance somewhat disproportionate to its size and population. Although it comprises only some 440,000 square miles on the northwestern corner of South America, it borders both the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific Ocean, it has economic growth potential, and it has proximity to the strategically important Panama Canal.

(2) Colombia's eastern and western parts are completely different both geographically and socially. An understanding of the contrast between these areas is fundamental to an understanding of the country itself. The western third of Colombia is made up of the rugged northern Andean Cordillera range, with its three high ranges separated by deep longitudinal valleys, fringed on the north and west by coastal lowlands. The eastern two-thirds is composed of vast, sparsely settled lowland plains of tropical grass and rain forest.

(3) Weather and terrain, major influences in any type of military operation, are of critical importance in the conduct of insurgency. Basically, Colombia has the diversity of land configuration and climate which satisfies the planners of insurgencies. Her craggy, mountainous terrain, with crude roads and poor communications, is ideally suited for insurgent operations. Her forests, swamps, jungles, marshes, and other geographical features

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reduce the mobility of and hamper control of conventional forces and provide the requisite protection and strongholds for insurgent units. Guerrilla units also have easy access to border sanctuaries (figure 2, page 221).

b. History.

(1) Colombian military tradition is strongly Bolivarian. The names given the battalions and squadrons of the Colombian Army are those of Bolivar and his generals and the victories of the liberation. In addition, the names of naval vessels reflect leaders and important dates of the wars of independence.

(2) Since liberation, Colombia's history has been of internal disorder rather than of foreign wars. The 19th century analysis reveals no fewer than 80 armed rebellions, attempted revolutions, and armed coups. None of these contributed to the enrichment of the military tradition. The two most serious lasted 3 years each, from 1860 to 1862 and from 1899 to 1902. The "War of 1,000 Days," as the last of these is known, is said to have cost nearly one hundred thousand casualties in all parts of the country. This is an indication of the fierce and merciless type of guerrilla war which evolved. The 20th century has been relatively free of serious armed revolt that can be characterized as civil war. The only foreign clash during the period was the short jungle war in the Amazon Basin occasioned by the boundary dispute with Peru in 1933-34. Ground action and river boat fighting were supported by the Colombian Air Force, which had been in existence less than 10 years.

(3) Writers indicate that Colombia began its history as a nation with a weak and socially discredited military institution. This initial

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Figure 2. Major regions of Colombia

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status of the military has been constantly reinforced by the social structure and political culture, which are characterized more by continuity than change. Thus, although there have been some outward signs of change which are evident in certain sectors due to the military's public relations efforts during the Ruiz Novo period (early 1950's), the unfavorable image of the military still endures. (See paragraph 8 for a discussion of military origins and status.)

(4) Specific US interest in Colombia and the Isthmus of Panama was shown as early as 1786, when Thomas Jefferson wrote about the practicability of a canal. Following the United States-Colombian Treaty of 1847, the Panama Railroad Company (chartered in 1849) received a concession from Colombia and opened a cross-Isthmus railway in 1855. US troops were landed in the Isthmus area several times during the 19th century to protect American lives and property and to put down revolts in accordance with treaty arrangements. The revolt of 1903 which culminated in the independence of Panama was convenient to US policy, and some writers believe that US business interests encouraged the revolutionaries. US policies and statements at the time led to bad relations with Colombia which continued until settlement of the Panama issue in 1922. Although Panama and the Canal are no longer Colombian territory, the proximity of Colombia continues to make it an important element in US strategic interests, as demonstrated by the dangers seen in the German ownership of the Colombian airline, Sociedad Colombiana de Transportes Aereos (SCADTA), in the 1930's.

(5) The first US military missions to the Colombian military services were established in 1939 and have functioned continuously since that time.

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Colombia received lend lease during World War II, declared a state of belligerency with the Axis powers, and responded to the United Nations call for troops in Korea. In 1952, a bilateral mutual assistance treaty with the United States was signed and resulted in the arrival in Colombia of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).

59. The Colombian Armed Forces.

a. General.

(1) The Armed Forces of Colombia consisted of an Army, a small Air Force, a small Navy, and Police Force. The size, composition, and character had varied throughout history, and the period under study, 1930 to 1948, did produce some substantial changes in character. The Army set the tone for the general political behavior of the other services. The police forces were semi-independent of the military services and were more politically involved. The tradition of noninvolvement of the armed forces in the country's political destiny began in the 1930s and has developed more fully following the Bogotazo in 1948.

(2) The origin of the officer corps is of considerable interest. Today all four services draw their officers from the higher rungs of the middle class, and the officer corps tends toward a middle class outlook. Leading families produce few candidates for the corps. Yet, up until 1948, literature indicates that although the military officer corps was politically and socially a discredited group, it drew its leaders from the upper class. (See annex III for a discussion of Colombian armed forces officers.)

b. Legal basis.

(1) Article 166 of Colombia's 1886 Constitution (which remained in force) under the heading "Public Forces" (fuerza publica), provided for

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the establishment of a standing army for national defense. This was extended by Article 167, which authorized the passage of laws to establish a national militia (milicia nacional) and a national police force (cuerpo de policia). The militia, as provided in the Constitution, has never existed. The Constitution delegated to statutory law (la ley) the obligation to spell out the details of recruitment, assignment, and promotion as well as the general duties and rights of the military.

(2) The supreme command of the Armed Forces (Jefe Supremo di las fuerzas armadas) was placed in the hands of the President by Article 120, which authorized him to make disposition of the forces, to appoint military officers in accordance with the law, and, if he deemed it necessary, to personally direct military operations in time of war. Colombia's turbulent past was recognized in the fact that Article 120, which directed the President to "preserve the public order throughout the whole territory and reestablish it if it should be disturbed," preceded the articles concerned with the conduct of military operations and the provisions for security against external threats.

(3) In addition, the President had the power to declare war with the consent of the Senate, or, if the country is invaded, on his own authority; he also negotiated and ratified treaties of peace, submitting the pertinent documents to the next session of the legislature for ratification. Article 121 conferred extraordinary powers on the President in times of external war or internal disturbances. It allowed the President to suspend laws and remove limitations that might be inconsistent with the state of siege.

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c. The Army. The Army in 1948 consisted of three divisions of two brigades each. Brigades were formed of two regiments each, and each regiment contained three battalions. These units were augmented by an artillery regiment, an engineer battalion, a cavalry regiment of four squadrons, and one transportation battalion. At the beginning of the period, units totaled some 408 officers and 8,400 enlisted men, but these totals went as high as 15,000 officers and EM late in the period. Service varied from 1 to 2 years and was compulsory for 21-30 year olds. Men in the ages of 30-45 were placed in reserve units, subject to reporting upon call. Reserve effectiveness increased from 50,000 in 1930 to nearly 500,000 in 1946.

d. Navy. Colombia has always had something in the way of a Navy. In 1930, 1 seagoing tug, 3 coast guard cutters, and some customs launches were the sum total of the Colombian Navy. Additional gunboats, 2 modern destroyers, and a frigate were added during the period. In 1934, the Colombian Navy was reorganized with the aid of British advisers. In 1946, a battalion of marines (800 men) was added.

e. The Air Force. Although the Colombian Air Force was founded in 1919 and managed to progress in the 1920's, statistics on the air arm did not appear until 1935. At that time, the Air Force consisted of one training squadron and one service squadron with a total of 15 airplanes. The Air Force did provide air support during the Peruvian crisis of 1933-34. One paratrooper company was added to the Air Force in 1946.

f. Military equipment capabilities. During the period, equipment for the armed services of Colombia was of Swiss, German, and French manufacture,

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indicating that the Colombian capability to manufacture arms was extremely limited. The American military mission introduced in 1939 was instrumental in modernizing through lend-lease during World War II. Navy and Air Force equipment was foreign-made; destroyers were purchased from Portugal and aircraft from the United States and Germany.

g. Military manpower. No fewer than 30 statutes and decrees implemented Article 165 of the Constitution: "All Colombians are bound to bear arms when public necessity so requires, in order to defend the independence of the nation and the institutions of the country." Compulsory service for 1-1/2 years for men between the ages of 21 and 50 was required until August 1944, when it was extended to 2 years. Approximately 20,000 men registered annually during the period under study. Total population during 1930 was 7.6 million and for 1946 was 10.1 million. Army figures show that in 1930 the Army's legally authorized size of 6,170 men was also its actual size; the number increased to 19,500 by 1946. In 1946, trained reserves totaled 45,000 men, and there was an untrained reserve of 500,000. The Air Force had 1,030 men in 1946, and the Navy 1,978.

h. Interservice problems. There is no evidence that the Army, Navy, and Air Force had any interservice difficulties. However, dissension did develop between the Police Force and the Army in the 1930's. This dissension appears to be a threat to the elements which provide stability. The development of rivalry was due to President Lopez' liberalization of the police forces. Part of the problem stemmed from the increase in the size of the Colombian Armed Forces and the officer corps, due to the Leticia incident in 1933-34, and the expansion of the police forces. The enlarged officer corps consisted of highly conservative elements who failed to support Lopez'

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efforts to assign "stability" missions to the Armed Forces, whereas the enlarged police forces supported the regime by accepting these "stability" missions. The growing split between the National Police and the Army led to the abortive Pasto revolt led by the Army in 1944. The Army in general remained loyal to Lopez, but the damage to his prestige led to his political downfall.

60. The threats and military objectives.

Basically, the armed forces have a twofold objective: to protect the country from external threat and to maintain internal security.

a. External threat. The Colombian military establishment historically has been defensive in nature. The possibility of attack from outside was considered to be remote. Colombia's borders have been established and defined throughout its history by amicable agreements with its neighbors. Only one border dispute resulted in a major incident, an altercation with Peru in 1933-34 over the town of Leticia. Thus, Colombia's attitude toward external threats was based on peaceful relations with her neighbors, the weakness of neighboring countries, and the protection afforded by the Rio Pact of 1947. Colombian terrain itself discourages aggression. Low-lying, densely wooded terrain in the north and east, which is interwoven with streams, would impede movements of ground forces, and three large mountain ranges, where the bulk of the populace lives, restrict the effectiveness of the road and railroad systems.

b. Internal threat. With an external threat considered unlikely, the foremost menace was an internal threat against public order. The Colombian Army's basic task, then, was to reduce banditry and counter

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subversion, and the most demanding task faced by the Colombian Government was to achieve and maintain a state of public order and tranquillity. Merciless political partisan warfare, habitual banditry with social and economic revolutionary overtones, and growing friction between major social classes characterized the period from 1930 to 1948. Of the several major threats, two had foreign overtones--the Spanish-Falange/ Nazi influence and the growing strength of Communism--and one was wholly internal--the strife between communities and groups, often of opposing affiliation, and simple banditry.

61. Political and legal conditions governing internal use of military forces.

a. The President had the authority to appoint military officers (per Article 120 (6) of the Constitution), and it was customary to appoint those who favored his party. The officer corps, as part of the political system, thus enjoyed the confidence of the party in power and, obviously, could not be considered to be neutral. From the early 1900^s to 1930, with the Conservatives in power, the military establishment consisted mainly of Conservatives. When President Herrera (Liberal) took office in 1930 (following four and a half decades of Conservative rule), the Liberal-dominated Congress disenfranchised the military. The process of appointment by the President was a major means of controlling the military. In addition, control of the budget and of the size of the establishment provided additional controls.

b. Throughout the 19th century, the mission of the military was to act as guardians or policemen and messenger boys for the political structure.

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In 1927, under a military reform policy, the military was assigned a traditional mission as guarantor of national security and integrity. Foreign training missions were instrumental in emphasizing this older, traditional concept of military missions. However, ambiguities still existed, because the military leaders continued to hold different concepts of the Army's role in society, and missions of firefighting and intervention in labor disputes (including strikebreaking as late as 1926) still plagued the military. At no time during this period did the status of the military permit it to defend its concept of a traditional mission.

c. When President Lopez (Liberal) was elected in 1934, the Army's role was still being determined by the political party in power. Because of this custom, the military was unable to perform a role which conformed to its assigned mission. The Leticia incident alone (the conflict with Peru in 1933-34) served to unite the populace and enlarge the Army, resulting in an emphasis on the Army's mission to provide security for the nation. From 1934 through 1938, with an enlarged Conservative military establishment, Lopez did begin to give the military a specific sense of direction, disengaging it from the political conflicts and from the need for guarding institutional stability or extending Colombian sovereignty within its own boundaries.

d. In 1935, President Lopez amplified this new mission by emphasizing that the Colombian society could not afford an Army that did not have social utility during peacetime. This social function was that of opening up new regions of Colombia for colonization. In other words, the Army was to change the physical character of the nation. This mission did not

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arouse public support, at least according to the military journals of that time.

e. Two confrontations between the civilian political sector and the top military command took place: one of Conservative officers with Lopez in the 1930's, and an attempted coup against Lopez in 1944. Such attacks by the Conservative elements of the Army on the Lopez regime resulted in purges by the Liberal government in 1936, 1943, and 1945. The Army was considerably weakened, and the police force was strengthened beyond what the Army considered necessary. The outburst in 1948, following assassination of Gaitan, emphasizes the weakness of the Army that developed through these purges.

62. Appraisal of armed force effectiveness.

a. The ability of the Army to intervene successfully in maintaining internal security was undermined by the result of the abortive Pasto revolt led by the Army in 1944. This revolt was caused by the growing split between the Army and the National Police, and this dissension worked to weaken the effectiveness of the Army. In addition, whereas the Army in general was loyal to President Lopez, the officer corps was made up of conservative elements who refused to support Lopez' efforts to assign "stability" (police) missions to the Army.

b. Disagreement about the role the services were to play also diminished the effectiveness of the military in that it hampered the planning efforts of the Armed Forces. Additional factors were the lack of experience, training, and know-how, evident in later estimates of military effectiveness. Attempts were made to correct these deficiencies by securing missions from other countries.

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c. There is no indication that an effective command, control, and communication system existed in the early part of the period under study. Nevertheless, the Colombian Air Force, under Army control, did support the ground and river gunboat forces during the Colombian-Peruvian border conflict over Leticia in 1933-34.

d. The influence of the French and German missions to Colombia, active from 1920 to 1939, is reflected in the Colombian planning efforts. The US mission arrived in 1939, with the objective of strengthening the Colombian Armed Forces. This appears to continue to be the major objective of US efforts in Colombia even to the present day. US missions to the Colombian military services have been in continuous operation since the arrival of the first one in 1939. These missions have been instrumental in arranging for the attendance of Colombian officers at US service schools, including those of the Command and General Staff College level. Thus it is that the organization of the Colombian Armed Forces has changed from French, German, Swiss, and Italian concepts to those of the United States.

e. Troop deployments. Figure 3 shows the historic deployments in and near urban centers during the period. Obviously, the response capability to disorders (banditry, guerrilla activity, etc.) is somewhat tied to the communications and road networks. This dependence on road and rail nets reduces effectiveness. Six brigades and school brigades of various organizations were located as follows:

- (1) 1 brigade--Tunja
- (2) 2 brigade--Barranquilla
- (3) 3 brigade--Cali

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


Figure 3. Colombian troop deployments

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- (4) 4 brigade--Medellin
- (5) 5 brigade--Bucaramanga
- (6) 6 brigade--Ibaque
- (7) School brigade--Bogota

This deployment plus an additional brigade (8th) at Armenia and the 7th Brigade at Villavicencio outside Bogota are the only changes up until 1965.

63. The police forces.

a. Modern police organization in Colombia dates from 1891, when a senior French police official was retained to establish a force for the city of Bogota. From this beginning the National Police grew. Changes in organization between 1915 and 1940 brought increased strength, expanded functions, and new services to fulfill these functions. The first mention of a detective section appeared in 1926. Its functions, which at first consisted of criminal investigation, were expanded to include registration and control of foreigners and counterintelligence duties. A corps of mounted police (carabineros) appeared in 1935. The police forces were characterized by developing specialized bodies of police raised and administered by the national organization but functionally directed by the various government ministries, e.g., customs, judicial, prison, and highway police.

b. An integrated police school system was initiated in 1940 when the General Santander Police School was established in the outskirts of Bogota, advised by an FBI agent. Members of departmental and municipal police forces were accepted as students, and courses were provided for commissioned and noncommissioned grades and detectives. As the forces grew, the Jimenez de Quesada School was established in Bogota to provide instruction for enlisted personnel.

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c. During the period under study, the Government sought foreign advice and asked that missions be sent not only to provide theory and practice of general police operations but also to introduce scientific techniques of identification methods and records. France, Argentina, Spain, Chile, and the United Kingdom furnished missions to Colombia. After the Bogotazo in 1948, the British furnished a mission to develop the needed police reform. Not much was accomplished by the mission because of differences between Anglo-Saxon legal concepts and procedures and those used on the continent (on which the Colombian system is based).

d. From 1902 to 1915, the police were a part of the Ministry of War (this was again true after 1953). Beginning in 1946 (when the Conservatives replaced the Liberals in power), army officers were assigned to police duty.

e. One of the most unpopular steps taken by the Conservative President Ospina Perez after he took office in 1946 was to establish a "political police" as an extension of existing security forces. Directed at first against all violence, these elements inevitably became an arm of the Conservative Party. Liberals were widely persecuted, while Bogota officials denied charges made in Liberal newspapers. Liberal counterattacks in the rural areas, still planned and conducted by the local leaders, contributed further to the bloodshed.

f. Statistics on police strength have seldom been published. There were around 5,000 national police in 1939. As of 1948 the total number of police was probably somewhat less than the totals of government personnel reported in the category "justice and internal order:" 11,624 at the

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national level, 8,235 at departmental level, and 401 at municipal level, for a total of 20,260, or roughly 1 per 500 people. These figures undoubtedly include some nonpolicemen concerned with courts and prisons. In 1960, a police official in a news interview gave the total of active police agents as 21,000--probably exclusive of support and training staff and specialists.

g. Prior to 1946, the various regions (departments) controlled their own police forces; the national force, under the Ministry of Government, operated in the city of Bogota, in the national territories and for certain specialized purposes. The departmental governors had jurisdiction over their forces, although senior departmental police officers were national police members. There was talk of nationalizing the police during the thirties. A law in 1948 proposed to nationalize the entire force, but departmental resistance necessitated abandonment of the project at the time. Certain departments, however, abolished their local forces.

64. Economic factors.

a. An analysis of budget figures available for the period preceding 1930 verifies the lack of bargaining power of the military sectors. For 1930-1944 as a whole, national defense took only 7.8 percent of cumulative governmental expenditures (central, departmental, and municipal), while "education and culture" took 9.2 percent. For the postwar period, 1945-52, defense spending was somewhat larger, but only 8.8 percent, about equal to the shares for education and for health. By 1951, the military portion of the Federal Government budget amounted to 13,400,000 pesos annually, or 16 percent of the total Federal budget.

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b. Pay for the military was always a major cause of dissatisfaction among the officers. Colombia's President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, did have the power to fix and adjust the pay of military personnel, and in time of turmoil this power was used to upgrade the salaries and position of the military and make it more attractive as a profession.

65. Origins and status of the military.

a. Antecedents of the Colombian national military establishment date back to 1810, the year that marked the entry of the military into national politics and the beginning of the revolt of the Spanish-American colonies against Spain. The first Colombian Army was a product of both Spanish military structure and Colombian social conditions. Its corps of officers consisted mainly of members of the socially minded upper class, primarily because the Spanish customarily recruited men of status to be military officers. The founding of Colombia as a nation was largely a product of the attitudes and behavior of the military, headed as it was by Colombian nobles. After 300 years of Spanish rule, the country won its freedom in 1824. The list of fallen Colombian officers reads like the roll call of elder sons of Nueva Granada's upper class families.

b. With independence, Colombia's aristocracy turned to government and civil affairs, and the urban intellectual's weapon was his pen, rather than a sword. Following the loss of a large number of this group of military leaders from military depletion and to civil affairs, there was an urgent need to form and weld an officer group whose life and outlook embodied the spirit of a warrior.

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c. During the wars of independence, the ethnic distribution in Colombia was such that the ascendent group was the white aristocracy (877,000 whites--table VIII). In Ecuador, the important institution was the monastery; in Colombia, it was the university; but in Venezuela, the soldier was outstandingly important. Therefore, it was natural that the warrior group (officers) for New Granada forces should come from Venezuela. The top-ranking families of Bogota demonstrated an intense aristocratic spirit, and the behavior patterns of the aristocrat were dramatically opposed to those of the warrior types. Thus, while the prestige of the officer class remained high in New Granada, a military career became identified with the worst aspects of social order in Colombia, therefore Colombia began its history as a nation with a socially discredited military institution. This situation continued to exist throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries.

TABLE VIII

ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION
(During the Wars of Independence)

<u>Country</u>	<u>Whites</u>	<u>Indians</u>	<u>Colored (Pardos)</u>	<u>Negroes (Slaves)</u>
Ecuador	157,000	393,000	42,000	8,000
Colombia	877,000	313,000	140,000	70,000
Venezuela	200,000	207,000	433,000	60,000

Source: Samper, Ensayos Sobre Las Revoluciones Politicas, p. 75.

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d. The very differences in the kinds of life led by the warrior and the socially oriented Colombian inevitably led to antagonism and to anti-militarism among members of the upper class. In addition, the kind of military dictatorship which Bolivar established was based on such a harsh rule that it also engendered national antagonism to the military.

e. As crisis followed crisis, each served to intensify the inequality between civil and military groups in Colombia. The relationship between the two groups was shaped by two opposing classes (warriors and aristocrats), and the result of the crises was the solidification of the low social and occupational status of the military. The initial status of the military as both weak and socially discredited has been constantly reinforced by the social and political structures, the nature of which encourages continuity rather than change.

f. In 1823, civilian authority (the Government) expelled many members of the military establishment to prevent the military from achieving great influence or power. The size of the Army was limited to 2,370 men at this time, with a resulting loss of prestige, lack of group identity, and complete subordination to political control. As late as 1930, military reform had never become a reality. Without comradeship, group identity, or cohesiveness, the Colombian military position remained extremely low. The system of social sanctions and rewards, controlled as it was by civilians, kept the military subordinate. It was only after the US military mission was established in 1939 that a higher type of training was made available for the Colombian military officer. After that time the officer class began to develop into an elite group, both because of the higher level of

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social groups from which the corps was drawn and because of specific requirements for admission to both the US service schools and Colombia's own academies for its Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, during the period of this study, for all practical purposes, the Colombian military institution was nonexistent. Even the officers were at the mercy of the party in power. Without hope for or guarantee of a stable career, without much education, and recruited from levels below or marginal to the dominant social, economic, and political class, an officer had little choice but to become the instrument of the dominant class.

g. Annex III provides a detailed discussion of Colombian Armed Forces' officers.

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ANNEX I

STATISTICAL TABLES

267

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Table IX (D)

PERMANENT GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL BY FUNCTIONAL GROUPS, 1948

FUNCTION	National	Government Cost	Departmental	Government Cost	Municipal	Government Cost
	Number	Monthly	Number	Monthly	Number	Cost Mo.
Direction of Administration	1,648	Ps. \$ 421,261	905	Ps\$ 201,262	13,023	1,087,367
Justice and Internal Order	11,624	1,891,375	8,235	679,124	401	38,834
International Relations	254	205,463	--	--	--	--
Collection of Taxes	2,400	401,385	3,878	459,889	3,570	488,750
National Services	6,405	872,633	--	--	--	--
Municipal Services	--	--	2,038	214,947	1,444	201,470
Departmental Services ^a	--	--	351	38,460	--	--
National Defense	4,550	523,576	--	--	--	--
Culture	3,696	446,830	17,880	1,752,752	2,103	131,765
Hygiene & Public Assistance	2,602	463,297	988	117,280	2,067	273,598
Labor and Social Security	184	65,030	--	--	--	--
Economic Development ^b	1,740	596,957	667	92,086	--	--
Audit and Control	1,570	413,447	674	150,473	228	56,671
Statistics	269	71,055	149	30,066	--	--
Various Services	642	150,505	1,230	129,105	791	177,007
TOTAL	37,584	6,522,814	36,995	3,875,444	23,627	2,457,462

Source: Contraloria General, Colombia, as reported by International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Basis of a Development Plan for Colombia, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1950) pp. 348-349 and 277.

^aCivilian personnel only.

^bIncluding public works, agriculture and animal industry, mines, industry and commerce, and miscellaneous development activities.

Table X (U)

ELECTION STATISTICS SINCE 1914

<u>Year</u>	<u>Candidates</u>	<u>Liberals</u>	<u>Conser- vatives</u>	<u>Commu- nist</u>	<u>Others</u>	<u>Blank</u>	<u>Total</u>
1914	President	---	---	---	---	---	229,003
1918	President	---	---	---	---	---	407,258
1922	President	---	---	---	---	---	670,057
1926	President	---	---	---	---	---	370,492
1930	President	---	---	---	---	---	823,787
1934	President	338,908	---	---	---	3,401	942,309
1935	Local councils	435,751	234,435	---	12,140	---	682,326
1935	House of Represent.	420,547	---	---	10,181	---	430,728
1937	House of Represent.	550,726	---	---	---	---	550,726
1937	Local councils	424,340	208,557	---	7,682	---	640,579
1938	President	511,947	---	---	---	1,573	513,520
1939	Local councils	472,321	226,648	---	6,713	---	705,682
1939	House of Represent.	592,283	322,825	---	4,461	---	919,569
1941	Local councils	504,125	286,422	---	10,229	---	800,776
1941	House of Represent.	565,237	316,185	---	4,103	---	885,525
1942	President	673,169	474,637	---	---	---	1,147,806
1943	House of Represent.	566,217	298,644	---	15,686	---	882,647
1943	Local councils	479,813	235,749	---	19,805	---	735,367
1945	House of Represent.	561,224	294,237	27,696	2,522	177	875,856
1945	Local councils	482,164	283,406	---	15,014	---	780,584
1946	President	803,156	565,939	---	---	177	1,366,272
1947	Congress, assemblies	805,874	653,716	6,422	---	---	1,466,012
1947	Local councils	746,154	575,833	7,742	---	379	1,330,108

Source: Quick Colombian Facts, 1960, p. 67. The Senate during most of this period (until 1947) was elected by the Departmental Assemblies.

Table XI (U)

INCREASE OF THE POPULATION OF COLOMBIA BY DEPARTMENT AND TERRITORY FOR 1938-48 AND 1948-51

<u>DEPARTMENTS</u>	<u>TERRITORIES</u>	Increase, Percent 1938-48	Increase, Percent 1948-51	Increase, Percent 1938-48	Increase, Percent 1948-51
Antioquia	Caqueta	18.2	11.7	0.9	120.8
Atlantico	Meta	41.3	12.9	0.9	29.4
Bolivar	San Andres y Providencia	29.9	- 0.2	0.9	- 13.9
Boyaca	Amazonas	6.1	- 0.3	0.9	17.8
Caldas	Arauca	34.7	3.0	0.9	17.4
Cauca	La Guajira	22.5	1.7	0.9	- 2.9
Cundinamarca	Putumayo	20.6	14.7	0.9	41.9
Choco	Vaupes	0.9	16.8	0.9	17.0
Huila	Vichada	8.8	24.5	0.9	34.3
Magdalena		27.6	4.7		
Narino		17.2	0.2		
North Santander		20.6	- 17.2		
Santander		18.7	2.3		
Tolima		29.5	0.4		
Valle del Cauca		51.2	19.4		
TOTAL DEPARTMENTS	TOTAL	24.3	6.6	23.8	7.2

Source: Census of Colombia, 1938 and 1951 and Anuario de Estadística, 1948, (by calculation)

Table XII (U)

POPULATION OF CAPITAL CITIES OF DEPARTMENTS, PROPORTION OF POPULATION
IN CAPITAL CITIES AND INCREASE IN SELECTED AREAS

Department and City	1918		1938		1948		1951	
	Pop	%Dept	Pop	%Dept	Pop	%Dept	Pop	%Dept
Antioquia-Medellin	79,146	9.6	168,266	14.2	246,450	17.5	358,189	22.8
Atlantico-Barranquilla	64,543	47.5	152,348	56.8	235,460	62.1	279,627	65.3
Bolivar-Cartagena	51,382	11.2	84,937	11.1	109,580	11.0	128,877	13.0
Boyaca-Tunja	10,680	1.6	20,236	2.7	27,970	3.6	27,402	3.5
Caldas-Manizales	43,203	10.1	86,027	11.2	121,940	11.8	126,201	11.8
Cauca-Popayan	20,235	8.5	30,038	8.4	36,690	8.4	44,808	10.1
Cundinamarca-Bogota	143,994	17.7	330,312	28.1	503,230	35.5	648,324	39.9
Choco-Quibdo ^a	24,722	27.1	30,122	27.1	33,290	29.7	36,558	27.9
Huila-Neiva	25,185	13.7	34,294	15.8	40,110	17.0	50,494	17.2
Magdalena-Santa Marta	18,040	8.5	33,245	9.7	45,330	10.4	47,354	10.4
Narino-Pasto	29,035	8.5	49,644	10.7	65,180	11.9	81,103	14.8
North Santander-Cucuta	29,490	12.3	57,248	16.5	80,130	19.2	95,150	24.6
Santander-Bucaramanga	24,919	5.7	51,283	8.3	73,890	10.1	112,252	15.0
Tolima-Ibaque	30,255	9.2	61,447	11.2	87,940	12.4	98,695	13.9
Valle del Cauca-Cali	45,525	16.8	101,883	16.6	153,300	16.5	284,186	25.7
	640,354	11.3	1,291,330	15.2	1,860,490	17.6	2,419,220	21.4
								30.0

Sources: Annual de General de Estadistico, 1948 (for 1918, 1938, 1948); Censo de Poblacion de Colombia, 1951 (for 1951

^aChoco became a Dept in 1948.

Table XIII (U)
 RACIAL COMPOSITION OF COLOMBIA
 (in Percent)

<u>Category</u>	<u>1852</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1962</u>
Indians	13.8	1.6	5.0	1.0
Mestizo	44.5	46.0	42.0	58.0
Negro	3.5	4.4	8.0	4.0
Mulatto	17.6	22.0	20.0	14.0
Zambo (Indian/Negro)	--	--	--	3.0
White	20.6	26.0	25.0	20.0

Sources: W. O. Galbraith, *Colombia*, p. 17 (for 1852, 1942, 1962)
 T. Lynn Smith, "The Racial Composition of the Population of Colombia,"
Journal of Inter-American Studies, Volume VIII, No. 2, April 1966,
 p. 218 (for 1950).

Table XIV (U)

ILLITERACY BY DEPARTMENTS AND FOR ALL TERRITORIES, 1934, 1938, 1951

	Percentate Illiteracy Among Population Over 10 Years of Age		
	1934	1938	1951 ^a
DEPARTMENTS:			
Antioquia	32	28.1	n/a
Atlantico	20	33.7	n/a
Bolivar	61	60.1	n/a
Boyaca	62	60.4	n/a
Caldas	28	25.4	n/a
Cauca	62	54.5	n/a
Cundinamarca	47	38.5	n/a
Choco	80	--	n/a
Huila	60	51.4	n/a
Magdalena	57	49.8	n/a
Narino	51	46.1	n/a
North Santander	53	50.5	n/a
Santander	57	55.3	n/a
Tolima	57	50.6	n/a
Valle del Cauca	32	29.4	n/a
TERRITORIES:			
Caqueta	69	n/a	n/a
Meta	52	n/a	n/a
San Andres y Providencia	12	n/a	n/a
Amazonas	93	n/a	n/a
Arauca	69	n/a	n/a
Casanare	--	n/a	n/a
La Guajira	87	n/a	n/a
Putumayo	77	n/a	n/a
Vaupes	91	n/a	n/a
Vichada	85	n/a	n/a
TOTAL DEPARTMENTS	48	43.2	
TOTAL TERRITORIES	73	71.4	
NATIONAL TOTAL	48	44.2	38.5

Sources: Anuario General de Estactistica (for 1934); Censo de Poblacion de Colombia, 1938 (for 1938); Censo de Poblacion de Colombia, 1951.

^aInformation not available for Departments or Territories.

TABLE XV (U)

PRIMARY SCHOOL AGE POPULATION ENROLLED IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS FOR 1934

<u>DEPARTMENTS</u>	<u>1934 % of population 6-14 yrs. of age in primary school</u>	<u>TERRITORIES</u>	<u>1934 % of population 6-14 yrs. of age in primary school</u>
Antioquia	51.2	Caqueta	20.5
Atlantico	33.8	Meta	36.5
Bolivar	30.0	San Andres y Providencia	50.2
Boyaca	23.4	Amazonas	52.0
Caldas	48.7	Arauca	24.7
Cauca	42.6	Casanare	--
Cundinamarca	30.2	La Guajira	6.0
Choco	34.0	Putumayo	56.2
Huila	30.4	Vaupes	4.2
Magdalena	21.0	Vichada	2.8
Narino	31.3	Total Territories	27.9
North Santander	20.4		
Santander	23.8		
Tolima	30.0		
Valle del Cauca	68.3		
TOTAL DEPARTMENTS	34.8	NATIONAL TOTAL	34.6

Source: Anuario General de Estadística, 1934.

Table XVI (U)

NUMBER OF SCHOOLS (PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) AND ENROLLMENT BY LEVEL OF SCHOOL

FOR SELECTED YEARS

SCHOOL	1934		1938		1945		1946		1947		1948	
	No. of Schools	Enrollment	No. of Schools	Enrollment	No. of Schools	Enrollment	No. of Schools	Enrollment	No. of Schools	Enrollment	No. of Schools	Enrollment
Primary	8,300	548,113	9,204	627,730	12,147	678,386	12,324	711,798	12,526	738,716	13,010	765,488
Secondary	438	31,122	401	33,730	677	35,807	637	45,678	592	47,161	601	42,293
Normal	--	--	21	2,633	60	5,075	71	6,432	64	6,026	66	4,411
Superior	30	2,971	22	3,050	42	6,512	52	7,337	59	8,032	62	8,252

Sources: Anuario General de Estadística, 1938, (for 1934 and 1938); Anuario General de Estadística, 1948, (for other years).

Table XVII (U)

PREPARATION OF PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS AS OF 1948

	TOTAL		Without a Degree ^a		Completed Secondary School		Completed Normal School	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Urban	7,850	100	3,824	48.7	346	4.4	3,680	46.9
Rural	8,355	100	6,808	81.5	111	1.3	1,436	17.2
Total	16,205	100	10,632	65.6	457	2.8	5,116	31.6

Source: Anuario General de Estadística, 1948.

^aIncludes those who did not complete primary school, those who completed primary school, and those who had some secondary school but who did not complete secondary or normal school.

Table XVIII (U)

ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS AS A PERCENT OF ALL BIRTHS
BY DEPARTMENTS FOR 1938 AND 1948

Department	Percent Illegitimate Births	
	1938	1948
Antioquia	14.2	13.3
Atlantico	45.3	38.0
Bolivar	70.0	66.3
Boyaca	24.7	22.1
Caldas	14.9	14.8
Cauca	34.4	36.3
Cundinamarca	30.0	23.0
Choco	--	52.1
Huila	34.5	30.2
Magdalena	70.9	65.9
Narino	31.6	29.8
North Santander	39.1	31.7
Santander	30.5	27.2
Tolima	41.2	37.8
Valle del Cauca	39.5	33.3
TERRITORIES	48.9	35.9
NATIONAL TOTAL	31.1	28.3

Source: Anuario General de Estadística, 1938 and 1948.

Table XIX (U)

DEATH RATES IN COLOMBIA FOR SELECTED CAUSES: 1930-48

(Exclusive of stillbirths. Numbers after causes of death are those of the 1938 revision of the detailed International list of causes of death. Rates are the number of deaths per 100,000 population.)

Cause of Death	<u>1930</u>	<u>1935</u>	<u>1938</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1948</u>
Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers (1, 2)	29.3	32.7	29.6	28.4	14.5
Whooping Cough (9)	23.3	37.0	55.1	26.1	35.7
Tuberculosis (all forms) (13-22)	28.3	45.3	47.0	45.9	43.6
Dysentery, diarrhea, enteritis (27, 119, 120)	84.7	179.2	184.3	157.9	161.7
Malaria (28)	33.6	60.5	66.2	42.5	27.2
Helminthiases (40-42)	28.6	60.7	86.8	45.7	33.4
Cardiac diseases (90-95)	34.0	28.3	52.4	45.2	62.5
Bronchitis (106)	53.8	67.0	115.8	70.5	66.2
Pneumonia and influenza (107-109, 33)	108.3	129.7	168.7	150.5	143.4
Congenital malformation and diseases peculiar to first year of life (157-161)	44.2	77.0	136.0	145.8	65.4
Vitamin deficiencies (68-71)	20.8				19.1
Anemia (73)	18.2				19.1
Ill-defined and unknown causes (199-200)	416.9	319.9	145.0	203.6	339.5
All causes	1,238.5	1,487.9	1,731.5	1,834.9	1,432.2

Sources: National Planning Association, *Latin America in the Future World*, p. 47.
 International Bank, *The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia*, Appendix 13, p. 1.
 Institute of Inter-American Affairs, "Colombia," *Newsletter*, #139, pp. 1-4.
 HEW, *Nutrition Survey May-August 1960*, p. 39.

Table XX (U)

REGISTERED VITAL RATES PER 1000 POPULATION, 1930-1951

<u>Year</u>	<u>Births</u>	<u>Deaths</u>	<u>Deaths under 1 year per 1000 live births</u>
1930	31.4	12.7	105.5
1931	30.7	13.6	124.6
1932	25.3	11.2	---
1933	28.4	15.5	143.5
1934	29.9	15.6	117.4
1935	30.1	15.3	156.1
1936	29.5	15.5	153.4
1937	30.8	15.4	150.0
1938	32.2	17.3	156.5
1939	31.6	17.6	161.9
1940	32.2	15.2	140.9
1941	32.8	15.5	150.3
1942	33.2	16.0	154.2
1943	32.3	17.1	159.2
1944	32.4	16.4	154.8
1945	31.9	15.8	151.0
1946	33.0	15.6	150.4
1947	34.0	14.5	139.7
1948	35.1	14.3	136.6
1949	35.3	14.0	134.1
1950	36.7	14.2	123.9
1951	36.4	14.3	122.4

Source: International Bank, The Basis of a Development Program for Colombia, pp. 7, 8, 177, 179.

Table XXI (U)

CRUDE RATES OF BIRTHS, DEATHS AND DEATHS UNDER 1 YEAR OF AGE, 1930-51

(Rates are the number of births or deaths per 1000 population exclusive of stillbirths. Infant mortality rates are the number of deaths under 1 year of age per 1000 live births.)

	BIRTHS					DEATHS					INFANT MORTALITY						
	1930	1935	1938	1942	1948	1951	1930	1935	1938	1942	1948	1951	1930	1935	1937	1942	1948
Antioquia	42.3	40.4	40.4	41.3	46.1	46.2	15.5	17.5	19.4	17.1	15.5	16.6	131.4	144.8	142.6	146.7	121.9
Atlantico	31.1	26.2	31.3	32.0	35.1	37.3	15.8	15.0	14.4	14.7	13.1	11.9	160.8	178.3	132.1	126.6	81.6
Bolivar	14.0	15.8	14.6	13.9	20.8	21.3	5.9	8.8	9.4	7.8	6.0	5.1	61.4	122.1	120.2	122.8	61.9
Boyaca	25.2	26.0	35.6	35.5	35.1	35.2	9.6	12.0	19.5	15.6	16.7	14.0	14.4	111.1	112.7	122.3	108.7
Caldas	41.7	37.4	40.4	42.8	39.7	39.6	16.0	17.0	19.3	19.9	15.2	17.1	155.3	198.6	199.9	193.4	164.1
Cauca	31.2	28.4	29.7	30.9	33.3	32.8	10.1	14.7	15.9	18.6	15.7	14.0	92.3	139.2	132.8	176.1	105.7
Cundinamarca	29.7	27.0	30.4	31.0	34.4	40.7	13.8	15.4	18.8	16.8	14.8	15.6	121.8	150.5	147.3	151.5	111.8
Huila	26.9	22.8	32.2	31.5	37.1	43.8	9.7	14.9	19.1	15.2	18.6	21.5	109.9	203.7	158.3	158.5	153.9
Magdalena	8.6	16.7	28.9	28.4	22.3	31.8	3.7	9.7	12.7	12.3	9.7	8.3	--	157.8	115.0	96.1	68.0
Narino	35.0	35.6	35.8	31.5	32.2	32.8	13.1	17.8	21.5	17.8	14.3	16.1	120.5	158.6	143.8	166.3	148.9
Norte de Santander	33.7	33.0	36.1	39.2	29.2	32.7	14.2	17.6	21.1	17.1	16.3	15.1	107.7	151.1	150.0	133.6	129.5
Santander	27.1	21.9	29.1	34.0	34.3	34.4	12.4	15.4	19.2	18.1	17.0	15.9	82.8	182.3	162.4	166.9	132.1
Tolima	35.5	32.8	33.5	33.6	36.3	35.3	12.9	14.6	16.6	15.8	14.5	14.7	9.3	139.9	154.4	156.5	130.3
Valle del Cauca	45.9	42.8	38.0	44.2	40.3	40.2	19.8	19.1	17.6	19.8	16.4	16.5	173.0	170.2	170.4	175.0	142.9
Choco				12.6	17.9					8.3	10.3						124.9
Territorios	15.5	6.3	11.6	18.2	34.3	29.6	7.7	13.0	9.6	13.0	12.3	11.7	114.8	433.7	180.5	178.8	124.4
Total excluding Territories	31.2	29.8	33.0	34.0			12.6	15.0	17.7	16.1			106.8	154.7	149.8	153.8	
Total Colombia	30.8	29.2	32.2	33.4	35.1	36.4	12.4	14.9	17.3	16.3	14.3	14.4	106.8	156.1	150.0	154.2	122.4

Table XXII (U)
CORRECTED VITAL RATES

	<u>Annual averages for inter-</u> <u>censal periods</u>	
	<u>1912-1938</u>	<u>1938-1951</u>
Births per 1000 population	48	47-46
Deaths per 1000 population	27	25-18
Average annual rate of increase	2.08	2.2-2.8
Life expectancy at birth, years	35	35-40

Source: International Bank, The Basis for a Development Plan for Colombia, pp. 8-11.

Table XXIII (U)

CONTENT OF THE COLOMBIAN DIET, 1935-1953 (Per Capita and per Diem)

	1935- 1939 FAO	1946 FAO	1946- 1949 FAO	FAO Target 1960	1946 Development Survey	1946 Development Target	1951- 1953 ECLA
Calories (units)	1,881	2,008	2,280	2,590	1,801	1,710	2,040
Total proteins (grams)	46.7	50.9	56.0	74.0	39.65	50.0	44.5
Animal proteins (grams)	20.0		26.0	30.0	18.03	20.0	
Fats (grams)	36.7	39.3			24.38	37.0	41.3
Carbohydrates (grams)					349.00		381.4
Calcium (mg)					455.37	880.00	456.0
Phosphorus (mg)					730.13	1320.00	958.0
Iron (mg)					12.51	9.12	12.26
Vitamin A (International Units)							2025
Thiamine (mg) (Vitamin B ₁)					1.07	0.93	0.955
Riboflavin (mg) (Vitamin B ₂)					0.67	1.28	1.040
Niacin (mg)					5.50	9.30	11.840
Ascorbic Acid (mg) (Vitamin C)					47.63	55.20	104.93

Sources: For 1935-1939 and 1946: FAO, Food Balance Sheets, 1948.

For 1946-1949 and FAO Target 1960: Second World Food Survey, 1952.

For 1946 Development Survey and Target: A Development Program for Colombia, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Mission to Colombia. Appendix B.

For 1951-1953: ECLA estimates, 1953.

Table XXIV (U)

ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' DAILY DIETS IN FOUR IMPORTANT CITIES AND IN COLOMBIA, 1946

Item	Cities			Total for Colombia	Theoretical requirements
	Manizales	Bucaramanga	Barranquilla Honda		
Calories (units)	1,618.500	1,348.40	1,690.61	1,801.33	1,710.00
Proteins (grams)					
Total	35.550	33.28	49.87	39.65	50.00
(Animal origin)	(16.9)	(15.5)	(23.7)	(18.03)	(20.00)
Fats (gm.)	28.550	21.78	39.51	24.38	37.00
Carbohydrates (gm.)	295.430	263.27	278.34	349.00	...
Calcium (mg.)	418.010	344.69	405.14	455.37	880.00
Iron (mg.)	12.250	10.44	13.68	12.51	9.12
Ascorbic acid (mg.)	34.370	46.56	36.90	47.63	55.20
Thiamine (mg.)	1.001	0.65	1.01	1.07	0.93
Riboflavin (mg.)	0.643	0.47	0.63	0.67	1.28
Niacin (mg.)	4.846	4.40	7.06	5.50	9.30
Phosphorus (mg.)	710.250	503.70	950.50	730.13	1,320.00

Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Second World Food Survey. Appendix B.

Table XXV (U)

COLOMBIA: SAMPLE OF THE DEGREE OF AVITAMINOSIS IN SOME SECTORS OF THE POPULATION

LOCALITY	GROUP	Number of Persons Examined	Avitaminosis A		Under Weight (Percentage)
			(Percentage of Total)	Ariboflavinosis	
Bogota	School children	685	88	78	52
Bogota	Industrial workers, aggregate	342	71	52	43
Medellin	Industrial workers, aggregate	406	63	49	47
Calli	Industrial workers, aggregate	204	42	46	41
Valle de Tensa	Agricultural workers	421	78	19	35

Sources: Instituto Nacional de Nutricion, "El Problema de la disponibilidad de leche en Colombia," in *Revista Colombiana de Pediatria y Puericultura* (February 1953). UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs. Cited in Economic Development of Colombia, Geneva: UN 1957 p. 148.

Table XXVI (U)

HEALTH FACILITIES AND RESOURCES IN COLOMBIA

	Hospitals		Hospital Beds		No. of People Attended			Doctors		Hygiene Centers ⁴ 1947
	1938 ¹	1942 ² 1948 ²	1938 ¹	1948 ¹	1938	1942	1948	1938 ³	1942 ³ 1948 ¹	
Antioquia	37	55 72	1875	5518	19,388	22,825	44,101	327	594	16
Atlantico	1	1 2	315	833 ^a	4,434	4,937	9,281	119	181	4
Bolivar	2	5 8	136	565 ^a	3,081	3,675	9,338	101	268	14
Boyaca	17	20 19	454	1336	3,804	5,825	7,899	84	91	7
Caldas	24	27 35	1553	3310 ^a	20,049	25,726	38,106	143	261	3
Cauca	3	3 3	249	404	1,940	1,908	3,168	28	43	7
Cundinamarca	21	32 35	1884	6208 ^a	39,968	41,102	54,573	130	955	23
Huila	9	8 9	556	610	2,602	3,108	4,627	27	36	6
Magdalena	5	4 7	406	995	4,908	7,444	9,273	77	94	10
Narino	1	8 10	50	711 ^a	1,575	2,416	5,762	38	51	8
Norte de Santander	5	8 9	459	173 ^a	5,221	7,713	10,771	64	85	15
Santander	19	28 27	747	2855 ^a	12,563	19,703	32,921	78	177	5
Tolima	10	13 19	441	795 ^a	6,089	5,600	12,120	73	88	14
Valle del Cauca	8	10 13	1079	2311 ^a	11,819	17,404	29,938	137	337	11
Choco	3	4 4	67	28 ^{3a}			1,851	12	18	6
Meta		1 1		50	983	2,695	2,462	13		2
San Andrea Providencia		1 1						4		2
Comisaria		2					1,362	7	48	7
TOTAL	165	228 276	10271	32310	139,249	172,081	276,553	1868 ^b	3327	159

Sources: (1) International Bank, *The Basis of a Development Plan for Colombia*, pp. 181, 215-217;(2) National Planning Association, *Latin America in the Future World*, p. 47;(3) Republic of Colombia, *Annex a/a Memoria du Ministro*, Vol I, pp. 69-73;(4) Republic of Colombia, *Epidemiological Bulletin*.^aIncomplete count^bTotal exceeds area listings

Table XXVII (U)

NUMBER OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND INDEX OF INHABITANTS
PER MEDICAL PROFESSION, 1938 AND 1949

<u>Medical Personnel</u>	1938		1949	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Index</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Index</u>
Physicians	1868	1/4658	3327	1/3310
Midwives	91	1/95602	200	1/55076
Nurses	--	--	400	1/27538
Dentists	1277	1/6814	1600	1/6884

Sources:

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ANNEX II

ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

1. General.

a. From the military point of view, Colombia is probably the most difficult of the Latin American countries to describe or analyze in terms of natural environment and people. Few nations of the world of similar size have the diversity of land configuration, climate, cultural groups, and economics. In reality, physically and culturally there are many Colombias. This fact has been and is reflected by a keen regional consciousness and by political separation that has erupted in civil strife. From a time-space viewpoint, the chief physical reason for the complex pattern of landscape can be seen in the varied land surface coupled with the position Colombia has within the tropical latitudes. The cultural reasons for Colombia's time-space diversity are even more complex. For instance, a reason may be the varied historical development and relationships of three racial groups and the cultural heritages of each: the native Indian of many different cultural levels; the Spanish Caucasian invaders; and the African Negro, imported as slaves during the colonial era. Another reason may be the prolonged isolation of the particular groups of people in areas due to the poor transportation and communication networks over rugged terrain coupled with long distance.

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b. In general, the political division of Colombian territory can be characterized by two greatly different areas p. 221.

(1) The western third of the country which is the rugged northern Andean Cordillera (range) with its three high ranges separated by deep longitudinal valleys and fringed on the north and west by coastal lowlands. This area comprises the most complex and important part of the country, containing about 98 percent of Colombia's population. Since early times, this area has been one of the most densely settled and economically significant sections of all Latin America.

(2) The eastern two-thirds of the country is a vast, sparsely settled lowland plain of tropical grass and rain forest not yet incorporated or in the process of being incorporated into the Colombian national life.

c. The contrast between eastern and western Colombia is fundamental in understanding Colombia. It is a truism that human activity takes place upon land and that man adapts himself to natural conditions according to his cultural attributes. Hence, one is able to deduce that Colombia is a plural nation made up of different cultural areas. This has a profound effect on political, economic sociocultural, and military developments.

2. Natural regions of Colombia.

a. General. This portion of the time-space discussion is based on physical criteria such as land configuration, climate and vegetation, and in some instances, regions closely associated with a given culture

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


Figure 4. Natural regions and subregions of Colombia

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and a particular economy. Yet, realize that two peoples of different cultures or cultural values will utilize and transform a given physical setting in entirely different ways. Figure 3 page 232 depicts Colombia divided into five natural regions with the more important subregions listed and mapped.

(1) The Andean core.

(a) Cordillera oriental.

1. The Altiplano. 1
2. Santander highlands. 2
3. Suarez basin. 3
4. Western Versant. 4

(b) The Magdalena depression.

1. The Central Magdalena. 5
2. Magdalena Tolimense. 6
3. Magdalena Huilenese. 7

(c) Cordillera Central.

1. Antioquian Massif. 8
2. Pasto plateau. 9

(d) The Cauca-Patia depression.

1. El Valle de Cauca. 10
2. Popayan area. 11
3. Upper Patia Valley. 12

(e) Cordillera occidental.

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- (2) Caribbean region.
 - (a) El Cenu. 13
 - (b) Bolívar Savannas. 14
 - (c) Lower Magdalena and coast. 15
 - (d) Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. 16
 - (e) Guajira peninsula. 17
- (3) Pacific Lowlands.
- (4) Llanos Arriba.
 - (a) Llanos Arriba. 18
 - (b) Llanos Abajo. 19
- (5) Colombia Amazonia. 20

Of the listed major natural regions, the Andean core is by far the most significant, since it is physically and culturally the center of the country. The other four natural regions (referred to as peripheral areas) surround the northern Andes. In terms of population densities, economic production, and political influence, these peripheral areas appear to be far less important than the Andean core.

3. Andean core. The three Andean Cordilleras (figure 5) and the two intervening structural depressions (Magdalena and Cauca) form the physical and cultural heartland of Colombia. The great variations in elevation, the resulting climatic and vegetational difference, and the wide range of landforms actually depict the complexity of this area of the country. Here are found the temperature zones, defined by altitude, familiar to every Colombian of the region:

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


Figure 5. The Andean cordilleras

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(a) The "tierra caliente" of the valleys and slopes from sea level to 3,000 feet.

(b) The "tierra templada" between 3,000 and 6,000 feet.

(c) The "tierra fria" between 6,000 and 11,000 feet, and above the snowfields and glaciers of the highest plateaus and mountain peaks. The climatic pattern throughout the Colombian Andes is complicated by two rainy seasons and two dry seasons annually. Since preconquest times, man has utilized the fertile lowland and highland valleys and adjacent slopes for farming. The cordilleras have yielded a variety of economically valuable minerals, but the fantastic ruggedness of this mountain area has made land transport extremely difficult and, in the past, has often resulted in cultural isolation and stagnation in certain areas.

4. Cordillera oriental. The Cordillera oriental is the easternmost, the longest, and the widest of the three Andean chains of Colombia. This region has thick deposits of folded and faulted sandstone, limestone, and shale, with the highest elevations (18,000 feet) in the snow and ice-capped Sierra de Cotuy.

a. Near the center of the cordillera is an area known as the Altiplano, a series of some fourteen highland basins of 8,500-9,000 feet elevation that extend for nearly 150 miles from Bogota northward to beyond Sogamoso in the departments of Cundinamarca and Boyaca (figure 4). This area was once covered by shallow lakes, thus the flattish floors of the basins contain fertile lacustrine soils. The largest and the southernmost is called the Sabana de Bogota, the site of Colombia's capital

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city. Culturally, these basins are the most significant features of the Cordillera oriental. They were sites of the Indian farming settlements that formed the Chibcha (muisca) culture of preconquest times. It was in these same localities that the Spanish invaders of the 16th century founded the cities of Santa Fe de Bogota, Tunja, Sagamoso, as well as the large estates devoted to wheat and cattle production that formed the core of the New Kingdom of Granada. Still today the basins of the Altiplano can be considered the heart of Colombia, one of the most densely populated sectors of the country and the traditional political and cultural centers. Most of the rural population of the basin is mixed Indian-white (mestizo), who are highly conservative and reticent yet retain a large number of aboriginal traits. The traditional urban element of the population, although equally conservative, take pride in its pure Spanish ancestry.

b. Northward from the Altiplano are other natural subregions of the Cordillera oriental. One is the rugged, highly dissected highlands of Santander with its low, warm, dry valleys adjacent to steep slopes and high frigid mountain crests. Another is the temperate limestone basin of Suarez, characterized by landforms and dry soils, where poverty-stricken farmers struggle to cultivate subsistence crops in small, scattered hillside plots. The steep western and eastern flanks of the Cordillera are frayed by deep canyons which have hindered transportation and communication since colonial times. The most formidable canyon is that of Chica Mocha, which bisects the Santander highlands and creates

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a difficult barrier to land travel between the central and northern portions of the Cordillera. Since the close of the colonial period, the heavy forests that once covered the Cordillera's western flank overlooking the Magdalena depression have been almost destroyed by subsistence farmers who cultivate tiny fields on the steep (45-50°) slopes. The western flank also contains one of Colombia's important coffee belts which lies within the "tierra templada" zone between 3,000 and 5,000 feet elevations.

c. The thick sedimentary strata of the Cordillera oriental contains two special minerals that have given fame to the area since preconflict Spanish times. One is the enormous deposits of rock salt within the Antiplano; the other, the Americas' only commercially important deposit of emeralds, exposed at two points (Muzo and Samondoes) on the western and eastern flanks of the Cordillera. Both minerals were first exploited by the Chibcha Indians for trade items. Followed by the Spanish exploitation during the colonial era. Some deposits worked even today. Presently the extensive coal and limestone deposits of the Cordillera and the occurrence of iron ore near Sogamoso form the physical basis for the recently developed iron and steel industry in Colombia.

5. The Magdalena depression.

a. This depression, which separates the central and eastern Cordilleras, forms the important subregions of Andean Colombia. Through this low, hot, elongated basin flows the country's longest river, the Magdalena. Since the beginning of the colonial period, the lower half of this river

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has been regarded as Colombia's calle real, the main road connecting the Caribbean Coast with the interior. Despite its utility as a line of communication, most of the Magdalena's course is treacherous to navigate. It is a shallow river with shifting channels, bars, and snags that impede modern steamboat travel. Moreover, during the two annual dry seasons (December-March and July-August), the river may be so low that steam transport ceases. During the past hundred years the deforestation and cultivation of the adjacent mountain slopes has so increased sedimentation that the river has become even less navigable. The head of navigation for large boats occurs 500 miles upstream from the mouth, at the first rapids where the old port of Honda was established in 1560.

b. Physically, the Magdalena depression may be divided into three parts. The lower section, often called El Magdalena Central, is a wide alluvial plain--a steamy tropical zone originally covered by dense rain forest. Sparsely populated, this area is now being slowly colonized by highlanders, and the exploitation of petroleum reserves has resulted in the recent development of the Barrancabermeja industrial complex near the river. Up the valley within the department of Tolima the depression narrows, rainfall decreases, and the natural vegetation cover suddenly changes to low scrub and grassland. This is called the Magdalena Tolimense, famed since colonial times for its livestock economy that evolved on the grassy terraces and alluvial fans that compose most of the valley floor. This area is now being developed for irrigated agriculture. The upper part of the Magdalena depression within the department

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of Huila is even drier than the Tolima section, and the basin floor is highly dissected by intermittent streams forming a low, rough, hill land. This is the home of the Huilan cowboys, who together with the cattlemen of Tolima form a distinctive Colombia culture group whose traits have been recorded in national literature and song.

6. Cordillera central. Westward from the Magdalena depression, the Cordillera central rises abruptly as the highest of the three northern Andean chains. In contrast to the sedimentary cover of the Cordillera oriental, the central range in part consists of geologically recent volcanoes and immense bodies of granitic intrusions called batholiths. In the middle sector of the Cordillera, the snow and ice-covered peaks of Huila, Ruiz, and Tolima rise to heights that measure from 17,000 to nearly 19,000 feet above sea level. In the southern part of the range, some volcanoes, such as Purace near Popayan, are still active. On the lower flanks of the volcanoes, highly fertile soils derive from the weathering of ash, pumice, and lava, while the highly mineralized edges of the great batholiths have yielded large quantities of precious metals, the exploitation of which has formed significant chapters in the aboriginal, colonial, and modern history of Colombia.

a. There are few extensive highland bases or level plateaus within the Cordillera central. A rolling plateau surface occurs near the southern end of the Cordillera where it joins the western and eastern chains to form the high, wind-swept, almost uninhabited Gran Macizo Colombiano. South of this area, near the Ecuadorian border, is the Pasto plateau, a

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high volcanic zone more akin to the Ecuadorian Andes than those of Colombia. Many Quechua-speaking Indians, as well as Spanish-speaking mestizos, inhabit the fertile, densely settled basin floors and adjacent slopes of this highland area. Culturally, the Pasto region is Ecuadorian, and anciently it formed the northern periphery of the Inca Empire.

b. Another plateau occurs near the northern extremity of Cordillera central. This is the large Antioquian batholith, or massif, whose rolling, weathered surface lies between 7,000 and 8,000 feet elevation. The steep western, northern, and eastern flanks of the granite mass are frayed by deep narrow valleys. The Rio Neche has carved a deep gorge through the middle of the massif, dividing the Sante Rosade Osos plateau to the north from the Rionegro plateau to the south. At the head of the Porce gorge is a small, alluvium-filled basin called the Valle de Aburra which, since the seventeenth century, has played a role in Colombian history far out of proportion to its size. For this valley is the heart of Antioquia, a cultural and political area that vies with the altiplano of Cundinamarca and Boyaca as the economic and political center of the country. Antioquia, which encompasses the massif and adjacent slopes of the Cordillera central between the Cauco and Magdalena Rivers, is indeed another Colombia.

c. One of the most significant geologic-geographic aspects of the Antioquian massif is the abundance of gold-bearing quartz veins within and around the periphery of the batholith. Streams eroding deeply into the weathered surface have uncovered many of the gold-bearing deposits and have deposited gold dust and nuggets within the sandy, gravelly beds,

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forming a rich plateau. Moreover, the deep weathering of the gigantic surface has formed easily worked layers of clay and gravel rich in gold. Thus, the Antioquian batholith and its drainage network were the chief source of gold that the Indians of the area in preconquest times mined and fashioned into ornaments to be traded throughout northwestern South America. During the second half of the 16th century, the same gold deposits, as well as the abundant gold artifacts buried in Indian graves, attracted the Spanish invaders into the Antioquian massif and adjacent rivers. Here they established the third most productive mining area in the Spanish colonies. During most of the colonial period, the interest of the Spanish crown in the New Kingdom of New Granada focused chiefly on the wealth of gold that came from the Antioquian massif.

d. Isolated from the colonial administrative seat in Sante Fe de Bogota by long distances over rough terrain and hot Magdalena depression, the Antioqueno miners and their Negro slaves formed the base for a special culture group in Colombia. Later in the colonial period, the whites of Spanish descent kept to the high plateau surface, the Valle de Aburra, and the adjacent malaria-free slopes, ordinarily above 3,000 feet elevation. The Negroes and the mulattoes settled chiefly in the low hot river valleys surrounding the massif. After gold mining declined at the end of the 18th century, the rapid growing Antioqueno highland population began to expand north and south along the steep slopes of the Cordillera central within the tierra templada belt. There the pioneer farmers felled the dense rain forest to grow maize and manioc and to plant

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pasture for livestock. Later in the 19th century, the Antioqueno farmers became coffee planters and still today produce the greater part of Colombia's leading export crop. South of the massif, the Antioquenos founded the towns of Manizoles, Periera, and Armenia, which today are leading commercial centers within the coffee zone. The Antioqueno is still a vigorous pioneer. Owing to the population pressure in his homeland, he has crossed the Cauca Valley to the slopes of the western Cordillera cutting the forest as he went, sowing grass for pasturing his black-eared white cattle, and planting coffee for a cash crop. Within the Valle de Aburra, the site of the capital city, Medellin, the riches of the Antioqueno families have established a thriving industry based chiefly on textile manufacture and food processing. Shrewd and thrifty, friendly and loquacious, the Antioqueno is widely known as the "Yanqui" of South America. In native dress, modes of speech, and philosophical attitude, he is quite different from his more conservative compatriots of the Altiplano.

7. The Cauca-patia. The Cauca depression separates the central and western cordilleras of Colombia. In the lower or northern half of the depression, the Cauca River has a deep, narrow valley, and extensive dissection of former terraces has left little level land. The middle section of the depression, however, contains the elongated, alluvium-filled valley commonly called El Valle. Only 10 to 15 miles wide, El Valle extends north-south for a distance of 120 miles from near Cali to Cartago. Some 3,000 feet above sea level within the upper margin of the

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tierra caliente, this fertile stretch is today one of Colombia's most productive agricultural districts. The stagnant colonial economy of stork raising has been partially replaced by the cultivation of sugar cane, cotton, and rice on the well-drained alluvial fans that line the valley's eastern side; the low, marshy grasslands along the Cauca flood plain are devoted to fattening livestock shipped in from other parts of the country. Cali, founded on the western edge of the valley at the terminus of an important but difficult trail across the western cordillera to the Pacific, has been the commercial center of the district since its founding early in the 16th century. El Valle is a distinct cultural as well as a natural unit. The inhabitants call themselves "Vallecaucanos" and since the colonial era, the towns of the valley--Cali, Buga, Toro, Culoto, and Cartago--have felt a bond of political economic, and cultural unity. Negroes and mulattoes, products of colonial labor policy and recent immigration from the Pacific lowlands, make up a large part of Vallecaucano population, but old white families of Spanish descent still hold most of the land in large estates.

a. Farther south, the Popayan area forms the highest part of the Cauca depression. At this point, large quantities of volcanic ash and lava ejected from nearby volcanoes in the cordillera central have partially filled the depression to an elevation of 5,000 feet above the sea. The cool climate and brilliantly green landscape of this delightful land contrast with the staid, conservative attitude of the townspeople, descendants of old Spanish families who once controlled much of the land in El Valle farther north.

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b. The structural rift that shapes the Cauca Depression continues even south of Popayan to form the upper valley of the Patia River. This small lowland is still another natural and cultural region of Andean Colombia, for its dry, hot, scrub-covered hills and river flood plains are inhabited almost entirely by Negroes and mulattoes who live by subsistence farming and stock raising.

8. The cordillera occidental. This is the westernmost, lowest, but most rugged of the three Andean ranges of Colombia. Its crest, whose maximum elevations rarely exceed 13,000 feet, is composed of sharp, isolated peaks weathered from a series of granitic batholiths. The steep slopes are completely clothed in dense forest, except where the Antiqueno farmers have hewn out small farm plots, chiefly on the eastern flank of the range. Few alluvium-filled basins or plateau surfaces occur in this mountain land. In terms of man, the chief functions of the Cordillera occidental have been a barrier separating the densely settled Andean core from the almost empty lands of the Pacific lowlands and a source of precious metals contained in the many batholiths and later deposited in the beds of rivers that flow westward to the Pacific.

9. The peripheral lowlands.

a. Around the Andean core of Colombia lie the peripheral lowlands: to the north, the dry Caribbean area; to the west, the rain-drenched Pacific lowlands; to the east, the vast grass and scrub-covered llanos and a portion of the Amazonian forest. These are Colombia's main areas of tierra caliente. Except for parts of the Caribbean area, they are

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sparsely inhabited; these are the lands that may offer possibilities for colonizing the expanding highland population and for the development of scientific tropic agriculture and stockraising.

b. By far the most important of the peripheral zones is the Caribbean area, one of the major natural regions of Colombia. At present, it is second only to the Andean core as the country's most densely populated sector, and for the past 50 years it has received substantial numbers of highlanders as agricultural colonists within the river flood plains and as industrial workers in the rapidly growing urban centers. Most Colombians know the Caribbean areas as La Costa and its inhabitants as Costenos, who, like the Cundenamarquenses and Boyacenses of the Altiplano and Antiplano and Antiquenos of Cordillera central, have developed particular cultural characteristics in dress, dialect, and manner.

c. Although it contains a variety of landscapes, the Caribbean area has a semblance of physical unity. Physiographically, it consists of low hills, one high mountain region, and many flattish alluvial basins. Of these, the wide marshy flood plain and delta of the lower Magdalena is the largest, forming the central part of the lowlands. Several low coastal ranges confine the delta on the west, while, immediately eastward, an isolated mountain mass, the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, rises abruptly from sea level to elevations of nearly 19,000 feet. The Caribbean area extends northeastward into the dry desert-like Guajira peninsula, and the alluvial plains of Sinú and upper San Jorge Rivers form its southwest periphery. Except for the Sierra de Santa Marta, the Caribbean

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area is a hot land, with one-half of the year (November-April) almost completely without rain; the other half (May-October) moist and muggy. Originally, a low semideciduous and deciduous forest with scattered areas of tropical grass covered the hill slopes and alluvial flats; but today man has altered the vegetation of this area so much that only spots of the natural cover remain.

d. Since preconquest times, the drainage basins of the Sinú and upper San Joige Rivers in the western part of the Caribbean area have been considered a natural and cultural unit, called El Cenú. Within the fertile river plains lived the Zenu Indians, expert goldsmiths and farmers who buried artifacts with their dead. During the early 16th century, initial Spanish activity in the area was simply grave robbing; only later were stock ranches established on Indian-made savannas. The grasslands of El Cenú and the adjacent savannas of Bolivar in the lower Magdalena became the cradle of Spanish cattle raising in New Granada. Stock raising continues today as the prime activity of the lowlands. As in colonial days, cattle are still driven overland from the pastures to markets in the Antioqueno highlands, though many are also taken to ports on the Magdalena for shipment up river to the Altiplano. Within the last few decades, the Sinu valley has seen a thriving development of tropical agriculture based on rice, cotton, and sugar cane, with an influx of farmers from Antioquia. So strong is the feeling of cultural and political unity and so rapidly has population recently increased that the area of El Cenú in 1952 was made the new department of Corodoba.

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e. Eastward from El Cend are the extensive savannas of Bolivar and the lower Magdalena; today, as in colonial times, the most important cattle raising area in Colombia. Here, as well as in Cend, stockmen have destroyed much of the original forest and have replaced the coarse native grasses with the more nutritious Brazilian and African species such as guinea, para, and jaragua. In both areas a system of transhumance has developed in the cattle industry. During the rainy season, when the lowlands are inundated, herds are moved to well-drained slopes to planted jaragua grass; in the long dry season, when the hill grasses desiccate and the lowland floods recede, the cattle are driven into the moist river flood plains to pasture on guinea grass. More than fifteen million head of cattle graze on the planted pastures that fit so well into the climatic and hydrographic characteristics of the area.

f. Since the 16th century, the Caribbean area has been Colombia's front door to the outside world. The specific gateways have been the colonial ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta and the more recent river port of Barranquilla near the mouth of the Magdalena.

g. The Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta is a physical anomaly of the Caribbean area. Since the Spanish conquest, its deep valleys and high, steep slopes have served as refuge areas for Indian groups that have retained much of their native cultures. In terms of modern economy, however, the vast alluvial piedmont plains formed at the base of the mountain mass are of special significance. The western piedmont south of Santa Marta is the site of Colombia's big banana plantations; the

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southeastern piedmont overlooking the Cesar River basin is an area of recent agricultural colonization.

h. Finally, the dry Guajira Peninsula, like the Sierra Santa Marta, is a refuge area for the populous Guajiro Indians, who since the Spanish conquest have changed from primitive hunting and gathering peoples to nomadic herders, breeding Old World goats, cattle and sheep.

i. The Pacific lowlands. The Pacific fringe of Colombia is a world apart from the rest of the country. It is a hot, extremely humid, forested land of many rivers. These in some parts have built narrow alluvial flood plains; in other parts, they have dissected the lowland into a maze of rugged hills. The Pacific lowlands is a land of rain, few areas of which receive less than 200 inches annually; one area, the Upper Atrato Basin, receives almost 400 inches per year--the wettest spot in the Americas. The Pacific lowland is also a land of sparse population, 85 percent of which is made up of Negroes and mulattoes who live as subsistence farmers, miners, and fishermen along the rivers of the coast.

j. The north half of the area, called the Choco is composed of a structural depression that lies between the Cordillera occidental and the low Serrania de Bando and is drained by the Atrato and San Juan Rivers. The upper part of these drainage systems forms the cultural center of Choco. There, particularly in the vicinity of Quibido, the Spaniards exploited rich gold placers, in the 17th and 18th centuries importing large numbers of slaves for labor. The present Negroid

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population of the Choco is descended from the colonial slave labor, and the washing of river sands for both gold and platinum still occupies a large number of native Chocoanos.

k. The southern part of the Pacific area consists of a coastal fringe of mangrove swamp backed by hilly, steam-dissected lowlands. There, too, gold placer mining along the rivers was the mainstay of the colonial economy and the basis for the present Negro population. Despite the climate and paucity of population, within this low coastal area have developed two growing port towns that may have increasing significance for Colombian commerce. One is Buenaventura, the colonial port of Cali, and now the most important coffee port of the country, serving most of western Colombia. The other is Tumaco, near the Ecuadorean border, which is the outlet for southern highlands of Colombia and, formerly, of northern Ecuador.

l. The Pacific lowlands offer a few opportunities for future colonization and development of tropical agriculture. The only fertile lands are extremely narrow strips of alluvium along the rivers; the flood plain of the lower Arato River forms a vast swamp unfit for production without enormous expenditure for drainage. Moreover, the hill slopes that cover most of the Pacific lowlands carry highly infertile clay soils that are hardly suitable for successful pioneer settlement in the tropics.

m. The Llanos. The largest of Colombia's peripheral areas lies east of the Andes. The better known area is the Llanos, the grassy

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plains that stretch eastward 400 miles from the Andean wall to the Orinoco River. The Colombian Llanos are actually a southwestern continuation of those of Venezuela and reach their southern limit along the Guaviare River, where the vast Amazon forest begins.

n. Built of alluvial soil deposited by Andean streams, the Llanos form a great plains area that slopes gently eastward from the mountains. Tall, tropical bunch grass dominates the natural vegetation in the influves, but along the rivers grow strips of rain forest. During the wet season, heavy rains cause the rivers to overflow, forming large shallow lakes in low areas; in the dry season, the rivers shrink to shallow braided streams, the grass withers, and dust and smoke from burning grass fill the air. Possibly in no other part of Colombia are contrasting seasons so short as in the Llanos.

o. Physiographically, the Llanos consist of two zones: the Llanos Arriba, the higher plains near the Andean foothills and the Llanos Abajo, the lower plains that approach the Orinoco. The former consist of great alluvial fans formed by streams flowing from the eastern Andean versant. Around the base of the sloping fans are wide belts of fine-grained moisture-retentive alluvium, which supports clumps of rain forest. Such areas have proven well suited for agriculture. The Llanos Abajo are almost flat, grass-covered plains and, except along the rivers, are characterized by highly weathered, infertile soils.

p. Although the Llanos have been utilized for extensive stock raising since colonial times, they have always been sparsely populated.

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From the large cattle ranchers and the ranch centers, or hatos, has developed the peculiar Llanero culture, so memorably recorded in both Colombian and Venezuelan literature. Far from markets and plagued by flood, drought, disease, the cattle industry of the Llanos has never attained full development.

q. The Llanos Arriba, however, has been the scene of recent colonization from the overpopulated Andean highlands. Productive farms of rice, maize, and plantains have been established, especially in the belt of fine soils at the base of the alluvial fans. The development of tropical agriculture in the Llanos Arriba may be at least a partial solution to the vexing problem of growing population pressure within the Andean core of Colombia.

r. The Colombian Amazonia. In terms of drainage, vegetation, and culture, the southern part of eastern lowlands of Colombia belongs to the Amazon Basin. South of the Guaviare and Guayabero Rivers, a dense rain forest covers the undulating surface. Still partially unexplored, this is Colombia's least populated area and the one that is least incorporated into national life. Only small groups of primitive forest Indians and collectors of forest products live along the rivers. A few spots along the Andean foothills, however, are being slowly settled by highland farmers from Antioquia, the upper Magdalena, and the Pasto area. This zone of colonization forms a southern combination of that mentioned above for the Llanos Arriba.

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ANNEX III

COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES OFFICERS

1. General. This discussion refers to all officers of the Armed Forces. It does not refer to members of the National Police.

2. Number and distribution. The officers of the Colombian Armed Forces are a very small group, totaling 500-1,000 during the period under study, or considerably less than 1 percent of the total population, but a group that obviously has not possessed influence out of proportion to its numerical strength. The largest concentration of officers has been and is in or near the capital city, Bogata, because of the location in that area of central war ministry officers and the military training installation at suburban Usaquen. Naval officers are stationed mainly in the coastal regions, especially Barranquilla and Cartagena.

3. Training and experience with the United States. A large number of officers have attended service schools in the United States or in the Canal Zone. Since 1939 there have been US service missions in Colombia as official instructors in the Army, Navy, and Air Force school systems. This is not true today; the US Army mission supervises the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

4. Composition, training, and promotion.

a. Generally speaking, the officer class during this period began to develop into an elite group, not only because of the social group

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from which it was drawn but also because of specific academy admission requirements. Requirements are contained in figure 6. Army officers are graduated from a single military academy, and Navy and Air Force officers from their own academies.

b. There were no outsiders in the regular establishment--that is, no officers were taken into the corps from civilian life or through the ranks, except as reserve personnel. All three services are bound together under dominance of the Army, which is considered the senior service.

c. Entrance into the cadet schools requires an academic secondary education (bachillerato), which is economically difficult to obtain for all but the members of the upper and middle classes. There are few free Government secondary schools (which no one attends unless he has no alternative), and the private schools are very expensive. Further, the cadet candidate must pass a comprehensive examination covering mathematics, geography, history, English, and Spanish. Among the three military departments (Army, Navy, Air Force), the Army, which relies on conscription, seems to have the lowest quality enlisted personnel. The other services, composed of volunteers, are smaller and can therefore be more selective, and a much larger percentage of their officers have had the opportunity to attend US and other foreign schools.

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(Each school year consists of two semesters. Courses are listed by year with number of class hours per week following the course.)

<u>1st Year of General Course</u> (Equal to 5th year of <u>bachillerato</u>)		<u>2nd Year of General Course</u> (Equal to 6th year of <u>bachillerato</u>)	
Physics	4	Physics	4
Geometry and Trigonometry	3	Mathematics	2
Religion	2	Religion	1
Philosophy	4	Philosophy	4
Chemistry	4	History of Colombia	2
Spanish and Literature	4	Geography of Colombia	2
English	2	Chemistry	4
French	3	Spanish and Literature	3
		English	2
		French	3

1st Year of Military Course (Equal to 1st year university studies)

<u>Economics</u>		<u>Engineering</u>	
Military Philosophy	2	Military Philosophy	2
Economics I	3	Drawing I, II	2
Mathematics I	5	Descriptive Geometry I, II	2
Accounting I	3	Mathematics I, II	5
Political Science	3	English I, II	3
Sociology	3	Spanish I, II	2
Spanish	3	Chemistry I, II	4
English	3		
Colombian Problems and General Culture	2		

Figure 6. Five-year study program
at the Escuela Militar

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2nd Year of Military Course (Equal to 2nd year university studies)

<u>Economics</u>		<u>Engineering</u>	
Military Penal Justice	2	Military Penal Justice	2
Statistics I, II	3	Topography I	3
Money and Banking	3	Trigonometry	3
Economic Geography	3	Mathematics III	5
Economics II	3	English III	3
Mathematics II	5	Humanities I	4
Accounting II	3	Physics I	5
English II	3		
Colombian Problems and General Culture	2		

3rd Year of Military Course

<u>Economics</u>		<u>Engineering</u>	
Topography	2	Economic Geography	2
Knowledge of Regulations	2	Knowledge of Regulations	2
Tactics	5	Tactics	5
R.I.A.M.	2	R.I.A.M.	2
Military History	4	Military History	4
Military Administration	3	Military Administration	3
Military Legislation	1	Military Legislation	1
Weaponry	2	Weaponry	2
Military Pedagogics	2	Military Pedagogics	2

Figure 6. Five-year study program at
the Escuela Militar (cont'd)

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5. Professional orientation. The strength of hierarchial military discipline is attested by the fact that Colombian junior officers have not imitated junior officer groups elsewhere in Latin America and defied their military superiors.*

a. There has been one recent breach in the army's apolitical tradition--the seizure of the Presidency by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in June 1953. But it is significant that Rojas Pinilla was not a freelance adventurer but was the top-ranking military officer, the Commandante General de las Fuerzas Armadas (Commanding General of the Armed Forces). His coup was accepted by most military officers not only as a political expedient but as a matter requiring automatic obedience to their military commander. Subsequently a great many officers, possibly most of them, came to the conclusion that Rojas Pinilla was dishonoring the Armed Forces by his arbitrary political measures and by the corruption in his inner circle. However, civilians had to do the job of getting rid of him, because anti-Rojas officers hesitated to violate openly their sworn allegiance to him as their military commander. Anti-Rojas officers, however, felt fewer scruples when it came to ignoring or soft-pedaling the regime's orders to crack down on the opposition.

b. Colombian officers are also bound together by their enjoyment of such military fringe benefits as commissaries and officers' clubs, which

* A notable exception was the Pasto rebellion in 1944.

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are resented by the civilians who do not have access to them. These institutions were considerably expanded by Rojas Pinilla. Much of the officers' recreation is centered around their clubs--playing pool or cards, drinking beer, holding discussions, or giving parties. Although they are usually unable to gain admittance to the most exclusive private clubs, the military ones to which they do belong are good and much less expensive.

c. The basis for high esprit de corps began developing within the Colombian ranks during the period but faltered at critical times prior to and during the Bogatazo. However, the corps was set apart from other groups of comparable socioeconomic background by a tradition of apolitical professionalism which is more highly developed in Colombia than in most other Latin American military establishments.

d. Armed Forces officers are almost all Roman Catholics, and support the Colombian tradition of church influence in politics. Most of them believe that the cross and the sword must work hand in hand, if chaos is to be prevented. Officers also subscribe to the military virtues of patriotic duty, honor, and obedience. They appear to take this code somewhat more seriously than other officer groups in Latin America. During the years 1946-53 they carried out the orders of a frequently oppressive Conservative civilian regime, and in 1953-57 they did the same for the pseudomilitary government of Rojas Pinilla, who also was a Conservative. They duly battled Liberal guerrillas, and, under Rojas Pinilla in particular, they filled many posts in the civil administration (e.g., governorships).

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e. Throughout these years the worst excesses of oppression and corruption were committed by Conservative civilian politicians. Mistreated Liberals often asked to have military mayors or governors sent out to replace Conservative civilians. This is not to say that officers never succumbed to the temptation to capitalize on their position for personal gain--but their behavior was generally better than that of civilian rulers, and they definitely served as a moderating influence.

f. Many officers have traditionally engaged in miscellaneous business pursuits as a sideline. At least until the late 1940's, this was almost a necessity for many because of the low level of military salaries. In more recent years, salaries and other benefits have increased substantially, and an officer without outside income can expect a comfortable standard of living. The extracurricular business activities of individual officers have no significant effect on the economy at large. Under Rojas Pinilla, some favored officers made use of official connections to engage in large-scale speculative ventures of doubtful propriety, but the number of such offenders is generally thought to have been small. It is probable that these practices have now largely disappeared.

6. Political role.

a. General. Military officers, like other Colombians, usually derive their political affiliation--Liberal or Conservative--from their own family tradition. At present, there can be little doubt that they

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are largely Conservative, especially in the upper ranks. This is partly because so many Liberal officers were eased out or were discouraged (by the prevalent favoritism toward Conservatives) to the point of resigning, during the period from the late 1940's to the fall of Rojas (1957). Virtually all the Liberal officers now in the Armed Forces belong to the moderate wing of the Liberal Party.

b. The personal political sympathies of Colombian officers, though relevant, must not be overstressed, in view of the apolitical professional tradition of the Colombian military. Since the early 20th century, the Armed Forces, taking their lead from the officer corps, have for the most part served faithfully under whatever government happened to be in power. On some occasions the Army has been requested by both parties-- Liberal and Conservative--to bring force to bear in certain political situations. One instance of such intervention was the famous Bogotazo in April 1948, which resulted in the dynamiting and burning of much of Bogota. Moreover, there have been some military conspiracies. President Lopez and many members of his government were seized in July 1944 by Colonel Diogenes Gil, commander of the Pasto garrison. Colonel Gil attempted to set up his own government, but other officers failed to support him, and the revolt was suppressed. Although by his coup Rojas Pinilla established what he called a "Government of the Armed Forces," this was something of a misnomer, as many of the most influential figures around him were civilians.

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c. Although Colombian officers have a good record of respect for constituted authority --an excellent record by Latin American standards-- they usually have a rather free hand in running institutional military matters, and their share of the budget seems to be guaranteed by a kind of tacit understanding. If either their internal autonomy or their budget should be seriously threatened, the Colombian military might well be more inclined to meddle in politics.

7. Effectiveness.

a. The social and political effectiveness of the Armed Forces officers is very high indeed. From time to time the Armed Forces have dominated the country, as during the period 1953-57. At all times the prestige of the officers has been high.* The officers are of the upper class; the majority are from the political and social elite. Colombians, following Spanish tradition, look upon the profession of arms as an elite profession. Their officers are trained and perceived as gentlemen officers, the executors of policy, and the strong arm of the oligarchy. However, among the oldest elite families, it is generally assumed that brilliant and talented sons go into law, medicine, and other learned professions, and that less intellectual sons go into the military. Hence, the core of the political, social elite, and intellectuals tend

* Note that this is based on a publication in the 1950's, whereas a publication for the period under study indicated the opposite pertaining to officer prestige.

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to view military officers with a mildly depreciatory attitude and to consider themselves superior.

b. Nominally, civil and military control parallel one another; in practice, when emergency conditions arise, the military control may become paramount. Officers often determine policy and frequently are the government-in-fact in primitive regions, such as the jungle and the great eastern plains (llanos). In time of severe civil disturbance, the country tends to look to the Armed Forces to take over the civil government and restore peace. During the period 1953-57, military control extended into municipal and provincial government, supervision of the Aduana (Customs), and even the cabinet and the executive branch of the Government.

c. The National Police appears to have been established as a counterbalance to strong military influence; but since the 1950's the National Police has been a lesser branch of the Armed Forces.

d. The middle- and upper-class origin, the academy education, and the training of the officer corps give the services great cohesiveness and potential, if not actual power. No political policy can long be pursued without Armed Forces support. Were it not for the naturally divisive force of politics (Conservatives against Liberals) within the Armed Forces as well as among the civilian population, the Armed Forces might readily dictate to the civil government to a far greater extent than they do. Actually, however, the citizenry are inclined to look upon the armed services as less politically minded than the remainder

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of the elite, and this comparative objectivity tends to make them even more socially effective than other members of the elite.

8. Susceptibility.

a. While each Colombian officer has his own reaction (which may include personal likes and dislikes) to his many contacts with citizens of the United States, there are few who do not respect the United States and its Armed Forces. They are inclined to respect strength, and they have profound confidence in the US ability to "get things done."

b. The social position of upper-class Colombian officers is fixed by their family positions within the ruling oligarchy. Middle-class officers aspire to the same prestige. Any individual officer can readily feel aggrieved over a slight, real or imagined, and thus make it a focal point for friction. Moreover, Latin pride and individualism tend to make individual officers suspicious and wary of one another. Nevertheless, in their professional military role they are cohesive and display esprit de corps. They tend to identify themselves as a part of the particular government in power. Those unable to adjust to a particular regime are usually retired summarily, unless, of course, their position is so strong personally that they can lead other officers and enlisted men to attempt a coup.

c. The officer corps cannot identify itself with the lower social classes with whom its only relationship is one of command. Therefore, officers do not ordinarily have the zeal for reform which may lead other groups to advocate Socialistic measures or to espouse Castroism or

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communism. There can be no doubt that the Fidelists are making an appeal to some opportunists in the officer corps who might respond as much from a desire for increased privilege as from ideological conviction. But there can also be no doubt that the fate of the regular army officer in Cuba has made even the chance of opportunistic gain less attractive. The position of the officer class in Colombian society, based often on birth and implying prestige, almost precludes any fundamental attraction toward the doctrines of communism. Therefore they are sympathetic to the West in the general struggle against communism, although they do not always understand the immediate issues.

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