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MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

Evaluation of Military Techniques

FINAL REPORT

by
Martin F. Massoglia
Philip S. McMullan
Clarence N. Dillard
July 1971

Sponsored by:
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY
ARPA Order Nr. 1384

under
Contract DAAH01-70-C-0950
U. S. Army Missile Command

RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE
Operations Research and Economics Division

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AD

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(Evaluation of Military Techniques)

by

Martin F. Massoglia
Philip S. McMullan
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Technical Requirement Nr. 1208

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Operations Research and Economics Division

This research was sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense under ARPA Order 1384 and was monitored by the U.S. Army Missile Command under Contract Number DAAH01-70-C-0950. Views and conclusions expressed herein are the primary responsibility of the authors or the contractor and should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of USAMICOM, ARPA, DOD or any other agency of the Government.

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SUMMARY

General

This report provides a compilation of information available in the continental United States (CONUS) regarding military civic action objectives, techniques, program assessment procedures, and program effectiveness. Specific requirements as stated in Technical Requirement Nr. 1208 are to prepare recommendations on the necessity for and advisability of developing improved means of assessing the effectiveness of U.S. supported military civic action projects. These specific requirements were satisfied by the following major subtasks:

- Determine the objectives of U.S. sponsored military civic action programs.
- Determine if U.S. sponsored military civic action programs are being assessed.
- Determine if program assessment methods are valid.
- Determine what action has been taken to correct the situation if military civic action programs are not achieving their stated objectives.
- Based on reported successes and failures of military civic action projects, generate hypotheses concerning preferred objectives, planning techniques, types of projects, or modes of project execution for various cultural settings.

The research methodology and plan are presented in Section I and Appendix A.

Description

In Section II, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition of military civic action is dissected and analyzed in the light of basic legislation, doctrinal literature, and the role of military civic action in an insurgency/counterinsurgency context. Characteristics of military civic action emerging from this analysis are determined to be:

- Military civic action is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
- Military civic action is part of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) which is, in turn, an element of foreign assistance.

Expectations of civic action programs, as derived from an analysis of the basic legislation and pertinent hearings related thereto, can be considered to be:

- Contribution to the image of the armed forces.
- Contribution to the social and economic development of less developed nations.
- No increase in political power of the military.
- Not a replacement for viable civilian agencies.

In an insurgency/counterinsurgency context, military civic action has the following characteristics:

- People-to-people approach.
- Responsive to community needs.
- Emphasis on self-help.
- Primary effort through host country military.
- Emphasis on remote areas.
- Transfer to indigenous military as soon as practical.

Major objectives of military civic action are determined to be:

- Economic and social development.
- Improved standing of the host country military.

Two major types of military civic action can be derived from the doctrinal literature and verified by analysis of U.S. field experience:

Type I. Joint U.S. and host country military involvement.
Type II. Unilateral U.S. involvement.

Considerable variation is found in the interpretations of the aims and substance of military civic action under the JCS approved definition. Essential conceptual factors have frequently been misapprehended or lost in endeavors to conform with the wording of the approved definition.

U.S. System

The U.S. military civic action system is described in Section III using as parameters; objective, definition, principles, selection criteria, techniques, and evaluation. Interrelationship and coordination with the foreign policy and foreign assistance programs are discussed. Relationships are shown in flowchart form. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps civic actions are also described. Findings pertinent to the U.S. military civic action system include:

- The intent of Congress that the MAP, including U.S. sponsored civic action, be directed toward defeating subversive insurgency appears to be reflected in the implementing directives and doctrine of the various echelons of the defense establishment.
- Military civic action planning and implementation are performed within the existing military establishment system.
- At the national level civic action is coordinated with U.S. foreign policy through the structure established for the coordination of all foreign assistance activities.
- The U.S. Army conceptualizes military civic action with a strong social science flavor and describes it as being imbedded in the internal defense and development programs of emerging nations.
- The U.S. Navy conducts two general types of military civic action; (1) use of Seabee teams in support of the developmental efforts of other government agencies, and (2) community relations type activities.

- The U.S. Air Force treats military civic action separate from civil affairs and discharges these functions through its existing command structure.
- The U.S. Marine Corps views military civic action as an integral part of counterinsurgency operations with emphasis on individual-to-individual relationships.

Host Country Systems

Host country systems for military civic action are covered in Section IV. Data on the details of indigenous civic action organization and doctrine were not in sufficient detail to permit generalizations or conclusions. There is, however, an indication that Latin American armed forces are closely following the U.S. concepts for civic action organization and operations. As in the case of the U.S. system, formal evaluation procedures and techniques appear to be non-existent.

Personnel and Training

Personnel and training systems specific to military civic action are discussed in Section V. Findings in this area are:

- The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide resident programs of instruction in military civic action.
- The only formal program of instruction for enlisted personnel is a correspondence course offered by the Marine Corps Institute.
- Civic action coverage becomes broader and more general as one moves up the hierarchy of Service Schools.
- Training related to civic action is provided enlisted Marine Corps personnel as part of the USMC Personal Response Program.
- No special selection procedures are utilized for personnel assigned to positions requiring civic action duties.
- Action is being taken by the U.S. Army to enhance assignments in the military advisory system.

Field Experience

After action and operational reports are analyzed in Section VI to describe military civic action as it is being carried out in the field. Findings include:

- Lack of a dedicated military civic action reporting system results in an absence of detailed information in CONUS sources.
- There are indications that such data are available and could be obtained through structured interviews with personnel who have been or are engaged in military civic action programs and projects.
- Primary military civic action emphasis of U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam appears to be in unilateral U.S. military participation.
- Most of the U.S. sponsored military civic action in Latin America involve host country military participation.

- After action and situation reports do not contain sufficient data to permit either an evaluation of the effectiveness of individual projects or an evaluation of the appropriateness of corrective actions.
- There appears to be an increasing involvement of RVN military forces in military civic action projects in Vietnam.

Evaluation

Relative evaluation techniques and general evaluation are reviewed in Section VII. This review suggests that, when used in an appropriate manner, military civic action can be an effective instrument in improving the image of indigenous military.

Evaluation terminology is discussed and the following level and scope placed on evaluation techniques:

Type I.	Assessment of overall program impact.
Type II.	Evaluation of relative effectiveness of different program strategies.
Type III.	Evaluation of individual projects.

This paradigm is then tested by evaluating historical reports on military civic action.

Reported and ongoing evaluation research is analyzed to determine suitability for use in the evaluation of military civic action programs/projects. Of particular interest is the work done by Niehoff, Human Resources Research Organization, and the ongoing American Institutes for Research (AIR) work in Thailand. The AIR research appears to have promise as a technique for Type II evaluation. The Niehoff research, with modifications, appears to hold promise as the basis for the development of a Type III evaluation instrument.

Findings relative to the evaluation of military civic action include:

- There is no evaluation system dedicated to military civic action.
- There is no evidence that it is either feasible or profitable to create such a system so long as the JCS definition remains as it is now written.
- With very few exceptions, information currently available to evaluate military civic action comes from personal observations of the participants.

Hypotheses

Military civic action is based on several key hypotheses that also underlie economic and social development, especially the type broadly designated community development. These are discussed in Section VIII.

Both military civic action and community development involve purposeful intervention in the cultural pattern of communities, primarily through efforts to promote higher standards of living. Although this practice has gained quite a respectable following, the rationale for it remains largely hypothetical.

Hypotheses underlying community development and military civic action are analyzed with the following finding:

- The military can benefit from the experiences of theorists and practitioners in the field of community development. Phase III of the companion study "Evaluation of Civilian Techniques" is designed to provide these inputs.

Recommendations

Major recommendations presented in Section IX include:

- The current definition of military civic action should be revised.
- A three-stage evaluation system should be utilized for the evaluation of U.S. sponsored military civic action programs/projects.
- Criteria for selection and assessment of individual military civic action projects should be developed.
- AIR research in Thailand should be reviewed and evaluated for application to Type II military civic action evaluation.
- Structured interview procedures should be employed to obtain detailed information on U.S. sponsored military civic action projects. Such data could be used as the basis for a Type II evaluation instruments.

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FOREWORD

This research is supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the U. S. Department of Defense under ARPA Order Nr. 1384 and is monitored by the U. S. Army Missile Command under Contract DAAH01-70-C-0950.

Project activity over the period April 1970 - May 1971 has been carried out under the supervision of the Operations Research and Economics Division, Research Triangle Institute, Research Triangle Park, N. C. Actual research and evaluation has been accomplished in varying measures by Clarence N. Dillard, Philip S. McMullan, and Martin F. Massoglia.

Assistance of Mr. Kenneth L. Mayall, in the organization of the report and in the translation and interpretation of documents pertaining to civil action programs of Latin American countries is acknowledged. Timely submission of this report could not have been accomplished without the unstinted cooperation of RTI's Operations Research and Economics Division support staff.

The cooperation and frankness of Department of Defense personnel contacted during the research is also acknowledged and appreciated. Particular mention is made of the technical monitors, Mr. Jack Childers and Major Steven Walker, USMICOM, who assisted in obtaining information from and access to many of the Department of Defense activities contacted during the research.

Mrs. Anne Fuller and Mrs. Dora Wilkerson reviewed and tabulated the data from operational and lesson learned reports which formed the basis for Section VI, Field Experience.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Research Objectives

The objective of the research is to provide a compilation of all information available in the continental United States regarding military civic action objectives, techniques, program assessment procedures and program effectiveness.

B. Research Procedures

1. Research Plan

The RTI research plan is included in Appendix A. This plan was prepared and submitted in accordance with Technical Requirement Nr. 1208, paragraph 3.2.

2. Methodology

The open literature was first screened to obtain an overview of military civic action and to obtain a general impression of the program. It was found that the open literature concerning the military civic action experience of the U. S. Armed Forces was of only general value for describing and evaluating the system.

Official documentation; files, doctrinal publications, and after-action reports were generally in sufficient detail for the purposes of this study. In some instances, interviews were required to obtain the requisite depth of information.

Evaluation of the quality of information obtained from all sources is shown in Figure I-1.

The information extracted from the open literature on doctrine and objectives was informative. Indications were found as to the availability of information on staff organization, training methods, planning and operating techniques, and evaluation. No specific indications were found with respect to project organization and personnel selection.

Information extracted from official sources was adequate in all categories except project organization and personnel selection. While detailed data on these categories are most likely available in overseas commands, contractual constraints limited the literature search to CONUS repositories. Interviews and discussions with personnel experienced in military civic action were required to obtain detailed data in these two categories.

As an example, the open literature indicated that all foreign assistance programs, including military civic action, were coordinated.




Fig. I-1. Military Civic Action; Evaluation of Data Sources.

Macro-level information was found in Congressional hearings, the basic foreign assistance legislation, and DOD and State Department doctrinal literature. However, these documents did not contain the step-by-step procedures. These details were developed during interviews and discussions with State Department and DOD/ISA personnel. Similar comments can be made about the U. S. mobile training teams which are used to train host country military in the planning and implementation of military civic action programs and projects.

Limited grass-root level information on individual projects and their reported effectiveness are available only in official documents.

3. Installations/Activities Contacted

During the course of the research over forty installations or activities were contacted. Many of these were visited on more than one occasion. A listing of these installations/activities is contained in Appendix B.

C. Report Organization

The report is organized into Sections which present descriptions of discrete elements of military civic action. Individuals interested in data concerning specific subject areas are referred to portions of the report as indicated below:

Overview of findings, conclusions, and recommendations	Section IX
General description of military civic action and basic legislation	Section II
Detailed description of military civic action	Appendix C
Detailed discussion of enabling legislation	Appendix D
Military civic action in an insurgency counterinsurgency context	Appendix D
U.S. military civic action systems	Section III
Host country military civic action systems	Section IV
Personnel and training	Section V
Field experience	Section VI
Evaluation	Section VII
Underlying hypotheses	Section VIII

II. DESCRIPTION

A. General

A description of military civic action is developed in this section. First a brief history of present day civic action is outlined with emphasis on legislation and actions which resulted in major shifts of emphasis. This is followed by a summary discussion and analysis of the definition for military civic action. (A more detailed discussion and analysis appears in Appendix C.) Characteristics of civic action are derived from an analysis of the basic legislation. Finally, the role of military civic action in an insurgency/counterinsurgency context is summarized from the more detailed discussion of this subject in Appendix D.

B. Historical Development

The role played by the armed forces of the United States in the development and expansion of the West is well known. Two considerations seem to have prompted the use of the Army in this country's expansion; in the nineteenth century the Army was unique in having technically trained men with the requisite skills, and the War Department was competent and willing to accept the wide variety of assignments the opening of the West demanded.[Ref. 1]

According to Glick, [Ref. 2] civic action, in some respects, is a logical and inevitable outcome of civil affairs. Recent roots for civic action stem from the curriculum of the Army's World War II military government school at the University of Virginia.

Though not specifically labeled as civic action, U.S. efforts in Korea through the Korean Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) and the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) programs were the first large-scale American post World War II civic action activities.[Ref. 3,4]

The Mutual Security Act of 1959 directed military assistance administrators in underdeveloped countries to encourage the use of host country military units for public works and economic development.

The desirability of the use of indigenous military forces for these purposes was reaffirmed by the Draper Committee. This committee was appointed in 1958 by President Eisenhower to examine all aspects of the United States Military Assistance Program.

The Committee recommended that United States agencies and officials encourage the use of foreign military forces in less developed countries for achieving economic objectives. Two constraints were placed on this recommendation; (1) such a program should not be used as a basis for maintaining military forces not justified by purely military reasons, and (2) such a program should not significantly reduce the ability of military forces to carry out essential security missions.[Ref. 5]

During the deliberations of the Draper Committee, the Department of Defense was also pursuing the subject of military assistance. In 1959 the Chief of Civil Affairs, Department of the Army, began a study of the AFAK program to determine whether or how any lessons deriving from that experience were applicable to other underdeveloped countries.[Ref. 6] As a result, civic action training teams were organized and made available to military assistance personnel abroad. In 1960 the first such team was dispatched to Guatemala. Another team was sent to Ecuador in 1962.

In 1961 the major recommendations of the Draper Committee were incorporated in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. In December 1961 a key civic action directive, National Security Action Memorandum No. 119, was issued relating civic action to the three types of situations where military civic action could be useful.

Monetary sharing agreements were worked out in 1962 between the Agency for International Development (AID) and the Department of Defense (DOD). The funding formula developed in 1962 has continued to date. DOD, through the Military Assistance Program (MAP), funds for the purchase and maintenance of equipment employed in military civic action and associated training, AID funds for consumable supplies.

In 1965, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was amended to make civic action an objective, per se, of the MAP and to broaden the circumstances wherein indigenous civic action programs could be sponsored by the MAP.

In 1965 President Johnson reiterated the policy on MAP support of civic action in his message to Congress in which he said:

> "This new act will provide: * * * greater emphasis on civic action through which local troops build schools and roads, and provide literacy training and health services. Through these programs, military personnel are able to play a more constructive role in their society, and to establish better relations with the civilian population."[Ref. 7]

President Nixon, in his message to Congress, "Foreign Assistance for the 'Seventies", proposed six major reforms to the United States foreign assistance program.[Ref. 8] None of these deals directly with the MAP. However, Mr. Nixon references the Report of the Task Force on International Development. This report makes specific reference to the MAP and while making no specific references to civic action restates the principles upon which the present civic action programs are based.[Ref. 9]

C. Definition

Since the research effort requires that the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved definition of military civic action be adhered to (Subsection 1.1 General, Technical Requirement Nr. 1208), an interpretation aimed at the contract objectives and based upon pertinent legislation, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, is appropriate.

This definition, as it appears in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, JCS Pub. 1, is:

> "Military civic action-(JCS I, SEATO) The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military with the population. (JCS,I) (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)"[Ref. 10]

The essential elements of the JCS approved definition of military civic action are:

- Military civic action projects require a preponderant use of indigenous military forces.
- Military civic action projects must be useful to the local population at all levels.
- Military civic actions are carried out in fields contributing to economic and social development.
- Primary purpose of military civic action is to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.
- United States forces may participate in military civic actions in overseas areas.

Detailed discussion of this definition, analysis and interpretation of the elements in the context of the basic legislation appear in Appendix C.

A dual model of military civic action emerges from the preliminary analysis; Type A, covering the joint involvement of U.S. and host country military forces, and Type B, that of U.S. unilateral involvement.

While there appear to be some internal inconsistencies within the JCS approved definition of military civic action (i.e., between the stipulated use of preponderantly indigenous military forces vis-a-vis the use of U.S. Forces in military civic actions in overseas areas) the dual model appearing in Table II-1 will be used to describe military civic action for the following reasons:

1) A U.S.-only military civic action program was specifically acknowledged for Vietnam.

2) Funds appropriated for use under the programs authorized by the basic legislation have been used on U.S.-only military civic actions.

3) Some model is necessary to report what was done and is being done under the title of military civic action.

Table II-1

MODELS OF MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

	DESCRIPTORS	
	JOINT U.S. HOST COUNTRY MILITARY INVOLVEMENT	UNILATERAL U. S. INVOLVEMENT
Primary Interface for:		
U.S. Military	Host Country Military	Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals)
Host Country Military	Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals),	No Involvement
Primary Role of:		
U.S. Military	Advise and Support Host Country Military	Advise and Support Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals)
Host Country Military	Advise and Support Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals)	No Involvement
Primary Objective of:		
U.S. Military	Involvement of Host Country Military in Military Civic Action	Enhance Image
Host Country Military	Enhance image	No Involvement
Level of Country Directly Effected by:		
U.S. Military	All echelons of Host Country Military	District and Village
Host Country Military	District and Village	No Involvement
Change Agent Role of:		
U.S. Military	With Host Country Military	With District, Village, and People
Host Country Military	With District, Village, and People	No Involvement
Types of Projects for:		
U.S. Military	Training for Host Country Military	Social and Economic Development
Host Country Military	Social and Economic Development	No Involvement

In compiling available information concerning military civic action objectives, techniques, program assessment procedures, and program effectiveness, it was found that interpretations of the aims and substance of military civic action varied considerably.

D. Basic Legislation

The basic legislation concerned with U.S. support of military civic action is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This act authorizes provision of military assistance and the utilization of Defense articles and services for the furtherance of civic action. A detailed discussion of this legislation appears in Appendix D.

The following characteristics of American sponsored military civic action emerge from an analysis of the provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended.

- Military civic action is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
- Military civic action is part of the Military Assistance Program which is, in turn, an element of Foreign Assistance.

Expectation of civic action programs, as derived from an analysis of the basic legislation and pertinent hearings related thereto, can be considered to be:

- Contribution to the improved image of the armed forces.
- Contribution to the social and economic development of less developed nations.
- No increase in political power of the military.
- Not a replacement for viable civilian agencies.

E. Role in Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

In 1961 President Kennedy stated that the United States might become more concerned with civic action and defined three types of situations where military civic action would be useful.[Ref. 11]

> "(1) In countries fighting actual campaigns against internal subversion, military civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the armed forces and the populace.
>
> "(2) In countries threatened by external aggression, military forces should participate in civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission.
>
> "(3) In countries where subversion or attack is less imminent selected indigenous military forces can contribute substantively to economic and social development and such a contribution can be a major function of these forces."

Analysis of these three types of situations in which military civic action may have applicability indicates the similarity with the three phases of insurgency currently included in U.S. doctrine.[Ref. 12]

Phase I

Latent or incipient subversive activity during which subversive incidents occur with frequency in an organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

Phase II

Subversive movement has sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

Phase III


Primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

Types of military civic action activities differ in each of the three insurgency phases. As stated in U.S. Army Field Manual 31-23, during Phase I insurgency, military civic action emphasis is placed on the development of the socioeconomic environment. The manual directs that remote areas, inhabited by ethnic and other minority groups susceptible to subversion, should be given civic action priority. During Phase II insurgency, emphasis shifts to projects with short-range and immediate impact designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. Examples of such projects are farm-to-market roads, bridges, short-range educational programs, basic hygiene, medical immunization programs, and simple irrigation projects. Data from CONUS sources were not available to verify whether or not civic action projects in the field follow this doctrine.[Ref. 13]

In the insurgency/counterinsurgency context, military civic action has the following characteristics:

- People-to-people approach
- Responsive to community needs
- Self-help emphasized
- Primary effort through host country military
- Remote areas emphasized
- Transfer to indigenous military as soon as practical.

The interaction and interfaces of the major elements of civic action in an insurgency/counterinsurgency context are shown in Figure II-1. It can readily be seen that military civic actions are a small part of the overall counterinsurgency effort and the relations between the United States and the host country, its people, and the insurgents. These relationships and a description of the activities of these elements will be discussed in subsequent sections of this report.



* NOT NORMALLY A PART OF STABILITY OPERATIONS (INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY) INCLUDED TO DEPICT CURRENT SEA SITUATION.

Fig. II-1. Military Civic Action in Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Context.

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1. Command and Staff Guidelines for Civic Action, Special Text ST 41-10-90. Fort Gordon, Georgia: U.S. Army Civil Affairs School, 1 May 1964, p. 6.

2. Glick, Edward B. Peaceful Conflict: the Non-Military Use of the Military. Harrisburg, Penn.: Stackpole Books, 1967, p. 67.

3. Ibid., p. 68.

4. Command and Staff Guidelines. op. cit., pp. 6, 7.

5. The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Final Report, Washington, 1959, p. 43.

6. Glick, op. cit., p. 70.

7. Platt, Major General Jonas M. "Military Civic Action", Naval War College Review, Vol. XXII: 8 April 1970, p. 31.

8. Document No. 91-385. Foreign Assistance for the 'Seventies. Message from the President of the United States Proposing a Transformation of Foreign Assistance Program, Washington, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, Second Session, September 1970.

9. U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach. Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development, Washington, March 4, 1970, pp. 11-15 passim.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dictionary of United States Military Terms of Joint Usage (Short Title: JD), JCS Pub. 1, Washington, D. C., August 1968, p. 112.

11. Command and Staff Guidelines, op. cit.

12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); JCS Pub. 2, Washington, D. C., 12 May 1967, para 41105.

13. Department of Army, Stability Operations - U.S. Army Doctrine FM 31-23. Washington, D. C., November 1966, pp. 66, 68.

III. UNITED STATES SYSTEM

A. General

The United States military civic action system is described in this section. There are, in effect, two systems; military civic action as part of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and military civic action being carried out in Southeast Asia under Service sponsorship and funding

Planning, programming, funding and administration of the parent programs for military civic action, be it the MAP or operations in Southeast Asia, are complex operations involving many elements of the Executive Branch of the government. Appropriation of funds and general guidance is provided by Congress. Providing the personnel, materiel, and operating funds to carry out these complex programs involves many governmental activities and agencies. The interrelationship between major elements of the systems through which military civic action is carried out is shown in Figure III-1. The functions of the elements shown in this figure and their relationship with other elements will be discussed in the paragraphs that follow. Host Country systems, with which the U.S. system interfaces is described in Section IV.

B. MAP Planning and Programming System

Since military civic action is a subset of military assistance, a discussion of the planning and programming procedures for MAP should give an indication of the constraints under which U.S. sponsored military civic action programs operate.

MAP planning is conducted within the general framework of DOD guidance which includes U.S. policy objectives by region and country as well as military tasks which should be emphasized in MAP planning. Military assistance programs are planned on a regional and country basis on a five-year cycle. The five-year plans are based on (1) force goals and base requirements established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and (2) dollar guidelines provided the DOD after interagency approval. These data serve as inputs to plans prepared by the Unified Commands.

The unified commander, in turn, allocates dollar guidelines to each country in his command to help the MAAG/Mission in the preparation of a five-year country MAP plan as well as the detailed program for the next fiscal year. Based on this, each MAAG/Mission submits a five-year military equipment and training plan which includes requirements for such military action programs as may be in effect or proposed for the country. These plans, which include the total estimated defense costs for the country with which MAP funds are associated, are submitted to the Unified Command. The total defense costs are broken down into the portion which will be financed by the country itself and the portion which will be supported by the U.S. The MAAG/Mission submission indicates shortfalls from the JCS goals which will result from the planned program and the acceptability or nonacceptability of these shortfalls in relation to U.S. objectives and anticipated threats.




Fig. III-1. Military Civic Action; Interaction Between Major Elements.

The Unified Command reviews the MAAG/Mission submissions and then approves, with such modification as may be deemed necessary, the plans as part of the regional program prior to submission to DOD.

The Unified Command submissions are used by DOD as the basis for interagency review of the next fiscal year's operating program and the current five-year MAP. Following the interagency review, submission is made to AID, in its capacity as coordinator of foreign aid, for review and then to the Budget Bureau for submission to Congress for appropriations.

After Congressional appropriations, program revisions are made and the Operating Year Program approved for execution.

Thus military civic action competes with all other military assistance for funds and support.

C. The Congress (Figure III-2)


The role of Congress in military civic action is described in detail in Appendix D. Primary interface is with the Executive Branch through the enactment of enabling legislations, hearings, and reports submitted in conjunction with the annual appropriation cycle. Pertinent information concerning civic action activities derived from the basic legislation, amendments thereto, and pertinent hearings is shown in Table III-1.

D. Executive Office of the President (Figure III-3)

1) Organization of the Executive Office of the President insofar as military civic action is concerned is shown in Figure III-3 [Ref. 1,2]. Problems concerning military assistance, as part of the overall foreign assistance program, which cannot be resolved at the Departmental level are adjudicated through the Interdepartmental Group system.

2) In 1961 President Kennedy related civic action to the various phases of insurgency as reflected in this passage from National Security Action Memorandum 119:[Ref. 3] (Cited in Section II but repeated here for convenience)

> "1. In countries fighting active campaigns against subversion, civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the armed forces and the populace.
>
> "2. In countries threatened by external aggression, forces should participate in military civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission.



Key

..... Coordination

Fig. III-2. The Congress.

Table III-1

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION AS DESCRIBED IN CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION AND HEARINGS

OBJECTIVE

International peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except for individual and collective self defense.

DEFINITION

None specified.

PRINCIPLES

Provision of defense articles and services for the purpose of assisting foreign military forces in less developed countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States) to engage in activities helpful to the economic and social development of the recipient country.

Foreign military force shall not be maintained or established solely for civic action activities.

Civic action activities should not significantly detract from the primary military mission.

Civic action shall be coordinated with and form a part of the total economic and social development effort.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Priority should be given to the needs of those countries in danger of becoming victims of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression or those countries in which internal security is threatened by Communist or Communist-supported internal subversion.

TECHNIQUES


Fostering an improved climate of political independence and liberty.

Improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist-supported aggression.

Creating a secure and stable environment.

EVALUATION

None specified.



Sources: Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LX, No. 1548, Feb. 24, 1969. Selected readings for Counterinsurgency Correspondence Course, installation for U.S. Naval War College, Installment Four, Aug. 1970, p. 10-B-1.

Key

———— Command (Reports flow in reverse)

—·—·— Advice

Fig. III-3. Executive Office of the President.

"3. In countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, selected indigenous military forces can contribute substantively to economic and social development, and such a contribution can be a major function of such forces."

3) This policy was reiterated by President Johnson in his 1965 message to Congress requesting a five-year extension to the Foreign Assistance Act.[Ref. 4]

"This. . . new act will provide. . . general emphasis on civic action programs. We shall give new stress to civic action programs through which local troops build schools and roads, and provide literacy training and health services. Through these programs, military personnel are able to play a more constructive role in their society, and to establish better relations with the civilian population."

4) While not making specific reference to civic action, per se, the recently published Peterson Report, "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s: A New Approach," embodies the same underlying principles of socioeconomic development through self-help programs. This is emphasized in the first conclusion which states:[Ref. 5]

"1. The United States has a profound national interest in cooperating with developing countries in their efforts to improve conditions of life in their societies."

and again in the conclusion on military assistance programs:

"6. Military and related economic assistance programs will strengthen military security only to the degree that they help countries move toward greater self-reliance. These U.S. programs should be geared to the resources that the receiving countries ultimately will be able to provide for their own security."

5) Reforms for AID announced by President Nixon on 15 September 1970 reemphasize these same principles. Mr. Nixon's proposed reforms are based on the findings and recommendations of the Peterson Report.[Ref.6]

6) For a discussion of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) 119, the basic document covering civic action, see paragraph B, Appendix E (issued separately.)

E. Interdepartmental Groups (Figure III-4)

1) Responsibility for civic action programs, as a part of MAP, was initially vested in the Special Group (Counterinsurgency). In 1966 certain duties and responsibilities of this group were transferred to the Senior Interdepartmental Regional Groups and the Political-Military Interdepartmental Group. In 1969 the interdepartmental groups were reconstituted as Interdepartmental Groups (IG) in the National Security Council (NSC) system. These groups are chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State and include representatives of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other agencies at the discretion of the Chairman depending on the issue under consideration. Insofar as MAP, including civic action, is concerned, the IG discusses and decides interdepartmental issues which can be settled at the Assistant Secretary level, referring unresolved issues to higher echelons of the NSC system for resolution.[Ref. 7]

2) For a detailed discussion of the Interdepartmental Groups and military civic action see paragraph C, Appendix E (issued separately.)

F. Department of State (Figure III-5)

1. Secretary of State

Responsibility for the overall coordination of the MAP with the foreign policy of the United States is vested in the Secretary of State. His responsibilities as outlined in Sec. 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, are: [Ref. 9]

> "Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance and military assistance programs, including but not limited to determining whether there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby."

2. Under Secretary of State

The function of coordinating the MAP with foreign policy has been delegated to the Under Secretary of State with the Deputy Assistant Under Secretary for Political Affairs providing continuous supervision and general direction to the MAP. According to an





Fig. III-4. Interdepartmental Groups.



* During the research some question arose during various discussions as to the relationship of AID and the Secretary of Defense. The relationship is as shown in the Government Organization Manual.[Ref. 8]

Key

——————— Command (Reports flow in reverse)
..... Coordination
—·—·—·— Advice

Fig. III-5. State Department.

Industrial College of the Armed Forces publication, this responsibility has devolved, in practice, on the Agency of International Development.[Ref. 10]

3. Interdepartmental Coordination

Integration of U.S. military civic action programs, at home and abroad, with the foreign policy of the United States is accomplished through the coordinator of MAP. The Secretary of State discharges his responsibility for "continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance and military assistance programs" through the Interdepartmental Groups which form a part of the National Security Council organization. (See paragraph E above).

Coordination of military and economic assistance programs is performed within the Department of State on a country and regional basis under the overall supervision of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Each of the geographical bureaus within the State Department have their own coordination procedures designed to meet the specific requirements of their areas of interest. For the purposes of this report, the procedures used in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs has been selected to describe the coordination process. This selection was made on the recommendation of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, who stated that while the Inter-American Affairs procedures are typical of those used by other regional bureaus, they are more formalized and more thoroughly documented.


The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (State) Bureau for Latin America (AID), coordinates programs within its area of interest by Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP). Procedures and steps by which a CASP is developed are shown in Figure III-6. Data for the preparation of this flow chart were obtained during discussions with State department personnel.[Ref. 11]


A CASP is prepared annually for all countries receiving economic aid from the U.S. and covers the program for the next three years. The following steps are involved in preparation:

a) The Interdepartmental Group (IG) provides each country with general guidance as to goals, order of magnitude funding, and similar planning data.

b) The Country Team prepares a CASP and submits it to the Department of State for review and approval. The CASP contains detailed country objectives, and an allocation of funds to each program (including civic action) designed to attain these objectives.

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*/ Bureau for Inter-American Affairs (State) and Bureau for Latin America (AID) are operationally combined under the Assistant Secretary of States for Inter-American Affairs. (U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1970/71, p. 78)

Fig. III-6. Flow Chart of Actions: Country Analysis and Strategy Paper

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c) Initial coordination is accomplished by the Pre-IG, an ad hoc group with membership from Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (State) and Bureau for Latin America (AID), DOD, and United States Information Agency (USIA). The Pre-IG sharpens up the CASP for presentation to the formal IG by resolving, to the extent possible, any conflicts or problem areas. A key issue paper is prepared for submission to the IG.

d) The Pre-IG submissions are reviewed by the formal IG which consists of the following:

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Director, Western Hemisphere Division, J-5, JCS
Director of Military Assistance and Sales, DOD/ISA
Representative of AID Latin America Bureau,
USIA Latin America Desk, and others.

The IG reviews one country at a time. After review and changes as required, the key issue paper is approved and becomes an official statement of U.S. policy toward the country concerned for the planning period covered by the CASP. Approval of the CASP does not constitute approval of the precise level of funding stated therein; it does mean that the agreed general magnitudes are approved for budget submissions. Unresolved areas are submitted to the National Security Council for resolution.

e) The approved CASP becomes the basis of the MAP prepared by DOD/ISA. It is implemented within the military by the Military Assistance Manual (MAM). The MAM is reviewed by the formal IG prior to promulgation.

f) State and DOD prepare budget submissions based on the approved CASP and submit them through the budget approval chain.

g) Upon Congressional approval of the budget, necessary adjustments are made by DOD/ISA to MAP funding and detailed instructions issued through the Unified Command.

Using the approved CASP as the basis, the MAP for the current year is planned and coordinated.

4. Inspector General, Foreign Assistance

Review and evaluation of those aspects of military assistance which fall within the purview of the Secretary of State and the U.S. Country Teams are accomplished by the Inspector General, Foreign Assistance (IGFA). This officer is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and is charged with the following duties and responsibilities in regards to the MAP:[Ref. 12]

"(b) For the purpose of ascertaining the extent to which the programs being carried out under Part II of this Act (Military Assistance and Sales). . . ; are in consonance with the foreign policy of the United States, are aiding in the attainment of the objectives of this Act, and are being carried out consistently with the responsibilities with respect thereto of the respective United States chiefs of missions and of the Secretary of State, as well as the efficiency and the economy with which such responsibilities are discharged, he shall arrange for, direct or conduct such reviews, inspections and audits of programs under Part II of this act . . . as he considers necessary."

The Inspector General, Foreign Assistance, reports directly to the Secretary of State. In practice, reports prepared by him are transmitted to the Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (DOD/ISA) for necessary action.[Ref. 13]

According to DOD/ISA [Ref. 14] the following procedures govern the processing of these reports:

a) Upon receipt of reports from State Department, ISA determines appropriate action.

b) Reports, along with ISA recommended action, are sent to the Unified Command having responsibility for the country concerned.

c) Unified Commands transmit reports to country MAAG/Mission Military Group for comment.

d) Comments submitted to DOD/ISA through Unified Command.

e) DOD/ISA submits report of corrective actions taken to State Department.

f) State Department comments on adequacy of corrective action.

A review of seven reports covering 1968-1969 visits to Indonesia, Chile, The Congo, Ethiopia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, indicated that the reports were generally audits of accountability for equipment and spare parts, and inspection for compliance with existing procedural regulations. The IGFA report covering an inspection in Guatemala during 1969 is an exception.[Ref. 15] The IGFA recommended that the civic action space in the Military Group Support Division be eliminated and gave the following reasons:

"The inspectors visited units of the Guatemalan Armed Services and observed that the civic action. . . function was being performed in a creditable manner. Also we believe that the Army, Navy, and Air Force Sections are staffed to give any assistance that may be required."

The Chief of the Military Mission non-concurred with the IGFA recommendation:

> ". . . The position of the Civic Action Officer would be the last position in the Mil Group I would voluntarily relinquish. Even should the Mil Group disappear I would urge including such a position to the Military Attache.
>
> "The statement that the civic action function is being performed in a creditable manner is considered to be erroneous. Further, the advisors in the Service Sections of the Military Group, being completely devoted to their technical specialties, have little or no time, training, or capability to perform the Civic Action role."

Insofar as could be determined, the non-concurrence of the Chief of the Military Group, was supported by the Unified Command and DOD in the response to the IGFA.

This nature of the IGFA reports is verified in the 1969 Senate Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations.[Ref. 16] The Senate praised IGFA for its work and inserted into the record a report prepared specifically for the Senate. This report contains summaries of IGFA efforts in 35 countries. Only one of these, that for Colombia, mentioned civic action.

> "3. IGA noted that some $60,000 had been set aside to import tires for civic action construction battalions, although many of the sizes needed were being manufactured locally. The AID mission agreed that the tires should be bought locally with Colombian pesos, and not dollars."

It appears that in establishing the position of IGFA in the State Department Congress intended that office to be a watcher of the pursestrings. The Committee chairman closed out this portion of the hearings with these statements:

> "I think the Inspector General has done a very good job."
> "They have been very effective."

G. Department of Defense (Figure III-7)

1. General

Under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the Secretary of Defense is charged with the following responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program, of which military civic action is a part:[Ref. 17]




Fig. III-7. Department of Defense.

"(1) the determination of military end-item requirements;
"(2) the procurement of military equipment in a manner which permits its integration into service programs;
"(3) the supervision of end-item use by recipient countries;
"(4) the supervision of training of foreign military personnel;
"(5) the movement and delivery of military end-items; and
"(6) within the Department of defense, the performance of any other functions with respect to the furnishing of military assistance."

Most of the military assistance functions are delegated to elements of the Department of Defense.[Ref. 18] Details appear in subsequent paragraphs.

a. Joint Chiefs of Staff

The JCS is charged with continuous review of MAP to insure that they are in consonance with global security plans and promote U.S. strategic concepts.

b. Assistant Secretary of Defense/International Security Affairs (ASD/ISA)

Subject to the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense the ASD/ISA has general authority to act on military assistance matters. He is charged with the responsibility for:

- Developing and establishing procedures pertaining to the MAP.
- Directing, administering, and supervising the MAP.
- Directing, administering, and supervising Foreign Military Sales.
- Planning, organizing, and monitoring activities of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups.

c. Military Departments

The Military Departments are responsible for assistance in program development; provision of supplies and materiel, advice, and assistance to MAAGs and Unified Commands.

d. Unified Commands

Unified Commands are responsible for the integration of MAP with regional defense planning and the direction and supervision of MAAGs in their area of responsibility.

e. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG)

MAAG's represent the Secretary of Defense in the countries to which they are accredited. They are, however, subject to the authority of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, specifically provides in Sec. 622 that: [Ref. 19]

> ". . . The Chief of the diplomatic mission shall make sure that recommendations of such representatives pertaining to military assistance (including civic action) programs are coordinated with political and economic considerations, and his comments shall accompany such recommendation if he so desires."

2. Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (DOD/ISA)

a) As part of the Military Assistance Program, military civic action comes under the jurisdiction of ISA. In 1962 civic action was so identified in MAP and, as such, all civic action programs were monitored and funded through ISA. In 1966 MAP civic action assistance to Vietnam was terminated and in 1967 similar actions were taken with respect to Thailand and one other unidentified East Asia country [Ref. 20]. Civic action programs for these countries is now wholly Service funded and is not included as part of the MAP program.

b) From the data in Tables III-2 and III-3, it can be seen that U.S. support of military civic action has decreased from an annual average of $21,982,000 in 1962-1966 to $6,348,000 in 1970. Of the 1970 commitment over 90% is committed to one country--Indonesia. Concurrently with the decreasing emphasis on MAP funding of civic action programs, organizational changes have taken place within ISA since 1966 when this program was managed by a Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary. Today civic action responsibility is an additional duty for an action officer at a military assistance desk. Nonetheless, the basic policy as it pertains to military civic action funded under MAP is of interest since it is applicable today in MAP recipient countries and it serves as a guide to the preparation of doctrinal literature.

c) Basic ISA guidance on military civic action is contained in the Military Assistance Manual (MAM). This document is revised annually on the basis of the interdepartment review of military assistance programs described in paragraph E above. In addition to general guidance, the MAM includes specific guidance to the Unified Commands MAAG's and Missions

Table III-2

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS
FISCAL YEARS 1962-1970

(In Thousands of Dollars)

		Fiscal Year			
	1962-66 (annual average)	1967	1968	1969	1970
Latin America	9,308	3,987	1,451	1,001	512
East Asia	11,376	10,732	9,270	4,954	5,813
Near East, South Asia, and Africa	1,297	83	32	9	23
Worldwide Totals	21,981	15,002	10,753	5,964	6,348

Source: Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriation, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1.

Table III-3

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE FUNDS FOR CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS BY COUNTRY, FISCAL YEAR 1970
(In Thousands of Dollars)

Latin America			
Argentina	12		
Bolivia	29		
Brazil	7		
Chile	21		
Colombia	100		
Dominican Republic	22		
Ecuador	74		
Guatemala	75		
Honduras	10		
Mexico	4		
Panama	5		
Paraguay	106		
Peru	2		
Uruguay	23		
Venezuela	13		
Regions	9		
Area Total		512	
East Asia			
Indonesia	5,805		
Philippines	8		
Area Total		5,813	
Near East, South Asia, and Africa			
Liberia	2		
Senegal	21		
Area Total		23	
Worldwide Total			6,348

Source: Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971. Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, 2nd Session, Part 1.

in each of the MAP recipient countries. General MAM guidance on civic action as well as guidance specific to geographical regions is contained in paragraph D, Appendix E (issued separately) [Ref. 21].


d) DOD/ISA works closely with the State Department in preparing the Military Assistance Program. Guidance for the annual submission is provided through the Interdepartmental Group system described in subparagraph D above. One example of the planning cycle involved in the coordination of the MAP with overall foreign assistance is shown in Figure III-5 supra. The planning cycle and actions for MAP is shown in Figure III-8. Details of the developmental cycle for military civic action, as a part of MAP, are shown in Figure III-9.

3. Joint Chiefs of Staff

a) As indicated in subparagraph F.1.a above, The Joint Chiefs of Staff is charged with the responsibility of reviewing civic action programs, as a part of MAP, to insure that they are in consonance with global security plans and are promoting U.S. strategic concepts. The JCS exercises its responsibility for review of civic action for consonance with global strategy through its membership on the Interdepartmental Group which reviews all foreign assistance programs. Responsibility for review of the civic action aspects of operational and contingency plans is included in the JCS review of the civil affairs portions, civic action being considered a subset of civil affairs for this purpose. JCS responsibilities in civil affairs operations are prescribed in JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) [Ref. 22].

"1. Request guidance from the Secretary of Defense as to broad policies in the field of civil affairs operations.
"2. Formulate specific policies for transmittal to unified and specified commands.
"3. Insure interim guidance and direction when necessary in an emergency.
"4. Insure adequate civic affairs coverage in joint plans.
"5. Keep abreast of current military, economic, and political trends.
"6. When outbreak of hostilities appears imminent, establish a Joint Civil Affairs Committee to assist the JCS.
"7. When outbreak of hostilities appears imminent recommend establishment at allied command level of a committee analogous to the Joint Civil Affairs Committee. Provide representation to this committee."

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


Fig. III-8. Flow Chart: Military Assistance Program Development.

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



Fig. III-9. MAP Sponsored Military Civic Action Planning Cycle.

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ing Cycle.

LEGEND

For descriptive purposes the flow of MAP sponsored military civic action activities have been divided into three phases. (1) Program Development, (2) Program Implementation, and (3) Project Implementation. These will be described separately for statistic purposes. In actuality many of the actions take place simultaneously or in some other sequence than shown on the flow chart.

1 Broad policy guidance for all foreign assistance is developed by the Interdepartmental Group and passed to the Country Team through State Department channels. DOD/ISA uses this guidance to update the Military Assistance Manual through which guidance on military civic action is disseminated to the country MAAG/Mission through the Unified Command having area responsibility.

2 The U.S. Country Team expands the broad guidance by applying it to the particular needs of the country. Host country counterparts are encouraged to participate in civic actions.

3 Decision to use military forces in national development through civic action is made by the host country government.

4 Host country government requests assistance through the MAP and AID for equipment, material, and training beyond their capabilities.

5 Responsibility for approval of the host country request for military civic action assistance rests, by law, with the Ambassador. Upon approval of U.S. support of host country civic actions through the MAP, the Country Team elements determine their inputs to the program.

6 The MAAG/Mission, working with their host country counterparts develops general requirements for assistance. These can include funds, material, and training assistance. The latter can be conducted in country under MAAG/Mission sponsorship or at U.S. Service schools for selected host country military personnel.

Requirements developed by MAAG/Mission are reviewed at the Unified Command and, after approval and/or revision, forwarded to DOD.

7 At DOD the request for assistance is reviewed by ISA for consistency with overall MAP guidelines.

8 The proposed program is reviewed at JCS for consistency with global military requirements.

9 The Armed Services (Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) review the program to determine impact on their programs. For example, if the program includes recommendations for sending host country military to CONUS Service Schools, the cognizant Service programs these inputs to their school schedules.

The United States Information Service (USIS) reviews the program to determine how it may be used as part of the information program for the country.

12 Requirements for capabilities beyond those available to the USIS are sent to the United States Information Agency for approval.

13 The AID mission reviews the program to determine requirements for AID support.

14 Requirements beyond local AID capability are sent to AID/Washington for approval.

15 Based on recommendations from the JCS and the Services as well as internal review, ISA recommends program approval.

16 The proposed program is reviewed by the Assistant Secretary of State for the area concerned. Inputs are provided by ISA, USIA, and AID.

17 Upon determination that the proposed program is consistent with U.S. foreign policy, the Assistant Secretary of State approves the program.

18 ISA authorizes the Unified Command to implement the program.

19 The Unified Command transmits the approval, along with implementing instructions to the MAAG/Mission.

20 Working with the host country military the MAAG/Mission determines requirements for planning assistance in the form of a Civic Action Mobile Training Team (CAMT).

21 Continuous coordination is effected with other members of the Country Team.

22 The Unified Command reviews the MAAG/Mission request for a CAMTT and begins to organize and train the team from available resources. Request for assistance beyond local capabilities is transmitted to ISA.

23 ISA reviews the Unified Command request for assistance in the formation of a CAMTT and directs the Services to provide support as required.

24 The Services direct the provision of support from their CONUS installations.

25 CONUS installation provides assistance to MAAG/Mission.

26 The Unified Command completes organization and training of the CAMTT.

27 The CAMTT works as part of the MAAG/Mission during its stay in the host country.

28 Continuous coordination is maintained with other elements of the Country Team.

29 Under supervision of the MAAG Mission the CAMTT works with the host country military to develop a civic action capability or plan. The CAMTT may conduct training programs, assist in area surveys, and assist in the development of a civic action plan for the host country military.

30 The host country military establishment prepares and issues a civic action directive to its units.

31 The Country Team develops specific assistance requirements.

32 The USIS develops a country information plan as an input to the overall U.S. sponsored civic action program.

33 The AID Mission develops requirements for "soft" support, i.e. expendible supplies, POL, etc.

34 The MAAG/Mission develops requirements for "hard" support, i.e. equipment and training.

35 The AID Mission arranges for distribution of locally available "soft" supplies. Request for supplies beyond local capability or authority is transmitted to AID Washington for action.

36 MAAG Mission arranges for distribution of locally available "hard" supplies and conducts in-country training as appropriate. Request for assistance beyond local capability or authority is sent to the Unified Command.

37 The Unified Command approves MAAG Mission request and transmits to ISA any support beyond local authority or capability.

38 Unified Command arranges for distribution to the MAAG Mission of locally available "hard" supplies and training support.

39 ISA acts on the Unified Command request for additional assistance using previously approved funding as a basis.

40 ISA passes on request to the appropriate Service along with such funding as may be necessary. The services direct their CONUS installations to provide the necessary assistance.

41 CONUS activities provide the required assistance-material or training.

42 AID/Washington acts on request for additional "hard" support and arranges shipment to or provision of funds for local purchase by AID Mission.

43 "Soft" assistance is distributed through host country civilian channels.

44 Host country military initiates civic action program.

45 The MAAG Mission provides continuous advice and assistance to the host country military.

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b) The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, has been appointed Executive Agent for the JCS in civil affairs planning. Responsibilities delegated to the Chief of Staff are:[Ref. 23]

> "1. As Executive Agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for civil affairs planning until such time as the Joint Civil Affairs Committee is established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiate for appropriate consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, actions required to discharge the responsibilities set forth in 40708e above."
> "2. Establish and operate civil affairs training establishment for basic civil training of all United States civil affairs units and personnel.
> "3. Mobilize, train, and provide all civil affairs units and personnel required in unified and specified commands except to the extent that this responsibility is hereinafter assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations of the Commandant of the Marine Corps.
> "4. Furnish to the other services, at their request, qualified personnel for service in their civil affairs units as specialists in the fields in which the Army normally has an interest but in which the other services ordinarily do not require or maintain trained personnel.
> "5. Make appropriate recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the adequacy of detailed plans prepared by other agencies and commanders of unified and specified commands, as a part of the normal review procedure, and insure necessary coordination with United States government agencies."

There appears to be some question whether the responsibilities of the Army, as Executive Agent for Civil Affairs, includes civic action. In 1961 the Department of the Army was designated as Executive Agent for civic action. However this was rescinded within a few months since civic action was a part of the MAP. Designation of an Executive Agent for any military assistance responsibilities is not an appropriate action.[Ref. 24]

c) The Chief of Naval Operations is charged with the responsibility for mobilizing, training and deploying civil affairs units or personnel required to support Navy and Marine Corps operations.

4. Department of the Army

a) Army responsibility for civic action, as a part of civil affairs, is discharged by the Civil Affairs Branch, Security Operations Division, International and Civil Affairs Directorate,

in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. In addition, this branch acts for the Army Chief of Staff in his role as Executive Agent for civil affairs planning. As indicated in the preceeding paragraph, there is some question whether this role can be extended to include civic action.

b) The basic publication covering Army civic action, as a part of civil affairs doctrine, is covered in Field Manual 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations.[Ref. 25] Military civic action as a part of internal defense and development is covered in Field Manual 100-20, Internal Defense and Development..[Ref. 26] The latter reference lists as the U.S. Army's third principal mission, "Military activities to promote stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations. . ." These activities are further defined as-- ". . . military assistance operations, tactical operations, military civic actions, civil affairs operations, show of force deployments, peacekeeping missions, and other military operations designed to foster growth, and to forestall and resolve conflict in the political process within a nation."

The most recent Army doctrinal publication in which civic action is mentioned is a study, Institutional Development, which was approved by the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army on 8 December 1969 as: [Ref. 27]

> "a. Doctrinal guidance on the conduct of institutional development and its coordination with military operations.
> "b. A basis for the United States Army Combat Developments Command to develop required field manuals or changes to existing field manuals."

Institutional development is defined as: [Ref. 28]

> "The combination of civic action and internal security, viewed in the perspective set forth above, has been given the ruberic 'institutional development'."

Civic action and internal security are described in the study as complimentary functions with civic action focusing on developing a people's knowledge, skills, attitudes, and values as well as aiding their technological development. Internal security is described as the building of support for the government to effectively meet the people's needs and desires.

Table III-4 presents a comparison of the Army doctrinal statement on civic action contained in the above cited documents. Analysis of the data contained in Table III-4

Table III-4

COMPARISON OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY CIVIC ACTION DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS

	Field Manual 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations	Field Manual 100-20 Field Service Regulations Internal Defense and Development	DA Study Institutional Development
OBJECTIVE	"... furthering U.S. force ... policy and fostering a deeper appr[e]ciation in host countries for the ne[e]d for mutual civil-military understanding, cooperation and support." (para 6-6a) "... within the limitations of the military mission and U.S. national policy, these assets may be applied to achieve the local cold war objectives of the United States." (para 6-6b)	Military activities to promote stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations have become the U.S. Army's third principal mission. They include military assistance operations, tactical operations, military civic actions, civil affairs operations, show of force deployments, peacekeeping missions, and other military operations designed to foster growth, and to forestall or resolve conflict in the political process within a nation. (para 1-2)	". . . The combination of civic action and internal security, viewed in the perspective set forth above, has been given the ruberic 'institutional development'. . . It refers to the development of a people's capacities to identify and solve their own problems." (para 5 a, Chapter 1)
DEFINITION	Military civic action is the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. U.S. forces may at times advise, assist or engage in military civic action in overseas areas." (para 7-16a)	Military civic action serves to improve the image of the national government by improving the peoples image of the military forces. It also develops the spirit and practice of cooperation between civilian and military members of the community, primarily by expediting political, economic, or sociological development and providing a stimulus for social change. Important consequences of the foregoing are denial of civilian support to insurgents and development of intelligence and counter-intelligence sources.	"The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population." (Glossary p. xv)
PRINCIPLES	"Communist propaganda preys on emotions and skillfully foments antagonisms to U.S. programs. Therefore, U.S. military and civilian assistance programs are more successful when conducted in such a way as to-- "(1) Reach the masses of the people. "(2) Yield some tangible and prompt benefits. "(3) Involve active and constructive participation of the people. "(4) Develop pride of the people in their own achievement or status." (para 8-9b)	A national internal development program should establish priorities and outline types of projects leading to rational and progressive development. Military civic action projects can be developed to support a great variety of national internal development programs. Military civic action also can have undesirable secondary effects which are not readily apparent. For example, care must be taken to avoid the creation of a desire or supposed need for services or benefits that cannot be continued when the military units move from the area.	"Planning Guidelines. In sum general guidance for institutional development can be given. Initially projects should be directed at the technical aspects of life where results are immediately demonstrable and ultimate values are not challenged. Projects should be evaluated in terms of their group formation potential. Subsequent projects should capitalize on the needs generated within the community by the earlier projects . . ." (para 9 ., Chapter 2)
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION	"a. Criteria for the propriety of military participation in civic action projects during any phase of insurgency include-- "(1) Is it an important need, locally wanted, and beyond unaided local capabilities? "(2) Can military participation be so managed that it does not compromise civilian authority and responsibility? "(3) Does the activity support the commander's political-military mission, or at least avoid jeopardizing it? "(4) Is the activity in consonance with the country's national objectives and interests? "(5) Will participation by the military avoid wasteful or needless duplication of functions and services of other agencies? "(6) Does the activity support, supplement, or substitute for the available services of other agencies?	Coordination of programs of all agencies with developmental capabilities--US, this country, multinational, international, commercial, and non-profit. Political factors - improve public administration Economic factors - project must be selected and managed to illustrate the importance of community economics in improving the well-being of the family Legal - establish and operate a legal system Economic development - infrastructure Management - management training program Labor - provide skilled and unskilled labor Sociological influences - project must have favorable impact on the internal progress of a developing society.	"Conventional Criteria. Selection of target areas for change projects is usually guided by such criteria as importance to national economic growth, proximity of the area to urban centers, stable leadership and population, and a relatively high cultural level. "Military Criteria. Military involvement in institutional development must promote internal security as well as achieve success in development. Consequently, selection of areas for development by the military must be guided by criteria related to actual or potential disorder in the area. Based on consideration of insurgent strategy, insurgent strength and weaknesses, and recent experience, this means military efforts should generally be directed at rural areas." (para ", Chapter 2)

(Continued)

Table III-4 (Continued)

COMPARISON OF U.S. ARMY MILITARY CIVIC ACTION DOCTRINAL PUBLICATIONS

	Field Manual 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations	Field Manual 100-20 Field Service Regulations, Internal Defense and Development	DA Study Institutional Development
CRITERIA FOR SELECTION (continued)	"(7) Does the project lend itself to the participation of local people? "b. If the nation is in a Phase II or III insurgency situation additional criteria might include-- "(1) Will the project stimulate the flow of needed information from the people of the area? "(2) Will the project serve to gain civilian cooperation with the populace and resources control and counterguerrilla programs? "(3) Is the project in an area which the government may reasonably expect to hold? If not, will the project improve facilities and provide a net gain in other ways to offset a possible insurgent advantage?" (para 7-17)		
TECHNIQUES	"a. While some military civic action operations entail a major effort and funding, the emphasis is on assistance, guidance, and the initiation of self-help programs within the scope of existing resources. Teams of military specialists with appropriate technical skills are established and work directly with the population and with other agencies of their government, such as public health, public welfare, education, agriculture, and interior ministries. Individual members of a unit or their dependents may engage in independent civic action projects of significant benefit to a community. "b. Civic action operations involve two avenues of approach, directed national activities and voluntary efforts on the local level. Both have generally similar goals. "(1) Directed activities usually involve specific assignments, central government funding, and authorization to use military resources "(2) Voluntary activities should follow general stimuli and guidelines from the national government, but they involve greater initiative and resourcefulness on the local level. . ." "(3) Whether the civic action operations are directed or are voluntary, activities must be coordinated closely among all action agencies to avoid duplication of effort, to re-channel misdirected idealism, and to secure maximum benefits from skills, labor, supplies, equipment, and funds involved." (para 7-20b)	None specified.	"Inducing Change in the Indigenous Military System." "Inducing Change in the Indigenous Counterparts." "Inducing Change in the Indigenous Military/Civilian Relationship." (Para 7, Chapter 3)
EVALUATION	None specified	None specified.	". . . Institutional development requires that civic action projects be evaluated in terms of developing the knowledge, skills, attitudes, values and the organization of people, as well as in terms of technological benefit. . ." (para 5.c., Chapter 1)

indicates no major disparities between the civic action doctrine extracted from three sources. The information contained in FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operation approaches civic action as a subset of civil affairs. That from Institutional Development covers civic action as a sociological concept which plays a role in the overall program of Nation Building.

The Army has shown a considerable interest in the development of criteria for the selection and assessment of civic action programs. A draft, prepared by Center for Research and Social Systems (CRESS), is currently undergoing internal Army review and revision. Copies of this draft study were not made available to RTI for analysis and inclusion in this report. The purpose of this study, as expressed in a presentation at the school of the Americas in 1970, is:

> ". . . provide our U.S. military commanders with standardized, practical procedures and guidelines for assessing our civic action operations. It is our expectation that this study can serve as a basic source and reference work on this specialized aspect of civic action for all who may desire to use it. Above all, our final objective is to produce from this study effort, not only basic guidance, but working guidance in a form which can be readily utilized by our commanders in the field."[Ref. 29]

The development of criteria, such as described above, should fill the gap in doctrinal literature concerning the selection and assessment criteria for civic action programs. However, the results of the CRESS study do not appear to be directed toward another area in which doctrinal data are lacking--that of assessing and evaluating individual projects at the grass-roots level.

5. Department of the Navy

Attempts to determine the specific office within Office of the Chief of Naval Operations having responsibility for military civic action were unsuccessful. Neither was it possible to isolate a central source of doctrine for this area. Responsibility for military civic action appears to be fragmented throughout the Department. Responsibility for the conduct and planning of civic action programs is delegated to the various fleets and naval elements of the unified commands.

Two basic concepts of civic action emerge from discussions with personnel at Headquarters, USN and Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The first appears to be a community relations type program.

In response to a specific request, RTI was informed that the basic Navy policy regarding civic action programs is that contained in DOD directive 5410.18 Community Relations, April 21, 1965 [Ref. 30]. This document is the basic source of guidance for the USN programs "Buddy Base" and "Handclasp". Both of these programs involve direct USN involvement in the provision of food, clothing, and other supplies to overseas areas through the units of the Fleet and USN installations and units in overseas areas.

While on the surface these programs may seem removed from the basic purpose of military civic action--improvement of the standing of indigenous military with the population through socioeconomic development projects--"Buddy Base" can be considered to indirectly contribute to this objective.

Buddy Base is a program in which selected CONUS Naval installations are paired off with indigenous installations in Vietnam. The host U.S. Navy installation collects and supplies some of the amenities of life such as curtains and other supplies intended to improve the living conditions of the Vietnamese Naval personnel and their families at their home bases. This program could contribute to the elimination of one of the obstacles in encouraging host country military to undertake civic action programs. There have been reports that it is difficult to initiate a Vietnamese civic action program. One such report states:

> "Others express the thought that one can't expect ARVN to do civic action when their own dependents are housed under worse conditions than the surrounding population."[Ref. 31]

The second Navy civic action program is the Seabee Technical Assistance Team program (STAT). This program is monitored and coordinated by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Headquarters. Under this program each Naval Construction Battalion organizes and trains two teams of volunteers who are given specialized training in a foreign language and other areas appropriate to the country and mission assigned. These teams are then deployed, usually on the request of an embassy of AID, to developing areas of the world where they engage in construction projects which contribute to socioeconomic development. Costs incidental to the travel and operation in the overseas area are borne by the requesting agency. Currently STAT's are deployed in Vietnam and Thailand under AID sponsorship and in the Trust territories of the Pacific under Department of Interior sponsorship.

Inability to uncover any specific doctrinal publication or central source of control for USN civic action precludes the inclusion of a structured description of Hq USN civic action.

6. Department of the Air Force

Military civic action responsibilities within the Hq, USAF, are well defined and delineated in Air Force Regulation 55-7. Of all the services, the Air Force stands alone in detailing the responsibilities of its headquarters element and subordinate commands for military civic action in one central document.[Ref. 32] With Hq, USAF, the following responsibilities are assigned:

> "a. The Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives (AFXDO):
>
> (1) Formulates MCA basic doctrine for inclusion in AFM 1-1.
>
> (2) Participates with the other services in the development of joint doctrine covering MCA functions.
>
> (3) Develops long-term MCA concepts and objectives for inclusion in the USAF Planning Concepts document."
>
> "b. The Special Operations Plans and Policy Branch (AFXPPGS), Deputy Director for Plans and Policy:
>
> (1) Establishes and develops Air Force policy and plans for MCA.
>
> (2) Develops and coordinates USAF support of United States national policy with respect to MCA.
>
> (3) Provides guidance on USAF MCA plans and policies.
>
> (4) Prepares and coordinates AF positions on MCA plans and policies being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>
> (5) Reviews MCA plans of major commands.
>
> c. The Special Operations Division (AFXOSO), Deputy Director for Strike Forces, Directorate of Operations:
>
> (1) Supervises and coordinates the development of MCA operational doctrine, tactics, and techniques.
>
> (2) Supervises and coordinates the development, training, and equipping of MCA forces.
>
> (3) Reviews MCA operational plans, activity reports, and after action reports.
>
> (4) Monitors MCA programs and projects of the major command.
>
> (5) Prepares, publishes and distributes the semi-annual USAF MCA Report."

Responsibilities of major commands and subordinate units are:

"a. All major commands and subordinate units develop MCA plans and programs and apply their resources in MCA consistent with their basic and/or assigned missions, the validated requirements of the host government, the responsibilities of host air force, and the desires of the United States Country Team.

(1) Appropriate commanders at all levels:

(a) Assure that command and staff personnel are knowledgeable of MCA plans and requirements in their respective areas of responsibility.

(b) Assure the MCA personnel are trained, professionally oriented, and capable of organizing complete staff participation in approved MCA programs.

(c) Designate an MCAO responsible for developing, planning, coordinating, conducting and reporting MCA activities. This MCAO will also be responsible for the necessary budget estimates and financial plans. Normally, within the staff at the major command (numbered) air force level and air division, the MCAO is assigned to the directorate of plans, special operations division/branch/section, as appropriate. At the wing, group, or squadron level, an MCAO is assigned to the special staff of each commander. At these lower command levels, and in situations overseas where MCA programs are active and widespread, the MCAO will be designated as chief of the MCA section by each commander as a special staff member responsible for MCA programs and activities.

(d) Maintain a detailed record of USAF participation in or support of MCA activities to comply with requirement for MCA reports according to paragraph 10.

(e) Insure that MCA activities are coordinated with the Air Force information personnel and their community relations program.

b. Tactical Air Command maintains the Special Operations Force to:

(1) Develop, in coordination with PACAF, USAFE, and USAFO, doctrine, concepts, equipment, tactics, and techniques for Air Force forces and host country air force forces (to include joint use civilian aviation facilities) in support of MCA programs and activities.

(2) Provide specialized training and equipment for personnel to engage in military civic action.

(3) Provide country survey teams, as directed."

Basic components of USAF doctrine for military civic action are shown in Table III-5. These are summarized from AFR55-7.

Until 1970, Hq USAF required a semi-annual report of USAF and host country air force military civic action activities. Reasons cited for this report is their requirement at the national level. According to Hq USAF personnel, these reports were discontinued in 1970 due to the elimination of their need by higher echelons.[Ref. 33] A review of two semi-annual reports indicates that they are primarily narrative. Evaluation is essentially subjective. Most of the projects described in the two reports which were reviewed cover unilateral civic actions on the part of the units concerned. Tabular data will be presented in subsequent sections of this report.

7. United States Marine Corps

Official Marine Corps documents trace the use of civic action to accomplish assigned missions back to the Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Dominican Republic operations of the 1920s.[Ref. 34] The experience and lessons of these campaigns were recorded in the Small Wars Manual of 1940 which states:[Ref. 35]

> "The motive in small wars is not material destruction. It is usually a project dealing with the social, economic, and political development of the people. It is of primary importance that the fullest benefit be derived from the psychological aspects of the situation. That implies a serious study of the people, their racial, political, religious, and mental development. By analysis and study the reasons for existing emergency may be deduced; the most practical method of solving the problem is to understand the possible approaches thereto and the repercussion to be expected from any action which may be contemplated. By this study and the ability to apply correct psychological doctrine, many pitfalls may be avoided and the success of the undertaking assured."

Within this basic concept of small wars the Manual states:[Ref. 36]

> "The purpose should always be to restore normal government or give the people a better government than they had before, and to establish peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable. In so doing one should endeavor to make self-sufficient native agencies responsible for these matters. With all this accomplished, one should be able to leave the country with the lasting friendship and respect of the native population."

From this basis, Marine Corps civic action has developed into its present day concept centered around the Combined Action Program

Table III-5

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, U.S. AIR FORCE (AIR FORCE REGULATION 55-7)

OBJECTIVES

To develop, stimulate, and support programs which indigenous air forces, paramilitary forces, and other host-country agencies can use to meet the needs and aspirations of the people.

DEFINITION

The use of indigenous military forces on projects which are useful to all levels of the local populace in fields that contribute to economic and social development (education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health sanitation, etc.) and also serve to improve the relations between the military forces and the population. (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic action in overseas areas.)

PRINCIPLES

Military civic action is an action program designed to maintain internal security.

Military civic action programs must not be confused with community relations programs.

Military civic action programs should be essentially host country programs.

Military civic action programs should be adapted to meet local needs and culture.

Immediate impact and short term completion projects should be encouraged.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Programs should be:

- Initiated only after host country has indicated support and has the resources required.
- Complimentary and not competitive with other host country programs.
- Implemented unilaterally or conducted in consonance with, or integral to, other programs.
- Such as not to detract significantly from the USAF capability to perform the military mission.
- Encouraged even in countries where USAF has no large organized units or the USAF detachments are isolated from parent command.

(Continued)

Table III-5 (Continued)

TECHNIQUES

Use of airpower to develop a civil transportation network with all of its inherent technical requirements for communications, airport management, air traffic control, weather services, and search and rescue.

Use of Air Force professional and technical skills in the development of a modern technological society.

Assist governments of friendly nations to improve living conditions of the people.

Distinguish between military civic actions and community relations or humanitarian programs such as sponsorship of orphanages, small building projects, people-to-people programs, special events, and volunteer language teaching.

EVALUATION

Semi-annual report from major subordinate commands is to contain a command evaluation of the individual or collective success of military civic action programs. No specific evaluation criteria prescribed.

and Personal Response concepts. While these concepts are current they have not been completely reflected in Marine Corps doctrinal publications. At Headquarters, USMC, staff responsibility for civil affairs and civic action was assigned to the Civil Affairs Branch, G-3 Division. On 31 March 1970, this branch was redesignated as the Counterinsurgency Branch in order to recognize the counterinsurgency nature of the functions being performed by the old Civil Affairs Branch.[Ref. 37] This change reflects the nature of Marine Corps participation in civic actions in Vietnam.

During personal discussions, the Chief, Counterinsurgency Branch, indicated that the Marine Corps was in the process of institutionalizing their civic action doctrine based on Vietnam experience.[Ref. 38] Pending formalization of doctrinal publications, the information appearing in the Marine Corps Gazette March 1968 reflects the current thinking of the Marine Corps insofar as civic action is concerned.

The Combined Action Program was first implemented in Vietnam in 1965. A USMC unit was integrated with a GVN Popular Force (PF) unit as a Combined Action Platoon (CAP). The CAP moved into a hamlet and provided protection to the people, thereby denying the hamlet to the Viet Cong. In addition the CAP assisted the local populace in improving their social and economic status by initiating self-help projects.[Ref. 39] While no official data could be found as to effectiveness of the CAP program, several writers allude to its success. For example,

> ". . . The VC has never regained control of a hamlet which is protected by one of these units (CAP)."[Ref. 40]

The Marine Corps is placing considerable emphasis on individual-to-individual interaction in what they call the Personal Response Program. This program, designed specifically for use in Vietnam, has as its purposes and objectives:[Ref. 41]

> "The Personal Response Project is a systematic effort toward attitudinal improvement in intercultural relations. By discovering the ways in which people of another culture relate their religious and ethical value systems to daily life, the project develops effective anticipation of acculturative problems. Such anticipation and understanding is one of the keys to the elimination of offensive behavioral patterns toward indigenous citizens. It is expected that appropriate mutual assistance between Marines and the citizenry will be a by-product of increased understanding and contributory to the elimination of local guerrilla forces in an insurgency environment. . .

"The objectives of the Personal Response Project are to: assist military personnel to respond to the predisposition of indigenous citizens to act in concert with their social, religious and cultural value systems; identify the expression of these value systems and the motivation implicit in them; and recognize that the lives, relationships, and actions of indigenous citizens are of the same importance as those of all other human beings."

In 1967 the Unit Leaders Personal Response Handbook (NAVMC 2616) was published. It is currently being used throughout the Marine Corps. Predeployment training for corporals and lower ranks includes four hours of instruction designed to prepare the individual marine "for constructive and effective intercultural interaction upon his arrival in Vietnam."[Ref. 42] The Personal Response Program is currently being expanded into a culture non-specific program applicable wherever interpersonal relationships are concerned. Data on this expanded program is not expected to be available until September 1971. [Ref. 43]

Basic components of Marine Corps civic action doctrine are summarized in Table III-6.

H. Unified Commands (Figure III-10)

1. General

In Section II it was developed that military civic action is a counterinsurgency function. The responsibilities of a commander of a Unified Command in counterinsurgency are defined in JCS Pub 2 as:[Ref. 44]

"a. Exercises complete responsibility for military operations and operational command of assigned military units within his area. . .

"b. Supports, through the Military Assistance Program, appropriate requirements of the country team for counterinsurgency activities.

"d. Directs and supervises the activities of the MAAGs and Missions in his command and provides technical assistance and administrative support in counterinsurgency activities."

Details of specific Unified Command doctrine and guidance on military civic action are in paragraph E, Appendix E (issued separately).

2. U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)

USSOUTHCOM philosophy on military civic action can be summed up in the following statement from an undated paper covering this subject:[Ref. 45]

Table III-6

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, U.S. MARINE CORPS (MCI 03.30)

OBJECTIVES

To win support of the people by showing the discontented that their legitimate desires can better be achieved under the established government than under any government promised by insurgents.

To convince the populace that the existing government is a better friend, better protector, and better servant than are the insurgents.

DEFINITION

Promotion and support of military civic action programs as a part of civil affairs operations involves the use of preponderantly local military forces on projects benefiting the population and enhancing the relationship of the military forces with the civilian community. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in civic action in overseas areas.)

PRINCIPLES

Almost any action which makes the military man (host country or American) a brother to the people, as well as their protector, can be termed civic action.

Civic action projects should be limited to the village level.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Civic action project requirements:

Meet popular desires.

Meet the greatest need.

Respect culture and religion.

Provide for project continuity.

Be economically beneficial to the community.

Create a favorable government image.

Be progressive.

Lean toward self-sufficiency.

(Continued)

Table III-6 (Continued)

TECHNIQUES


Environmental Improvement. A program designed to eliminate the causes of popular discontent and restore confidence in the established government.

Population and Resources Control. A program designed to isolate the insurgents from the people and their resources.

Counterguerrilla Operations. A program designed to neutralize and eliminate the guerrilla movement.

EVALUATION

None specified.



Key

Command (Reports flow in reverse)

Support (Training, funds, personnel, materiel)

Control

Fig. III-10. Unified Command.

". . . the United States Government advocates a vigorous civic action program executed by the indigenous internal security forces. For maximum effect this military civic action must be performed as an integral part of the nation's overall blueprint for development and must receive the necessary impetus and interest at the highest levels of government."

If one accepts the concept that one criteria of a successful U.S. sponsored civic action program is typified by decreasing U.S. support and increasing host country support, USSOUTHCOM programs have been successful. USSOUTHCOM's evaluation of their civic action programs is contained in the following statement extracted from the undated paper referenced above:

"In spite of a somewhat jaundiced opinion of military civic action from certain quarters, the entire concept is sound. In Latin America it is indispensable --the 'sine qua non' of development. That the program achieves success is borne out by increased rapport and active cooperation between military and civilian agencies engaged in work of this nature. In terms of schools built, patients treated, rivers charted, and roads constructed, the program is singularly important in the emerging nations of Latin America. But perhaps the most valid evaluation is that based on the testimonials of the Latin American armed forces themselves. Enclosed, as examples, are self-evaluations of the civic action programs of Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, and Peru (see Tab D). They form the basis of a cogent argument recommending military civic action. Further, reports from US Military Groups in Latin America verify the success of civic action and strengthen its justification."

Summary information of military civic action as envisioned by USSOUTHCOM is in Table III-7.

I. Military Advisory System (Figure III-11)

1. General

Military advisory assistance is provided friendly foreign nations through Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs), Missions, Military Groups (MILGRPs) and Defense Attaches. A MAAG which is normally established in a country receiving assistance under the MAP, has responsibility for the management and control of the MAP to include military civic action. In countries not having a MAAG, the MAP is administered through the military mission, MILGRP, or the appropriate Defense Attache.[Ref. 46]

Table III-7

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

OBJECTIVES

As stated in paragraph D, Chapter 5, Part I, Military Assistance Manual. (See paragraph D, Appendix E, Issued Separately).

DEFINITION

Standard JCS definition (by reference)

PRINCIPLES

Active participation of the component Services resources in support of host countries' military civic action programs through logistical aid, instruction, advice, and coordination of efforts.

Vigorous civic action programs executed by indigenous internal security forces as an integral part of the nation's overall development plan. Impetus for these programs should emanate from the highest levels of government.

SELECTION CRITERIA

U.S. support to civic actions must be in response to requests of host countries.

TECHNIQUES

While emphasis is on host country funding, MAP funds and equipment should be used when appropriate on nonmilitary tasks.

Use of Mobile Training Teams to deliver formal instruction.

Annual Civic Action Planning course conducted by the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

Deployment of Technical Assistance Teams from USSOUTHCOM components to provide advisory assistance during the planning and execution phases of military civic action projects of a technical nature.

Inclusion of personnel oriented toward host country civic action objectives and operations in each U.S. Military Group.

USSOUTHCOM coordination of civic action ventures to insure parallel--or at least compatible--national development among the various Latin American countries.

(Continued)

Table III-7 (Continued)

EVALUATION

True evaluation of a project is in terms of its contribution to the national program and effect on the overall plan for national development.

Despite inability to assign absolute values of indices to success, an evaluation must be made in order to justify its existence.

Bases for appraising military civic action are:

a. Attainment of programmed objectives in terms of quantity, quality, time, and invested funds.


b. Tangible, observable, and measurable benefits.

c. Comparative analysis of performance and manner in which military resources were used in military civic action ventures.

d. Effect on armed forces training based on a before and after comparison.

e. Impact of the projects on public opinion.

f. Effect of completed projects on overall plan for country development.



* When operating in country (e.g., Southeast Asia)

Fig. III-11. Military Advisory System.

Whatever form the military advisory element takes, it is a part of the U.S. Country Team and is under the general supervision of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.[Ref. 47]

Responsibilities and functions of the Military Advisory system as it pertains to military civic action are outlined in JCS Pub 2 as:[Ref. 48]

> "a. Represents the Secretary of Defense in the countries to which he is accredited, as specified in each case by Executive Order or other pertinent instruction.
>
> "b. Develops the military section of country team internal defense plans and assures that provision is made for MAP support.
>
> "c. Provides advice and assistance to host countries on the military aspects of counterinsurgency, whenever such assistance is sought by the host country and approved by the United States.
>
> "d. In countries where no MAAG is assigned the senior U.S. military officer will perform the responsibilities listed above."

Discussions with personnel at STRICOM, the only CONUS based Unified Command having MAAGs and Missions in its jurisdiction, indicated that reports of civic action activities were aggregated and included in the annual MAAG/Mission report.[Ref. 49] As such, reports of civic action performed under MAAG/Mission jurisdiction are general and are lacking in detail.

2. ARMISH/MAAG

The Command Doctrine of the U.S. Military Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran (ARMISH/MAAG) lists the general principles of civic action to be:[Ref. 50]

> "(a) To use the organization, technical and professional capability of the IIG to help the people in social and economic development.
>
> "(b) To work <u>with</u> the people, not just <u>for</u> the people. The people should learn that they can contribute to their own social and economic improvement by working side by side with the military in the conduct of civic action."

ARMISH/MAAG emphasis on military civic action is evidenced by including this subject as an Annex to ARMISH/MAAG PLAN 258-68 (Military Portion, Internal Defense Plan, Iran.)[Ref. 51] Basic

components of ARMISH/MAAG doctrine and directives for military civic action are contained in Table III-8.

3. MAAG/Liberia

In 1969 a Civic Action Mobile Training Team was sent to Liberia to assist the U.S. Military Mission (USMM/L) in the development of a civic action plan for the mission and the Liberian Armed Forces. A copy of the program which constituted the team's after action report was obtained from the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg. Summary data for USMM/L as contained in this document are shown in Table III-9.

J. United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) (Figures III-11, III-12)

1. General

MACV military civic action efforts are a part of the overall pacification program. Pacification is defined as:

> ". . . the military, political, economic, and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the participation of the people. It includes . . . the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion."[Ref. 52]

Revolutionary Development (RD) is described as being the leading edge of pacification and is defined as:

> ". . . the formalized government of Vietnam program, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development, in specified hamlets generally within RD campaign areas. It includes the local security for those hamlets and the political, economic, and social activities at that level."[Ref. 53]

It should be noted that RD is conducted primarily at the local level in rural areas. Similar activities in urban areas or of nationwide scope are classified as nation building. MACV defines this operations as:

> ". . . economic, political, and social activity having an impact nationwide and/or in urban centers."[Ref. 54]

The similarity between the definitions of pacification and rural development, and military civic action are readily apparent. All are involved in socioeconomic development, all have as objectives strengthening the grass-roots of a country. The principle difference is that military civic action entails the use of indigenous military,

Table III-8

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, ARMISH/MAAG

OBJECTIVE

ARMISH/MAAG in cooperation with the U.S. Embassy and other country team agencies advise the Imperial Iranian Army in improving their image and relationships with the people of Iran and assist in the socioeconomic development of the country through coordinated military civic action projects.

DEFINITION

Civic action is the participation by an agency, organization, or group in economic and sociological projects which are useful to the local population at all levels, but for which the sponsor does not have primary governmental responsibility. Projects may be in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others which contribute to the general welfare and serve to improve the standing of the sponsor with the population.

PRINCIPLES

Personnel must make suggestions, as appropriate, to Iranian military and encourage:

Minimum diversion of military resources.

Maximum contribution of time and material by civilian agencies and villagers.

Contact with villagers and Iranian civil officials made by Iranian military.

Program must be one in which the Iranian military personnel help the civilians to help themselves.

Emphasis on projects which directly complement existing and planned activities of civilian agency programs.

Publicize Iranian military participation in successful civic action projects.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Not applicable since ARMISH/MAAG acts in an advisory capacity only. All military civic action in Iran is funded by the Iranian government.

General guidance to ARMISH/MAAG advisory sections lists these types of projects which can be pursued in Iran: rural development, water supply, public health, public works, education, disaster relief, sports programs, and vocational training for the Imperial Iranian Army.

(Continued)

Table III-8 (Continued)

TECHNIQUES

Explore every opportunity to encourage military civic action projects by the Imperial Iranian Army.

Adequate and timely publicizing of successful projects.

EVALUATION

None indicated.

Table III-9

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, U.S. MILITARY MISSION/LIBERIA (USMM/L)

OBJECTIVES

Encourage the Armed Forces of Liberia to undertake civic action projects with their own resources.

DEFINITION

The employment of the military forces of a nation on economic and social activities which are beneficial to the population as a whole. Civic action projects provide for the utilization of military resources for constructive peacetime activities, such as assisting with health, educational, welfare, and public works projects; improving living conditions; alleviating suffering; and improving the economic base of the area.

PRINCIPLES

U.S. contributes to civic action in Liberia through the Country Team involving the resources of the U.S. Embassy, USAID, USIS, as well as USMM/L.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Projects must emphasize Liberian military personnel helping the Liberian civilian personnel to help themselves.

TECHNIQUES

Each mission staff and unit advisor acts as civic action advisor for counterpart staff section or unit.


Advise and assist the Armed Forces of Liberia in the identification and development of civic action projects and in the preparation and submission of project statements.

Advise the Armed Forces of Liberia on PIO aspects. Coordinate PIO activities with USIS.

Serve as liaison between the Armed Forces of Liberia and the U.S. Country Team.

EVALUATION

None specified.



Key

Command (Reports flow in reverse)
Coordination
Support (Training, funds, personnel, materiel)
Advice
Military Civic Action Projects
Control

*When operating in country (e.g., Southeast Asia)

Fig. III-12. U.S. Field Forces.

pacification and to the use of all indigenous government elements. Civic action therefore can be considered to be subsumed under the pacification program.

2. Objectives

Pacification has three objectives:[Ref. 55]

- To provide sustained territorial and internal security.
- To establish an effective political structure at the local level responsive to and involvement by the people.
- To stimulate self-sustaining economic activity.

The "hearts and minds" aspects is evidenced in the following statements:

> "The people must be separated and won over from the enemy--and this can be done only with the active cooperation of the people themselves."[Ref. 56]

> "In these RD areas, the GVN, through its RD cadre groups, establishes a channel of communications between the people and their government and, through their productive work, gains the support and loyalty of the people." [Ref. 57]

3. Definition

The role of military civic action and its contribution to the pacification program is contained in this quote:

> "Military civic action is conducted by all military elements in cooperation with the province and district officials in such a manner as to ensure maximum credit to the GVN. The use of military management and technical skills is emphasized. Civic action programs of all US/FWMAF (U.S./Free World Military Assistance Forces) and RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces) will be coordinated at province level with the province chief or his delegated military commander."[Ref. 58]

While the definition is somewhat at variance with the approved JCS definition, in that maximum credit should accrue to the GVN rather than the host country military forces, the intent of the JCS definition is satisfied in that the ultimate objective of any civic action program is the enhancement of the indigenous government. As in the case of most of the published guidance on military civic action, the MACV description positively states the aims and objectives but does not go into the "how". How, for example, can military civic action activities of US/FWMAF be conducted in such a manner as to ensure maximum credit to the GVN? This problem of coordination between the civic

actions of the RVNAF with U.S. advice and assistance, and the civic actions of U.S. units operating in the area has been addressed in a staff study by the 300th Civil Affairs Group. The study concludes that existing doctrine does not recognize the special problems experienced by the U.S. military advisor when U.S. or allied tactical troops with a combat mission are operating in his area. Recommendations are made that Army doctrine should be modified by clearly defining the respective responsibilities of the advisory and tactical systems so that the existing ambiguities are dispelled.[Ref. 59]

4. Organization

Responsibility for overall direction and management of U.S. civil and military pacification activities within RVN is vested in the Deputy to the Commander, USMACV, for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS). The Deputy for CORDS is charged with supervising the formulation and execution of all policies and programs, military and civilian, which support RVN's pacification program. [Ref. 60] An Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS, is provided at Headquarters, MACV, to supervise, plan, and direct RD operations. Similar organizational structure is found in subordinate elements. The CORDS organization is shown in Figure III-13.

In addition to the CORDS organization there is a parallel military advisory system. This system provides advice and assistance to the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) in the conduct of operations, including military civic action. The advisory organization and its relationship to ARVN is depicted in Figure III-14.

U.S. supported military civic actions involving the use of indigenous military forces are carried out through the advisory system (Figure III-14). Unilateral U.S. involvement programs are carried out through the CORDS system (Figure III-13).


5. Techniques

No techniques specific to military civic action are included in the MACV handbook.

Lower level directives were uncovered which provide guidance to techniques applicable to military civic action.[Ref. 61] This document lists the following operational procedures for the accomplishment of civil affairs (including civic action) missions.

> "(1) Stress coordination and cooperation among all agencies concerned with civil affairs/civic action activities.
>
> "(2) Advise and assist supported units in developing and executing a meaningful civil affairs program.

* * *




SOURCE: USMACV Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, February 1968, p. 29.

x-x-x Coordination--Military and CORDS matters.

xxxx Operational Control when unit assigned on RD direct support mission.

Fig. III-13. CORDS Organization.



SOURCE: USMACV Handbook for Military Support of Pacification, February 1968, p. 32.

Fig. III-14. ARVN/US Advisor Organization.

"(5) Assist in the coordination and monitoring of military civic action projects to assure they are consistent with and support provincial pacification and development programs."

* * *

6. Evaluation

Reports of civic actions are submitted as part of CORDS field reporting system.[Ref. 62] The report consists of a narrative portion and a statistical portion. The narrative portion consists of the following paragraphs:

"(1) Comment on beneficial results of military civic action activities, to include increased cooperation of the people with GVN agencies, furnishing of intelligence information by the people and evidence of effective organization of the people in their own behalf in cooperation with the GVN and US/FWMAF.

"(2) Comment on significant problems encountered which hinder or render less effective the military civic action programs conducted within the province; e.g., attitudes of local, district, and province officials and people; availability of commodities and equipment to accomplish projects.

"(3) Describe specific military civic action projects considered to be particularly effective and reasons for success to include methods employed."

The statistical portion of the report covers man-days of effort and funds expended in the performance of civic actions.

No copies or summaries of these reports were located in CONUS sources. The format, however, parallels that used in the operational reports and lessons learned submitted by U.S. units operating in Vietnam. These latter reports will be covered in Section VI.

Civic actions are also evaluated indirectly in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) and Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) used by MACV in evaluating the effectiveness of the pacification program. These systems will be discussed in Section VII.

K. Field Activities

1. 300th Civil Affairs Group

The 300th Civil Affairs Group, a reserve unit, has prepared a guide to military civic action.[Ref. 63] The guide was prepared to assist in training in the principles, methods, and technical skills necessary to achieve civic action goals. These goals as well

as summary of other aspects of civic action are summarized in Table III-10.

2. U.S. Army Civil Affairs School

Military civic action doctrine and procedures included in the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School (USACAS) curricula are contained in USACAS special text ST 41-10-90.[Ref. 64] Summary data on doctrine and procedures are contained in Table III-11.

L. U.S. Country Team (Figure III-15)

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, requires that all military assistance (including civic action) programs are coordinated with other political and economic considerations by the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission.[Ref. 65] This is accomplished through the "country team" concept which places responsibility for the coordination of all governmental activities under the chief of mission and designates him as the senior U.S. representative in the area.[Ref. 66] The Commander of a U.S. Field Force operating in a foreign country, such as Vietnam, does not come under the direct jurisdiction of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission. He does work closely with him in the furtherance of U.S. policies.

The relationship of the Country team and U.S. advisory elements is discussed in paragraphs E and F above.

M. Findings

1. General

The intent of Congress that the MAP, including U.S. sponsored civic action, be directed toward defeating subversive insurgency appears to be reflected in the implementing directives and doctrine of the various echelons of the defense establishment.

Military civic action planning and implementation are performed within the existing framework of the military establishment. No special organizational structure has been established for this purpose. The normal chain of command from the DOD to field elements is utilized. In this sense military civic action is only one of the many tools a commander has for the performance of his assigned missions. Provisions are included for the coordination of civic actions with other activities.

At the national level civic action is coordinated with the U.S. foreign policy through the structure established for the coordination of all foreign assistance activities. There were no indications that this resulted in over or under emphasis of these programs.

Table III-10

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, 300TH CIVIL AFFAIRS GROUP

OBJECTIVES

Contribute to the social, cultural and economic progress of a country.

Promote the desire of communities to contribute to their own progress.

Strengthen the ties of mutual respect and friendship between the civilian population and the national armed forces.

Assist in reducing discontent among the people, thereby discouraging insurgency and infiltration of extremist ideologies.

DEFINITION

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development which would serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

PRINCIPLES

Civilian self-help is the single most important factor in the development process.

Project selection must reflect as closely as possible the choice of the local people.

The manner of accomplishment is often as important as the completed work.

Civic action operations should not work against the basic mission of the military forces.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Level of interest and enthusiasm of the populace.

Willingness of the populace to directly participate.

Probability of continuance, maintenance, and operation of the project by the populace after completion.

Understanding of the significance of the project and benefits thereof by the populace.

(Continued)

Table III-10 (Continued)

TECHNIQUES

Area survey to gather information relevant to civic action operations and to observe local problems. A broad investigation at many levels to secure general information of any type which may influence future operations.

Project support survey to collect additional information specifically related to project feasibility. A project-by-project field survey to gather detailed information on how each project would be implemented and to establish priorities.

EVALUATION

Evaluation should be continuous during conduct of the project.

Following aspects of civic activities should be evaluated:

- degree to which the immediate technical objectives were achieved.
- degree to which resources were appropriately and efficiently used.
- appropriateness of administration and management.
- degree to which intangible benefits of the project were accomplished.

Table III-11

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, U.S. ARMY CIVIL AFFAIRS SCHOOL
(Special text ST 41-10-90)

OBJECTIVES

Use of the armed forces organizational, technical and professional capability to help the people in social and economic development.

Secure popular support of the legal government.

Assist in the stabilization of society.

Provide progressive economic development.

As part of a counterinsurgency program, prevent or eliminate the causes of insurgency.

DEFINITION

The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local populace at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to social and economic development which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. U.S. Forces may at times advise or engage in military civic action in overseas areas.

PRINCIPLES

The armed forces should work with the people, not for the people.

The people should learn that they can contribute to their own social and economic improvement by working side by side with the military.

Civic action projects should have a direct and current impact.

The civic action program is a host country program. The U.S. renders advise and assistance wherever needed, but the major effort must be indigenous.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Civic action projects must be undertaken in relation to conventional military assignments and based upon priorities calculated to achieve national security objectives.

In determining priorities it must be remembered that the primary threat in most developing nations is rooted in actual or potential unrest.

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


Fig. III-15. Embassy.

2. Service Implementation

a. Army

The U.S. Army conceptualizes military civic action as being imbedded in the internal defense and development activities in a developing nation. A strong social action flavor can be detected in the current U.S. Army doctrine on this subject. Institutional Development, current doctrinal publication on this subject, leans heavily on social science research and theories as reflected in the following footnotes to its summary: [Ref. 67]

> "1. This report has been prepared by an ad hoc work group of Army officers under the supervision of the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Directorate of Doctrine and Systems, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the Army. The group included three field grade officers with advisor experience in both Southeast Asia and Latin America, as well as four company grade officers with advanced degrees in the social sciences. The advanced degrees were in experimental social psychology, engineering psychology, European history, and sociology."
>
> "2. Institutional Development-Developing patterns of cooperation among people. The process of integrating the citizens of a nation into a cohesive social fabric that enables a people to work in concert to achieve social, economic, psychological, and political goals. (Formally referred to as institution building; however, it is believed that institutional development is more descriptive of the Army's mission than is the term institution building."

The social science/sociology flavor is further indicated in the high percentage of references to the behavioral sciences in the text and in the bibliography.

b. Navy

Responsibility for military civic action is fragmented within the Department of the Navy. No central source of information could be found during the research. Responsibility for the development and implementation of civic actions is decentralized to the major commands with only general guidance emanating from the Department itself.

Two distinct Navy program types were uncovered: the use of Seabee teams in the support of the developmental efforts of

other government agencies, and community relations type action carried out under the supervision of the information officer. Indications were that neither of these two programs involved the use of indigenous military forces.

c. Air Force

Military civic action is well defined in the basic Air Force doctrinal publication, AFR 55-7. Military civic action is treated as being distinct from civil affairs. While responsibilities are detailed, they are discharged through the existing command structure. Until recently the Air Force had a dedicated military civic action reporting system. However, the requirement for reports of civic action activities from subordinate commands was eliminated in 1970. There were no indications that the report was used for other than historical purposes.

d. Marine Corps

The Marines view civic action as an integral part of counter-insurgency. Emphasis is on an individual-to-individual basis. Personal response to individuals of a different culture is stressed. The Combined Action Program developed from Vietnam experience is the primary USMC vehicle for the conduct of civic action. While this concept prescribes the use of paramilitary forces working in conjunction with small Marine units, civic action is directed toward enhancing operations rather than socioeconomic development or improving the image of the host country paramilitary forces. Basic to the Marine civic action concept is that local security is a prerequisite to any socio-economic development activities.

The Marine Corps Personal Response program offers potential for use by the other services in training individuals in cross cultural communications.

3. Unified Command Implementation

Based on the limited detail of information available within CONUS, it appears as if the implementing directives of the Unified Commands and the MAAGs and Missions are in consonance with the letter and intent enabling legislation and the DOD instructions governing civic action as a part of the MAP.

4. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Civic actions in Vietnam appear to follow both of the models for military civic actions described in Section II of this report. The directives authorize and encourage the participation of RVNAF in civic actions under U.S. sponsorship and support as well as unilateral efforts of U.S. military units. While the ultimate

objective of civic actions is to reflect maximum credit on the GVN, no guidelines were uncovered which spell out how the unilateral U.S. programs should be conducted to contribute to this end. Most of the unilateral efforts appear to be directed, and properly so, toward the facilitation of U.S. military operations through increased intelligence and cooperation. Perhaps successful elimination of subversive and terrorist activities through the provision of internal security might result in favorable responses to the GVN regardless of nationality of the armed forces accomplishing this. No specific guidance or data on grass-roots projects activities were located in CONUS repositories. The existence of such information is indicated by the MACORDS civic action report requirements.

5. Evaluation

With the exception of the requirement that the MAP be evaluated by the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, State Department, to ascertain if MAP programs are being carried out in consonance with the foreign policy of the United States, no evaluation systems or procedures were discovered. Even the IGFA program appears to be primarily one of watching the purse strings, an approach which was lauded during Congressional hearings.

Evaluation systems are in use in Vietnam for the assessment of the progress of the pacification/Vietnamization program. However, these systems are directed to the overall effort. No provisions are included which permit factoring out the contribution of a specific element such as civic action.

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IV. HOST COUNTRY SYSTEMS

A. General

Outside of Southeast Asia, U.S. sponsored/funded military civic action is performed primarily by host country military forces. The U.S. advisory system's primary responsibility in this area is to offer advice, encouragement, and when appropriate, support to host country civic action efforts. While the data available in CONUS on host country military civic action systems do not permit the drawing of definitive conclusions and findings in this area, some data were found during the research which at least indicate the general nature of civic action in areas outside of Southeast Asia.

B. Latin America

An overall picture of the framework within which Latin American countries perform civic action can be drawn from publications of the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). In 1960 the IADB recommended that the Governments of the American States consider the use of their Armed Forces in civic actions, such as infrastructure development, economic activities, and education programs, in underdeveloped regions. The IADB pronouncement also contained a caveat that such activities should not compete with private civilian activities nor decrease the capability of their Armed Forces to accomplish their primary military mission.[Ref. 1] In 1965 the Council of Delegates approved the resolution and published Document T-255, which was based on information provided by IADB members, as a " . . . first approach to the study of this field of economic-social activities of the armed forces."[Ref. 2] In 1967 after approval of the resolutions, the IADB "deemed it advisable to condense into a single document the purpose, scope and general standards for the various uses of military civic action, . . ."[Ref. 3]

A summary description of military civic action as presented in the IADB publications is in Table IV-1. The information presented in the IADB publication is deliberately made as broad as possible to permit each of the member countries to develop objectives and programs which are in consonance with their national plans and objectives. The IADB also sets the stage for multination regional military civic action programs in the statement:

> "Nevertheless, this does not exclude the accomplishment of collective military civic action, subject to appropriate legal agreements, between countries interested in carrying out this type of activity in their own territory."[Ref. 4]

A general evaluation of civic action programs in Latin America is contained in this excerpt from a DA sponsored study:

Table IV-1

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD

OBJECTIVES

Contribution to the achievement of national objectives in economic, social, and cultural fields, particularly in the developing countries with internal security problems resulting from socioeconomic maladjustments and inequalities.

DEFINITION

Military civic action is a contribution of the armed forces made for the benefit of socioeconomic and cultural development within their countries, without detriment to their specific mission. It can assist in reducing socioeconomic and cultural imbalance, contributing indirectly to the maintenance of internal security.

PRINCIPLES

Armed Forces contribution should be made within context and without impairment of ability to perform primary military missions.

Military civic action should be coordinated among the armed forces and between them and other government and/or private agencies.

No profit should accrue the military from civic action projects.

Participation of the armed forces in socioeconomic and cultural development should not relieve civilian agencies of their responsibilities in these areas.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Absence of other agencies to perform the project.

No requirement for creation of a special armed forces organization.

TECHNIQUES

Promotion, study, investigation, planning, direction, execution, supervision and evaluation of activities in the following areas:

Agriculture
Mapping
Industry
Education and Training
Health, Housing and Community Development
Transportation and Routes of Communication
Telecommunications

(Continued)

Table IV-1 (Continued)

EVALUATION

Evaluation is of fundamental importance.

Qualitative and quantitative evaluation may be accomplished by analysis of the following:

a. Degree to which the established objectives were achieved.

b. Influence on the dynamic development of the nation.

c. Degree of effectiveness of the armed forces means employed.

d. Influence on the training of the armed forces.

e. Influence on public opinion.

"Numerous articles and literary works suggest that the military can contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress. This is the basic hypothesis of the military civic action programs. However, there are no records of specific achievement of any one of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress by the Latin American armed forces through civic action or other programs. Neither is there any evidence that failure of any Latin American nation to achieve any of the objectives of the Alliance for Progress is due primarily to actions of its armed forces. The consensus of opinion is that contributions of the military to the modernization process in Latin America tend to be technological rather than economic or social." [Ref. 5]

C. Colombia

The only Latin American country for which reasonably informative indigenous literature was available is Colombia. A description of the Colombian military civic action system is presented in this paragraph along with subjective comments, gleaned from the literature, concerning the effectiveness of the program. The limited data upon which this description is based do not warrant generalization to other Latin American countries.

Military civic action of the Colombian Armed Forces is cited by Hanning as being effective:

"Colombia is a classical example of a country that has successfully used PUMF [Peaceful use of military forces, Hanning's term for civic action] as an integral part of a counterinsurgency campaign." [Ref. 6]

and by General O'Meara (then Commanding General, USSOUTHCOM) in testimony before the 1964 hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act:

"A considerable measure of the successes achieved against guerrillas this last year must be attributed to civic action. For example, only after the Colombian civic action program convinced the campesinos that the soldiers were their friends and that they meant business in their campaign to protect the campesinos from the bandits did the campesinos start providing the necessary intelligence to make the campaign effective. . ." [Ref. 7]

In testimony on the 1970 appropriations hearing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Military Assistance and Sales, made the following statement concerning the state of insurgency in Colombia:

"Rural guerrilla activity has been at a relatively low level for almost 2 years with only sporadic incidents being reported. The improved counterinsurgency capability of the security forces has been one of the primary reasons for this development. . .

"To reiterate, the insurgents do not represent a serious threat at this time. . ."[Ref. 8]

The following statement on the Colombian civic action program is made in a 1969 CRESS study:

". . .The only empirical research into the consequences of military civic action in Latin America is a study of its influence on the attitudes of rural villagers in Colombia toward the Colombian military. The results of this study show a positive improvement of villager attitudes toward the military and toward the Colombian government. The study did not explore side effects or cost-effectiveness of the program. . ."[Ref. 9]

In the early 1960's CRESS conducted a study on the evaluation of civic action in Colombia, Project "Sympatico". Study results are not available since the Colombian government has not yet approved release of the final report.[Ref. 10]

Information on the Colombian Armed Forces civic action plan is contained in Project "Andes".[Ref. 11] Summary details of this plan are in Table IV-2. The plan appears to be patterned on the U.S. and IADB concepts of military civic action. Of interest is the proposed utilization of unmarried men with at least a high school education in a program similar to the reputedly successful Literacy Corps program in Iran. No information was found in CONUS sources as to the implementation or success of this effort.

D. Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam (PHILCAGV)

Starting with a modest beginning with civilian medical assistance to the Vietnamese people, the Republic of the Philippines now has a Civic Action Group operating in Vietnam. This military group includes engineer construction, medical and rural development teams. PHILCAGV was activated in 1966 and arrived in Vietnam on September of that year. It is currently operating in four provinces.[Ref. 12] Activities of the group are not without criticism. Senator Symington criticized the activity in an article in the New York Times by questioning whether this group consisted of volunteers or mercenaries.[Ref. 13]

Like all other evaluations of civic action uncovered during this research, evaluation of PHILCAGV is subjective in nature. President Nguyen Van Thieu commented on this program:

Table IV-2

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, COLOMBIAN ARMED FORCES

OBJECTIVES

Community development in areas of potential insurgency through actions favorable to the civil population, to preclude subversion, and lead to the defeat of insurgents.

Contribute to the eradication of social and economic tensions and inequalities.

DEFINITION

None specifically stated. However, the nature of the document indicates that the JCS approved definition is accepted.

PRINCIPLES

Coordinated plan for use of all Colombian resources is essential.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Projects and programs should be selected which will reduce ideological conflict, and correct social, political, and economic inequalities.

TECHNIQUES

Stimulation of basic community development projects.

Land distribution programs.

Use of selected young men, minimum high school education, as a special cadre for community development.

EVALUATION

None specified. Evaluation is implied, however, in the quarterly reporting requirements.

Table IV-3

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, PHILIPPINE CIVIC ACTION GROUP, VIETNAM

OBJECTIVES

To undertake civic action and other environmental improvement programs to promote the welfare of the Vietnamese people.

DEFINITION

None specified. The socioeconomic development definition is implied.

PRINCIPLES

Help people of selected hamlets attain a better way of life.

Stress immediate impact projects, both short and long range.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Priority given to high impact projects requiring self-help.

TECHNIQUES

Engineering civic action programs directed toward infrastructure development.

Medical/dental civic action programs designed to contribute to improved health.

Miscellaneous environmental improvement programs to supplement the RVN rural development programs.

PHILCAGV-to-people programs oriented toward winning the hearts and minds of the populace.

EVALUATION

None specified.

"PHILCAGV has greatly contributed to the revolutionary development program of the Republic of Vietnam. Their untiring efforts also helped bring under government control many people previously living under Communist rule and given them confidence in the national cause."[Ref. 14]

Emphasis seems to be placed on statistics covering physical accomplishments rather than changes in attitudes and opinions toward the central government.[Ref. 15]

Summary details of PHILCAGV civic action are in Table IV-3. These data are from the previously cited report. There was no indication as to the interface of PHILCAGV and the Vietnamese Armed Forces. From all indications, PHILCAGV works directly with the civilian population.

E. Findings

Data on the details of host country civic action organization and doctrine are not in sufficient detail to permit generalizations or conclusions. There is, however, an indication that Latin American Armed Forces are closely following the U.S. concepts for civic action organization and operations. As in the case of U.S. organization, formal evaluation procedures and techniques appear to be nonexistent.

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V. TRAINING

A. General

Primary responsibility for the operation of civil affairs training establishments within DOD is placed on the U.S. Army.[Ref. 1] The Army is charged with the responsibility of conducting basic civil affairs training for all United States civil affairs units and personnel. In addition, the Army is responsible for the mobilization, training, and provision of all civil affairs units and personnel required by the unified commands with the exception of U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps units specific to Navy and Marine Corps Operations.

Thus, to the extent that civic action is a subset of civil affairs (see Appendix D), basic responsibility for civic action training is vested in the U.S. Army.

This training responsibility is further delegated to the United States Continental Army Command (CONARC) by Army Regulation 320-5. Military training objectives for civil affairs, as stated in this regulation, include:

> "a. Provide sufficient instruction on the entire spectrum of civil affairs activities (civic action through military government), balanced to emphasize the type of civil affairs training required, to meet the needs of current missions as well as those of projected contingencies."[Ref. 2]

The regulation further states that the United States Army Civil Affairs School (USACAS) provide appropriate courses of instruction in civil affairs for commanders who are responsible for the conduct of civil affairs, and for military personnel who are assigned or selected for assignment to civil affairs staff sections and units. It should be noted that these responsibilities apply for personnel of all the Armed Forces, insofar as civil affairs units are concerned. It does not apply to the training of non-civil affairs individuals and units. Such training remains the responsibility of the individual Services.

In the following paragraphs, the civic action training conducted by the Services is discussed.

B. U.S. Army

1. General

Basic civil affairs and civic action training within the Army is conducted at the USACAS. In implementing AR 320-4, CONARC has added the following additional requirements:

"3e. (Added) Any project or activity of a military unit involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment or designed to influence or control civilian activities and civil organizations can be classified as a civil affairs operation regardless of the location of the activity or the size or type of the participating military unit.

"3f. (Added) Projects or activities of a military unit involving contact with civilians outside the military establishment may be identified by various program titles or names (i.e., Civic Action, Civil Defense, Civil Disturbances, Civil Emergencies, Community Relations, Public Affairs, Public Relations, Domestic Actions, Domestic Emergencies, and Domestic Relations).

"3g. (Added) The scope of civil affairs operations may extend from measures of liaison and coordination with appropriate local civilian agencies to the furnishing of assistance and support to local officials and populations, or even to the temporary assumption of responsibility for the exercise of some or all of the functions of government in the locality in question under the provisions of local, state and/or federal law." [Ref. 3]

CONARC has also placed a requirement that civil affairs training be integrated into all individual and unit training. Minimal requirements for the various categories of instruction are as shown below:[Ref. 4]

"Category	Min Hr of Instr
(1) Definition and scope of civil affairs activities	.2
(2) The individual soldier's role in civil affairs (emphasis on stability operations)	.4
(3) Rules and conventions governing war	.2
(4) Civil affairs capabilities of noncivil affairs units	.2
(5) Organization and functions of civil affairs staffs and units	.4"

2. U.S. Army Civil Affairs School (USACAS)

All of the courses presented at the USACAS, resident and nonresident, are for officers only. Enlisted personnel are not selected to attend any of the formal course offerings. In addition to officers from the U.S. Armed Forces, many foreign officers have taken instruction at USACAS.

The Civic Action Course, a six-weeks course presented four times annually, provides U.S. and foreign officers with the "know how"

for generating military civic action projects.[Ref. 5] The purpose of this course, as expressed in the Program of Instruction (POI) is:

> "To provide commissioned officers, warrant officers, and selected civilians with a working knowledge in planning, developing, programming, administering and expanding, as necessary, military Civic Action programs and activities. MOS for which trained: None."[Ref. 6]

The POI includes the following units of instruction:

Background and basis for civic action	14 hours
Psychological Operations	2
Organizations involved in civic action	17
Cross-cultural communications	15
Civic action project and program development	85
Case studies (Civil Affairs)	42
Case studies (Civic Action)	24
Guest speakers	4
Course tour	12

Examination of the POI indicates that the course is heavily slanted toward the technical aspects of civic action projects. The 85-hour unit on project and program development is almost entirely devoted to technical aspects of such diverse subjects as public finance and public communications. This portion of the course appears to be structured around the civil affairs functional organization.

Civic action concepts are also covered in the other resident courses presented by USACAS.

USACAS also prepares inputs to training of enlisted personnel in the form of common subject packets. These packets are used in unit training, individual training at U.S. Army Training Centers, and in specialist courses at the various service schools. Identified under the common title USACAS Improvement of Civil Affairs Capability (Imp CA ___), they are primarily concerned with civil affairs training. One of the packets, Imp CA 12, is specifically devoted to the utilization of MOS skills in civic action in stability operations. Imp CA 12 is designed for common subject instruction in enlisted courses fed directly from basic training.[Ref. 7]

The USACAS will move to Fort Bragg, N. C. and become part of the USAIMA by the end of 1971, thereby placing in one location under centralized control all U.S. Army schooling activities concerned with the MAP and internal defense and development.

3. U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance (USAIMA)

At the USAIMA, civic action instruction is presented by the Military Advisory School. Specific civic action instruction is

indicated below for each of the courses conducted by this element of the USAIMA:[Ref. 8]

Military Assistance Officer Command and Staff Course (MAOP)	5 hours
Military Assistance Program Advisor Course (MAPA)	2 hours
Military Assistance Training Advisor Course (MATA)	2 hours.

The Military Advisory School also presents the two-hour civic action block of instruction to classes at the Psychological Operations School and the Special Forces School. In addition to the civic action instruction, the MAOP, MATA, and MAPA courses include instruction into which civic action is integrated. This seems to reflect the philosophy of the USAIMA as it pertains to civic action. Civic action is considered to be a tool which must be applied along with other programs in internal development operations. One of the senior instructors indicated that civic action must be taught as a tool of the military advisory system. It must not be considered as an end in itself but rather as a means for internal development.

The programs at the Military Advisory School, USAIMA, are oriented heavily toward Vietnam. During 1970 approximately 5000 U.S. and Allied student officers passed through the school; of these, more than 4000 were assigned to Vietnam upon graduation.

Instruction is kept up-to-date by a variety of methods including:

- Faculty-advisor communications with students during and after the course.
- Overseas returnee debriefings.
- Contact with the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
- Operations Reports and Lessons Learned.
- Guest speakers.
- Senior officer debriefings.
- Army Operations Center briefings.
- USAIMA visits to Vietnam.
- Visits by ARVN liaison officers.
- Faculty experience in Vietnam.

Of particular interest were discussions with recent Vietnam returnees who had been assigned to the USAIMA faculty. One of them [Ref. 9] mentioned the Mobile Assistance Team Program recently instituted in Vietnam. These teams are unilateral U.S. efforts consisting of approximately 5 military personnel who work with the local People's Self-Defense Forces in providing village and hamlet security and development. The concept is quite similar to the Marine Corps Combined Action Program. No mention of the Army program could be found in the CONUS literature.

The USAIMA participates in an annual field training exercise, "Gobbler Woods," conducted by the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. As a part of this exercise, Civil Affairs units are deployed to Anson County, N. C., and are given an opportunity to

apply their skills and techniques in a situation which resembles internal defense and development operations in a developing nation. While these operations have a definite civil affairs flavor they do provide a potential field laboratory for the testing of civic action techniques and procedures.

4. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC)

At the USACGSC, minimal civic action coverage is included in the subcourse, Command and Staff-Army in the Field.[Ref. 10] Since the emphasis on this unit of instruction is on staff organization and functioning, civic action is mentioned only as a responsibility of the G-5. No specifics as to techniques, principles, selection criteria, or evaluation are included. Civic action is treated as a tool of institution building, ". . . his [the G-5] emphasis may range from such undertakings as civic action projects and institution-building programs. . ."[Ref. 11] and stability operations, "Civic action, providing support to public facilities as an example, can be a major contributing factor in the accomplishment of the mission of defeating irregular forces."[Ref. 12]

5. U.S. Army War College (USAWC)

At the USAWC, civic action is included in broad terms only in Internal Defense and Development Operations.[Ref. 13] No mention is made of civic action in the course directive [Ref. 14]; it is mentioned, however, in selected background material provided with the course.

C. U.S. Navy

With the exception of the U.S. Naval War College, no training materials were uncovered on U.S. Navy training in civic action. The Naval War College information stressed the command and staff aspects as is fitting for the level on instruction at any of the senior Service Schools. Civic action coverage is included in the Counterinsurgency Correspondence Course.[Ref. 15] As reflected in the purpose of this course, emphasis is on the big picture of counterinsurgency:

> "The purpose of this course is to prepare senior and middle grade officers, including comparable civilian grade students, for command, staff, country team, and departmental positions of responsibility which involve planning, coordinating and implementing of counterinsurgency programs. The course is designed to acquaint the student with the nature of contemporary insurgency, its relationship to the interests of the United States, and the means available for preventing or combating insurgencies inimical to such interests."[Ref. 16]

Civic action is covered as an element of counterinsurgency operations. No details are presented concerning the description of civic action techniques, procedures, selection criteria, principles or evaluation.

D. U.S. Air Force

1. USAF Special Operations School

Within the USAF, responsibility for counterinsurgency instruction is vested in the USAF Special Operations School at Hullburt Field, Florida. No courses are specifically dedicated to civic action.[Refs. 17, 18] The 1966 POCADOT study [Ref. 19] recommended that a training program be established at the Special Operations School to provide officer personnel trained in psychological and civic action operations. This course was initiated but later discontinued due to the small demand for graduates. USAF requirements for trained psychological and civic action personnel are being satisfied by assigning officers to the Psychological Operations School at Fort Bragg and the Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon.[Ref. 20]

Civic action is covered in two of the course offerings, Counter-insurgency Course (COIN), and the Special Air Operations/Military Assistance Program (SAO/MAP). Graduates are qualified for special operations and military advisory assignments program. Two hours of instruction, oriented toward Vietnam, are presented in COIN and five hours, non-geographical orientation, in SAO/MAP. Eight hours of culture oriented subjects are included in COIN; seven in SAO/MAP. This instruction should contribute to the students' understanding of the problems involved in civic action. Civic action is also integrated into other units of instruction.[Ref. 18] Basic philosophy is that civic action is an integral part of the PSYOPS program which is in turn a basic element of counterinsurgency.[Ref. 20]

2. Air University

No direct instruction on military civic action is provided in the Air University Professional Military Education Schools.[Ref. 21] Instruction which could contribute to an understanding of civic action is provided. Seven hours of counterinsurgency instruction are included in the Squadron Officer curriculum, and fifty hours in the Air Command and Staff curriculum. In addition, 30 hours of human dynamics and 56 hours of Command and Leadership are included in the curricula for these two programs respectively. The subject matter appears to be oriented more toward U.S. culture than foreign cultures. As such, it may not be directly applicable to civic action.[Refs. 22,23]

E. U.S. Marine Corps

1. U.S. Marine Corps Institute (MCI)

The Marine Corps Institute offers a correspondence course on civic action to officers and enlisted men. This is the only course found which is offered to enlisted personnel. A manual, prepared for use with the MCI course, presents an excellent description of civic action as seen by the Marine Corps. Heavy emphasis is placed on the

personal response aspects and the combined action program. Like almost all of the other civic action literature, the manual adequately covers the "what" but does not present much in the way of the "how" at the grass roots level.[Ref. 24]

2. U.S. Marine Corps Development and Education Command

In response to a request for information as to current policy and doctrine on civic action, the Marine Corps Development and Education Command provided three documents as being helpful regarding military civic action, objectives, techniques, and program effectiveness. [Ref. 25] FMFM 3-1 Command and Staff Action outlines the Marine Corps staff organization, responsibilities of staff officers, and staff procedures. Civic action is mentioned under civic affairs planning in broad, general terms. The other documents present a historical summary of Marine Corps activities and duplicate information presented elsewhere in this report. It may be inferred that civic action is integrated in other units of instruction.

3. Personal Response Training

The Marine Corps placed heavy emphasis on what is termed "Personal Response." While not directed specifically at civic action, this program is designed to improve the cross-cultural communications ability of Marines being assigned to Southeast Asia. As such, this program contributes to any interaction, including civic action, with a foreign culture. Since 1968, corporals and below have been receiving four hours of instruction in personal response as part of predeployment training at Camp Pendleton. Sergeants and above, including officers, receive a one-hour presentation on the concepts and objectives of the project. A 6-hour core package has been developed and used at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and other programs at the Marine Corps Development and Education Command at Quantico.[Ref. 26] The perceived success of this program is evidenced in the present Marine Corps project to expand Personal Response into a culture non-specific program.[Ref. 27] (This project is discussed in Section III of this report.)

F. Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)

The curriculum for the Resident School of ICAF, while including some discussion on civic action, does not address this subject in its entirety. [Ref. 28]

Civic action is also included in the material presented by the ICAF Correspondence School course, "The Economics of National Security." Data on civic action are included in the correspondence text, Collective Defense and Foreign Assistance. Civic action is considered an element of the MAP. No details are provided as to grass roots procedures and techniques.

G. Armed Forces Staff College

At the Armed Forces Staff College civic action instruction is subsumed in a unit on civil affairs. Study Directive 612ASB, covering this instruction, lists one of the desired learning outcomes to be, "Know the authority and responsibility of a commander to conduct civil affairs/civic action in various conditions of conflict."[Ref. 29] Beyond this, civic action is not mentioned again in the instructional material. Frequent reference is made, however, to social and economic projects and programs. The instructional unit stresses classical civil affairs operations in which the U.S. efforts are directed toward the re-establishment of civilian control in an area beset by strife.

H. Training Teams

In addition to receiving training at CONUS schools, host country military are also training through the use of Mobile Training Teams. These teams are composed of personnel drawn from CONUS and overseas resources, and sent to the recipient country on a temporary basis. Their purpose is to provide the country with a self-training capability in an operational skill. Emphasis is on training the host country military instructors to pass on the skills to other members of their Armed Forces. These teams are normally funded under the MAP and are requested by the MAAG/Mission through military channels.[Ref. 30]

The scope of operations of these teams can be obtained from the following USSOUTHCOM description of basic types of civic action personnel deployed to recipient countries in Latin America:[Ref. 31]

> "1. Mobile Training Team (MTT) This consists of one or more personnel sent on temporary duty to give instruction. The mission of the team is to provide the military service of the host country with its own training capability in a particular skill by training instructor personnel.
>
> "2. Technical Assistance Team (TAT). This type of team provides for supply, installation operation, and maintenance assistance of equipment donated by the US to specific host country units.
>
> "3. Joint US Army/AID Teams (JUSA/AID). Supports all programs of the Agency for International Development."

The JUSA/AID Teams appear to be a USSOUTHCOM arrangement for civic action training in Latin America. An indication of the success of training teams in Latin America can be found in this excerpt from the summary of the document cited above:

> "Uncooperative host country military personnel is an infrequent but occasionally irritating problem. Since TAT and MTT members serve in an advisory capacity, they act at the pleasure of the local military authorities. Some officers

display resentment toward the advisors, although the government policy is to establish friendly rapport. Cases of recommendations that were disregarded by inefficient, disinterested, or resentful individuals can be found in some after action reports. Fortunately, these examples are isolated."[Ref. 32]

The role of the MTT sometimes extends beyond the training of indigenous military to the U.S. advisory system as well. An example can be found in the MTT which was sent to Liberia in 1969. In addition to preparing a civic action program for the Liberian Armed Forces, the MTT also prepared the documents governing the U.S. Military Mission role in advising the recipient country on civic action. This team, consisting of two officers, trained thirteen Liberian officers in a three-month period.[Ref. 33]

The organization of a MTT is described as follows:[Ref. 34]

"1. Organization - Military civic action mobile training teams will normally consist of from one to four people. In some cases more than four may be justified. The teams may be composed of military officers or enlisted personnel or civilians from any of the services, or civilians from any governmental agency. One officer, usually the senior military person or civilian, will be designated as chief of the team and furnish team leadership. The team chief will be responsible for seeing that proper procedures are followed, necessary contacts are made, reports are prepared and forwarded, and that the team functions as a unit. The composition of the team is determined by the needs of the area requesting the team. Normally one or more persons having training, knowledge or experience in the following fields will make up the team:

a. Governmental Affairs - (Economic/Political Affairs)
b. Civil Affairs
c. Engineering
d. Medical and/or Public Health
e. Sanitation
f. Psychological Warfare
g. Agriculture
h. Education
i. Public Relations"

Operational Guidelines for the MTT are listed as:[Ref. 35]

"1. Every effort should be made to make the basic ideas which the team wants to teach appear locally generated. . .

"2. Care should be taken not to recommend launching large scale projects which are not within the local capability to perform. . .

"3. Extreme care must be exercised never to offend by belittling or disparaging the backwardness or lack of ability of the local people. . .

"4. If the team members enter into the phase of working with the local military forces they should be prepared if necessary to toil with and not simply direct or advise the local military on civic action projects.

"5. Members of the team should be good listeners. The team, in spite of its specialty, should not assume the position of 'experts' in the field.

"6. Work through channels. The team should be careful to use proper channels to accomplish its projects and not present the picture of a special unit which answers only to headquarters.

"7. Start slowly. The team should spend enough time in surveying the situation to be able to make a well thought out proposal.

"8. The team should constantly keep in mind the requirement and make every effort to gain the support of the local personnel who should and must accomplish any project.

"9. Pride of 'Authorship' - The team should know when to step out of the act. The local people, once set on course and doing a reasonable job, should be encouraged to 'go it alone.' A major step forward would be noted at the time the local military unit pridefully comes to you to show what it has done 'on its own,' without team assistance.

"10. The team should be alert to exploit useful ideas which may generate from a project in the field, e.g., solution of a road drainage problem."

I. Personnel

1. General

None of the U.S. Armed Forces have a specific military occupational specialty (MOS) for military civic action. None of the training described above is designed to train for a civic action MOS. The Air Force does, however, assign a suffix to an officer's Air Force Specialty Code upon completion of prescribed military civic action training. This suffix indicates that the officer is civic action qualified.[Ref. 36]

Prior to 1969 certain positions in MAAGs, Missions, and MILGRPs were designated as civic action positions by Army Regulations 614-234 [Ref. 37]. Upon implementation of the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP), the AR was superseded and the requirements for civic action positions within the military advisory system eliminated. The current regulation governing MAOP designates key military advisory positions to be filled by MAOP trained officers. These positions, in general, are one or two levels higher than those previously designated as requiring civic action qualified personnel.[Ref. 38]

This change in the regulations apparently has not influenced the assignment of civic action trained officers in the military advisory system. As of 8 December 1970 all of the MILGRPs in Latin America, except Nicaragua, had officer personnel from all four Services assigned specific civic action duties.[Ref. 39] The importance attached to such assignments is evidenced in the following excerpt from the non-concurrence of a Mission Chief on the recommendation that civic action positions within his MILGRP be eliminated:

> ". . . The position of the Civic Action Officer would be the last position I would voluntarily relinquish. Even should the Mil Group disappear I would urge including such a position to the Military Attache."[Ref. 40]

2. Personnel Selection Procedures

No formal prescribed procedures for the selection of officer personnel for military civic action assignments were uncovered during the research. Assignment of officers to meet civic action requirements is accomplished through the existing personnel requisitioning structure.

3. Suggested Qualifications

Since officers assigned to civic action duties must deal with indigenous personnel, military and civilian, a discussion of the literature regarding the selection of military personnel for foreign service may provide some guidelines.

Lansdale, through a survey of Allied Officers and NCOs, developed the following criteria for personal success in U.S. Military Missions: [Ref. 41]

- Professional Competence
- Language Skills
- Empathy
- Accessibility
- Directness
- Enthusiasm
- Adaptability
- Humor and Temper

While not specifically stated by Lansdale, the criteria listed are underlain by a requirement for competence in cross-cultural communications. A similar observation can be made in analyzing the "27 Articles" developed by Lawrence for advising the Arabs during World War I. [Ref. 42]

In a study of planned change, Niehoff hypothesizes that the role characteristics of a change agent, i.e. civic action officer, are of secondary importance in comparison to innovation techniques.

According to Niehoff, role characteristics primarily influence the initial reaction but later reactions will be much more greatly influenced by specific innovation strategies and the perception of advantages of the proposed innovations by the target clientele.[Ref. 43]

A 1969 CRESS study of the U.S. military advisory system in Korea stated, ". . . the ability to have a reasonably accurate understanding of a foreign population's views is important." The study further related the ability to perceive Korean opinions to officers' military and general backgrounds, their attitudes, and their interactions with Koreans.[Ref. 44] Again the requirement for cross-cultural communications ability is evident.

The importance of a cross-cultural awareness is also recognized by the U.S. Marine Corps in the Personal Response program (Section III and paragraph E.3. supra), and by the U.S. Air Force. In a 1967 study the U.S. Air Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories field tested a self-confrontation technique for cross-cultural interaction skill training.[Ref. 45] The technique was developed for use at the first course in Psychological Operations and Civic Action in Counter-insurgency at the Special Air Warfare School (see paragraph D supra). The techniques involved a role-play situation with an Iranian "Air Force Major." Following the interaction, participants reviewed their performance by a videotape replay and were critiqued by the instructor. Following this, the students replayed their roles. Results indicated improved performance.

4. Personnel Participation

There has been a reluctance on the part of career military officers to participate in and to actively seek assignments in the military advisory system, in which civic action is accomplished. Barber and Ronning highlight this fact:

> "There is reason to believe that departure from the normal peacetime cycle of assignments of army officers from school to command-of-troops to staff duty to school has been considered by many officers as a definite threat to their professional careers and their promotion opportunities. (This is less applicable to Corps of Engineers officers.) Accordingly, service in MAAG's or on civic-action assignments was to be avoided. When the orders came anyway, the tour of duty might be something less than full of enthusiasm, imagination, and accomplishment."[Ref. 46]

This problem has been recognized and steps taken to remedy the situation. In an address at the Foreign Service Institute in May 1970, Secretary Resor outlined a program designed to enhance the attractiveness of the District Advisory Program for Vietnam. In addition to special incentives, service in a senior advisory capacity is to be equated with command of a United States unit in combat. At least

one former advisor would be designated as a member of all field grade officer promotion boards. The importance of advisory functions would be emphasized in efficiency reports.[Ref. 47] Pending publication of an Army Regulation, command equivalent positions have been outlined in Department of the Army Circular 624-97. A question logically arises as to the weight given by a promotion board to advisor assignments. An analysis of the Army Brigadier General promotion list published in May 1970 indicates that four of the 82 officers selected for promotion had completed assignments in Vietnam with primary duty in an advisory capacity.[Ref. 48]

As will be discussed in Section VI, following, there is no formal dedicated civic action evaluation system. As a result, the impact of current civic action personnel selection procedures cannot be evaluated in terms of contributing to the success or failure of U.S. sponsored civic actions. If one were to judge by the numerous subjective evaluations of the success of military civic action programs, it appears that the personnel procedures are not detracting from the program effectiveness.

J. Findings

The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide a formal resident program of instruction in military civic action. A five-week course is presented by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School for U.S. and foreign military officers. No resident programs of instruction are offered at any of the service schools for enlisted personnel.

The only formal program of instruction for enlisted personnel is a correspondence course, Civic Action, offered by the Marine Corps Institute.

Civic action coverage becomes broader and more general as one moves up in the hierarchy of Service Schools. At the higher levels, emphasis is on the command and staff aspects of civic action as a civil affairs function.

Training related to civic action is provided enlisted Marine Corps personnel as part of the USMC Personal Response program.

Mobile Training Teams are an economical means for on-site training of host country military personnel.

No special selection procedures are utilized for personnel assigned to positions requiring civic action duties. There is no evidence that such personnel procedures are detracting from success of U.S. sponsored civic actions.

Action is being taken by the U.S. Army to enhance assignments in the military advisory system.

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VI. FIELD EXPERIENCE

A. General

In this section data from after-action and situation reports are analyzed to describe military civic action that is being carried out in the field.

B. Field Experience

1. Armed Services Experience 1962-1969

Six hundred after-action reports, involving 1028 projects, covering the military civic action activities of the U.S. Armed Forces were reviewed. The experiences represent three general situations, U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam during 1968-1969, U.S. Navy Seabee experiences in 1959-1968, and Southern Command experience in 1965. The documents reviewed do not represent the total world of after-action reports. For example, the Southern Command experience includes only that for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia. However, a pattern emerged from the review of the sample which indicates its applicability to the program as a whole. It is highly unlikely that a total review would materially change the profile generated by the sample. These data are summarized in Table VI-1. Details by service and geographic area are shown in Tables VI-2 and VI-3.

No data were uncovered concerning military civic action projects in the Middle East. Only four were found for Africa; all unilateral civic action by Seabee teams. These are not included in the tabulated data.

Analysis of the data in Tables VI-1 and VI-2 indicates that while subjective results are reported on the average of 59.3% of the cases studied (range 45.2 to 70.3), indications of success or failure are reported so infrequently (less than 6.0%) that the reports have little or no value in evaluating the success or failure of military civic action projects. It can be inferred from these data that there is no dedicated military civic action evaluation system. This conclusion is consistent with the lack of any definitive information on evaluative procedures in the doctrinal literature.

By far the majority of projects, world wide, entail unilateral participation of the U.S. Armed Forces (average of 72.1%). This indicates that the majority of U.S. sponsored military civic action fall into the model Type II as described in Section II. A better description results, however, by analysis of the different geographic areas, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

In Latin America a majority of the projects, 88.2%, involved only host country or joint U.S./host country military participation. A review of the basic documents from which the Latin America experience was extracted indicates that almost all of the U.S. participation

Table VI-1

MILTARY CIVIC ACTION EXPERIENCE
U.S. ARMED FORCES
1962-1969
SUMMARY TABLE

	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
Number of Projects Reviewed	279	405	344	1028
	(All figures below expressed as %)			
MILITARY PARTICIPATION				
Only U.S. Military	64.9	92.1	54.4	72.1
Only Host Country Military	8.6	4.4	23.5	12.0
Joint U.S./Host Country	26.5	3.5	22.1	15.9
CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION				
Indicated	38.3	49.9	65.4	52.3
Not Indicated	61.7	50.1	34.6	47.7
RESULTS REPORTED *				
Qualitative	46.4	67.9	56.1	59.2
Quantitative	59.5	33.1	47.4	44.0
Success Indicated	2.7	0.5	9.3	3.8
Failure Indicated	1.0	-	-	0.1
Corrective Action Indicated	0.5	-	0.6	0.1
Basis for Evaluation Indicated	2.2	-	-	0.4

* Totals exceed 100% since sub-items are not mutually exclusive.

Table VI-2

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION EXPERIENCE, 1962-1969, BY SERVICE AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA
Southeast Asia(SEA), Latin America(LA)

	ARMY			NAVY			AIR FORCE			ALL SERVICES		
	SEA	LA	World Wide	SEA	LA	World Wide	SEA	LA	World Wide	SEA	LA	World Wide
Number of Projects Reviewed	183	96	279	368	37	405	291	53	344	842	186	1028
	(All figures below expressed as %)											
MILITARY PARTICIPATION												
Only U.S. Military	94.5	8.3	64.9	97.8	35.1	92.1	63.9	1.9	54.5	85.4	11.8	72.1
Only Host Country Military	5.5	25.0	8.6	1.1	37.8	4.4	13.7	77.4	23.5	5.2	42.5	12.0
Joint U.S./Host Country	0.0	66.7	26.5	1.1	27.1	3.5	22.4	20.7	22.1	9.4	45.7	15.9
CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION												
Indicated	38.3	44.8	40.5	49.2	51.4	49.4	69.1	45.2	65.4	53.7	46.2	52.3
Not Indicated	61.7	55.2	59.5	50.8	48.6	50.6	30.9	54.8	34.6	46.3	53.8	47.7
RESULTS REPORTED*												
Qualitative	46.4	58.3	50.5	67.7	70.3	67.9	58.1	45.2	56.1	59.7	57.0	59.2
Quantitative	59.5	47.9	55.6	33.7	27.0	33.1	45.0	60.4	47.4	43.2	47.3	44.0
Success Indicated	2.7	-	1.8	-	5.4	0.5	8.9	11.3	9.3	3.7	4.3	3.8
Failure Indicated	1.0	-	0.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1
Corrective Action Indicated	0.5	-	0.4	-	-	-	-	3.8	0.6	0.1	-	0.1
Basis for Evaluation Indicated	2.2	-	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.8	-	0.4

* Totals exceed 100% since sub-items are not mutually exclusive.

Table VI-3

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION EXPERIENCE, 1962-1969, BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA AND SERVICE
Southeast Asia(SEA), Latin America(LA)

	LATIN AMERICA				SOUTHEAST ASIA				TOTAL			
	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Total
Number of Projects Reviewed	96	37	53	186	183	368	291	845	279	405	344	1028
	(All figures below expressed as %)											
MILITARY PARTICIPATION												
Only U.S. Military	8.3	35.1	1.9	11.8	94.5	97.8	63.9	85.3	64.9	92.1	54.4	72.1
Only Host Country Military	25.0	37.8	77.4	42.5	5.5	1.1	13.7	5.3	8.6	4.4	23.5	12.0
Joint U.S./Host Country	66.7	27.1	70.7	45.7	0.0	1.1	22.4	9.4	26.5	3.5	22.1	15.9
CIVILIAN PARTICIPATION												
Indicated	44.8	51.4	45.2	46.2	38.3	49.2	69.1	53.7	40.5	49.9	65.4	52.3
Not Indicated	55.2	48.6	54.8	53.8	61.7	50.8	30.9	46.3	59.5	50.6	34.6	44.7
RESULTS REPORTED*												
Qualitative	58.3	70.3	45.2	57.0	46.4	67.7	58.1	59.7	50.5	67.9	56.1	39.2
Quantitative	47.9	27.0	60.4	47.3	59.5	33.7	45.0	43.2	55.6	33.1	47.4	44.0
Success Indicated	-	5.4	11.3	4.3	2.7	-	8.9	3.7	1.8	6.5	9.3	3.8
Failure Indicated	-	-	-	0.0	1.0	-	-	0.1	0.7	-	-	0.1
Corrective Action Indicated	-	-	3.8	1.1	0.5	-	-	0.1	0.4	-	0.6	0.1
Basis for Evaluation Indicated	-	-	-	-	2.2	-	-	0.5	1.4	-	-	0.4

* Totals exceed 100% since sub-items are not mutually exclusive.

involved advice and assistance from the MAAGs, Mil Groups, and Civic Action Mobile Training Teams. Military civic action experience in Latin America can be considered to be falling predominantly into the Type I model. This is consistent with the funding history of military civic action in Latin America in which average annual U.S. funding in this area has fallen from a high of over 9 million dollars in 1962-1966 to a programmed funding of slightly over half a million dollars in 1970.

Quantitative results, as used in the reports reviews, indicate some material accomplishment such as kilometers of road built, number of patients seen, etc. Qualitative results indicate some statement as to impact of the program. Almost all of the latter, however, are subjective; to cite a few:

"Evaluation of success: The overall Seventh Air Force Civic Action Program has been a highly successful operation. This is based on the following:

"a. Program objectives are being realized within resources available, consistent with the aspirations, desires and absorptive ability of the local populace.

"b. There are no insurmountable problems. This was evidenced in the recent support of the GVN Tet recovery effort.

"c. The continued increase of the self help labor, VNAF and ARVN participation and overall improvement and cooperation among USAF, GVN, CORDS, village and hamlet chiefs and the local population is evidenced throughout this report."[Ref. 1]

"The opinion of the staff and official of the Udorn Thani Trade School was that the program, of only two months duration, was a greater value than six months of formal schooling." (Referring to a Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force Summer Hire Program)[Ref. 2]

"An attempted self-help marketplace construction project at Cao Tram, a Viet Cong infested area, failed most likely because of threats and pressures on the villagers by the enemy."[Ref. 3]

"Their Civic Action program is gaining tremendous local support, especially after the completion of the Trang Sup market-place. The local villagers are enthusiastic about the CA team and are offering a variety of ideas for social and economic improvement."[Ref. 4]

"During the past three months, vegetable seeds were distributed to the hamlets in Phuoc Binh District. The seeds have matured into plants and the plants are doing fine. The significance of the project is that the people have shown a great interest in improving and supplementing their diet. The people have taken great pride in their gardens and they are in fine shape. Within the next few months the vegetables will be ready for harvest and should be on their dinner tables."[Ref. 5]

"The people of Pach Kien seem to be 100% behind the battalion civic action programs and more important are undertaking several projects on their own volition."[Ref. 6]

These comments, culled from over 1000 reports, are considered to be the most objective of those encountered. The majority of the reports contained primarily accounting type data such as number of patients seen. This is understandable since, with the exception of the Air Force reports, there was no dedicated civic action reporting system. Civic action is covered as a part of periodic after-action reports. As such the quality of the civic action information suffered from aggregation. No details were found in any of the reports, including Air Force, concerning the actual procedures and techniques utilized in the initiation, conduct, and evaluation of military civic action projects. As a result much valuable information relative to the procedures and techniques of bridging the cultural gap between U.S. Armed Forces and the indigenous elements rests only in the memories of the individuals who participated in the program at the grass-roots level.

2. Armed Service Experience 1970

Data on more recent experience of the U.S. Armed Forces are available from monthly reports prepared by the 2nd Civil Affairs Company in Vietnam. During the reporting periods the 2nd Civil Affairs Company operated under the control of the II Field Force, Vietnam in Military Regions 3 and 4. The Company provided civil affairs support to all Free World Military Forces in the area. Army, Air Force and Seabee units were utilized in the performance of this mission.[Ref. 7,8] Data from these documents are summarized in Table VI-4. The data show a relative consistency between the two reporting periods.

The reports of the 2nd Civil Affairs Company cover all civil affairs activities in their area of operation. In most cases their efforts can be considered to be in the military civic action category. While the basic directive for the 2nd CA Company is not available in CONUS, one for the 29th Civil Affairs Company, which operates in the I Corps Tactical Zone is available.[Ref. 9] The mission of the 29th CA Company is stated as:

". . . to provide civil affairs support to the Commanding General XXIV Corps. The company functions in close coordination and in support of Region I DEPCORDS and under the staff supervision of the Assistant Chief of Staff G5. To add increased support to the pacification and of the development effort, platoons or detachments of the 29th Civil Affairs Company are placed in support of each province advisory team and each tactical division and separate brigade in ICTZ.

* * *

Table VI-4

SUMMARY MILITARY CIVIC ACTION EXPERIENCE
2d CIVIL AFFAIRS COMPANY, MAY AND OCTOBER 1970
MILITARY REGIONS 3 AND 4, II FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM

	% Initiated By		% Managed By		% Participation By*	
	1 May 1970	Oct. 1970	May 1970	Oct. 1970	May 1970**	Oct. 1970
U. S. Agencies (Military and Civilian)	42.6	44.3	48.8	58.4	81.4	84.4
RVN Agencies (Military and Civilian)	57.4	55.4	50.7	41.0	17.8	13.9
Republic of Korea Agencies (Military)		0.3	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.7

*Military Agencies only.

**Total Projects - May-215, Oct.-305.

Source: Periodic Civil Affairs Report. Hq. 2d Civil Affairs Co. 1 May - 31 May, 1970 and 1 October - 31 October 1970.

"Civil affairs functional teams are employed at company headquarters level with the primary mission of providing professional and technical advice and assistance to civil affairs platoons. Functional teams also have an additional mission of supporting the Region I DEPCORDS in the development and execution of plans and programs for the pacification and development of ICTZ."

Operational procedures include encouraging, assisting, and advising ARVN forces in planning, coordinating, and executing military civic action projects. Specific activities include:

"(5) Assist in the coordination and monitoring of military civic action projects to assure they are consistent with and support provincial pacification and development programs. In this connection:

"(a) A project is not to be undertaken if it preempts the GVN by providing a service or facility which it is the function of the GVN (at any level) to provide. If such a project were undertaken it would divert popular respect and gratitude from GVN to the U.S., encourage the GVN to postpone addressing its responsibilities, and possibly complicate or distort plans the GVN may already have for the eventual provision of the service or facility at a tempo geared to its capabilities.

"(b) A project is not to be undertaken if its completion, staffing or recurrent maintenance is not reasonably assured.

"(c) Civic action projects will not be undertaken under any circumstances unless prior approval has been obtained from the province senior advisor and/or the project appears on an approved province civic action project priority list.

"(d) No project is to be undertaken as an exclusively American effort. Every avenue is to be explored to get GVN officials or RVNAF units involved, preferably as the most visible component of the effort. The emphasis is to be on training and motivating GVN civil and military officials to respond to popular aspirations, rather than on merely getting the job done. An improved relationship between RVNAF and the people at large can contribute greatly to U.S. objectives in Vietnam."

The Company also works closely with the MACCORDS Provincial Advisory Teams to improve conditions in refugee camps by assisting in the planning and implementation of programs which include, in addition to security and defense, such civic action activities as:

"2. Agricultural development through land clearing and reclamation, construction of irrigation systems, introduction of improved methods of farming, extension of agricultural and veterinarian technical services assistance, procurement of tractors and farm animals, crop diversification, and marketing of farm products.

"3. Development of small scale economic endeavors, such as cottage industries and handicrafts.

"4. Community centers, schools, health facilities, roads and other facilities and activities of benefit to the people."

3. Comparison of 1962-1969, and 1970 Experience

Table VI-5 compares the experience of U.S. Armed Forces as reported in the 1970 experience in Vietnam, and the 1962-1969 experience in Vietnam as derived from after action and situation reports for that period. The latter data are aggregated in the data previously presented in Table VI-1.

Table VI-5

COMPARISON OF U.S. ARMED FORCES MILITARY CIVIC ACTION EXPERIENCE IN VIETNAM
(Based on sampling of after-action and situation reports)

	1962-1969	1970
Participation by U.S. Military Only	85.3%	83.1%
Participation by RVN Military Only	5.3%	15.6%
Joint U.S. RVN Participation	9.4%	
Third Country Participation Only		1.3%

There seems to be a trend towards increasing participation of RVN military units in civic action programs. One of the objectives of the U.S. elements in Vietnam has been to encourage RVN military participation in such projects. While the data in Table VI-5 are based on different types of reports, there seems to be an indication of progress in obtaining an increased RVN participation in military civic action.

4. Analysis of Reported Experience

a) Based on reports of 1028 military civic action projects covering U.S. experience in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Army, Navy and Air Force experience) the following dimensions can be drawn from U.S. involvement:

- The majority (72.1%) of U.S. funded projects involve unilateral efforts of the U.S. Armed Forces.

- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (88.2%) involved the host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (85.3%) involved only the U.S. Armed Forces.
- Reported participation of indigenous civilians does not appear to vary with geographical area; 52.3% world wide, 46.2% in Latin America, and 53.7% in Southeast Asia.
- Success or failure of individual projects is indicated in less than 4% of the reports.
- Qualitative results of the projects are reported in 59.2% of the case studies; quantitative in 44.0%. In general qualitative results are subjective in nature.
- Corrective actions resulting from lessons learned on individual projects are indicated in less than 1% of the reports.

b) U.S. Army participation is characterized by:

- Unilateral involvement in 64.9% of the reported projects.
- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (91.7%) involved the host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (94.5%) involved only U.S. Army units.
- Reported participation by indigenous civilians does not appear to vary with geographic area; 38.3% in Southeast Asia, 44.8% in Latin America.
- Success or failure of individual projects is indicated in less than 2% of the reports.
- Qualitative results of the projects are reported in 50.5% of the case studies; quantitative in 55.6%. In general qualitative results are subjective in nature.
- Corrective actions resulting from lessons learned on individual projects are indicated in less than 2% of the reports.

c) U.S. Navy participation is characterized by:

- Unilateral involvement in 92.1% of the reported projects.
- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (72.9%) involved host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (97.8%) involved only U.S. Navy units.
- Reported participation by indigenous civilians does not seem to vary with geographical location; 49.2% in Southeast Asia, 51.4% in Latin America.
- Success or failure of individual projects is indicated in less than 1% of the reports.
- Qualitative results of the projects are reported in 67.9% of the cases studied, quantitative in 33.0%. In general, qualitative results are subjective in nature.
- No indications of corrective action in any of the cases reported.

d) U.S. Air Force participation is characterized by:

- Unilateral involvement in 54.4% of the reported projects.
- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (98.1%) involved host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (63.9%) involved U.S. Air Force units only.
- Reported participation by indigenous civilians varies somewhat more by geographical area than in the Army and Navy; 64.5% worldwide, 69.1% in Southeast Asia, 45.2% in Latin America.
- Success or failure of individual projects is indicated in less than 10% of the reports.
- Qualitative results are reported in 56.1% of the cases studied, quantitative in 47.4%. In general, qualitative results are subjective in nature.

e) No reports on individual U.S. Marine Corps civic actions were uncovered during the research. However, some dimensions can be drawn on Marine Corps civic actions from information contained in Marine Corps Historical Pamphlets and other literature. When the Marines landed in Da Nang in 1965 they had no formal organizational structure for carrying out large scale civic action projects. The Combined Action Program evolved from subsequent Marine Corps experience in Vietnam. This program is described in Section III of this report. The Marine Corps approach to civic action is described in the following extract from Marine Corps Bulletin 3480. [Ref. 10]

"The Good Self-Help Project in Ten Easy Steps

"A unit desires to help the people of Vietnam. This is a natural and commendable reaction. But how do we translate willingness into action? First, let's keep in mind that a good self-help project must have continuing usefulness to the majority of the people involved. Their investment of money, material and labor must give them something worth while in return and must benefit more than one individual or only a small percentage of the group. To aid in translating willingness into action and to ensure that any self-help project started is a good project. The following steps to success are suggested:

"1) Need. In most every hamlet or village there is a need for one or more priority projects which would improve the economic or social conditions of the community.

"2) Desire. Talk to the local leaders to identify the particular project or projects that the people want and are willing to participate using their own resources, skills, and labor.

"3) Plan. A simple plan of action must be developed by the local leaders. Assistance or technical guidance may be provided but the plan should be theirs.

"4) Request. Based on the plan a request must be submitted to the civilian provincial authorities using the GVN chain of command with the assistance of CORDS advisory personnel.

"5) Approval. After consideration the provincial must approve, amend, or reject the request.

"6) Release. If approved, the materials and things will be made available to local villages that are ready to start the project.

"7) Construction. As soon as materials are received the people of the hamlet or village should start construction. The sponsoring unit should provide technical assistance during this phase.

"8) Acceptance. Upon completion of the project, a provincial counsel in cooperation with the local leader should have a dedication ceremony and formally accept the project.

"9) Maintain. A good self-help project is one that the people of the village can and want to maintain with limited further assistance."

The Marine Corps Combined Action Program does not directly satisfy the requirements of the JCS approved definition of military civic action in that primary emphasis is given to the role played by the Marines themselves. Participation of the RVN paramilitary forces with whom the Marines had been working seems to be played down. Corson, one of the developers of the Marine Corps concept, in his own words indicates that in some cases the objectives of the CAP were at variance with those of legitimate government officials. [Ref. 11] Absence of detailed data in CONUS sources did not permit an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Marine Combined Action Program. Indications that the program has merit are found in the literature. At a recent seminar of the Vietnam war, a group of top British authorities with experience in Vietnam, Borneo, and Malaysia all independently paid tribute to the tactics of the Marine Corps with particular praise directed to Combined Action Platoons.[Ref. 12] According to the seminar:

> "Clear and hold mandate requires them to live and work in villages, helping the local people with both their self-defense and their development problems. The villager's 'mind' is set at rest by the knowledge that if any U.S. Marine is killed or injured he will invariably be replaced. But his 'heart' is also won by the cooperation in construction and irrigation work which every Marine brings to his task."

MACV makes the following evaluation of the Marine Corps program:[Ref. 13]

> "A clear evidence of a Combined Action Platoon's effectiveness is the fact that the VC have never been able to re-establish control over a village protected by a Combined Action Platoon."

C. Reporting Systems

Neither the individual services nor the Department of Defense, have a dedicated military civic action reporting system. Until mid 1970, Headquarters USAF required semiannual reports of civic activities from major Air Force overseas commands. This report was discontinued last year because the need for the information at the DOD level no longer existed.[Ref. 14] Discussion with DOD personnel, in International Security Affairs and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, failed to uncover any directive establishing or eliminating this reporting requirement.

The Navy Seabees have a reporting system covering the operations of Navy Seabee teams engaged in technical assistance. These teams are discussed in Appendix E. Team reports are submitted through channels to the Commander of U.S. Naval Constructions in the theater in which the teams are operating. Information copies of these reports are submitted to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Review of this report in the Naval Facilities Engineering Command indicated that they too were lacking in the details of grass-roots civic action.

While the Army has no civic action reporting system, information on civic action projects is available in information copies of U.S. Southern Command reports which can be found in the libraries of the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, and in the files of the Operations Reports and Lessons Learned Branch of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development. In the latter source reports on military civic action are included as a subsection of the units report of operations over the reporting period. While John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance at Fort Bragg was on the distribution list for the Southern Command reports on Civic Action, none could be located at that installation.[Ref. 15]

D. Findings

1) Lack of dedicated military civic action reporting systems and the aggregation of data in after-action and operational reports result in washing out the details of grass roots civic action programs. As a result much valuable information relative to the actual procedures and techniques utilized in planning and execution of military civic action projects is not readily available. Structured interviews with personnel who have been engaged in such programs appear to be one method by which this type of data may be obtained.

2) From the data which were available in CONUS repositories, most of the Services in Vietnam are conducting unilateral military civic action as described in the Type II Model in Section II. The Navy appears to be doing this worldwide. In Latin America the preponderance of military civic action projects involve host country military participation.

3) After-action and situation reports do not contain sufficient data to permit either an evaluation of the effectiveness of individual projects or an evaluation of the appropriateness of corrective actions.

4) There appears to be an increasing involvement of RVN military forces in military civic action projects in Vietnam.

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12. Hanning, Hugh. Defense and Development. London: Royal United Service Institution 1970, p. 22.

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VII. EVALUATION

A. Introduction

All of the available literature suggests that military civic action can be successful "if . . ." The list of "if's" is long and varied, e.g.:

- If security is maintained,
- If projects are initiated and continued with sincerity,
- If related or unrelated military or government actions do not destroy the effect,
- If projects are properly coordinated with local, district, provincial, and/or national programs,
- If local citizens express or feel a need for the projects.

The list can be made quite lengthy, but the point is that military civic action is never unrelated to other activities in or related to the area of its performance. No case has been described in which a military civic action (MCA) program has been conceived, planned, and executed in isolation. There is always an interrelated program of military security, governmental development, private development, or some combination of these. For this reason, it is with some difficulty that MCA has been presented in earlier sections as a single system with independent objectives which can be evaluated independently on its own merits. Since this situation exists, it is not surprising that no evaluation system dedicated solely to MCA was disclosed. However, many observations, objective evaluations, and subjective evaluations have been found to indicate the effectiveness of MCA when all related factors favor its success.

This section reviews some of the relevant evaluation techniques and some of the general evaluations which suggest that, when used in an appropriate manner, MCA can be an effective instrument in improving the image of indigenous troops.

B. Evaluation Terminology

1. General

The Webster definition of *evaluate* which most nearly fits the needs of MCA evaluation terminology is " . . . to determine or fix the value," and the definition of *value* may be either (1) ". . . relative worth, utility, or importance: degree of excellence," or (2) " . . . a numerical quantity assigned or computed." Evaluation of MCA must primarily deal with the first and broader definition, since meaningful evaluations of an objective such as ". . . to improve the standing of the military forces with the population," cannot always be satisfactorily reduced to a directly measured numerical quantity.

In order to facilitate the discussions which follow concerning MCA evaluations and evaluation techniques, several terms which indicate the level or scope of the evaluation will be introduced. These terms are to acknowledge that an evaluation is appropriately made before, during, and after program and project implementation. They also acknowledge the difference between the evaluation of a worldwide program by a supra-governmental body or external critic and that of a hamlet project by a project advisor or independent appraisor.

2. Level and Scope Dimensions

One of the more carefully planned techniques of evaluating "image building" type programs is that of the American Institute for Research (AIR) evaluation programs in Thailand. Their methodology is reviewed in a later paragraph, but some of the terminology introduced at an AIR symposium entitled Evaluation Research - Strategies and Methods is of interest here. Of particular note are the concepts of "formative" and "summative" research.[Ref. 1]

Summative evaluation can logically take place only after a program is either completed, such as the Philippine EDCOR program, or has reached a relatively steady state of operations, such as the Iranian Literacy Corps. Formative evaluation takes place during the development and formulation stages of a program and is primarily concerned with detecting problems and indicating corrective steps for improving the program. The measurements of results may be the same in either type of evaluation, but the interpretations are quite different. It is incumbent upon the evaluator to make this differentiation clear to his audience.

A useful three-fold scheme for defining types of evaluation has been suggested by John W. Evans, Director, Office of Research, Plans, Programs, and Evaluation of Office of Economic Opportunity [Ref. 2], as follows:

(1) "Type I. The assessment of overall program impact and effectiveness where the emphasis is on determining the extent to which programs are successful in achieving basic objectives."

This is comparable to the summative type of evaluation in AIR terminology, but it is preferably performed by unbiased or uninvolved evaluators. This type of evaluation may be a forecast of impact or effectiveness such as that made by the Draper Committee in proposing to Congress that the "peaceful uses of military forces" would be an effective countermeasure to "limited wars" by Communist aggressors.* Many Type I qualitative estimates of the effectiveness of past and ongoing MCA programs have been made earlier in this report, and several

* It is assumed that the final evaluation was done by unbiased Congressmen even though the proponents of peaceful use of military forces comprised a majority of those appearing before the committee.

others are discussed in paragraph C. Type I evaluation will henceforth be described as "Overall Program Impact."

(2) "Type II. The evaluation of the relative effectiveness of different program strategies and variables where the emphasis is on determining which alternative techniques for carrying out programs are most productive."

Military systems analysts are most familiar with this type of evaluation in connection with cost-effectiveness studies in support of Program Planning and Budgeting Systems. However, their experience is largely with forecasting the effectiveness of alternative techniques and subprogram elements because they are preparing input to procurement decisions. The "Try-before-Buy" policy which has recently received emphasis within DOD is an illustration of Type II evaluations in which realistic field trials must largely substantiate estimated effectiveness before designs are standardized. Similarly, if field trials were used to evaluate techniques for military civic action prior to establishing new operational doctrine, the resulting evaluations would be of Type II. They are comparable to AIR's formative evaluation and the term "Type II-Formative" will be adopted to distinguish this from the term "Type II-Hypothetical" evaluations which are performed using simulation models, untested hypotheses, or expert judgment to predict future effectiveness. A review of several Type II-Formative evaluations of MCA is contained in paragraph D.

(3) "Type III. The evaluation of individual projects through site visits and other monitoring activities where the emphasis is on assessing managerial and operational efficiency."

In a MCA context, the Type III assessment would ask: "Is doctrine being followed correctly and efficiently in the performance of (the) MCA project(s)." This is contrasted to Type II-Formative which asks: "When performed correctly and efficiently, are the desired results obtained?" Or Type I which asks: "When the anticipated results are obtained by MCA techniques, are the overall national goals met or enhanced?" Paragraph E examines Type III assessments using the limited information available through military and civilian publications.

3. Summary

It will be apparent to the reader that there are overlapping data requirements for the three types of evaluation. For this reason, the same data will sometimes be used to evaluate the overall impact (Type I) and to formulate alternative techniques (Type II). The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), a system to evaluate the Pacification Program in Vietnam, is designed to provide Washington with an overall impact evaluation and, also, to provide MACV(CORDS), Province Advisors, and District Advisors with a management tool (Type II) with which they can formulate alternative approaches to problem hamlets. Data are collected primarily on results, rather than on performance (Type III).

Paragraph E includes a discussion of HES, including a discussion of its shortcomings. However, a reputed shortcoming is that the use of the system for overall impact of the Pacification Program as well as formative evaluation put pressure on District Advisors, who were the principal data collectors, to show improvements even when none were warranted. This criticism is anticipated by Evans who reports:

> ". . . there are just too many built-in pressures at the program level that militate against the overall effectiveness question getting properly asked or answered. It seemed important that this type of evaluation [Type I-Overall Impact] be removed from the program level and made an overview function of a staff office which would not be faced with the budgetary choice of reducing program activity in order to fund such evaluations, and which could take an impartial view of all programs. On the other hand, we felt it was important that the Type II [formative] evaluations not be removed from the program level because of the need for intimate program knowledge in determining what program variables should be investigated."[Ref. 3]

The distinction between Type I and Type II, explained by Evans above, is believed to be important in considering MCA evaluation; and, as will be shown in the later discussion of HES, changes have been in the direction of removing the District Advisor from the pressure of analyzing his collected data.

C. Overall Impact Evaluation (Type I)

1. Introduction

It was apparent early in this study that there were no dedicated reporting systems, no special office of military civic action evaluation, no legislative requirement for a report to Congress, and no single civilian or military office with command or overview responsibility for military civic action. The Inspector General, Foreign Assistance (IGFA) of the State Department, is responsible for inspection and audit under the Military Assistance Program. However, there is no person or position within the Inspector General's office concerned with military civic action.

In the absence of official overall impact reports, it is useful to review the opinions and judgments of both proponents and opponents of MCA.

2. Worldwide Judgmental Evaluations

a. Judgment by Inference--An Example

A severe criticism of the philosophy of Military Civic Action was found in a paper by Dr. Davis B. Bobrow [Ref. 4]. His thesis is based upon the assumption that ". . . in the absence of validated statements about the civic action process,

fruitful hypotheses can be derived from knowledge of other social processes and actors." For example, "a greedy general manifests behavior similar to that of a greedy mayor or bureaucrat." Using his knowledge of "other social processes and actors", Bobrow develops hypotheses about the probable attitudes and behavior patterns of the population, the indigenous military, and the indigenous government toward military civic action. From these he concludes that:

> "To the extent that the reader finds our hypotheses tenable, he will question the expectations of civic action advocates which underlie much of our current military assistance planning. Indeed, the general implication of our hypotheses is that the local armies and governments best suited to the official American image of civic action are those already best qualified to meet popular aspirations and frustrate Communist maneuvers. Those indigenous armies and governments whose unsatisfactory behavior gave rise to the American adoption of the civic action doctrine are the least willing and able to use this strategy effectively. The irony of this situation points to the unremoved need for American efforts in many cases to modify either the local military or government or to reconcile ourselves to a curtailed set of objectives for the future of the developing nations."

Since Bobrow does not make clear which of the many possible models of MCA he is evaluating, it is difficult to confirm or deny his conclusions. However, some of his hypotheses can be tested against past experience, as will be pointed out at appropriate points in this section.

b. Judgment From Past Experience--An Example

In the euphoria engendered by the success of the Philippines against the Huks, a number of conclusions were drawn about the success of military assistance in civic projects. A striking example is the conclusion reported in a study submitted to the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, entitled Contributions of Military Resources to Economic and Social Progress, in June 1959:[Ref. 5]

> "13. Particularly in Southeast Asia the military has been instructed and trained to cooperate with villagers and to assist in civic projects, with the result that there is a high degree of support of and respect for the military as well as the government it represents."

If there were any truth to this statement in 1959, evidence of it has been washed away by events in the 60's. Country programs are described in the following quotes from the Appendix of the 1959 report: (Parenthetical comments added.)

Laos. ". . . A so-called civic action was organized in 1956 by the army chief of staff. Initially carried out by combat troops, civic action involved tasks of public works, education, welfare, information, and health, besides security operations. [There is no indication of success in gaining "support and respect"] . . . U.S. observers were reported to feel that the effort should be increased."

Thailand. "Military personnel perform but a limited amount of construction that is for use to the civilian economy . . . A limited amount of medical service is provided to civilians by military officer medical personnel . . ."

Vietnam. ". . . As a result of good planning, training, and operations by the military, effective government and security were quickly established [after the Geneva Agreement in 1955], much of the war-torn economy was rehabilitated, and the Communist organizations left behind were revealed by the Population."

Cambodia. "Since 1956, the Cambodian Army has not provided any construction services outside of purely military activities. . . Prince Sihanouk is reported to have stated that in the future the Army will have closer rapport with the surrounding civilian communities and will participate in local public works . . ."

Burma. "In the Burmese Army, civic action is a command responsibility and is a major concern of both staff and field commanders. . . [Successful programs are reported along the Chinese border and in Rangoon.] Mixed results have been observed from agrarian resettlement projects. One project is listed as a failure because of the laziness of the former insurgents. . . The field team of the Presidents Committee, after a visit to the area, observed that greater use could be made of dual purpose projects. . ."

Philippines. ". . . President Magsaysay made a strong beginning which served as an example in other Southeast Asia countries such as Laos, Vietnam, Malaya, and Burma. This activity is now largely neglected in the Philippines."

c. Counterinsurgency Hypotheses—Pro and Con

The report on Contributions of Military Resources to Economic and Social Progress may have contributed to the development of the hypothesis which is typified by the following statement in 1964 by Rutherford Poats of AID in testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House:

> "The [counterinsurgency] concept essentially rests on the assumption that this kind of war depends heavily upon the psychology of the peasant, his attitude toward his government, and toward his future. If we can quickly demonstrate to him the prospect of improvement in his livelihood, in his children's future, then he will not be vulnerable to the propaganda and terror of the insurgents."[Ref. 6]

In 1966 Secretary McNamara made the following statement during hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act:

> "We are also placing increased emphasis on the support of civic action projects, through which indigenous military forces participate in the economic and social development of their country. Civic action projects afford the civilian populace visible evidence that their government and their military are endeavoring to improve the lot of the average citizen. The resulting increased confidence in constituted authority, in or out of uniform, substantially lessens the vulnerability of a people to the subversive efforts of Communist agents, who prey upon the discontent of the underprivileged."[Ref. 7]

In the paper Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities [Ref. 8], Charles Wolf, Jr., of the RAND Corporation, argues that the assumption that insurgency depends on the support of the peasant is untested and probably false. "The growth of the Viet Cong and of the Pathet Lao probably occurred despite the opposition of a large majority of the populace of the two countries. . . By the same token, successful counterinsurgency programs can be conducted among a rural population that is passive or even hostile to the government." [underlining added] He also proposed that the idea that winning the support of the peasant through "demonstrating the prospect of improvement in his livelihood" is grounded in Western ideologies and values. The idea thus "strikes a particularly responsive chord in the populist symbols and sentiments of American traditions." He proposes that improving the livelihood of the peasant may be counter-productive in that it just increases the availability of goods to the insurgents.

After developing a logical argument against the counterinsurgency value of the winning of hearts and minds through socioeconomic improvement, Wolf proposed an alternative strategy. In essence the strategy involves the cutting off of the inputs of people, supplies, and arms to the insurgents. Interestingly enough, he then turns to the successful counterinsurgency in the Philippines to obtain many of the tactics he proposes for his strategy. (One of the proposed tactics, the bombing of North Vietnam to cut off inputs, has no parallel in Philippine experience.) The tactics he proposes from Philippine experience include:

- Promotion and a letter from the President to those who are effective in killing insurgents.
- Pre-emptive buying of food supplies through barter for items such as textiles and tobacco.
- Amnesty and resettlement program for defecting insurgents.
- Reward for weapons delivered to authorities and penalties for government forces who "lose" their weapons under non-combat conditions.
- Substantial rewards for information leading to the capture of insurgent leaders.
- Military discipline to insure that harshness is meted out only as a penalty deliberately imposed because of behavior by the populace that contributes to the insurgency movement.

It may be difficult to understand how the Philippine experience has been used to support the position of the proponents of peaceful uses of military forces in socioeconomic development and the strategy advocated by Wolf. A review of Philippine experience in later paragraphs may throw some light on this paradox.

The ambivalence of benefits from civic action is further demonstrated in this conclusion from the 1964 joint U.S./CENTO sponsored civic action seminar:[Ref. 9]

> "XIII. QUESTION: Are there any strictly military advantages derived from civic action programs when the local population is friendly and insurgency not likely? When the local population is unfriendly and hostile acts possible?
>
> "ANSWER: a. When the local community is disposed in a friendly manner toward the Armed Forces, civil assistance may well be justified on military grounds:
>
> (1) If it provides good military training.
>
> (2) If it improves the military environment, e.g., from a logistic or medical point of view.
>
> "b. The impact of assistance to a hostile community must be weighed carefully and must be in accord with overall national policy. Depending upon the situation, such assistance could have harmful or beneficial results."

D. Evaluation of Alternative Techniques (Type II)

1. Introduction

Review of most of the overall impact evaluations, examples of which were presented above, disclosed that both the proponents and opponents of the hypotheses underlying military civic action typically base their positions on logic and/or general impressions. An attempt

is made in this paragraph to counter or support some of the positions presented above by examining some of the specific country programs and their techniques. It is not possible to present a logical assessment of a military civic action project without discussing other projects and events during the period of its performance, as the discussion to follow demonstrates. It is hoped that the relevance of the non-civic action comments is eventually understandable.

2. Korea

Although the Philippines are typically the premier example of the use of military civic action in combating insurgents, the American model for the non-military use of military forces is Korea. The 1959 President's Commission on Military Assistance reports the following: [Ref. 10] (underlining added)

a. Overall Impact

"The eighth U.S. Army in Korea made a most valuable contribution to American policy in the Far East through the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program. It is unusual for a combat army in the field to participate in a program of rehabilitating the war-torn nation it has fought over. The accomplishments of this program have done much to demonstrate to the world that while communism destroys and exploits, the United States reconstructs and assists those who need aid."

b. Program Initiation

"The AFAK program was inspired by the spontaneous generosity of American soldiers toward Korean war victims even during days of combat."

"At first the informal sharing of rations and the collection of funds for support of destitute orphans and refugees was not systematically recorded so that the volume of such charity can only be estimated. Individual soldiers wrote to families, friends, and organizations requesting donations of clothing and relief supplies."

c. Program Formulation and "Legalization"

"The value of this movement was recognized by the Eighth Army commander, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, and at his request Congress authorized diversion of military supplies and equipment into a formal relief and rehabilitation activity officially designated as 'Armed Forces Assistance to Korea' in November 1953. An initial appropriation of $15 million for materials was subsequently followed by another for $5 million."

d. Project Selection and Implementation

"The program was designed to reach down to the 'grass roots' of Korea in a concerted effort to help others help themselves. Projects were selected to replace war-damaged facilities which served the largest number of local residents. Priorities were established in the following order:

(a) Schools.
(b) Public health.
(c) Orphanages.
(d) Civic buildings.
(e) Public utilities.
(f) Bridges.

All units down to company size participated in the program either as sponsors of specific projects or in conjunction with larger units. Projects were selected only after consultation with civic leaders in Korean communities and determination that such projects could be successfully operated after the AFAK contribution had been completed. Korean agencies were expected to provide local materials and effort. Construction materials normally found in military supply channels were paid for from AFAK funds and delivered to construction sites. Military equipment and manpower were used in approved projects provided such use did not detract from a state of combat readiness. Particular emphasis was placed on the medical program involving equipment, supplies, and personal services."

e. Physical Accomplishments

"By November 1955, 2,914 projects had been completed, including 813 relating to the rehabilitation of Pusan, 769 schools, 349 civic buildings, and 248 public health installations. During this period materials and supplies furnished by the United States amounted to $14,924,602.

"It is estimated that the resulting facilities had a value to the Korean economy in excess of $48 million. By January 1959, the number of completed projects had grown to 3,780 with U.S. material contributions amounting to $20,670,925. Improvements valued at more than $266,371,000 resulted. In addition, nonconstruction assistance in value of $2,836,000 was given in the form of contributions for public welfare, public health, education and religious purposes."

f. Analyses of Results (Type II-Formative)

"This program has been cited as having three highly beneficial results:

(1) It has given the Korean people a most favorable attitude toward our forces;

(2) It has a complementary effect on the morale of our forces;

and

(3) It has permitted coordinated use of military resources with the indigenous economy without detracting from a continuous state of readiness on the part of the armed forces.

The great success of the AFAK program was due to several factors: The need for cooperative assistance in Korea was very real and very great; U.S. forces had a large concentration of personnel in the greater and relatively large stocks of supplies and equipment; and above all the program had encouragement and support of commanders in the field as well as government agencies in Washington. It was a well-coordinated and well-directed program serving a distinctly worthwhile purpose. It exemplifies the possibilities of using military resources to assist in social-economic fields without detriment to the military mission."

g. Recommendation (Type I-Predicted Impact)

"The same approach would appear to have application in all underdeveloped areas. Where U.S. armed forces are present in significant numbers abroad opportunities exist for similar programs conducted in coordination with U.S. economic programs. Furthermore, armed forces of friendly nations could well be encouraged to adopt a similar program in their own country. Any guidance or support offered by U.S. officials in this regard would react to the benefit of the United States as indicative of our interest in and concern for the welfare of the people."

3. The Philippine Experience

a. Overall Impact

There is a concensus among reporters of both insurgency case studies and military civic action case studies that the combination of military and civilian programs in the Philippines was so successful that "by 1955 the rebellion was no longer a threat to the constitutional Government of the Republic of the Philippines." [Ref. 11] There is less agreement on the importance of the role played by programs to bring about "brotherhood" between the soldier and the civilians. Reviewers of the Philippine experience talk generally about the importance of civilian programs, but the only concrete example which emerges is the "major civic effort known as the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) whose mission it was to rehabilitate and resettle Huk prisoners and their families."[Ref. 12] The Draper Committee report discussed earlier also states that: "The major civic endeavor of the armed forces of the Philippines is the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR)." Walterhouse [Ref. 13] summarizes the significant civilian programs with:

"Magsaysay took corrective measures. He threw the light of publicity on the corrupt, used Army lawyers in mufti to handle without charge the legal problems of the disgruntled, and launched an Army-backed EDCOR to secure land for at least some of the landless."

It appears that this emphasis on EDCOR stems from a statement by Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, before the Anderson-Southeast Asia Subcommittee of the Draper Committee.[Ref. 14] A summary of his remarks includes: "The major civic endeavor of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is the Economic Development Corps." The complete EDCOR plan was considered of sufficient importance to be reproduced as Annex A of the Subcommittee report. Major Bohannan, who served as an advisor during the Philippine experience, states: "As a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal."[Ref. 15] Golay reports that, "EDCOR was politically oriented and its accomplishments must be measured in terms of the political impact on the Huk struggle."[Ref. 16] There were never more than 300 Huk families resettled by EDCOR. The Draper report overlooked this aspect in its report that "As of December 31, 1958, the EDCOR farms had a population of 5,175."[Ref. 17] This latter number included the many families who had not been Huks but had taken the opportunity to own land.

This lengthy review of EDCOR was presented to show how the reviewers had latched on to the part of the Philippine experience which was easiest to understand in the context of the U.S. experience in AFAK and the general U.S. orientation to major economic development projects. Although the EDCOR program was one important tactic in Magsaysay's strategy, it was only one of many civilian measures contributing to the overall impact of the civic action strategy.

b. Program Initiation

The combined military/civil action program in the Philippines began in mid-1950 with the appointment of Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of Defense. He is generally described as a man of the people who knew instinctively what was happening in the homes and the minds of the people of the villages and the farms. He took office at a time when the Huk guerrillas were near full force, when patrols were often ambushed and decimated, and corruption was commonplace. Counterinsurgency military tactics which were used throughout the campaign had been evolved during 1947 to 1949, but their successful implementation was severely impeded by the lack of sympathy of the people in the operations areas. No effort had been made to cultivate their sympathy prior to Magsaysay's arrival. A squad or platoon was required to serve a warrant of arrest in an isolated village, and it would return to town immediately--with or without the individual. Junior leaders would not remain long enough to become friendly with the villagers, to determine their problems, or to ask if the patrol could assist them in any manner.

The guerrillas were doing just the opposite, staying to help, play, and indoctrinate in communism. According to Col. Napoleon Valeriano, who commanded the Nenita Unit (a special counterinsurgency unit) and the 7th Batallion Combat Team during the campaign, "This was the secret of the whole thing."[Ref. 18]

Valeriano also reports that Magsaysay's first order to him was approximately the following:

> "I want you to turn out public relations men from every private, corporal, sergeant, lieutenant and officer of your command. I want every enlisted man of the Philippine Army in uniform to serve as a public relations man for the Army and for the government."

Lansdale called the policy one of "all-out friendship" with a coordinated military program against the hard core guerilla of "all-out force". An independent measure of the success in changing the behavior of the individual soldier is indicated by the report of a foreign correspondent who wrote: "I have seen many armies, but this one beats them all. This is an army with a social conscience."[Ref. 19]

Major Charles Bohannan, who was JUSMAG advisor to the AFP on unconventional operations adds these personal observations:[Ref. 20]

> " . . . Of those people who were concerned with and interested in such things as the actions of government, there were probably three times as many who said to hell with the government and to hell with the Huks both as were in favor of either one.
>
> "It was in changing this situation that Mr. Magsaysay scored his greater successes in combating the Huk. He shook up the army. I don't mean wholesale relief of officers, trials, court martials, or anything like that; he just simply shook them. . . He was ruthless in putting his foot on misbehavior by armed forces personnel.
>
> "Mr. Magsaysay was even more strenuous in emphasizing that the armed forces must make the civilians in their area realize that the armed forces were their friends and not their enemy. For example, in this Huklandia area, where the Huk forces could move fairly freely by day and very freely by night, you would see a truck loaded with soldiers pause in a town in broad daylight for a few minutes. Everybody would be in the truck pointing his rifle out as though the truck were going to be jumped any minute. Needless to say, the civilians around didn't particularly appreciate that treatment and they would have been quite willing to jump the army.

"Three months after he started shaking things up, when a truck load of soldiers pulled into town, you could see the kids come running, because probably those soldiers had a few pieces of candy, or at least they'd tell them some jokes. People would come and hear the news from the soldiers."

The comments above should be sufficient to indicate that the use by Wolf (discussed in C. above) of the Philippine experience to illustrate that there was no need for the support of the people in counterinsurgency shows a lack of understanding of the Magsaysay program. The more aggressive tactics which he described were used, but they were used in the context of almost total commitment of the Army to friendship and helpfulness to all but the hard core Huk. "At the height of the campaign, the troop buildup of Government formations against the Huk guerrilla finally reached a total of 34,000 officers and enlisted men deployed in the field as combat forces. Of these 34,000, I would say that a good ninety percent were in combat units which had civic and social welfare missions as well as combat missions," [Ref. 21] stated Valeriani. Thus the Philippine program, like the Korean AFAC program, grew out of a demonstrated friendship and concern for the welfare of people. However, like the Marine Corps Combined Action Program in I Corps - Vietnam, the program developed after failure of both unconventional and traditional military methods demonstrated the need to "win hearts and minds."

c. Program Formulation, Selection and Implementation

The selection of projects priorities to be performed by the military was largely done by reacting to the propaganda themes of the insurgents. As Major Medardo Justiniano, AFP intelligence officer reported, "they [Huks] demonstrated an extraordinary ability in attributing all imperfections, all injustices, all misfortunes, to the democratic process." Magsaysay countered each major theme in a manner described by Major Bohannan:[Ref. 22]

"As a former guerrilla himself, Mr. Magsaysay realized full well the vital importance of popular support to any guerrilla organization. Knowing that many of the common complaints of the peasants often had all too real justification and that these were magnified many times over by the Huk propaganda, he set out to eliminate the grounds for complaint, or at least to prove to the farmers that he was sincerely trying to do so.

"One of the favorite complaints of the farmers in Huklandia, as in almost every similar region in the world, was that they always lost the case if they went to law.

Tenants felt they had no legal defense against their landlords, because they couldn't afford to hire lawyers. Mr. Magsaysay gave to the Judge Advocate Generals Corps in the Armed Forces of the Philippines the role of public defenders. If some poor devil who couldn't afford a lawyer had a serious case, either criminal or civilian, particularly a civil suit over land tenure, all he had to do was to send word to Mr. Magsaysay's office and there would be an Army lawyer to represent him in court proceedings. The peasant knew that he would have forceful representation and that the judge would be at least as much in awe of a lawyer from Magsaysay's Army as he would be of the landlord's lawyer.

". . . There were many different operations designed to demonstrate to the people that the soldiers were their friends, that the government was their government and what the hell were the Huks fighting for anyhow. The Huks claimed it was for land, that they wanted land, that they couldn't own land in Central Luzon.

"Mr. Magsaysay dusted off a proposal that had been gathering dust in his office for a couple of years for an outfit known as EDCOR . . .

"Mr. Magsaysay took that proposal, . . . and turned it into a 'land for the landless' program specifically for the benefit of surrendered Huk . . . The idea was to get these civilians, . . . to . . . saying: 'Now why should we be giving contributions to these guys, . . . Why should we be supporting them and suffering for or from them? They say that they are fighting for land. If that is true, all they have to do is surrender, and Magsaysay will give them a homestead down in Mindanao. . . What are they really fighting for, these Huks?'"

On the issue of corruption, Magsaysay's "shaking up of the Army" described earlier significantly lowered the visibility if not the fact of corruption by military personnel, and he temporarily placed trusted officers in key civilian position where corruption was most rampant.*

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* Corrupt practices re-emerged soon after the death of Magsaysay and were not again subdued until President Macapagal was elected in 1962. Civic action ended with Magsaysay's death and the military returned to more "conventional" activities. "By 1961 the Huk menace had re-emerged in central Luzon . . . Macapagal, in 1962, put his security forces actively back into the business of progress and reform." With a coordinated approach involving Catholic Relief Services, CARE, USIA, American Legion, Asia Foundation, Philippine Public School Teachers Association, AID, and U.S. Military Forces, "the dissidence was quickly brought under control."[Ref. 23]

Free elections were part of the tradition of the Philippine under U.S. Trusteeship, and the tradition had been maintained at the local level throughout the Japanese occupation by both Communist and non-Communist guerrilla units. The elections of 1949 were characterized by terrorism, fraud, and rampant abuses. They gave the Communists an excellent propaganda theme and an excuse to declare a revolutionary government. In 1951, after the friendship theme had infused throughout the Army, Magsaysay used the military to insure free elections. Those who were present at the time agree that: "The turning point of the whole campaign occurred in . . . the election of 1951."[Ref. 24]

There is little in the literature of the Philippine experience to explain how the village-by-village program was formulated. The typical "schools, roads, and wells" projects receive only passing mention, possibly because little importance was placed on the material accomplishments. The emphasis is on expressions of friendship and helpfulness in any way that is appropriate for the time and place. This is suggested by the definition of civic action attributed to Lansdale by Major General Jonas Platt, USMC:

> "Civic action can be a simple act of politeness to civilians by troops manning a roadblock; it can be a job of construction too large for the local people themselves to undertake."[Ref. 25]

The results of the above definition on project selection, formulation, and implementation are that the actions of the Philippine armed forces must be summed up in a paragraph such as the following:

> "Actions of the army to help the civilians were almost innumerable. They ranged from patrols regularly carrying medicine so that they could attend the needs of sick or injured civilians whom they might encounter in remote places to the building of roads, the rebuilding of villages, later on the building of schoolhouses. Mr. Magsaysay made it clearly understood by everyone in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the troops quickly made it clear to those with whom they came in contact, that the purpose of the army was to help the people in every way they could. First in priority to accomplish this was, of course, to suppress armed rebellion. But if there was anything soldiers could do to help the people without seriously jeopardizing the actual prosecution of an armed action against an armed enemy, they were to do it. To a remarkable extent, they did."[Ref. 26]

Valeriani added that special forces type units were trained to serve as advisor instructors to municipal police forces and civilian guards. The general public joined in the security operations once their own villagers became police and guards. Team leaders began marching their home guard units to work on community projects, such as digging community wells, drainage canals, or assisting in the rice harvest. Operations such as these resemble the work of Special Forces among the Montagnard and the Combined Action Platoons of the Marines and Popular Forces in Vietnam.

The program gradually acquired a formal recognition in the table of organization. During the last phases of the campaign, civil affairs officers and units were added to combat units. These greatly assisted in realizing Secretary Magsaysay's objective of building up acceptance of the Armed Forces by the civilian population."[Ref. 27]

The civil affairs officer served as the liaison officer of the civil government on the staff of the combat unit. He also served as liaison with civilian guard and police force units in the combat unit's area. "Such integration, such cohesion of all government and semi-government agencies was achieved that I was able to accomplish my purpose, which was to separate the armed guerrillas from the local population, and the destruction of active guerrilla units. Actions of all agencies were thus well planned, well coordinated, well directed, and well supervised."[Ref. 28] These comments by Gen. Valeriani, a tactical unit commander at the time, stand in sharp contrast to the Civil Affairs Study of Vietnam which reported constant problems in coordination between Province Advisors, U.S. Tactical Commanders, ARVN units, and all U.S. and GVN civilian agencies. Unfortunately, Gen. Valeriani's report does not contain sufficient detail to establish the doctrine of cooperation used by the civil affairs liaison officer. It is possible that Magsaysay's personal commitment, backed up by frequent unannounced visits to the field and rewards for successful officers, may have been sufficient to ensure cooperation.

d. Analysis of Results

The Philippine experience was primarily a counterinsurgency operation. Military civic action was but one of many tools used to reduce the Huk insurgency to a minor police action. Although some of the tactics were social welfare and economic activities, the objective was not nation building, as the following analysis of the EDCOR program demonstrates:

> "Of course, they scoffed at the whole thing as a trick, but they soon found out that it wasn't, that some of their former comrades really were doing well

on their new homesteads. In actual fact, as a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families of Huks surrendered, or simply melted peacefully back into a peaceful country life as persons who didn't want any parts (sic) of this rebellion any more. One reason was that they were made to doubt the propaganda of their own leaders; a more significant reason perhaps was the effect the thinking outlined above had on their supply, support, and even intelligence channels." [Ref. 29]

Earlier quotes tell of the spread of the concept of civic action throughout Southeast Asia. Successes such as those in the Philippines were not experienced in other countries, and any assessment of the overall impact of the Philippine strategy should examine attempts to employ it elsewhere. Laos, Vietnam, and Columbia will be used for this purpose.

4. Laos

Details on the Laos civic action program were not uncovered, but enough information is available to show that the program reported by the Draper Committee to have been initiated in 1956 must be rated a failure.

Reports of attempts to initiate a civic action program are presented in Military Review [Ref. 30,31]. The Royal Laos Civic Action Program developed and executed between 1957 and 1959 lasted for one and one-half years and involved about 300 of "the best young men in the country" in 24 teams of 10 men. Its failure was attributed to organizational and financial difficulties. The visits of teams to villages had some value for a time, but the teams could not provide security or continuity of projects. It was in no way a total national commitment as was the case in the Philippines.

A second program was to have comprised 600 teams of 6 men each. Made up of army volunteers, the men were picked for ability and aptitude rather than formal training. They were to remain in the provinces and work closely with hamlet organizations. The program ended in less than a year because of the August 1960 coup by Captain Kong Le. A third program was started after a period of reorganization of the government. This program received much U.S. assistance, but it also failed. In his analysis, Major Charles Stockell, an advisory group member at the time, reports:

- Local commanders seldom adhered to methods approved by Ministry of Defense.
- Mobile training team "simplified" text was too theoretical and not simple enough for the junior officers being trained.
- MAAG phased out of the country before program had matured.
- Lao teams desperately needed Lao speaking advisors to lead them through first few months of the program.

- The teams recommended programs rather than determine need.
- Lao commanders believed that civic action was a way of influencing the villagers under their control.
- Lao soldiers on patrol alienated the villagers.
- There was an attempt to do too much too quickly.

In contrast to the MAAG supported program, the International Voluntary Services, Inc. (IVS) community workers stayed patiently in Laos and slowly began to achieve some success with their rural development program. However, their program has also been terminated. After the murder of three volunteers, IVS decided in 1969 that "our freedom has been severely limited by recently deteriorating security conditions." They had operated successfully in Pathet Lao territory, but "the North Vietnamese have taken from the Pathet Lao control of the revolution in many areas in Laos."[Ref. 32]

In Appendix E of the IVS report referenced above, the IVS/Laos Associate Chief-of-Party gave the following report of AID and Royal Laotian Government activities in rural development:

> "USAID is primarily a developmental organization. They have a large number of people who are genuinely interested in the development of Laos and have made significant contributions in that direction. They work within the framework of the military efforts in Laos contributing to the development of Laos in such a way as to lend support to the overall United States objectives.
>
> "The United States Agency for International Development bears the brunt of the developmental effort. The aid to the rural areas began in 1963 when 'USAID fielded teams of American technicians to assist villagers in the construction of schools, wells, dispensaries, and limited agricultural projects in the belief that a village-level rural improvement program could help improve the seriously deteriorating security by gaining the confidence and loyalty of the rural population. In most cases, RLG ministries and services at that time were for various reasons either unable or unwilling to participate at any depth.' [from a paper written by USAID/RDD] As time went on USAID was able to involve the RLG to a greater extent in the rural development of their country. Due to many factors the success has been varying. Poor security has been the biggest hinderance."[Ref. 33]

In summary, the Lao program of counterinsurgency was clearly not modeled upon Philippine experience, and civilian programs were not able to operate successfully because the military could not provide security.

5. Vietnam

Since many of the civic action programs in Vietnam have been reviewed earlier in this report and the assessment techniques employed there are reported in paragraphs to follow, the material reviewed here emphasizes similarities and differences between Vietnam and Philippine programs.

The first example of U.S. participation in civic action type activity was under the U.S. Special Technical and Economic Mission (STEM). It was an economic and social change program which simultaneously provided security. CIA agent Robert Blum led the rural program but had difficulties with both the French and the other members of the U.S. Mission. Corson [Ref. 34] reports that a "rehabilitated" Vietcong, who had worked for STEM as an interpreter, told him in 1966, "You now have the guns and ideas to defeat the VC." When asked if he thought the Americans would use them, he said, "No. . .because you are afraid to lose face by mixing the two."

When Diem took over as Premier, Col. Lansdale was assigned as his civic action advisor as he organized the GAMO's (Groupe Administrative Mobile Organization). The GAMO were taught the lessons of the Philippines, including the "three withs": eat, sleep, and work with the people. The GAMO activities were probably responsible for the 1959 Draper Committee report of a "successful" civic action program in Vietnam. Corson states, "Lansdale's influence was most effective in the economic and social areas; however, the political 'reform' was not nearly as successful. Diem, as subsequent political history was to show, was an arbitrary authoritarian despot who made the use of the Civic Action cadres to enforce his political control and tyranny."[Ref. 35] The initial successes of this program under Cieu Cong Cung faded when success prompted expansion beyond the capability of the GVN to run it, and the program as initially conceived and operated was moribund by 1957. Cieu Cong Cung died and was replaced by Ngo Dinh Nhu who coverted the program into a secret police organization. The former Vietminh-controlled areas in which political "persuasion" took place by the GAMO were still in VC control in 1967. However, Corson argues that, "In a clinical sense, given Diem's political outlook and the decline of Lansdale's influence over Diem, the concept promoted by Lansdale was not invalidated."[Ref. 36] After Diem's government fell and Henry Cabot Lodge returned as Ambassador, Lansdale was called back to Vietnam in 1965; but he was not able to re-institute a Philippine type operation.

Many programs were initiated in Vietnam after 1957 with a combined military-social-economic charter. None of those reviewed followed either the Korean or the Philippine model, although basic "brotherhood" principles were adopted by the Marine Corps Combined Action Program and Special Forces units operating among the Montagnards. Successes among the Montagnards were not translated into improving the image of the GVN. As a National Geographic survey of the people of Southeast Asia reports: "these isolated hill folk view with suspicion

and distrust the lowland Vietnamese, who in turn regard them as savages."[Ref. 37] Special Forces were not able to convince the Montagnards to view the GVN as "our government", and GVN actions may have made this impossible. A Special Forces document [Ref. 38] reports: ". . . they have been suppressed and treated as second class citizens."

The Marines had greater success because of the provincial coordination committee which evolved in I Corps. However, the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) was seldom a contributor and often a hindrance to the Combined Action Platoon concept. Lt. Col. David Wade*, who served as a Civil Affairs Officer near Saigon, hypothesizes that the ARVN soldier is not inspired to do civic good deeds when they and their families are typically in as bad or worse economic conditions than the villagers they are to help. Wade reports that the only military civic action projects he observed in which ARVN soldiers participated was the building of a school with an ARVN compound. The marines with the Combined Action Platoon were more successful with the Popular Forces (PF) members of their platoons. Both the marines and the PF lived in the hamlets and had a personal stake in the security and development of the hamlet. The success of the Combined Action Program within I Corps is described in The Betrayal by Corson and in the Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet, Civil Affairs in I Corps Republic of South Vietnam, April 1966 - April 1967. The Marine Combined Action Program appears to have been adopted by some U.S. Army elements. Operation Washington Green: Pacification of Northern Binh Dinh Province, RVN is the only document uncovered to support this contention. This late 1969 report is the first case uncovered of the complete integration of the efforts of Vietnamese military and civilian officials, MACV advisors, and elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade at all levels from battalion/district to platoon/hamlet. The report gave statistics on material and military accomplishments, but stated that the really meaningful results were:

> ". . . the smiles that I see on the people's faces . . . the confidence that is exhibited by RP/PF. . . children attending school. . . roads long in disuse being repaired. . . wives have gone into VC-dominated hills to have their husbands surrender . . . villagers turn in munitions . . . thriving activity of the market place,. . . or . . . fallow rice paddies of Hoai Nhon turn green with newly planted rice . . ."

There is no independent confirmation of the success of this operation, but the late 1969 IVS report which described the lack of security in Laos also stated: "Security (in Vietnam) for our volunteers is much better now than during recent years. Volunteers are traveling by surface transportation in almost all provinces . . ."[Ref. 40] These reports on successful pacification are in sharp

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* Interviewed at Ft. Bragg.

contrast to the 1967 assessment by the GVN Minister of Revolutionary Development of the Revolutionary Development Program:[Ref. 41]

"General Thang stated what he considered to be the deficiencies of the 1966 RD Program and disclosed that the Program for 1967 would be directed at correcting those deficits.(9) The points he cited were:

1. Lack of security--1,400 RD cadre killed or wounded during the first nine months of 1966.
2. Lack of peoples' participation--cadre were building in the hamlets without the help of the people.
3. Lack of coordination between GVN programs--GVN programs needed to be closely monitored to prevent:
   a. construction of hamlet schools where there were no teachers.
   b. construction of dispensaries where there were no medical personnel.
4. The program had been too much of a numbers game--quantity rather than quality in the pacification of hamlets in 1966.
5. Weak cooperation between the ARVN, the provincial administrators, and the RD cadre--lack of coordination and cooperation most pronounced at the hamlet and village level.
6. Lack of follow-up--a gap was created when the RD Teams moved on to another village or hamlet, leaving the people in the last village or hamlet feeling deserted.
7. The lack of overall doctrine--no common language for the RD Program--over half of the RD cadre had not been introduced to current RD philosophy and were operating under doctrine received as Peoples Action Teams (PAT) or Rural Political Cadre (RPC)."

It appears that the lessons learned in Korea and the Philippines have been re-learned in Vietnam, combined into a new program suited to the special conditions of Vietnam, and put into operation by some element of the GVN and U.S. forces. However, there are no U.S. documents on what appears to be a new doctrine for stability operations. Also, there is no counterpart in other services to the Personal Response Project which Major General Jonas M. Platt, USMC, claims to be, "the heart of the civil affairs effort."[Ref. 42]

E. Quantitative Assessment Methods

1. Introduction

Section VI presented a compilation of the lessons learned reports on civic action. These reports gave some indication of the type of projects undertaken and the participation by U.S. military, indigenous military, and indigenous civilians. However, there was no indication of the success of the projects in improving the image of the military or of the indigenous government. Although there are no systems to independently assess the impact of civic action projects, there are several systems in use or in formative stages which attempt to measure the combined effectiveness of military and socioeconomic programs in countering insurgency. These are discussed below.

2. Hamlet Evaluation System

The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) was introduced in Vietnam in January 1967 as a reporting device for evaluating the state of pacification throughout South Vietnam. Data are collected by district advisors each month on military, political, economic, and social features of each hamlet within the district. The reports are forwarded to Saigon for computerized compilation and analysis. Summary information and analyses are forwarded to Washington.

In June 1967, when the HES was ready for field trials, Simulmatics Corporation was employed to assist the Army Concepts Teams in Vietnam in a formative evaluation of the HES system. They were concerned with system "reliability--not validity" [Ref. 43]. They used interviews of civilians by Vietnamese study team numbers and independent direct observations by U.S. study team members to rate villages in the A,B,C,D,E, and V categories of the HES System. The A rating indicates most pacified and E, least pacified; while V indicates Viet Cong controlled.

The ranking of hamlets using this more detailed sampling survey were compared to the ratings derived by analyses of district advisor reports. Detail data were compared to disclose the sources of difference in the hamlet rankings. Interviews were then held with district advisors to further highlight the sources of differences and procedural problems with the system.

The major question asked by the study was: "Do the district advisors make their ratings conscientiously, carefully, accurately, intelligently?"[Ref. 44] The results reported were:

a) The HES ratings as a whole are in good agreement with ratings given by hamlet chiefs.

b) The HES ratings as a whole are in lesser agreement with ratings given by study analysts or hamlet citizens.

c) HES ratings on security factors seem highly reliable as measured by agreement either with hamlet chiefs or independent analysts.

d) HES ratings on development factors are less reliable than the ratings on security factors.

e) Advisors' ratings are substantially more optimistic about development factors than are those provided by other sources.

f) Advisors' ratings are no more optimistic, even perhaps slightly more pessimistic, about security factors than are those provided by other sources.

g) Advisors are more optimistic than other sources in their overall ratings.

A critical index of reliability to civic action evaluation is the coefficient of correlation between interviews with hamlet citizens and the HES. When this index is near 1.00, there is very high agreement between hamlet citizens and the HES. The reported value was 0.07, indicating that hamlet citizens were in strong disagreement with the security and development status reported by HES. In 29 percent of 106 hamlets, the HES was considerably more optimistic than hamlet citizens.

Detailed analyses also indicated that "awareness of non-military problem" was much more likely when a civilian advisor was present in the district and when the military advisor speaks Vietnamese. Also, the HES rating from advisors with high rating on "awareness of non-military problems" for whatever reason tend to agree with the villager's assessment of the situation.

The study also disclosed that the HES data depended heavily on information supplied by the Vietnamese District Chiefs, a very questionable source. "Personal knowledge of the senior district advisor" was the only source more frequently reported. Advisors in 70% of the districts said only Vietnamese sources of information were available to them.[Ref. 45]

". . . the optimists are more thorough, have more experience, spend more time on their reporting, exclude civilians, know less Vietnamese, and visit hamlets less." Since "thorough" relates to number of sources used, the implication is that the thorough advisor obtains more mis-information. "Experience" relates to the length of time the advisor has been in the province. Thus, the advisor becomes more optimistic as he spends more time in the district, but since he spends less time in the hamlets his optimism may be wishful thinking encouraged by Vietnamese who wish to please him.* The advisors who visit 80 percent or more of their hamlets

* In a personal interview, a former district advisor reports that there was increasing pressure by CORDS to report improvements, to the point that his report ". . . did not accurately reflect the situation."

during a month tend to agree more consistently with the study results and villager's opinion.

Advisors reported confusion in understanding the scope of many of the questions. They said development indicators did not measure growth in the private sector or separate GVN from U.S. government or foreign voluntary agency activities. Advisors noted lack of opportunity to reflect in the HES a measure of popular loyalty to the GVN or the degree of civic organizational activity. They noted that self-help and civic action are treated in the same category by HES, and they stated that it would be difficult to give an "A" rating in the development categories for many areas in the United States.

> ". . . the basic purpose of each indicator is to measure the degree of GVN or other action in response to popular need. If there is no action because there is no need, the hamlet rates an A." [Ref. 46]

The study team found that, with the exception of I Corps, the HES was not used as a management tool.

> "Some CORDS personnel at corps expressed the opinion that machine records just could not tell you what you need to know." [Ref. 47]

The raters of district advisors used ratings which varied from province to province. All personnel interviewed at the provincial level denied that progress or decline of HES rating was used as an element in rendering efficiency reports. However, province officers admitted that rating was influenced by whether the rater believed the HES reports were being conscientiously completed. There was no direction from higher headquarters on how raters were to consider HES ratings.

The training and area orientation received by advisory team numbers were limited to a general briefing on Vietnam and another by MACV-CORDS aimed specifically at the problems faced by advisors. Some advisors noted that briefing contents were unrealistic or irrelevant to the problems which they eventually faced. Language training was infrequent and HES ratings were in disagreement with the study team ratings quite often when the advisor was not trained in the Vietnamese language. The study advised much more training of advisors to make them aware of, and sensitive to, the political, social and economic problems in their districts.

On two key issues for image building, "GVN Governmental Management" and "Incidents of Misconduct Adversely Affecting Relations with Hamlet Population" the coefficients were (.000) and (-.061), respectively, when HES opinions are correlated with Villager opinions. It is particularly noted that Simulmatics used only security and development categories. If they were concerned with "image" of the GVN, the indigenous troops, and/or the U.S. military forces, this concern was not made obvious to the reader.

3. Hamlet Evaluation System Handbook, June 1969

This booklet is assumed to have received modification after the Simulmatics/Army Concept Team study was completed in May 1968. It states that the primary purpose of HES was to serve as data for progress reports on Pacification to "the highest levels of government." Use in formative evaluations and program correction by CORDS, Provinces, and Districts was still a secondary purpose.

This booklet shows the addition of a number of questions to assess the credibility of the data collection, but the basic system does not appear to have been significantly changed from the initial system of June 1967. The system in June 1969 was still almost completely dependent upon the judgement of the district advisor.

4. Hamlet Evaluation System--HES/70

Unpublished notes from a Briefing in 1970 indicate that a Revised System, HES/70 had been under development since mid-1968. The revised system operated in parallel with HES between July 1969 and January 1970. The system continues to use an A rating to represent best conditions and E to represent the worst. A V category continues to be used for enemy controlled hamlets.[Ref. 48]

The briefer reported that the old HES system, "has provided a reliable aggregate index to the status of pacification at the hamlet level," and "it has been of great value in planning pacification and allocating assets." He reports that there were shortcomings because of the subjective nature of questions, the use of untrained assessors, and resulting inconsistencies in reports. Furthermore, HES does not measure the effect of economic activity in the private sector, nor does it monitor political participation, or the political orientation of the people. These latter shortcomings are serious when the effectiveness of military civic action is being questioned. The HES/70 system was designed to overcome the problems reported above by:

- Obtaining more specific information,
- Reducing reliance on personal judgment,
- Improving rating procedures.

To evaluate the improvement with HES/70, comparisons were made between HES and HES/70 results during November 1969. While there was substantial agreement, HES/70 evaluations resulted in an increase of hamlets in the D, E, and V categories at the expense of those in A, B, and C. In considering the significance of the relatively small change, it must be remembered that the two systems use district advisors as primary data collectors. No independent data collection of the type performed by the Army Concepts Team and Simulmatics was reported.

The advisors who compiled both HES and HES/70 reports preferred the new system for two reasons:

- Less training and experience is required to work with HES/70 (presumably because of its dependence on simple yes--no questions).
- The district senior advisor is less subject to command and counterpart pressure to award hamlet ratings. (With the new system he does no rating: probability tables are applied to arrive at ratings).

5. A Probabilistic Evaluation of Pacification Indicators--Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc., 15 March 1968

The revision of HES reported above appears to be related to a study reported in March 1968 by Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc. (PTAI), to make indicators of pacification "more objective, and thus achieve an evaluation system which is characterized by reliability and operational simplicity."[Ref. 49]

The study began by interviewing seventy-six respondents from American, Vietnamese, and Free World Forces who worked at villages and hamlet levels. They were asked to list questions which could be answered by directly observable factors in a village or hamlet. An illustration of the questions suggested to test "VC Village Guerrilla Forces" presence is presented in Table VII-1.

Next, the PTAI analysts asked the interviewers to rate the relative importance of the questions selected as significant indicators. Respondents were asked to estimate the probability that a hamlet would be an A and the probability that it would be an E if the answer were "yes" and "no" to a question such as: "Is there a conspicuous absence of people" in the hamlet. The question was asked in several ways and the meaning of probability was explained several times until it was reasonably clear that the persons interviewed understood the objective of this rating. An example of the results for the category "Economic Improvement" is presented in Table VII-2. A low standard deviation is indicative of consistency of response by those interviewed. Straight line interpolation was used to obtain probabilities for B,C, and D categories for each question.

A Bayesian decision model was then developed to permit combining all questions into a rating of the probability that a hamlet is in status A,B,C,D, or E. By contrast, the HES system requires that the district advisor answer a set of questions about a category, such as Economic Improvement, and then judge whether the status is A,B,C,D, or E for that category. A comparison of the results of the two methods is presented in Figure VII-1.

In comparing HES and PTAI results, the analysts again point up the difficulty in using field-grade military officers to evaluate economic progress--particularly when the officer understands the objective to be "GVN sponsored programs." The new method permits tracking the "results" of all programs for economic improvement--whether GVN, other foreign or hamlet initiated. However, the proposed system does not record the performance of military civic action in the rated hamlet.

Table VII-1

INDEPENDENT AGREEMENT AMONG RESPONDENTS
ON DEFINITIVE OBSERVATIONS

VC Village Guerrilla Forces

Observation	Number of Respondents Suggesting Each Observation				
	US (41)	VN (22)	FI (3)	AU (6)	Total (72)
1. Is there a conspicuous absence of people?	3	4			7
2. Is there a general atmosphere of guardedness or hostility?	20	14	1		35
3. Are all the officials absent?	5				5
4. Does the village chief normally sleep in his village residence?	3	3			6
5. Does the hamlet chief normally sleep in his hamlet residence?	7	4		1	12
6. If there is an outpost, do the soldiers sometimes go out at night on patrols?	6	4			10
7. If there are PF, do they act concerned, as if they feel threatened?	6	2			8
8. Are there GVN posters in sight?	4	4			8
9. Are there usable bunkers in homes?	3	2			5

US - United States
VN - Vietnamese
FI - Philippines
AU - Australian


Source: A probabalistic Evaluation of Pacification Indicators, PTAI, p. 22.

Table VII-2

ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT

Probability Values Given an E Hamlet			
Observation	Average Value		Standard Deviation
	Yes	No	
1. Are there operable pumps?	.11	.89	.17
2. Are all the fields near the hamlet under cultivation?	.57	.43	.27
3. Are substantial secondary crops grown?	.19	.81	.20
4. Is there a large mill accessible?	.25	.75	.27
5. Is a significant number of people engaged in local crafts or industries?	.31	.69	.27
6. Do many of the women or girls wear valuable jewelry?	.13	.87	.16
7. Are there several motorized two-wheeled vehicles?	.24	.76	.26
8. Are the people well-clothed?	.11	.89	.10
9. Is there an abundance of livestock?	.19	.81	.25

Source: PTAI, Ibid., p. 38



Source: PTAI, Ibid., p. 66.

Fig. VII-1. Comparison of HES and PTAI Assessment of Pacification.

6. Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS) CORDS, Pacific Studies Group, MACV

A PAAS report [Ref. 50] states that "the semi-structured interview had proved to be the only feasible technique that is capable of encouraging rural populations living in wartime conditions to openly express their attitudes and aspirations." The PAAS uses a quota system rather than a random sample to obtain results such as:

> "24.3% of the respondents in hamlets where elections were held thought that most candidates were the best available. 39.6% stated that some were the best."[Ref. 51]

Also of interest to the potential for an effective Vietnamese civic action program was the following:

> "Of those respondents who thought the council would be better 37.8% indicated that the council would be more honest and 34.4% felt that improvement would come from better administrative ability or training."[Ref. 52]

and

> "Nearly 80% of all respondents stated that they had no problems getting themselves or their produce to markets." [Ref. 53]

Comparisons are made with the HES system and where direct comparisons can be made, the agreement appears to be fair to good. For example, HES D-rated hamlets report primary concern with security, while HES A-rated hamlets are primarily concerned with increasing prices, work problems, and financial problems.

PAAS is designed to measure trends in rural opinion. The summary quotes results in the form of percentages (to the nearest tenth of one percent) in various opinion categories. For example on page vi it is stated that "The May survey indicated a significant increase (26.8% - 34.5%) in the percentage of people who were knowledgeable about the hamlet and village administrative structure." However, there is no indication of the variability in these estimates, or of the number of interviews on which they are based. Thus the reader has no way of assessing the validity of the quoted statement, or of attaching any quantitative meaning to the term "significant." In fact, if, for a given level of confidence in the results, one would have to allow for a variability of, say, five percentage points either way on each of the estimates, then the quoted statement has no validity whatever.

The PAAS system cannot be evaluated with the information available but it must be noted that the interviews are not random samples of the Vietnamese population. The report suggests that this is to be corrected in surveys after May 1970.

7. AIR Impact Assessment Project

Perhaps the greatest interest, of all the projects reviewed, was generated by the Impact Assessment Project being conducted by American Institutes for Research (AIR) in Thailand, under contract with ARPA (contract DAAH01-68-C-1920). The reports summarizing the first 18 months activities [Ref. 54,55,56] were reviewed, later reports being unavailable at the time of this review.

In this project, which must be considered to be a research study of basic methodology, a team in Bangkok has developed a general strategy for evaluating those programs which are aimed at reducing susceptability of villages to influence by communist terrorists. They are now applying the general strategy, and in so doing are attempting to find the best ways of conducting such evaluations. The team hopes that the results found may be transferred to other cultural settings; it seems already obvious that the methodology will at least be transferrable and for the purposes of this review, that is an important conclusion. The reviewers were impressed with the contents of the AIR reports, and strongly suggest that the results of this AIR project be continually reviewed for further military civic action (MCA) program evaluation input.

Of all the systems of evaluation reviewed (e.g., HES, and the others mentioned above), the system being studied by AIR alone appears to have the generality needed to evaluate the extremely wide range of projects which come under the MCA guise. Indeed, it could also be used to evaluate the contribution of non-MCA projects (such as might be funded by private agencies or foundations) to the propensity of villagers to act in a counterinsurgency mode, and to provide evaluations of how such projects might fit into an overall counter-insurgency program.

The methodology being employed in the AIR study is the same general methodology which has been applied in many other research areas; the difference is a focus of interest on socioeconomic programs in a counterinsurgency setting. The general strategy being followed in that project may be outlined as follows:

a) First, the team is developing a number of joint assessment studies with Thai agencies which are engaged in counter-insurgency operations.

b) For each such study, the team develops a detailed rationale (or set of hypotheses) relating inputs to desired outputs.

c) They devise alternative data collection methods for measuring impact, keeping in mind that cost-effectiveness of data collection methods should be measurable.

d) They also include additional measures in data collection to provide both evaluative and diagnostic data for use in improvement of impact.

e) They then attempt to test generality of conclusions from early assessments in later assessments.

Perhaps the two most interesting and important aspects of the evaluation procedure lie in the rationales being developed and in the alternative data collection methods being evaluated. The rationales are explicit statements of the changes which could occur as a result of the projects being evaluated; they relate project inputs to first order changes, then to second order changes, and successively on to desired population response to insurgency. Thus they state, explicitly, the chains of hypotheses which relate input to desired output.

The rationale is then examined for indices which might be used to measure the impact of programs on target behavior. These indices may not be (and probably will not be) direct measures of frequency of actual target behavior, but rather would be indices relating to various measures within the chains of hypotheses. Thus, it would appear possible, using this method, to obtain a measure of counter-insurgency effectiveness of a program applied in an area in which insurgency had not yet occurred to a significant extent. Further, many of the factors required for successful counterinsurgency in a given place may be outside the scope of the individual project being evaluated and thus the reaction of the target population, alone, may not be a good measure of effectiveness of a single program.

Thus, the second important point refers to the development of required indices for which measurements are to be obtained. These indices are inferred from the chain of required hypotheses; it is then necessary to develop data collection methods to supply the 'numbers' for indices. These data collection methods are themselves subjects of investigation, particularly as regards the costs and effectiveness of alternative methods. Many different interviewing techniques, such as critical incident interviews, retrospective time sampling (in place of diary technique), situational proficiency tests, and others are being used, in addition to techniques such as direct observation by a passer-through. Alternate sources of data being studied includes official records and situational reports.

The team is currently applying these techniques to three Thai counterinsurgency projects: (a) a community development project, which is designed to increase the capability of villagers to manage village affairs and solve local problems, (b) the village police project, which is designed to recruit and train villagers to serve in village-based auxiliaries of the regular police and thereby provide resident village security forces more rapidly than would otherwise be possible, and (c) the counterinsurgency aspects of a rapid rural economic development program. Note that this last one is called a program, as it embraces several project areas.

As of August 1970, the team had completed a second evaluation of the village police program and had developed an Index of Village Investment.

In the prior evaluation of the village police system all of the field data had been collected from the police. To eliminate any possible bias the second evaluation was directed toward obtaining data from village populations. A conclusion was reached that the critical incident technique and observations of on-site researchers provide a sound basis for evaluating team-village relations.[Ref. 57]

The second major task completed as of August 1970, initial phases of the Development of an Index of Village Resistance to Subversion, is of particular interest to the evaluation of military civic actions. A general conclusion was reached that:

> "There is an existing capability (instruments, procedures, and specifications for their use) for measuring the extent to which a village is investing its resources in economic, political, and social development. Developing this capability within one or more agencies of the RTG is entirely feasible."[Ref. 58]

Considering that one of the implied criteria for success of military civic action is the participation of the indigenous population in the programs and their continuation of the programs after departure of the military, the AIR finding suggests the possibility of the development of an evaluation instrument for military civic action.

F. Conclusions and Recommended Evaluation Procedure

1. Conclusions Concerning Evaluation Techniques

(a) There is no evaluation system dedicated to military civic action, and there is no evidence that it is either feasible or profitable to create such a system so long as the JCS definition remains as it is now constructed. If the improvement of the image of the indigenous military is the accepted objective of military civic action, success is dependent upon too many other companion programs and external forces for the overall impact of military civic action (Type I) to be evaluated as an independent program.

(b) If "nationbuilding" through socioeconomic programs performed by U.S. and host country military were the primary objective, there would be an even greater need to include companion program in the evaluation. All of the country programs reviewed in this report were minor in level of effort or dollar expenditure when compared to non-military efforts within the country.*

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* The AFAK program in Korea is a possible exception. The expenditures were relatively large and the effort comprehensive. As the following

(c) Quantitative techniques are available to assess the overall impact of country programs which include military civic action as an integral part. Although the best known method, the Hamlet Evaluation System, was of questionable validity as originally performed, it appears that improved versions have moved toward greater objectivity and content of greater relevance to military civic action. Also, the research by AIR, in Thailand appears to be developing even more logical procedures and less expensive collection procedures. This program has not been completed, but there is little to be gained by initiating additional research in quantitative assessment techniques until the AIR methodology is complete and their hypotheses are tested.

(d) If an independent evaluation of program impact can be obtained through present and proposed quantitative assessment techniques, the most valuable direction toward improved military civic action evaluation would be in improving Type III project assessments. This will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

2. Evaluation by Participants

With very few exceptions, the information presently available to evaluate military civic action comes from the personal observations of participants, including U.S. advisors. When these advisors prepare papers on specific country programs for publication in the open literature (e.g., Military Review, Army, etc.) they understandably avoid critical reference to personalities, particularly

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quote indicates, military effort and organization eased the difficulty of establishing civilian programs:

"Korean civil assistance command (KCAC)

Following termination of hostilities in Korea, a military organization was utilized by the U.S. Economic Coordinator as an operating and technical staff for prosecution of the U.S. economic assistance program under the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and its successor organizations, the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). The military agency was designated as the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC) on July 1, 1953, and listed as the 8229th Army Unit (United States). It had been operating previously in connection with the military government organization of the United States command and was ready to serve the Economic Coordinator when he arrived. In view of the difficulty of recruitment of personnel to serve in the austere conditions then prevailing in Korea, it was essential that the available military potential be utilized as a tool for carrying out U.S. programs in the economic field."[Ref. 59]

as evidenced by the negative behavior of host governments and superiors. However, the face-to-face interviews held by RTI analysts with participants and the transcripts of relatively informal conferences on civic action suggest that personal and governmental commitment, motivation, and personal response are critical to program evaluation.

The first-hand observations of participants may be the only feasible source of information for Type III evaluations--those which indicate project-level managerial and operational efficiency. The objective outsider may logically measure material progress and, in some cases, changes in behavior toward the military. However, he cannot so logically answer the following:

- Was the indigenous military participant dedicated to the project or motivated to carry it out?
- How was a favorable personal response obtained and maintained?
- How were the needs of the recipients determined?
- How was the cooperation of the village headman obtained?
- How was local culture used to facilitate planning and implementation?

Informal comments by participants indicate that such questions can be answered in some cases when the project was rated a success, but the participant can almost always answer such behavior oriented questions when the project failed for behavioral reasons.

Some useful input for learning "how" to successfully implement or improve existing military civic action doctrine should be obtained if each U.S. Advisor were asked to prepare a final lessons-learned report on grass-roots experience. However, much more valuable input should be available through structured interviews of both U.S. and host country participants.

3. Analysis Categories for a Structured Interview

The basic doctrine of military civic action used by every service and every participating country is much the same. "In fact, civic action is based on common sense principles of human relations that are really quite obvious," say Army Lt. Colonels Livingston and Watson.[Ref. 60] The principles which have found their way into much of the doctrine of civic action include: civilian self-help, military and civilian teamwork, U.S. motivation of host country counterparts, projects based on population needs, and building/encouraging grass-roots institutions to continue socioeconomic improvement. But the officers quoted above also say, "We have grabbed the outer trappings of a sound society improvement idea and have put it into practice without first making sure we had <u>all the parts</u> or that we thoroughly understood <u>how</u> to make them function." [underlining added]

In a continuing study for the U.S. Army, Niehoff has attempted to deal with "all of the parts". Although he has not

identified all of the necessary and sufficient parts, he has categorized the criteria which he believes to be important in achieving success in grass-roots civic action projects. The criteria are listed in Table VII-3, Final Analysis Categories, and are discussed in paragraphs to follow. Niehoff refers to the criteria as, ". . . factors that influence the success or failure of planned change projects . . ."[Ref. 61]

In order to develop a beginning outline for a structured interview for military civic action, this study used the Niehoff analysis categories in an attempt to isolate possible causes of success and failure of the few grass-roots civic action reports which were uncovered. The results were promising, but two major additions were required:

(a) Niehoff categories were tested on 203 cases of non-military civic type projects. A category was added to test the ability to maintain local security. The experience of International Voluntary Services, Inc. in Laos and simple logic suggests that the best of programs will fail when security needs cannot be met.

(b) Niehoff concentrates upon village level activities. National program reviews in earlier paragraphs show the importance of commitment (e.g., the all-out friendship of Magsaysay) and cooperation at the National, District, and Province level by both U.S. Advisors and the host country to both the security and socioeconomic efforts. These factors were examined in the countries for which grass-roots information was available.

(c) Niehoff does not deal with the problem of "how" to make civic action parts function, but it is proposed that such questions can be formulated (during participant interviews) from the augmented Niehoff structure.

4. Niehoff Categories

a. Local Cultural Characteristics

(1) Leaders--Introduces innovations through local leaders, because their support is critical for the sanction and implementation of new ideas and programs. Types of local leaders whose backing can be crucial to the introduction of innovations include:

(a) Administrators--appointed bureaucrats on all levels above the village, and the traditional village headman.

(b) Educators.

(c) Religious leaders.

Table VII-3

FINAL ANALYSIS CATEGORIES

Local Cultural Characteristics

1. Leaders
   - A. Administrators
   - B. Educators
   - C. Religious
   - D. Civic
   - E. Noninstitutional
2. Social Structure
   - A. Kinship
   - B. Caste-Class
   - C. Ethnic
   - D. Political
   - E. Central Authority
3. Economic Pattern
   - A. Work Methods
   - B. Work Schedules
   - C. Work Groupings
   - D. Proprietary Rights
   - E. Distribution Patterns
4. Beliefs
   - A. Supernatural
   - B. Medical
   - C. Attitude Toward Change
5. Practices
   - A. Consumption
   - B. Recreation
   - C. Bathing

Motivation for Change

6. Felt Needs
   - A. Solicited
   - B. Demonstrated
   - C. Ascertained
   - D. Generated
7. Perceived Practical Benefit
   - A. Economic
   - B. Medical
   - C. Educational
   - D. Convenience
8. Other Motivation
   - A. Competition
   - B. Reward-Punishment
   - C. Novelty

Project Strategies

9. Image Characteristics
   - A. Personal
   - B. Age
   - C. Technical Competence
   - D. Organizational Affiliation
10. Communication
    - A. Use of Local Language
    - B. Formal Meetings
    - C. Mass Media
    - D. Demonstration
    - E. Interpersonal
    - F. Intragroup
11. Participation
    - A. Labor and Material Contributions
    - B. Organizational
    - C. Passive
12. Other Strategies
    - A. Flexibility
    - B. Continuity
    - C. Timing
    - D. Maintenance

(d) Civic leaders—such as leaders of farmers' clubs, cooperatives, PTAs, and welfare institutions.

(e) Noninstitutional leaders—those who have position and following stemming from personal characteristics, wealth, religious merit, or some other locally accepted criteria for prestige.

(2) Social Structure--Adapts innovations to suit the existing social structure. However, if an innovation is not compatible with the existing social patterns, recipients may be motivated to alter their social patterns on their own accord. (It should be noted that in most instances in which social structure has been mentioned as significant, it was reported as having had a negative influence on the process of innovation. Presumably this may have happened because the Western and Westernized change agents were largely ignorant of, or made few attempts to adapt the projects to, the local patterns of social structure.) The more important types of social patterns affecting change projects are those associated with kinship and caste or class relations. Also to be observed are political party membership and the attitude toward central authority by the peasantry, mainly a project of treatment they have received in the past.

(3) Economic Pattern--Utilizes an innovation strategy that produces maximum benefit to the recipients, with minimum disruption to the traditional economic pattern. However, when the recipient people perceive great economic benefits from an innovation, they also tend to be willing to modify the traditional economic practices. Local economic patterns of significance include work methods, work schedules, work groupings, proprietary rights, and distribution patterns. Of these, work methods and proprietary rights appear to be the least amenable to change.

(4) Beliefs--Initiates an innovation project in a manner which the recipient groups perceive as being closely compatible with, rather than counter to, their existing beliefs. (Despite the fact that, when mentioned in case histories, beliefs usually were reported as being negative toward the goals of the respective projects, they did not generally prevent innovation acceptance, especially when innovations were presented in ways which promised significant benefits to the local people.) The beliefs of primary significance are those involving supernatural concepts, traditional medical beliefs, and attitudes toward the possibility of change through self-help.

(5) Practices--Introduces innovations that accord with customary habits or practices of food consumption or can be adapted to the existing recreation patterns. Consumption patterns were more likely to be mentioned as a resistance factor when the perceived gain for changing habits was quite low in relation to the extent of the behavioral changes involved in adopting the innovation.

b. Motivation for Change

(6) Felt Needs--Introduces innovations that satisfy existing or felt needs of the recipients. Utilization of recipients' own felt needs was found to be the most significant motivational force for inducing change. More specifically, success is more likely if the change agent introduces innovations on the basis of:

(a) Solicited felt needs of the recipients—needs of which they are aware to the extent that they solicit assistance from the change agent. (It should be noted, however, that recipients may solicit assistance not so much because they are interested in the innovations but because of material rewards they expect to obtain by cooperating. In such instances innovations may be discontinued when the material rewards are withdrawn.)

(b) Recipients' demonstrated felt needs—needs which the recipients have attempted to fulfill through their own efforts.

(c) Ascertained felt needs--those which are decided upon through mutual consultation of the change agent and the potential recipients.

(d) Needs deliberately generated by the change agent, provided that the recipients perceive the innovations as advantageous.

(7) Perceived Practical Benefit--Introduces innovations that provide practical benefits, especially economic ones. The important point is that it is the recipients' perception that matters most in the selection of innovations by the change agent; what the change agent perceives as economically beneficial may not be so perceived by the recipients. With respect to short-term and long-term benefits of innovations, it is postuated that:

(a) Innovations that the recipients perceive as providing immediate benefits will be more readily accepted than those based on long-term gains.

(b) Although innovations that produce benefits over a long period of time may be the most valuable, the success of initial innovation projects can be expected to be greater if the change agent selects innovations that provide a combination of short- and long-term benefits.

(8) Other Motivation--Introduces innovations that provide individuals and groups with a positive stimulus for competition. Individuals will take part in a change effort, because for participation, they expect to receive something they value through the change agency (reward), or because they believe they will be punished if they do not participate, or because they see positive value in the innovation itself. The novelty of an innovation can also affect reaction to it.

c. Project Strategies

(9) Image Characteristics--Change agent has a favorable image to the people he is trying to influence. The critical element is not so much what the change agent is now but how he is perceived. The image as perceived by the recipient group can be subdivided into (a) personal characteristics of the change agent, especially his ability to establish rapport and to empathize with the recipients of innovations, (b) his technical expertise, and (c) his organizational affiliation. A program is more likely to succeed if the recipient group has a favorable image of the change agent's organization.

(10) Communication--Utilizes culturally acceptable and effective communication strategies that provide a two-way flow of information between him and the people he is trying to influence. Use of the local language by the change agent is principally a problem with foreigners, although government workers can come from different parts of a given country and consequently not be conversant in the local language. It is suggested that knowing the local language provides three advantages: establishing rapport more easily with the local people, learning the local cultural patterns more efficiently, and transferring ideas through other communication channels more efficiently. But direct communication channels are not necessarily open simply because a change agent knows the local language.

Communication may be through group meetings, mass media or demonstration. Demonstration is different from all other forms of communication in that it provides "proofs" of advantages. Interpersonal communication is the transmission of messages by means of

face-to-face interaction, usually in paired or small group situations. While a change agent may establish certain channels of communication to transfer his ideas to the potential adopters, interaction does not stop at this point. Informal conversation or gossip about the proposal begins among the villagers, and it is probably at this time that decisions are actually made to adopt or not to adopt. The conversation thus generated is called inter-group communication.

(11) Participation--Utilizes participation by recipients in project planning and implementation. Participation at the planning stage helps adapt the project to the existing social and cultural patterns, and subsequent participation in the form of contributions, such as material goods and labor, helps create a vested interest in the project.

(12) Other strategies:

(a) Flexibility in change projects is a willingness to alter methods or innovation characteristics when unforeseen problems occur in the implementation process.

(b) Continuity is persistent action to introduce a new idea even with modifications.

(c) Timing is the utilization of a special event, or conditions, which will improve the change of introducing an innovation.

(d) Establishing patterns for maintaining an innovation is a final but crucial technique needed for integration of an innovation. Integration of the new idea or technique into the local society will not take place unless there are patterns for maintaining it when the change agents leave. The three most important needs are: training local people in new skills; establishment of organizational responsibility for continuing the innovation; and establishment of a source for new materials, particularly reading material for new literates.

5. Evaluation of Example Civic Action Programs and Projects

Table VII-4, Type III Evaluation of Example Projects, shows the results of applying the Niehoff criteria, as augmented, to six military civic action programs for which project level information was available in fair detail. The Philippines, Marine CAP, and Laos Programs

Table VII-4

TYPE III EVALUATION OF EXAMPLE PROJECTS

Legend:

(+) - Positive Statements
(-) - Negative Statements
* - Mixed or Neutral
Blank - No Statement by Source

ANALYSIS CATEGORIES	Military Civic Action							Civilian Projects				
	Philippines	Marine CAP-VN	Phong Bac-CAP-VN	Royal Lao Program (1)	Second Lao Program (2)	OPN. WASH GREEN-VN		Philippines CARE	Dom. Rep. CARE	Nicaragua CARE	Dim. Rep. OCD	IVS-Laos
I. CULTURAL CHARACTERISTICS:												
Work Thru Local Leaders	+	+	+	+	-	+		+				+
Suitable to Social Structure	+	+		+		+						
Economic Patterns Observed	+	+	+	*		+		+	+			
Existing Beliefs Observed								+				
Behavioral Practices Observed			+			+		+				
II. MOTIVATION FOR CHANGE:												
Felt Needs Determined	+	+	+	+		+		+	+	+	+	
Perceived Practical Benefit	+	+	+		+	+		+	+	+		+
Other Motivation	+	+	+						+			
III. PROJECT STRATEGIES:												
Local Security Maintained (RTI)	+	+	+			+						-
Change-Agent Motivated (RTI)	+	+	+	+				+	+			+
Agent Has Good Image Initially	-	-	-	-	-			+	+			+
Agent "Technically" Competent			+	-	-				-			+
Communication Strategies:												
Use Local Language	+	*			-			+				+
Demonstration Projects	+	+	+			+		+		+		+
Interpersonal Commo.	+	+	+	+	-	+						+
Group Commo.	+		+	+		+						
Mass Media	+		+							+		
Local Participation:												
Labor and Material	+	+	+	+	+	+		+	+	+	+	
Planning	+		+			+						
Flexible Project Strategy	+		+					+	*			
Continuity in Implementation	+		+	-						-		-
Timing	+		+	-	-							
Project Locally Maintainable	+		+	+				+	+	-	+	
Success (✓) Failure (x) Measured by												
Material Accomplishments	✓	✓	✓	✓	x	✓		✓	*	x	✓	x
Evidence of Rapport Gained	✓		✓		x	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓
Assistance in Military Effort	✓	✓	✓	x	x	✓						
Source Reference No.												

are composites. The other two are narrative accounts of pacification activities in specific hamlets. Specific comments can be found in each of the referenced documents which indicate that positive (+) steps were taken in the categories so marked, and difficulties were experienced in the categories with negative (-) marking. In other categories, the subject was discussed in the document, but its impact on the project was either neutral or mixed (*). When no mention was made of the specific category, the cell is left blank.

Five civilian projects are also shown in the table so that a comparison can be between the information disclosed in military civic action reports and that found in selected voluntary agency project reports. These reports were obtained from the offices of agencies visited by RTI analysts in the companion project, Evaluation of Civilian Techniques. The CARE reports are on specific projects, the others are composite country programs.

The two categories added by RTI are so marked. They are Local Security Maintained and Change-Agent Motivated. The former category is of obvious signifiance to military programs, but it also is relevant to the IVS program in Laos. The two negative indicators of this terminated project are lack of local security and, the companion indicator, failure to maintain continuity of implementation. The two military programs in Laos had similar problems, but they apparently suffered from many other flaws.

A most interesting comparison can be made between the Phi ippine military program and the civilian project reported by CARE. Both examples were evaluated by participants and each covered many of the analysis categories in explaining the success of their programs. The CARE reporter [Ref. 62] was guided toward commenting on the positively marked categories by the standard project evaluation format which CARE employs. The Philippine military example is a composite local project compiled by RTI from a number of separate reports by both U.S. military advisors and Philippine Army participants. Picking local level examples to illustrate his point, each participant would emphasize one or more categories which was most important from his vantage point as civil affairs officer, intelligence officer, advisor, or tactical unit commander.

All of the military projects in the table have in common the initial "poor image" on the part of the military. Niehoff discusses the positive effect of a good personal image and also explains that a program is more likely to succeed if the recipient group has a favorable image of the change agent's organization. This is an interesting contrast to the hypothesis that successful military civic action programs enhance the image of the military organization. It is useful to examine the hypothesis that the military change-agent must win personal respect before he can complete successful programs which then improve the image of his organization. The category "Change-Agent Motivated" was added to lead toward an evaluation of this hypothesis through interviews with former participants.

Reporters of the Philippine case study, the IVS study, and the Marine Combined Action Program stressed the importance of change-agent motivation and the need to develop this motivation by training and careful selection of personnel. Other documents highlight the lack of motivation, and resulting poor performance, of the ARVN soldier, the Lao soldier, and many U.S. tactical unit soldiers in performing military civic action. The latter category, the U.S. soldier, is typically motivated to help those who are friendly toward him; but he is not disposed to "turn the other cheek" to help those who help his enemy. The Marine Corps experience suggests that a soldier can be motivated through the Personal Response Program to accept the antagonism of the villager and to change this attitude through his own actions. The program also tries to make it clear to him that it is in his own best interest to be motivated toward the socio-economic betterment of the hamlet.

The principal role of the change agent is summarized in the following quote from the HSRI study Planned Social Change:[Ref. 63]

> "Since tension between order and change is inherent in society, the practitioner of planned social change is intervening in an already on-going process of change, which is influenced and to some degree controlled by the existing social structure of the society. His first job is not to initiate his own plan of change; it is to understand the pressures for change into which he is now intruding as an additional variable. This point goes far beyond the usual injunction to 'understand the strange new culture and customs in which you, the American, find yourself'. What we are saying here is that beyond cultural or any other kinds of differences between the American and his new work environment, there are inherent, fundamental needs for him and his superiors to think of himself in the most general sense as an additional probabilistic variable, in a set of complex processes already governed by many variables in very complex interaction.
>
> "The FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT in defining, planning, and supporting social changes in a host society is, therefore, not to apply a theory or model to a new situation, but to diagnose the intrusion of the practitioner, the objectives behind him, and his supporting infrastructure as new and complex variables, using whatever perspectives will insure the broadest appreciation of all the consequences of the entry of these variables into a social system."

The limited hamlet level data available do not justify further generalization. They are sufficient to suggest that the augmented Niehoff analysis categories comprise a useful initial list for preparing a structured interview for a test of this method of Type III Project Evaluation (Are projects being managed in accordance with the

principles in present civic action doctrine?), and of Type II Formative Evaluation (Can lessons be learned about how to improve the effectiveness of military civic action through new training programs, new personnel selection techniques, and new operating techniques?). The value of information gained through such interviews can be enhanced if data are also available from independent quantitative assessments of results to confirm or counter the participants rating of project or program success.

Table VII-5, Summary Evaluation of Example Civic Action Programs, suggests the kind of higher governmental level information which should also be obtained from the interviewed former participants. The National, Province, and District level categories are essentially an expansion of the hamlet level category "Work Thru Local Leaders". Even in this summary table, the intent is to examine characteristics of Village/Hamlet level project, but the literature discloses numerous examples of local level failures because of the actions or inaction of higher echelons of the military or civilian government; and the commitment at the highest levels by Magsaysay of the Philippines, H.I.M. the Shananshah of Iran, and the President of Columbia are often cited as essential elements of their successful programs. Firm commitment at the top does wonders for cooperation at Province and District levels.

6. Recommendations

a. Design Participant Interview Procedure

(1) Design survey instruments for a structured interview of U.S. and foreign military officers and enlisted men who are now in the United States and who have participated in overseas military civic action programs.

(2) Design analysis techniques.

(3) Select a sample of officers and enlisted men to include experience in each operating area in which the U.S. has advised, trained, and/or participated in significant military civic action programs.

(4) Interview these participants.

(5) Analyze the results using appropriate techniques.

(6) Revise the instrument and recommend a procedure for routine evaluation of military civic action through interviews and/or questionnaires.

(7) Apply and verify the instrument at overseas location at on-site civic action projects.

b. Continue review of AIR procedures for quantitative assessment of counterinsurgency program impact, and evaluate this methodology for application to military civic action assessment.

Table VII-5

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF EXAMPLE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS

	Example Civic Action Programs									
	Viet Nam GAMO	Viet Nam RD	Viet Nam CAP	VN Wash. Green	Phili-ppines	VN Special Forces	Korea AFAK	Columbia	Laos (1)	Laos (2)
National Level:										
Commitment Host Govt. - Mil.	+	+	-		+	+	+	+	-	--
Commitment Host Govt. - Civ.	-	+	-		+	-	+	+	+	--
Commitment U.S. Adv. - Mil.	+	+	-	+	+	+				
Commitment U.S. Adv. - Civ.	*	+	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	+
Province Level										
Coordination Effective		-	*	+	+	-	+		-	--
District Level										
Coordination Effective		-	*	+	+	-	+			
Village/Hamlet										
Local Security Maintained	+	-	+	+	+	+		+	-	Prog.
Culture Observed	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Never
Motivation										Fully
Of MCA Team	+	*	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	Imple-
Of People	-	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	*	mented
Project Strategy	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	
Overall Program Impact In Area of Operation	-	-	+	+	+	*	+	+	*	--
Source of Information:										
U.S. Advisor	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Host Country Mil.		✓			✓			✓	✓	
Outside Observer			✓		✓			✓		

Legend: (+) - Indication of Positive Behavior
(-) - Indication of Negative Behavior or Results
* - Mixed or Neutral Indicators
Blank - No Information

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VIII. HYPOTHESES

A. General

Military civic action is based on several key hypotheses that also underlie nonmilitary economic and social development, especially the type broadly designated community development. Both military civic action and community development involve purposeful intervention in the cultural pattern of communities, primarily through efforts to promote higher standards of living. Although the practice of intervening in this fashion has gained quite a respectable following, the rationale for it remains largely hypothetical.

Hypothesis is used here in the sense of denoting "an interpretation of a practical situation or condition taken as the ground for action," implying "insufficiency of presently attainable evidence and therefore a tentative explanation."[Ref. 1] Hypotheses are necessary when a situation appears to require action or afford an opportunity for action but cannot be fully described and explained by available factual knowledge. An hypothesis is useful so long as it is not found to contain fallacies of reason or fact and it contributes to achieving the aims for which it is postulated. Hence none can be accepted uncritically, and every application should be considered also to be a test. When fallacies come to light, the hypothesis must be modified or discarded. When the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that it corresponds to objective reality, the hypothesis becomes a fact.

In the realm of human behavior, hypotheses with universal application are rare because of the complexity and diversity of individuals, groups, and their environments. Nevertheless, hypotheses that have been found sound* when applied in a number of socioeconomic situations provide an indispensable tool for approaching the solution of problems involving change in cultural attitudes and behavior. What appears to lead many into confusion and frustration is unquestioning acceptance of hitherto sound hypotheses as valid in the face of evidence that they do not apply in particular instances. A more productive approach to using these hypotheses might result from a more lively awareness of their nature and a better grasp of the relationship between hypothetical bases for actions and the objectives of actions.

B. Hypotheses Underlying Community Development

1. General

As previously mentioned, military civic action shares basic hypotheses with the field of community development. In fact, the

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* "Sound, which may be applied to both persons and concepts, implies avoidance of fallacies, insufficient evidence, and hasty conclusions, and stresses solid foundation in fact or in reason or both, as well as the habit of clear and deliberate thought, often with an admixture of shrewd and practical sense." Webster's Third New International Dictionary.

current military conception of economic and social development of local populations derives far more from the civilian experience than from any historical activities of armed forces that might be interpreted as such. Therefore, it will be useful to first examine some of these hypotheses in the civilian context.

2. External Agents Can Develop Communities

The fundamental assumption in community development is that outsiders can judge what socioeconomic improvement is for any given community. It is assumed that the social and economic structure as well as patterns of living can be ascertained, analyzed, and explained by anyone equipped with background in community development theory and techniques. Making use of concepts developed in the fields of psychology, anthropology, sociology, and political and economic ideology, one can identify "needs" of the community which, if satisfied, will "improve" the lives of community members. In the background of this assumption are recognition of the dynamic nature of human cultures and a certain amount of ethnocentrism.

It is manifest that cultures are not static. Whatever the direction and at whatever rate, changes do inevitably occur in environments and in human living patterns. They may originate either spontaneously in the evolutionary process or they may appear in response to external influences. Whether the changes represent improvement (progress, development) depends largely upon the values of the observer and his own cultural conditioning. The cultural anthropologist at one extreme strives to preserve his role as disinterested observer, viewing all features--including change--in the context of the culture under observation, whereas the community developer at the other extreme studies the culture in terms of needed improvement. The community developer holds change to be something for him to stimulate, initiate, or influence.

The community developer typically is oriented toward the dominant culture of the Western countries; his vocation, in fact, is a product of that culture's value system. He sees societies as advanced or backward in terms of technological and material achievement. He assesses the level of development in a community in relation to standards of living of the more affluent industrialized societies and considers changes that bring a community nearer those standards of living to be improvement. Advanced nations enjoy the benefits of more enlightened medical science, as evidenced by greater average life expectancy, lower infant mortality rates, more effective prevention and cure of disease, and higher standards of general health. Their culture regards as essential conveniences in transportation, communication, housing, education, public order, and production and marketing of consumer goods and services at a level superior to that of societies with less complex technology. The community developer accepts "higher standards of living" as corresponding to "better life"; he tends to view the values of advanced nations with regard to general and scientific knowledge, economic activity, social relationships, material wealth,

political processes, and ethics as generally valid for humankind. Having the resources of advanced technology and of knowledge amassed by scientists in the fields of human and social behavior to draw upon, he is confident that he can identify areas in the cultural pattern of backward societies in which change ("development") will contribute to a higher standard of living. In short, he knows how to improve people.

This assumption is shared by individuals and agencies with differing conceptions of how the higher standard of living improves life for the community. The missionary sees improvement as change conducive to propagation of his own world view. The politically oriented community developer sees improvement as change which leads to more democracy, stable government, nationalist sentiment, or the like. The humanitarian, whose aims come closest to being the common denominator, wants to reduce ignorance, poverty, disease, and the sufferings attendant on these ills. Each champion of community development tends to emphasize as genuine improvement those changes which are in accord with his aims. For example, one author finds that

> ". . . the avowed purpose of those establishing community development programs is to incorporate village communities in the life of the nation."[Ref. 2]

Another says:

> "So much emphasis has been placed on physical and economic improvements as ends in themselves that people have lost sight of the fact that the prime purpose of community development is to build and strengthen the processes of a free, self-determining society in order to provide man with an environment which in itself creates initiative for the responsible solution of problems."[Ref. 3]

Although all community developers agree that their mission is improvement of other people and they appear to be engaged in the same enterprise, their diverse orientations lead them to see the end product differently. Obviously the one who sets himself the tasks "to awaken a desire for a better life in the people" and "to help develop the confidence that improvements are attainable" [Ref. 4] has a far more complex view of development than the one who is satisfied with assisting isolated villagers to lower their infant mortality rate. Nevertheless, each is persuaded that successful accomplishment of his program will enable him to say that life has been made better for the community.

Considering that ignorance, poverty, health, and suffering are relative states, we must acknowledge that the views of the community regarding its own deficiencies may not coincide with those of the outsider. What to members of the community is knowledge may appear to the outsider superstition, prejudice, blind faith, or mere glimmering of understanding. The level of affluence that is poverty in one society is wealth in another. Literacy, where there is little occasion

to write and no opportunity or motivation to read, can be meaningless. Health and suffering will probably be gauged by each by quite different standards. Moreover, a community may be disinclined to hold as improvement any changes that have unfavorable effects on individuals or on the political, social, economic, or ecological system of which it is a part. There are even societies that subscribe to philosophies in which it is unseemly to be much concerned about material goods. These factors raise further questions relative to criteria by which to identify what is improvement.

- Is change improvement if the culture does not define it as such, or if the members of the society themselves do not?
- Is change improvement if its consequences include deterioration or displacement of the community's traditional culture?
- Is change improvement if it operates to the benefit of some elements of the community and not others?
- With what degree of confidence is it possible to forecast the ramifications of a given change?

In addition, there are two practical questions that one can hardly expect to have the same answer in any and all situations and circumstances:

- Is change improvement if it is only temporary; that is, if it is accomodated for a while, but not assimilated into the culture?
- When, in a process of effecting improvement, is a state of improvement attained? In other words, when the objective is to improve something, at what point can one say that the objective has been reached?

The literature indicates that these questions receive varying degrees of attention from practitioners and theorists in community development, but that no one has succeeded in providing generally satisfactory approaches to answer them. A few are concerned about "cultural arrogance" and "cultural imperialism"; some worry about the likelihood that unforeseen adverse effects may result from intervention. There are those who insist that genuine improvements must be "permanent" improvements, and there are those who feel that any change for the better justifies intervention.

Despite the numerous reports of community development programs that failed or had only limited success, the hypothesis that outsiders can identify changes that will improve a community cannot logically be discarded. Experience has proven that the cultural patterns of communities can be and are influenced by outside forces. However, the diversity and complexity of human behavior make it unlikely that the hypothesis as stated above will ever be proven universally valid. Therefore, it remains an hypothesis that can be tested only when improvement is clearly defined for the circumstances, yet is worthy of consideration when it appears that socioeconomic development of a population will contribute to an objective.

3. Community Development Promotes Stability

Those who have an interest in the stability of a social order hypothesize that improvement in living conditions promotes stability. It is assumed that instability threatens when people come into contact with more affluent societies and are stimulated to desire a higher standard of living for themselves. In these days, such contacts are inevitable. If expectations rise and fail to be satisfied, people become disaffected toward the existing order, making them easy prey to subversion. Socioeconomic development projects tend to neutralize the appeal of promises made by subversive elements by helping the people meet their rising expectations.

Experience has shown that this hypothesis does not hold true in all applications. Where the specific deficiencies causing unrest or tending to cause unrest in a community are identified, projects designed to overcome them have been judged to have a salutary effect. Even the hope of betterment stimulated by such projects has a stabilizing influence. Paradoxically, however, satisfying present expectations can sometimes generate even higher expectations, attended by greater instability.

4. Community Development Enhances Image of Sponsor

It is hypothesized that members of a community are induced by community development projects to view the sponsor and outside participants in a more favorable light. Even where the people's gratitude cannot be counted on, it is expected that the participation of outsiders in promoting improvements will persuade the community that the outsiders are well-disposed toward them. This hypothesis is extremely difficult to test because attitudes are very complex, changeable, and not easily ascertained.

5. Changed Attitude Results in Changed Behavior

It is hypothesized that improvement in a community's attitude toward the sponsor of its community development projects will result in greater acceptance of and cooperation with the sponsor. This is a part of the rationale behind economic and social development programs of national governments seeking to promote national consciousness and loyalty at the grass roots. At the level of the community development worker, cooperation of the people is essential to introducing cultural change.

Such response is met with frequently enough to justify consideration of this hypothesis in various types of community development, yet the possibility cannot be disregarded that a favorable change in attitude may not produce a meaningful change in behavior. For example, the people may be constrained by the presence of hostile neighbors to remain passively or even actively uncooperative. It is also possible for a favorable attitude to coexist with such strong cultural obstacles that cooperative behavior is not forthcoming.

6. Operational Hypotheses

It is widely held that community development cannot take place unless the economic and social development projects fill a felt need of the members of the community. This hypothesis is tied to the assumption that the community is not genuinely improved unless the projects are aimed at satisfying aspirations of sufficient importance to the community to accept the projects as worth while. It has even come to be viewed as an integral feature of community development where this is seen as a self-sustaining program of continual improvement.

Closely related to this is the hypothesis that self-help, or full participation in projects by the members of the community, must be present in genuine community development. Only if the beneficiaries are involved in the projects by contributing labor and other resources is there any likelihood that they will carry on projects independent of outside stimulus and support.

C. Hypotheses in Military Civic Action

1. General

Military establishments are in a somewhat better position to define their systems of economic and social development of local populations than civilian proponents of community development are to define theirs. Armed forces can always relate their interest in such activities to the missions assigned to them by their governments. The definition of military civic action (see Appendix C) used in this discussion,

> ". . . the participation of military forces in projects useful to a local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development,"

is not difficult to interpret in association with the objectives this activity is employed to serve.

As stated earlier, there are hypotheses which the concept of military civic action shares with community development. The fundamental assumption is the same: hypotheses regarding socioeconomic development as promoting stability, enhancing the image of the sponsor, and producing change in attitudes and behavior are very similar. Felt need and self help are concepts that also have a place in military civic action. In fact, military civic action is widely regarded as community development carried on by armed forces. Categorization of military civic action by types is developed in paragraph G, Appendix E. Hypotheses related to each of these types is discussed below.

2. External Agents Can Develop Communities

Armed forces engaged in indigenous military civic action are less likely to have difficulty in defining improvement for a local population than outsiders more remote from the cultural pattern of the community. Communication and understanding are much simpler where there are few or no differences in language and custom between the armed forces and the civilians. Indigenous military personnel will be better able to grasp intuitively the ramifications of economic and social change and therefore able to weigh short-range and long-range effects with respect to the background of their objectives. The views of fellow countrymen, even if they are not members of the local community, on improving the standard of living will in many instances be more acceptable than those of aliens. Furthermore, the national government may have a program of development which has identified the improvements to be stimulated, supported, or administered. Consequently, the hypothesis that outsiders can judge what is improvement for a given community has a fairly high probability of being proven valid in indigenous military civic action.

Armed forces engaged in overseas military civic action can be expected to have difficulties similar to those of alien civilian community developers in defining improvement. However, the objectives of alien armed forces are likely to make short-range effects more important, so that the ramifications of change in the distant future are of less immediate concern to them. It is also probable that they have less time and capability to study the community and its cultural configuration. The hypothesis that they can judge what is improvement for a given community must be modified in the light of their background and objectives.

In joint military civic action, the hypothesis has a higher probability of validity if the identification of improvement for a local population is the task of indigenous military civic action personnel.

3. Socioeconomic Development Promotes Stability

Nation-building military civic action derives partly from the hypothesis that economic and social development promote stability among the population and partly from the desire to utilize the armed forces' resources in promoting the country's economic growth. The hypothesis was mentioned as one underlying community development; the same reservations as to its validity are appropriate here.

4. Socioeconomic Development Enhances Image of Sponsor

The hypothesis that sponsorship of economic and social development projects enhances the image of the sponsor is widely considered to have been the cornerstone of modern military civic action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff appear to have been thinking of indigenous armed

forces as the ones to whom this benefit should accrue. Nevertheless, U.S. forces abroad have carried on overseas military civic action to improve their standing with indigenous populations. National governments sometimes direct their armed forces to participate in community economic and social development projects with the aim of fostering a better image of themselves among local populations.

The improved image is hypothesized to result in increased acceptance of and cooperation with the agency identified as the sponsor of improvements. In indigenous, overseas, and joint image-building military civic action, the military objective is to minimize friction between armed forces personnel and civilians, induce passive cooperation with the military in its operations in and around the civilian community, and encourage active cooperation with the military in countersubversion and counterinsurgent activities, as appropriate to the situation.

The complexity of human behavior makes it improbable that this hypothesis can ever be fully validated. Obviously, the attitude of the population toward the sponsor is immaterial except as this attitude may influence behavior. The attitude of a community may be quite favorable toward the sponsor, but various factors may mitigate against its being evidenced by acts. Behavior itself may appear to be cooperative without being genuinely or wholly so, and it may be motivated by other considerations than a favorable attitude.

National image-building military civic action attenuates the hypothesis by seeking to identify the military as an agent of the government in economic and social development projects carried out by armed forces. However logical the connection may be, it has been reported that underdeveloped communities are seldom persuaded to consider the military to represent the civil government. Instances have been reported where the local population accepted the armed forces as benefactors to the detriment of civil authority.

In cases where privation is obvious to all and must be alleviated, relief and welfare military civic action is conducted with little or no reference to the hypotheses of economic and social development. Any appropriate assistance to sufferers is improvement, and image-building quite often is only an incidental consideration. The favorable image cannot be counted on to persist beyond termination of the relief activities; in fact, termination may have a counterproductive effect.

5. Changed Attitude Results in Changed Behavior

As was seen in the discussion of this hypothesis relative to community development, the desired behavior is not certain to flow from a desired change in attitude. Not only may cooperative behavior be blocked by external influences or internal obstacles; the community may develop such dependence upon the agents of economic and social change that the latter derive no benefit from the type of cooperation achieved.

6. Operational Hypotheses

The hypothesis that economic and social improvement projects do not represent genuine development unless they fill a need felt by the members of the community is encountered in the literature of military civic action. The hypothesis that participation by the community in such projects is essential to achieving development is likewise emphasized. Nevertheless, it is nowhere maintained that experience proves that military civic action cannot attain objectives if the elements of felt need and self-help are lacking.

D. Utility of Hypotheses

In view of the sense in which hypothesis is used here, it may seem that too much emphasis has been placed on pointing out that the hypotheses explained above have not been shown to have universal validity. Obviously, if there were conclusive evidence that an interpretation of the practical situation or condition corresponded under all circumstances to objective reality, the interpretation would no longer be hypothetical. The emphasis is felt to be justified by the frequency with which hypotheses in economic and social development have been accepted as applicable in circumstances quite different from those in which they have proven valid.

Even the hypothesis essential to the existence of community development, that one can judge what is improvement of others, must be accepted critically as an hypothesis, not as a generally true factual statement. Ward Hunt Goodenough observes that

> ". . . existing scientific knowledge does not allow us to answer all questions as to the psychological, social, and cultural forces affecting cooperation in purposive change. Indeed some of the answers that have been given in the name of science may not prove correct. Knowledge of the processes of social change is still sketchy."[Ref. 5]

Yet it is rare that anyone in the literature comes close to admitting that there may be circumstances in which it is not feasible to undertake community development or military civic action. There is frequent discussion of difficulties encountered when dealing with societies whose cultural patterns are quite alien to the developer; there is in fact some attention devoted to problems of mastering psychological, social, and cultural patterns in communities that are a part of the developer's own social system. It may be possible in theory to become so knowledgeable regarding a society that one is able with certainty to define improvement for it, determine what projects of economic and social development will bring about improvement, and intervene to effect the improvement. However, accounts of community development and military civic action activities thus far have not indicated that the theory has fully become a practical reality anywhere. A major problem in economic and social development work—particularly in the task of evaluation—seems to arise from acceptance of the hypothesis where it is inappropriate or impracticable. If in each situation it were accepted

that the requirements for knowledge, understanding, wisdom, talent, and resources might exceed the capabilities or willingness of the sponsor; that Western technology might not be assimilable reasonably quickly or without insupportable stress; and that the ultimate effects of projects might not be reasonably predictable, the hypothesis as an hypothesis would be quite valuable.

The case is similar with regard to other hypotheses, whether conceptual or operational. There is a tendency to build them into definitions of community development, which gives them the color of scientific fact and thereby obscures their tentative nature. This creates problems for community developers who seek to design their activities in the framework of definitions thus formulated. For example, if one finds that his objectives are attained by a project that does not meet a "felt need", he is liable to doubts as to the propriety of his efforts. Further, failure to meet one's objectives despite extensive "self-help" in the implementation of a project can produce frustration.

The utility of hypotheses suffers to the extent that that they are not continually subjected to test during application, both with regard to the objectives of action and verifiable realities of the situation. It is evident in the literature of economic and social improvement that the field of community development gains a semblance of unity from a number of generally accepted hypotheses, but that these hypotheses have not yet been--and possibly never can be--formulated to fit all conceptions of what it consists of. In sum, hypotheses are useful and necessary, but one cannot with impunity allow them to impersonate truth.

E. Findings

The military can benefit from the experience of theorists and practitioners in the field of community development. The hypotheses that have been developed and applied by community developers in many situations under widely varying circumstances, being aimed at inducing desired social change, are valuable tools in pursuing similar goals through military civic action. The difference between military and civilian economic and social development programs appears to be chiefly in their ultimate objectives. Armed forces are constrained to identify their objectives in the context of their military mission, whereas civilian agencies tend to see intervention in "backward societies" as a good in itself and to state their objectives rather broadly. Consequently, the military requires results that can be identified and evaluated in somewhat more concrete terms than civilian agencies find acceptable.

The implications for military civic action in the foregoing discussion of hypotheses in economic and social development work appear clear. It has not been demonstrated that a developer can confidently expect to mold the cultural pattern of a society nearer to his desires, despite the instances in which practitioners have been satisfied with the results of their efforts. It has not been proven that application of a sufficiently high level of resources and use of certain techniques will automatically improve the standing of the sponsor with the local population, or that

an improved image is essential to induce desired changes in attitude and behavior. Certainly stability is not always assured by intervening to effect economic and social development. In view of civilian experience as represented in the literature, it is evident that the assumption that hypotheses upon which community development work is carried on have been adequately validated for universal application must be replaced by clear understanding of their continuing tentativeness.

Review of the literature indicates that the armed forces require further research into the background of its need and uses for military civic action in order to create a more effective system. Such a system should provide for clear and explicit definition of the various objectives to which military civic action might be considered applicable, and these objectives should be appraised in the light of relevant hypotheses. Doctrine must be developed in a manner that retains emphasis on the tentative nature of such hypotheses as those concerning practicality of the socioeconomic development approach, preferred objectives, planning and programming techniques, project selection, project execution, and evaluation in various cultural settings. Personnel concerned with military civic action should be taught to approach each situation as one in which economic and social development might--or might not--contribute to achievement of specific objectives of the armed forces. Personnel should be so trained in the critical approach that they apply methods and techniques with full consciousness of the possibility that any of them may be found inapplicable or unproductive under the circumstances. They must be ready to modify their activities or discontinue them as experience indicates. Consequently, they should not be involved in a reporting system that stresses "success" and "failure", but rather one that assesses levels of achievement toward stated objectives, since each project will be something of a test of hypotheses in a new situation.

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IX. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. General

Findings, conclusions, and recommendations, keyed to specific requirements of the research as stated in Technical Requirement Nr. 1208, are summarized in this section. Parenthetical reference to the section of the report in which the subject is discussed in detail is also indicated. Where appropriate, areas in which further investigation appears warranted are noted.

B. Objectives

"3.1.1 Determine the objectives that U.S. sponsored military civic action programs are supposed to achieve."

1. Findings and Conclusions

a) Objectives of military civic action as stated in DOD doctrine are:

- Economic and social development.
- Improved standing of the host country military.

However, behind these proximate objectives are the ultimate objectives of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) through which military civic action programs are funded (except Southeast Asia where such programs are Service funded). The objectives of MAP can be considered to apply to military civic action. As stated in the basic legislation, these are to promote the peace of the world, and the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States. (Section II)

As part of MAP, military civic action is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy directed toward the promotion of peace and security through effective self-help and mutual aid (Appendix D).

b) Two distinct types of military civic action are implied in the JCS definition and verified by analysis of field experience. These are: (1) joint U.S. and host country military participation, and (2) unilateral U.S. Military participation. The first of these is typified by U.S. sponsored programs in Latin America and the second by U.S. programs in Southeast Asia. Objectives of these two types of military civic action are as shown below. Both of these military civic actions can be considered as contributing to the ultimate objective of the national security of the United States. (Section II).

(1) Type I Military Civic Action, Joint U.S./Host Country Military Projects

The proximate objective of this type of military civic action is the enhancement of the image of indigenous military with their peoples and to develop a cohesive and viable political entity with a sense of belonging and loyalty to the legitimate central government. Military civic actions at the grassroot level are aimed toward teaching the populace to live in a social institution where loyalties, cooperation, and trust are extended beyond the family, tribal, or village group. Social and economic development are the vehicles by which these objectives are attained. (Appendix D)

(2) Type II Military Civic Action, Unilateral U.S. Efforts

There is an ambivalence associated with military civic actions which are unilateral U.S. efforts. At the project level the objectives appear to be the establishment of good community relations with, and cooperation on, the part of the indigenous populace in U.S. areas of operation so as to contribute to the success of U.S. military operations. As such, military civic action can be considered as contributing to the national security of the United States and serving as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. The objectives of this type of military civic action are vague. Necessity for clarification is indicated. (Appendix D)

c) There is a considerable variation in interpretations of the aims and substance of military civic action under the JCS-approved definition. The variety of interpretation has led to recognized confusion in the performance as well as the labeling of activities in civilian communities. Essential conceptual factors have frequently been misapprehended or become lost in endeavors to conform to the wording of the JCS-approved definition. Therefore, a generally formulated definition of the term military civic action that is applicable, with appropriate modifiers, to the range of activities theretofore given this label is desirable. (Section II, Appendix C)

2. Recommendation

It is recommended that the following definition of military civic action be considered for adoption by the Department of Defense:

"Military civic action is the participation of military forces in projects useful to a local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development.

"It is categorized by participants as follows:

"Indigenous military civic action is that activity conducted by armed forces among their own people.

"Overseas military civic action is that activity conducted by armed forces stationed in or conducting operations in a foreign country.

"Joint military civic action is that activity conducted jointly by indigenous and foreign armed forces.

"It is categorized further by specific objectives:

"Image-building military civic action is that aimed at improving the standing of the military forces with the local population. Depending on the armed forces involved, these activities may be indigenous, overseas, or joint.

"National image-building military civic action includes those activities aimed at improving the standing of the national government with the local population.

"Nation-building military civic action contributes to a national program of economic and social development."

"Relief and welfare military civic action is directed toward immediate and direct alleviation of privation and suffering.

"Contributions of foreign armed forces (other than in joint activities) are categorized by the nature of the assistance:

"Military civic action advice and assistance includes those activities of foreign military advisors directed toward instructing and encouraging the use of indigenous armed forces in military civic action projects.

"Military civic action support includes the activities of a foreign government, including its armed forces, in the provision of funds, manpower, or materials to another country for military civic action."

C. Achievement of Objectives

"3.1.2 Determine if U.S. sponsored military civic action programs are assessed to establish the extent to which stated objectives are achieved, also determine what action has been taken to correct the situation if military civic action programs are not achieving their stated objectives."

1. Findings and Conclusions

a) There was no evidence in CONUS repositories to indicate if U.S. sponsored civic actions were or were not being assessed to establish the extent to which stated objectives were being achieved. In fact, other than the broad national objectives and the general objectives contained in the JCS definition the research team did not find the detailed information on objectives of specific programs upon which such an assessment could be made. The objectives in the Military Assistance Manual, while somewhat more specific also appeared to be lacking in this respect. (Section VI)

b) Much specific data as to material accomplishments was found in after action reports and in subsequent aggregation of these reports. These data generally reflected miles of road built, number of immunizations administered, and quantities of clothing and supplies distributed. As such, the data were of little value in assessing the degree of socioeconomic change, the degree to which the image of the host country military was improved, or the degree to which loyalty to the central government was increased. Isolated indications of these changes were found in the reports reviewed. These, however, were subjective in nature and were based primarily on personal opinions rather than on valid before and after measurements. (Section VI)

c) Analysis of over 1000 after action reports in which military civic action projects were covered, the following additional conclusions can be drawn (Section VI):

1) Lack of dedicated military civic action reporting systems and the aggregation of data in after-action and operational reports results in washing out the details of grass-roots civic action programs. As a result much valuable information relative to the actual procedures and techniques utilized in planning and execution of military civic action projects is not readily available. Structured interviews with personnel who have been engaged in such programs appears to be one method by which this type of data may be obtained.

2) From the data which were available in CONUS repositories, most of the Services in Vietnam are conducting unilateral military civic action as described in the Type II Model in Section II. The Navy appears to be doing this worldwide. In Latin America almost all military civic action projects involve host country military participation.

3) After-action and situation reports do not contain sufficient data to permit either an evaluation of the effectiveness of individual projects or an evaluation of the appropriateness of corrective actions.

4) There appears to be increasing involvement of RVN military forces in military civic action projects in Vietnam over the almost negligible amount in 1960 through 1968.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that structured interview procedures be employed to obtain detailed information on military civic action programs from personnel who have and are currently participating in U.S. sponsored military civic action programs. Details of a suggested procedure to accomplish these structured interviews are presented later in this Section.

D. Program Assessment

"3.1.3 Determine if the methods of program assessment in paragraph 3.1.2 above are scientifically and technically valid. Based on this evaluation accomplish the following:

"3.1.3.1 If invalid assessment techniques are employed establish what changes or modifications should be considered for adoption.

"3.1.3.2 If current assessment techniques are valid, determine from recorded findings the effectiveness of military civic action program in achieving their stated objectives."

1. Findings and Recommendations

a) With the exception of the requirement that the MAP be evaluated by the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance, State Department (IGFA), to ascertain if MAP programs are being carried out in consonance with the foreign policy of the United States, no evaluation systems or procedures were discovered. Even the IGFA program appears to be primarily one of watching the purse strings, an approach which was lauded during Congressional hearings (Section III).

b) No scientifically or technically valid program assessment procedures were uncovered during the research. Considerable promise is shown in the ongoing ARPA sponsored research being performed in Thailand by AIR. This study, "The Impact of Economic, Social, and Political Action Programs," is designed to develop procedures for quantitative counter-insurgency program impact measurement. As of August 1970, the feasibility of developing valid instruments to quantitatively assess such programs had been demonstrated. Considering that one of the implied criteria for success of military civic action is the participation of the indigenous population in their continuation of the programs after departure of the military, the AIR findings suggest the possibility of the development of an evaluation instrument for military civic action. (Section VII)

c) There is no evaluation dedicated to military civic action, and there is no evidence that it is either feasible or profitable to create such a system so long as the JCS definition of military civic action remains as it is now constructed. If the improvement of the image of the indigenous military is the accepted objective of military civic action, success is dependent upon too many other companion programs and external forces for the overall impact of military civic action to be isolated. (Section VII)

d) If "nationbuilding" through socioeconomic programs performed by U.S. and host country military were the primary objective, there would be an even greater need to include companion programs in the evaluation. All of the country programs reviewed in this report were minor in level of effort or dollar expenditure when compared to nonmilitary efforts within the country. (Section VII)

e) Quantitative techniques are available to assess the overall impact of country programs which include military civic action as an integral part. Although the best known method, the Hamlet Evaluation System, was of questionable validity as originally performed, it appears that improved versions have moved toward greater objectivity and content of greater relevance to military civic action. Also, the research by AIR in Thailand appears to be developing even more logical and less expensive collection procedures. This program has not been completed, but there is little to be gained by initiating additional research in quantitative assessment techniques until the AIR methodology is complete and their hypotheses are tested. (Section VII)

f) If an independent evaluation of program impact can be obtained through present and proposed quantitative assessment techniques, the most valuable direction

toward improved military civic action evaluation would be in developing and improving assessment procedures for us at the project level. (Section VII)

g) The three-fold scheme for defining types of evaluation is applicable to military civic actions. This scheme is applicable to a wide range of military civic actions as evidenced by its use in the historical analysis and evaluation of military civic action and comparable civilian experiences. (See Section VII for details.)

The principal levels of evaluation and terminology associated therewith are (Section VII):

Overall Impact Evaluation (Type I)
The assessment of overall program impact and effectiveness where the emphasis is on determining the extent to which programs are successful in achieving basic objectives.

Evaluation of Alternative Techniques (Type II)
The evaluation of the relative effectiveness of different program strategies and variables where the emphasis is on determining which alternative techniques for carrying out programs are most productive.

Quantitative Project Assessment (Type III)
The evaluation of individual projects through site visits and other monitoring activities where the emphasis is on assessing managerial and operational efficiency.

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a) A three-stage evaluation system be utilized for the evaluation and assessment of U.S. sponsored military civic action programs and projects.

b) AIR procedures for quantitative assessment of counter-insurgency program impact be reviewed and evaluated for application to military civic action assessment.

c) Structured interview procedures be employed to obtain detailed information on U.S. sponsored military civic action.

E. Program Effectiveness

"3.1.4 Determine what actions have been taken to increase the effectiveness of military civic action programs. The contractor shall develop criteria to support his findings."

1. Findings and Conclusions

a) The absence of a dedicated military civic action system and the aggregation of project data made it impossible to isolate, solely from data in CONUS repositories, any specific action which had been taken to increase the effectiveness of military civic action programs. From the national to the project level, the program and project objectives were stated in such general terms as to make evaluation of effectiveness difficult if not impossible. Even if detailed program and project data were available the situation would be further confounded by the absence of base line data concerning attitudes, values, and opinions of the indigenous population from which the impact of specific programs and projects could be determined. (Section VI)

b) Evidence of actions being taken or planned to improve this situation was found in a CRESS study to develop criteria for the selection and assessment of civic action programs. Copies of the draft report covering this Army sponsored research were not made available to RTI and therefore data contained in the CRESS study is not included in the RTI analysis of military civic action. The development of selection and assessment criteria should provide guidance for field use. However, the CRESS study seems to be directed toward program evaluation rather than the assessment of individual projects at the grass-roots level. (Section VI)

c) Modifications and changes to other programs in which military civic action is imbedded are being made. The extent to which these changes will affect the effectiveness of military civic action cannot be determined. Of particular interest is the recent Department of the Army policy to upgrade the stature of assignments in the Military Assistance Office Program by equating duty as a senior province advisor to combat command experience. (Section V)

2. Recommendation

It is recommended that criteria for the selection and assessment of individual military civic action projects be developed. Basic information can be obtained through interviews with personnel who have and are currently participating in military civic action at the grass-roots level.

F. Hypotheses

"3.1.5 Using information compiled on the successes and failures of military civic action projects, generate hypotheses concerning preferred objectives, planning techniques, types of projects, or modes of project execution for various cultural settings. If these hypotheses have been generated, determine what action has been taken to verify them and to integrate the findings with current military civic action doctrine and operational practices."

1. Findings and Conclusions

a) Data on completed projects and their successes or failures were not sufficiently detailed to permit the generation of hypotheses concerning preferred objectives, planning, techniques, types of projects, or modes of project execution for various cultural settings. Based on a sample of over 1000 project reports covering Army, Navy, and Air Force military civic action experience in Latin America and Southeast Asia, success or failure of specific projects was indicated in less than 4 percent of the reports; corrective action in less than 1 percent. There were indications, however, that such data are available in the memories of individuals who participated in military civic action programs at the grass-roots level.(Section VI)

b) The military can benefit from the experience of theorists and practitioners in the field of community development. The hypotheses that have been developed and applied by community developers in many situations under widely varying circumstances, being aimed at inducing desired social change, are valuable tools in pursuing similar goals through military civic action. The difference between military and civilian economic and social development programs appears to be chiefly in their ultimate objectives in the context of their military mission, whereas civilian agencies tend to see intervention in "backward societies" as good in itself and to state their objectives rather broadly. (Section VIII)

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a) The analysis categories developed by Niehoff and modified by RTI (Section VII) be used as a basis for developing hypotheses concerning preferred objectives, planning techniques, types of projects, or modes of project execution for various cultural settings.

b) That structured interviews with personnel who have and are engaged in military civic action programs and projects be used to initially verify these hypotheses.

G. Miscellaneous

"3.1.6 Identify and describe to the fullest extent possible, any additional research study results concerning U.S. sponsored military civic action operations which become apparent during the course of the research."

1. Findings and Conclusions

a. Elements of Military Civic Action

(1) Doctrine

DOD basic doctrine on civic action is contained in the Joint Manual for Civic Affairs.

No major inadequacies of doctrine covering the "advice and assistance" elements of military civic action were identified during the research. The doctrine considers the contribution that the military forces of a developing nation can make to socioeconomic development. The intent of Congress is reflected in the requirement that civic action projects by host country military should be undertaken in relation to conventional military assignments. National priorities should guide selection of projects. The U.S. role is that of encouraging the use of host country military forces for peaceful purposes. All U.S. sponsored programs must be coordinated through the country team. (Section III, Appendix D)

While doctrine does mention the unilateral effort of U.S. forces, it does not indicate how U.S. unilateral efforts could be designed to contribute to the standing of the host country military with the population. While U.S. unilateral civic action would enhance the standing of U.S. forces--similar to a community relations project--such effort could be counterproductive to the image of the host country military. (Section III, Append. D)

(2) Staff Organization

Civic actions are handled within the normal military staff organization. No specific staff element is charged solely with this responsibility. At Unified Commands and subordinate levels civic action is coordinated in the G-5 or comparable general staff element. There has been no evidence uncovered during RTI's effort which indicates

that this is an unsatisfactory arrangement. While such an organization may tend to fragment and play down the role of military civic action, the present organization permits ease of coordination with all military operations. (Section III)

(3) Project Selection

In countries where U.S. MAAG's or Missions are stationed, responsibility for final selection and approval of specific projects rests with the host country. Advice and assistance is furnished by the U.S. advisory system. Guidance is normally provided by the Country Team to insure that the military civic action program and projects are integrated with and contribute to the overall plan for country development. Final in-country approval of military civic action projects receiving U.S. support rests with the Country Team. In Vietnam, project selection is accomplished through the Assistant Chief of Staff, CORDS Hq MACV. CORDS is jointly staffed with U.S. military and AID personnel. (Sections II, III)

(4) Personnel Selection

No special selection procedures are utilized for personnel assigned to positions requiring civic action duties. There is no evidence that such personnel procedures are detracting from success of U.S. sponsored civic actions. Formal procedures do exist, however, for selection of personnel to duties of which civic action may be a component. (Section V)

Senior personnel for MAAGs, Missions, and advisory assignments in Southeast Asia are selected through the Military Assistance Officers Program for the Army and the Special Air Operations/Military Assistance Program for the Air Force. (Section V)

Personnel on civic affairs units are selected through the Civil Affairs career program. As far as could be determined, there are no career programs for enlisted personnel. (Section V)

Selection of personnel for Mobile Training Teams (MTT) is done on an ad hoc basis and is governed by the specific requirements of the country to which the MTT will be deployed and individual training and experience of available personnel. (Section V)

(5) Training Methods

Training of host country military in civic action techniques is accomplished in two ways. Mobile training teams, tailored to meet the particular requirements of the country, are provided on request to assist and train the host country military in planning and implementing military civic action programs. As part of the overall MAP training programs, selected host country military personnel can attend either the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, or the Military Assistance Institute at Fort Bragg. (Section V)

The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide a formal resident program of instruction in military civic action. A five-week course is presented by the U.S. Army Civil Affairs School for U.S. and foreign military officers. No resident programs of instruction are offered at any of the service schools for enlisted personnel. (Section V)

The only formal program of instruction for enlisted personnel is a correspondence course, Civic Action, offered by the Marine Corps Institute. (Section VI)

Civic action coverage becomes broader and more general as one moves up in the hierarchy of Service Schools. At the higher levels, emphasis is on the command and staff aspects of civic action as a subset of civil affairs. (Section VI)

Training related to civic action is provided enlisted Marine Corps personnel as part of the USMC Personal Response Program. (Section VI)

Mobile Training Teams are an economical means for on-site training of host country military personnel. (Section V).

(6) Planning Techniques

The planning of military civic action programs is accomplished through the same system as AID and other foreign economic assistance programs. Guidance is provided to the country team through State Department channels, and to the MAAG or Mission through DOD channels. A coordinated country program is prepared by the Country Team and after approval by the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission, is submitted to the State Department for review and approval. Review is accomplished through the interdepartmental group system. Once approved, the country submission can be used for

planning and budgetary purposes. Upon Congressional appropriation, funds are made available to the country concerned through MAP, and the programs are implemented. (Section III)

(7) Operating Techniques

MAP-funded civic actions are implemented through the MAAG or Mission and the host country armed forces with the advice and assistance of the U.S. element. Basic guidance is contained in the Military Assistance Manual published by the Department of Defense. (Section III)

In actuality, two distinct functions are performed by the U.S. Armed Forces: (Section III)

- Encouragement of host country participation in civic actions.
- Engagement in civic actions.

(8) Evaluation Techniques

The literature search and analysis of data obtained therefore indicates that objective program or project evaluation procedures are lacking. Most of the evaluation information uncovered to date reflects either the subjective judgment of an individual or material accomplishment. (Section VII)

b. Service Implementation

(1) General

The intent of Congress that the MAP, including U.S. sponsored civic action, be directed toward defeating subversive insurgency appears to be reflected in the implementing directives and doctrine of the various echelons of the defense establishment. (Section III)

Military civic action planning and implementation are performed within the existing framework of the military establishment. No special organizational structure has been established for this purpose. The normal chain of command from the DOD to field elements is utilized. In this sense military civic action is only one of the many tools a commander has for the performance of his assigned missions. Provisions are included for the coordination of civic actions with other activities. (Section III)

At the national level civic action is coordinated with the U.S. foreign policy through the structure established

for the coordination of all foreign assistance activities. There were no indications that this resulted in over- or under-emphasis of these programs. (Section III)

(2) Army

The U.S. Army conceptualizes military civic action as being imbedded in the internal defense and development activities in a developing nation. A strong social action flavor can be detected in the current U.S. Army doctrine on this subject. Institutional Development, current doctrinal publication on this subject, leans heavily on social science research and theories. (Section III)
U.S. Army field experience is characterized by:

- Unilateral involvement in 64.9 percent of the reported projects.
- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (91.7 percent) involved the host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (94.5 percent) involved only U.S. Army units. (Section V)

(3) Navy

Responsibility for military civic action is fragmented within the Department of the Navy. No central source of information could be found during the research. Responsibility for the development and implementation of civic actions is decentralized to the major commands with only general guidance emanating from the Department itself. (Section III)

U.S. Navy Field Experience is characterized by: (Section V)

- Unilateral involvement in 92.1 percent of the reported projects.
- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (72.9 percent) involved host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (97.8 percent) involved only U.S. Navy units.
- No indications of corrective action in any of the cases reported.

(4) Air Force

Military civic action is well defined in the basic Air Force doctrinal publication, AFR 55-7. Military civic action is treated as being distinct from civil affairs. While responsibilities are detailed, they are discharged

through the existing command structure. Until recently the Air Force had a dedicated military civic action reporting system. However, the requirement for reports of civic action activities from subordinate commands was eliminated in 1970. (Section IV)

U.S. Air Force participation is characterized by: (Section V)

- Unilateral involvement in 54.4 percent of the reported projects.
- In Latin America the preponderance of projects (98.1 percent) involved host country military forces.
- In Southeast Asia the preponderance of projects (63.9 percent) involved U.S. Air Force units only.

(5) Marine Corps

The Marines view civic action as an integral part of counterinsurgency. Emphasis is on the individual-to-individual basis. Personal response to individuals of a different culture is stressed. The Combined Action Program developed from Vietnam experience is the primary USMC vehicle for the conduct of civic action. (Sections III, V)

The Marine Corps Personal Response program offers potential for use by the other services in training individuals in cross-cultural communications. (Sections III and V)

(6) Unified Command Implementation

Based on the limited detail of information available within CONUS, it appears as if the implementing directives of the Unified Commands and the MAAGs and Missions are in consonance with the letter and intent of the enabling legislation and the DOD instructions governing civic action as a part of the MAP. (Section III)

(7) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

Civic actions in Vietnam appear to follow both of the models for military civic actions. The directives authorize and encourage the participation of RVNAF in civic actions under U.S. sponsorship and support as well as unilateral efforts of U.S. military units. While the ultimate objective of civic actions is to reflect maximum credit on the GVN, no guidelines were uncovered which spell out how the unilateral U.S. programs should be conducted to contribute to this end. Most of the unilateral efforts appear to be directed, and properly so, toward the facilitation of

U.S. military operations through increased intelligence and cooperation. Perhaps successful elimination of subversive and terrorist activities through the provision of internal security might result in favorable responses to the GVN regardless of nationality of the armed forces accomplishing this. No specific guidance or data on grass-roots projects activities were located in CONUS repositories. The existence of such information is indicated by the MACORDS civic action report requirements. (Section III)

As mentioned previously there appears to be an increasing involvement of RVN military forces in civic action programs. (Section V)

2. Recommendations

It is recommended that:

a) The U.S. Marine Corps Personal response program be evaluated for possible use in military civic action training for other Service.

b) Determination be made of the need for formal courses in military civic action for enlisted personnel.

H. Structured Interview Procedures

The recommendation concerning the employment of structured interview procedures was made in paragraphs C, D, E, and F, above. The following steps are suggested for the implementation of the recommendation:

1) Design survey instruments for a structured interview of U.S. and foreign military officers and enlisted men who are now in the United States and who have participated in overseas military civic action programs.

2) Design analysis techniques.

3) Select a sample of officers and enlisted men to include experience in each operating area in which the U.S. has advised, trained, and/or participated in significant military civic action programs.

4) Interview these participants.

5) Analyze the results using appropriate techniques.

6) Revise the instrument and recommend a procedure for routine evaluation of military civic action through interviews and/or questionnaires.

7) Apply and verify the instrument at overseas location at on-site civic action projects.
(Section VII)

GLOSSARY

AID	Agency for International Development
AIR	American Institutes for Research
ARMISH/MAAG	United States Military Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group to Iran
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARVN	Army of Vietnam (The common term used to refer to regular army forces)
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
AC of S	Assistant Chief of Staff
AFAK	Armed Forces Aid to Korea
AFP	Armed Fources of the Philippines
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
CA	Civic Affairs
CAP	Combined Actions Platoon
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CASP	Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CRESS	Center for Research in Social Systems
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
CONUS	Continental United States
DOD	Department of Defense
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
EDCOR	Economic Development Corps
FOA	Foreign Operations Administration
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
HSRI	Human Sciences Research,
HumRRO	Human Resources Research Organization
GAMO	Group Administration Mobility Organization
GVN	Government of Vietnam
IG	Interdepartmental Groups
IGFA	Inspector General for Foreign Assistance

ISA	International Security Affairs
IVS	International Volunteer Service, Inc.
IADB	Inter-American Defense Board
ICA	International Corporation Administration
ICAF	Industrial College of the Armed Forces
ICTZ	International Corps Tactical Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSA/AID	Joint United States Army/Agency for International Development
KCAC	Korean Civil Assistance Command
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MILGRP	Military Group
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAM	Military Assistance Manual
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MCA	Military Civic Action
MCAO	Military Civic Action Officer
MCI	Marine Corps Institute
MAPA	Military Assistance Program Advisor
MATA	Military Assistance Training Advisor
MAOP	Military Assistance Officer Program
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSC	National Security Council
PF	Popular Forces
PHILCAGV	Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam
POI	Program of Instruction
PTAI	Pacific Technical Analysts, Inc.
POCADOT	Psychological Operations, Civic Action Doctrine, Operations, and Training (A USAF Study)
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RP	Regional Force

RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (all armed forces of RVN, all services)
SEA	Southeast Asia
STAT	Seabee Technical Assistance Team
STEM	Special Technical and Economic Mission
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USN	United States Navy
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USMM/L	United States Military Mission to Liberia
UN	United Nations
UNAAF	Unified Action Armed Forces
US/FWMAF	United States/Free World Military Assistance Forces
USACGSC	United States Command and General Staff College
USAWC	United States Army War College
USAIMA	United States Army Institute for Military Assistance
USSOUTHCOM	United States Southern Command
USSTRICOM	United States Strike Command
USCONARC	United States Continental Army Command
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
USACAS	United States Army Civil Affairs School
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force

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Appendix A

PROGRAM PLAN

Military Civic Action
Evaluation of Military Techniques

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Appendix A

PROGRAM PLAN

Military Civic Action
Evaluation of Military Techniques

I. INTRODUCTION

A. General

Technical Requirement Nr. 1208 (ARPA Order 1384), a part of Contract DAAH01-70-C-0950, requires the submission of a Program Plan outlining the areas of research to be accomplished during the contract term. This plan is to include (1) a time-phased research plan, and (2) a milestone listing including financial and manpower data for each major task.

B. Objective

Objective of the research as presented in Technical Requirement Nr. 1208 is:

> "1.2 Requirement Objectives - The object of this requirement is to conduct a research effort which shall provide a compilation of all information available in CONUS regarding military civic action objectives, techniques, program assessment procedures and program effectiveness."

C. Statement of Work

The contractual work statement, as presented in Technical Requirement Nr. 1208 is as follows:

> "Section 3 Requirements
>
> "3.1 Specific Requirements - Prepare recommendations on the necessity for and the advisability of developing improved means of assessing the effectiveness of U.S. supported military civic action projects.
>
> "3.1.1 Determine the objectives that U.S. sponsored military civic action programs are supposed to achieve.
>
> "3.1.2 Determine if U.S. sponsored military civic action programs are assessed to establish the extent to which stated objectives are achieved, also determine what action has been taken to correct the situation if military civic action programs are not achieving their stated objectives.

"3.1.3 Determine if the methods of program assessment in paragraph 3.1.2 above are scientifically and technically valid. Based on this evaluation accomplish the following:

"3.1.3.1 If invalid assessment techniques are employed, establish what changes or modifications should be considered for adoption.

"3.1.3.2 If current assessment techniques are valid, determine from recorded findings the effectiveness of military civic action programs in achieving their stated objectives.

"3.1.4 Determine what actions have been taken to increase the effectiveness of military civic action programs. The contractor shall develop criteria to support his findings.

"3.1.5 Using information compiled on the successes and failures of military civic action projects, generate hypotheses concerning preferred objectives, planning techniques, types of projects, or modes of project execution for various cultural settings. If these hypotheses have been generated, determine what action has been taken to verify them and to integrate the findings with current military civic action doctrine and operational practices.

"3.1.6 Identify and describe to the fullest extent possible, any additional research study results concerning U.S. sponsored military civic action operations which become apparent during the course of research."

II. RESEARCH PLAN

A. Research Tasks

The planned research effort will include the following six tasks. Sequence and relationship of these tasks are shown in Fig. A-1.

Task 1 - Describe Military Civic Action

Military Civic Action will be described as a part of an existing overall system for socioeconomic development. Within this context the objectives of Military Civic Action programs and present assessment procedures will be compiled. This will involve an analysis of current doctrine and procedures, discussions with personnel currently and formerly engaged in Military Civic Action, and review of pertinent after-action reports.

Data on assessment criteria as well as general cultural settings in which Military Civic Action programs have been or may be conducted also will be compiled.

An integral part of this task will be the development of a classification procedure which will serve as a systems framework and establish a manageable format in which to describe Military Civic Action.

Task 2 - Evaluate Assessment Procedures and Programs

Within the overall system definition and using the data developed in Task 1, the validity of current assessment programs and procedures will be determined and a collection of information will be made of the special problems encountered in the field in conducting assessment of programs. If it is determined that program assessment methods are not scientifically and technically valid, analysis will be made to determine changes and modifications which should be considered for adoption. Should the program asssessment methods be determined to be valid, a determination will be made as to the effectiveness of Military Civic Action programs in achieving their stated objectives.

Task 3 - Analyze Effectiveness and Corrective Actions

Using the data base developed in Task 1 a determination will be made as to what actions have been taken to increase the effectiveness of Military Civic Action programs. Criteria will be developed upon which to base the effectiveness of corrective actions. Areas in which further improvement can be achieved will be indicated.




Fig. A-1. Research Plan,

Military Civic Action (Evaluation of Military Techniques).

Task 4 - Develop Hypotheses

Using recorded information concerning the success or failure of Military Civic Action projects as a base, along with the analysis of the success or failure of specific project elements developed during Task 3, a determination will be made of the feasibility of defining operational hypotheses regarding effectiveness of Military Civic Action programs. The impact of cultural setting on the objectives, planning techniques, types of projects, and modes of execution will be examined and included in the hypotheses. The data base will be searched and additional data collected, as appropriate, regarding the actions of the Department of Defense in developing similar hypotheses. It is recognized that these hypotheses may not appear as such but may have to be derived and reconstructed from analysis of corrective actions taken and the circumstances which dictated the changes.

Task 5 - Develop Improved Programs and Procedures

Additional study results concerning U.S. sponsored Military Civic Action programs which have become apparent during the course of the research will be identified and described to the extent possible within the constraints of time and available funds.

Task 6 - Prepare Final Report

B. Milestones

The following technical milestones are proposed for this research program. With the exception of MILESTONES F and G, accomplishment will be indicated by the preparation of RTI Research Memorandums (for internal distribution only) which will form the bases for the Final Report. Accomplishment of MILESTONES F and G will be indicated by the submission of a draft final report, and publication of the Final Report respectively.

MILESTONE A. DESCRIPTION OF MILITARY CIVIC ACTION SYSTEMS (Task 1)

Target date for accomplishment:	31 July 1970
Manpower	1014 man-hours
Funds:	$17,995

MILESTONE B. ANALYSIS OF ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES AND PROGRAMS (Task 2)

Target date for accomplishment:	30 September 1970
Manpower:	936 man-hours
Funds:	$17,576

MILESTONE C. ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS

Target date for accomplishment:	30 November 1970
Manpower:	546 man-hours
Funds:	$10,585

MILESTONE D. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS (Task 4)

Target date for accomplishment:	15 February 1971
Manpower:	1170 man-hours
Funds:	$23,894

MILESTONE E. IMPROVED PROGRAMS AND PROCEDURES (Task 5)

Target date for accomplishment:	31 March 1971
Manpower:	624 man-hours
Funds:	$10,742

MILESTONE F. DRAFT FINAL REPORT (Task 6, partial)

Target date for accomplishment:	30 April 1971
Manpower:	390 man-hours
Funds:	$7,041

MILESTONE G. FINAL REPORT PUBLICATION (Task 6)

Target date for accomplishment:	30 June 1971
Manpower:	234 man-hours
Funds:	$5,426

C. Monthly Manpower and Funding Requirements

Manpower and funding requirements, by month, are depicted in Fig. A-2.

	Actual Thru July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	Total
Total Costs	17025	5507	7289	8077	7730	8095	6721	5547	5547	9278		6751	87567
Fixed Fee	1107	358	474	525	502	526	437	361	361	603		438	5692
Total Costs Plus Fixed Fee	18132	5865	7763	8602	8232	8621	7158	5908	5908	9881		7189	93259
Contract Balance	75127	69262	61499	52897	44665	36044	28886	22978	17070	7189			
Man Hours	1064	312	390	507	507	430	368	312	312	430		312	4944

Fig. A-2. Revised Monthly Manpower and Funding Requirement
Military Civic Action Research (Evaluation of Military Techniques)

Revised 9 Aug 70

Appendix B

Installations and Activities Visited

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Appendix B

Installations and Activities Visited

During the course of the research the following installations and activities were visited or contacted by phone or letter. The latter group are indicated by an asterisk.

Department of Defense

Counterinsurgency Division, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Military Assistance and Sales, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
*U.S. Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board

Department of Army

Civil Affairs Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Special Assistant to Director, International and Civil Affairs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
*ACTIV Liaison Group, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Operational Reports and Lessons Learned Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Office of the Chief, Military History

Department of Navy

*Community Relations Division, Office of Information
*Shore Installation Division, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)
Systems Operations Division, Headquarters, Naval Facilities Engineering Command

Department of Air Force

Special Operations Division, Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations
*Office of Air Force History

Headquarters, United States Marine Corps

Counterinsurgency Branch, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3
*Studies Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff (RD&S)

Department of State/Agency for International Development

*Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance
Director Political Military Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Bureau for Vietnam (AID)
Bureau for Technical Assistance (AID)

Field Activities and Installations

Civil Affairs Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff Operations, Hq. USCONARC
95th Civil Affairs Group, Fort Gordon, Ga.
6th Special Forces Group (Abn), Fort Bragg, N. C.
*300th Civil Affairs Group (USAR)
Institute for Strategic and Stability Operations, USA Combat Developments Command, Fort Bragg, N. C. and Fort Gordon, Ga.
Public Affairs Officer, CINCLANT
Civil Affairs Joint Plans Officer, CINCLANT
*Plans Division, J-5, US Strike Command

Service Schools and Colleges

Industrial College of the Armed Forces
*U.S. Army War College
*U.S. Naval War College
*U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
*Armed Forces Staff College
*Air University
*Marine Corps Command and Staff College
*Marine Corps Educational Center
*USAF Special Operations School
U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance
U.S. Army Civil Affairs School

Libraries

U.S. Army Civil Affairs School
Industrial College of the Armed Forces
U.S. Army Military Assistance Institute
AID Reference Library
The Army Library
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
North Carolina State University at Raleigh
Duke University

Appendix C

Military Civic Action: Definition

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Appendix C

Military Civic Action: Definition

A. General

Technical Requirement Nr. 1208, a part of the contract governing this research on military civic action, requires adherence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) definition of military civic action. This definition, as it appears in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage, JSC Pub. 1 is:

> "Military civic action-(JCS, I, SEATO) The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (JCS, I) United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas."[Ref. 1]

It is assumed that within the context of JCS Pub. I [Ref. 2], the terms "military civic action" and "civic action" are synonymous since an entry under "civic action" reads:

> "civic action - See military civic action"

While the JCS definition of military civic action was promulgated to obtain a uniformity of nomenclature and to dispel the multiplicity of terms and interpretations which were prevalent in the prior literature, the adoption of a set of specific terms did not result in uniform and unambiguous interpretation of the definition for military civic action. Barber and Ronning comment on the 1964 JCS definition of civic action, which was not changed in the current Joint Dictionary, as follows:

> "The definitions did not achieve the result among our own military services, much less in the Latin American armed forces, even less in the writings of North and South American civilians."[Ref. 3]

The multiplicity of interpretations of the official definition of military civic action is prevalent even today among the Latin American armed forces. At the 1970 Annual Civic Action Seminar in the Canal Zone, sponsored by U.S. Southern Command, the following descriptions of civic action were made by the participants. Brazil views it as "an instrument of psychological action being directed toward our people, particularly the least favored. . ."[Ref. 4]; Venezuela describes it as "a permanent bridge lain for the enlightment and comprehension allowing us to direct the free minute, the rested hand, the excessive good, toward the community, for its own sake, and especially to bring into it the love for country. . ."[Ref. 5]; Bolivia concentrates on

educational programs with "special interest in the building of rural schools and establishment of literacy programs in every military post"[Ref. 6]; Argentina lists as paramount importance "identification of the people with their Army in the pursuit of common national goals"[Ref. 7]; in Peru civic action is described as "complying with its (Armed Forces of Peru) duty as a fundamental institution of the nation."[Ref. 8]

Since the research effort requires that the JCS definition be adhered to (subsection 1.1 General of the Technical Requirement), an analysis and interpretation of the elements of the JCS definition should provide a common basis of understanding. To accomplish this, the definition will be dissected and its elements analyzed and interpreted in the light of the provision of the basic legislation covering military assistance. The following essential elements of the JCS definition will be so analyzed and interpreted in subsequent paragraphs of this Appendix.

1) Military civic action projects require a preponderant use of indigenous military forces.

2) Military civic action projects must be useful to the local populace at all levels.

3) Military civic actions are carried out in fields contributing to economic and social development.

4) Primary purpose of military civic action is to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

5) United States forces may participate in military civic actions in overseas areas.

In the following portions of this appendix these essential elements will be analyzed and interpreted in the light of the provisions of the basic legislation.

B. Indigenous Military Forces

"The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces. . ."

The words "preponderantly indigenous military forces" would seem to eliminate from the category of military civic action any activity in which U.S. Armed Forces play a dominant or even major role. Projects carried out by non-indigenous armed forces (e.g., U.S. Armed Forces), even with indigenous armed forces contributing, would be unconvincing as demonstrations of the interest of the indigenous military in the welfare of the civilian population and thereby preclude attainment of the primary objectives of military civic action.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes American participation in the military civic action programs of certain foreign countries. Sec. 502 of the Act authorizes the use of "defense articles and defense services . . . for the purpose of assisting foreign military forces in less developed friendly countries . . . to construct public works and to engage in other activities

helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries." In Sec. 503, the President of the United States is authorized to assign or detail "members of the Armed Forces of the United States and other personnel of the Department of Defense to perform duties of a noncombatant nature, including those related to training or advice." This latter enabling proviso appears to be the background for the parenthetical note accompanying the contractual and JCS definition of military civic action which specifies that "U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.' The portion of the parenthetical note not seemingly explained by the above discussion of the provisions of the Act centers around the word "engage" which will be rationalized later in this section.

C. Impact on Local Populace

". . . on projects useful to the local poulation. . ."

The requirement that military civic action projects must be useful to the local population derives from the assumption that the attitude of that population will be made more favorable toward the indigenous armed forces if such forces demonstrate ability and willingness to promote civilian welfare. For this assumption to be valid, the local population must recognize and acknowledge that the military is contributing to their welfare. This concept is consistent with Secretary McNamara's testimony in the 1965 hearings before the United States Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs on further amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Mr. McNamara stated:

> ". . . Civic action projects afford the civilian populace visible evidence that their government and their military are endeavoring to improve the lot of the average citizen. . ."[Ref. 9]

It is accepted that "local population" refers to members of a relatively cohesive community, since "community development" is encountered as a term describing socioeconomic development projects in rural and small-town settings, though occasionally in urban districts. It will usually be a community which regards itself as an entity, such as a village, group of villages, or similar basic political-geographic subdivision. "Local" is therefore not interpreted here as the antonym of "U.S." or "foreign." The requirement that projects be "useful to the local population at all levels" is interpreted to mean that the whole community, rather than any special interest group or individual, should share in the benefits deriving therefrom.

This assumption concerning the interpretation that "local population" refers to rural and small-town settings, though occasionally urban districts, is reinforced by testimony before the 1965 hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Mr. Benjamin Forman, Assistant General Counsel (International Affairs) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense introduced the following as the DOD response to a question raised by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

"Questions

* * *

"(d) Are these going to be small self-help type projects, or are you going to try to convert the military assistance program into an economic development program?"

* * *

"Answers

"(d) The established policy is to emphasize small self-help type projects. There is no intent to convert the military assistance program into economic development program."[Ref. 10]

Reference was made to the 1961 hearings as containing illustrations of civic action projects carried out under the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program. A description of the AFAK program introduced into the record of the 1961 hearings by the Director, Military Assistance, Department of Defense, contains the following statements:

> "The Armed Forces Assistance to Korea (AFAK) program which is generally considered to be the prototype of military civic action programs . . .
>
> * * *
>
> "The AFAK program is generally confined to modest undertakings in small urban and rural areas of the United States or Republic of Korea troop concentrations. . ."[Ref. 11]

D. Socioeconomic Development

". . . in such fields . . . contributing to economic and social development. . ."

It can be assumed that economic and social development projects will be viewed by local populations as beneficial to their well-being, and that the change agents introducing such projects will be viewed as benefactors. Although socioeconomic development is not the primary aim of the indigenous armed forces (or of U.S. Armed Forces), the basic mission of maintaining internal security and stability of the country is assumed to be served also by assisting the local population to meet its aspirations for a better life.

A similar assumption is contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in Section 102:

> "Sec. 102. Statement of Policy . . . but also important to our national security that the United States, through private as well as public efforts, assist the people of less developed countries in their efforts to acquire knowledge and resources essential for development and to build the economic, political, and social institutions which will meet their aspirations for a better life, with freedom, and in peace."[Ref. 12] (emphasis added)

During the 1965 hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act there appeared to be some Congressional intent to limit the "social" development aspects of military civic action during the questioning of Mr. Forman, Assistant General Counsel, DOD, who introduced the following statement for the record:

> "The only civic action activity involving the use of military assistance program furnished equipment which may be termed 'social development' as distinguished from 'economic development' is the construction of schools."[Ref. 13]

E. Indigenous Military Image

". . . which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population."

The inclusion of this phrase in the definition almost appears to be an afterthought and taken solely within the context of the definition might indicate that this objective of military civic action is secondary and subordinate to that of social and economic development.

Support and funding of military civic action projects through military assistance programs tends to indicate that the purely military objectives are paramount. This is reflected in the history of the legislation. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, initially entitled the International Development and Security Act, specifically tied in U.S. support of civic action with military objectives. The 1961 act contains the following statements:

> "Sec. 2313 Utilization of assistance; construction of public works and other activities useful to economic development.
>
> "(a) Military assistance to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or otherwise to permit the recipient countries to participate in collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security . . .
>
> (b) To the extent feasible and consistent with the other purposes of this subchapter, the use of military forces in less developed friendly countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development shall be encouraged."[Ref. 14]

It was not until 1965 that the current language of the Act was introduced. At that time AID and DOD recommended that the Act be changed to permit a broader interpretation of military civic action by elimination of the requirement that such programs may be supported by the military assistance program only if such assistance is furnished for a military purpose listed in the Act (i.e., internal security, self defense, participation in collective defense arrangements, or UN peacekeeping). The underlying philosophy of this recommended change appears in the following quote from the AID prepared Section-by-Section Analysis of the proposed Foreign Assistance Act of 1965:

"Purpose of this amendment is to make civic action activities in less developed friendly nations, a specific objective, per se, of the military assistance program . . . .

"The Executive Branch feels that the existing law is too restrictive and that it is frequently difficult to point to a precise military purpose served by each civic action activity. At the same time, civic action is, in a more general sense, a direct object of military aid because the productive use of military forces through civic action provide the military with valuable on-the-job training, improves troop morale, and contributes to improved relationships between the military and civilian population. . ."[Ref. 15]

F. U.S. Armed Forces Participation

". . . (United States forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)"

This parenthetical note to the JCS definition of military civic action is seemingly inconsistent with that portion of the definition which pertains to "preponderantly indigenous military forces." As previously mentioned in paragraph B above, the participation of U.S. forces in an advisory capacity is compatible with the remainder of the definition. In fact, advising and encouraging indigenous military forces in initiation and execution of military civic actions is a major responsibility of U.S. MAAGs and missions in countries which are receiving military assistance. For example, the Command Doctrine of the U.S. Military Mission (ARMISH/MAAG) to Iran lists civic action as Army and Navy areas of emphasis.[Ref. 16] ARMISH/MAAG OPLAN 258-68, which is devoted solely to military civic action, stresses the need for such programs and the advisory role that the mission must play.[Ref. 17]

The apparent inconsistency centers around the words "engage in." The dictionary definition "to occupy oneself; become involved: to engage in business or politics"[Ref. 18] indicates active participation. An examination of the legislation which introduced the parenthetical phrase was introduced in 1965 when the act was amended to read as it now does:

"Sec. 502 Utilization of Defense Articles and Defense Services. . . (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries). . ."[Ref. 19]

It should be noted that in translating from the Act to the JCS definition the term "voluntary" has disappeared. The 1966 implementation by the Senior Interdepartmental Group, upon which the JCS definition is based, also did not include the word "voluntary."[Ref. 20]

The 1965 Committee hearing shed some light on the intent of Congress in including the reference to U.S. Armed Forces in the legislation. Mr. Forman's testimony is quite specific on this subject.

The following was introduced into the record:[Ref. 21]

"Questions

* * *

"1. What do you mean by "the voluntary efforts" of American Armed Forces?" Does this mean doing projects in off-duty hours--or is some general going to "volunteer" a company or two to carry out some civic action project?

"2. Are our Armed Forces going to get involved in initiating civic action projects abroad--or simply encouraging and assisting local military personnel in their undertakings?

* * *

"Answers

* * *

"1. It means doing projects in off-duty hours. For an illustration of such projects see pages 509-511 of the hearings before the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

"2. The only country in which our Armed Forces have initiated civic action projects is Vietnam."

* * *

The 1961 hearings referenced in the answer to question 1 above refers to AFAK and describes civic action as:

"The AFAK program is generally confined to modest undertakings in small urban and rural areas of United States or Republic of Korea troop concentrations and promotes friendly relations between U.S. forces and the people in these areas. It sponsors jointly programmed and financed projects, actively and constructively participated in by U.S. Armed Forces personnel (and to a lesser extent, Republic of Korea military personnel) shoulder to shoulder with Korean civilians at the local community grass-roots level."[Ref. 22]

While the introductory remarks to this testimony indicated that initially the program was a voluntary one, the statements which followed in the body of the text indicates that the program became one in which units participated as such. For example the scope of the program is described as:

"The overall AFAK program consists of three component programs: (1) the construction program to provide assistance by means of construction materials, supervisory assistance, and loan of military equipment; (2) the medical program to furnish medical supplies and equipment to Korean medical facilities, to provide orthopedic appliances to Korean nationals who have lost limbs as a result of actions involving U.S./U.N. Forces, and emergency treatment of Korean nationals in U.S. medical facilities; (3) the non-construction program to provide assistance to Koreans through the voluntary contributions of money, gifts, and services of individuals and units of U.S. forces as well as donation of salvage material to Korean charitable and welfare organizations."[Ref. 22]

The use of the word "voluntary" appears only in that portion of the scope which covers charitable activities. The AFAK program as described above appears to be a dual program, one involving military units in a coordinated program and one involving the voluntary efforts of individuals and units in charitable ventures. This unilateral participation of U.S. Armed Forces in civic action programs is also the U.S. Army's interpretation as evidenced in Field Manual 100-20 which states that "military activities to support stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations have become the U.S. Army's third principal mission. They include . . . military civic action . . . designed to foster growth, and to forestall or resolve conflict in the political process within a nation."[Ref. 23]

G. Analysis

The literature indicates that the various proponents and sponsors of military civic action are far from full agreement on how to define and describe this field of endeavor, despite the efforts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to provide guidance in an official definition.

A definition expresses the essential nature of that which is defined, and "essential implies belonging to the very nature of a thing and therefore incapable of removal without destroying the thing itself or its character."[Ref. 24] In other words, whatever does not conform to all the features set forth in the definition is not that which is defined. It is something else.

It would seem, then, that definitions would ensure clear communication and understanding; however, our common experience is that they often do not. They are useful, even indispensable, but the understanding and practical application of definitions are relative to formulation of the definition, the thing defined, the situation, and the individuals involved. A further complicating factor is the tendency to be lax about distinguishing between a definition of a term and the definition of a thing.

A list of the various meanings attached to a term is especially useful when seeking to discern connotations a speaker may intend to bring into his discourse. However, an unambiguously worded description of its basic elements and functioning is needed when seeking to assure that a thing is identified clearly and precisely for all concerned. Both the relativeness of definitions and the tendency to blur distinctions between terms and things contribute to the farrago of guidelines, descriptions, and deductions found in documents concerned with military civic action.

An example of the interpretative process that routinely appears is the following extract from a lecture presented at the Naval War College by Major General Jonas M. Platt, who quotes the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition and comments:[Ref. 25]

"This is a good definition as far as it goes, but it gives two questionable impressions. First, the emphasis on indigenous forces and the parenthetical, almost afterthought, that U.S. forces 'may' engage in military civic action does not reflect the realities of today in the United States or in Vietnam since U.S. forces in both places engage in widespread civic action. Second, the definition gives the impression that civic action must be in terms of concrete projects. It overlooks the possibility that the attitudes of the forces performing civic action may be even more important than the projects themselves.

"Here is a definition used by General Lansdale: 'Civic action can be a simple act of politeness to civilians by troops manning a roadblock: it can be a job of construction too large for the local people themselves to undertake.'

"Dr. E. B. Glick, in his book Peaceful Conflict, defines it even more broadly as 'The non-military use of the military.'"

If the Joint Chiefs of Staff had wished to define only the term, they might have found it enough to state that military civic action is the use of military forces on projects contributing to the economic and social development of the local population; these are projects which would serve to improve the standing of the military with the local population. However, they apparently had in mind a definition describing and delimiting an entity. This sort of definition is useful when well and clearly formulated but the Joint Chiefs of Staff formulation is rather ambiguous. [Ref. 26] Ambiguities in wording can perhaps be easily resolved where the definition of the thing is amplified by a detailed description that is equally authoritative. Such has not come to light in the case of military civic action. Further, it is nowhere evident that there exists a model system clearly distinguishable as military civic action under the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition by its objectives, functions, performers, and user. Consequently there are various official and quasi-official accounts of what military civic action involves, each ostensibly derived from interpretations of the official definition, each patiently relative to the background, circumstances, and goals of the branch and individuals making the interpretation.

Examples of activities labeled "military civic action" are:

- Performance of economic and social development projects by indigenous military personnel for indigenous civilian communities.
- Assistance by indigenous military personnel to indigenous civilian communities in economic and social development projects.
- Performance of economic and social development projects by indigenous military personnel for their national government.
- Programs of economic and social development carried on by the military for personnel prior to release from military service.
- Performance of economic and social development projects by foreign military personnel for civilian communities abroad.
- Assistance by foreign military personnel to civilian communities abroad in economic and social development projects.

- Welfare activities carried on in civilian communities by indigenous military personnel.
- Welfare activities carried on in civilian communities by foreign military personnel.
- Advisory assistance to the military of one country on its use of military personnel on nonmilitary economic and social development projects given by military personnel of another country.
- Support assistance to the military of one country in its use of military personnel on nonmilitary economic and social development projects given by military personnel of another country.

Only the first two types of activity conform to the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of military civic action. The last two are mentioned in parentheses at the end of the official definition--interpreting "engage in military civic actions overseas" to mean "participate in military civic action activities of foreign armed forces"--without clearly labeling them military civic action. The other types can be considered to be included in the definition inferred in the enabling legislation, but they cannot be subsumed under the current wording of the JCS definition.

Examination of the Who? What? Where? Why? and How? of the official formulation indicates the extent to which application of the term has gone beyond what the simplest understanding of its meaning would justify.

Who: Not named. Presumably the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects? is by those whose indigenous forces they are.

What: "The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the location population at all levels . . . contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population." (Underlining added.)

Where: Not plainly stated, but implied by the terms indigenous and local population. Indigenous "applies to species or races and adds to native" (which "implies birth or origin in a place or region and may suggest compatibility with it") "the implication of not having been introduced from elsewhere."[Ref. 27] Local population in this context appears to denote the population of a community ("population cluster") or a minor political subdivision, even though for Americans abroad local community has the connotation of indigenous. The most likely inference from these terms is that use is made of military forces in their own country among their own people.

Why: Not plainly stated, but implied by the constraint that the projects "also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population." The implication is that there are instances where objectives of a government or its defense establishment are more effectively pursued if the local population can be induced to view the military forces more favorably.

How: How "the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects . . ." would be affected is not mentioned.

In this formulation, military civic action is not the participation by military personnel in economic and social development projects for civilians, but their use in this manner by a higher agency. Since this does not simplify usage of the term--rather the contrary--and adds nothing to clarity, it is proposed to speak here of military civic action as participation. This obviates the necessity of straining the official definition in order to discuss actual performance of projects as military civic action. An agency can now be said without tautology to use military civic action; furthermore, the prevailing usage will thus be accepted for the purposes of this discussion.

A reformulation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition along the lines pointed to in the foregoing examination might be as follows:

> Military civic action is the participation of predominantly indigenous forces in projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

Reformulation of the parenthetical note is also indicated, as it appears to have been the source of considerable confusion. Under this rubric U.S. forces have undertaken to carry on economic and social development projects in civilian communities abroad, calling this activity military civic action. Confusion arises when the U.S. forces seek to justify the projects in terms of improving the standing of the indigenous military forces, as they find it difficult to demonstrate any such result; in fact, it is reported that unilateral U.S. projects may have just the opposite effect. Since military civic action is carried on by "preponderantly indigenous military forces" by definition, it is probable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff used the phrase "engage in" to mean "participate in". In this case, U.S. forces are really seen as taking part in projects in overseas areas executed by indigenous military forces. The word "may" does not make clear whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff are merely pointing to possible involvement of U.S. forces overseas, or are granting authority to them to become involved. Accepting the latter case, the reformulation might be as follows:

> U.S. forces are authorized to advise or to support military civic action programs in overseas areas.

U.S. manuals, guidance documents, and reports tend to label American activities related to economic and social development projects abroad, whether advising and supporting foreign armed forces or performing such projects unilaterally, as military civic action. Sometimes, as mentioned earlier, the inconsistencies of such usage with the official definition

are pointed to in reports. For example, an Army evaluation team assessing programs carried on in Vietnam as "military civic action" noted the confusion prevailing there in attempts to label clearly the assistance being provided to Vietnamese civilians by U.S. armed forces. They suggested that "all of this might be dismissed as simply semantical quibbling if it were not for the fact that important conceptual factors often become lost in the mislabelings." They say:

> "Basically, the U.S. military idea of 'civic action' originated as one of the means of improving indigenous military relations with their own population--through having the indigenous military participate with their own people in improving their environmental conditions."[Ref. 28]

Yet, even they acquiesce in the mislabeling, since they comment:

> "U.S. tactical units have legitimate occasion to conduct some civic action unilaterally and there are some environmental improvements too technical in nature for such participation by inhabitants of hamlets. The danger we face is that so much attention may be given to these activities that there will be little or no indigenous participation in civic action or self-help. . ."[Ref. 29]

Two ways out of this "semantic quibbling" suggest themselves. One is to retain the concept of military civic action set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attempting to eliminate ambiguousness while defining--describing--other activities of similar nature under different labels. The second is to define the term military civic action more broadly and use it with appropriate modifiers to denote the several activities which have been carried on under that label.

Under the first alternative, a reasonable and useful reformulation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff definition might be as follows:

> Military civic action is the participation of indigenous military forces on projects useful to all levels of the local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, and others contributing to economic and social development which serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

Similar activities by armed forces outside their homelands might be labeled <u>military civic assistance</u> and defined as follows:

> Military civic assistance is the participation of nonindigenous military forces on projects useful to all levels of the local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development which serve to improve the standing of the nonindigenous military forces with the population.

Where a government employs its armed forces in a program of "nation-building" by having them engage in economic and social development at the community level, the armed forces might be said to be involved in military community development:

> Military community development is the participation of indigenous military forces on projects useful to all levels of the local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development of the local population and serving to improve the national level of economic and social development.

Where a government employs its armed forces in a program of "nation-building" by having them engage in construction projects that develop the national economy rather than improve the economic and social conditions of specific communities, the armed forces might be said to engage in military public construction.

> Military public construction is the participation of indigenous armed forces on projects of building facilities contributing to the development of the national economy.

Military public construction belongs with the other activities named above to the category of "nonmilitary use of military forces", but differs from them in not having armed forces-civilian community relationships as a major element. For example, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers dams streams in this country with little regard to local reaction. A Latin American military establishment may construct a railway and thus improve the national transportation network without bringing economic (and social) development to particular local populations. Nevertheless, some general discussions of military civic action include these as representative.

Since this first solution entails introducing a new terminology which would not contribute to better understanding of the material that has been written on the subject over the past decade, an alternative solution is offered. It would appear more practical to adopt terminology which conforms more nearly to widely prevalent usage among those concerned with nonmilitary employment of armed forces, one that allows for recognition of the common elements in such activities while noting clearly essential differences. Consequently, the following definition of the term military civic action is proposed under this second alternative for use in the discussion of hypotheses:

> Military civic action is the participation of military forces in projects useful to a local population in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development.

Where conducted by armed forces among their own people, the activity is indigenous military civic action.

Where conducted by armed forces stationed in or conducting operations in a foreign country, the activity is overseas military civic action.

Where conducted jointly by indigenous and foreign armed forces, the activity is joint military civic action.

Where the activity is aimed at improving the standing of the military forces with the local population, it is military image-building military civic action. It is, according to the armed forces that are conducting it, indigenous military image-building, overseas military image-building, or joint image-building military civic action.

Where the activity is aimed at improving the standing of the national government with the local population, it is national image-building military civic action.

Where the activity is aimed at contributing to a national program of economic and social development, it is nation-building military civic action.

Relief and welfare activities by armed forces, being aimed at immediate and direct alleviation of privation, are not actually economic and social development projects, but can be considered to contribute to such development. This category of military assistance to a civilian population is relief and welfare military civic action.

Since the concept is project-centered, it is only by extension that advice and assistance provided by foreign military advisors have been spoken of as "military civic action". Military civic action advice and assistance denotes it precisely. Furthermore, where a government or its armed forces undertake to provide funds, manpower, or materiel to another country for military civic action, the activity is military civic action support.

H. Findings

1) A dual model of military civic action emerges from the foregoing analysis. While there appear to be some internal inconsistencies within the contractual definition of military civic action (i.e., between the stipulated use of preponderantly indigenous military forces vis-a-vis the use of U.S. forces in military civic actions in overseas areas) the dual model appearing in Table C-1 will be carried forward for the following reasons:

   a) A U.S. only military civic action program was specifically acknowledged for Vietnam.

   b) Funds appropriated for use under the programs authorized under the act have been used on U.S. only military civic actions.

Table C-1

MODELS OF MILITARY CIVIC ACTION

	DESCRIPTORS	
	MILITARY CIVIC ACTION: JOINT U.S. HOST COUNTRY MILITARY INVOLVEMENT	MILITARY CIVIC ACTION: UNILATERAL U. S. INVOLVEMENT
Primary Interface for:		
U.S. Military	Host Country Military	Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals)
Host Country Military	Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals).	No Involvement
Primary Role of:		
U.S. Military	Advise and Support Host Country Military	Advise and Support Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals)
Host Country Military	Advise and Support Host Country Populace (Groups and Individuals)	No Involvement
Primary Objective of:		
U.S. Military	Involvement of Host Country Military in Military Civic Action	Enhance Image
Host Country Military	Enhance image	No Involvement
Level of Country Directly Effected by:		
U.S. Military	All echelons of Host Country Military	District and Village
Host Country Military	District and Village	No Involvement
Change Agent Role of:		
U.S. Military	With Host Country Military	With District, Village, and People
Host Country Military	With District, Village, and People	No Involvement
Types of Projects for:		
U.S. Military	Training for Host Country Military	Social and Economic Development
Host Country Military	Social and Economic Development	No Involvement

c) Some model is necessary to report what was done and is being done under the title of military civic action.

2) The current approved definition of military civic action is ambiguous and can be interpreted to mean all things to all men. Clarification is necessary to ensure uniform interpretation and application.

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Appendix D

Military Civic Action: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

Appendix D

Military Civic Action: Insurgency/Counterinsurgency

A. General

In Appendix C, the definition of military civic action was dissected and analyzed, specifically in reference to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and related Congressional hearings. A dual model of military civic action was derived; joint U.S./Host Country military participation, and unilateral U.S. involvement.

In this Appendix the overall objectives of military civic action as an element of the Military Assistance Program and the role that military civic action plays in the internal defense and development of emerging nations will be developed. First the basic legislation will be analyzed to determine the major objectives of civic action as prescribed by Congress. Implementation of instructions and directives will be examined to derive the role of military civic action in military assistance and military operations. And finally, military civic action will be compared with other programs directed toward the indigenous nationals of areas in which MAP programs or military operations may be in process.

B. Basic Legislation

The basic legislation concerned with U.S. support of military civic action is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. This act authorizes provision of military assistance and the utilization of defense articles for the furtherance of civic action. The following excerpts from the Foreign Assistance Act clearly indicate that the Military Assistance Program, of which military civic action is an element, is designed to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist-inspired or Communist-supported aggression. [Ref. 1] Underlining added.

> "The Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except for individual or collective self-defense. The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of the United States and other friendly countries to promote peace and security continue to require measures of support based upon the principle of effective self-help and mutual aid. It is the purpose of this part (of the act) to authorize measures in the common defense against internal and external aggression, including the furnishing of military assistance, upon request, to friendly countries and international organizations. In furnishing such military assistance, it remains the policy of the United States to continue to exert maximum efforts to achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying countries against violation and evasion."

"The Congress recognizes that the peace of the world and the security of the United States are endangered so long as international communism and the countries it controls continue by threat of military action, by use of economic pressure, and by internal subversion, or other means to attempt to bring under their domination peoples now free and independent and continue to deny the rights of freedom and self-government to peoples and countries once free but now subject to such domination."

* * *

"In enacting this legislation, it is therefore the intention of the Congress to promote the peace of the world and the foreign policy, security, and general welfare of the United States by fostering an improved climate of political independence and individual liberty, improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist-supported aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security, and creating an environment of security and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political progress. The Congress urges that all other countries able to contribute join in a common undertaking to meet the goals stated in this part."

"It is the sense of the Congress that in the administration of this part priority shall be given to the needs of those countries in danger of becoming victims of active Communist or Communist-supported aggression or those countries in which the internal security is threatened by Communist-inspired or Communist-supported internal subversion."

"Sec. 502. Utilization of Defense Articles and Defense Services.

"Defense articles and defense services to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security, for legitimate self-defense, to permit the recipient country to participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of restoring international peace and security, or for the purpose of assisting foreign military forces in less developed countries (or the voluntary efforts of personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States in such countries) to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries. It should not be maintained or established solely for the civic action activities and that such civic action activities not significantly detract from the capability of the military forces to perform their military missions and be coordinated with and form part of the total economic and social development effort."

Congress also prescribed in the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 1, "Statement of Policy," the principles which should govern programs carried out under the Act. Underlining added.[Ref. 2]

* * *

"The Congress further declares that to achieve the objectives of this Act, programs authorized by this Act should be carried out in accordance with the following principles:

"First, development is primarily the responsibility of the people of the less developed countries themselves. Assistance from the United States shall be used in support of, rather than substitution for, the self-help efforts that are essential to successful development programs, and shall be concentrated in those countries that take positive steps to help themselves. Maximum effort shall be made, in the administration of this Act, to stimulate the involvement of the people in the development process through the encouragement of democratic participation in private and local government activities and institution-building appropriate to the requirements of the recipient nations."

* * *

"Fourth, the first objects of assistance shall be to support the efforts of less developed countries to meet the fundamental needs of their peoples for sufficient food, good health, home ownership and decent housing, and the opportunity to gain the basic knowledge and skills required to make their own way forward to a brighter future. In supporting these objectives, particular emphasis shall be placed on utilization of resources for food production and voluntary family planning.

"Fifth, assistance shall wherever practicable be constituted of United States commodities and services furnished in a manner consistent with other efforts of the United States to improve its balance of payments position.

"Sixth, assistance shall be furnished in such a manner as to promote efficiency and economy in operations so that the United States obtains maximum possible effectiveness for each dollar spent."

* * *

In Section 622 of the Act, Congress requires that "military assistance (including civic action) programs," be coordinated with U.S. foreign policy at the national level by the Secretary of State, at the country level by the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.

The Congressional intent of the foreign assistance program as it pertains to overseas internal defense is well expressed in the 1962 policy, U.S. National Objectives Relating to Overseas Internal Defense, promulgates by the U.S. Department of State, which is reproduced below.

"A basic premise of U.S. foreign policy is that the security of the U.S. and its fundamental values and institutions will best be preserved and enhanced as part of a community of free and independent nations. These nations should be characterized by economic growth, political responsibility and social justice in their domestic affairs and a due respect for established international behaviour in their foreign relations. In this regard, the U.S. is endeavoring to assist newly emerging and developing nations to maintain their freedom and independence and to deal effectively with their problems.

"The U.S. believes that the process of development and nation-building should be aided and encouraged but not manipulated by outside forces. The creation of a relatively stable international environment within which economic growth can occur and free people are able to determine their own form of government is therefore a primary U.S. objective.

"The achievement of this objective, however, is being challenged by an alien force which advocates and actively pursues the subjugation of free nations through subversion, insurgency and other means of indirect aggression.

"The primary responsibility for preventing or combating internal aggression rests with the threatened country. It is the policy of the U.S. to assist threatened nations, when requested, to prevent or defeat communist inspired, supported or directed insurgency in order to ensure that all nations-especially those newly emerging and developing states--are given the opportunity to determine their own future."

The following characteristics of American sponsored military civic action emerge from an analysis of the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act as amended:

- Military civic action is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.
- Military civic action is part of the Military Assistance Program which is, in turn, an element of Foreign Assistance.

D. Counterinsurgency/Insurgency Context

1. General

It should be noted that nowhere in the definition of military civic action do the terms "Communist or Communist-supported aggression" or "insurgency" occur. Analysis of the definition of military civic action within the context of other JCS approved definitions, however, does establish a connection between military civic action, insurgency, and Communist or Communist-supported aggression.

Insurgency, as defined by the JCS, is:

"Insurgency--(JCS,I) A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited."[Ref. 4]

Counterinsurgency is defined as:

"Counterinsurgency--(JCS,I) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency."[Ref. 5]

Civic action as used in the above definition refers to military civic action and is so defined in the JCS Dictionary.[Ref. 6] Military civic action, therefore, is one of the counterinsurgency actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency, i.e., Communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

Comparison of this currently accepted definition of military civic action with the companion actions comprising "counterinsurgency" indicates some overlap. The definition of military civic action includes economic development as an objective. However, economic actions are also subsumed under counterinsurgency. A question arises as to how an economic development program is classified: As an economic action? As a military civic action? Or both? The JCS accepted definition of economic action provides no guidance in this respect. Economic action is defined as:

> Economic Action--(JCS) The planned use of economic measures designed to influence the policies or actions of another state, e.g., to impair the war-making potential of a hostile power, or to generate economic stability within a friendly power.[Ref. 5]

Interpretation of this definition in the light of the definition of military civic action suggests that economic actions initiated and conducted by the U.S. Government and designed to improve the macroeconomy of a developing nation be classified as economic actions, while those actions taken by the host country military designed to improve the micro- or grassroots level economy be considered as military civic action.

2. Phases of Insurgency

Since military civic action is a subset of counterinsurgency operations and is part of the overall effort to combat subversive or Communist inspired insurgency, a description of insurgency is in order. Doctrine considers three phases of insurgency.[Ref. 8]

Phase I - Latent or incipient subversive activity during which subversive incidents occur with frequency in an organized pattern. No major outbreak of violence or uncontrolled insurgent activity.

Phase II - Subversive movement has sufficient local or external support to initiate organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

Phase III - Primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

The Joint Manual for Civil Affairs, a document which has been approved by the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps [Ref. 9], includes a discussion of Civil Affairs Operations as a continuum of emergency measured on the scale of violence corresponding to the three insurgency phases previously described.

A listing of the various counterinsurgency actions, of which military civic actions are a subset, is contained in Table D-1. U.S. Army Field Manual 31-23, Stability Operations--U.S. Doctrine, is the source of this information.[Ref. 10]

3. Internal Defense and Development

Of interest is the introduction of the terms "internal defense" and "internal development." The term "internal defense" is defined in JCS Pub. 1 and is approved for service-wide use:

> "Internal Defense--(JCS,I) The full range of measures taken by a government and its allies to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency."[Ref. 11]

The term "internal development" has been approved only for U.S. Army usage. Internal development is defined in the U.S. Army Dictionary as:

> "Internal Development--The strengthening of the roots, functions and capabilities of government and the viability of its national life toward the end of integral independence and freedom from conditions fostering insurgency."[Ref. 12]

While the definition of "internal development" has not been approved for joint use throughout the Department of Defense, designation of military civic action as an internal development activity is not inconsistent with the JCS approved definition. Furthermore, the basic legislation which authorizes military civic action is part of the overall Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The U.S. Air Force, in essence, recognizes the role of internal development in the reduction of the insurgency potential of a developing nation in AF 55-7 which states: (Parenthetical note added.)

> "MCA [military civic action] as a preventive measure, is an important means of improving social and economic conditions which contribute to insurgency, distrust of government authority, and breakdown in law and order."[Ref. 13]

Since military civic action, by definition, is an element of counterinsurgency, analyses of military civic action objectives must be made within the context of counterinsurgency/insurgency operations. These operations may be depicted as shown in Figure D-1.

Table D-1

OBJECTIVES DURING VARIOUS PHASES OF INSURGENCY

Major Area	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
INTERNAL DEFENSE Create an atmosphere of internal security and relative peace within which internal development can assure national growth thru controlled social, economic, and political change.	Intelligence operations designed to identify and neutralize the insurgent infrastructure and to develop an intelligence data base. Formulation of internal defense and internal development program based on logical assumptions regarding insurgent activities. Populace and resource control to separate populace from insurgents. Protect populace from incurgent control and domination. Expose, discredit, and destroy the the insurgent infrastructure. Establish psychological rapport with people. Inflict maximum psychological damage on insurgents. Discredit insurgency propaganda. Publicize governments efforts on behalf of the people. Tell citizens what is expected of them.	Reorientation of internal defense measures toward action directly against insurgent underground organization, support system, external sanctuary, or outside supporting power. Continue assistance to internal development projects to extent feasible. Orient internal defense toward effective and comprehensive internal security. Expand and reorganize police. Expand and organize paramilitary forces. Increase size of Armed Forces. Direct intelligence efforts toward insurgent tactical forces, leaders, plans and other OB information. Expand populace and resources control. Stress frontier denial operations and LOC security. Use Psyops to explain reduction of internal development programs due to internal security requirements. Protect people.	Combat requirements take priority. Other activities continue only after military defense has been assured Continue effort to gain popular support. Stricter administration of internal defense measures. Emphasis on larger unit operation; increased firepower, mobility, and support.
POPULACE AND RESOURCE CONTROL	Normally a police operation-augmented by armed forces as necessary. Repressive measures by police to destroy insurgent infrastructure. Protective measures by police to isolate the insurgent from loyal and neutral citizens. Strong frontier denial effort if a neighboring country is suspected of sponsoring or supporting the insurgent. Border security/counterinfiltration.	Normally a police operation with armed and paramilitary force support. Extend government controlled area. Operations in contested and insurgent controlled areas. Increased border security.	Police continue operations with heavy reliance on armed forces and paramilitary support. Relocate families. Resettle communities. Rationing. Expand resources control to critical material.
MILITARY/PARAMILITARY	Military Civic Action projects. Advisory assistance to paramilitary. Establishment of favorable military-civilian relationship. Psyops support of civil information effort. Assist police intell gence, resources and population control effort. Improve military defense posture.	Destruction and neutralization of insurgent tactical force becomes prime objective. Assist in expansion of government controlled areas. Conduct operations in contested or insurgent controlled areas. Support frontier operations. Organize and equip regular forces.	Tactical operations by larger segments. Increase size and capabilities of paramilitary force.

(Continued)

Table D-1 (Continued)

OBJECTIVES DURING VARIOUS PHASES OF INSURGENCY

Major Area	Phase I	Phase II	Phase III
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT Promote advances in the the economic, sociological, and political area. Maximum effort with priority to internal security and law and [illegible] The objective is improvement of individual attitudes, status, and standards of living.	Overall, integrated program of political, economic, and social action.	Reorientation of development programs, at all levels to support internal defense. Priority to government controlled areas. Other areas to extent feasible. Increase political development to extend government presence where it may not have existed previously. Economic development may decrease due to demand for resources by internal defense. Curtailment of economic efforts in areas where security cannot be assured. Sound development problem by displaced persons, relocated communities, militant factions, and former insurgents.	Political, economic, and social development oriented toward military or emergency.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	Develop appropriate skills and experience. Establish modern fiscal and monetary structure. Expand agriculture to create a degree of self-sufficiency and freedom. Develop economic infrastructure.	Shift emphasis for projects which support the internal defense effort--(1) those involved directly and (2) those which demonstrate government concern and ability to benefit the people. Shift toward short and mid-range projects with high visibility results. Emphasize projects which satisfy peoples immediate needs.	Continue short and mid-range projects wherever possible. Continue long-range projects in govern-controlled areas. Develop simplified, clear lines of authority. Extend government control through expansion of government controlled areas.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT	Delineate administrative responsibilities. Establish procedures for coordination of all programs prior to initiation. Improve judicial system. Establish procedures which permit the people to bring their problems to the governments.	Extend government presence downward. Demonstrate sympathy and respect for the individual at all governmental levels.	Increased military liaison at all levels.
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT	Improve health standards. Increase range and quality of individual skills Instill a personal sense of participation in a larger local and national effort.	Practical programs for dealing with displaced persons, relocation of communities, and the demands of militant factions and antagonistic minorities. Rehabilitate former insurgents or insurgent supporters. Continue Phase I efforts.	Same as Phase II.
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION	Develop socio-economic environment. Long and short-range projects. Priority to remote areas inhabited by ethnic or other minority groups susceptible to subversion.	Emphasize projects designed to prevent intensification of the insurgency. High-impact, high-visibility, short-term projects.	Same as II. May be reduced by military security to providing medical aid, and providing food and shelter to displaced persons.




Fig. D-1. Counterinsurgency/Insurgency.

The interactions and interfaces of the major elements are contained in Figure D-2. Military civic action relationships are accented. It is readily seen that military civic actions are a small part of the overall counterinsurgency effort and the relations between the United States, host country, its people, and the insurgents. These relationships and description of the activities of each element are described in Sections III and IV of the basic report.

4. Military Civic Action - Community Relations

Parenthetically, Section 502 of the Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, authorizes the use of U.S. defense articles and defense services for the realization of voluntary efforts of U.S. personnel in the less developed friendly foreign countries to advise or engage in military civic action.[Ref. 14] The "engage" military civic action pertains to those actions taken by U.S. forces in overseas areas in which United States units interface with the indigenous population in projects contributing to economic and social development. However, it is difficult to conceptualize how such projects could contribute to the second objective of military civic action--"serves to improve the standing of the military forces (referring to indigenous military forces) with the population."


In fact, U.S. military direct participation in projects may be counterproductive insofar as improving the standing of the host country military forces is concerned. There is a natural tendency on the part of U.S. Forces to go "whole hog" on such programs even to the extent of diverting supplies and equipment from other uses. This can easily result in the natural reaction on the part of the indigenous population typified by the question, "Why can't our own military do the same?"[Ref. 15] Perhaps participation by U.S. military in projects of this type might better be classed as community relations.

The JCS approved definition of community relations is:

> "Community relations (JCS)--The relationship between military and civilian communities."[Ref. 16]

Further description is found in the JCS approved definition of a community relations program: (Underlining added)

> "Community Relations Program (JCS)--That command function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the mission of a military organization with the public interest, and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance. Community relations programs are conducted at all levels of command, both in the United States and overseas, by military organizations having a community relations area of responsibility. Community relations programs include, but are not limited to, such activities as liaison and cooperation with associations and organizations and their local affiliates at all levels; Armed Forces participation in international, national, regional, State



* NOT NORMALLY A PART OF STABILITY OPERATIONS (INSURGENCY/COUNTERINSURGENCY) INCLUDED TO DEPICT CURRENT SEA SITUATION.

Fig. D-2. Military Civic Action in Insurgency/Counterinsurgency Context.

and local public events; installation open houses and tours, embarkations in naval ships, orientation tours for distinguished civilians; people-to-people and humanitarian acts; cooperation with government officials and community leaders; and encouragement of Armed Forces personnel and their dependents to participate in activities of local schools, churches, fraternal, social and civic organizations, sports and recreation programs, and other aspects of community life to the extent feasible and appropriate, regardless of where they are located."[Ref. 17]

This separation of community relations and military civic action is recognized by the U.S. Air Force. Air Force Regulation 55-7 contains the following caveat:

> "Do not confuse MCA programs with community relations or humanitarian programs carried out by Air Force personnel. AFR 190-20 explains the community relations programs, activities, and reporting procedures. In this connection, activities such as sponsorship of orphanages, small building projects, disaster relief, people-to-people programs, special events, and volunteer language teaching are considered to be a part of the Air Force community relations program."[Ref. 18]

Community relations programs such as those described in the Air Force Regulations can certainly be considered as contributing to economic and social development of the host country. They do not, however, satisfy the other dichotomous goal of military civic action, i.e., improvement of the standing of the military forces (referring to indigenous military) with the population.

5. Military Civic Action - Civil Affairs

Up to this point, military civic action has been discussed as a subset of counterinsurgency. Civic action is also subsumed under civil affairs which are defined as:

> "Civil Affairs (JCS,SEATO)--Those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs include, inter alia: a. Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and is normally covered by a treaty or other agreement, expressed or implied: b. Military government. The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory. See also civil affairs agreement, phases of military government."[Ref. 19] (Underlining added.)

It should be noted that this definition of civil affairs defines U.S. military interface with civil authorities and people. No mention is made in the definition of activities between the United States and host country military. Yet civic action, which is subsumed under civil affairs is by definition such a relationship.

6. U.S. and Host Country Interfaces

The host country element with which the U.S. military element interfaces varies with the type of action (see Figure D-3). A comparison of these interfaces will serve to further describe military civic action and its relationship with other U.S. host country (HC) relationships.

Using US-HC interface as a measure, military civic action involving HC military is more akin to psychological operations and public relations operations performed with the advice and assistance of the U.S. Advisory System than it is to civil affairs. This suggests that consideration should be given to separating the civic action function from civil affairs. This has, in effect, been done by the other services. The basic Air Force document on military civic action, AFR 55-7, contains no mention of civil affairs and treats military civic action as a separate entity.[Ref. 20] The same separation of military civic action and civil affairs is reflected in the Air Force Study Project CORONET POCADOT.[Ref. 21] In this project, civic action is closely allied with psychological operations. This study hypothesizes that civic action, to be successful, must be accomplished through persuasion, salesmanship, and other facets of psychological operations, and, since significant aspects of civic action are psychological in nature, many areas overlap. The acronym POCADOT reflects this hypothesis. (Psychological Operations and Civic Action Doctrine and, Operations and Training.)

Civic action, as an element of civil affairs, is also considered by the Army to be an element of community relations. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Field Service Regulations: Internal Defense and Development [Ref. 22] lists the following as one of the elements appropriate for inclusion in Community Relations programs overseas.

* * *

> "Undertaking civic action projects at the unit level. Care must be taken to assure that projects are coordinated and can be accomplished with the resources of the sponsoring unit."

The confusion surrounding the conflicting definitions of military civic action if further compounded by the separate considerations of military civic action and civil affairs in another section of FM 100-20 which lists military civic actions and civil affairs operations as being separate components of the U.S. Army's third mission of promoting stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations. [Ref. 23] This definition between military civic action and civil affairs is carried forward in the Army's current doctrine on institutional development in which civic action is a major component of institutional development in combination with internal security.[Ref. 24]




Fig. D-3. Interfaces, U.S. Military and Host Country Elements. Military Civic Action and Related Counterinsurgency Operations.

7. Military Civic Action As a Preventive Measure

As previously discussed, military civic action can be construed as having a dichotomy of objectives, short-range in improving the standing of the local military and long-range in social and economic development. Both of these objectives can be considered as creating conditions unfavorable to the emergence of an insurgency situation. As such, military civic action is a preventive measure. The preventive nature of military civic action is recognized by the U.S. Army in the following excerpt from FM 100-20. (Underlining added)

> "Military activities to promote stability and progress in the modernization process of developing nations have become the U.S. Army's third principle mission. They include military assistance operations, tactical operations, military civic actions, civil affairs operations, show of force deployments, peacekeeping missions, and other military operations designed to foster growth, and to forestall or resolve conflict in the political process within a nation."[Ref. 25]

The preventive nature of military civic action as a part of MAP also permeates the testimony of General Warren, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales, before the 1971 hearings before a subcommittee on the House Committee of Appropriations.[Ref. 26] Previous years' testimony includes the same concept.

The preventive nature of military civic action is also recognized by the U.S. Air Force. AFR 55-7, the basic Air Force document covering military civic action states:

> ". . . MCA (referring to military civic action), as a preventive measure, is an important means of improving social and economic conditions. . ."[Ref. 27]

8. Conclusions

The following features of military civic action as presently defined can be distilled from the foregoing discussion.

The target population consists of the country's own citizens.

Military civic action's primary objective is enhancement of the image of the indigenous armed forces with the population. This is a short-range objective under conditions of internal unrest, but is both short- and long-range in times of peace.

Military civic action's secondary objective is socioeconomic development in civilian communities. This is also the means by which the primary objective is to be achieved. Short-range or long-range aspects are governed by the stage of insurgency in which military civic actions are carried out.

Military civic action is one of several prescribed counterinsurgency measures.

Military civic action is employed as a preventive measure to forestall the development of unrest or insurgency.

Promoting and participating in the military civic action programs of allied and friendly countries is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

Activities involving socioeconomic development of foreign populations wherein the United States armed forces play a major role are similar to and would more properly be classified as community relations activities.

The primary role of the U.S. in the military civic action of other countries is to encourage and support the host-country military.

Current DOD doctrinal documents contain conflicting statements as to the functions and scope of military civic action, civil affairs, and community relations.

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Final Report OU-532
by Martin F. Massoglia, Philip S. McMullan, and Clarence N. Dillard
31 July 1971 (UNCLASSIFIED) pp. 280

U.S. Armed Forces are sponsoring military civic action in developing nations as an element of the Military Assistance Program. As part of the counterinsurgency effort similar programs are being conducted in Southeast Asia. Current doctrine prescribes two distinct types of military civic action; (1) joint U.S. and host country military efforts where U.S. participation is generally limited to advice and support, and (2) unilateral U.S. efforts such as programs currently being carried out in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and host country military civic action systems are described in terms of objectives, definition, principles, selection criteria, techniques, and evaluation. No dedicated system was found through which military civic action programs and projects are carried out. No formal evaluation or assessment procedures were identified during the research. The current JCS approved definition of military civic action engenders wide interpretation of what constitutes military civic action. A revised definition is presented for consideration. Evaluation systems and theory are analyzed for applicability to military civic action programs and projects. A suggested system for use in the evaluation of military civic action programs is described. (U)

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, FOREIGN AID, COUNTERINSURGENCY, INTERNAL DEFENSE, INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, INTERNAL CONFLICT, EVALUATION.

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Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

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1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
Research Triangle Institute P.O. Box 12194 Research Triangle Park, N.C. 27709	UNCLASSIFIED
	2b. GROUP

3. REPORT TITLE

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION (Evaluation of Military Techniques)

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Final Report

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

MARTIN F. MASSOGLIA
PHILIP S. MCMULLAN
CLARENCE N. DILLARD

6. REPORT DATE	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES	7b. NO OF REFS
July 1971	280	282

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	9a. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)
DAAH01-70-C-0950	FR OU-532
b. PROJECT NO. 9 G 20(21)	
c. ARPA Order 1384	9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)
d.	

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13. ABSTRACT

U.S. Armed Forces are sponsoring military civic action in developing nations as an element of the Military Assistance Program. As part of the counterinsurgency effort similar programs are being conducted in Southeast Asia. Current doctrine prescribes two distinct types of military civic action; (1) joint U.S. and host country military efforts where U.S. participation is generally limited to advice and support, and (2) unilateral U.S. efforts such as programs currently being carried out in Southeast Asia. The U.S. and host country military civic action systems are described in terms of objectives, definition, principles, selection criteria, techniques, and evaluation. No dedicated system was found through which military civic action programs and projects are carried out. No formal evaluation or assessment procedures were identified during the research. The current JCS approved definition of military civic action engenders wide interpretation of what constitutes military civic action. A revised definition is presented for consideration. Evaluation systems and theory are analyzed for applicability to military civic action programs and projects. A suggested system for use in the evaluation of military civic action programs is described. (U)

DD FORM 1 NOV 68 1473

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14. KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
Military Civic Action						
Military Assistance						
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Counterinsurgency						
Internal Defense						
Internal Development						
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Evaluation						

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Dear Sir:

Request that the enclosed addendum be made a part of the referenced final report.

Truly yours,

M. F. Massoglia
Project Leader

MFM/sp

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ADDENDUM
FR-OU-532
MILITARY CIVIC ACTION
Evaluation of Military Techniques
FINAL REPORT
July 1971

1. On page v under "Personnel and Training," change first subparagraph to read:

- The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide resident programs of instruction in military civic action in a Service School.

and add the following subparagraphs:

- Civic action instruction is included in the U.S. Navy Seabee Team Training Curriculum.
- The U.S. Navy has rigidly prescribed standards for selecting personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams.

2. On page V-5 under "C. U.S. Navy", add the following as the first subparagraph:

Within the U.S. Navy, training materials related to military civic action were uncovered at the U.S. Naval War College and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command.

Delete the first sentence of the second subparagraph which reads:

"With . . . civic action."

and add the following subparagraph at the end of paragraph C:

The Seabee Team Training Curriculum is designed to provide "purposeful activities through which Team members can gain the basic technical knowledge and practical skills required. The purpose of the curriculum is to prepare Team members for maximum usefulness when they deploy."(Ref. 16a. p. vii) A general outline of the curriculum is at Table V-1. Civic action concepts are included in the subunit, Fundamentals of Insurgency and Counter-Measures, which is a part of the Counterinsurgency and Intelligence instructional segment.

and add the inclosed Table V-1 as page V-5a.

3. On page V-11 under "2. Personnel Selection Procedures", add the following subparagraph:

The U.S. Navy has rigidly prescribed standards for selecting personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams (Ref. 40a).

4. On page V-13 under "J. Findings", change the first subparagraph to read:

The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide a formal resident program of instruction in military civic action at a Service School. A five-week . . . .

Add the following to the sixth subparagraph:

The U.S. Navy has rigidly prescribed standards for selecting personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams.

and add the following as the last subparagraph:

Civic action instruction is included in the U.S. Navy Seabee Team Training Curriculum.

5. On page V-14 under "REFERENCES" add the following reference:

16a. Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Seabee Team Training Curriculum. Undated.

6. On page V-16, add the following reference:

40a. COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT Instruction 5440.3, Subj. Seabee Teams, policies concerning establishment, training, planning and development of. Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Naval Construction Battalions, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. 18 August 1971.

7. On page VI-13 under "C. Reporting Systems", in second subparagraph on third line change "Appendix E" to paragraph G. 5, SECTION III.

8. On page IX-12 under "(5) Training Methods", change the second subparagraph to read:

> The U.S. Army is the only Service which was found to provide a formal resident program of instruction in military civic action at a Service School. A five-week. . . .

and add the following subparagraph:

> Civic action instruction is included in the U.S. Navy Seabee Team Training Curriculum.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION
Evaluation of Military Techniques
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
July 1971

1. On page 6, add the following to the sixth subparagraph:

. . .civic action duties. The U.S. Navy has rigidly prescribed standards for selecting personnel for assignment to Seabee Teams.

and change the seventh subparagraph to read:

. . .enlisted personnel from Service Schools. Civic action instruction is included in the U.S. Navy Seabee Team Training Curriculum.

Table V-1. GENERAL OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION

Unit of Instruction	Applicable Rating	Time
Indoctrination	All Team Members	1 week
Instructor Training	All Team Members	1 week
*Counterinsurgency and Intelligence	All Team Members	1 week
Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape	All Team Members	1 week
SEABEE Infantry Training	All Team Members	2 weeks
*Language Training	All Team Members	3 weeks
Equipment Operator Training	All Team Members	2 weeks
Builder Training	All Team Members	2 weeks
#Construction Mechanic Training	CM, EO, SW	1 week
#Planning and Estimating	OIC, AOIC, BU, EA	1 week
#Utilitiesman Training	UT, CE, HM	1 week
##Construction Electrician Training	CE, UT, CM, HM	1 week
##Steelworker Training	SW, BU, EO, EA	1 week
##Administration and Management	OIC, AOIC	1 week
Field Exercise	All Team Members	2 weeks
Pre Deployment	All Team Members	1 week
Physical Conditioning	All Team Members	1 hour daily
Field Safety and First Aid	All Team Members	As available
**Weapons Maintenance	Team Armorer	1 week
**Communication Equipment	Team Communicator	1 week
**Field Medical/Dental Training	Team Corpsman	3 weeks

Total of 18 Training Weeks per Team Member

*Denotes unit of instruction to be geared to the host country.

**Special training conducted for various Team members. In certain instances, personnel will miss regular training to attend special training.

#Conducted during the same week.

##Conducted during the same week.

Note: This Outline of Instruction is a minimum requirement for all Seabee Teams and does not preclude Team members attending other special training, e.g., Blasting, Well Drilling, for specific Team deployments.

Source: Seabee Team Training Curriculum